DRAFT - Comments warmly welcomed
ICLC 1999, Stockholm
Ideological ground and relevant interpretation in a cognitive
semantics
Peter Grundy University of Durham and Yan Jiang The
Hong Kong Polytechnic University
"The perceptual mechanisms - and perceptual salience itself
- are relevance oriented" (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/95:
152)
1 Introduction
In this paper, we show how the figure / ground gestalt
enables discourse to be interpreted in relation to the background
ideological context in which it occurs. We argue that the relation
of linguistic figure to contextual ground is indicated by discourse
markers which function as viewpoint shifters and space builders
enabling contextual ground to be represented in the mental space
model of cognitive semantics proposed by Fauconnier. Although
it is nowhere explicitly stated in Fauconnier's work, we suggest
that his proposals also reflect the figure / ground gestalt
in the characterization of the different cognitive functions associated
with Focus and Viewpoint spaces.
The data on which we draw are taken from President Clinton's national
television address of 18 August 1998 following his testimony to
the grand jury in the Monica Lewinsky affair. (See appendix for
the full text.) Our analysis provides cognitive plausibility for
the well motivated distinction made in relevance theory between
conceptual and procedural meaning (Blakemore 1987), and at the
same time shows how both linguistic expressions and non-linguistic
pragmatic conditions are represented in a single semantics.
Broadly, the intuition is that there is little (if anything) procedural
about the utterance
(1) Presidents have private lives.
But when Clinton says
(1') Even presidents have private
lives
the procedural use of even constrains the interpretation
of Presidents have private lives by restricting the set
of contexts which are called up. It is in relation to these contexts
that Presidents have private lives is both one amongst
a set of possible variables (i.e. many other things might have
been said) and a salient figure. In this way, procedural meaning
relates a new notion, a variable figure, to an established context,
the invariant ground (Talmy, 1978). This ground may well be, and
perhaps usually is, in part ideological. Given the obvious ideological
context in which Clinton's conduct appears unacceptable, it is
hardly surprising that his national television address exhibits
a very wide range of metalinguistic and metapragmatic procedural
encodings.
The principal focus of this paper is the implications for the
nature of a cognitive semantics posed by attempting to model data
containing a wide range of procedural forms with space shifting
and space building properties. Thus, a complete semantics for
the statement / utterance
(2) Indeed, I did have a relationship
with Ms Lewinsky that was not appropriate. In fact, it was wrong
would need to model at least how the contexts are constructed
which are oriented to by the maxim hedges indeed and in
fact, by emphatic did, by the higher level metalinguistic
predicates not appropriate and wrong, and by an
utterance that glosses the preceding utterance. In this paper,
we attempt to model the way in which such metapragmatic phenomena
relate conceptual meaning to background ideological context. Readers
expecting an ideological critique of a moment in US political
history will, therefore, be disappointed.
From a model theoretic point of view, this paper addresses the
issue of how non-linguistic elements are represented in cognitive
semantics. The work of Fauconnier and others is largely, although
not exclusively, concerned with showing how linguistic expressions
build mental spaces and how meanings are constructed in them.
In this paper, we will attempt to characterize the way in which
mental spaces may, and indeed must, include non-linguistic objects
which provide a ground in relation to the linguistic figures in
focus. It is the fact that the prevailing ideology is relevant
in interpreting the Clinton's statement rather than explicitly
encoded in it that make the data discussed here especially pertinent.
In the remainder of this paper, we will first delimit the semantic
/ pragmatic area under consideration and review the ways in which
the figure / ground gestalt has informed linguistic analysis.
We then will argue that this gestalt can also be productively
linked to the relevance theoretic notions of procedural and conceptual
encoding and that it is implicit in proposed mental space representation
types. After considering the status of cognitive constructions
in the light of the arguments presented in the earlier sections,
we will show how cognitive semantics allows for the construction
of the ideological contexts without which the interpretation of
the linguistic figure is at best problematic, and sometimes even
impossible.
2 Semantics, pragmatics and cognitive linguistics
The essential facts that a semantics of language production and
comprehension has to account for are that a speaker conveys Meaning
X in Context Y by means of Form Z and that (all being well) their
addressee/s process Form Z, supply Context Y and infer Meaning
X. Because the roles of speakers and their addressees are different
in that speakers start with a meaning to convey and addressees
end by recovering that meaning, pragmatic accounts have typically
focused either on production, as in Speech Act theory, or on understanding,
as in Grice's theory of conversational implicature and Sperber
& Wilson's work on relevance. In the cognitive literature,
Langacker at one point suggests that conceptualizing is identified
primarily with speakers and secondarily with addressees (1991:
318). As we shall see, there is a considerable advantage in a
proposal which recognizes the conceptualizing role of both speakers
and hearers.
Cognitive linguists typically reject the semantics / pragmatics
distinction on the grounds that logical semantics presupposes
a relation of language to an objective world which takes no account
of the language user's conceptualization. However, the logical
form of an utterance (Form Z) and the logical form of the inferred
meaning (Meaning X) are often, perhaps typically, unrelated. Thus
a speaker may use the form "I'm tired" to mean I
want to go to bed, I want you to come to bed, I
don't want to get out of bed, I want you to get out of
bed and make me a drink, etc.
Whilst cognitive semantics models pragmatic phenomena such as
presupposition and deixis and some cases of implicature, we suggest
that the new logical forms associated with (most) implicatures
are not so easily captured in this kind of cognitive construction.
In any case, it isn't appropriate to do this. If the relevance
theoretic notion that implicatures are deductive inferences is
right, it seems reasonable to restrict the role of mental space
constructions to providing all the information necessary for drawing
the deductive inference. This is consistent with the notion that
mental space configurations are mental models of discourse (Fauconnier,
1994: xxxix) and not that they represent the overall process of
discourse understanding. The absence of any mention of pragmatics
in the 'Final remarks' of Concept, Image, and Symbol and
the conclusion that "The only elements ascribable to a linguistic
system are semantic, phonological, and symbolic structures that
occur overtly as (parts) of linguistic expressions, schematizations
of such structures, and categorizing relationships" (Langacker,
1991: 343) also supports the suggestion that a cognitive semantics
is limited to specifying a meaning construction1
which includes both linguistic forms and pragmatically conditioned
contexts, but stops short of modelling the implicature whose propositional
form is entirely new.
In this paper, we argue that Form Z is a figure and that context
Y is a ground and that both exist as cognitive constructions,
but that Meaning X exists, not as a conceptualization, but in
rather the way that we would draw a conclusion about what to do
from looking through the window in the morning and seeing the
sun shine or the clouds gathering:
Cognitive construction Pragmatic inference
What is said Context of utterance What is meant by what is said
Weather observed Knowledge of weather types What to wear, etc.
Thus the purpose of cognitive construction is to resolve indeterminacy
and to provide a unique characterization of utterances and their
contexts: "Linguistic forms are (partial and underdetermined)
instructions for constructing interconnected domains with
internal structure" (Fauconnier, 1997: 35).
The distinction between Meaning X on the one hand and a cognitive
construction including Form Z (= Figure) and Context Y (= Ground)
on the other is reflected in current accounts of cognitive semantics.
In his summary of operating principles for natural language semantics,
Fauconnier (1997: 111) lists many relevant pragmatic conditions
(background knowledge, knowledge of activity types, beliefs, cultural
constructions, focusing devices, etc.), and in Mental Spaces
(1985/1994) he discusses presupposition and scalar implicatures,
but, significantly, none of these pragmatic processes results
in the construction of new logical forms of the kind associated
with Gricean particularized conversational implicature and with
relevance oriented implicatures in the sense defined in Sperber
& Wilson. In fact, meaning constructions are not either an
underlying form or a linguistic representation; nor are they a
representation of real or possible worlds, but rather a conceptualizer's
(i.e. non-truth conditional) way of relating language and the
world in which it occurs, and thus resolving the indeterminacy
associated with Form Z (Fauconnier, 1997: 36).
Resolving linguistic indeterminacy involves inference. For example,
Fauconnier (1985/94: 39ff) discusses the sentence The President
changes every seven years, and points out that the expression
The President will have different values in different places
or organizations at different times. Moreover, The President
could equally be a referential description referring metonymically
to the President's mood, for example, or an attributive description
(i.e. whoever is President). Each different determination
of the expression The President is also likely to be linked
to a different determination of the expression changes.
In order to illustrate the argument that pragmatic phenomena which
preserve propositional form are part of mental space meaning constructions
and that relevance oriented implicatures are not, we might consider
the case of
(1') Even presidents have private
lives.
In the Gricean account, even would be treated as a conventional
implicature whose literal meaning can be distinguished from its
pragmatic function - which is to suggest a scale of individuals
who have private lives and advise the hearer that presidents are
at one end of this scale. In mental space terms, the scale is
part of a larger meaning construction which also represents the
ideological context and the different attitudes people are assumed
to hold to those at different points on the scale. However, the
further inference drawn from what is said and the background knowledge
invoked or, strictly, constrained by even will be an implicature
with a new propositional form, maybe something along the lines
of What I do in my own time is my business not yours, and certainly
doesn't interfere with my ability to do a good job as President.
Sperber & Wilson see this implicature as a deductive inference
which follows from the premises represented in the cognitive construction.2
Although we agree that the distinction
between semantics and pragmatics as traditionally drawn is not
motivated, we argue that cognitive semantics represents everything
that is necessary to deduce Meaning X from Form Z, but not Meaning
X itself.
3 The figure / ground gestalt in linguistic analysis
In this section, we review the way in which the figure / ground
gestalt has been applied in linguistic analysis. The review
will show how pervasive the figure / ground relation is in linguistic
representation. We will argue additionally that linguistic structure
and relevant non-linguistic context are equally accounted for
in this way.
Essentially, figures are associated with discreteness, shape and
singularity, whereas diffuseness is the principal characteristic
associated with ground. This insight is owed the pioneering experimental
work of Rubin (1915/1958) in the field of visual perception. What
we 'see' is the figure. We assume that the contour marking the
boundary of figure and ground belongs to the figure and not to
the ground against which the figure is, consequently, profiled.
Figures give an impression of solidity, closeness and density
of colour relative to ground. The ground appears to continue uninterrupted
behind the figure. It is the figure and not the ground which is
remembered. However, without ground there can be no figure.
In relation to the 'actual' world, these perceptions are, strictly
speaking, illusions. They are, therefore, direct reflections of
cognitive processes which impose, even on a flat surface such
as the page you are now reading, the impression that some parts
of what you see, i.e. the graphemic symbols, are closer to you
than the background (we cannot avoid the metaphor) on which they
are printed. The salient shapes to which your attention is drawn
are those of the symbols and not of the background page. Moreover,
you can easily reproduce the symbols, but would have immense difficulty
reproducing the shape which shares a common contour with them.
The figure / ground gestalt has been appealed to at a number
of linguistic levels. One of the earliest is the Prague School's
structuralist characterisation of poetic language, and especially
the work of Mukarovsky.3
For Mukarovsky, poetic language consists of the "foregrounding"
of phonological, syntactic or even semantic features, whose resulting
prominence tends to push meaning into the background (Freeman,
1970: 43ff). Thus the formal means of expression rather than what
is expressed is the salient figure: what is drawn to our attention
in the case of poetic writing is not what is conveyed, but how
it is conveyed. Mukarovsky's insight therefore lays the foundations
for Jakobson's functionalist definition of poetic language as
"projecting the principle of equivalence from the axis of
selection into the axis of combination" (1960: 358).
Many of the later, more overt appeals to the figure / ground gestalt
focus on the intra-sentential structural properties of language.
For Langacker, figure designates the foregrounded entity in the
trajector / landmark profile of a grammatical relation, such as
that of subject and predicate (1991: 301). As the term trajector
suggests, the figure is dynamic rather than static. In Talmy's
account of complex sentences (1978: 628ff), figure is seen as
a variable in relation to a ground provided in the subordinate
clause. Thus clauses introduced by after and before,
for example, and phrases introduced by during provide the
ground, or presupposition, in relation to which the rest of the
sentence is seen as a figure. This assertion-as-figure / presupposition-as-ground
hypothesis is also taken up by Levinson (1983: 180).
At the level of the word or phrase, Hanks (1992) argues that deictics
uniquely capture the relation of referential figure to indexical
ground in a single linguistic expression. Thus what a demonstrative
points to as a figure in an expression like you or this
year is related to the indexical ground or deictic anchoring
point of the speaker (and sometimes of the hearer) at the time
when and in the place where the utterance occurs.
Each of these accounts generalizes a perceptual theory to the
understanding of language and shows how salience, a relation of
figure to ground, is basic to language. The positions adopted
by Talmy and, especially, Hanks strongly suggest that the structures
of language must reflect the cognitive structure of the mind in
this respect.
Wallace (1982) attempts to draw together and expand on the considerable
body of existing work on grammatical categories, which, he argues,
demonstrate figure / ground polarity. Thus languages have a range
of grammatical forms (perfective / imperfective, eventive / non-eventive,
etc.) which are predominantly oriented to expressing figure /
ground relations. Wallace therefore invokes the figure / ground
gestalt to explain discoursal phenomena: a speaker has
the means at each point in a discourse to foreground some element
of propositional meaning as figure in relation to some other element
as ground.
These and other like accounts may be seen as demonstrations of
the linguistic reflexes of a fundamental processing strategy in
which salience is perceived as a relation of figure to ground.
In these accounts, ground is typically represented as a co-textual
phenomenon (Langacker, Talmy) or as the linguistic option which
is not chosen (Mukarovsky, Wallace). By contrast, Hanks treats
context as the ground which enables the identification of the
demonstratum by virtue of their relatedness. Langacker
also acknowledges this type of contextual ground, stating that
it includes the "speech event, its participants, and its
immediate circumstances (such as the time and place of speaking)"
(1991: 318).
The table below summarizes these accounts of how figure / ground
relations have been invoked in linguistic analysis:
Level Author Figure which is Ground against which the
remembered Figure stands out
Word/phrase Hanks Deictic reference Deictic origo
Sentence Langacker Trajector Landmark
Sentence Talmy Content of asserted Content of presupposed
sentence sentence
Discourse Mukarovsky Form of poetic text Meaning of poetic text
Discourse Wallace (E.g.) a perfective in an (E.g.) the imperfective
imperfective discourse discourse surrounding a
perfective item
Discourse Langacker Speech act4 The speech event, its
participants and its
immediate circumstances
In this paper we extend the
application of the figure / ground gestalt to show how
the broader contextual, and particularly the ideological, ground
is relevant in processing foregrounded linguistic phenomena.
4 Procedural and conceptual encoding and the figure / ground
gestalt
So far as we know, encodings of propositional attitude have not
previously been discussed in relation to the figure / ground gestalt,
despite their roles in limiting the ground in relation to which
the figure appears salient.
Expressions of propositional attitude are a long recognized category
and include, for example, hedges and intensifiers on Gricean maxims.
Thus, expressions such as I'm told, all I know is that,
by the way and I mean advise the hearer of the extent
to which the speaker is committed to the well-foundedness, informativeness,
relevance and perspicuity, respectively, of the propositions to
which they are attached. They show speaker viewpoint and advise
the hearer how to take what is in focus. In Fauconnier's model
of cognitive semantics, as discourse unfolds, mental spaces are
constructed, each of which relates to one or more items in the
propositional content of utterances. Whilst new spaces are introduced
to reflect changes of propositional notions such as time and location,
propositional attitude is indicated by the space taken as viewpoint.
Meta-talk is by no means limited to hedges and intensifiers on
Gricean maxims. Schiffrin (1987) draws attention to a range of
phenomena, including higher level predicates such as right,
wrong, for example, and like, which modify
propositions in the text and thus show the speaker's evaluation
of the stated proposition. And in his more general work on reflexivity,
Lucy (1993) brings together deictics, reported speech, gloss,
mention and a range of other phenomena where it is possible to
distinguish propositional description from talk about talk. All
these expressions of propositional attitude invoke ground in relation
to which the propositions to which they are attached or on which
they comment may be seen as figures.
As well as these meta-talk phenomena, there is another important
category, usually known as discourse particles, whose function
has been especially productively studied within the relevance
theoretic framework, and particularly in the ground-breaking work
of Blakemore (1987). This has led to a recognition of the distinction
between conceptual and procedural meaning. Utterances typically
contain both conceptual and procedural encodings, or, as Wilson
and Sperber put it, "information about the representations
to be manipulated, and information about how to manipulate them"
(1993: 2). This second, computational, type of encoding (i.e.
information about how to manipulate representations) is held to
constrain the interpretation of conceptual meaning by limiting
the available ground in relation to which it is to be interpreted.
Whereas to say
(1) Presidents have private lives
is to encode a conceptual meaning, to say
(1') Even Presidents have private
lives
is to encode not only a conceptual meaning but also to constrain
the background context in relation to which the conceptual meaning
is to be interpreted by implying that the explicated proposition
that Presidents of the United States such as the speaker are
entitled to extra-marital relationships (inferred from "Presidents
have private lives") would be low on a scale of expectability
given the prevailing ideology which constitutes the contextual
ground. It is in relation to this prevailing ideology that Presidents
have private lives is both one amongst a set of possible variables
and a salient figure. In this way, procedural meaning relates
a new notion, a variable figure, to an established context, the
invariant ground. This ground may well be, and perhaps usually
is, in part ideological. In Sperber & Wilson (1986/95), the
relevance of the variable figure is guaranteed, but is only proved
by the recovery of the appropriate ground, which in this case
is made possible by even.
Put simply, it is much more difficult to know in what way the
would-be figure Presidents have private lives could be
relevant (i.e. what might be meant by uttering it) when recovery
of the relevant ground is not triggered by the procedural even.
Thus procedural encodings provide the hearer with an indication
of how to limit the potentially infinite set of contexts in relation
which Meaning X is to be inferred. They therefore enable a hearer
to recover the ground in relation to which an utterance can be
a figure in a more economical way.
For these reasons, we suggest that Blakemore's relevance theoretic
distinction between conceptual and procedural meaning should also
be considered in relation to the figure / ground gestalt.
And given the distinctly ideological context in which Clinton's
conduct appears unacceptable, it is hardly surprising that his
national television address exhibits a very wide range of metalinguistic
and metapragmatic procedural phenomena which act as space shifters
and space builders for pragmatically conditioned material, thus
establishing viewpoints not set up in the meaning construction
built from previous discourse.
Finally, it turns out that the figure / ground representational
phenomena described in this section parallel Hanks's three-part
Denotatum type - Relational type - Indexical type categorization
of the figure / ground properties of deictics discussed in the
previous section. The table below includes three representative
examples from Hanks's original table showing the relational structures
of deictic reference with respect to figure (Denotatum type) and
ground (Indexical type) (1992: 52):
Form Denotatum type Relational type Indexical type
this = "the one Proximal to me"
here = "the region Immediate to you"
now = "the time Immediate to this utterance"
Both higher-level predicates such
as not appropriate and the relational function of even
establish a relation between figure and ground comparable to that
encoded in demonstratives:
Figure Relation Ground
(Focus space) (Connector) (Viewpoint space)
the one Proximal to me (this)
Clinton's conduct Not appropriate to the cultural context
P has private life <relator = even> A 1
, A
2, A 3 ,...
have private lives
5 Mental space representations
of figure / ground phenomena: the case of deixis
The question then is how a cognitive semantics represents the
relative salience which is a fundamental feature of perceptual
cognition in general (Rubin, 1915/1958), and which, according
to Wallace, determines the very linguistic categories available
to us. We suggest that Fauconnier's definitions of Focus space
as the space "where meaning is currently being constructed"
(1997: 72) and Viewpoint as "the space from which others
are accessed and structured or set up" (1997: 49) precisely
allows for the representation of a figure / ground relation. This
is hardly surprising since cognitive linguists seek to show how
linguistic expressions evoke conceptual structures as natural
reflections of such cognitive abilities as grounding, i.e. relating
language (and other) events to the perspective of "the conceptualizer
[who] chooses to construe the situation and portray it for expressive
purposes" (Langacker, 1991: 315).
A detailed proposal for representing ground in cognitive constructions
is made by Grundy & Jiang for deictics. They suggest a re-analysis
of an example discussed by Rubba5
in order to account for the anaphoric as well as the deictic reading
of this in the utterance
(3) ...or the same with when I
go to, like, a Spanish part of
town, you know, see everything in Spanish, and I say, well,
you know, this is not where I belong
They propose that when this arises in Focus space, the
index associated with the demonstrative must either find an antecedent
in the same Focus space as itself, or, where this default mechanism
fails, float up to Viewpoint space (by analogy with presupposition
float) where it acts as a space builder for pragmatically conditioned
material. How then might we get either a deictic or an anaphoric
reading of this in this example?
In Rubba's account there are four spaces:
- a Base space containing the utterance situation, i.e. speaker,
hearer, etc.
- a Time space opened by WHEN I go
- a Location space opened by TO like a Spanish part
of town see everything in Spanish..
- and a Quotation space opened by SAY for well
you know this is not where I belong.
When the Location space is Viewpoint and the Quotation space is
Focus, this cannot find an antecedent in Focus and is therefore
treated as deictic. When this is the case, according to Grundy
& Jiang's proposal, the deictic index floats up to Viewpoint.
When the index reaches Viewpoint, it builds a new mental space
to be filled with pragmatic material which the space-building
index causes to be recovered from encyclopedic knowledge, processing
of local context, etc. and which constitutes the interpretation6.
This proposal acknowledges that a deictic figure necessarily first
occurs in the Focus space, but that its interpretation crucially
depends on the indexical ground which will be in Viewpoint space.
Index-instantiation thus becomes a matter of choosing the relevant
ground among the available spaces that serve as potential alternate
grounds. Thus the indexical element of a demonstrative is space
building just in case it cannot co-index with a linguistic item
in a Focus space, and a deictic interpretation is then assigned.
In addition, treating indexes as space builders provides us with
a principled way of showing how non-sentential pragmatic material
is incorporated in mental spaces.
Although Rubba does not consider the possibility of an anaphoric
interpretation, Grundy & Jiang suggest that the uses of the
procedurals "you know" and "well" in Rubba's
example shift the Viewpoint back to the Base. In this case, the
index attaches to a co-referential item "the Spanish part
of town" in the enlarged Focus which includes Rubba's time,
location and quotation spaces. We believe that this is the preferred
reading and that the deictic reading is hard (but not impossible)
to recover.
The ease with which these two interpretations are modelled seems
to show the advantage of mental space theory, which captures in
a maximally economical manner the relatedness of deictic and anaphoric
reference by showing how an index is either instantiated into
a contextually inferred interpretation (deictic reference) or
attached to an antecedent item in the linguistic co-text (anaphoric
reference), depending on the space taken as ground or Viewpoint.7
This is a radical proposal for two reasons: Firstly, the new space
created is built by the index, i.e. the deictic element of a demonstratum.
Secondly, a new space is built from Viewpoint, contrary to the
standard position that new spaces can only be built, for apparently
obvious reasons, from Base or Focus spaces (Cutrer 1994, in Fauconnier
1997: 83). However, Grundy & Jiang's proposal seems intuitively
suited to a mental space theory which allows for the incorporation
of not only linguistic but also pragmatically conditioned contextual
material. Indeed Grundy & Jiang argue precisely that the default
for a demonstrative, such as this, is that it should find
an linguistic antecedent. But where the default interpretation
is impossible, the demonstrative is a space builder for non-linguistic
material which is necessarily in the viewpoint of the speaker,
a viewpoint which constitutes the deictic origo in relation
to which the figure is in focus.
The intuitively persuasive notion that linguistically filled spaces
are built from Focus and Base spaces and that pragmatically conditioned
spaces are built from Viewpoint will turn out to be an important
principle in accounting for data contained in Clinton's address.
At the beginning of this section, we cited Fauconnier's definition
of Viewpoint as "the space from which others are accessed
and structured or set up" (1997: 49). We are now in a position
to expand this definition so that the spaces accessed and structured
from Viewpoint include a construction of the conceptualizer's
understanding of the relevant context and the instantiation of
pragmatically conditioned structure. The whole mental space lattice
then invites a further conceptualizing inference which results
in the new propositional form of a relevance oriented implicature.
6 Instruction in Fauconnier's cognitive semantics
In his proposals for a cognitive semantics, Fauconnier posits
a restricted set of frames and space types sufficient to represent
all possible meaning potentials: "What human grammar reflects
is a small number of general frames and space builders which can
apply to organize the very large numbers of situations that we
encounter or imagine" (1997: 190). The generative position
in which an autonomous syntax is semantically interpreted to give
a context-free truth-conditional meaning, which is itself subject
to pragmatic processes resulting in a context-bound meaning is
rejected (1997: 34, 111). Rather, knowledge of language involves
knowing "how to apply partial grammatical instructions in
context to provide appropriate cognitive configurations"
(1997: 189). As in Relevance Theory, this definition treats grammar
as less than fully determining of structure, recognizes the computational
nature of grammatical instructions, and acknowledges the role
of context in determining meaning. However, because our knowledge
of the way in which context contributes to the elaboration of
constructions is tacit and because, unlike grammatical instructions,
context lacks any kind of formal instructions for its recovery
or specification beyond the constraining effect of discourse particles,
precise proposals for how context is included in a semantics are
not easy to decide.
Cognitive semantics, therefore, treats sentences as sets of "(underspecified)
instructions for cognitive construction at many different levels"
(1997: 40). It seems to us that there will need to be two kinds
of instructions: those which enable us to specify the cognitive
configurations that relate linguistic material, and those which
specify how frames and other kinds of schemata or ICMs necessary
for the successful recovery of meaning in context are related
to the cognitive configurations containing linguistic material.
Cognitive construction takes place at a level which is neither
a representation of language nor a representation of models of
the world:
"constructions at level C ...
are a function of the language expressions that come in, the
state of the cognitive construction when the language expression
arises, and the context of the discourse; this includes social
framing, pragmatic conditions such as relevance, and real-world
events perceived by the participants" (Fauconnier, 1997:
36).
Even though space building is driven by linguistic information,
the spaces themselves are not linguistically filled, because
they are by nature part of a mental representation or "language
thought" in the sense of Pinker (1994). Thus the mental
space built by the linguistic content of the utterance is only
the initial cognitive context, and can be enriched by factors
in the non-linguistic context which are cognitively salient.
New elements are added to spaces "by linguistic expressions
(e.g., indefinites) or by non-linguistic pragmatic conditions
(e.g., objects which are salient in the interaction that produces
the discourse)" (Fauconnier, 1997: 39).
There is always a Base space or starting point for the construction,
a Focus space in which meaning is currently being constructed,
and a Viewpoint space "from which others are accessed and
structured or set up" (Fauconnier, 1997: 49). These spaces
may be, and typically will be, reassigned as the discourse unfolds.
There are a number of processes which ensure that structuring
in one space is accessible in another. The purpose of these representations
is to constrain potentially available interpretations to that
intended, or assumed to be intended, by the speaker.
Since new spaces may not be built
from Viewpoint (except when co-incidentally it is also Base or
Focus space), its function may appear somewhat underspecified.
However, there is clear intuitive support for the notion of Viewpoint,
which is motivated as a construct by the way in which natural
language sentences express attitudes to and instructions for manipulating
the propositions which they contain. It is for this reason that
we propose that spaces built from Viewpoint should be available
for non-linguistic pragmatic conditions, often in the form of
ICMs, as motivated in our earlier discussion of deictics. Despite
stating that space building is "determined by linguistic
and non-linguistic features of the ongoing discourse and discourse
setting" (1997: 131) and hinting that matching allows for
various pragmatic parameters for a single cognitive construction
(1997: 143), Fauconnier provides only a limited number of illustrations
of the operation of space building in relation to the non-linguistic
pragmatic conditions without which the linguistic expressions
are not properly interpretable.
The remainder of this paper, therefore, focuses on the cognitive
semantic treatment of discourse particles, which in Relevance
Theory are taken as instructions for accessing a limited (i.e.
processable) set of contexts which prove the relevance (i.e. interpretability)
of the conceptual content of the utterance.
In Mappings in Thought and Language, Fauconnier mentions
a number of discourse particles and discusses their function:
"words like even, but, already ... typically
signal implicit scales for reasoning and argumentation" (1997:
40), and "words like therefore signal deductive relationships
that may not have been explicitly stated" (1997: 70).8
The essential fact to be taken into account in the case of even
is that the speaker wishes to convey to the hearer that the proposition
to which it is attached is at the end of a scale9
of expectability, even
a , even b
, even c
..even n
. The cognitive construction must
also include ICMs which provide background knowledge about the
set of paradigmatic cases of which even P is an end-of-scale
member. This is the viewpoint in relation to which the proposition
in focus is understood. Taken together, proposition and context
constitute the premises which yield Meaning X as a deductive inference.
In the case of
(1) Presidents have private lives
no constraint on relevance-making contexts is available and the
hearer will have a hard time drawing the appropriate inference
as to what was meant by what was said, unless the discourse context
provides very considerable help. This is because the hearer lacks
a sufficiently rich perspective or viewpoint. However, in the
case of Clinton's utterance
(1') Even Presidents have private
lives
the existence of a pragmatic scale is suggested to the hearer
containing sets of representative individual referents who "have
private lives". It is this ground which enables the hearer
to infer what Clinton meant by what he said. The question then
is how to represent this scale with its particularly interesting
ideological content in the cognitive construction.
This leads naturally to the related question of how frames or
schemata are represented in meaning constructions. Fauconnier
discusses the sentence
(4) In France, Watergate wouldn't
have done Nixon any harm
at some length. Much of his work on this example addresses issues
of counterfactual representation, which are not directly relevant
to the issue under consideration here. However, in his discussion,
Fauconnier states that the background knowledge required to make
sense of the sentence "is not in any way conveyed by it"
and suggests that when the sentence is processed, "the space
builder in France ... is going to bring in two new spaces.
First it beings in a space G (as in Gallic) corresponding to relevant
partial background information about the French political system"
(1997: 107).
It seems to us that such data are not a special case at all. The
relevance theoretic construct of explicature enables us to enrich
"In France" to a full propositional form something like
In French political culture and "Watergate" to
a full propositional form something like The Watergate break-in
in which Republican Party officials were instructed to burgle
the office of their Democrat opponents and steal information from
them. Metonymies such as these occur in most utterances. Because
the metonymic items are conceptual encodings and do not invoke
pragmatic contexts beyond those required to elaborate them, they
do not require the same kind of cognitive construction as those
triggered by procedural encodings (such as even) that invoke,
or, more accurately, constrain, contexts. In fact, metonymies
are more comparable to deictics - at Viewpoint the metonymic 'index'
is instantiated in an interpretation of the kind suggested above
for "In France" and "Watergate".
How would this work, then?
Imagine an 'index' associated with expressions as a space builder
for ICMs which the speaker as conceptualizer supposes that the
hearer as conceptualizer can recover.10
Thus explicatures of linguistic representations are constructed
at Viewpoint where encyclopedic knowledge is recovered in the
form of ICMs to resolve the indeterminacy of the meanings being
structured in Focus space.
A plausible model might see a mental space configuration for Even
Presidents have private lives along these lines:
Base space (also, co-incidentally, the Viewpoint space):
- the discourse context (following Rubba), including Clinton and
his television audience
Focus space = Figure:
- Presidents have private lives (conceptual content)
- Even (procedural content); an instruction to build new
structure from Viewpoint which elaborates the scale associated
with even
Viewpoint space = Ground (also, co-incidentally, the Base space):
- through access to relevant ICMs, the conceptual content in Focus
is explicated or enriched to give the full propositional form
Presidents of the USA such as the speaker are entitled to extra-marital
relationships)
- the existence of a paradigmatic scale even a
, even b
, even c
..even n
- ICMs which provide background knowledge about the set of paradigmatic
cases
- a consequential inference as to what it means to be at the end
of scale of expectability (perhaps in the form of an ICM).
This mental model then provides the premises for a deductive inference
which is guaranteed to produce the most relevant way of understanding
what is meant by saying Even Presidents have private lives.
There is nothing especially remarkable about linguistic ostention
in this respect. Deciding meaning, like deciding to overtake when
driving a car, is a decision taken in relation to a mental model
constructed as a representation of all the relevant data.
7 Cognitive pragmatics and President Clinton's television address
President Clinton's address of 18 August 1998 was printed in The
Times of 19 August under the headline "Reading between
the lines of TV address". The address itself was prefaced
by the sub-heading "What Clinton said". To the right
of the address, the sub-heading which prefaced the interpretation
offered by The Times was "What Clinton meant".
Although The Times' interpretation was concerned only with
such matters of conceptual content as, for example, the significance
of the distinction between "legally accurate" answers
on the one hand and not having "volunteer[ed] information"
on the other, it is our opinion that another important aspect
of "What Clinton meant" can only be captured by understanding
his awareness of the significance of the ideological ground constructed
by his use of procedural space builders and meta-talk in general.
It is this awareness which we now explore.
Most attempts to model the cognitive construction of utterances
work with examples like
(4) In France, Watergate wouldn't
have done Nixon any harm
which are straightforward encodings of conceptual meaning requiring
only the kind of explication suggested earlier. This contrasts
with Clinton's utterance,
(2) Indeed, I did have a relationship
with Ms Lewinsky that was not appropriate. In fact, it was wrong
which contains several overt comments on the proposition that
he had a relationship with Ms Lewinsky: indeed and in
fact and the emphatic use of the epenthetic auxiliary did
advise us of the extent to which the propositional information
is to be regarded as reliable; the higher level predicates not
appropriate and wrong are speaker comments on the proposition;
in addition, the repair "In fact, it was wrong" is evidence
of the speaker's belief that he could not get away with styling
the relationship "not appropriate".
The question then is how mental space construction is determined
by meta-talk and how it represents the pragmatic background evoked
by the speaker's realisation that the predicate "not appropriate"
is inadequate to the ideological context in which it occurs.
Let's begin with considering how a an utterance like
(5) I had a relationship with
Ms Lewinsky that was not appropriate
might be represented as a mental space configuration. Following
Rubba, we begin with a Base space representing the discourse context,
including President Clinton and his audience. A new space, which
we will call R, is then opened and contains I had a relationship
with Ms Lewinsky. A further comment space, which we will call
C, is then opened. C inherits the material in R by optimization,
or downward spreading, and adds the higher-level predicate which
was not appropriate.
The issue now is how this construction differs from the construction
for
(5') Indeed, I did have a relationship
with Ms Lewinsky that was not appropriate.
Earlier we suggested that discourse particles such as you know
and well shift the Viewpoint back to the Base. As the Viewpoint
is already the Base space in the example under consideration,
this doesn't enable us to distinguish Indeed-R from R.
Moreover, there is a distinction between the discourse context
as represented in the Base and the Clinton's perception of the
discourse context. We therefore suggest a modification to allow
such particles to open up a new Viewpoint space which inherits
the conceptualizer's view of the initial discourse context based
on ICMs from Base and represents the conceptualizer's view of
the discourse context at the moment of conceptualization. Thus
we can distinguish the R version of this utterance in which Base
is also Viewpoint from the Indeed-R version in which Base
and Viewpoint are distinct spaces. But how can we justify such
structure building, apart from by appeal to its intuitive rightness?
Grundy & Jiang (1998) discuss the representation of anomalous
sentences which are typically found as public address messages
in Hong Kong, such as
(6) Last bus had departed
and
(7) This passage was closed
They argue that what makes them anomalous in the contexts in which
they are encountered is that it is impossible to recover a reference
time in relation to which the events are located. They then try
to show how mental space configurations are able to represent
this anomaly. Their suggestion is that the index associated with
the deictic tense form acts as a space builder. In non-anomalous
utterances such as
(6') When we arrived, the last
bus had (already) departed
this space contains linguistic material, i.e. when we arrived,
and is the Viewpoint or ground in relation to which the figure,
the last bus had departed, is in Focus. The space builder
is therefore an index, the deictic element of the tense, which,
in non-anomalous utterances, will be instantiated in a linguistic
form such as when we arrived to provide a ground or reference
time in relation to which (6') is interpretable. Their characterization
of an anomalous utterance such as (6) is, therefore, that there
is a Viewpoint space opened by a pragmatic index which remains
empty of linguistic material.
We now wish to appeal to this kind of cognitive construction as
a way of accounting for the difference between R and Indeed-R
type utterances, and at the same time to refine Grundy and Jiang's
characterization of pragmatic anomaly: an anomaly occurs when
a Viewpoint space is built and remains empty of either linguistic
or pragmatically conditioned material. This is illustrated in
the case of (6), which is anomalous when displayed as a public
address message at a bus station (as observed originally), but
which poses no such problems as the opening sentence of a novel,
precisely because the reader is able to supply sufficient pragmatically
conditioned material to provide a reference time. Moreover, the
sentence
(6") The last bus had already
departed
isn't anomalous, again because already acts as a space
builder for the Viewpoint space which the hearer or reader is
able to fill with pragmatically conditioned material.
We therefore suggest that expressions like indeed in (5')
are space builders for a Viewpoint space which contains the speaker's
apparent representation of the discourse context inherited from
the Base space at the moment of conceptualization. This space
enables the hearer to reconstruct the speaker's viewpoint of,
or perspective on, the space R currently being constructed - in
this case that the speaker wants to assure the hearer that what
is asserted in R is reliable information. Emphatic did
works in the same kind of way and opens a further Viewpoint space,
again filled with pragmatically recovered material. Although it
is sometimes possible for conflicting viewpoints to be constructed,
in this case the Viewpoint spaces opened by indeed and
did offer consistent perspectives on the proposition in
the space being constructed.
The material in the new Viewpoint space 'I' (for indeed)
will constrain the interpretation of the linguistic material in
R and as a result enable the hearer to draw a conclusion as to
what the speaker means by uttering R. We assume that indeed
is therefore also a space builder for an ideological context recovered
as an ICM in relation to which the speaker wishes to mediate his
utterance of R. The distinction between the B context and the
I context is that the I context contains the knowledge the speaker
has of Base which is essentially ideological. Thus it is more
difficult to interpret I had a relationship with Ms Lewinsky
than it is to interpret I did have a relationship with Ms Lewinsky,
and more difficult to interpret I did have a relationship with
Ms Lewinsky than it is to interpret Indeed, I did have
a relationship with Ms Lewinsky.
Knowing that he cannot get away with describing this relationship
as "not appropriate", Clinton then constructs a further
Viewpoint space opened by "In fact" and a further Comment
space to include "was wrong", as well as a Focus that
inherits the antecedent structure in respect of which "It"
is an anaphor. The space opened by "In fact" is filled
with a slightly different speaker conceptualization of the ideological
ground from that already opened by "Indeed", and it
is with respect to his perception of this new ground that the
speaker assures his audience of the status of his representation,
"it was wrong", as a well-founded comment.
The same kinds of analysis are appropriate to the other examples
of meta-talk in Clinton's address. Consider the case of
(8) Still, I must take full responsibility
for all my actions..
Fauconnier (1985/94: 114ff) suggests that the function of the
arguably more propositional use of still in the apodosis
of (counterfactual) conditionals is to cancel an implicature that
would otherwise have arisen on the basis of expectability. Thus
If A, B
gives rise to the expectation that If A were to occur,
then so would B. Thus the unexpected case
If A, B
is often metalinguistically marked, to give
If A, still B.
(8) follows the self-congratulatory statement, "I answered
their questions truthfully, including questions about my private
life, questions no American citizen would ever want to answer."
The expectation of further statements in this vein, presumably
constructed from Viewpoint as a kind of template for the new meaning
to be constructed in Focus space, presupposes the same Base and
Viewpoint. We, therefore, suggest that the procedural encoding,
still, cancels this template and reassigns the separate
Base, Viewpoint and Focus spaces of the preceding construction
so that they are now understood as Base (and, consequently, Viewpoint)
in relation to which a contrasting new meaning will be structured
in Focus space.
As you know in
(9) As you know, in a deposition
in January, I was asked questions..
returns the Viewpoint to Base and the ideological context in which
the speaker is the President of the United States and not the
person who in the previous Focus space has just stated "I
did not volunteer information".
Although but has the same truth function as and,
it implies a contrast between the conjoined stretches of discourse.
Fauconnier treats but as an explicit warning against a
likely implicature (1985/94: 110, 113), and in some cases against
the expectation of optimization. Thus in
(10) But I told the grand jury
today and I say to you now that..
the previous Focus space has become a Viewpoint space for the
materials being constructed in (10). The expectation derived from
Clinton's admission in the previous sentence that what he had
done "constituted a critical lapse in judgement and a personal
failure on my part for which I am solely and completely responsible"
sets up a template for a further admission. This template is cancelled
by but, and the previously constructed spaces reassigned
as a new Base, and therefore Viewpoint. The expectation templates
cancelled by still and but are constructions based
on ideological perspectives which Clinton wishes to challenge.
The factive know in
(11) I know that my public comments..
opens a space for a presupposition which reflects the ideological
perspective (the President holds) of the President's audience.
In
(12) I misled people, including
even my wife
even
is a space builder for a scale constructed from Viewpoint where
such an act of betrayal is extremely unexpectable and of which
Clinton will say, "I deeply regret that". This creates
an expectation template which awaits an explanation. The explanation
is provided by
(13) I can only tell you I was
motivated by many factors
Only
constructs a scale from viewpoint. Given such a scale, onlyp
is not an especially convincing explanation - but then given the
prevailing ideology in relation to which it is to be interpreted,
there cannot be much of a justifying explanation.
The penultimate sentence of the address begins
(14) And so tonight, I ask you
to turn away from the spectacle of the past seven months..
In the Conversation Analytic literature, so is a conventional
way of signalling an upcoming formulation. Typically, formulations
follow accounts and attempt to summarize the relevance or procedural
consequentiality of these accounts. Thus so reassigns all
the spaces containing the preceding account to a new Base (and
consequently Viewpoint) in relation to which a formulation is
offered. Moreover, the close connection between the account-bearing
cognitive construction and the new Focus space is indicated by
and.11
As we see, these examples contain
space builders and space shifters which do not contribute to the
conceptual or propositional content of Clinton's address, but
instead provide instructions for the cognitive construction of
ideological ground.
8 Conclusion
Most existing accounts of how the figure / ground gestalt
is linguistically realised have focused on conceptual meaning.
To be satisfied with this is tantamount to treating communicating
meaning as a simple matter of encoding and decoding linguistic
form rather than causing an addressee to draw inferences from
explicated linguistic and inferred non-linguistic premises. We
have been able to show that mental space constructions neatly
allow for the construction of linguistic figure in Focus space
and contextual ground in Viewpoint space. In doing this, we demonstrate
how mental space representations are uniquely able to represent
in a single account phenomena treated counter-intuitively (and
certainly non-cognitively) as either semantic or pragmatic in
other theories.
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1
This is the first time we have used the
term 'meaning construction'. We tend to favour the more inclusive
term 'cognitive construction', because we are arguing that, although
mental spaces structure meaning, they stop short of representing
'Meaning X'. Both terms are found in Fauconnier's work.
2 Strictly,
the process of language understanding is deductive as we draw
explicatures and implicatures as logical consequence from premises.
However, as the premises are not given but accommodated, the inferential
process is more of an abductive kind in which Meaning X is a best
explanation of the available evidence.
3 Mukarovsky
does not refer to Rubin or specifically to the figure / ground
gestalt. Nevertheless, his work clearly presupposes such
a notion.
4 The term
'speech act' is ours rather than Langacker's and is used non-technically.
5 Rubba proposes
sententially embedded rather than discoursally sequential space
building. The advantage of Rubba's proposal is that spaces can
be enlarged 'upwards' as well as reassigned.
6 This analysis
follows Nunberg's theory of deferred reference for deictics, in
which index (a linguistic entity) and referent or interpretation
(a pragmatically inferred entity) are distinguished. Thus an academic
at a conference who whispers to a colleague while a paper is being
read, "These papers are dull" points to an instance
of paper reading (the figure). However, the reference or interpretation
is not accomplished just by mentioning these papers (as
claimed in Kaplan's theory of direct reference [1977/89: 493]);
rather, it is only possible to know which papers are included
in the reference in relation to a deictic origo (the ground).
The index, or demonstratum, (a single paper being read
at the time of utterance), is thus instantiated in an interpretation,
or demonstrandum, (a set of papers mutually known to speaker
and hearer).
7 The notion
of co-indexing in generative grammar has long been rather nebulous
and seems to consist of little more than attaching integers to
items intuitively felt to be in an antecedent / anaphor relation.
The elegant way in which mental space theory enables both deictic
and anaphoric reference to be modelled collapses the two notions
of index (that identified in accounts of indexical reference and
that supposed in syntactic co-indexing) and neatly explains why
first and second person pronouns are typically deictic (i.e. when
no co-textual item is identified as the index) and third person
pronouns are typically, although not necessarily, anaphoric (i.e.
when a co-textual item is identified as the index).
8 In the construction
of one mental space diagram, Fauconnier proceeds by "Leaving
aside the pragmatic scale constructed by even" (1997:
55). In another case, otherwise is shown to set up a counterfactual
space.
9 The scale
is pragmatic (Fauconnier, 1975), and hence potentially ideological,
in the sense that the items contained may not have material properties
in ranking.
10 This presupposes
the extension of indexicality to all referential descriptions
and predicates. This is not a new suggestion, and merely takes
account of the fact that all linguistic expressions are indeterminate
and require explication.
11 The various
phonetic realizations of so and and so suggest that
spaces need to be built to show the extent of the relatedness
of Viewpoint to Focus, i.e. the relevance of a formulation to
an account, as conceptualized by the speaker.