Public Schools in New Orleans: Background

Background | School Operators

Pre-Hurricane Katrina
Before Hurricane Katrina, the public school district in Orleans Parish—New Orleans Public Schools (NOPS)—was viewed as one of the worst urban public school districts in the country.  In the 2004–2005 school year, 63 percent of public schools in New Orleans were deemed “academically unacceptable” by Louisiana accountability standards (compared to 8 percent of public schools across Louisiana).   NOPS was failing to provide quality education to its 64,000 students.   

Within the public education system, schools were largely segregated along racial lines.  While a few high-performing, selective-admission public schools had predominantly Caucasian students, the vast majority of underperforming public schools were composed of almost entirely African Americans.  On the 2004 Louisiana Educational Assessment Program (LEAP) standardized test, Caucasian students scored more than 50 points higher in both English and math than African American students—a gap twice as large as that between Caucasian and African-American students across all of Louisiana. 

 Socioeconomic factors took their toll on public schools.  Prior to Hurricane Katrina, 40 percent of children in New Orleans lived below the poverty line.  Seventy-seven percent of students in NOPS were participating in free or reduced-price lunch programs, compared to 41 percent nationally that were eligible.  Student safety was also a key concern; many parents and the community considered public schools unsafe.

District leadership suffered a high rate of turnover—eight superintendents served between 1998 and 2005—and was often at odds with the vocal and influential Orleans Parish School Board (OPSB).  Decision-making was centralized at the district level, leaving principals with little autonomy over their schools.   The district was also experiencing a series of legal problems over its finances, with 11 employees indicted in 2004 for criminal offenses related to financial mismanagement.  By 2005, the district was almost bankrupt.

In addition to the growing financial and governance issues that faced the OPSB, the severely deteriorated physical condition of NOPS buildings was a constant challenge.  Run-down school facilities, which suffered from decades of deferred maintenance, raised parents’ concerns about school security and safety.  The neglected buildings became a visible symbol of the failure of New Orleans public schools.

Rebuilding Schools: The 2005–2006 School Year
Hurricane Katrina physically and financially devastated the city of New Orleans and its public schools.  More than half of New Orleans public schools suffered significant damage, and many were rendered unusable.  Immediately after Hurricane Katrina, turnaround firm Alvarez & Marsal estimated the total damage at more than $800 million.

All 64,000 NOPS students were displaced from New Orleans by Hurricane Katrina.  Though nearly a quarter of displaced students returned to New Orleans during the spring of 2006, many students went to school in other cities or did not attend school at all.  In addition, immediately following Hurricane Katrina, more than 7,500 NOPS employees, including more than 4,000 teachers, were laid off.

Public school governance and leadership were also overturned in the wake of Hurricane Katrina.  Under Act No. 35, passed in the November 2005 Special Session of the Louisiana Legislature, the definition of a “failing” school and the state’s authority over these schools was significantly expanded allowing the state to take over the majority of New Orleans schools.   Act 35 broadened the definition of “failing,” however, this new bar was applicable only in districts with more than 30 schools, where 50 percent or more of its student population was enrolled in academically unacceptable schools—a standard that only Orleans Parish met.

With the expanded definition, the number of New Orleans schools defined as “failing” dramatically increased.  The state then transferred 112 former OPSB schools and their buildings to the governance of the Recovery School District (RSD) which was charged with opening and operating the schools for an initial period of five years.  These changes in school governance resulted in significant changes in leadership as well.  The Louisiana Department of Education named Dr. Robin Jarvis to head the RSD.  The OPSB named NOPS veteran Darryl Kilbert to the position of Superintendent in 2006.   Many charter schools chose to hire principals and leaders from outside of New Orleans.

In addition, the structure of the school system changed.  Instead of two strong central districts operating schools, the majority of reopened schools were charter schools (or “charters”).  The growth of charter schools in New Orleans was driven largely by the need to open new schools quickly.  The OPSB and the RSD promoted the opening of charter schools to gain access to federal funds and to open schools with limited central office support.  However, unlike the OPSB, the RSD also viewed chartering schools as a way to provide schools with increased autonomy in key areas—such as curriculum and teacher hiring—and hold them accountable for student performance. 

Charter schools were awarded contracts by the RSD and OPSB for an initial term of five years.  If they do not meet the terms of their contracts and demonstrate sufficient achievement, charter schools can be closed and their contracts terminated or not renewed.  By the end of the 2005-2006 school year, 19 charters and only 8 district-run schools were operating in the city.  In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans public education had been transformed from a uniform yet dysfunctional “school system” to a scattered “system of schools” — including charters, OPSB-run, and RSD-run schools.

The First Full Post-Katrina School Year: 2006-2007

Originally, the RSD envisioned their role as providing a lean administrative staff to oversee a district comprised mainly of charter schools.  By early 2006, however, it had become apparent that there were not enough high quality charter operators for the number of schools that needed to open, and the RSD was forced to transform itself into a district able to operate schools.  Lacking experienced leadership and a fully staffed central office, the RSD found it challenging to meet its mandate of operating public schools to serve some of the most academically and developmentally needy students in the city.  During 2006-2007, there was a 100 percent turnover rate in the top personnel at the RSD central office.

 The RSD was incapable of providing regular and timely operational support to the schools it operated.  By year’s end, many RSD schools still lacked basic amenities such as working kitchens, functioning bathrooms, and school supplies such as textbooks.  Student safety and security was another salient issue.  Incidents of student violence were prevalent in RSD-run schools, forcing the district to hire additional guards, limit access to school buildings, and require students to pass through metal detectors. 

One of the RSD’s most enduring problems during the 2006-2007 school year was a persistent teacher shortage.  Because the majority of RSD-run schools opened after the OPSB-run and charter schools, there was a limited pool of teachers, administrators, and staff from which to draw.  This contributed to a wide spread community consensus – backed up by anecdotal evidence – that students did not receive the support services they needed.

 In addition to the RSD-run schools’ troubles, RSD charters and OPSB-run and charter schools also struggled to open schools, fix buildings in disrepair, and provide basic supplies and services in their schools.  Even so, the OPSB-run and OPSB charter schools enjoyed initial success post-Katrina.  With the formation of the RSD, the OPSB was left to run or oversee only those schools that had traditionally been the board’s highest-performing public schools, many of which have some form of selective admissions criteria.  Many of these schools already had strong leaders, experienced staff, and community relationships that supported their reopening. 

RSD charter schools did well in some of the same areas as OPSB schools, in part because of their leaders’ ability and resolve to focus only on the performance of a single school or a small set of schools.  Charter schools also had the advantage of being able to cap their enrollment and access to federal funds earmarked for charter education.  Many also sought donations from private philanthropic organizations and individuals.

Promising Results and Remaining Challenges: 2007-2008

In the spring of 2007, newly appointed State Superintendent Paul Pastorek made the timely reopening of schools a top priority.  A new superintendent, Paul Vallas, was hired to head the Recovery School District.  Vallas planned to bring much needed support staff to the RSD from his previous jobs in Chicago and Philadelphia and to actively engage local educators to assist as well.

Under the leadership of Darryl Kilbert, the OPSB achieved better control of its finances – a problem that plagued the board before Hurricane Katrina.  Cash flow improved substantially due to the state’s decision to lend the district funds to service its debt.  In May of 2007, the OPSB received the first clean audit of its financial records in four years.

The 2007-2008 school year began more smoothly than the previous year.  There was a sufficient number of teachers hired, buildings had been brought up to standard, and there was better access to needed supplies and technology.  Overall, there was a sense among students, teachers, school leaders, and community members that there have been significant improvements in most schools since the year before.

Despite these positive developments, many challenges still remain.  Many teachers do not have the skills and support they need to teach a diverse student population with high needs.  Special education and mental health services are lacking.  There is poor coordination among schools and districts and a lack of timely and accessible school information for parents, students, and the public.

Test scores for the 2007-2008 school year improved dramatically in the lower grades of the RSD and OPSB, and experienced smaller but significant gains in the higher grades of the RSD.  While this is a promising development, overall test scores for most public school students in New Orleans are still well below state averages.  It remains to be seen whether the momentum for improvement created in the 2007-2008 school year will continue and ultimately allow for a system of excellent schools to flourish in New Orleans.

For an overview of the current status of public education in New Orleans, click here.

To read further about the history of New Orleans Public Schools, click here.