The Contemporary Effects of Vice-Presidential Nominees: Sarah Palin and the 2008 Presidential Campaign

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This paper reviews the politics of vice-presidential selection from the point of view of both the scholar and campaign strategist. Using John McCain’s selection of Sarah Palin as his running mate in 2008, we first explore academic theories of vice-presidential selection and assess the ways Palin either succeeds or fails to meet the expectations of those theories. We go on to explore the specific factors the McCain campaign considered when selecting a vice-presidential nominee and assess Palin’s performance in addressing those factors. We conclude with a discussion of Palin’s impact on the outcome of the 2008 election.

KEYWORDS 2008 presidential election, campaigns, elections, John McCain, running mate, Sarah Palin, vice-presidential candidates

The 2008 presidential election was full of firsts. Senator Barack Obama was the first African American to win the nomination of a major party, and later he became America’s first African American president. Senator Hillary Clinton was the first woman to seriously threaten to win a major party nomination.

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And Governor Sarah Palin was the first woman to be nominated for the vice-presidency by the Republican Party. Palin’s nomination led to extensive—and largely positive—early media coverage; yet over the course of the general election campaign press coverage, and ultimately voters’ opinions, of the Alaska governor became decidedly more mixed. Despite the old adage that vice-presidential nominees are never as important as on the day they are selected, it remains an interesting question as to whether Governor Palin—a relatively young woman without extensive experience in government—had a more profound effect on the presidential campaign than did previous candidates for vice-president.

In this article, we address the question of what impact Palin’s nomination may have had on the success (or lack of success) of John McCain’s presidential campaign. We of course recognize that McCain’s campaign for the White House was an uphill battle from the beginning, regardless of who was nominated for vice-president. As McCain’s own campaign manager notes, an unpopular incumbent and a failing economy made it obvious that the only road to a Republican victory involved “throwing a football through a tire at 50 yards: It’s doable theoretically, but it is very difficult and it needs a little bit of luck” (Milbank, 2009). Yet a large portion of McCain’s “Hail Mary” pass involved the nomination of Sarah Palin for vice-president.

Our analysis of the Palin nomination begins with a review of the academic literature on vice-presidential selection. We then make use of a unique source of data—an interview with McCain’s campaign manager Steve Schmidt—to delineate the specific strategic tasks the campaign team wanted Palin to perform. With those tasks in mind, we also assess whether Palin was successful in playing the role that the McCain campaign needed her to play. We then conclude with a review of the impact of Palin’s nomination on the 2008 campaign and some broader insights into the effects vice-presidential nominees can have on election outcomes.

ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVE ON THE VICE-PRESIDENTIAL CHOICE

Many scholars agree that the primary factor in choosing a running mate is ticket balancing. Prior to 1940, vice-presidential nominees were chosen by party leaders. “An agreement among party leaders typically determined who would fill the ticket. They generally picked a vice-presidential candidate able to add balance to the ticket, to placate a faction of a party, or to carry a swing state” (Goldstein, 1982, 48). Since party leaders controlled the nomination, the vice-presidential nomination was based primarily on electoral impact. The vice-president was meant to broaden the presidential candidate’s appeal and to unite different factions within the party. Typically, presidential nominees would not trust the running mates chosen for them and replaced them after one term in every election until 1912. This would change in
1940 when President Franklin Roosevelt chose his own running mate (Nelson, 1988).

Since 1940, the presidential nominee has been in charge of choosing his running mate. As a result, recent scholarship has reassessed the factors that influence the vice-presidential choice. Dudley and Rapaport (1989) test whether region would be an important factor in balancing the ticket, yet they find that vice-presidents rarely make a difference in their home states or regions. Hurwitz (1980) emphasizes the importance of age, previously held office, and size of state as factors that affect the selection of a vice-presidential nominee. Sigelman and Wahlbeck (1997) also note the importance of age as a deciding factor, although they find that the region or state of the nominee does not make a candidate more likely to be in the final choices for vice-president. Baumgartner (2004), in reviewing vice-presidential nominations after 1940, notes that nominees have been younger (on average) white Protestant men, typically with military service and previous political involvement (particularly in the U.S. Senate).

Nelson (1988) takes a different path by suggesting that the criteria for the vice-presidential choice should be narrowed to three factors: governance, legitimacy, and electoral. The governance criteria include the ability of a vice-president to succeed the president if the need arose and loyalty to the president’s policies if the vice-president were to succeed the president. The legitimacy criteria relate to the view of the public toward the vice-president and his or her ability to lead. Finally, electoral criteria are meant to broaden the ticket’s appeal and to unite the party. Azari (2006) pays particular attention to the governance criterion in her examination of balancing strategies. She would argue that John McCain was running in a time of “disjunction,” and such candidates:

“…are forced to repudiate the dominant regime because it has ceased to solve problems, but they cannot reject it to the extent that they are affiliated with it and must use it as a source of authority. As such, we should expect these [candidates] to be from the moderate or opposite ideological camp and choose running mates from the party’s ideological base” (p. 10).

CAMPAIGN MANAGER PERSPECTIVE ON THE VICE-PRESIDENTIAL CHOICE

Yet presidential campaigns do not set out to comply with academic theories when making important decisions such as the selection of a running mate. In fact, McCain’s selection of Palin seemed to ignore many of the accumulated wisdoms from the academic perspective. In terms of balancing criteria, Palin balanced the ticket only in terms of age, while failing to help the ticket to win a swing state or large Electoral College state or to add (much) important
previous experience to the ticket. Among the governing criteria, Palin surely met the (legal) ability to succeed to the presidency and partially met the criteria of policy loyalty to the presidential nominee. As to the legitimacy criterion, most Americans did not believe Palin was “ready to lead.” Finally, with respect to the electoral criteria, Palin helped unite her party while largely failing to broaden the appeal of the ticket.

Instead, campaign insiders often have unique insights into the particular needs that must be addressed by a specific vice-presidential choice. Thus, the individuals running a campaign can provide a more practical interpretation of the reasoning in selecting a particular vice-presidential nominee. To understand John McCain’s profoundly unconventional vice-presidential choice, it helps to know a bit about the process and the goals of the campaign. Sarah Palin was among a short list of traditional conservatives as well as wild cards, including Senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson of Texas and Senator Joe Lieberman of Connecticut. “But when McCain brought up Lieberman’s name at a secret high-level meeting held in Sedona, Arizona, to consider veep choices on Sunday August 24, his top aides balked” (Thomas, 2009, 121). Although Lieberman may have been too ideologically different for the choice, McCain did not want a safe pick.

According to the McCain campaign (Schmidt, 2009), the vice-presidential choice had to address four needs in the campaign:

- The nominee had to restore McCain’s “maverick” credentials.
- The nominee had to help the campaign attract women voters.
- The nominee had to increase the distance of the campaign from unpopular President Bush.
- Finally, and perhaps most important, the nominee had to excite the base of the Republican Party.

Eventually, McCain settled on Palin because she was a “different” choice (Thomas, 2009) who could potentially address all four needs. But the Palin pick was still surprising. While the campaign was confident that Palin—and only Palin (Schmidt, 2009)—could accomplish the four tasks set forth by the campaign, it remains to be seen which, if any, of these goals Palin actually managed to fulfill. We now turn to an analysis of these four tasks with an eye toward establishing whether the choice of Palin as the vice-presidential nominee served the required purpose.

**IMPACT OF PALIN IN THE 2008 ELECTION**

To assess whether Palin helped the campaign accomplish the four goals identified at the beginning of the general election campaign, we utilize survey data from several polls from CNN/Opinion Research Corporation and Democracy Corps to gauge Palin’s impact on the electorate. The analysis
will be centered on three of the four points that Steve Schmidt gave for the Palin pick: attracting women voters, distancing the ticket from President Bush, and rallying the base of the Republican Party. Since we could not find any survey data testing whether Palin had “maverick” credentials like McCain, we will not address this criterion, although popular press accounts certainly trumpeted Palin’s “maverick” qualities.

Attracting the Support of Women

Following the historic—and nearly successful—campaign of Hilary Clinton for the Democratic presidential nomination, many women still longed for a woman to be on the ballot in 2008. This gave rise to the PUMAs, or women who had supported Clinton and refused to blindly fall in line behind the Obama candidacy. As the conventions and the beginning of the general election campaign neared, many Republicans held out hope that some of these women could be persuaded to vote for McCain in November. As a result, Schmidt and the McCain campaign placed a high value on picking a running mate who could help win this important segment of the electorate. But did the selection of Palin actually manage to attract a significant number of women voters?

Evidence of Palin’s electoral attractiveness to women is presented in Figure 1. Based on polling data over the course of the fall campaign, it is clear

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**FIGURE 1** Data points correspond to percentage of women respondents in CNN/Opinion Research Corp. polls reporting favorable and unfavorable opinions toward Palin, as well as the difference in those opinions and the percentage of women respondents intending to vote for the Republican ticket.
that women quickly got to know Palin and then came to relatively stable evaluations of the Republican vice-presidential nominee. Immediately after her selection, Palin had a 17 percent advantage in favorable/unfavorable ratings, but a substantial 44.6 percent of women declined to rate her. Within a week, nearly everyone was able to make an evaluation of Palin. In the early part of the campaign, Palin had a strongly favorable rating among women, although that net favorable rating would decline throughout the fall campaign, particularly following Palin’s interview with Katie Couric on the CBS Evening News. By the end of the campaign, Palin had a net favorable rating among women of less than one percent.

But favorable ratings of Palin by women were not what the McCain campaign was interested in; they wanted the votes of women. In order to address this fundamental goal of the McCain campaign, we also present trial ballot data for women in Figure 1. Initially, it appeared that the choice of Palin might do the job. At the time of selection, Obama led McCain among women by 3 percentage points. This flipped to a virtual tie a week later. However, following Palin’s interview with Couric, women came back to the Democratic ticket, in the end favoring Obama by 7 percentage points. As a result, it appears that selecting Palin as the vice presidential nominee did not fulfill the campaign’s goal of attracting the votes of women.8

Distancing the Ticket From Bush

In addition to attracting women, the McCain campaign sought to use the selection of a vice-presidential nominee to establish distance between the ticket and the unpopular incumbent president. With approval ratings in the 20 to 30 percent range, President George W. Bush was proving to be a drag on Republican fortunes in 2008. McCain had already established his differences with Bush as a result of McCain’s quest for the Republican presidential nomination in 2000; those differences had been further emphasized by McCain’s support for positions on issues such as immigration and campaign finance reform that were at odds with the Republican establishment. McCain hoped to further solidify his “maverick” image and distance himself from the unpopular incumbent through his choice in running mate.

McCain thought that, in Palin, he had selected a running mate that would help emphasize his differences with Bush and the Republican establishment. It certainly helped that Palin had taken on the Republican establishment in Alaska, which further bolstered her outsider credentials. And the American public initially agreed. Figure 2 illustrates how likely voters perceived the differences between Palin and Bush. The data in Figure 2 are taken from four Democracy Corps surveys of likely voters performed throughout the fall campaign.9 In each case, respondents’ ratings of Bush on a 100-point thermometer scale are subtracted from their ratings of Palin. Average differences are calculated for self-identified conservatives, moderates, and liberals.
Throughout the campaign, Palin is rated more favorably than Bush, and initially likely voters of all three ideological stripes see quite a bit of difference between Palin and Bush. McCain was certainly pleased with his selection early on, as liberals and moderates rated Palin more favorably than Bush by margins of more than 30 points. However, over the course of the campaign, all three types of likely voters came to evaluate Palin more closely with Bush. Liberals, predictably, came to see Palin as only slightly more favorable than Bush, giving her only a five-point advantage by Election Day. Conservatives, too, came to evaluate them more closely, which is likely a good thing as conservatives still largely approved of the incumbent president. Finally, moderates too came to view Palin as only slightly more favorable than Bush, rating her 10 points more favorably by Election Day. Thus, while Palin remained a more popular figure than Bush throughout the general election campaign, the campaign itself caused voters to view Palin and Bush more similarly. As a result, McCain did not find a running mate who helped him establish great distance between the ticket and the unpopular incumbent.

Exciting the Base of the Republican Party

Earlier, we discussed the scholarly expectation that a vice-presidential nominee should rally the base of the party. This potential function of the vice-presidential nominee was not forgotten by the McCain campaign, as

![Distance from Bush](image-url)
Schmidt explicitly indicated the necessity for selecting a running mate who would excite the base of the party. We explore this topic further with survey data over the course of the general election campaign.

Figure 3 presents data on the ratings by self-identified conservatives (the “base” of the Republican Party) of the favorability of Palin. The story is unsurprising. The only unique detail in the trend of favorable/unfavorable ratings is the fact that one-third of conservatives were unwilling to rate Palin immediately after her selection. This is further testament to how unanticipated Palin’s selection was, as even many conservatives had not heard of her and were unwilling to rate her. Following her introduction to the public, however, Palin manages to excite conservatives and maintains a strongly favorable rating among them for the duration of the campaign, ending with a 63.5 percent net favorable rating a week before the election.

Yet the McCain campaign was not merely interested in goodwill toward Palin among conservatives; they needed conservative votes. Figure 3 also presents data on trial ballot preferences among conservatives over the course of the fall campaign. Again, this is a largely unsurprising story, as the Republican ticket leads substantially among conservatives for the duration of the campaign. It is important to note, though, that conservative support drops slightly after the first week of September (immediately following the onset of the financial crisis) to only a 51.5 percentage point lead for the Republican ticket. After continuing to fall though October, conservative support
rebounds at the end, with the Republican ticket holding a 57.8 percentage point lead immediately before Election Day. However, on the whole the McCain campaign ought to be pleased with this aspect of Palin’s candidacy, as she remained popular among conservatives and the ticket won conservative voters by a considerable margin.

**PALIN AND VOTE CHOICE IN THE 2008 ELECTION**

The choice of Sarah Palin was interesting from an academic standpoint. She fit only a few of the predictions provided by different scholars. Palin was younger than McCain and of a different ideological branch of the Republican Party. However, her lack of experience and the electoral insignificance of her home state, among other factors, prevented her from fitting into most academic models of the vice-presidential choice.

The perspective of the campaign manager suggests that the choice of Palin was not only interesting but also unorthodox and largely unanticipated. McCain’s campaign manager Steve Schmidt notes that the rationale behind the pick was to find someone who could rally the Republican base that McCain was estranged from, attract women voters who McCain was losing to Obama, and provide a separation from unpopular President Bush, as well as bolster McCain’s maverick credentials.

This was a tall order for a single candidate, especially one that is not at the top of the ticket. And based on our analyses, Palin had limited success in meeting these goals. First, Palin was popular with conservatives throughout the campaign. Her popularity with conservatives did decrease slightly with time but rebounded in the end and remained highly positive overall. Second, Palin did not have much success in attracting women voters. Her popularity among women peaked with her selection and then leveled off, yet she could not help the Republican ticket carry women voters. Third, Palin did provide the separation from Bush for all ideologies. Yet her separation from Bush decreased over time, regardless of ideology. However, the decrease was most marked in moderates and liberals. Moderates were probably the most likely target of this tactic, so her failure in this area probably hurt the McCain ticket.

But whether Palin, as a vice-presidential candidate, had an impact on the election results remains an open question. We offer some thoughts on the impact of Palin on vote choice in 2008 based on a series of analyses presented in Table 1.

Table 1 presents the results of a logit model of vote choice with the dependent variable coded 1 for a McCain vote and 0 for an Obama vote. As independent variables, we include the thermometer scores for the four major party presidential and vice-presidential nominees in 2008 as well as control variables for respondent demographic characteristics, socioeconomic

The results of the analysis are quite distinct for the three groups. For Democrats, evaluations of the four candidates all had statistically significant effects in the expected directions: higher thermometer scores for Obama and Biden decreased the likelihood of a McCain vote, while higher thermometer scores for McCain and Palin increased that likelihood. For Republicans, the opposite was true, as evaluations for only Obama had a statistically significant (negative) impact on the likelihood of a McCain vote. For Independents, strangely enough, only the evaluation of Palin failed to exert a statistically significant impact.

Generally speaking, demographic factors did not play a factor in predicting the likelihood of a McCain vote for partisans, with the notable exception of race. For both Democrats and Republicans, respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 1 Impact of Palin on Vote Choice</th>
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<tr>
<td>Obama thermometer</td>
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<td>Democrats</td>
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<td>−.094(^a) (0.035)</td>
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<tr>
<td>McCain thermometer</td>
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<td>Democrats</td>
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<tr>
<td>.142(^a) (0.051)</td>
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<td>Biden thermometer</td>
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<td>Democrats</td>
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<tr>
<td>−.070(^c) (0.034)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Palin thermometer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
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<tr>
<td>.112(^c) (0.044)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Race</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
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<tr>
<td>−4.345 (1.876)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
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<td>1.447 (1.400)</td>
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<td>Age</td>
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<td>Democrats</td>
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<tr>
<td>.025 (0.043)</td>
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<td>Income</td>
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<td>Democrats</td>
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<td>.069 (.169)</td>
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<td>Ideology</td>
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<tr>
<td>−.439 (.512)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
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<tr>
<td>−7.646 (6.240)</td>
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<td>No. of cases</td>
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<td>Log likelihood</td>
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Impact of Palin thermometer on probability\(^d\) of McCain vote:

- White men: .0004 (1.482) .0000
- White women: .0017 (1.236) .0000
- Nonwhite men: .0000 (0.0160) .0006
- Nonwhite women: .0000 (0.0094) .0002

Data are logit coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is coded 1 if respondents indicated they voted for McCain and 0 if they voted for Obama. Voters for non–major party candidates were excluded from the analysis.

\(^a\)Statistically significant at \(p < .01\).

\(^b\)Statistically significant at \(p < .10\).

\(^c\)Statistically significant at \(p < .05\).

\(^d\)The change in probability was calculated by estimating the probability of a McCain vote with the Palin thermometer set to 60 and subtracting the estimated probability of a McCain vote with the Palin thermometer set to 40 (holding all other values at their means). This calculation was performed in Stata/SE10.0 with the \texttt{prvalue} command from the SPost Collection (Long and Freese, 2005).
who were not white were much less likely to vote for McCain. Race also played a factor in predicting the likelihood of a McCain vote for independents, as did age (with older independents more likely to vote for Obama) and ideology (more conservative independents were more likely to vote for McCain).

Despite the fact that only Democratic respondents’ evaluation of Palin (as measured with the American National Election Studies feeling thermometer) had a statistically significant impact on their likelihood of voting for McCain, it would be interesting to note whether the three groups’ evaluations of Palin had a substantively significant impact on presidential voting. The final four rows of Table 1 present statistics on the impact of the Palin thermometer rating on the probability of a McCain vote. For each group, the change in probability of a McCain vote was calculated by estimating the probability function with the Palin thermometer set at 60 (and all other values at their means) and subtracting the probability calculated with the Palin thermometer set at 40. We also incorporate race and sex into the analysis.

Among partisans, a positive shift of 20 percentage points in respondents’ evaluations of Palin does not have a large substantive impact on the likelihood of a vote for McCain. Among Democrats, both white men and women have a small (far less than one percent) increase in the likelihood of a McCain vote, while nonwhites of both sexes are unaffected by a positive shift in evaluations of Palin. That pattern is reversed for Republicans, with a positive shift having no impact on white men and women and an extremely small positive impact on nonwhite men and women. Generally speaking, partisans were going to vote for or against McCain for other reasons (including party identification), such that a moderately more positive evaluation of Palin would do very little to affect their vote choice decisions.

For Independents, however, there was potential for Palin to have an important—and statistically independent—effect on vote choice. A positive shift of 20 percentage points in Palin’s thermometer rating would make white independents more likely to vote for McCain, with white men nearly 15 percent more likely and white women more than 12 percent more likely. However, race still played a significant role in the campaign, even among independents, and the same 20 percentage point shift in the Palin thermometer yielded only an increase of only 0.5 percentage points in the probability of a McCain vote among nonwhite women and men, respectively.

The impact of Palin evaluations on the vote choice decisions of white Independents is a key finding. We should note that the mean thermometer scores for Palin among white Independents was 47.4 for men and 53.5 for women, and despite those (lukewarm) evaluations, Independents in the American National Election Studies voted for McCain with 47.5 percent (for men) and 45.5 percent (for women).
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

In the final analysis, it seems unlikely that Palin had much of an impact on presidential voting. She certainly did not have a substantive impact on partisan voters, and although she could have had an impact on white independents, it would have required far higher evaluations of the vice-presidential nominee in order to sway a significant portion of independent voters to vote for McCain.

In the end, Palin was a bold and interesting choice. However, she only managed to fulfill one of the criteria that the campaign cited for her choice: to rally the Republican base. She did not attract women voters and her difference from Bush was marginal with moderates. But it is unclear whether any other potential vice-president could have done any better. With a failing economy and an unpopular president of the same party, the McCain campaign faced a plethora of problems, many insurmountable, and the vice-presidential nominee was not going to change those fundamentals. The McCain campaign tried for a “Hail Mary” with the selection of Sarah Palin as the vice-presidential nominee, but it is undeniable that she had very limited success in fulfilling her obligations to help win the presidency for the Republican ticket.

NOTES

1. See, for example, Cook (2008).
2. Both McCain and Palin would be considered conservatives, but the two candidates exhibited important policy differences on issues such as a Constitutional ban on gay marriage, energy policy, sex education in schools, and foreign policy toward North Korea.
3. A Rasmussen Reports survey of 1,000 likely voters on September 1, 2008, found that only 29 percent of respondents believed Palin was “ready to lead,” while 48% believed she was “not ready.”
4. A list of polls used in the subsequent analyses is presented in Appendix A.
5. A LexisNexis search of major U.S. and world publications finds 954 hits for a search of “Palin and maverick.” Typical examples of such press coverage include Thompson (2008) and Safire (2008).
6. PUMA stands for “party unity my ass.”
7. Comparable data on men are presented in Figure 4 in Appendix B.
8. As a point of reference, John Kerry won women voters in 2004 51 percent to 48 percent (CNN, 2004).
9. Details of the four Democracy Corps surveys used in this analysis are provided in Appendix A. Democracy Corps survey data were used for this analysis because it was the only polling firm that asked thermometer questions for both Bush and Palin at multiple points during the fall campaign.
10. Voters for non–major party candidates were excluded from the analysis.
11. The race variable was a dummy coded 0 if the respondent was white and 1 if the respondent was not white.
12. Further details on the probability calculation are provided in the footnote below Table 1.
13. We conclude that Palin managed to rally the Republican base, yet our analysis of presidential voting in the American National Election Studies concludes that evaluations of Palin did not have an impact on Republican voters. We believe that these facts are not contradictory. Indeed, we argue that the nomination of Palin served as a signal to Republicans and helped warm them to the McCain-Palin ticket. By the end of the campaign, however, it was Republicans’ party identification (and distaste for Obama)—and not their specific evaluations of Palin—that had an impact on their decision to vote for McCain.
REFERENCES


AUTHOR NOTE

Brian Brox is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at Tulane University. Madison Cassels is a candidate for Juris Doctor at Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law.
APPENDIX A. SOURCES OF POLLING DATA

For analyses of Palin’s impact on women and conservatives (Figures 1, 3, and 4):

- CNN/Opinion Research Corporation, in the field August 29–31, 2008—national sample of adults, N = 1,031
- CNN/Opinion Research Corporation, in the field September 5–7, 2008—national sample of adults, N = 1,022
- CNN/Opinion Research Corporation, in the field September 19–21, 2008—national sample of adults, N = 1,020
- CNN/Opinion Research Corporation, in the field October 3–5, 2008—national sample of adults, N = 1,006
- CNN/Opinion Research Corporation, in the field October 17–19, 2008—national sample of adults, N = 1,058
- CNN/Opinion Research Corporation, in the field October 30–November 1, 2008—national sample of adults, N = 1,017

These polls were accessed through the Roper Center Public Opinion Archives.

For analysis of Palin’s impact on distancing the ticket from President Bush (Figure 2):

- Democracy Corps, in the field September 1–3, 2008—national sample of likely voters, N = 1,000
- Democracy Corps, in the field September 28–30, 2008—national sample of likely voters, N = 1,000
- Democracy Corps, in the field October 21–23, 2008—national sample of likely voters, N = 1,000
- Democracy Corps for Campaign for America’s Future, in the field November 4–5, 2008—national sample of voters, N = 2,000

These polls were provided to the authors by Democracy Corps.
FIGURE 4 Data points correspond to percentage of men respondents in CNN/Opinion Research Corp. polls reporting favorable and unfavorable opinions toward Palin, as well as the difference in those opinions and the percentage of men respondents intending to vote for the Republican ticket.