

2

Limiting Resistance

*Juan Pardo and the Shrinking
of Spanish La Florida, 1566–68*

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In May 1568, native peoples of the Carolinas and eastern Tennessee—at towns named Canos (or Cofitachequi), Joara, Guatari, Cauchi, and Chiaha—obliterated a string of Spanish forts that stretched from the Atlantic coast across the Appalachian Mountains. This would seem to be an act of resistance par excellence: indigenous peoples rising together to defeat the world's most powerful empire (see also Church et al., Chapter 9; Liebmann, Chapter 10; and Murphy et al., Chapter 4). Indeed, never again did Spain attempt to impose its colonial ambition upon the interior of the American Southeast. Yet we suggest that the concept of resistance—along with its regular partner, domination—may obfuscate rather than clarify the events that we seek to understand (Quilter, Chapter 6).

The themes of domination and resistance are fundamental to most theoretical articulations of the colonial experience. For many cases of Spanish and indigenous interactions in the Americas, they provide a solid framework on which to build insightful models of culture change and colonial entanglements. In our paper, we examine Juan Pardo's expeditions of 1566–68, focusing on relations between this expedition and the native polities of the western Carolina Piedmont and eastern Tennessee. Pardo twice led more than a hundred men into the interior Southeast and built half a dozen small forts. We have identified one of these garrisons, Fort San Juan

de Joara, at the Berry site in what is now Burke County, North Carolina. Thirty soldiers occupied Fort San Juan—situated at the northern end of Joara, a large native town—for eighteen months. While our excavations have yielded evidence of cooperation between these Spaniards and their native hosts, the destruction of the fort's buildings by fire indicates that this cooperation ultimately failed.

Thinking about our case in terms of a domination–resistance dichotomy creates a dilemma: is it realistic to speak of the small group of Spaniards who manned this isolated garrison, or even of Pardo's combined force of 125 men, as the “dominant” side of the dichotomy simply because they were Europeans? Does such a dichotomy improve or inhibit our understanding of either Spanish or indigenous experience in the early colonial Southeast, where Spain so often—and often so spectacularly—failed to achieve much more than a tentative toehold? Here, we draw upon a conception of agency offered by William Sewell Jr. (2005) to propose that native polities on the Carolina Piedmont actively used the Pardo expedition as a structural resource to advance their own political and economic ends. Such an approach helps us understand the gamut of social actions that constitute this encounter, from early cooperation to the ultimate destruction of Pardo's forts.

First we offer a summary of the Pardo expeditions, which are little known outside the Southeast. In summarizing the historical context of this colonial entanglement, we draw attention to three distinct kinds of relationships between expedition members and indigenous peoples on the piedmont. At each of the major towns that Pardo visited, he and his men were received by numerous native leaders, some of whom traveled long distances to meet with the Spaniards. Invariably, two things occurred during these encounters: Pardo made gifts to the visiting dignitaries, and they in turn agreed to support the expedition by providing the Spaniards food and housing, including the construction of new buildings in their respective towns. And, on at least two occasions, a native leader apparently drew the Spaniards into military confrontation against his enemies. Each of these three kinds of interaction resists the simple dichotomous tropes of domination and resistance. Indeed, in each case we may profitably ask who was using whom. After summarizing the expeditions we turn to examine these interactions—including labor mobilization, gifting, and military support—under the lens of Sewell's approach to agency. Finding this perspective more nuanced in its approach to indigenous motivations and actions, we use it to shed interpretive light on the failure and destruction of Pardo's forts. Our point, again, is not to deny the significance of either domination

or resistance for understanding colonial entanglements, but to illustrate that in cases such as ours these terms may unnecessarily constrain our interpretation of events.

THE JUAN PARDO EXPEDITIONS, 1566–68

During the first half of the sixteenth century, Spain launched many failed attempts to claim the American Southeast. Perhaps the most famous (or infamous) of these was Hernando de Soto's, which cut its ravenous swath across the Southeast from 1539 to 1543. But of the more than six hundred soldiers who began the expedition, more than half, including Soto himself, perished in La Florida. Other similarly disastrous ventures include those of Juan Ponce de León (1521), Lucas Vázquez de Ayllón (1526), Pánfilo de Narváez (1528), and Tristán de Luna y Arellano (1559–60). Although largely forgotten today, these were the first European attempts to explore the American South.

In 1565–66, after his successful expulsion of the French from La Florida, Pedro Menéndez de Avilés founded a pair of small colonies on the southern Atlantic coast: St. Augustine, established September 1565 in northern Florida, and Santa Elena, founded April 1566 on Parris Island, South Carolina; the latter was to be the principal site of Menéndez's colonial ambitions (Hoffman 1990; Hudson 1990; Lyon 1976; Paar 1999). When Spain's king, Philip II, received news of these developments, he ordered immediate reinforcement for Menéndez's colony. In July 1566, Captain Juan Pardo, a member of the king's private guard, arrived at Santa Elena with a company of 250 men and quickly began to fortify the settlement. As the Santa Elena colony was ill prepared to feed this contingent of soldiers for very long, Menéndez ordered Pardo to prepare half of his army for an expedition into the interior regions that lay behind the Atlantic coast. His task was to explore the area, claim its lands for Spain while pacifying local Indians, and find an overland route from Santa Elena to silver mines in Zacatecas, Mexico. Pardo left with 125 men on December 1, 1566. Over the following months they would revisit a small part of the path that Hernando de Soto's party had taken across the Carolinas in 1540 (Figure 2.1).

Of the first of Pardo's two expeditions into the interior, we have but a single eyewitness account—a brief and rather inattentive *relación* written by Pardo himself. This document provides few details about social relations on the Carolina Piedmont during the post-Soto era, other than the names of the places that the expedition visited and how their leaders received Pardo and his men. By combining this document with records of the second expedition, however, it has been possible to reconstruct a basic itinerary for




FIGURE 2.1.

Native towns visited by Juan Pardo, 1566–68.

the first (e.g., DePratter et al. 1983; Hudson 1990). After leaving Santa Elena, Pardo and his men went north for a few days across South Carolina's lightly populated inner coastal plain. The first town of note was called Guiomae, the same name as Soto's Himahi (Hudson et al. 1984:72; Hudson 1990:34). Two days later, they came to the important town of Canos, where Pardo reported that he "found a great number of caciques and Indians" (Pardo 1990:311). Fortunately, Juan de la Bandera, the expedition's notary, made two records of the second expedition and noted in the shorter of these that the Indians called this town "Canosi and, for another name, Cofetazque" (1990b:301). Thus, the place named Canos in the Pardo accounts is likely the same as Soto's Cofitachequi, one of the most powerful polities that Soto encountered east of the Appalachian Mountains (DePratter 1994; Hudson 1997:146–84; Hudson et al. 2008). Here, as at most of the important places that Pardo entered, he told the cacique and his subjects to construct a house for the expedition and to fill it with a quantity of maize for the soldiers' use.

When Pardo and his men crossed the Carolina Piedmont, it was in

ferment and transition. More than two decades earlier, when Soto's army crossed this ground, Cofitachequi cast a long shadow from its location along the Wateree. During the century prior to Soto's arrival, this town appears to have precluded the growth of regional polities or chiefdoms in neighboring parts of the piedmont. Indeed, Cofitachequi was the only town where Soto encountered a chief—the famous "lady" or *cacica*—with any degree of regional, multicomunity authority. But, by the time of Pardo's arrival, Cofitachequi's power was on the wane, and as Pardo and his men would soon find, a pair of new polities were starting to coalesce just to its north. The accounts of Pardo's expeditions thus capture this social landscape at a moment of political instability, a fact that we must remember as we later seek to understand why its native peoples engaged Pardo and his men with the particular actions and strategies they did.

Pardo continued north from Canos through the Wateree-Catawba Valley, pausing at several small villages before arriving at Joara—Soto's Xualla—situated along a tributary of the upper Catawba River near the base of the Appalachian Mountains. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the upper Catawba River was among the most densely populated regions of the North Carolina Piedmont (Beck and Moore 2002; Moore 2002). More than fifty archaeological sites with Burke phase components (1400–1600) have been identified in this area and range in size from 500 m² to nearly 5 ha. The political center of the Joara chiefdom was the Berry site, located near modern Morganton. Berry is the largest known Burke phase site and one of the only sites in the valley with a platform mound.

Pardo's command from Menéndez had been to press over the mountains and forge a route to Mexico. At Joara, however, he could see that there was snow on the peaks that lay ahead (Martinez 1990:320), so he halted his westward push through the piedmont region. Pardo was at Joara for fifteen days, writing that its people "demanded Christians from me to catechize them" (Pardo 1990:312). Here, he built a small fort christened Fort San Juan de Joara, leaving it with thirty soldiers under the command of his sergeant, Hernando Moyano; this small outpost was the earliest European colony in the interior of what is now the United States (Beck et al. 2006:66). Our ongoing research at the Berry site, to which we will return, has identified the burned remains of Fort San Juan de Joara flanking the northern periphery of the Berry site (Beck et al. 2006).

The remainder of the army traveled northeast through the upper Catawba Valley, and after passing through an unoccupied region between the Catawba and Yadkin basins, arrived at Guatari, located in the central Yadkin Valley near present-day Salisbury, North Carolina. Pardo (1990:312)

found thirty caciques and many Indians waiting to meet with him at Guatari, a clear indication of the town's prominence in 1567. Pardo stayed for just over two weeks, quickly departing for Santa Elena when he learned of a possible French military threat to the colony. He left four soldiers and a cleric, Father Sebastian Montero, to catechize the Indians, and it was here that Montero founded the first mission within the interior of North America (Hudson 1990:26).

During the six months that Pardo was at Santa Elena, Moyano, his sergeant at Fort San Juan de Joara, became enmeshed in conflicts between Joara and its adversaries across the Appalachians (Beck 1997). Francisco Martinez, who recorded testimony from four of Pardo's men at Santa Elena in July 1567, stated that Moyano left Fort San Juan on at least two occasions (Martinez 1990). On the first of these, he took twenty soldiers and perhaps a group of warriors from Joara into southern Virginia, where they attacked and destroyed a native village. Afterward, another mountain chief sent Moyano a message threatening to eat the Spaniard and his dog (probably a large mastiff). Moyano and his soldiers went back into the mountains and destroyed this chief's village too. Martinez's four informants claimed that more than two thousand Indians were killed during the attacks, but this is likely an exaggeration. Putting off their return to Joara, Moyano and his small company continued on to Chiaha, also known as Olamico, a powerful polity in eastern Tennessee. At Chiaha, they built a small fort and waited for Pardo's reinforcement.

Pardo left Santa Elena at Menéndez's command on September 1, 1567, taking 120 soldiers. As already noted, this second expedition was accompanied by an official scribe named Juan de la Bandera who kept two detailed accounts of the journey. The longer of these is particularly useful because of the data it offers on interpolity relations across the Carolina Piedmont. Pardo returned to Canos (or Cofitachequi) on September 10. Bandera notes that an impressive group of *orata* was awaiting the army at Canos, and that all of these had helped to build a large house for the Spaniards there or else had provided some maize. In the longer of his two documents, Bandera carefully distinguishes between the terms *mico* and *orata*: while the latter apparently refers to village headmen—he recorded the names of more than 120 *orata* during the second expedition—the former applied only to those chiefs with regional authority (e.g., Hudson 1990:63). In fact, Bandera explicitly stated that *mico* was the term used for great lords (*un gran señor*) and that *orata* was used for lesser lords (*un menor señor*) (Bandera 1990a:215). He recorded but three *micos* in the longer account: Joara Mico, Guatari Mico, and Olamico (Chiaha).

Thus, there was no *mico* present at Cofitachequi in 1567, though this was the only place in the Carolina Piedmont to which Soto applied the term in 1540. Still, Canos remained an important place, given that at least thirteen *orata* met there to receive Pardo; these included the leaders of Ylasi, Vehidi, Yssa, and Cataba (Bandera 1990a:260). Ylasi is probably the Ylapi of the Soto accounts, where Baltasar de Gallegos employed most of Soto's army to take some maize belonging to the cacica of Cofitachequi. Ylasi seems not to have been a subject of Canos in 1567, for while its *orata* did want credit for helping to build the house for the Spaniards there, he kept his maize contribution in a house he had built for that purpose in his own village (Bandera 1990a:261). Pardo continued north from Canos and visited several towns—Tagaya, Gueça, Aracuchi, and Otari—on the lower reaches of the Catawba River. Each of these towns was certainly subject to Cofitachequi in 1540, though it is unclear whether any remained so in 1567, but each had built its own wooden house for Pardo. All of the towns along the Wateree-Catawba, in fact, built such houses, a point to which we will return.

On September 24, 1567, Pardo arrived at Joara and Fort San Juan, where he learned that his sergeant, Moyano, "was gone from the fort...and that the Indians had him under siege" (Pardo 1990:313–14). Pardo and his company left at once for Chiaha, likely crossing the Appalachians through the Swannanoa Gap and then into eastern Tennessee via the Pigeon River Gap. On October 7, they arrived at Olamico, the main town of Chiaha, where they found Moyano and his men "hard pressed" but safe (Pardo 1990:314). From Chiaha they continued southwest for three days, but at Satapo, Pardo learned of a plot to ambush the expedition and decided to turn back. At Olamico, the company built Fort San Pedro, where Pardo left twenty-seven men. At Cauchi, west of present-day Asheville, North Carolina, they built another fort, San Pablo, garrisoned with eleven men (Bandera 1990a:278). On November 6, the rest of the army returned to Joara.

While the company rested, no fewer than twenty-five *orata* and their *mandadores* or principal men came to see Pardo at Joara, a clear consequence of the burgeoning status enjoyed by this chieftdom and its leader, Joara Mico. Some of these leaders had met with Pardo at Cauchi as he was returning across the mountains, and Hudson suggests that they may have represented Cherokee towns (Hudson 1990:88–89). Some also likely came from Burke phase communities on the upper Catawba and nearby Yadkin rivers. Bandera does report that five were "*caciques of*" Joara Mico (Bandera 1990a:278, italics added), and that their towns likely formed the core of the Joara polity (Beck and Moore 2002:201). Finally, just before Pardo left Joara, two chiefs called Chara Orata and Adini Orata—though nominally

subjects of Guatari—came to switch their allegiance to Joara. To prevent hostility between Guatari and Joara, Pardo persuaded these men to continue giving their obedience in the place they were accustomed.

Leaving thirty men at Fort San Juan, Pardo and the rest of the expedition departed Joara on November 24 and arrived at Guatari on December 15. As at Cofitachequi when Soto passed through the Carolinas in 1540, the *mico* at Guatari was a woman; thus, two of the three *micos* whom Soto and Pardo met in the Carolinas were women. This is rather extraordinary given the lack of complementary evidence (archaeological or documentary) for women holding these highest seats of political leadership in other southern chiefdoms. In his account of the first expedition, Pardo states that thirty *caciques* met him at Guatari, the most at any town during the two expeditions. *Bandera* does not say how many visited during this later occasion, but the number was far less impressive. Pardo told the *mico* to summon her subjects to help the Spaniards build a fort, and from *Bandera*'s list of formal gifts that Pardo made that day, it appears that about seven of the subject *orata* came at the *mico*'s behest (*Bandera* 1990a:284). While at first this number seems low, it is close to the number that *Bandera* describes as "caciques of" Joara *Mico*.

Pardo completed Fort Santiago at Guatari on January 6, 1568. Leaving a corporal named Lucas de Canizares in command of the fort and its sixteen men, he departed on the following day with the rest of his army and arrived at Canos (or Cofitachequi) on January 23. Pardo remained at Canos for eighteen days, building another fort called Santo Tomás where he left thirty men (*Bandera* 1990a:292). Leaving Canos and the Carolina Piedmont, he made a strong house at the coastal-plain village of Orista and then returned to Santa Elena with fewer than a dozen men on March 2, 1568.

Shortly after Pardo's return to Santa Elena, relations between these garrisons and their indigenous hosts took a calamitous turn. By May, news reached Santa Elena that Indians had attacked all of the forts, including Fort San Juan, and that all were destroyed. Only one soldier, Juan Martín de Badajoz, is known to have escaped from the destruction by walking native trails at night and taking cover during the day. Although it is not known whether all the forts were attacked at the same time—in a strategy similar to the better-known Pueblo Revolt of 1680 (*Liebmann*, Chapter 10)—it is clear that none remained by June 1568. With this episode, the native peoples of the southern Appalachians emphatically rebuffed Pardo's attempt to extend Spanish ambitions into their domains, bringing to a tumultuous close Spain's last effort to claim the northern interior of its La Florida venture.

ENTANGLED AGENTS AND THE CONTEXT OF COLONIAL ACTION

It is easy to conceive these events as native resistance to a Spanish attempt at domination. Indeed, this violent rejection of Spain's presence offers a gift-wrapped package for such treatment. However, such an approach also perpetuates an insidious assumption that in any colonial interaction it was inevitably the Indians seeking to resist the might of the Europeans, and, moreover, that the arrival of Europeans on the North American continent was inevitably disastrous for all Native Americans. While this claim is certainly true when applied to the macronarrative of the Columbian Exchange, it is less helpful for understanding any particular context of colonial entanglement. Indeed, it may obfuscate variability in the kinds of interactions between native peoples and Europeans in different times and places. In some cases, as in the expeditions of Juan Pardo, the arrival of Europeans played into the hands of native peoples engaged in their own local contexts of competition, alliance, and exchange (*Preucel*, Chapter 11). An approach based in agency—rather than based on resistance *per se*—offers a more nuanced understanding of colonial entanglements and allows us to focus on these local contexts of action. We are not suggesting that resistance and agency are contradictory concepts, but rather that framing this particular engagement in terms of agency might better direct our attention to the indigenous perspective, thereby helping us to avoid treating native motivation as mere reaction or response.

Here we adopt a perspective on agency advocated by sociologist William Sewell Jr. (2005). This is not the place to present a fuller explication of Sewell's theory (see Beck et al. 2007), but we do need to briefly summarize his approach. At the heart of Sewell's theory is the concept of structure. Expanding the work of Anthony Giddens, Sewell makes an explicit case that social structures consist of material or actual resources and virtual schemas. Sewell's schemas, like Giddens's rules, are "generalizable procedures applied in the enactment/reproduction of social life" (Sewell 2005:131). Schemas are not context dependent (i.e., they are generalizable) and can be transposed to cultural contexts beyond those for which they were originally learned; this makes schemas virtual, as "they can be actualized in a potentially broad and undetermined range of situations" (Sewell 2005:131). Resources are actual in that any opportunity to mobilize them in social action is fixed to place, time, and quantity (Sewell 2005:133). Resources therefore implicate, as they are recursively implicated by, their associated schemas:

before now it had been declared and said unto them by the captain how they were to make the house and maize which they had for His Majesty, and that it was suitable for them to turn Christian and be under his dominion...and...now that His Grace saw that they actually fulfill the things stated above, it is necessary that in the presence of me, the notary, they ratify and approve it. They...declared and said that they will be very happy to do that which has been commanded and declared to them by the captain in His Majesty's name and as such, remaining...under the said dominion, they made the "Yaa," which I, the notary, attest.

Later events would emphatically reveal the degree to which both Pardo and Bandera were mistaken about native submission to His Majesty at Canos and other piedmont towns. In fact, for us to use the concept of resistance to explain the Indians' ultimate rejection of the Spaniards is to reify the latter's line of thought. That is, resistance suggests that the act of building one of these houses represents a temporary loss or a ceding of local autonomy to Spanish authority, an acquiescence that was, in the end, rescinded. Instead, we might need to look more broadly at the indigenous political context for these actions.

Canos—better known as Cofitachequi—was one of the most important places where Pardo requested that a house be built for the Spaniards. As many as a dozen chiefs from nearby towns met with Pardo while he rested there during his first expedition, and it was expected that all of these orata would assist in building the house at Canos and help fill a portion of it with maize. When Pardo returned here during the second expedition, he met again with most of these leaders, all of whom wanted credit for having done their part in making the house. One of these, Ylasi Orata, wanted credit for helping build the house at Canos but was holding his maize contribution in a house he had built for that purpose in his own town. In 1540, when Soto crossed the same region, Ylasi was subject to Canos (the latter keeping a corncrib there to store its tribute), but by making his own structure and filling it with maize, Ylasi Orata was demonstrating—both to Pardo and to Canos—that he was no longer obligated to pay tribute at another town. We suggest that such a motivation likely applied to other peoples along Pardo's path; specifically, making a house for Pardo's expedition became a means for expressing one's autonomy relative to other indigenous towns and polities, and was more a statement about long-simmering and contested local relations than a temporary bow to Spanish authority.

Beyond the opportunity to demonstrate autonomy with respect to other towns and polities, building a house and providing it with a store of maize also allowed some chiefs to coordinate labor on a regional scale and to show their capacity for such expenditures to other leaders and to the Spaniards. At Guatari, Joara, and Canos, for example, it is clear that labor was drawn from neighboring towns and villages. Bandera again reports that seven orata and their associates came when summoned by Guatari Mico. This capacity was not shared by all of the towns that built houses for the expedition—for example, smaller villages such as Ylasi, Tagaya, Otari, and Aracuchi. Thus the act of building a house for these Spaniards also gave some emerging leaders—especially those such as Joara Mico and Guatari Mico, who seem to have lacked regional stature at the time of the Soto expedition—the opportunity to improve their positions at the multicomunity scale.

Gift Exchange

Initially at least, the Pardo expeditions afforded many native leaders an opportunity to acquire exotic European trade goods. Pardo made formal presentations of these goods to the chiefs who came to visit with him and appears to have been particularly generous, not surprisingly, to the leaders of those towns where he garrisoned a fort. Bandera made very meticulous notes about the materials that Pardo presented as gifts, including necklaces of beads (probably glass and brass or copper); small iron chisels, wedges, and knives; pieces of taffeta cloth, silk, and satin; iron axes of various sizes; ball buttons; and small mirrors. During his second expedition, Pardo gave away twenty-nine necklaces, 126 chisels and wedges, thirty-two knives, thirty-five plain or socketed axes, six mirrors, several ball buttons, and many swatches of fabric or textile (Hudson 1990:135–38). These materials were quickly distributed across a wide swath of the Carolinas and nearby areas, as it is clear from the Pardo accounts that many chiefs traveled large distances, sometimes more than one hundred miles, to meet with Pardo and receive a gift for their efforts. Pardo seems to have taken care to distribute these gifts through proper channels of local authority so that native leaders could use these exotic resources to bolster relations with their subjects and with one another. It is significant in this respect that the detailed lists of supplies that Bandera recorded for each of Pardo's six garrisons included no specific trade materials, a point to which we will return.

Numerous examples of such European trade items, all or most of which are likely associated with the Pardo expeditions, are known from Burke phase contexts. During the late 1880s, Smithsonian archaeologists excavating at several burial mounds in the Happy Valley section of the

upper Yadkin River—about twenty miles from the Berry site, as the crow flies—recovered two iron chisels, a small iron axe, an iron spike set in a bone handle, and a piece of an iron blade from Burke phase burials (Moore 2002; Thomas 1894). Moore's (2002) analysis of upper Yadkin ceramics indicates a very close relationship between the people of this area and those of the upper Catawba during the mid-sixteenth century, and the individuals buried with these European items in the upper Yadkin were likely among the *orata* who visited Juan Pardo at Joara in 1567. Significantly, these individuals were also buried with items of native manufacture usually interpreted as markers of status in Late Mississippian societies, including stone spatulate celts and engraved shell gorgets. At Berry, we have recovered more than two dozen glass and rolled brass beads—probably lost from necklaces intended for exchange—since 2001. Also, David Moore recovered an iron knife from a burial that he excavated as part of his dissertation work in 1986 (Moore 2002:235–36). The knife lay across the upper chest of a male individual and may have been worn suspended from the neck.

In summary, the Pardo expeditions provided local leaders over a wide swath of the Carolina Piedmont access to exotic materials that easily fit within native contexts for status and exchange relations. Moreover, the opportunity to receive such goods attracted many leaders to those towns situated along Pardo's path, particularly those where he built forts. From this perspective, hosting such a garrison was likely far from an imposition to *mico* and *orata*—at least at first—but appears instead to have offered a means of increasing one's stature at the local and regional scale, particularly in relation to those chiefs lacking such direct access to the Spaniards and forced to make long treks to participate in these Spanish–native exchange relations.

Military Support

During the six months between Pardo's first and second expeditions, Hernando Moyano, the sergeant whom Pardo placed in charge of Fort San Juan, became embroiled in the violent conflicts between Joara and its adversaries across the Appalachians. According to the statement of Francisco Martinez, Moyano left Fort San Juan on at least two occasions to attack unfriendly villages in present-day southwestern Virginia and eastern Tennessee. Each time, Moyano took twenty of his men across the mountains, and though it is unstated in Martinez's account, the Spaniards were probably accompanied by a contingent of warriors from Joara. It is unclear what events precipitated the first of these excursions, although it seems

most likely that there were long-standing hostilities between these mountain towns and the people of Joara. With the second case, it is clear from Martinez that another chief personally threatened Moyano, with the result that his village was destroyed by the Spaniards and their allies. Unfortunately, while the Martinez document is brief and provides little explicit detail about relationships between Joara and its neighbors, it seems quite likely, if we read between the lines, that Joara Mico successfully entangled Moyano in his own local politics, using the Spanish presence as a resource to intimidate or remove potential rivals. We therefore need to envision Moyano's forays across the Appalachians as more than a simple case of Spanish malfeasance. Instead, Joara Mico may have successfully used the Spaniards—whether they knew it or not—to further his own political and military ends. We suggest that Joara Mico's actions are more easily understood through Sewell's concept of agency than within a framework of domination and resistance.

THE FAILURE OF PARDO'S FORTS

Finally, we would like to consider the destruction of Fort San Juan and the rest of Pardo's undermanned garrisons during the spring of 1568. As we noted at the beginning of this chapter, it is all too easy to interpret this series of events as the ultimate act of resistance—the violent rejection of Spain's colonial enterprise. And yet the people of Joara and other towns had little knowledge of Spain's broader ambitions and indeed had no way of knowing that they were challenging the mightiest empire in the world at the time. We believe that such an understanding of indigenous actions, while not necessarily inaccurate, does misleadingly imply that the only relationships of consequence here were those between the Spaniards and their resisting native hosts. On the contrary, and as our previous discussion suggests, actions the native leaders undertook in their entanglements with the Pardo expedition often had more to do with political positioning relative to other native leaders and towns than to the Spaniards themselves. This is not to suggest that the soldiers at Pardo's forts had not worn out their welcome, but rather that the native attacks on these forts and their aftermath are not reducible to such a tidy interpretation. Evidence from the Berry site may offer dramatic evidence of a more thickly layered set of aims and motivations on the part of Joarans when they destroyed Fort San Juan.

The Weakening of Spanish–Native Relations at Joara

Even before the fall of the Spanish occupation at Joara, there is new evidence that relations between the Spaniards and Joarans had already

begun to fray. We have thus far excavated two of the burned buildings associated with the Spanish compound, Structure 1 and Structure 5. As is evident in Figure 2.2, Structure 5 was built atop a mass of large pit features. There are at least six such pits in the area under or immediately around this building, and most of these pits we have excavated contain Spanish artifacts (Beck et al. 2006: table 1). There are no such pit features in the area under or immediately around Structure 1. Looking at the broader scale of the entire compound, these large features are concentrated in the western section with Structures 2 and 5, while the eastern section with Structures 1 and 3 is relatively free of these pits. We believe that Structures 1 and 3 were probably built first, and that the mass of pits in the western section of the compound were dug in association with the construction and use of these first two buildings. Structures 2 and 5 were built later and are thus intrusive into those pits that define this area. Since we believe that all of these buildings were burned at the same time, when the people of Joara burned Fort San Juan, this interpretation of a construction sequence implies that Structure 1 was used for longer than Structure 5, an implication borne out by recent work.

Our excavations in 2007 and 2008, supported by funds from the National Science Foundation, have revealed that Structure 1 had two superimposed hearths located at the center of the building, one associated with its original floor surface and the other associated with the surface in use when the building burned. Structure 5, by contrast, had only one hearth stage and no evidence of multiple floor surfaces. We feel confident suggesting, then, that Structure 1 saw longer use than Structure 5. We should also point out, though, that neither building appears to have been in use for an extended period. Neither exhibits any evidence of rebuilding and neither was rebuilt after being consumed by fire.

A more obvious difference between the buildings is the time expended in the preparation of the structural surfaces and entryways. While Structure 1 (Figure 2.3) exhibited a clearly defined house basin, a pair of deep entrance trenches, and four central support posts—all typical of native-style Mississippian houses in the South Appalachian area—Structure 5 is more ephemeral in comparison, lacking a clearly defined house basin, entrance trenches, or central support posts. In fact, the posts themselves bring up another point of comparison. Many of the wall posts in Structure 5 display an unusual pattern, in that the postholes are quite large in relation to the actual posts. This would undoubtedly have caused problems with stability, and indeed one of these postholes contained a large fragment of wrought iron jammed between the edge of the post and its posthole as a possible




FIGURE 2.3.

Excavations in Structure 1, showing center posts, wall posts, and entry trenches.

shim (Figure 2.4). In Structure 1, however, all of the posts were rammed into place. We believe that the postholes of Structure 5 were dug with metal tools, perhaps with the shovels we know that Pardo left for his soldiers at Fort San Juan.

What can these architectural details tell us about relations between Spaniards and Indians at Fort San Juan? Here we will offer some preliminary observations. Structure 1 was built in a manner typical of Mississippian buildings in our study area. This in no way contradicts our interpretation of the building as a house for Pardo's soldiers because the Pardo documents evince that Late Mississippian people built such structures for the expedition at many towns in the Carolina Piedmont, including Joara. Structure 5 is an interesting comparison, in that it seems to be much more of an expedient construction. If Structure 1 were built at the beginning of the Spanish occupation of Joara—during the first winter—then both its style and the techniques of its construction indicate a high degree of cooperation



FIGURE 2.4.

Possible wrought iron shim in posthole, Structure 5.

between the Spaniards and the native Joarans. While we have yet to conduct excavations in Structure 3, its location in the eastern part of the compound suggests that a similar interpretation may be warranted. By the time that Structure 5 was built—probably prior to the second winter—it appears that Joarans were supplying the Spaniards with little expertise or support. Rather, its flimsy or expedient character suggests that it and perhaps Structure 2 were built by people with less skill at the construction of such houses. The archaeology of the Spanish compound tells us as much about the fluid and changing native perceptions of the Spaniards in their midst as it does about the Spaniards themselves. As Barbara Voss shows (Chapter 12), the architecture of a colonial encounter is more than just an architecture of the colonizer: it situates in time and space the dynamic relationships between—in our case—would-be colonizers and the indigenous peoples who brought their own agendas to the encounter.

The Destruction of Fort San Juan

By late May 1568, news arrived at Santa Elena that Indians had attacked all the interior forts, and that all had fallen. It is unclear whether every fort was surprised at the same time, in an action prefiguring the better-known Pueblo Revolt of 1680 (see Liebmann, Chapter 10), but it is

clear that none remained by June 1568 (Hudson 1990:176). Several factors appear to have played a role in the Indians' decision to destroy the forts, but two stand out: Spanish demands for food and the soldiers' improprieties with native women. With respect to the provisioning of Pardo's forts, there was probably a great deal of miscommunication between Spaniards and Indians about the presentation of food. By the spring of 1568, the soldiers at the forts may have had few trade goods left to offer in exchange for maize and the other foodstuffs they received from their native hosts. From the Spaniards' perspective, this was fair and just, as the Indians of the Carolina Piedmont were now their subjects, having formally made the "Yaa," and they therefore owed the Spanish Crown—and the men who served as its military stand-ins—continued sustenance as tax or tribute. And yet from the indigenous perspective, the soldiers were no longer fulfilling their part of an exchange relationship, such that they owed the Spaniards nothing (e.g., Mallios 2006).

Sexual politics seem to have played a significant role in the forts' destruction. At the town of Guatari, for example, Bandera (1990a:285) recorded that "the captain commanded him [the corporal placed in charge of Fort Santiago] in the name of His Majesty...that no one should dare bring any woman into the fort at night and that he should not depart from the command under pain of being severely punished." However, Teresa Martín, a native woman taken to Santa Elena on Pardo's second expedition and wife of Juan Martín de Badajoz (believed to be the only survivor of the attack on the forts), testified to Governor Canço in 1600 that the men waited "three of four moons" for Pardo to return to the interior, and that when he had failed to do so they began to commit improprieties with native women, angering their men (Hudson 1990:176). We recognize that there are many ways to interpret these "improprieties" and acknowledge that sexual violence may have played a role in the ultimate destruction of Pardo's forts. But we should not generalize all such relationships without better documentary support. During the early 1700s, for example, indigenous women across the piedmont actively sought and maintained sexual relations with English traders, and we see no reason to assume that native women lacked such agency during the occupation of Fort San Juan. In fact, Indian women from the interior later married two of Pardo's soldiers. So while it is possible that sexual violence occurred at Joara, we have no direct historical evidence for it and some good reasons for believing that native-Spanish sexual relations here were more complex than this. As with other aspects of the entanglement, we must situate sex in its appropriate social-historical context.

In any event, 130 soldiers and all six of the forts were lost, and with them Spain's only attempt to colonize the deep interior of northern La Florida. Indeed, the destruction of Pardo's forts precipitated the shrinking of Spain's claims in the American Southeast. Virginia, known as Ajacán, was abandoned in 1571 after a brief, disastrous mission attempt. Santa Elena, too, was finally abandoned in 1587, after which time Spain's territorial holdings in the Southeast were largely limited to modern-day Florida. Even so, no Europeans penetrated as far into the southern interior as Soto and Pardo until the second half of the seventeenth century.

The failure of Fort San Juan also may have changed the native political landscape more durably than we might expect, given the brief span of its occupation. At Berry, much of the mound's construction may have postdated the burning of the fort. Evidence from David Moore's 1986 excavations offers intriguing support for this possibility. Two fragments of olive jars and one piece of lead sprue were recovered from a partially intact humus zone overlaying moundfill on the south margin of the mound. During the time that the zone was forming, this part of the mound was only about 1 m high (Moore 2002:220, Figure 2.3), suggesting a low earthen feature similar to those that Cyrus Thomas described in Caldwell County in his reports on the Smithsonian's Yadkin River fieldwork. If so, then most of the mound's volume was added *after* the humus zone formed—and thus after these olive jar sherds and lead sprue were deposited—as we know that the Berry mound eventually attained a height of at least 4 m (Thomas 1891:151). While careful stratigraphic analysis is needed to resolve the temporal context of the mound, it is possible that the people of Joara used the destruction of Fort San Juan to consolidate political authority in the upper Catawba and neighboring regions, a triumph they celebrated in the expansion of their mound into a true platform.

If we may assume then that the Spaniards had already worn out their welcome by sometime in the spring of 1568, and that the material resources they demanded from Joarans (namely food and native women) were no longer matched by the resources they offered in return, then Joara Mico may have used his attack as a demonstration of strength—not to the Spaniards, of course, but to his neighbors. Platform mounds are quite uncommon here, and it may only have been in the aftermath of the fort's destruction that Joara Mico earned the political capital to sponsor such a monument's enlargement. Documents from the Pardo expeditions suggest that Joara Mico was actively trying to consolidate or expand his authority at the time of the expeditions, and we believe that the destruction of Fort San Juan may have offered him an opportunity to do so.

CONCLUSION

In summary, we find the concepts of domination and resistance too restrictive for the context of the Juan Pardo expeditions. We do not doubt that there are many parts of the Americas where these terms provide a solid foundation for understanding indigenous interactions with Spain. However, it may be the case that these concepts fare less well in areas where Spain fared less well, in areas where the duration of the entanglement was relatively brief and where Spain failed to establish a long-term institutional presence. Rather, we have tried to show how native polities of the Carolina Piedmont mobilized resources of the Pardo expeditions—human and non-human alike—for their own political, economic, and military ends. This approach turns our focus away from mere reaction and onto the native context of motivated action or agency.

Enduring Conquests

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Edited by Matthew Liebmann and Melissa S. Murphy



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