I. THE POLITICAL-ECONOMY OF PROTECTION

 

A. Domestic Political Economy

 

1. Institutional Context of the Domestic Politics of Trade Policy: US

 

a. Overviews

 

-R. Baldwin (1985). The Political Economy of US Import Policy. Cambridge: MIT Press.

 

-I.M. Destler (1986). American Trade Politics: System Under Stress. Washington, DC: IIE.

 

-R. Barrie (1987). Congress and the Executive: The Making of US Foreign Trade Policy, 1789-1968. New York: Garland Press.

 

-R. Baldwin (1988). “US Trade Policy, 1945-1988: From Foreign Policy to Domestic Policy”. in C. Pearson and J. Riedel, eds. The Directions of Trade Policy. Oxford: Blackwell.

 

-E. Ray (1988). “Changing Patterns in Protectionism: The Fall in Tariffs and the Rise in Non-Tariff Barriers”. Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business; V.8-#2, pp. 285-327.

 

-P. Nivola (1993). Regulating Unfair Trade. Washington, DC: Brookings.

 

-S. O’Halloran (1994). Politics, Process, and American Trade Policy. Ann Arbor: Michigan.

 

-E. Kaplan (1995). American Trade Policy, 1923-1995. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press.

 

-A. Eckes (1995). Opening America’s Market: U.S. Foreign Trade Policy Since 1776. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

 

b. Legislative Structure, Process, and General Political Economy

 

(1) The Classic Tariff System

 

-F. Taussig (1931). The Tariff History of the US. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons.

 

-J.J. Pincus (1975). “Pressure Groups and the Pattern of Tariffs”. JPE; V.83-#4, pp. 757-778.

 

-Pincus, J.J. (1977). Pressure Groups and Politics in Ante-Bellum Tariffs. New York: Columbia University Press.

 

-Pope, Clayne (1972). “The Impact of the Ante-Bellum Tariff on Income Distribution”. Explorations in Economic History; V.9-#4, pp. 375-421.

 

-Baack, Ben and Edward John Ray (1973/4). “Tariff Policy and Income Distribution: The Case of the United States, 1830-1860”. Explorations in Economic History; V.11-#2, pp. 103-121.

 

-James, John (1978). “The Welfare Effects of the Antebellum Tariff: A General Equilibrium Analysis”. Explorations in Economic History; V.15-#3, pp. 231-256.

 

-B. Baack and E. Ray (1983). “The Political Economy of Tariff Policy: A Case Study of the US”. Explorations in Economic History; V.20-#?, pp. 73-93.

 

-J.A.C. Conybeare (1991). “Voting for Protection: An Electoral Model of Tariff Policy”. IO; V.45-#1, pp. 57-81.

 

-W. Becker (1982). The Dynamics of Business Government Relations: Industry and Exports, 1893-1921. Chicago: University of Chicago Press

 

-J. Kenkel (1983). Progressives and Protection: The Search for a Tariff Policy, 1866-1936. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America.

 

-C. Hody (1996). Politics of Trade: American Political Development and Foreign Economic Policy. Hanover, NH: Dartmouth/University Press of New England.

 

-E. Stanwood (1904). American Tariff Controversies in the 19th Century (Two Vols.). Boston: Houghton Miflin and Co.

 

-T. Terrill (1973). The Tariff, Politics and American Foreign Policy, 1874-1901. Westport: Greenwood Press.

 

-F.W. Poulshock (1965). The Two Parties and the Tariff in the 1880's. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.

 

-C. Stern (1971). Protectionist Republicanism: Republican Tariff Policy in the McKinley Period. Oshkosh: Stern.

 

-D. Detzer (1973). “Business Reformers and Tariff Revision: The Payne-Aldrich Tariff of 1909”. The Historian; V.35-#?, pp. 196-204.

 

-D. Verdier (1993). “The Politics of Trade Preference Formation: The US from the Civil War to the New Deal”. Politics and Society; V.21-#4, pp. 365-392.

 

-J. Reitano (1994). The Tariff Question in the Gilded Age. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.

 

-C. Calhoun (1996). “Political Economy in the Gilded Age: The Republican Party’s Industrial Policy”. Journal of Policy History; V.8-#3, pp. 291-309.

 

-K. Schneitz (1994). “The 1916 Tariff Commission: Democrats' Use of Expert Information to Constrain Tariff Protection”. Business and Economic History; V.23-#1, pp.176-189.

 

-K. Schneitz (1998). “Democrats’ 1916 Tariff Commission: Responding to Dumping Fears and Illustrating the Consumer Costs of Protectionism”. Business History Review; V.72-#1, pp.1-45.

 

(2) The Smoot-Hawley Tariff

 

(a) Political Economy

 

-E.E. Schattschneider (1935). Politics, Pressure and the Tariff. New York: Prentice Hall.

 

-B. Eichengreen (1989). “The Political Economy of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff”. Research in Economic History; V.12, pp. 1-43.

 

-M. Hayford and C. Pasurka (1992). “The Political Economy of the Fordney-McCumber and Smoot-Hawley Tariff Acts”. Explorations in Economic History; V.29-#1, pp. 30-50.

 

-C. Callahan, J. McDonald, and A. O’Brien (1994). “Who Voted for Smoot-Hawley?”. Journal of Economic History; V.54-#3, pp. 683-690.

 

-R. Cupitt and E. Elliott (1994). “Schattschneider Revisited: Senate Voting on the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930". Economics and Politics; V.6-#4, pp. 187-199.

 

-D. Irwin and R. Kroszner (1996). “Economic Interests and Logrolling in the Passage of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff”. Carnegie-Rochester Series on Public Policy, #45, pp. 173-200. [Comments by M. Bordo, pp. 201-205.]

 

(b) How High Was the Smoot-Hawley Tariff?

 

-M. Hayford and C. Pasurka (1991). “Effeective Rates of Protection and the Fordney-McCumber and Smoot-Hawley Tariff Acts”. Applied Economics; V.23-#?, pp. 1385-1392.

 

-R. Archibald, D. Feldman, M. Hayford, and C. Pasurka (2000). “Effective Rates of Protection and the Fordney-McCumber and Smoot-Hawley Tariff Acts: Comments and Revised Estimates”. Applied Economics; V.32-#9, pp. 1223-1226.

 

-M. Crucini (1994). “Sources of Variation in Real Tariff Rates: The US, 1900-1940". AER; V.84-#3, pp. 732-743.

 

-D. Irwin (1998). “Changes in U.S. Tariffs: The Role of Import Prices and Commercial Policies”. American Economic Review; V.88-#4, pp. 1015-1026.

 

(c) Macroeconomic Consequences of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff

 

-P. Friedman (1974). The Impact of Trade Destruction on National Incomes. Gainesville: University of Florida Press.

 

-B. Eichengreen and D. Irwin (1995). “Trade Blocs, Currency Blocks, and the Reorientation of World Trade in the 1930s”. JIE; V.38-#1/2, pp. 1-24.

 

-M. Crucini and J. Kahn (1996). “Tariffs and Aggregate Economic Activity: Lessons from the Great Depression”. JMonE; V.38-#3, pp. 427-467.

 

-D. Irwin (1998). “The Smoot-Hawley Tariff: A Quantitative Assessment”. REStat; V.53-#2, pp. 326-334.

 

-R. Archibald and D. Feldman (1998). “Investment during the Great Depression: Uncertainty and the Role of Smoot-Hawley Tariff”. SEJ; V.64-#4, pp. 857-879.

 

-J. McDonald, A. O'Brien, and C. Callahan (1997). “Trade Wars: Canada's Reaction to the Smoot-Hawley Tariff”. Journal of Economic History; V.57-#4, pp. 802-826.

 

-A. Eckes (1995). “Revisiting Smoot-Hawley”. Journal of Policy History; V.7-#3, pp. 295-310.

 

-A. Eckes (1998). “Smoot-Hawley and the Stock Market Crash, 1929-1930". International Trade Journal; V.12-#1, pp. 65-82.

 

-K. Carey (1999). “Investigating a Debt Channel for the Smoot-Hawley Tariffs: Evidence from the Sovereign Bond Market”. Journal of Economic History; V.59-#3, pp. 748-761.

 

-J. Madsen (2001). “Trade Barriers and the Collapse of World Trade During the Great Depression”. SEJ; V.67-#4, pp. 848-868.

 

(3) The RTAA and the Transition to the Modern System

 

-S. Haggard (1988). “The Institutional Foundations of Hegemony: Explaining the Trade Agreements Act of 1934". International Organization. V.42-#1; pp. 91-119.

 

-D. Nelson (1989). “Domestic Political Preconditions of US Trade Policy: Liberal Structure and Protectionist Dynamics”. Journal of Public Policy; V.9-#1, pp. 83-108.

 

-W. Hansen and T. Prusa (1993). “Congressional Decision-Making and the Rise of Delegation: An Application to Trade Policy”. ms: SUNY Stony Brook.

 

-K. Schneitz (1996). “To Delegate or Not To Delegate: Congressional Institutional Choices in the Regulation of Foreign Trade”. Business and Society; V.35-#1, pp. 129-36.

 

-M. Bailey, J. Goldstein and B. Weingast (1997). “The Institutional Roots of American Trade Policy: Politics, Coalitions, and International Trade”. WP; V.49-#3, pp. 309-338.

 

-M. Gilligan (1997). Empowering Exporters: Reciprocity, Delegation and Collective Action in American Trade Policy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

 

-D. Irwin (1997). “From Smoot-Hawley to the Reciprocal Trade Agreements: Changing the Course of U.S. Trade Policy in the 1930's”. in M. Bordo, C. Goldin, and E. White, eds. The Definint Moment: The Great Depression and the American Economy in the Twentieth Century. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 325-352.

 

-D. Irwin and R. Kroszner (1999). “Interests, Institutions, and Ideology in Securing Policy Change: The Republican Conversion to Trade Liberalization after Smoot-Hawley”. Journal of Law and Economics; V.42-#2, pp. 643-674.

 

-M. Hiscox (1999). “The Magic Bullet? The RTAA, Institutional Reform, and Trade Liberalization”. IO; V.53-#4, pp. 669-698.

 

-K. Schnietz (2000). “The Institutional Foundations of U.S. Trade Policy: Revisiting Explanations for the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act”. Journal of Policy History, V.12-#4, pp. 417-444.

 

-K. Schnietz (2003). “The 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act: Investor Response to Political Institutional Change”. International Organization; V.53-#4, pp. 669-698.

 

-M. Butler (1998). Cautious Visionary: Cordell Hull and Trade Reform, 1933-1937. Kent: Kent State University Press.

 

(4) The Modern Trade Policy System

 

-R. Bauer, I.deS. Pool and L.A. Dexter (1963). American Business and Public Policy. Chicago: Aldine.

 

-T. Lowi (1964). “American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies and Political Theory”. WP; V.16-#4, pp. 347-382.

 

-J.R. Wilkinson (1960). Politics and Trade Policy. Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press.

 

-R. Pastor (1980). Congress and the Politics of US Foreign Economic Policy, 1929-1976. Berkeley: University of California Press.

 

-S. Lande and C. VanGrasstek (1986). The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984: Trade Policy in the Reagan Administration. Lexington: DC Heath.

 

-P.S. Nivola (1986). “The New Protectionism: US Trade Policy in Historical Perspective”. Political Science Quarterly; V.101-#4, pp. 577-600.

 

-P.S. Nivola (1990). “Trade Policy: Refereeing the Playing Field”. in T. Mann, ed. A Question of Balance: The President, Congress and Foreign Policy. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 201-253.

 

-D. Yoffie (1989). “American Trade Policy: An Obsolete Bargain?”. in J. Chubb and P. Peterson, eds. Can Government Govern? Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 100-138.

 

-C. Pearson (1989). Free Trade, Fair Trade? The Reagan Record. Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute.

 

-S. Schwab (1994). Trade-Offs: Negotiating the Ombibus Trade and Competitiveness Act. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.

 

-S. Dryden (1995). Trade Warriors: USTR and the American Crusade for Free Trade. New York: Oxford University Press.

 

-B. Fordham (1998). “Economic Interests, Party, and Ideology in Early Cold War Era U.S. Foreign Policy”. IO; V.52-#2, pp. 359-396.

 

-J. Schoch (1998). “Party Politics and International Economic Activism: The Reagan-Bush Years”. Political Science Quarterly; V.113-#?, pp. 113-131.

 

-Mayer, F. (2000). “Labor, Environment and the State of U.S. Trade Politics”. NAFTA: Law and Business Review of the Americas; V.6-#3, pp. 335-346.

 

-Uslaner, E. (2000). “The Democratic Party and Free Trade: An Old Romance Restored”. NAFTA: Law and Business Review of the Americas; V.6-#3, pp. 347-362

 

-Schiller, W.J. (2000). “Has Free Trade Won the War in Congress, or is the Battle Still Raging”. NAFTA: Law and Business Review of the Americas; V.6-#3, pp. 363-387

 

-Schiller, Wendy (1999). “Trade Politics in the American Congress: A Study of the Interaction of Political Geography and Interest Group Behavior”. Political Geography; V.18-#7, pp. 769-789.

 

-M. Bailey (1998). “Trade-Security Linkage in Congress and the Origins of Cold War Trade Policy”. ms: Georgetown University.

 

-R. Phelps (1993). “International Perspective: American Public Opinion on Trade, 1950-1990”. Business Economics; V.28-#3, pp. 35-40.

 

c. Administrative Structure and Process

 

-I.B. Kravis (1954). “The Trade Agreements Escape Clause”. AER; V.44-#3, pp. 319-338.

 

-W.B. Kelly (1962). “The 'Expanded' Trade-Agreements Escape Clause, 1955-61". AER; V.70-#1, pp. 37-63.

 

-W.B. Kelly, ed. (1963). Studies in US Commercial Policy. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

 

-J. Goldstein (1986). “The Political Economy of Trade: Institutions of Protection”. APSR; V.80-#1, pp. 161-184.

 

-D. Nelson (1989). “On the High Track to Protection: The US Automobile Industry, 1979-1981". in S. Haggard and C. Moon, eds. Pacific Dynamics. Boulder: Westview Press, pp. 97-128.

 

-J.M. Finger and T. Murray (1990). “Policing Unfair Imports: The US Example”. Journal of World Trade; V.24-#4, pp. 39-53.

 

-E. Grinols (1990). “Procedural Protectionism: The New American Trade Bill and the New Interventionist Mode”. WA; V.?-#?, pp. 501-521.

 

-D. Palmeter (1989). “The Capture of Anti-Dumping Law”. Yale Journal of International Law; V.14-#1, pp.

 

-M. Leidy and B. Hoekman (1991). “Spurious Injury as Indirect Rent-Seeking: Free Trade under the Prospect of Protection”. E&P; V.3-#4, pp. 111-137.

 

-M. Leidy (1994). “Quid Quo Pro Restraint and Spurious Injury: Subsidies and Prospect for CVDs”. in A. Deardorff and R. Stern, eds. Analytical and Negotiating Issues in the Global Trading System. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 263-305.

 

-R. Baldwin (1998). “Imposing Multilateral Discipline on Administered Protection”. in A. Krueger, ed. The WTO as an International Organization. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 297-327.

 

2. Historical Studies in the Politics of Protection

 

a. Comparative Studies

 

-C. Kindleberger (1951). “Group Behavior and International Trade”. JPE; V.59-#1, pp. 30-46.

 

-A. Gerschenkron (1962). Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of Essays. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

 

-J. Kurth (1979). “The Political Consequences of the Product Cycle”. IO; V.33-#1, pp. 1-34.

 

-A. Milward (1981). “Tariffs as Constitutions”. in S. Strange and R. Tooze, eds. The International Politics of Surplus Capacity. London: Allen and Unwin. pp. 57-66.

 

-P. Gourevitch (1986). Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

 

-P. Bairoch (1988). “European Trade Policy, 1815-1914". in P. Mathias and S. Pollard, eds. Cambridge Economic History of Europe. V.8, Industrial Economies. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 1-160.

 

-R. Rogowski (1989). Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments. Princeton: PUP.

 

-D. Verdier (1994). Democracy and International Trade: Britain, France and the US, 1860-1990. Princeton: PUP.

 

-J. Hobson (1997). The Wealth of States: A Comparative Sociology of International Economic and Political Change. Cambridge: CUP.

 

b. Britain

 

-B. Brown (1943). The Tariff Reform Movement in Great Britain, 1881-1895. New York: Columbia University Press.

 

-W. Chaloner (1970). “The Agitation Against the Corn Laws”. in J. Ward, ed. Popular Movements c. 1830-1850. London: Macmillan.

 

-W. Grampp (1982). “Economic Opinion When Britain Turned to Free Trade”. History of Political Economy; V.14-#?, pp. 496-520.

 

-W. Grampp (1987). “Britain and Free Trade: In Whose Interest?”. Public Choice; V.55-#?, pp. 245-256.

 

-W. Grampp (1987). “How Britain Turned to Free Trade”. Business History Review; V.61-#?, pp. 86-112.

 

-G. Anderson and R. Tollison (1985). “Ideology, Interest Groups, and the Repeal of the Corn Laws”. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, V.141-#2, pp. 197-212.

 

-D. Irwin (1989). “Political Economy and Peel’s Repeal of the Corn Laws”. E&P; V.1-#1, pp. 41-59.

 

-T. McKeown (1989). “The Politics of Corn Law Repeal and Theories of Commercial Policy”. BJPS; V.19-#?, pp. 353-380.

 

-J. Williamson (1990). “The Impact of the Corn Laws Just Prior to Repeal”. Explorations in Economic History; V.27-#2, pp. 123-156.

 

-C. Schonhardt-Bailey (1991). “Lessons in Lobbying for Free Trade in 19th-Century Britain: To Concentrate or Not”. APSR; V.85-#1, pp. 37-58.

 

-C. Schonhardt-Bailey (1991). “Specific Factors, Capital Markets, Portfolio Diversification and Free Trade: Domestic Determinants of the Repeal of the Corn Laws”. WP; V.43-#4, pp. 545-569.

 

-K. O’Rourke (1994). “The Repeal of the Corn Laws and Irish Emigration”. Explorations in Economic History; V.31-#1, pp. 120-138.

 

-M. Lusztig (1995). “Solving Peel’s Puzzle: Repeal of the Corn Laws and Institutional Preservation”. Comparative Politics; V.?-#?, pp. 393-408.

 

-P. Fraser (1962). “Unionism and Tariff Reform: The Crisis of 1906”. Historical Journal; V.5-#?, pp. 149-166.

 

-K. Brown (1970). “The Trade Union Tariff Reform Association, 1904-1913”. Journal of British Studies; V.9-#2, pp. 141-153.

 

-A.W. Coats (1968). “The Political Economy of the Tariff Reform Campaign of 1903”. Journal of Law and Economics; V.11-#?, pp. 181-229.

 

-A. Sykes (1979). Tariff Reform in British Politics, 1903-1913. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

 

-F. Capie (1983). Depression and Protectionism: Britain Between the Wars. London: Allen and Unwin.

 

A.J. Marrison (1983). “Businessmen, Industries and Tariff Reform in Great Britain, 1903-1930". Business History; V.25-#?, pp. 148-178.

 

-D. Irwin (1994). “The Political Economy of Free Trade: Voting in the British General Election of 1906". Journal of Law and Economics; V.37-#1, pp. 75-108.

 

-D. Irwin (1996). “Industry or Class Cleavages over Trade Policy?: Evidence from the British General Election of 1923". in R. Feenstra, G. Grossman and D. Irwin, eds. The Political Economy of Trade Policy. Cambridge: MIT, pp. 53-75.

 

-B. Eichengreen (1992). “The Eternal Fiscal Question: Free Trade and Protection in Britain, 1860-1929. in F. Capie, ed. Protectionism in the World Economy. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

 

-F. Capie (1981). “Shaping the British Tariff Structure in the 1930's”. Explorations in Economic History; V.18-#?, pp. 155-173.

 

c. Canada

 

-R. Johnston and M. Percy (1980). “Reciprocity, Imperial Sentiment and Party Politics in the 1911 Election”. Canadian Journal of Political Science; V.13-#?, pp. 711-729.

 

d. Germany

 

-A. Gerschenkron (1943). Bread and Democracy in Germany. Berkeley: University of California Press.

 

-I. Lambi (1963). Free Trade and Protection in Germany, 1868-1896. Weisbaden: Steiner.

 

-H. Böhme (1968). “Big Business Pressure Groups and Bismarck’s Trun to Protectionsim, 1873-1879". Historical Journal; V.10-#2, pp. 218-236.

 

-S. Webb (1977). “Tariff Protection for the Iron Industry, Cotton Textiles and Agriculture in Germany, 1979-1914". Jahrbucher für Nationalökonomie und Stastik; V.192-#3/4, pp. 336-357.

 

-S. Webb (1980). “Tariffs, Cartels, Technology and Growth in the German Steel Industry, 1879-1914". Journal of Economic History; V.40-#2, pp. 309-329.

 

-S. Webb (1982). “Agricultural Protection in Wilhelminan Germany: Forging and Empire with Pork and Rye”. Journal of Economic History; V.42-#2, pp. 309-326.

 

-R. Moeller (1981). “Peasants and Tariffs in the Kaiserreich: How Backward were the ‘Bauern’?”. Agricultural History; V.55-#4, pp. 370-384.

 

e. France

 

-M. Smith (1977). “Free Trade versus Protection in the Early Third Republic: Economic Interests, Tariff Policy, and the Making of the Republican Synthesis”. French Historical Studies; V.10-#2, pp. 293-314.

 

-M. Smith (1980). Tariff Reform in France, 1860-1900. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

 

-B. Ratcliffe (1978). “The Tariff Reform in France, 1831-1836". Journal of European Economic History; V.7-#1, pp. 61-138.

 

-J. Nye (1991). “The Myth of Free Trade Britain and Fortress France: Tariffs and Trade in the Nineteenth Century”. Journal of Economic History; V.51-#1, pp. 23-46.

 

-J. Nye (1991). “Revisionist Tariff History and the Theory of Hegemonic Stability”. Politics and Society; V.19-#2, pp.209-232.

 

3. Comparative Institutional Analysis

 

a. Japan

 

-I. Magaziner and T. Hout (1980). Japanese Industrial Policy. Berkeley: University of California Institute of International Studies.

 

-C. Johnson (1982). Miti and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

 

-K. Yamamura, ed. (1982). Policy and Trade Issues in the Japanese Economy: American and Japanese Perspectives. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

 

-C. Higashi (1983). Japanese Trade Policy Formulation. New York: Praeger.

 

-M. Schmieglow (1985). “Cutting Across Doctrines: Positive Adjustment in Japan”. IO; V39-#2, pp. 261-296.

 

-M. Schmieglow (1986). “The Reform of Japan's Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law: A Case of Qualitative Economic Policy”. in M. Schmieglow, ed. Japan's Response to Crisis and Change in the World Economy. Armonk: M.E. Sharp, pp. 1-27.

 

-G. Saxonhouse and K. Yamamura, eds. (1986). Law and Trade Issues in the Japanese Economy: American and Japanese Perspectives. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

 

-K. Yamamura (1986). “Caveat Emptor: The Industrial Policy of Japan”. in P. Krugman, ed. Strategic Trade Policy and the New International Economics. Cambridge: MIT Press. pp. 169-209.

 

-K. Suzumura and M. Okuno-Fujiwara (1987). “Industrial Policy in Japan: Overview and Evaluation”. in R. Sato and P. Wachtel, eds. Trade Friction and Economic Policy. Cambridge: CUP. pp. 50-79.

 

-R. Komiya, M. Okuno and K. Suzumura, eds. (1988). Industrial Policy of Japan. San Diego: Academic Press.

 

-K. Calder (1988). “Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation: Explaining the Reactive State”. WP; V.40-#?, pp. 517-541.

 

-M. Anchordoguy (1988). “Mastering the Market: Japanese Government Targeting of the Computer Industry”. IO; V.42-#3, pp. 509-453.

 

-D. Okimoto (1989). Between MITI and the Market: Japanese Industrial Policy for High Technology. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

 

-C. Johnson, L. Tyson and J. Zysman, eds. (1989). Politics and Productivity: The Real Story of How Japan Works. Cambridge: Ballinger.

 

-H. and M. Schmieglow (1990). “How Japan Affects the International System”. IO; V.44-#4, pp. 553-588.

 

-F. Weil and N. Glick (1979). “Japan: Is the Market Open? A View of the Japanese Market Drawn from US Corporate Experience”. Law and Policy in International Business. V.3-#?, pp. 815-907.

 

-G. Saxonhouse (1983). “The Micro- and Macro- Economics of Foreign Sales in Japan”. in W. Cline, ed. Trade Policies in the 1980s. Washington, DC: IIE. pp. 259-304.

 

-G. Saxonhouse (1983). “What's All This About 'Industrial Targeting' in Japan?”. World Economy; V.?-#?, pp. 253-274.

 

-G. Saxonhouse (1985). “Industrial Policy and Factor Markets: Biotechnology in Japan”. Prometheus; V.3-#?, pp. 277-314.

 

-G. Saxonhouse (1986). “What's Wrong with Japanese Trade Structure”. Pacific Economic Papers; V.?-#?, pp. 1-36.

 

-R.Z. Lawrence (1987). “Imports in Japan: Closed Markets or Minds?” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity; 1987-#2, pp. 517-548.

 

-R. Staiger, A. Deardorff and R. Stern (1987). “An Evaluation of Factor Endowments and Protection as Determinants of Japanese and American Foreign Trade”. CJE; V.20-#?, pp. 449-463.

 

-R. Staiger, A. Deardorff and R. Stern (1988). “The Effects of Protection on the Factor Content of Japanese and American Foreign Trade”. REStat; V.70-#?, pp. 475-483.

 

-G. Saxonhouse (1989). “Differentiated Products, Economies of Scale, and Access to Japanese Markets”. in R. Feenstra, ed. Trade Policies for International Competitiveness. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 145-183.

 

-R.E. Lawrence (1991). “Efficient of Exclusionist? The Import Behavior of Japanese Corporate Groups”. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity; 1991:1; pp. (comment by Saxonhouse)

 

-M. Noland (1993). “The Impact of Industrial Policy on Japan’s Trade Specialization”. REStat; V.75-#?, pp. 241-248.

 

-B. Balassa and M. Noland (1988). Japan and the World Economy. Washington, DC: IIE.

 

-P. Krugman, ed. (1991). Trade with Japan: Has the Door Opened Wider. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER.

 

b. Australia

 

-A. Capling and B. Galligan (1992). Beyond the Protective State: The Political Economy of Australia’s Manufacturing Industry Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

 

-A. Woodland (1992). “Trade Policies in Australia”. In D. Salvatore, ed. National Trade Policies. Westport: Greenwood Press, pp. 241-260.

 

-W.M. Corden (1996). “Protection and Liberalization in Australia and Abroad”. Australian Economic Review; V.114-#2, pp. 141-154.

 

c. European Countries and the EC

 

-W. Feld (1979). “Implementation of the EC's Common Agricultural Policy: Expectations, Fears, Failures”. IO; V.33-#3, pp. 335-363.

 

-L. Tsoukalis and A. daS. Ferreira (1980). “Management of Industrial Surplus Capacity in the EC”. IO, V.34-#3, pp. 355-376.

 

-E. Verreydt and J. Waelbroek (1982). “European Community Protection Against Manufactured Imports from Developing Countries: A Case Study in the Political Economy of Protection”. in J. Bhagwati, ed. Import Competition and Response. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 368-393.

 

-J. Pearce, J. Sutton and R. Batchelor (1985). Protection and Industrial Policy in Europe. London: RKP.

 

-R. Hine (1985). The Political Economy of European Trade: An Introduction to the Trade Policies of the EEC. New York: St. Martins.

 

-J. Hayes (1993). Making Trade Policy in the European Community. New York: St. Martins.

 

-S.A.B. Page (1981). “The Revival of Protectionism and Its Consequences for Europe”. Journal of Common Market Studies; V.20-#?, pp. 17-40.

 

-M. Kahler (1985). “European Protectionism in Theory and Practice”. WP; V.37-#?, pp. 475-502.

 

-V. Cable (1983). “Economics and Politics of Protection: Some Case Studies of Industries”. World Bank Staff Working Paper. #569. (UK case)

 

-B. Bobe (1983). “Public Assistance to Industries and Trade Policy in France”. World Bank Staff Working Paper, #570.

 

-P. Messerlin (1986). “Export-credit Mercantilism a la Francaise”. World Economy; V.9-#4, pp.385-408.

 

-E. Grilli (1980). “Italian Commercial Policies in the 1970's”. World Bank Staff Working Paper, #428.

 

-E. Grilli and M. LaNoce (1983). “The Political Economy of Protection in Italy”. World Bank Staff Working Paper, #567.

 

-P.K.M. Tharakan (1980). “The Political Economy of Protection in Belgium”. World Bank Staff Working Paper; #431.

 

-K.A. Koekkoek, J. Kol and L.B.M. Mennes (1981). “On Protectionism in the Netherlands”. World Bank Staff Working Paper; #493.

 

-H.H. Glismann and F.D. Weiss (1980). “On the Political Economy of Protection in Germany”. World Bank Staff Working Paper; #427.

 

-P. Katzenstein, ed. (1978). Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

 

-P. Katzenstein (1984). Corporatism and Change: Austria, Switzerland and the Politics of Industry. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

 

-P. Katzenstein (1985). Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

 

d. East Asian NICs

 

-B. Cummings (1984). “The Origins and Development of the Northeast Asian Political Economy”. IO; V.38-#1, pp. 1-40.

 

-G. White and R. Wade, eds. (1985). Developmental States in East Asia. Brighton, UK: IDS, Research Report #16.

 

-F. Deyo, ed. (1987). The Political Economy of New Asian Industrialism. Ithaca: Cornell.

 

-S. Haggard (1990). Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in Newly Industrializing Countries. Ithaca: Cornell.

 

-G. Gereffi and D. Wyman (1990). Manufacturing Miracles: Paths of Industrialization in Latin America and East Asia. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

 

(1) Mostly Taiwan

 

-A. Amsden (1985). “The State and Taiwan’s Economic Development”. in P. Evans, et al., eds. Bringing the State Back In. New York: Cambridge University Press.

 

-T. Gold (1986). State and Society in the Taiwan Miracle. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe.

 

-K.S. Liang and C.H. Liang (1986). “The Industrial Policy of Taiwan”. in H. Mutoh, et al., Industrial Policies for Pacific Economic Growth. Sydney: Allen & Unwin, pp. 104-125.

 

-S. Chan (1987). “The Mouse that Roared: Taiwan's Management of Trade Relations with the US”. Comparative Political Studies. V.20-#3, pp. 251-292.

 

-E. Winckler and S. Greenhalgh, eds. (1988). Contending Approaches to the Political Economy of Taiwan. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe.

 

-R. Wade (1990). Governing the Market. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

 

(2) Mostly Korea

 

-J. Odell (1985). “The Outcomes of International Trade Conflicts: The US and South Korea”. ISQ; V.29-#?, pp. 263-386.

 

-A. Amsden (1989). Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization. New York: Oxford University Press.

 

-S. Haggard and C. Moon (1983). “Liberal, Dependent or Mercantile?: The South Korean State in the International System”. in J. Ruggie, ed. Antinomies of Interdependence. New York: Columbia University Press.

 

-S. Haggard and C. Moon (1990). “Institutions and Economic Policy: Theory and a Korean Case Study”. WP; V.42-#2, pp. 210-237.

 

-S. Haggard, D. Kim and C. Moon (1991). “The Transition to Export-led Growth in South Korea: 1954-1966". Journal of Asian Studies; V.50-#4, pp. 850-873.

 

e. Latin America

 

-D.R. Mares (1990). “Domestic Institutions and Shifts in Trade and Development Policy”. in J. Odell and T. Willett, eds. International Trade Policies: Gains from Exchange Between Economics and Political Science. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. pp. 193-223.

 

-S. Sanderson (1992). The Politics of Trade in Latin American Development. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

 

-P. Smith (1992). “The Political Impact of Free Trade on Mexico”. Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs; V.34-#?, pp. 1-25.

 

-M. Pastor and C. Wise (1994). “The Origins and Sustainability of Mexico's Free Trade Policy”. IO; V.48-#3, pp. 459-489.

 

4. Empirical Studies on the Political Economy of Protection

 

a. Correlates of Interindustry Variation in Protection

 

-N. Fielke (1976). “The Tariff Structure for Manufacturing Industries in the US: A Test of Some Traditional Explanations”. Columbia Journal of World Business; V.11-#4, pp. 98-104.

 

-R. Caves (1976). “Economic Models of Political Choice: Canada's Tariff Structure”. CJE; V.9-#2, pp. 278-300.

 

-G. Helleiner (1977). “The Political Economy of Canada's Tariff Structure: An Alternative Model”. CJE; V.10-#2, pp. 318-326.

 

-R. Saunders (1980). “The Political Economy of Effective Tariff Protection in Canada's Manufacturing Sector”. CJE; V.13-#2, pp. 340-348.

 

-J.A.C. Conybeare (1978). “Public Policy and the Australian Tariff Structure”. Australian Journal of Management; V.??-#?, pp.49-59.

 

-J.A.C. Conybeare (1984). “Politicians and Protection: Tariffs and Elections in Australia”. PC; V.43-#2, pp. 203-209.

 

-K. Anderson (1980). “The Political Market for Assistance to Australian Manufacturing Industries”. EcRec; V.56-#153, pp. 132-144.

 

-C. Aislabie (1988). “Economic Incentives and the Pattern of the Australian Tariff”. Australian Economic Papers; V.27-#50, pp. 20-32.

 

-D. Feaver and K. Wilson (1998). “Unlocking Australia’s Contingent Protection Black Box”. Economic Record; V.74-#224, pp. 62-73.

 

-J. Hartigan (1981). “Does Factor Content Determine Protection?”. SEJ; V.48-#?, pp. 144-148.

 

-R. Lavergne (1983). The Political Economy of US Tariffs: An Empirical Study. New York: Academic Press.

 

-W. Cline (1984). “The Determinants of Protection in Industrial Countries”. Chapter 2 of Exports of Manufactures from Developing Countries. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 34-84.

 

-D. Greenaway and C. Milner (1994). “Determinants of the Inter-Industry Structure of Protection in the UK”. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics; V.56-#4, pp. 399-419

 

-M. Metcalfe and B. Goodwin (1999). “An Empirical Analysis of the Determinants of Trade Policy Protection in the U.S. Manufacturing Sector”. Journal of Policy Modeling; V.21-#2, pp. 153-165.

 

-R. Lopez and E. Pagoulatos (1996). “Trade Protection and the Role of Campaign Contributions in US Food and Tobacco Industries”. EcInq; V.34-#2, pp. 237-248.

 

-F. McGillvray (1997). “Party Discipline as a Determinant of the Endogenous Formation of Tariffs”. AJPS; V.41-#2, pp. 584-607

 

b. Regulation Theory: Partial Equilibrium Models of Endogenous Protection

 

(1) Theoretical Framework

 

(a) General Papers on Regulation Theory

 

-G. Stigler (1971). “The Theory of Economic Regulation”. Bell Journal; V.2-#1, pp. 3-21.

 

-S. Peltzman (1976). “Toward a More General Theory of Regulation”. JLawEcon; V.19-#2, pp. 211-240.

 

-G. Becker (1983). “A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence”. QJE; V.98-#3, pp. 371-400.

 

-G. Becker (1985). “Public Policies, Pressure Groups and Deadweight Costs”. JPubE; V.28-#?, pp. 329-347.

 

-S. Peltzman (1989). “The Economic Theory of Regulation After a Decade of Deregulation”. BPEA; Microeconomics, pp. 1-41.

 

-D. Wittman (1989). “Pressure Group Size and the Politics of Income Redistribution”. SC&W; V.6-#?, pp. 275-286.

 

-E. Rasmusen and M. Zupan (1991). “Extending the Economic Theory of Regulation to the Form of Policy”. PC; V.72-#< pp. 167-191.

 

-G. Becker and C. Mulligan (1998). “Deadweight Costs and the Size of Government”. NBER Working Paper, #6789.

 

(b) Regulation Theoretic Approaches to Trade Policy

 

-A.L. Hillman (1982). “Declining Industries and Political Support Protectionist Motives”. AER; V.72-#5, pp. 1180-1187.

 

-J. Cassing and A.L. Hillman (1986). “Shifting Comparative Advantage and Senescent Industry Collapse”. AER; V.76-#?, pp. 516-523.

 

-N.V. Long and N. Vousden (1991). “Protectionist Responses and Declining Industries”. JIE; V.30-#1/2, pp. 87-103.

 

-J.P. Choi (2001). “Protectionist Response to Import Competition in Declining Industries Reconsidered”. European Journal of Political Economy; V.17-#1, pp. 193-201

 

-D. Feldman and I. Gang (1996). “Revenue Motives and Trade Liberalization”. RIE; V.4-#3, pp. 276-281.

 

-S. Wellisz and J.D. Wilson (1986). “Lobbying and Tariff Formation: A Deadweight Loss Consideration”. JIE; V.20-#?, pp. 367-375.

 

-J.D. Wilson (1990). “Are Efficiency Improvements in Government Transfer Policies Self-Defeating in Political Equilibrium?”. E&P; V.2-#3, pp. 241-258.

 

-R.V. Fabella (1991). “The Bias in Favor of Pro-Tariff Lobbies”. JPubE; V.44-#1, pp. 87-93.

 

-M. Leidy (1994). “Trade Policy and Indirect Rent-Seeking: A Synthesis of Recent Work”. E&P; V.6-#2, pp. 97-118.

 

-D. Gould and G. Woodbridge (1997). “Building Trade Barriers and Knocking them Down”. RIE; V.5-#2, pp. 256-271.

 

-J. Devereux and L.L. Chen (1999). “Growth, the External Terms of Trade and Endogenous Trade Liberalization”. PC; V.98-#1/2, pp. 43-57.

 

-P. Messerlin (1981). “The Political Economy of Protectionism: The Bureaucratic Case”. WA; V.117-#3, pp. 469-495.

 

-W. Mayer (1999). “The Political Economy of Administering Trade Laws”. in J. Piggott and A. Woodland, eds. International Trade Policy and the Pacific Rim. London: Macmillan, pp. 245-262.

 

(2) Empirical Findings

 

-K. Anderson and R. Baldwin (1987). “The Political Market for Protection in Industrial Countries”. in A.M. El-Agraa, ed., Protection, Cooperation, Integration and Development. New York: Macmillan.

 

-E. Ray (1981). “The Determinants of Tariffs and Nontariff Trade Restrictions in the US”. JPE; V.89-#?, pp. 105-121.

 

-E. Ray (1981). “Tariff and Nontariff Barriers to Trade in the US and Abroad”. REStat; V.68-#2, pp. 161-168.

 

-E. Ray (1991). “Protection of Manufactures and the US”. in D. Greenaway, ed. Global Protectionism: Is the US Playing on a Level Field. London: MacMillan, pp. 12-36.

 

-W. Dougan (1985). “Tariffs and the Economic Theory of Regulation”. Research in Law and Economics; V.6, pp. 187-210.

 

-P. Godek (1985). “Industry Structure and Redistribution Through Trade Restrictions”. Journal of Law and Economics; V.28-#3, pp. 687-703.

 

-D. Trefler (1993). “Trade Liberalization and the Theory of Endogenous Protection: An Econometric Study of US Import Policy”. JPE; V.101-#1, pp. 138-160.

 

-A. Dick (1996). “Explaining Managed Trade as Rational Cheating”. RIE’ V.4-#1, pp. 1-16.

 

-J.W. Lee and P. Swagel (1997). “Trade Barriers and Trade Flows across Countries and Industries”. Review of Economics and Statistics; V.79-#3, pp. 372-82.

 

-K. Gawande (1997). “Testing Theories of Endogenous Protection: Robust Evidence From U.S. Nontariff Barrier Data”. in K. Maskus, P. Hooper, E. Leamer, and J.D. Richardson, eds. Quiet Pioneering: Robert M. Stern and His International Economic Legacy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 37-70.

 

-K. Gawande (1998). “Comparing Theories of Endogenous Protection: Bayesian Comparison of Tobit Models Using Gibbs Sampling Output”. REStat; V.?-#?, pp. 128-140.

 

-Kishore Gawande and Alok Bohara (2000). “Errors-in-Variables Bounds in a Tobit Model of Endogenous Protection”. Southern Economic Journal; V.66-#4, pp. 881-905.

 

-M. Busch and E. Reinhardt (1999). “Industrial Location and Protection: The Political and Economic Geography of U.S. Nontariff Barriers”. AJPS; V.43-#4, pp. 1028-1050.

 

-P. Goldberg and G. Maggi (1997). “Protection for Sale: An Empirical Analysis”. AER; V.89-#5, pp. 1135-1155.

 

-C. Hamilton (1990). “The Political Economy of Transient 'New' Protectionism”. WA; V.?-#?, pp. 522-545.

 

c. Explaining Legislative Votes on Protection

 

(1) General Trade Legislation

 

-R. Watson (1956). “The Tariff Revolution: A Study of Shifting Party Attitudes”. Journal of Politics; V.18-#4, pp. 678-701.

 

-R. Baldwin (1976). “The Political Economy of Postwar US Trade Policy”. NYU C.J. Devine Institute of Finance Bulletin--#4.

 

-C. Coughlin (1985). “Domestic Content Legislation: House Voting and the Economic Theory of Regulation”. EcInq; V.23-#?, pp. 437-448.

 

-S. Tosini and E. Tower (1987). “The Textile Bill of 1985: The Determinants of Congressional Voting Patterns”. PC; V.54-#?, pp. 19-25.

 

-J. McCarthur and S. Marks (1988). “Constituent Interest vs. Legislator Ideology: The Role of Political Opportunity Cost”. EcInq; V.26-#?, pp. 461-470.

 

-J. McCarthur and S. Marks (1989). “Empirical Analyses of the Determinants of Protection: A Survey and Some New Results”. in J. Odell and T. Willett, eds. International Trade Policies: Gains from Exchange Between Economics and Political Science. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. pp. 105-139.

 

-S. Nollen and H. Iglarsh (1990). “Explanations of Protectionism in International Trade”. PC; V.66-#?, pp. 137-153.

 

-L. Wade and J. Gates (1990). “A New Tariff Map of the United States (House of Representatives)”. Political Geography Quarterly; V.9-#3, pp. 284-304.

 

-J. Lutz (1991). “Determinants of Protectionist Attitudes in the United States House of Representatives”. International Trade Journal; V.5-#3, pp. 301-328.

 

-S. Marks (1993). “Economic Interests and Voting on the Omnibus Trade Bill of 1987". PC, V.75-#1, pp. 21-42.

 

-S. Nollen and D. Quinn (1994). “Free Trade, Fair Trade, Strategic Trade, and Protectionism in the US Congress, 1987-1988". IO; V.48-#3, pp. 491-525.

 

-K. Srinivasan (1997). “An Empirical Analysis of the Political Economy of Tariffs”. E&P; V.9-#1, pp. 55-70.

 

-E. Gartzke and J.M. Wrighton (1998). “Thinking Globally or Acting Locally? Determinants of the GATT Vote in Congress”. LSQ; V.23-#1, pp. 33-55.

 

-M. Bailey and D. Brady (1998). “Heterogeneity and Representation: The Senate and Free Trade”. AJPS; V.42-#2, pp. 524-544.

 

-Michael Bailey (2001). “Quiet Influence: The Representation of Diffuse Interests on Trade Policy, 1983–94". Legislative Studies Quarterly; V.26-#1, pp. 45-80.

 

-R. Baldwin and C. Magee (2000). “Is Trade Policy for Sale? Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Bills”. Public Choice; V.105-#1/2, pp. 79-101.

 

-S. O’Halloran (1994). Politics, Process, and American Trade Policy. Ann Arbor: Michigan.

 

-W. Keech and K. Pak (1995). “Partisanship, Institutions, and Change in American Trade Politics”. JoP; V.57-#4, pp. 1130-1142.

 

-W. Hansen and T. Prusa (1997). “The Role of the Median Legislator in US Trade Policy: A Historical Analysis”. EcInq; V.35-#1, pp. 97-107.

 

-M. Gilligan (1997). Empowering Exporters: Reciprocity, Delegation and Collective Action in American Trade Policy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

 

(2) NAFTA

 

-W. Kaempfer and S. Marks (1993). “The Expected Effects of Trade Liberalisation: Evidence from U.S. Congressional Action on Fast-Track Authority”. World Economy; V.16-#6, pp. 725-740.

 

-F. Boadu and M. Thompson (1993). “The Political Economy of the U.S.-Mexico Free Trade Agreement: Analysis of the Congressional Fast Track Vote”. Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics; V.25-#2, pp. 27-35.

 

-L. Kahane (1996). “Senate Voting Patterns on the 1991 Extension of the Fast Track Trade Procedures: Prelude to NAFTA”. PC; V.87-#1, pp. 35-53.

 

-L. Kahane (1996). “Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA: An Empirical Analysis”. American Journal of Economics and Sociology; V.55-#4, pp. 395-409.

 

-J. Conybeare and M. Zinkula (1996). “Who Voted Against the NAFTA”. World Economy; V.19-#1, pp. 1-12.

 

-J. Steagall and K. Jennings (1996). “Unions, PAC Contributions, and the NAFTA Vote”. Journal of Labor Research; V.17-#3, pp. 515-521.

 

-J. Steagall and K. Jennings (1996). “Unions and NAFTA’s Legislative Passage: Confrontation and Cover”. Labor Studies Journal, V21-#1, pp. 61-79.

 

-J. Garand, C.D, Livingston, and K. Wink (1996). “Dispositions, Constituencies, and Cross-Pressures: Modelling Roll-Call Voting on the North American Free Trade Agreement”. Political Research Quarterly; V.49-#4, pp. 729-748.

 

-J. Box-Steffenmeister, L. Arnold, C. Zorn (1997). “The Strategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress: A Study of the North American Free Trade Agreement”. APSR; V.91-#2, pp. 324-338.

 

-W. Thorbecke (1997). “Explaining House Voting on the North American Free Trade Agreement”. PC; V.92-#3/4, pp. 231-242.

 

-D. Holian, T. Krebs, and M. Walsh (1997). “Constituency Opinion, Ross Perot, and Roll-Call Behavior in the U.S. House: The Case of the NAFTA”. LSQ; V.22-#3, pp. 369-392.

 

-Kamdar, Nipoli and Jorge Gonzalez (1998). “An Empirical Analysis of the U.S. Senate Vote on NAFTA and GATT”. International Advances in Economic Research; V.4-#2, pp. 105-14.

 

-I.-B. Kang and K. Greene (1999). “A Political Economic Analysis of Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA”. PC; V.98-#3/4, pp. 385-397.

 

-K. Schnietz and T. Nieman (1999). “Politics Matter: The 1997 Derailment of Fast-Track Negotiating Authority”. Business and Politics, V.1-#?, pp. 233-251.

 

-K. Bardwell (2000). “The Puzzling Decline in House Support for Free Trade: Was Fast Track a Referendum on NAFTA?”. Legislative Studies Quarterly; V.25-#4, pp. 591-610.

 

d. Explaining Administered Protection Outcomes

 

(1) Presidential Preferences and Discretion

 

-R. Baldwin (1981). “US Political Pressures Against Adjustment to Greater Imports”. in W. Hong and L. Krause, eds. Trade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of the Pacific Basin. Seoul: Korea Development Institute.

 

-F. Boadu, F. Ruppel and A. Angel (1992). “An Empirical Model of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in Trade Restrictions”. Eurpoean Journal of Political Economy; V.8-#?, pp. 281-293.

 

(2) The ITA’s LTFV Decision

 

-J.M. Finger, H.K. Hall and D.R. Nelson (1982). “The Political Economy of Administered Protection”. AER; V.72-#3, pp. 452-466.

 

-R. Baldwin and M. Moore (1992). “Political Aspects of the Administration of the Trade Remedy Law”. in R. Boltuck and R. Litan, eds. Down in the Dumps: Administration of the Unfair Trade Laws. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 253-280.

 

-Hansen, W. L. and K. O. Park (1995). Nation-state and pluralistic decision making in trade policy: The case of the international trade administration. International Studies Quarterly; V.39-#2, pp. 181-211.

 

(3) The ITC’s Injury Decision

 

-J. Goldstein and S. Lenway (1989). “Interests or Institutions: An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC Relations”. ISQ; V.33-#?, pp. 303-327.

 

-S. Lenway and K. Rehbein (1989). “Rent Seekers in the U.S. International Trade Commission Escape Clause Investigations”. International Trade Journal; V.4-#2, pp. 119-142.

 

-S. Lenway and D. Schuler, “The Determinants of Corporate Political Involvement in Trade Protection: The Case of the Steel Industry”. In R. Baldwin, ed. Empirical Studies of Commercial Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 75-105.

 

-W. Hansen (1990). “The International Trade Commission and the Poltics of Protection”. APSR; V.84-#1, pp. 21-46.

 

-R. Baldwin and J. Steagall (1991). “An Analysis of Factors Influencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping, Countervailing Duty and Safeguards Cases”. WA; V.130-#2, pp. 290-307.

 

-M. Moore (1992). “Rules or Politics? An Empirical Analysis of Antidumping Decisions”. EcInq; V.30-#3, pp. 449-466.

 

-T. Prusa (1991). “The Selection of Antidumping Cases for ITC Determination”. in R. Baldwin, ed. Empirical Studies of Commercial Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 47-71.

 

-J. DeVault (1993). “Economics and the International Trade Commission”. SEJ; V60-#?, pp. 463-478.

 

-K. Anderson (1993). “Agency Discretion or Statutory Direction: Decision Making at the US ITC”. Journal of Law and Economics; V.36-#?, pp. 915-935.

 

-K. Rehbein and S. Lenway (1993). “Industry Structure or Managerial Discretion: The Determinants of Industry Political Success in the U.S. International Trade Commission’s Escape Clause Investigations”. In J. Post, ed. Research in corporate social performance and policy. Volume 14. Greenwich, Conn: JAI press, pp. 3-18.

 

-C. Rowley and W. Thorbecke (1996). “Congressional Influence over Decision-Making at the ITC”. In F. Schneider and J. Casas Pardo, eds. Current Issues in Public Choice. Cheltenham: Elgar, pp. 189-199.

 

-D. Butler (1995). Does ‘Independent’ Mean ‘Free From Influence’?: Escape Clause Decision Making at the U.S. International Trade Commission. New York: Garland Press.

                            

-W. Hansen and T. Prusa (1996). “Cumulation and ITC Decision-Making: The Sum of the Parts is Greater than the Whole”. EcInq; V.34-#4, pp. 746-769.

 

-W. Hansen and T. Prusa (1997). “The Economics and Politics of Trade Policy: An Empirical Analysis of ITC Decision Making”. RIE; V.5-#2, pp. 230-245.

 

-R. Cumby and T. Moran (1997). “Testing Models of the Trade Policy Process: Antidumping and the ‘New Issues’”. In R. Feenstra, ed. The Effect of U.S. Trade Protection and Promotion Policies. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 161-190.

 

-M. Czinkota and M. Kotabe (1997). “A Marketing Perspective on the US ITC’s Antidumping Actions: An Empirical Inquiry”. V32-#2, pp. 169-187.

 

-J. DeVault (2002). “Congressional Dominance and the International Trade Commission”. Public Choice; V.110-#1/2, pp. 1-22.

 

-R. Feinberg (1989). “Exchange Rates and ‘Unfair Trade’”. REStat; V.71-#4, pp. 704-707.

 

(4) Harassment and Withdrawal: Who Files and Why?

 

-J.M. Finger (1981). “The Industry-Country Incidence of Less-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Trade”. Quarterly Review of Economics and Business; V.21-#?, pp. 260-279.

 

-M. Herander and J.B. Schwartz (1984). “An Empirical Test of the Impact of the Threat of US Trade Policy: The Case of Antidumping Duties”. SEJ; V.51-#1, pp. 59-79.

 

-R. Feinberg and B. Hirsch (1989). “Industry Rent-Seeking and the Filing of 'Unfair' Trade Complaints”. International Journal of Industrial Organization; V.7-#?, pp. 325-340.

 

-T. Prusa (1992). “Why are So Many Antidumping Petitions Withdrawn”. JIE; V.33-#1/2.

 

-R. Staiger and F. Wolak (1994). “Measuring Industry-specific Protection: Antidumping in the US”. BPEA; 1994: Microeconomics, pp. 51-118.

 

-R. Staiger and F. Wolak (1996). “Differences in Uses and Effects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sources”. in A. Krueger, ed. The Political Economy of American Trade Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 385-415.

 

(5) Comparative Analysis

 

-P. Messerlin (1990). “The EC Antidumping Regulations: A First Economic Appraisal”. WA; V.126-#?, pp. 562-587.

 

-P.K.M. Thrakan (1991). “The Poltical Economy of Antidumping Undertakings in the European Communities”. EER; V.35-#?, pp. 1341-1359.

 

-P.K.M. Tharakan and J. Waelbroeck (1994). “Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and in the US: An Experiment in Comparative Political Economy”. EER; V.38-#1, pp. 171-193.

 

-A. Eymann and L. Schuknecht (1996). “Antidumping Policy in the European Community: Political Discretion or Technical Determination”. E&P; V.8-#2, pp. 111-131.

 

e. The Income Tax and the Political Economy of the Tariff

 

-B. Baack and E. Ray (1985). “Special Interests and the Adoption of the Income Tax in the US”. Journal of Economic History; V.45-#3, pp. 607-625.

 

-B. Baack and E. Ray (1985). “The Political Economy of the Origin and Development of the Federal Income Tax”. in R. Higgs, ed. Emergence of Modern Political Economy (Research in Economic History, supplement 4). Greenwood: JAI Press, pp. 121-138.

 

-J.M. Hansen (1990). “Taxation and the Political Economy of the Tariff”. IO; V.44-#4, pp. 527-551.

 

-G. Gardner and K. Kimbrough (1992). “Tax Regimes, Tariff Revenues and Government Spending”. Eca; V.59-#1, pp. 75-92.

 

-G. Gardner and K. Kimbrough (1992). “Tax Smoothing and Tariff Behavior in the US”. Journal of Macroeconomics; V.14-#4, pp. 711-729.

 

f. Macroeconomic Conditions and Protection

 

(1) Tariff Protection

 

-T. McKeown (1984). “Firms and Tariff Change: Explaining the Demand for Protection”. WP; V.36-#2, pp. 215-233.

 

-J. Cassing, T. McKeown and J. Ochs (1986). “The Political Economy of the Tariff Cycle”. APSR; V.80-#3, pp. 843-862.

 

-R. Dornbusch and J. Frankel (1987). “Macroeconomics and Protection”. in R. Stern, ed. US Trade Policies in a Changing World Economy. Cambridge: MIT. pp. 77-130.

 

-Magee, Stephen P. (1987). “The Political-Economy of US Protectionism”. in H. Giersch, ed. Free Trade and the World Economy: Towards and Opening of Markets. Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr, pp. 368-402.

 

-Magee, Stephen P. and Leslie Young (1987). “Endogenous Protection in the United States, 1900-1984". in Stern, ed., pp. 145-195.

 

-G. Gardner and K. Kimbrough (1989). “The Behavior of US Tariff Rates”. AER; V.79-#1, pp. 91-110. [comment by Sadorsky, 1994, V.84-#4, pp. 1097-1103.]

 

-A. Bohara and W. Kaempfer (1991). “A Test of Tariff Endogeneity in the United States”. AER; V.81-#4, pp. 952-960.

 

-A. Bohara and W. Kaempfer (1991). “Testing the Endogeneity of Tariff Policy in the US: Further Evidence”. EcLets; V.35-#?, pp. 311-315.

 

-S. Das and S.P. Das (1994). “Quantitative Assessment of Tariff Endogeneity: Interwar vs. Postwar”. EcLets; V.44-#?, pp. 139-146.

 

-S. Lohmann and S. O’Halloran (1994). “Divided Government and US Trade Policy: Theory and Evidence”. IO; V.48-#4, pp. 592-632.

 

-D. Epstein and S. O’Halloran (1996). “The Partisan Paradox and the US Tariff, 1877-1934". IO; V.50-#2, pp. 301-324.

 

-H.K. Hall, C. Kao, and D. Nelson (1998). “Women and Tariffs: Testing the Gender Gap Hypothesis in a Downs-Mayer Political-Economy Model”. Economic Inquiry, 1998, V.36-#2, pp. 320-332.

 

-A. Bohara and W. Kaempfer (1992). “Endogenous Protection and Retaliation Between Canada and the US”. EcLets; V.38-#?, pp. 335-339.

 

-G. Gardner, D. Slottje and K. Kimbrough (1992). “Tariff Behavior in Five European Countries”. EcLets; V. 39-#?, pp. 73-78.

 

-A. Bohara and W. Kaempfer (1994). “Tariff Behavior in Five European Countries: Further Evidence”. EcLets; V.45-#?, pp. 213-216.

 

-I. Henriques and P. Sadorsky (1994). “The Determinants and Persistence of Canadian Tariff Rates”. CJE; V.27-#1, pp. 112-128.

 

-W. Thompson and L. Vescera (1992). “Growth Waves, Systemic Openness, and Protectionism”. IO; V.46-#2, pp. 493-532.

 

-R. Reuveny and W. Thompson (1997). “The Timing of Protectionism”. Review of International Political Economy; V.4-#?, pp. 179-213.

 

-W. Thompson and R. Reuveny (1998). “Tariffs and Trade Fluctuations: Does Protectionism Matter as Much as We Think?”. IO; V.52-#2, pp. 421-440.

 

(2) Administered Protection

 

-W. Takacs (1981). “Pressures for Protectionism: An Empirical Analysis”. EcInq; V.19-#?, pp. 687-693.

 

-S. Feigenbaum, H. Ortiz and T. Willett (1985). “Protectionist Pressures and Aggregate Economic Conditions: Comment on Takacs”. EcInq; V.23-#1, pp. 175-182.

 

-S. Feigenbaum and T. Willett (1985). “Domestic versus International Influences on Protectionist Pressures in the US”. in S. Arndt, R. Sweeney and T. Willett, eds. Exchange Rates, Trade and The US Economy. Cambridge: Ballinger, pp. 181-190.

 

-W. Shughart and R. Tollison (1985). “The Cyclical Character of Regulatory Activity”. PC; V.45-#?, pp. 303-311.

 

-Salvatore, Dominick (1987). “Import Penetration, Exchange Rates, and Protectionism in the US”. Journal of Policy Modelling; V.9: pp. 125-141.

 

-E. Grilli (1988). “Macro-economic Determinants of Trade Protection”. World Economy; V.11-#3, pp. 313-326.

 

-C. Coughlin, J. Terza and N.A. Kahlifah (1989). “The Determinants of Escape Clause Petitions”. REStat; V.??-#?, pp. 341-347.

 

-M. Leidy (1997). “Macroeconomic Conditions and Pressures for Protection under Antidumping and Countervaling Duty Laws: Empirical Evidence from the US”. IMFSP; V.44-#1, pp. 132-144.

 

-M. Knetter and T. Prusa (2000). “Macroeconomic Factors and Antidumping Filings: Evidence from Four Countries”. JIE; V.61-#1, pp. 1-17.

 

5. Endogenous Tariff Theory

 

a. Surveys/Overviews

 

-D. Nelson (1988). “Endogenous Tariff Theory: A Critical Survey”. AJPS; V.32-#3, pp. 796-837.

 

-A.L. Hillman (1988). The Political Economy of Protection. Chur: Harwood Academic Publishers.

 

-S. Magee, W. Brock and L. Young (1989). Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

 

-D. Austen-Smith (1991). “Rational Consumers and Irrational Voters: A Review Essay on Magee, Brock and Young”. E&P; V.3-#1, pp. 73-92.

 

-W. Mitchell and M. Munger (1991). “Economic Models of Interest Groups”. AJPS; V.35-#2, pp. 512-546.

 

-D. Rodrik (1995). “Political Economy of Trade Policy”. in G. Grossman and K Rogoff, eds. Handbook of International Economics--V.III. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 1457-1494.

 

-E. Helpman (1995). “Politics and Trade Policy”. in D. Kreps and K. Wallis, eds. Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 19-45. Also in in R. Baldwin, D. Cohen, A. Sapir, and A. Venables, eds. Market Integration, Regionalism and the Global Economy. Cambridge: CUP/CEPR, pp. 86-112.

 

-J. Alt, J. Frieden, M. Gilligan, D. Rodrik, and R. Rogowski (1997). “The Politics of International Trade: Enduring Puzzles and an Agenda for Inquiry”. Comparative Political Studies; V.29-#?, pp. 689-717.

 

-Kishore Gawande and Pravin Krishna (2003). “The Political Economy of Trade Policy: Empirical Approaches”. In E. Kwan Choi and James Harrigan, eds. Handbook of International Trad. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 213-250.

 

b. Deriving Agent Preferences

 

-J. Bhagwati (1982). “Shifting Comparative Advantage, Protectionist Demands and Policy Response”. in J. Bhagwati, ed. Import Competition and Response. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 153-184.

 

-E. Dinopoulos (1983). “Import Competition, International Factor Mobility and Lobbying Responses”. JIE; V.14-#?, pp. 395-410.

 

-J. deMelo and S. Robinson (1982). “Trade Adjustment Policies and Income Distribution in Three Archetype Developing Economies”. JDevEc; V.10-#?, pp. 67-92.

 

-R. Baldwin (1984). “Rent-Seeking and Trade Policy: An Industry Approach”. WA; V.120-#4, pp. 662-676.

 

-L. Leger (1993). “Land Rents and the Demand for Protection”. International Trade Journal; V.7-#4, pp. 435-462.

 

-T. Pugel and I. Walter (1985). “US Corporate Interests and the Political Economy of Trade”. REStat; V.??-#?, pp. 465-473.

 

-V. Aggarwal, R. Keohane and D. Yoffie (1987). “The Dynamics of Negotiated Protection”. American Political Science Review; V.81-#2, pp. 345-366.

 

-H. Milner and D. Yoffie (1989). “Between Free Trade and Protectionism: Strategic Trade Policy and a Theory of Corporate Trade Demands”. IO; V.43-#2, pp. 239-272.

 

-S. Magee (1978). “Three Simple Tests of the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem”. in P. Oppenheimer, ed. Issues in International Economics; Stocksfield: Oriel Press, pp. 138-153.

 

-D. Nelson and C. Wasley (1989). “Two is Not Enough: A Capital Market Test of 3x2 Endogenous Tariff Theory”. ms: Murphy Institute, Tulane University.

 

-A. Krueger (1980). “Protectionist Pressures, Imports and Employment in the US”. ScanJE; V.??-#?, pp. 133-146.

 

-I.M. Destler and J. Odell (1987). Anti-Protection: Changing Forces in US Trade Politics. Washington, DC: IIE.

 

-H. Milner (1988). Resisting Protectionism: Global Industries and the Politics of International Trade. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

 

-E. Balistreri (1997). “The Performance of the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek Model in Predicting Endogenous Trade Policy Forces at the Individual Level”. CJE; V.30-#1, pp. 1-17.

 

-K. Scheve and M. Slaughter (2001). “What Determines Individual Trade Policy Preferences”. JIE; V.54-#2, pp. 267-292.

 

-K. O’Rourke and R. Sinnott (2001). “The Determinants of Individual Trade Policy Preferences: International Survey Evidence”. Brookings Trade Policy Forum 2001, forthcoming.

 

-A.M. Mayda and D. Rodrik (2001). “Why Are Some People (and Countries) More Protectionist Than Others?”. ms: Kennedy School of Government.

 

c. The Organization of Interests

 

-P. Murrell (1981?). “Comparative Growth and Comparative Advantage: Tests of the Effects of Interest Group Behavior on Foreign Trade Patterns”. PC; V.??-#?, pp. 35-53

 

-D. Yoffie and S. Bergenstein (1985). “Creating Political Advantage: The Rise of the Corporate Political Entrepreneur”. California Management Review; V.28-#1, pp. 124-139.

 

-G. Lehmbruch (1986). “Interest Groups, Government and the Politics of Protectionism”. Aussenwirtschaft; V.41-#2/3, pp. 273-302.

 

-H.K. Hall and D. Nelson (1989). “Institutional Structure and Time Horizon in a Simple Political-Economy Model: The Lowi Effect”. International Spectator; V.24-#3/4, pp.153-173.

 

-A.L. Hillman (1991). “Protection, Politics and Market Structure”. in E. Helpman and A. Razin, eds. International Trade and Trade Policy. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 120-140.

 

-M. Herander and R. Pupp (1991). “Firm Participation in Steel Industry Lobbying”. EcInq; V.29-#?, pp. 134-147.

 

-S. Lenway and D. Schuler (1991). “The Determinants of Corporate Political Involvement in Trade Protection: The Case of the Steel Industry.” in R. Baldwin, ed. Empirical Studies of Commercial Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 75-105.

 

-P. Midford (1993). “International Trade and Domestic Politics: Improving on Rogowski’s Model of Political Alignments”. IO; V.47-#?, pp. 535-564.

 

-J. Alt and M. Gilligan (1994). “The Political Economy of Trading States: Factor Specificity, Collective Action Problems and Domestic Political Institutions”. Journal of Political Philosophy; V.2-#?, pp. 165-192.

 

-K. Gawande (1997). “US Non-Tariff Barriers as Privately Provided Public Goods”. JpubE; V.64-#?, pp. 61-81.

 

-K. Gawande (1998). “Stigler-Olson Lobbying Behavior in Protectionist Industries: Evidence from the Lobbying Power Function”. JEBO; V.35-#?, pp. 477-499.

 

-Y. S. Chiu (1998). “Politics, Structure of Protection, and Welfare”. RIE; V.6-#3, pp.

 

-D. Mitra (1999). “Endogenous Lobby Formation and Endogenous Protection: A Long-Run Model of Trade Policy Determination”. AER; V.89-#5, pp. 1116-1134.

 

-R. Damania and P.G. Fredriksson (2000). “On the Formation of Industry Lobby Groups”. JEBO. V.41-#4, pp. 315-335.

 

-L. Salamon and J. Siegfried (1977). “Economic Power and Political Influence: The Impact of Industry Structure on Public Policy”. APSR; V.71-#?, pp. 1026-1043.

 

-E. Esty and R. Caves (1983). “Market Structure and Political Influence: New Data on Political Expenditures, Activity and Success”. EcInq; V.?-#?, pp. 24-38.

 

-D. Jacobs (1988). “Corporate Economic Power and the State: A Longitudinal Assessment”. American Journal of Sociology; V.93-#4, pp. 852-881.

 

-D. Clawson and A. Neustadtl (1989). “Interlocks, PACs, and Corporate Conservatism”. American Journal of Sociology; V.94-#4, pp. 749-793.

 

-K. Grier, M. Munger and B. Roberts (1991). “The Industrial Organization of Corporate Political Participation”. SEJ; V.57-#3, pp. 727-738.

 

-B. Kennelly and P. Murrell (1991). “Industry Characteristics and Interest Group Formation: An Empirical Study”. PC; V.70-#1, pp. 21-40.

 

-L. Kristov, P. Lindert and R. McClelland (1992). “Pressure Groups and Redistribution”. JPubE; V.48-#?, pp. 135-163.

 

-T. Moe (1980). The Organization of Interests. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

 

-G.K. Wilson (1977). Unions in American National Politics. London: Macmillan.

 

-G.K. Wilson (1985). Business and Politics: A Comparative Introduction. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House.

 

-L. Lynn and T. McKeown (1988). Organizing Business: Trade Associations in America and Japan. Washington,DC: AEI.

 

-D. Mitchell (1970). “Labor and the Tariff Question”. Industrial Relations; V.1-#3, pp. 268-276.

 

d. Equilibrium Policy Choice: Levels

 

(1) Lobbying

 

-R. Findlay and S. Wellisz (1982). “Endogenous Tariffs, the Political Economy of Trade Restrictions and Welfare”. in J. Bhagwati, ed. Import Competition and Response. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 223-234.

 

-R. Findlay and S. Wellisz (1983). “Some Aspects of the Political Economy of Trade Restrictions”. KYKLOS, V.36-#3, pp. 469-481.

 

-S. Donnenfeld and S. Weber (1985). “Lobbying for Tariffs and the Cost of Protection”. Recherches Economiques de Louvain; V.51-#1, pp. 21-27.

 

-R. Baldwin (1982). “The Political Economy of Protectionism”. in J. Bhagwati, ed. Import Competition and Response. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 263-292.

 

-R. Feenstra and J. Bhagwati (1982). “Tariff Seeking and the Efficient Tariff”. in J. Bhagwati, ed. Import Competition and Response. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 245-258.

 

-R. Baldwin (1987). “Politically Realistic Objective Functions and Trade Policy: PROFs and Tariffs”. EcLets; V.24-#?, pp. 287-290.

 

-P. Wagstaff (1975). “Consensus Tariff Policy”. EcRec; V.51-#?, pp. 105-108

 

-W. Mayer (1993). “Lobbying for Tariff Policies”. RIE; V.1-#3, pp. 221-233.

 

-K. Kiyono, M. Okuno-Fujiwara and K. Ueda (1991). “Industry Specific Interests and Trade Protection: A Game Theoretic Analysis”. ESQ; V.42-#4, pp. 347-361.

 

-H.K. Hall and D. Nelson (1992). “Institutional Structure in the Political Economy of Protection: Legislated versus Administered Protection”. E&P; V.4-#1, pp. 61-77.

 

-M. Moore (1992). “Bureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a Repeated Game”. JITE; V.148-#?, pp. 607-627.

 

-D. Gould and G. Woodbridge (1997). “Building Trade Barriers and Knocking Them Down”. RIE; V.5-#2, pp. 256-271.

 

-P. Pecorino (1997). “Exogenous Tariff Changes with Endogenous Lobbying Response”. PC; V.92-#1/2, pp. 91-108.

 

-J. Conlon and P. Pecorino (1998). “Primary and Secondary Reform”. Economic Inquiry; V.36-#4, pp. 590-602.

 

-P. Pecorino (1999). “Endogenous Export Subsidies as a Revenue-Seeking Activity: Some Implications for the Evolution of Protection”. CJE; V.32-#3, pp. 785-798.

 

-S. Bradford (2003). “Protection and Jobs: Explaining the Structure of Trade Barriers across Industries”. JIE; V.61-#1, pp. 19-39.

 

-R. Jensen and M. Thursby (1986). “Endogenous Tariff Policy under Uncertainty”. ms.: Ohio State University.

 

-M. Fafchamps, E. Sadoulet, and A. de Janvry (1993). “Tariff Seeking in a General Equilibrium Framework”. Journal of International Trade and Economic Development; V.2-#?, pp. 167-189.

 

-M. Fafchamps, A. de Janvry, and E. Sadoulet (1999). “Social Heterogeneity and Wasteful Lobbying”. PC; V.98-#1/2, pp. 5-27.

 

-R. Findlay (1990). “The New Political Economy: Its Explanatory Power for LDCs”. E&P; V.2-#2, pp. 193-221.

 

-R. Clarida and R. Findlay (1991). “Endogenous Comparative Advantage, Government, and the Pattern of Trade”. NBER Working Paper, #3813.

 

-J. Coggins, T. Graham-Tomasi and T. Roe (1991). “Existence of Equilibrium in a Lobbying Economy”. IER; V.32-#3, pp. 533-550.

 

-R. Smith (1995). “Interest Group Influence in Congress”. Legislative Studies Quarterly; V.20-#1, pp. 89-139.

 

(2) Voting

 

-W. Mayer (1984). “Endogenous Tariff Formation”. AER; V.74-#5, pp. 970-985.

 

-H. Weck-Hannemann (1990). “Protectionism in Direct Democracy”. JITE; V.146-#3, pp. 389-418.

 

-H.K. Hall, C. Kao, and D. Nelson (1998). “Women and Tariffs: Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer Model”. Economic Inquiry; V.36-#2, pp. 320-332.

 

-J. Rotemberg (2000). “Commercial Policy with Altruistic Voters”. JPE; V.111-#1, pp. 174-201.

 

-R. Fischer and P. Serra (1996). “Income Inequality and Choice of Free Trade in a Model of Intraindustry Trade”. QJE; V.111-#1, pp. 41-64.

 

(3) Partisan Competition with Probabilistic Voting

 

-W. Mayer and J. Li (1994). “Interest Groups, Electoral Competition, and Probabilistic Voting for Trade Policies”. E&P; V.6-#1, pp. 59-77.

 

-D. Clark and J. Thomas (1995). “Probabilistic Voting, Campaign Contributions, and Efficiency”. AER; V.85-#1, pp. 254-259.

 

-C.C. Yang (1995). “Endogenous Tariff Formation under Representative Democracy: A Probabilistic Voting Model”. AER; V.85-#4, pp. 956-963.

 

-W. Mayer (1998). “Trade Policy Platforms of Competing Parties: What Makes Them Different?”. RIE; V.6-#2, pp. 185-203.

 

(4) Influence-driven Contributions

 

-G. Grossman and E. Helpman (1994). “Protection for Sale”. AER; V.84-#4, pp. 833-850.

 

-A. Dixit (1996). “Special-Interest Lobbying and Endogenous Commodity Taxation”. Eastern Economic Journal; V.22-#4, pp. 375-388.

 

-A. Dixit, G. Grossman, and E. Helpman (1997). “Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Tax Policy”. JPE; V.105-#4, pp. 752-69.

 

-S.L. Brainard and T. Verdier (1994). “Lobbying and Adjustment in Declining Industries”. EER; V.38-#?, pp. 586-595.

 

-S.L. Brainard and T. Verdier (1997). “The Political Economy of Declining Industries: Senescent Industry Collapse Revisited”. JIE; V.42-#1/2, pp. 221-237.

 

-C. Magee (2002). “Declining Industries and Persistent Tariff Protection”. RIE; V.10-#4, pp. 749-762.

 

-M. Rama and G. Tabellini (1998). “Lobbying by Capital and Labor over Trade and Labor Market Policies”. EER; V.42-#7, pp. 1295-1316.

 

-Y.S. Chiu (1998). “Politics, Structure of Protection, and Welfare”. RIE; V.6-#3, pp. 472-487.

 

-Hideo Konishi, Kamal Saggi, and Shlomo Weber (1999). “Endogenous Trade Policy under Foreign Direst Investment”. Journal of International Economics; V.49-#2, pp. 289-308.

 

-R. Boylan (2000). “An Optimal Auction Perspective on Lobbying”. SC&W; V.17-#1, pp. 55-68.

 

-R. Riezman and J. Wilson (1997). “Political Reform and Trade Policy”. JIE; V.42-#1/2, pp. 67-90.

 

-P. Goldberg and G. Maggi (1999). “Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation”. AER; V.89-#5, pp. 1135-1155.

 

-U. Bandyopadhyay and K. Gawande (2000). “Is Protection for Sale? Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of Endogenous Protection”. REStat; V.82-#1, pp. 139-152.

 

e. Equilibrium Policy Choice: Instruments

 

-J. Cassing and A.L. Hillman (1985). “Political Influence Motives and the Choice Between Tariffs and Quotas”. JIE; V.19-#?, pp. 279-290.

 

-W. Mayer and R. Riezman (1987). “Endogenous Choice of Trade Policy Instruments”. JIE; V.23-#3/4, pp. 377-381.

 

-W. Mayer and R. Riezman (1989). “Tariff Formation in a Multidimensional Voting Model”. E&P; V.1-#1, pp. 61-79.

 

-W. Mayer and R. Riezman (1990). “Voter Preferences for Trade Policy Instruments”. E&P; V.2-#3, pp. 259-273.

 

-W. Mayer (2002). “Systematic Political Grass-Root Support for Tariffs”. RIE; V.10-#4, pp. 657-670.

 

-R. Findlay and S. Wellisz (1986). “Tariffs, Quotas and Domestic-Content Protection: Some Political Economy Considerations”. PC; V.50-#?, pp. 221-242.

 

-P. Lloyd and R. Falvey (1986). “The Choice of Instrument for Industry Protection”. in R. Snape, ed. Issues in World Trade Policy: GATT at the Crossroads. New York: St. Martins, pp. 152-170.

 

-A. Deardorff (1987). “Why Do Governments Prefer Nontariff Barriers”. Carnegie Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy; #24, pp. 191-216.

 

-S. Magee, W. Brock, and L. Young (1989). “Optimal Obfuscation and the Theory of the Second Worst: The Politically Efficient Policy”. Chapter 18 in Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 257-263. [Mathematical appendix, pp. 363-364.]

 

-W. Kaempfer, J.H. McClure and T. Willett (1989). “Incremental Protection and Efficient Political Choice Between Tariffs and Quotas”. CJE; V.22-#2, pp. 228-236.

 

-M. Moore and S. Suranovic (1992). “Lobbying vs. Administered Protection: Endogenous Industry Choice and National Welfare”. JIE; V.32-#3/4, pp. 289-303.

 

-B.P. Rosendorff (1996). “Endogenous Trade Restrictions and Domestic Political Pressure”. in R. Feenstra, G. Grossman and D. Irwin, eds. The Political Economy of Trade Policy. Cambridge: MIT, pp. 245-264.

 

-B.P. Rosendorff (1996). “Voluntary Export Restraints, Antidumping Procedure, and Domestic Politics”. American Economic Review; V.86-#3, pp. 544-561.

 

-D. Mitra (2000). “On the Endogenous Choice between Protection and Promotion”. E&P; V.12-#1, pp. 33-51.

 

-G. Maggi and A. Rodriguez-Clare (2000). “Import Penetration and the Politics of Protection”. JIE; V.51-#2, pp. 287-304.

 

f. Equilibrium Policy Choice: The Role of Foreign Interests

 

-A.L. Hillman and H. Ursprung (1988). “Domestic Politics, Foreign Interests, and International Trade Policy”. AER; V.78-#4, pp. 729-745. [comment by Hofer/Woodruf, AER; V.84-#5, pp. 1474-1475.]

 

-S. Das (1990). “Foreign Lobbying and the Political Economy of Protection”. Japan and the World Economy; V.2-#2, pp. 169-179.

 

-S. Husted (1991). “Foreign Lobbying: A Theoretical Analysis”. Eastern Economic Journal; V.17-#1, pp. 89-99.

 

-R. Fischer (1992). “Endogenous Probability of Protection and Firm Behavior”. JIE; V.32-#1/2, pp. 149-163.

 

-R. Fischer and L. Mirman (1994). “Learning about Enforcement: A Model of Dumping”. JEI; V.9-#2, pp. 214-240.

 

-A.L. Hillman and H. Ursprung (1993). “Multinational Firms, Political Competition, and International Trade Policy”. IER; V.34-#2, pp. 347-363.

 

-A.L. Hillman and H. Ursprung (1999). “Foreign Investment and Endogenous Protection with Protectionist Quid Pro Quo”. E&P; V.11-#1, pp. 1-12.

 

-M. Moore and S. Suranovic (1993). “Lobbying and Cournot-Nash Competition: Implications for Strategic Trade Policy”. JIE; V.35-#3/4, pp. 367-376.

 

-K. Rehbein (1995). “Foreign-owned Firms’ Campaign Contributions in the United States: An Exploratory Survey”. Policy Studies Journal; V.23-#1, pp. 41-61.

 

-K. Gawande, P. Krishna, and M. Robbins (2004). “Foreign Lobbies and US Trade Policy”. NBER Working Paper; #10205.

 

g. Equilibrium Policy Choice: The Role of State-Society Relations

 

-D. North (1979). “A Framework for Analyzing the State in Economic History”. Explorations in Economic History;

 

-T.N. Srinivasan (1985). “Neoclassical Political Economy, the State and Economic Development”. Asian Development Review; V.3-#2, pp.

 

-R. Findlay and J. Wilson (1987). “The Political Economy of Leviathan”. in A. Razin and E. Sadka, eds. Economic Policy in Theory and Practice. New York: St. Martins, pp. 289-306.

 

6. International Structures and the Domestic Politics of Trade

 

-T. Ferguson (1984). “From Normalcy to New Deal: Industrial Structure, Party Competition and American Public Policy”. IO; V.38-#1, pp. 41-94.

 

-C. Deubner (1984). “Change and Internationalization in Industry: Toward a Sectoral Interpretation of West German Politics”. IO; V.38-#3, pp. 501-535.

 

-D. Lake (1988). Power, Protection, and Free Trade: International Sources of U.S. Commercial Strategy, 1887-1939. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

 

-R. Baldwin (1987). “The New Protectionism: A Response to Shifts in National Economic Power”. in D. Salvatore, ed. The New Protectionist Threat to World Welfare. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 95-112.

 

-A. Deardorff and R. Stern (1977). “American Labor's Stake in International Trade”. in W. Adams, et al., eds. Tariffs, Quotas and Protection. San Francisco: ICS. pp. 125-148.

 

B. International Political Economy

 

1. The Optimum Tariff with Retaliation and Trade War

 

a. The Basic Analysis

 

-T. Scitovsky (1942). “A Reconsideration of the Theory of Tariffs”. REStud; V.9-#?, pp. 89-110.

 

-H.G. Johnson (1953-4). “Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation”. REStud; V.21-#2, pp. 142-153.

 

-W.M. Gorman (1958). “Tariffs, Retaliation, and the Elasticity of Demand for Imports”. REStud; V.25-#?, pp. 133-162.

 

-E. Tower (1976). “The Optimum Tariff, Retaliation and Autarky”. Eastern Economic Journal; V.3-#?, pp. 72-75.

 

-V.R. Panchamukhi (1961), “A Theory for Optimum Tariff Policy”, Indian Economic Journal. V.9-#2; pp. 178-198.

 

-M. Kemp (1964). “Trade Warfare: A Sketch”. in The Pure Theory of International Trade. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, pp. 208-217.

 

-D.J. Horwell (1966), “Optimum Tariffs and Tariff Policy”. REStud; V.33-#:?; pp. 147-158.

 

-K. Kuga (1973), “Tariff Retaliation and Policy Equilibrium”, JIE. V.3-#?; pp. 351-366.

 

-Y. Otani (1980), “Strategic Equilibrium of Tariffs and General Equilibrium”, Etrica. V.48-#3; pp. 643-662.

 

-K.H. Kim and F.W. Roush (1988). “Strategic Tariff Equilibrium and Optimal Tariffs”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.15-#?, pp. 105-134.

 

-J. Kennan and R. Riezman (1988). “Do Big Countries Win Tariff Wars”. IER; V.29-#1, pp. 81-85.

 

-M. Thursby and R. Jensen (1983). “A Conjectural Variation Approach to Strategic Tariff Equilibrium”. JIE; V.14-#?, pp. 145-161.

 

-S. Turnovsky (1986). “Optimal Tariffs in Consistent Conjectural Variations Equilibrium”. JIE; V.21-#?, pp. 301-312.

 

-G. Post (1987). “Optimal Tariffs and Retaliation with Perfect Foresight”. JIEI; V.2-#1, pp. 54-70.

 

-C.C. Yang and T.-r. Tsai (1992). “Optimum Tariffs: North-South”. JIE; V.32-#3/4, pp. 369-377.

 

-J. McLaren (1997). “Size, Sunk Cost, and Judge Bowker’s Objection to Free Trade”. AER; V.87-#3, pp. 400-420.

 

-W.M. Cox and R. Ruffin (1998). “Country-bashing Tariffs: Do Bilateral Trade Deficits Matter?”. JIE; V.46-#1, pp. 61-72.

 

-B. Lockwood and K.-y. Wong (2000). “Specific and ad valorem Tariffs are Not Equivalent in Trade Wars”. JIE; V.52-#1, pp. 183-195.

 

-C. Syropoulos (2002). “Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation Revisited: How Country Size Matters”. REStud; V.69-#3, pp. 707-727.

 

-S.-k. Wong (2004). “Existence of Trading Nash Equilibrium in Tariff Retaliation Models”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.47-#?, pp. 367-387.

 

-J. Burbidge and G. Myers (2004). “Tariff Wars and Trade Deals with Costly Government”. RIE; V.12-#3, pp. 543-549.

 

-M. Nicholson (1967), “Tariff Wars and a Model of Conflict”, Journal of Peace Research; V.4-#1; pp. 26-38.

 

-A. Dixit (1987). “How Should the US Respond to Other Countries' Trade Policies”. in R. Stern, ed. US Trade Policies in a Changing World Economy. Cambridge: MIT Press; pp. 245-282.

 

-R. Baldwin (1990). “Optimal Tariff Retaliation Rules”. in R. Jones and A. Krueger, eds. The Poltical Economy of International Trade. Oxford: Basil Blackwell; pp. 108-121.

 

-D. Gros (1987). “A Note on the Optimal Tariff, Retaliation and the Welfare Loss from Tariff Wars in a Framework of Intra-Industry Trade”. JIE; V.23-#?, pp. 357-367.

 

-J. Shoven and J. Whalley (1974). “On the Computation of Competitive Equilibrium on International Markets with Tariffs”. JIE; V.4-#?, pp. 341-354.

 

-B. Hamilton and J. Whalley (1983). “Optimal Tariff Calculations in Alternative Trade Models and Some Possible Implications for Current World Trading Arrangements”. JIE; V.15-#?, pp. 323-348.

 

-A. Deardorff and R. Stern (1987). “Tariffs and Defensive Responses: A Computational Analysis”. IEJ; V.1-#2, pp. 1-23.

 

-J. Markusen and R. Wigle (1989). “Nash Equilibrium Tariffs for the U.S. and Canada: The Roles of Country Size, Scale Economies and Capital Mobility”. JPE; V.97-#2, pp. 368-386.

 

-H. Lee and D. Roland-Holst (1999). “Cooperation or Confrontation in US-Japan Trade? Some General Equilibrium Estimates”. Journal of the Japanese and International Economies; V.13-#?, pp. 119-139.

 

-Pahre, Robert (1998). “Reactions and Reciprocity: Tariffs and Trade Liberalization from 1815 to 1914”. JCR; V.42-#4, pp. 467-492.

 

-A. Bohara, K. Gawande, and W. Kaempfer (1998). “The Dynamics of Tariff Retaliation Between the United States and Canada: Theory and Evidence”. RIE; V.6-#1, pp. 30-49.

 

b. Quotas

 

-C. Rodriguez (1974). “The Non-equivalence of Tariffs and Quotas under Retaliation”. JIE; V.4-#?, pp. 295-298.

 

-E. Tower (1975), “The Optimum Quota and Retaliation”, REStud; V.62-#?; pp. 623-630.

 

-R. Falvey (1985). “Quotas and Retaliation: A Reexamination”. EcLets; V.17-#?, pp. 373-377.

 

-J. Melvin (1986). “The Nonequivalence of Tariffs and Import Quotas”. AER; V.76-#5, pp. 1131-1134.

 

-D. Bernhardt and A. Enders (1989). “Free Trade Equilibria to Multi-Country Quota Games”. JIE; V.27-#3/4, pp. 319-333.

 

-K. Chan (1988), “Optimum Trade Policies and Retaliation”, CJE. v.21-#2; pp. 427-433.

 

-B. Copeland (1989). “Tariffs and Quotas: Retaliation and Negotiation with Two Instruments of Protection”. JIE; V.26-#?, pp. 179-188.

 

-C. Syropoulos (1994). “Endogenous Timing in Games of Commercial Policy”. CJE; V.27-#?, pp. 847-864.

 

-W. Csaplar (1995). “Quota Wars in Conjectural Variations”. RIE; V.3-#3, pp. 355-365.

 

-C. Syropoulos, E. Dinopoulos and M. Kreinin (1995). “Bilateral Quota Wars”. CJE; V.28-#4a, pp. 939-944.

 

-S. Grant and J. Quiggin (1997). “Strategic Trade Policy under Uncertainty”. IER; V.38-#1, pp. 187-204.

 

-N. Nakanishi (1999). “Reexamination of the International Export Quota Game through the Theory of Social Situations”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.27-#1, pp. 132-152.

 

2. Political-Economy of Trade Conflict

 

-A. Dixit and A. Kyle (1985). “The Use of Protection and Subsidies for Entry Promotion and Deterrence”. AER; V.75-#1, pp. 139-152.

 

-K. Ishibashi (1991). “The Role of Tariffs in Entry Promotion and Deterrence under International Oligopoly”. KES; V.28-#2, pp. 13-29.

 

-D. Collie (1994). “Endogenous Timing in Trade Policy Games: Should Governments Use Countervailing Duties?”. WA, V.?-#1, pp. 191-209.

 

-J.A.C. Conybeare (1987). Trade Wars: The Theory and Practice of Commercial Rivalry. New York: Columbia University Press.

 

-S. James and D. Lake (1989). “The Second Face of Hegemony: Britain's Repeal of the Corn Laws and the American Walker Tariff of 1846". IO; V.43-#1, pp. 1-29

 

-K. Stegemann (1989). “Policy Rivalry Among Industrial States: What Can We Learn from Models of Strategic Trade Policy?”. IO; V.43-#1, pp. 73-100.

 

a. Textiles and Apparel

 

-J. de al Torre, et al. (1978). Corporate Responses to Import Competititon in the US Apparel Industry. Atlanta: Georgia State University Press.

 

-I.M. Destler, et al. (1979). The Textile Wrangle: Conflict in Japanese-American Relations, 1969-1971. Ithaca: Cornell.

 

-C. Farrands (1979). “Textile Diplomacy: The Making and Implementation of European Textile Policy”. Journal of Common Market Studies; V.18-#?, pp. 22-39.

 

-J. de la Torre and M. Bachetta (1980). “The Uncommon Market: European Policies Toward the Clothing Industry in the 1970s”. Journal of Common Market Studies; V.19-#2, pp. 95-122.

 

-R.B. Brandis (1982). The Making of Textile Trade Policy, 1935-1981. Washington, DC: American Textile Manufacturers Institute.

 

-R. Mahon and L.K. Mytelka (1983). “Industry, the State and Protectionism in Canada and France”. IO; V.37-#4, pp. 551-581.

 

-M. Dolan (1983). “European Restructuring and Import Policies for a Textile Industry in Crisis”. IO; V.37-#4, pp. 583-615.

 

-D. Keesing and M. Wolf (1980). Textile Quotas Against Developing Countries. London: Trade Policy Research Centre.

 

-H.H. Glismann, D. Spinanger, J. Pelzman and M. Wolf (1983). Trade, Protection and Employment in Textiles. London: Trade Policy Research Centre.

 

-M. Wolf (1983). “Managed Trade in Practice: Implications of the Textile Arrangements”. in W. Cline ed. Trade Policy in the 1980's. Washington, DC: IIE, pp. 455-482.

 

-D. Yoffie (1983). Power and Protectionism: Strategies of the Newly Industrializing Countries. New York: Columbia University Press.

 

-V. Aggarwal (1985). Liberal Protectionism: The International Politics of Organized Textile Trade. Berkeley: University of California Press.

 

-H.R. Friman (1990). Patchwork Protectionism: Textile Trade Policy in the US, Japan and West Germany. New York: Columbia University Press.

 

-C. Hamilton, ed. (1990). Textiles Trade and the Developing Countries: Eliminating the MFA in the 1990's. Washington, DC: The World Bank.

 

b. Steel

 

-Woolcock, Stephen (1982). “The International Politics of Trade and Production in Steel”. in J. Pinder, ed. National Industrial Strategies in the World Economy. London: Croom Helm.

 

-Jones, Kent (1983). Impasse and Crisis in Steel Trade Policy. London: Trade Policy Research Centre.

 

-Walter, Ingo (1983). “Structural Adjustment and Trade Policy in the International Steel Industry”. in W. Cline, ed. Trade Policy in the 1980s. Washington, DC: IIE, pp. 483-525.

 

-Jones, Kent (1985). “Trade in Steel: Another Turn in the Protectionist Spiral”. World Economy; V.?-#?, pp. 393-408.

 

-Jones, Kent (1986). Politics vs. Economics in World Steel Trade. London: Allen and Unwin.

 

-Nam, Chong Hyun (1986). “Changing Comparative Advantage and Trade and Adjustment Policies in the Steel Industry”. in H. Mutoh, et al., eds. Industrial Policies for Pacific Economic Growth. Sydney: Allen and Unwin, pp. 211-232.

 

-T. Howell, W. Noellert, J. Dreier and A.W. Wolff (1988). Steel and the State: Government Intervention and Steel's Structural Crisis. Boulder: Westview Press.

 

(1) Basic Economics of Steel Production and Trade

 

-Crandall, Robert (1981). The US Steel Industry in Recurrent Crisis. Washington, DC: Brookings.

 

-Barnett, Donald and Louis Schorsch (1983). Steel: Upheaval in a Basic Industry. Cambridge: Ballinger.

 

-Barnett, Donald and R. Crandall (1986). Up From the Ashes: The Rise of the Minimill in the United States. Washington, DC: Brookings.

 

-Adams, Walter and Hans Mueller (1986). “The Steel Industry”. in Walter Adams, ed. The Structure of American Industry. New York: Macmillan, pp. 74-125.

 

-Adams, Walter and Joel Dirlam (1964). “Steel Imports and Vertical Oligopoly Power”. American Economic Review; V.54-#?, pp. 626-655.

 

-Kreinin, M. (1982). “US Comparative Advantage in Motor Vehicles and Steel”. in H. Brazer and D. Laren, eds. Michigan Fiscal and Economic Structure. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

 

-Kreinin, M. (1984). “Wage Competitiveness in the US Auto and Steel Industries”. Contemporary Policy Issues; V.4-#1, pp. 39-50.

 

-US Federal Trade Commission (1977). The US Steel Industry and Its International Rivals: Trends and Factors Determining International Competitiveness. Washington, DC: USGPO.

 

-Eichengreen, Barry (1988). “International Competition in the Products of US Basic Industries”. in M. Feldstein, ed. The United States in the World Economy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 279-353.

 

(2) Consequences of Steel Protection

 

-Adams, Walter and Joel Dirlam (1979). “Unfair Competition in International Trade”. in Tariffs, Quotas and Trade: The Politics of Protectionism. San Francisco: ICS, pp. 95-107.

 

-Dirlam, Joel and Hans Mueller (1982). “Import Restraints and Reindustrialization: The Case of the US Steel Industry”. Journal of International Law; V.14-#3, pp. 419-446.

 

-Cline, William (1986). “US Trade and Industrial Policy: The Experience of Textiles, Steel and Automobiles”. in P. Krugman, ed. Strategic Trade Policy and the New International Economics. Cambridge: MIT, pp. 211-239.

 

-Koo, Anthony Y.C. (1979). “On the Equivalence of Reference Price with Tariffs and Quotas”. American Economic Review; V.69-#5, pp. 964-967.

 

-Kaplan, Daniel (1986). Has Trade Protection Revitalized Domestic Industries. Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office.

 

-Crandall, Robert (1987). “The Effects of U.S. Trade Protection for Autos and Steel”. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity; #1, pp. 271-288.

 

-Tarr, David (1987). “Costs and Benefits to the US of the 1985 Steel Import Quota Program”. in R. Sato and P. Wachtel, eds. Trade Friction and Economic Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 159-183.

 

-Tarr, David (1987). “Effects of Restraining Steel Exports from the Republic of Korea and Other Countries to the US and the EEC”. WBER; V.1-#3, pp. 397-418.

 

-Tarr, David (1988). “The Steel Crisis in the US and the EC: Causes and Adjustments”. in R. Baldwin, et al. eds. Issues in US-EC Trade Relations. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 173-198.

 

-Mueller, Hans (1988). “Protection and Market Power in the Steel Industry”. Challenge; V.31-#5, pp. 52-55.

 

-Anderson, Andrew and Alan Rugman (1989). “Subsidies in the U.S. Steel Industry: A New Conceptual Framework and Literature Review”. Journal of World Trade; V.23-#6, pp. 59-83.

 

-Lenway, Stafanie; Rehbein, Kathleen; Starks, Laura (1990). “The Impact of Protectionism on Firm Wealth: The Experience of the Steel Industry”. Southern Economic Journal; V.56-#4, pp. 1079-1093.

 

-Boorstein, Randi and Robert Feenstra (1991). “Quality Upgrading and Its Welfare Cost in US Steel Imports, 1969-1974". in E. Helpman and A. Razin, eds. International Trade and Trade Policy. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 167-186.

 

-Carbaugh, Robert and Darwin Wassink (1991). “Steel Voluntary Restraint Agreements and Steel-Using Industries”. Journal of World Trade; V.25-#4, pp. 73-86.

 

-Adams, Walter (1991). “Import Restraints and Industrial Performance: The Dilemma of Protectionism”. In J. Brock and K. Elzinga, eds. Antitrust, the market, and the state: The contributions of Walter Adams. Armonk, NY: Sharpe, pp. 221-237.

 

-Haughton, Jonathan and Balu Swaminathan (1992). “The Employment and Welfare Effects of Quantitative Restrictions on Steel Imports into the United States, 1955-1987”.  Journal of World Trade; V.27-#2, pp. 95-118.

 

-Trela, Irene and John Whalley (1992). “Trade Liberalisation in Quota Restricted Items: U.S. and Mexico in Textiles and Steel”. World Economy; V.15-#1, pp. 45-63.

 

-Trela, Irene and John Whalley (1994). “Trade Liberalization in Quota-Restricted Items: The United States and Mexico in Textiles and Steel”. in J. Francois and C. Shiells eds. Modeling trade policy: Applied general equilibrium assessments in North American free trade. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 256-298.

 

-de Melo, Jaime and David Tarr (1993). “Industrial Policy in the Presence of Wage Distortions: The Case of the U.S. Auto and Steel Industries”. International Economic Review; V.34-#4, pp. 833-851.

 

-Harris, Richard (1994). “Trade and Industrial Policy for a ‘Declining’ Industry: The Case of the U.S. Steel Industry”. In P. Krugman and A. Smith, eds. Empirical studies of strategic trade policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 131-156.

 

-Scott, Robert and Robert Blecker (1997). “Labour Rents, Adjustment Costs and the Cost of US Steel Trade Restraints in the 1980s”. International Review of Applied Economics; V.11-#3, pp. 399-419.

 

-Appleton, Arthur (2000). “Amicus Curiae Submissions in the Carbon Steel Case: Another Rabbit from the Appellate Body's Hat?”. Journal of International Economic Law; V.3-#4, pp. 691-699.

 

-Eichengreen, Barry and Hans van der Ven (1984). “US Antidumping Policies: The Case of Steel”. in R. Baldwin and A. Krueger, eds. The Structure and Evolution of Recent US Trade Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press\NBER, pp. 67-103.

 

-Fors, Gunnar (1993). “Stainless Steel in Sweden: Antidumping Attacks Responsible International Citizenship”. In J.M. Finger, ed. Antidumping: How it works and who gets hurt. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 137-61.

 

-Hartigan, J., S. Kamma and P. Perry (1990). “Bifurcated vs. Single Injury Determination in USITC Antidumping Investigations”. JIEI; V.5-#1, pp. 47-63.

 

-Hartigan, J., S. Kamma and P. Perry (1994). “Are Subsidies More Dangerous than Dumping: Evidence From the Wealth Effects for the Steel Industry”. Journal of Economic Integration; V.9-#1, pp. 45-61.

 

-Grawe, Oliver; Howarth, Dolly; Morkre, Morris (1994). “Did Depreciation of the Dollar Render the Steel VRAs Nonbinding?”. Federal Trade Commission Bureau of Economic Working Paper: 208.

 

-Prusa, Thomas and David Sharp (2001). “Simultaneous Equations in Antidumping Investigations”. Journal of Forensic Economics; V.14-#1, pp. 63-78.

 

-Rehbein, Kathleen and Laura Starks (1995). “Changes in U.S. Trade Policies: The Wealth Effects on Japanese Steel Firms”. Japan and the World Economy; V.7-#3, pp. 309-327.

 

-Chung, Jae (1998). “Effects of U.S. Trade Remedy Law Enforcement under Uncertainty: The Case of Steel”. Southern Economic Journal; V.65-#1, pp. 151-159.

 

-Blonigen, Bruce and Stephen Haynes (1999). “Antidumping Investigations and the Pass-Through of Exchange Rates and Antidumping Duties”. NBER Working Paper #7378.

 

-Ladd, John (1969). “The Logic of Foreclosure: Tie-In Doctrine after Fortner v. U. S. Steel”. Yale Law Journal; V.79-#1, pp. 86-101.

 

-Feinberg, Robert and Seth Kaplan (1993). “Fishing Downstream: The Political Economy of Effective Administered Protection”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.26-#1, pp. 150-158.

 

-Durling, James and Thomas Prusa (2003). “Using Safeguard Protection to Raise Domestic Rivals' Costs”. Japan and the World Economy; V.15-#1, pp. 47-68.

 

(3) Domestic Political-Economy of Steel: US

 

-Urofsky, Melvin (1969). Big Steel and the Wilson Administration: A Study in Business-Government Relations. Columbus: Ohio State University Press.

 

-Yeager, Mary (1980). “Trade Protection as an International Commodity: The Case of Steel”. Journal of Economic History; V.40-#1, pp. 33-42.

 

-Levine, Michael (1985). Inside International Trade Policy Formulation: A History of the US-EC Steel Arrangements. New York: Praeger.

 

-Marcus, Maeva (1977). Truman and the Steel Seizure Case. New York: Columbia University Press.

 

-McConnell, Grant (1963). Steel and the Presidency, 1962. New York: Norton.

 

-Hoopes, Roy (1963). The Steel Crisis. New York: The John Day Company.

 

-Borrus, Michael (1983). “The Politics of Competitive Erosion in the US Steel Industry”. in J. Zysman and L. Tyson, eds. American Industry in International Competition: Government Policies and Corporate Strategies. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. pp. 60-105.

 

-Jones, Kent (1986). Politics v. Economics in World Steel Trade. London: Allen & Unwin.

 

-Lenway, Stefanie and Douglas Schuler (1991). “The Determinants of Corporate Political Involvement in Trade Protection: The Case of the Steel Industry”. In R. Baldwin, ed. Empirical studies of commercial policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 75-105.

 

-Lenway, Stefanie, Randall Morck, and Bernard Yeung (1994). “Rent Seeking and Protectionism in the American Steel Industry: An Empirical Analysis”. University of Michigan Research Forum on International Economics Discussion Paper: 349.

 

-Lenway, Stefanie, Randall Morck, and Bernard Yeung (1996). “Rent Seeking, Protectionism and Innovation in the American Steel Industry”. Economic Journal; V.106-#435, pp. 410-421.

 

-Jones, Kent (1994). Export restraint and the new protectionism: The political economy of discriminatory trade restrictions. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

 

-Tonelson, Alan (1994). “Beating Back Predatory Trade”. Foreign Affairs;; V.73-#4, pp. 123-135.

 

-Moore, Michael (1996). “The Rise and Fall of Big Steel's Influence on U.S. Trade Policy”. In A. Krueger, ed. The political economy of trade protection. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER,, pp. 15-34.

 

-Mastel, Greg (1999). “The U.S. Steel Industry and Antidumping Law”. Challenge; V.42-#3, pp. 84-94.

 

-Miravete, Eugenio (1998). “Infant-Industry Tariff Protection with Pressure Groups”. International Journal of Industrial Organization; V.16-#6, pp. 749-784.

 

-Brook, Douglas (1998). “Steel: Trade Policy in a Changed Environment”. In Alan Deardorff and Robert Stern, eds. Constituent interests and U.S. trade policies. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 133-44.

 

-Brook, Douglas (2003). “Trade Policy Strategies and Enforcement Choices: An Examination of the 1992 Steel Antidumping Cases”. International Trade Journal; V.17-#1, pp. 81-100.

 

-Chung, Jae (1999). “Insights into Trade Protection under U.S. Trade Remedy Laws”. Journal of Policy Modeling; V.21-#3, pp. 375-387.

 

-Swagel, Philip (2000). “Union Behavior, Industry Rents, and Optimal Policies”. International Journal of Industrial Organization; V.18-#6, pp. 925-947.

 

-Morck, Randall, Jungsywan Sepanski, and Bernard Yeung (2001). “Habitual and Occasional Lobbyers in the U.S. Steel Industry: An EM Algorithm Pooling Approach” Economic Inquiry; V.39-#3, pp. 365-78.

 

-Gibbs, Ryan, Omer Gokcekus, and Edward Tower (2002). “Is Talk Cheap? Buying Congressional Testimony with Campaign Contributions”. Journal of Policy Reform; V.5-#3, pp. 127-131.

 

-Tornell, Aaron (1997). “Rational Atrophy: The U.S. Steel Industry”. NBER Working Paper; #6084.

 

(4) EC Steel Policy and US-EC Steel Conflict

 

-Tsoukalis, Loukas and Antonio da Silva Ferreira (1980). “Management of Industrial Surplus Capacity in the European Community”. International Organization; V.34-#3, pp. 355-376.

 

-Joliet, R. (1981). “Cartelisation, Dirigism and Crisis in the EC”. World Economy; V.3-#?, pp. 403-445.

 

-Messerlin, Patrick and Christopher Saunders (1983). “Steel: Too Much Investment Too Late”. in G. Shepherd et al. Europe's Industries: Public and Private Strategies for Change. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 52-81.

 

-Benyon, Frank and Jacques Bourgeois (1984). “The EC-US Steel Arrangement”. Common Market Law Review; V.21-#?, pp. 305-354.

 

-Martin Rhodes and Vincent Wright (1984). “The European Unions and the Steel Crisis, 1974-1984: A Study in the Demise of Traditional Unionism”. British Journal of Political Science; V.18-#2, pp. 171-195.

 

-Tsoukalis, Loukas and Robert Strauss (1985). “Crisis and Adjustment in European Steel: Beyond Laisser-Faire”. Journal of Common Market Studies; V.23-#3, pp. 207-228.

 

-Crandall, Robert (1986). “The EC-US Steel Trade Crisis”. in L. Tsoukalis, ed. Europe, America and the World Economy. Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 17-35.

 

-Messerlin, Patrick (1987). “The European Iron and Steel Industry and the World Crisis”. in Yves Meny and Vincent Wright,es. The Politics of Steel: Western Europe and the Steel Industry in the Crisis Years, 1974-1984. Berlin: Walter de Gruyther.

 

-H. Schneider (1986). “Steel Crisis: Consequences of European Steel Policy After World War II”. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics; 142-#1, pp. 138-151. [comments by H. Siebert and K. Scott follow.]

 

-Dicke, Hugo and Hans Glismann (1987). “The Rise and Decline of West German Steel Industry: The Role of National and Supranational Agencies”. Aussenwirtschaft, V.42-#4, pp. 421-441.

 

-W. Goldberg, ed. (1986). Ailing Steel: The Transoceanic Quarrel. New York: St. Martins.

 

-Y. Meny and V. Wright, eds. (1987). The Politics of Steel: Western Europe and the Steel Industry Industry in the Crisis Years, 1974-1984. Berlin: de Gruyther.

 

-S. Houseman (1991). Industrial Restructuring with Job Security: The Case of European Steel. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

 

-L.A. Winters (1995). “Liberalizing European Steel Trade”. EER; V.39-#3/4, pp. 611-621.

 

-L.A. Winters (1995). “Liberalization of European Steel Trade”. In R. Faini and R. Portes, eds. European Union Trade with Eastern Europe: Adjustment and Opportunities. London: CEPR, pp. 201-235.

 

-Smith, W. Rand (1995). “Industrial Crisis and the Left: Adjustment Strategies in Socialist France and Spain”. Comparative Politics; V.28-#1, pp. 1-24.

 

-M. Moore (1998). “European Steel Policies in the 1980s: Hindering Technological Innovation and Market Structure Change?”. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; V.134-#1, pp. 42-68.

 

N. Groenendijk and G.-J. Hospers (2002). “A Requiem for the European Coal and Steel Community (1952-2002): Summary”. De Economist; V.150-#5, pp. 601-612.

 

(5) Japanese Steel Policy and the US-Japan Steel Conflict

 

-Kawahito, Kiyoshi (1981). “Japanese Steel in the American Market: Conflict and Causes”. World Economy; V.?-#?, pp. 229-250.

 

-Patrick, Hugh and Hideo Sato (1982). “The Political-Economy of US-Japan Trade in Steel”. in C. Yamamura, ed. Policy and Trade Issues of the Japanese Economy. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

 

-Sato, Hideo and Michael Hodin (1982). “The US-Japanese Steel Issue of 1977". in I.M. Destler and H. Sato, eds. Coping with US-Japanese Economic Conflicts. Lexington: DC Heath, pp. 27-72.

 

-Yonekura, Seiichiro (1991). “The Postwar Japanese Iron and Steel Industry: Continuity and Discontinuity”. in E. Abe and Y. Suzuki, eds. Changing Patterns of International Rivalry. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, pp. 193-241.

 

c. Automobiles

 

(1) General Analysis of Auto Industry


OECD (1983). Long Term Outlook for the World Automobile Industry. Paris: OECD.


Altschuler, A. et al. (1984). The Future of the Automobile. Cambridge: MIT Press.


Cole, R. and T. Yakushiji (1984). The American and Japanese Industries in Transition: Report of the Joint US-Japan Automotive Study. Ann Arbor: Center for Japanese Studies, University of Michigan.


Adams, W. and J. Brock (1986). “The Automobile Industry”. in W. Adams, ed. The Structure of American Industry. New York: Macmillan, pp. 126-171.


Katz, H. (1985). Shifting Gears: Changing Labor Relations in the US Automobile Industry. Cambridge: MIT Press.


Katz, H., T. Kochan and J. Keefe (1987). “Industrial Relations and Productivity in the US Automobile Industry”. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity; #3, pp. 685-727.


J. Womack, D. Jones and D. Roos (1990). The Machine that Changed the World. New York: Harper-Collins.


Rothschild, E. (1973). Paradise Lost: The Decline of the Auto-Industrial Age. New York: Random House.


Halberstam, D. (1986). The Reckoning. New York: Morrow.


Flink, J.J. (1988). The Automobile Age. Cambridge: MIT.

 

(2) Microeconomic Analysis of the Auto Industry


Fuss, M. and L. Waverman (1985). “Productivity Growth in the Automobile Industry, 1970-1980: A Comparison of Canada, Japan and the US”. NBER Working Paper #1735.


Fuss, M. and L. Waverman (1986). “The Extent and Sources of Cost Efficiency Differences Between US and Japanese Automobile Producers”. NBER Working Paper #1849.


Fuss, M. and L. Waverman (1992). Costs and Productivity in Automobile Production: The Challenge of Japanese Efficiency. New York: Cambridge University Press.


Cowling, K. and J. Cubbin (1971). “Price, Quality and Advertising Competition: An Econometric Investigation of the UK Car Market”. Economica; V.38-#152, pp. 378-394.


Griliches, Z. (1971). “Hedonic Price Indices for Automobiles: An Econometric Analysis of Quality Change”. in Z. Griliches, ed. Price Indices and Quality Change. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.


Hess, A. (1977). “A Comparison of Automobile Demand Equations”. Econometrica; V.45-#3, pp. 683-701.


Hunker, J.A. (1983). Structural Change in the US Automobile Industry. Lexington: DC Heath.


Carlson, R. (1978). “Seemingly Unrelated Regression and the Demand for Automobiles of Different Sizes, 1965-1975: A Disaggregate Approach”. Journal of Business; V.51-#2, pp. 243-262.


Blomqvist, A. and W. Haessel (1978). “Small Cars, Large Cars, and the Price of Gasoline”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.11-#3, pp. 470-489.


Irvine, F. (1983). “Demand Equations for Individual New Car Models Estimated Using Transactions Prices, with Implications for Regulatory Issues”. Southern Economic Journal; V.49-#?, pp. 764-782.


Ohta, M. and Z. Griliches (1976). “Automobile Prices Revisited: Extensions of the Hedonic Hypothesis”. in N. Terleckyj, ed. Household Production and Consumption. New York: Columbia University Press/NBER.


Smith, R.P. (1975). Consumer Demand for Cars in the USA. Cambridge: CUP.


Westin, R.B. (1975). “Empirical Implications of Infrequent Purchase Behavior in a Stock Adjustment Model”. American Economic Review; V.65-#3, pp. 384-396.


Boyle, S. and T. Hogarty (1975). “Pricing Behavior in the American Automobile Industry, 1957-1971". Journal of Industrial Economics; V.24-#?, pp.


Bresnahan, T. (1981). “Departures from Marginal Cost Pricing in the American Automobile Industry”. Journal of Econometrics; V.17-#?, pp. 201-227.


Kwoka, J. (1984). “Market Power and Market Change in the US Automobile Industry”. Journal of Industrial Economics; V.32-#4, pp. 509-522.


Bresnahan, T. (1987). “Competition and Collusion in the American Automobile Oligopoly: The 1955 Price War”. Journal of Industrial Economics; V.35-#?, pp. 437-455.


Clark, K., W.B. Chew and T. Fujimoto (1987). “Product Development in the World Auto Industry”. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity; #3, pp. 729-781.

 

(3) International Competition and the US Auto Industry


House Committee on Ways and Means (Subcommittee on Trade) (1980). World Auto Trade: Current Trends and Structural Problems. Serial 96-78. Washington, DC: US GPO.


Anderson, R. and M. Kreinin (1981). “Labor Costs in the American Steel and Auto Industries”. World Economy. V.4-#?, pp. 199-208.


Kreinin, M. (1982). “US Comparative Advantage in Motor Vehicles and Steel”. in H. Brazer and D. Laren, eds. Michigan Fiscal and Economic Structure. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.


Kreinin, M. (1984). “Wage Competitiveness in the US Auto and Steel Industries”. Contemporary Policy Issues; V.4-#1, pp. 39-50.


USITC (1980). Certain Motor Vehicles and Certain Chassis and Bodies Therefor: Report to the President on Investigation TA-201-44 Under Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974. Publication #1110.


USITC (1985). The Internationalization of the Automobile Industry and Its Effects on the US Auto Industry. Publication #1712.


USITC (1985). The US Automobile Industry: US Factory Sales, Imports, Exports, Apparent Consumption, Suggested Retail Prices, and Trade Balances for Selected Countries in Motor Vehicles, 1964-1984. Publication #1762.


USITC (1986). US Trade Related Employment, 1978-1984. Publication #1855.


Abernathy, W. (1983). The Competitive Status of the US Auto Industry. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.


Abernathy, W., K. Clark and A. Kantrow (1983). Industrial Renaissance: Producing a Competitive Future for America. New York: Basic Books.


Abernathy, W., J. Harbour and J. Henn (1981). Productivity and Comparative Cost Advantage: Some Estimates for Major Automotive Producers. Report to the Transportation Systems Center, Department of Transportation. Cambridge, Massachusetts.


Flynn, M. (1982). “Differentials in Vehicles' Landed Costs: Japanese Vehicles in the US Marketplace”. Working Paper Series, #3, Center for Japanese Studies, University of Michigan.


Flynn, M. (1983). “A Note on the Treatment of Labor Content as a Source of the Manufacturing Cost Differential”. Working Paper Series, #19, Center for Japanese Studies, University of Michigan.


Flynn, M. (1984). “Estimating Comparative Compensation Costs and Their Contribution to the Manufacturing Cost Differences”. Working Paper Series, #21, Center for Japanese Studies, University of Michigan.


Salter, M., A. Webber and D. Dyer (1985). “US Competitiveness in Global Industries: Lessons from the Auto Industry”. in B. Scott and G. Lodge, eds. US Competitiveness in the World Economy. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.


Scott, R. (1988). “Trade and Employment in Automobiles: The Short-Run Success and Long-Run Failure of Protectionist Measures”. in L. D'A. Tyson, W. Dickens and J. Zysman, eds. The Dynamics of Trade and Employment. Cambridge: Ballinger, pp. 157-203.


Cline, W. (1986). “US Trade and Industrial Policy: The Experience of Textiles, Steel and Automobiles”. in P. Krugman, ed. Strategic Trade Policy and the New International Economics. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 211-239.


Eichengreen, B. (1988). “International Competition in the Products of US Basic Industries”. in M. Feldstein, ed. The United States in the World Economy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 279-353.


Richardson, J.D. (1988). “Exchange Rates and US Auto Competitiveness”. in R. Marston, ed. Misalignment of Exchange Rates: Effects on Trade and Industry. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 215-240.

 

(4) Effects of Trade Policy on the US Auto Industry

 

(a) Welfare Costs

 

-B. Munk (1969). “The Welfare Costs of Content Protection: The Automotive Industry in Latin America”. Journal of Political Economy; V.77-#1, pp. 85-98.

 

-E.J. Toder, with N. Cardell and E. Burton (1978). Trade Policy and the US Automobile Industry. New York: Praeger.

 

-J. Gomez-Ibanez and D. Harrison (1982). “Imports and the Future of the US Auto Industry”. American Economic Review; V.72-#3, pp. 319-323.

 

-J. Gomez-Ibanez, R. Leone and S. O'Connell (1983). “Restraining Auto Imports: Does Anyone Win?”. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management; V.2-#?, pp. 196-218.

 

-D. Tarr and M. Morkre (1984). Aggregate Costs to the US of Tariffs and Quotas on Imports. Washington, DC: Federal Trade Commission.

 

-R. Crandall (1984). “Import Quotas and the Auto Industry: The Costs of Protection”. Brookings Review; V.2-#4, pp. 8-16.

 

-A. Denzau (1986). “Made in America: The 1981 Automobile Cartel”. St. Louis: Center for the Study of American Business (publication #76).

 

-D. Kaplan (1986). “Automobiles”. Chapter 5 of Has Trade Protection Revitalized Domestic Industries. US: Congressional Budget Office.

 

-OECD (1987). The Costs of Restricting Imports: The Auto Industry. Paris: OECD.

 

-R. Crandall (1987). “The Effects of US Trade Protection for Autos and Steel”. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity; #1, pp. 271-288.

 

-E. Dinopoulos and M. Kreinin (1988). “Effects of the US-Japan Auto VER on European Prices and on US Welfare”. Review of Economics and Statistics, V.70-#3, pp. 484-491.

 

-USITC (1985). A Review of Recent Developments in the US Automobile Industry Including an Assessment of the Japanese Voluntary Restrain Agreement. Publication # 1648.

 

-D. Tarr (1989). A General Equilibrium Analysis of the Welfare and Employment Effects of US Quotas in Textiles, Autos and Steel. Washington, D.C.: Federal Trade Commission.

 

-C. Winston and Associates (1987). Blind Intersection? Policy and the US Automobile Industry. Washington, DC: Brookings.

 

(b) Costs of Protection with Monopolistic Competition and Quality Upgrading

 

-R. Feenstra (1984) “Voluntary Export Restraint in US Autos, 1980-81: Quality, Employment and Welfare Effects”. in R. Baldwin and A. Krueger, eds. The Structure and Evolution of Recent US Trade Policies; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 35-65. also in Bhagwati.

 

-R. Feenstra (1985). “Automobile Prices and Protection: The US-Japan Trade Restraint”. Journal of Policy Modeling; V.7-#1, pp. 49-68.

 

-R. Feenstra (1988). “Quality Change Under Trade Restraints in Japanese Autos”. Quarterly Journal of Economics; V.103-#1, pp. 131-146.

 

-R. Feenstra (1988). “Gains from Trade in Differentiated Products: Japanese Compact Trucks”. in R. Feenstra, ed. Empirical Methods for International Trade. Cambridge: MIT, pp. 120-139.

 

-J. Levinsohn (1988). “Empirics of Taxes on Differentiated Products: The Case of Tariffs in the US Automobile Industry”. in R. Baldwin, ed. Trade Policy Issues and Empirical Analysis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 11-44.

 

-J. Levinsohn and R. Feenstra (1990). “Identifying the Competition”. Journal of International Economics; V.28-#3/4, pp.199-215.

 

-J. Levinsohn (1993). “Testing the Imports-as-Market-Discipline Hypothesis”. JIE; V.35-#1/2, pp. 1-22.

 

-R. Feenstra and J. Levinsohn (1995). “Estimating Markups and Market Conduct with Multidimensional Product Attributes”. REStud; V.69-#1, pp. 19-52.

 

-C. Collyns and S. Dunaway (1987). “The Cost of Trade Restraints: The Case of Japanese Automobile Exports to the US”. IMF Staff Papers; V.34-#1, pp. 150-175.

 

-Y. Mertens and V. Ginsburgh (1985). “Product Differentiation and Price Discrimination in the European Community: The Case of Automobiles”. Journal of Industrial Economics; V.34-#2, pp. 151-166.

 

-J. deMelo and P. Messerlin (1988). “Price, Quality and Welfare Effects of European VERs on Japanese Autos”. European Economic Review; V.32-#?, pp. 1527-1546.

 

(c) Oligopolistic Competition

 

-A. Dixit (1987). Tariffs and Subsidies under Oligopoly: The case of the US Automobile Industry”. in R. Feenstra, ed. Empirical Research in International Trade. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 112-127.

 

-A. Dixit (1987). “Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy for the US Automobile Industry”. in R. Feenstra, ed. Empirical Research in International Trade. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 141-169.

 

-K. Krishna, K. Hogan, and P. Swagel (1994). “The Non-Optimality of Optimal Trade Policies: The US Automobile Industry Revisited, 1979-1985". in P. Krugman and A. Smith, eds. Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 11-37.

 

-M. Fuss, S. Murphy and L. Waverman (1992). “The State of North American and Japanese Motor Vehicle Industries: A Partially Calibrated Model to Examine the Impacts of Trade Policy Changes”. NBER Working Paper; #4225.

 

-D. Laussel, C. Montet and A. Peguin-Feissolle (1988). “Optimal Trade Policy under Oligopoly: A Calibrated Model of the Europe-Japan Rivalry in the EEC Car Market”. EER; V.32-#?, pp. 1547-1565.

 

-A. Smith (1990). “The Market for Cars in the Enlarged European Community”. in C. Bliss and J. B.de Macedo, eds. Unity With Diversity in the European Economy. Cambridge: CUP\CEPR.

 

-A. Smith and A. Venables (1990). “Automobiles”. in G.C. Hufbauer, ed. Europe 1992: An American Perspective. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 119-158.

 

-A. Smith and A. Venables (1991). “Counting the Cost of Voluntary Export Restraints in the European Car Market”. in E. Helpman and A. Razin, eds. International Trade and Trade Policy. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 187-220.

 

-A. Smith (1994). “Strategic Trade Policy in the European Car Market”. in P. Krugman and A. Smith, eds. Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 67-81.

 

-V. Lambson and J.D. Richardson (1987). “Tacit Collusion and Voluntary Restraint Agreements in the US Auto Market”. ms: University of Wisconsin, Madison.

 

-J. deMelo and D. Tarr (1992). A General Equilibrium Analysis of US Trade Policy. Cambridge: MIT Press.

 

-J. de Melo and D. Tarr 1993. “Industrial Policy in the Presence of Wage Distortions: The Case of the US Auto and Steel Industries”. IER; V.34-#4, pp. 833-851.

 

-J. Levinsohn (1994). “International Trade and the US Automobile Industry: Current Research, Issues, and Questions”. Japan and the World Economy; V.6-#4, pp. 335-357.

 

-P. Goldberg (1994). “Trade Policies in the US Automobile Industry”. Japan and the World Economy; V.6-#2, pp. 175-208. [comments by N. Yanagawa and J. Levinsohn follow]

 

-P. Goldberg (1995). “Product differentiation and Oligopoly in International Markets: The Case of the US Automobile Industry”. Etrica; V.63-#4, pp. 891-952.

 

-S. Berry, J. Levinsohn, and A. Pakes (1995). “Automobile Prices in Market Equilibrium”. Etrica; V.63-#4, pp. 841-890.

 

-S. Berry, J. Levinsohn, and A. Pakes (1999). “Voluntary Export Restraints in Automobiles: Evaluating a Trade Policy”. AER; V.89-#3, pp. 400-430.

 

(5) Political Economy of Auto Policy--US

 

-R. Cohen (1983). “The Prospects for Trade and Protectionism in the Auto Industry”. in W. Cline, ed. Trade Policy in the 1980s. Washington, DC: IIE, pp. 527-563.

 

-S. Cohen and R. Meltzer (1982). “Braking Japanese Automobile Import Competition”. Chapter 3 in Cohen and Meltzer, US International Economic Policy in Action. New York: Praeger, pp. 65-90.

 

-L. White (1986). “The US Auto Industry: A Case Study of a de facto Industrial Policy”. in H. Mutoh, et al., eds. Industrial Policies for Pacific Economic Growth. Sydney: Allen and Unwin, pp. 196-210.

 

-I. Kabashima and H. Sato (1986). “Local Content and Congressional Politics: Interest Group Theory and Foreign Policy Implications”. International Studies Quarterly; V.?-#?, pp. 295-314.

 

-J. Keely (1983). “Cast In Concrete for All Time? The Negotiation of the Auto Pact”. Canadian Journal of Political Science; V.16-#?, pp. 281-298.

 

-D. Nelson (1989). “On the High Track to Protection: The US Automobile Industry, 1979-1981". in S. Haggard and C. Moon, eds. Pacific Dynamics. Boulder: Westview Press, pp. 97-128.

 

-R. Reich (1985). “Bailout: A Comparative Study in Law and Industrial Structure”. Yale Journal on Regulation; V.2-#2, pp. 163-224.

 

-R. Reich and J. Donahue (1985). New Deals: The Chrysler Revival and the American System. New York: Basic Books.

 

-D. Dyer, M. Salter and A. Webber (1987). Changing Alliances: The Harvard Business School Project on the Auto Industry and the American Economy. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.

 

-G. Winham and I. Kabashima (1982). “The Politics of US-Japanese Auto Trade”. in I.M. Destler and H. Sato, eds. Coping with US-Japanese Economic Conflicts. Lexington: DC Heath, pp. 73-119.

 

-S. Cohen and R. Meltzer (1982). “Braking Japanese Automobile Import Competition”. Chapter 3 in Cohen and Meltzer, US International Economic Policy in Action. New York: Praeger, pp. 65-90.

 

-R. Cohen (1983). “The Prospects for Trade and Protectionism in the Auto Industry”. in W. Cline, ed. Trade Policy in the 1980s. Washington, DC: IIE, pp. 527-563.

 

-A. Laffer, V. Canto, R. Easterlin and C. Kadlec (1985). “A High Road for the American Automobile Industry”. World Economy; V.8-#?, pp. 267-286.

 

-I. Kabashima and H. Sato (1986). “Local Content and Congressional Politics: Interest Group Theory and Foreign Policy Implications”. ISQ; V.?-#?, pp. 295-314.

 

-L. White (1986). “The US Auto Industry: A Case Study of a de facto Industrial Policy”. in H. Mutoh, et al., eds. Industrial Policies for Pacific Economic Growth. Sydney: Allen and Unwin, pp. 196-210.

 

-A. Denzau (1986). “Made in America: The 1981 Automobile Cartel”. St. Louis: Center for the Study of American Business (publication #76).

 

-P. Donahue (1992). “`Free Trade` Unions and the State: Trade Liberalization's Endorsement by the AFL-CIO, 1943-1962". Research in Political Economy; V.13, pp. 1-73.

 

-D. Nelson (1995). “Political Economy of Protection for the US Automobile Industry”. in A. Krueger, ed. Political Economy of American Trade Policy. 1995. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 133-191.

 

-D. Nelson (1995). “Making Sense of the 1981 Automobile VER: Economics, Politics and the Political Economy of Protection”. in A. Krueger, ed. The Political Economy of Trade Protection. 1995. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 35-42.

 

(6) Political Economy of Auto Policy: Comparative and International

 

-D. Bennett and K. Sharpe (1979) “Agenda Setting and Bargaining Power: The Mexican State versus Transnational Automobile Corporations,” World Politics; V.32-#1, pp. 57- 89.

 

-D. Bennett and K. Sharpe (1979) “Transnational Corporations and the Political Economy of Export Promotion,” International Organization; V.33-#2, pp. 177-201.

 

-F. Coronil and J. Skurski (1982) “Reproducing Dependency: Auto-Industrial Policy and Petrodollar Circulation in Venezuela,” International Organization, V.36-#1, pp. 61-94.

 

-J. Dunn (1987). “Automobiles in International Trade: Regime Change or Persistence”. International Organization; V.41-#2, pp. 225-252.

 

-J. Dunn (1989). “The Asian Auto Imbroglio: Patterns of Trade Policy and Business Strategy. in S. Haggard and C. Moon, eds. Pacific Dynamics. Boulder: Westview, pp. 155-183.

 

-R. Gregory (1988). “A Sad and Sorry Story: Industrial Policy for the Australian Motor Vehicle Industry”. in A.M. Spence and H. Hazard, eds. International Competitiveness. Cambridge: Ballinger, pp. 173-196.

 

-S. Wilks (1984). Industrial Policy and the Motor Industry. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

 

-M. Mason (1994). “Elements of Consensus: Europe’s Response to the Japanese Automotive Challenge”. JCMS; V.32-#?, pp. 433-453.

 

-A. Mattoo and P. Mavroidis (1995). “The EC-Japan Consensus on Cars: Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy”. World Economy; V.18-#?, pp. 345-365.

 

d. Machine Tools

 

-A. Amsden (1977). “The Division of Labor is Limited by the Type of the Market: The Case of the Taiwanese Machine Tool Industry”. World Development; V.5-#3, pp. 217-233.

 

-S. Jacobsson (1982). “Electronics and the Technology Gap: The Case of Numerically Controlled Machine Tools”. IDS Bulletin; V.13-#2, pp.

 

-S. Jacobsson (1984). “Industrial Policy for the Machine Tool Industries of South Korea and Taiwan”. IDS Bulletin; V.15-#2, pp. 44-49.

 

-M. Fransman (1986). “International Competitiveness, Technical Change and the State: The Machine Tool Industry in Taiwan and Japan”. World Development; V.14-#12, pp. 1375-1396.

 

-A. Amsden (1985). “The Division of Labor is Limited by the Rate of Growth of the Market: The Taiwan Machine Tool Industry Revisited”. Cambridge Journal of Economics; V.9-#?, pp. 271-284.

 

-D. Jones (1983). “Machine Tools: A Competitive New European Industry”. in G. Shepherd, et al. Europe's Industrys: Public and Private Strategies for Change. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 186-208.

 

-D. Collins (1988). “The Machine Tool Industry and Industrial Policy, 1955-1982". in M. Spence and H. Hazard, eds. International Competitiveness. Cambridge: Ballinger, pp. 75-114.

 

-D. Friedman (1988). The Misunderstool Miracle: Industrial Development and Political Change in Japan. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

 

-R. Sarathy (1989). “The Interplay of Industrial Policy and International Strategy: Japan's Machine Tool Industry”. California Management Review; V.31-#3, pp. 132-160.

 

-E. Dinopoulos and M. Kreinin (1991). “The US VER on Machine Tools: Causes and Effects”. in R. Baldwin, ed. Empirical Studies of Commercial Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 113-129.

 

-D. Noble (1984). Forces of Production: A Social History of Industrial Automation. New York: Knopf.

 

e. Semiconductors and Computers

 

-M. Borrus, J. Millstein and J. Zysman (1983). “Trade and Development in the Semiconductor Industry: Japanese Challenge and American Response.” in J. Zysman and L. Tyson, eds. American Industry in International Competition: Government Policies and Corporate Strategies. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. pp. 142-248.

 

-G. Dosi (1983). “Semiconductors: Europe's Precarious Survival in High Technology”; in G. Shepard, et al., Europe's Industries: Public and Private Strategies for Change. London: Frances Pinter.

 

-D. Okimoto, T. Sugano and F. Weinstein (1984). The Competitive Edge: The Semiconductor Industry in the US and Japan. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

 

-T. Pugel (1987). “Limits of Trade Policy Toward High Technology Industries: The Case of Semiconductors”. in R. Sato and P. Wachtel, eds. Trade Friction and Economic Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 184-237.

 

-M. Borrus, L. Tyson and J. Zysman (1987). “Creating Advantage: How Government Policies Shape International Trade in the Semiconductor Industry”. in P. Krugman, ed. Strategic Trade Policy and the New International Economics. Cambridge: MIT, pp. 91-113.

 

-A. Denzau (1988). “Trade Protection Comes to Silicon Valley”. St Louis: Center for the Study of American Business (#86).

 

-D. Okimoto (1989). Between MITI and the Market: Japanese Industrial Policy for High Technology. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

 

-J. Hart (1989). “The Origins of the US-Japan Semiconductor Dispute”. in S. Haggard and C. Moon, eds. Pacific Dynamics: The International Politics of Industrial Change. Boulder: Westview Press. pp. 129-153.

 

-L. Tyson (1992). Who’s Bashing Whom?: Trade Conflict in High-Technology Industries. Washington, DC: IIE.

 

-D. Irwin (1996). “Trade Politics and the Semiconductor Industry”. in A. Krueger, ed. The Political Economy of American Trade Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 11-66.

 

-M. Kreinin (1985). “US Trade Policies and Possible Restrictions in High Technology Products”. Journal of Policy-Modelling, V.7-#, pp. 69-105.

 

-W. Finan and C. Amundsen (1985). An Analysis of the Effects of Targeting on the Competitiveness of the US Semiconductor Industry. Washington, DC: USTR.

 

-Finan, W.F. and C.B. Amundsen (1986). “Modeling US-Japan Competition in Semiconductors”. Journal of Policy Modeling; V.8-#3, pp. 305-326.

 

-Mody, A. and D. Wheeler (1987). “Prices, Costs and Competition at the Technological Frontier: A Model for Semiconductor Memories”; Journal of Policy Modeling; V.9-#2, pp.

 

-R. Baldwin and P. Krugman (1988). “Market Access and International Competition: A Simulation Study of 16K Random Access Memories”. in R. Feenstra, ed. Empirical Methods in International Trade. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. pp. 171-202.

 

-R. Wilson, P. Ashton and T. Egan (1980). Innovation, Competition and Government Policy in the Semiconductor Industry. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington.

 

-M.T. Flaherty (1984). “Field Research on the Link between Technological Innovation and Growth: Evidence from the International Semiconductor Industry”. AER; V.74-#2, pp. 67-72.

 

-G. Dosi (1984). Technical Change and Industrial Innovation. New York: St. Martins.

 

-C. Parsons (1988). “The Changing Shape of Domestic Employment in a High-Tech Industry: The Case of International Trade in Semiconductors”. in L. Tyson, W. Dickens and J. Zysman, eds. The Dynamics of Trade and Employment. Cambridge: Ballinger, pp.

 

-Y. Kimura (1988). The Japanese Semiconductor Industry: Structure, Competitive Strategies and Performance. Greenwich: JAI Press.

 

-Y. Kimura (1990). “Sustainable Competitive Advantages and Market Share Performance of Firms: The Case of the Japanese Semiconductor Industry”. IJIO; V.8-#?, pp. 73-92.

 

-K. Flamm (1987). Targeting the Computer: Government Support and International Competition. Washington, DC: Brookings.

 

-K. Flamm (1988). Creating the Computer: Government, Industry, and High Technology. Washington, DC: Brookings.

 

-K. Flam (1985). “Internationalization in Semiconductors”. in J. Grunwald and K. Flamm, eds. The Global Factory: Foreign Assembly in International Trade. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp.

 

-K. Flamm (198?). “Measurement of DRAM Prices: Technology and Market Structure”. in M. Foss, M. Manser and A. Young, ed. Price Measurements and their Uses. Chicago: Univeristy of Chicago Press/NBER

 

-K. Flamm (1993). “Forward Pricing vs. Fair Market Value: An Analytic Assessment of 'Dumping' in DRAMs”. in T. Ito and A. Krueger, eds. Trade and Protectionism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 47-93.

 

-K. Flamm (1993). “Semiconductor Dependency and Strategic Trade Policy”. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics. pp. 249-233.

 

-A. Dick (1994). “Accounting for Semiconductor Industry Dynamics”. International Journal of Industrial Organization; V.12-#?, pp. 35-51.

 

-D. Irwin and P. Kleinow (1994). “Learning by Doing Spillovers in the Semiconductor Industry”. JPE; v.102-#6, pp. 1200-1227.

 

-R. Baldwin (1994). “The Impact of the 1986 US-Japan Semiconductor Agreement”. Japan and the World Economy; V.6-#2, pp. 129-152. [comment by K. Krishna follows]

 

3. The Macro Poltical-Economy of Economic Power and Policy Compliance

 

a. General

 

-M. Doxey (1971). Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement. Oxford: Oxford University Press/RIIA. (2nd Edition, 1980)

 

-D. Baldwin (1971). “The Power of Positive Sanctions”. World Politics. V.24-#1, pp. 19-38.

 

-N.R. Richardson (1976). “Political Compliance and US Trade Dominance”. APSR; V.70-#?, pp 1098-1109.

 

-N.R. Richardson (1980). “Economic Dependence and Foreign Policy Compliance”. in C. Kegley and P. McGowan, eds. The Political Economy of Foreign Policy Behavior. Beverley Hills: Sage, pp.

 

-R. Renwick (1981). Economic Sanctions. Cambridge: Harvard Center for International Affairs.

 

-M. Daoudi and M. Dajani (1983). Economic Sanctions: Ideals and Experience. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

 

-T. Bayard, J. Pelzman and J. Perez-Lopez (1983). “Stakes and Risks in Economic Sanctions”. World Economy; V.5-#?, pp. 73-87.

 

-D. Baldwin (1985). Economic Statecraft. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

 

-G. Hufbauer and J. Schott (1985). Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy. Washington, DC: IIE.

 

-J. Lindsay (1986). “Trade Sanctions as Policy Instruments: A Reexamination”. ISQ; V.?-#?, pp. 153-173.

 

-S. Lenway (1988). “Between War and Commerce: Economic Sanctions as Tools of Statecraft”. IO; V.42-#2, pp. 397-426.

 

-K. Nossal (1989). “International Sanctions as International Punishment”. IO; V.43-#2, pp. 301-322.

 

-P. van Bergeijk (1989). “Success and Failure of Economic Sanctions”. KYKLOS; V.42-#?, pp. 385-404.

 

-P. van Bergeijk (1992). “Diplomatic Barriers to Trade”. De Economist; V.140-#?, pp. 44-63.

 

-P. van Bergeijk and C. van Marrewijk (1993). “Economic Sanctions: A Hidden Cost of the New World Order”. in M. chatterji, H. Jager and A. Rima, eds. Economics of International Secturity. London: Macmillan.

 

-J. Eaton and M. Engers (1992). “Sanctions”. JPE; V.100-#5, pp. 899-928.

 

-L. Martin (1992). Coercive Cooperation. Princeton: PUP.

 

-J. Dashti-Gibson, P. Davis and B. Radcliff (1997). “On the Determinants of the Success of Economic Sanctions: An Empirical Analysis”. AJPS; V.41-#2, pp. 608-618

 

-D. Drezner (2003). “The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion”. International Organization; V.57-#3, pp. 643-659.

 

b. Against the (now “former”) Soviet Union

 

-G. Adler-Karlsson (1968). Western Economic Warfare 1947-1967: A Case Study in Foreign Economic Policy. Stockholm: Almqvist and Wicksell.

 

-A.J. Hughes Hallett and A. Brandsma (1983). “How Effective Could Sanctions Against the Soviet Union Be?”. WA; V.119-#?, pp. 498-522.

 

-B. Crawford and S. Lenway (1985). “Decision Modes and Regime Change: Western Collaboration on East-West Trade”. WP; V.37-#?, pp. 375-402.

 

-M. Mastanduno (1985). “Strategies of Economic Containment: US Trade Relations with the Soviet Union”. WP; V.37-#?, pp. 503-531.

 

-M. Mastanduno (1988). “Trade as a Strategic Weapon: American and Alliance Export Control Policy in the Early Postwar Period”. IO; V.42-#1, pp. 121-150.

 

-G. Bertsch, ed. (1988). Controlling East-West Trade and Technology Transfer. Durham: Duke University Press.

 

-B. Jentelson (1986). Pipeline Politics: The Complex Politics of East-West Energy Trade. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

 

-J. Alt and B. Eichengreen (1989). “Parallel and Overlapping Games: Theory and an Application to the European Gas Trade”. E&P; V.1-#2, pp. 119-144.

 

c. Against South Africa

 

-H.A. Khan (1989). The Political Economy of Sanctions Against Apartheid. Boulder: Lynne Reinner.

 

(1) International Aspects

 

-R. Porter (1979). “International Trade and Investment Sanctions: Potential Impact on the South African Economy”. Journal of Conflict Resolution; V.23-#4, pp. 579-612.

 

-D. Gordon (1983). “The Politics of International Sanctions: A Case Study of South Africa”. in M. Nincic and P. Wallensteen, eds. Dilemmas of Economic Coercion: Sanctions in World Politics. New York: Praeger, pp. 183-210.

 

-M. Lundahl (1984). “Economic Effects of a Trade and Investment Boycott Against South Africa”. ScanJE; V.86-#1, pp. 68-83.

 

-J. Cooper (1984). “Southern Africa and the Threat of Economic Sanctions”. South African Journal of Economics; V.52-#3, pp. 266-281.

 

-J. Cooper (1986). “The Welfare Effects of Sanctions”. Journal for Studies in Economics and Econometrics; V.25-#?, pp. 3-11.

 

-C. Becker (1987). “Economic Sanctions Against South Africa”. WP; V.39-#?, pp. 147-173.

 

-P. Black and H. Cooper (1987). “On the Welfare and Employment Effects of Economic Sanctions”. South African Journal of Economics; V.55-#1, pp. 1-15.

 

-J. Cooper (1989). “On Income Distribution and Economic Sanctions”. South African Journal of Economics; V.57-#1, pp. 14-21.

 

-M. Holden (1989). “Unemployment in a Sector-Specific Trade Model in the Presence of Economic Sanctions”. South African Journal of Economics; V.57-#2, pp. 137-141.

 

-H.A. Khan (1988). “Impact of Trade Sanctions on South Africa: A Social Accounting Matrix Approach”. Contemporary Policy Issues; V.6-#?, pp. 130-140.

 

-W. Kaempfer, J. Lehman and A. Lowenberg (1987). “Divestment, Investment Sanctions, and Disinvestment: An Evaluation of Anti-Apartheid Instruments”. IO; V.41-#3, pp. 457-473.

 

-B. Feigenbaum and A. Lowenberg (1988). “South African Disinvestment: Causes and Effects”. Contemporary Policy Issues; V.6-#?, pp. 105-117.

 

-W. Kaempfer and Moffett (1988). “Impact of Anti-Apartheid Sanctions on South Africa: Some Trade and Financial Evidence”. Contemporary Policy Issues; V.6-#?, pp. 118-129.

 

-W. Kaempfer and A. Lowenberg (1990). “South Africa's Vulnerability to Oil Sanctions”. Journal of Energy and Development; V.14-#1, pp. 19-44.

 

-W. Kaempfer and A. Lowenberg (1990). “Analyzing Economic Sanctions: Toward a Public Choice Framework”. in J. Odell and T. Willett, eds. International Trade Policies: Gains from Exchange Between Economics and Political Science. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. pp. 173-192.

 

(2) Domestic Aspects

 

-J.B. Knight (1964). “A Theory of Income Distribution in South Africa”. Bulletin of the Oxford University Institute of Economics and Statistics; V.27-#4, pp. 289-310.

 

-J.B. Knight and M. McGrath (1977). “An Analysis of Racial Wage Discrimination in South Africa”. Bulletin of the Oxford University Institute of Economics and Statistics; V.39-#?, pp. 245-271.

 

-R. Porter (1978). “A Model of the Southern African-type Economy”. AER; V.68-#5, pp. 743-755.

 

-M. Lundahl (1982). “The Rationale of Apartheid”. AER; V.72-#5, pp. 1169-1179.

 

-R. Findlay and M. Lundahl (1987). “Racial Discrimination, Dualistic Labor Markets and Foreign Investment”. JDevE; V.27-#?, pp. 139-148.

 

-W. Kaempfer and A. Lowenberg (1986). “A Model of the Political Economy of International Investment Sanctions”. KYKLOS; V.39-#3, pp. 377-396.

 

-W. Kaempfer and A. Lowenberg (1988). “The Theory of International Sanctions: A Public Choice Approach”. AER; V.78-#?, pp. 786-793.

 

-W. Kaempfer and A. Lowenberg (1988). “Determinants of the Economic and Political Effects of Trade Sanctions”. South African Journal of Economics. V.56-#4, pp. 270-277.

 

-W. Kaempfer and A. Lowenberg (1989). “Sanctioning South Africa: The Politics Behind the Policies”. Cato Journal; V.8-#3, pp. 713-727.

 

-A. Lowenberg (1989). “An Economic Theory of Apartheid”. Economic Inquiry; V.27-#1, pp. 57-74.

 

-P. Black and J. Cooper (1989). “Economic Sanctions and Interest Group Behavior: Some Reservations”. South African Journal of Economics; V.57-#2, pp. 188-193.

 

4. Political Power and Trade Structure

 

-T. Baumgartner and T.R. Burns (1975). “The Structuring of International Economic Relations”. ISQ; V.19-#2, pp. 126-159.

 

-S. Krasner (1976). “State Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade”. WP; V.28-#3, pp. 317-347.

 

-C. Christensen (1977). “Structural Power and National Security”; in K. Knorr and F. Trager, eds. Economic Issues and National Security. Lawrence: Regents Press of Kansas. pp. 127-159.

 

-J.E. Roemer (1977). “The Effect of Sphere of Influence and Economic Distance on the Commodity Composition of Trade in Manufactures”. REStat; V.59-#3, pp. 318-327.

 

-G. Gaile and R. Grant (1989). “Trade, Power, and Location: The Spatial Dynamics of the Relationship between Exchange and Political-Economic Strength”. Economic Geography; V.65-#4, pp 329-337.

 

-B. Pollins (1989). “Does Trade Still Follow the Flag?”. APSR; V.83-#2, pp 465-480.

 

-E. Mansfield (1992). “The Concentration of Capabilities and International Trade”. IO; V.46-#3, pp. 731-764.

 

-J. Gowa and E. Mansfield (1993). “Power Politics and International Trade”. APSR; V.87-#2, pp 408-420.

 

-E. Mansfield and R. Bronson (1997). “Alliances, Preferential Trading Arrangements, and International Trade”. APSR; V.91-#1, pp. 94-107.

 

-J. Morrow, R. Siverson, and T. Tabares (1998). “The Political Determinants of International Trade: The Major Powers, 1907-1990". APSR; V.92-#3, pp. 649-661.

 

-C.P. Kindleberger (1980). “Government Policies and Changing Shares in World Trade”. AER; V.70-#2, pp. 293-298.

 

-A. Hirschman (1945). National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade. Berkeley: University of California Press.

 

-S. Sideri (1970). Trade and Power. Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press.

 

5. Imperialism, Neoimperialism and Political-Economic Domination

 

-P. Baran (1957). The Political Economy of Growth. New York: Monthly Review.

 

-A.G. Frank (1966). “The Development of Underdevelopment”. Monthly Review, V.18-#4, pp. 17-31.

 

-I. Wallerstein (1974). “The Rise and Future Demise of the Capitalist World System”. Comparative Studies in Society and History; V.16-#4, pp. 387-415.

 

-F. Cardoso and E. Faletto (1979). Dependency and Development in Latin America. Berkeley: University of California Press.

 

-B. Warren (1980). Imperialism: Pioneer of Capitalism. London: New Left Books.

 

6. Trade, War and Peace

 

a. Economic Interdependence and Political Conflict

 

-K. Barbieri and G. Schneider (1999). “Globalization and Peace: Assessing New Directions in the Study of Trade and Conflict”. Journal of Peace Research; V.36-#4, pp. 387-404.

 

-S. Polachek (1980). “Conflict and Trade”. Journal of Conflict Resolution; V.24-#1, pp. 55-78.

 

-M. Gasiorowski and S. Polachek (1982). “Conflict and Interdependence: East-West Trade and Linkages in the Era of Detente”. Journal of Conflict Resolution; V.26-#4, pp. 709-729.

 

-M. Gasiorowski (1986). “Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: Some Cross-National Evidence”. ISQ; V.30-#1, pp. 23-38.

 

-B. Pollins (1989). “Conflict, Cooperation and Commerce: The Effect of International Political Interactions on Bilateral Trade Flows”. American Journal of Political Science; V.33-#?, pp. 465-480.

 

-S. Polachek (1992). “Conflict and Trade: An Economics Approach to Political International Interactions”. In W. Isard and C. Anderton, eds. Economics of Arms Reduction and the Peace Process. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 89-120.

 

-K. Barbieri (1996). “Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or a Source of Interstate Conflict”. Journal of Peace Research; V.33-#1, pp. 29-49.

 

-K. Barbieri (1997). “Risky Business: The Impact of Trade Linkages on Interstate Conflict, 1870-1985”. In G. Schneider and P. Weitsman, eds. Enforcing Cooperation: ‘Risky’ States in the Intergovernmental Management of Conflict. London: Macmillan, pp. 202-231.

 

-R. Reuveny and H. Kang (1996). “International Trade, Political Conflict/Cooperation, and Granger Causality”. American Journal of Political Science, V.40-#3, pp. 943-970.

 

-S. McMillan (1997). “Interdependence and Conflict”. Mershon International Studies Review; V.41-#1, pp. 94-107.

 

-S. Polachek, J. Robst, and Y.-C. Chang (1999). “Liberalism and Interdependence: Extending the Trade-Conflict Model”.Journal of Peace Research; V.36-#4, pp. 405-422.

 

-J. Oneal and B. Russett (1999). “Assessing the Liberal Peace with Alternative Specifications: Trade Still Reduces Conflict”. Journal of Peace Research; V.36-#4, pp. 423-442.

 

-H. Dorussen (1999). “Balance of Power Revisited: A Multi-Country Model of Trade and Conflict”.Journal of Peace Research; V.36-#4, pp. 443-462. [comment by H. Hegre and response, 2001, V.39-#1, pp. 109-118.]

 

-J. Levy and K. Barbieri (1999). “Sleeping with the Enemy: The Impact of War on Trade”. Journal of Peace Research; V.36-#4, pp. 463-479.

 

-J. Morrow (1999). “How Could Trade Affect Conflict?”. Journal of Peace Research; V.36-#4, pp. 481-489.

 

-E. Gartzke, Ql Li, and C. Boehmer (2001). “Investing in the Peace: Economic Interdependence and International Conflict”. IO; V.55-#2, pp. 391-438.

 

-Q. Li and D. Sacko (2002). “The (Ir)Relevance of Militarized Interstate Disputes for International Trade”. International Studies Quarterly, V.46-#1, pp. 11-43.

 

-E. Mansfield (1994). Power, Trade, and War. Princeton: PUP.

 

-Special Issue (1983): “The Economic Foundations of War”. ISQ; V.27-#4.

 

-R. Gilpin (1981). War and Change in World Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press.

 

-J. Levy (1985). “Theories of General War”. WP; V.37-#?, pp. 345-374.

 

-P. Kennedy (1987). The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000. New York: Random House.

 

-G. Modelski (1987). Long Cycles in World Politics. Seattle: Universtiy of Washington Press.

 

-J. Goldstein (1988). Long Cycles: Prosperity and War in the Modern Age. New Haven: Yale University Press.

 

-W. Thomson (1988). On Global War: Historical-Structural Approaches to World Politics. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.

 

b. Regime Type, Economic Interdependence and Political Conflict

 

-M. Brown, S. Lynn-Jones, S. Miller eds. (1996). Debating the Democratic Peace. Cambridge: MIT.

 

-S. Chan (1984). “Mirror, Mirror on the Wall ... Are the Freer Countries More Pacific”. JCR; V.28-#?, pp. 617-648.

 

-M. Doyle (1986). “Liberalism and World Politics”. APSR; V.80-#4, pp. 1151-1169.

 

-Z. Maoz and N. Absolali (1989). “Regime Types and International Conflict, 1816-1976". JCR; V.33-#1, pp. 3-36.

 

-C. Ember, M. Ember, and B. Russett (1992). “Peace Between Participatory Polities: A Cross Cultural Test of the ‘Democracies Rarely Fight Each Other’ Hypothesis”. WP; V.44-#?, pp. 573-599.

 

-Z. Maoz and B. Russett (1993). “Normative and Structural Causes of the Democratic Peace, 1946-1986". APSR; V.87-#?, pp. 624-638.

 

-S. Bremer (1993). “Democracy and Militarized Interstate Conflict, 1816-1965". International Interactions; V.18-#?, pp. 231-249.

 

-W. Dixon and B. Moon (1993). “Political Similarity and American Foreign Trade Patterns”. Political Research Quarterly; V.46-#?, pp. 5-25.

 

-E. Weede (1995). “Economic Policy and International Security: Rent-Seeking, Free Trade and Democratic Peace”. European Journal of International Relations; V.1-#4, pp. 519-537.

 

-E. Mansfield and J. Snyder (1995). “Democratization and the Danger of War”. International Security; V.20-#?, pp. 5-38.

 

-E. Mansfield and J. Snyder (1995). “Democratization and War”. Foreign Affairs; V.74-#?, pp. 79-97.

 

-E. Mansfield and J. Snyder (1996). “The Effects of Democratization on War”. International Security; V.21-#?, pp. 196-207.

 

-W. Thompson (1996). “Democracy and Peace: Putting the Cart Before the Horse?”. IO; V.50-#?, pp. 141-174.

 

-D.S. Bennett (1996). “Democracy, Regime Change, and Rivalry Termination”. International Interactions; V.22-#4, pp. 369-397.

 

-J. Oneal, F. Oneal, Z. Maoz, and B. Russett (1996). “The Liberal Peace: Interdependence, Democracy, and International Conflict”. Journal of Peace Research; V.33-#1, pp. 11-28.

 

-J. Oneal and B. Russett (1997). “The Classical Liberals were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-1985”. ISQ; V.41-#2, pp. 267-293.

 

-J. Oneal and J.L. Ray (1997). “New Tests of the Democratic Peace: Controlling for Economic Interdependence”. Political Research Quarterly; V.50-#4, pp. 751-775.

 

-A. Raknerud and H. Hegre (1997). “The Hazards of War: Reassessing Evidence of the Democratic Peace”. Journal of Peace Research; V.34-#4, pp. 385-404.

 

-H. Farber and J. Gowa (1997). “Common Interests or Common Polities? Reinterpreting the Democratic Peace”. Journal of Politics; V.59-#2, pp. 393-417.

 

-W. Thompson and R. Tucker (1997). “A Tale of Two Democratic Peace Critiques”. Journal of Conflict Resolution; V.41-#3, pp. 428-454. [comments by Farber/Gowa, Mansfield/Snyder and response follows 457-477.]

 

-S. Polachek (1997). “Why Democracies Cooperate More and Fight Less: The Relationship between International Trade and Cooperation”.  RIE; V.5-#3, pp. 295-309.

 

-E. Gartzke (1998). “Kant We All Just Get Along? Opportunity, Willingness, and the Origins of the Democratic Peace”. AJPS; V.42-#1, pp. 1-27.

 

-M. Ward and K. Gleditsch (1998). “Democratizing for Peace”. APSR; V.92-#1, pp. 51-61.

 

-E. Henderson (1998). “The Democratic Peace through the Lens of Culture, 1820-1989”. ISQ; V.40-#3, pp. 461-484.

 

-H. Bliss and B. Russett (1998). “Democratic Trading Partners: The Liberal Connections, 1962-1989”. Journal of Politics; V.60-#4, pp. 1126-1147.

 

-B. Russett, J. Oneal, and D. Davis (1998). “The Third Leg of the Kantian Tripod for Peace: International Organizations and Militarized Disputes, 1950-1985”. IO; V.52-#3, pp. 441-467.

 

-J. Morrow, R. Siverson, and T. Tabares (1998). “The Wages of Peace: Trade, Democracy, Interests and International Conflict Among the Major Powers”. in G. Geeraerts and P. Stouthuysen, eds. Democratic Peace in Europe: Myth or Reality? Brussels: Free University of Brussels Press, pp. 131-149.

 

-N. Beck, J. Katz, and R. Tucker (1998). “Taking Time Seriously: Time-Series/Cross-Section Analysis with Binary Dependent Variables”. AJPS; V.42-#4, pp. 1260-1288. [erratum AJPS; V.43-#3 pg. 978.]

 

-J. Oneal and B. Russett (1999). “The Kanitan Peace: The Pacific Benefits of Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1886-1992”. World Politics; V.52-#1, pp. 1-37.

 

-B. Leeds and D. Davis (1999). “Beneath the Surface: Regime Type and International Interaction, 1953-1978”. Journal of Peace Research; V.36-#1, pp. 5-21.

 

-J. Gowa (1999). Ballots and Bullets: The Elusive Democratic Peace. Princeton: PUP.

 

-G. Flynn and H. Farrell (1999). “Piecing Together the Democratic Peace: The CSCE and the ‘Construction’ of Security in Post-Cold War Europe”. International Organization; V.53-#3, pp. 505-535.

 

-Lars-Erik Cederman (2001). “Back to Kant: Reinterpreting the Democratic Peace as a Macrohistorical Learning Process”. APSR; V.95-#1, pp. 15-31.

 

-Christopher F. Gelpi and Michael Griesdorf (2001). “Winners or Losers? Democracies in International Crisis, 1918–94". American Political Science Review; V.95-#3, pp. 633-647.

 

-Donald P Green, Soo Yeon Kim and David H Yoon (2001). “Dirty Pool”. International Organization; V.55-#2, pp. 441-468.

 

-John Oneal and Bruce Russett (2001). “Clear and Clean: The Fixed Effects of the Liberal Peace”. International Organization; V.55-#2, pp. 469-486.

 

-Nathaniel Beck and Jonathan N Katz (2001). “Throwing Out the Baby with the Bath Water: A Comment on Green, Kim, and Yoon”. International Organization; V.55-#2, pp. 487-496.

 

-Gary King (2001). “Proper Nouns and Methodological Propriety: Pooling Dyads in International Relations Data”. International Organization; V.55-#2, pp. 497-507.

 

-Janet Box-Steffenmeister and Christopher Zorn (2001). “Duration Models and Proportional Hazards in Political Science”. American Journal of Political Science, V.45-#4, pp. 972-988.

 

-M. Peceny, C. Beer, and S. Sanchez-Terry (2002). “Dictatorial Peace?”. APSR; V.96-#1, pp. 15-26.

 

c. Regime Type and Trade Conflict

 

-R. Sherman (2001). “Democracy and Trade Conflict”. International Interactions; V.27-#1, pp. 1-28.

 

-K. Zeng (2002). “Trade Structure and the Effectiveness of America’s “Aggressively Unilateral” Trade Policy”. International Studies Quarterly; V.46-#1, pp. 93-115.

 

-K. Zeng (1999). “Why Do Democracies Fight More Trade Wars? The Importance of Competitive versus Complementary Structure”.

 

-Edward D. Mansfield, Helen V. Milner and B. Peter Rosendorf (2002). “Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements”. International Organization; V.56-#3, pp. 477-513.


II. THE POLITICAL-ECONOMY OF LIBERALIZATION

 

A. Interdependence: Theory, Measurement and Political Economy

 

1. The Measurement of Interdependence

 

-A. Hirschman (1945). National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade. Berkeley: University of California Press.

 

-I.R. Savage and K. Deutsch (1960). “A Statistical Model of the Gross Analysis of Transaction Flows”. Etrica; V.28-#3, pp. 551-572.

 

-K. Deutsch and A. Eckstein (1961). “National Industrialization and the Decline of the International Economic Sector”. WP; V.?-#?, pp. 267-299.

 

-K. Deutsch, C. Bliss, and A. Eckstein (1962). “Population, Sovereignty, and the Share of Foreign Trade”. EDCC; V.?-#?, pp. 353-366.

 

-S. Kuznets (1964). “Quantitative Aspects of the Economic Growth of Nations, IX. Level and Structure of Foreign Trade: Comparisons for Recent Years”. EDCC; V.13-#1, Part II, pp. 1-106.

 

-S. Kuznets (1967). “Quantitative Aspects of the Economic Growth of Nations, X. Level and Structure of Foreign Trade: Long Term Trends”. EDCC; V.15-#2, Part II, pp. 1-140.

 

-H. Alker and D. Puchala (1968). “Trends in Economic Partnership: The North Atlantic Area, 1928-1963". In J. D. Singer, ed. Quantitative International Politics. New York: Free Press.

 

-B. Russett (1967). International Regions and the International System. Chicago: Rand McNally.

 

-B. Russett (1968). “‘Regional’ Trading Patterns 1938-1963". ISQ; V.12-#4, pp. 360-379.

 

-B. Russett (1968). “Delineating International Regions”. in J. D. Singer, ed. Quantitative International Politics. New York: Free Press.

 

-R. Tollison and T. Willett (1973). “International Integration and the Interdependence of Economic Variables”. IO; V.27-#2, pp. 255-271.

 

-P. Katzenstein (1975). “International Interdependence: Some Long Term Trends and Recent Changes”. IO; V.29-#4, pp. 1021-1034.

 

-R. Rosecrance, et al. (1977). “Whither Interdependence?”. International Organization; V.31-#3, pp. 425-445.

 

-S. Grassman (1980). “Long-term Trends in Openness of National Economies”. OEP; V.32-#1, pp. 123-133.

 

Thygesen, Niels, Yutaka Kosai, and Robert Lawrence (1996). Globalization and Trilateral Labor Markets: Evidence and Implications: A report to the Trilateral Commission. New York: Trilateral Commission.

 

Lee, Eddy (1996). “Globalization and Employment: Is Anxiety Justified?”. International Labour Review; V.135-#5, pp. 485-497.

 

-P. Bairoch (1996). “Globalization Myths and Realities: One Century of External Trade and Foreign Investment”. In R. Boyer and D. Drache, eds. States against markets: The limits of globalization. New York: Routledge, pp. 173-192.

 

-P. Bairoch, R. Kozul-Wright (1998). “Globalization Myths: Some Historical Reflections on Integration, Industrialization and Growth in the World Economy”. In R. Kozul-Wright and R. Rowthorn eds. Transnational corporations and the global economy. New York: St. Martins, pp. 37-68.

 

-Lipsey, Robert (1998). “Galloping, Creeping, or Receding Internationalization”. International Trade Journal; V.12-#2, pp. 181-191.

 

-Lipsey, Robert E., Magnus Blomstrom, and Eric Ramstetter (2000). “Geography and Ownership as Bases for Economic Accounting”. in Robert E. Baldwin, Robert E. Lipsey, and J. David Richardson, eds., Geography and Ownership as Bases for Economic Accounting. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 83-135.

 

-Gundlach, Erich and Peter Nunnenkamp (1997). “Globalization and Labour Markets in the Triad: Different Adjustment Patterns”. Transnational Corporations; V.6-#3, pp. 57-85.

 

-Rodrik, Dani (1999). “Globalisation and Labour, or: If Globalisation is a Bowl of Cherries, Why are There So Many Glum Faces Around the Table?”. in R. Baldwin, D. Cohen, A. Sapir, and A. Venables, eds. Market Integration, Regionalism, and the Global Economy. Cambridge: CUP/CEPR, pp. 117-150.

 

-Bordo, Michael, Barry Eichengreen, Douglas A. Irwin (1999). “Fin de Siècle Déjà Vu: Is Globalization Today Really Different than Globalization a Hundred Years Ago?”. NBER Working Paper; #7195. Forthcoming in Brookings Trade Forum–1999.

 

-R. Baldwin and P. Martin (1999). “Two Waves of Globalization: Superficial Similarities, Fundamental Differences”. In. H. Siebert, ed. Globalization and Labor. Tubingen: Mohr, pp. 3-58.

 

-P. Temin (1999). “Globalization”. Oxford Review of Economic Policy; V.15-#4, pp. 76-89.

 

J. McCallum (1995). “National Borders Matter: Canada-U.S. Regional Trade Patterns”. AER; V.85-#3, pp. 615-623.

 

-C. Engel and J. Rogers (1996). “How Wide Is the Border?”. AER; V.86-#5, pp. 1112-1125.

 

-S.-J. Wei (1996). “Intra-National versus International Trade: How Stubborn are National in Global Integration?”. NBER Working Paper; #5531.

 

M. A. Anderson and S. Smith (1999). “Do National Borders Really Matter? Canada-US Regional Trade Reconsidered”. RIE; V.7-#2, pp. 219-227.

 

M. A. Anderson and S. Smith (1999). “Canadian Provinces in World Trade: Engagement and Detachment”. CJE; V.32-#1, pp. 22-38.

 

-J. Helliwell and R. McKitrick (1999). “Comparing Capital Mobility Across Provincial and National Borders”. CJE; V.32-#5, pp. 1164-1173.

 

-M. Jenkins (1997). “Cities, Borders, Distances, Non-traded Goods and Purchasing Power Parity”. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics; V.59-#2, pp. 203-213.

 

-J. Helliwell (1996). “Do National Borders Matter for Quebec's Trade?”. CJE; V.29-#3, pp. 507-522.

 

-J. Ceglowski (1998). “Has the Border Narrowed?”. Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Research Working Paper, #98/15.

 

2. Theoretical Analysis of Political Implications of Economic Interdependence

 

-R. Cooper (1968). The Economics of Interdependence. New York: McGraw-Hill.

 

-B. Russett (1971). “Transactions, Community, and International Political Integration”. JCMS; V.?-#?, pp. 224-245.

 

-R. Rosencrance and A. Stein (1973). “Interdependence: Myth or Reality?”. WP; V.26-#1, pp. 1-27.

 

-H. Alker (1977). “A Methodology for Design Research on Interdependence Alternatives”. IO; V.31-#1, pp. 29-61.

 

-R. Keohane and J. Nye (197?). Power and Interdependence. Boston: Little-Brown.

 

B. The General Theory of Second-Best and Unilateral Trade Policy Reform

 

1. The General Theory of Second-Best and Policy Reform

 

-R. Lipsey and K. Lancaster (1956). “The General Theory of Second Best”. REStud; V.24-#1, pp. 11-32.

 

-J. Green (1961). “The Social Optimum in the Presence of Monopoly and Taxation”. REStud; V.29-#1, pp. 66-77.

 

-E. Foster and H. Sonnenschein (1970). “Price Distortion and Economic Welfare”. Etrica; V.38-#2, pp. 281-297.

 

-K. Kawamata (1974). “Price Distortion and Potential Welfare”. Etrica; V.42-#3, pp. 435-460.

 

-T. Rader (1976). “The Welfare Loss from Price Distortions”. Etrica; V.44-#6, pp. 1253-1257.

 

-T. Hatta (1975). “Radial Change in Distortion and Choice of Numeraire”. Etrica; V.43-#3, pp. 519-520.

 

-M. Bruno (1972). “Market Distortion and Gradual Reform”. REStud; V.39-#4, pp. 373-383.

 

-A. Dixit (1975). “Welfare Effects of Tax and Price Changes”. JPubE; V.4-#?, pp. 103-123.

 

-T. Hatta (1977). “A Theory of Piecemeal Policy Recommendations”. REStud; V.44-#1, pp. 1-21.

 

-R. Guesnerie (1977). “On the Direction of Tax Reform”. JPubE; V.7-#?, pp. 179-202.

 

-W.E. Diewert (1978). “Optimal Tax Perturbations”. JPubE; V.10-#?, pp. 139-177.

 

-J. Weymark (1979). “A Reconciliation of Recent Results in Optimal Taxation Theory”. JPubE; V.12-#?, pp. 171-189.

 

-K. Roberts (1980). “Price-Dependent Welfare Prescriptions”. JPubE; V.13-#?, pp. 277-297.

 

-J. Tirole and R. Guesnerie (1981). “Tax Reform from the Gradient Projection Viewpoint”. JPubE; V.15-#3, pp. 275-293.

 

-J. Weymark (1981). “Undominated Directions of Tax Reform”. JPubE; V.16-#?, pp. 343-369.

 

-A. Turunen-Red (1990). “On the Hatta Normality Condition: Policy Reforms and Shadow Pricing”. JPubE; V.43-#?, pp. 253-262.

 

-R. Roberts (1992). “When Does a Decrease in a Distortion Increase Welfare”. EcLets; V.39-#?, pp. 37-42.

 

-C.C. Yang and H. Haller (1993). “On Directions of Commodity Price Reform in the Presence of a Given Non-Linear Income Tax Schedule”. CJE; V.26-#2, pp. 469-480.

 

-P. Hatzipanayotou, M. Michael and S. Miller (1994). “Win-Win Indirect Tax Reform: A Modest Proposal”. EcLets; V.44-#?, pp. 147-151.

 

-S. Kanbur and G. Myles (1993). “Policy Choice and Political Constraints”. EJPE; V.8-#1, pp. 1-29.

 

2. Second-Best Trade Policy Reform

 

a. Unilateral Reform of Tariffs

 

-T. Bertrand and J. Vanek (1971). “The Theory of Tariffs, Taxes and Subsidies: Some Aspects of the Second Best”. AER; V.61-#?, pp. 925-931.

 

-P.J. Lloyd (1974). “A More General Theory of Price Distortions in Open Economies”. JIE; V.4-#4, pp. 365-386.

 

-T. Hatta (1977). “A Recommendation for a Better Tariff Structure”. Etrica; V.45-#8, pp. 1859-1869.

 

-T. Fukushima (1979). “Tariff Structure, Nontraded Goods and Theory of Piecemeal Policy Recommendations”. IER; V.20-#2, pp. 427-435.

 

-T. Fukushima (1981). “A Dynamic Quantity Adjustment Process in a Small Open Economy, and Welfare Effects of Tariff Changes”. JIE; V.11-#?, pp. 513-529.

 

-A. Dixit (1987). “On Pareto-Improving Redistributions of Economic Welfare”. JET; V.41-#1, pp. 133-153.

 

-W.E. Diewert, A. Turunen-Red and A. Woodland (1991). “Tariff Reform in a Small Open Many-Household Economy with Domestic Distortions and Non-Traded Goods”. IER; V.32-#4, pp. 937-957.

 

-G. Fane (1991). “The Global Efficiency of Radial Tax Reductions”. IER; V.32-#4, pp. 853-857.

 

-K. Abe (1992). “Tariff Reform in a Small Open Economy with Public Production”. IER; V.33-#1, pp. 209-222.

 

-A. Panagariya (1992). “Input Tariffs, Duty Drawbacks, and Tariff Reforms”. JIE; V.32-#1/2, pp. 131-147.

 

-R. Lopez and A. Panagariya (1992). “On the Theory of Piecemeal Tariff Reform: The Case of Pure Imported Intermediate Inputs”. AER; V.82-#3, pp. 615-625.

 

-A. Turunen-Red (1987). “Economic Inequality and Public Policy in a Small Open Economy”. ScanJE; V.89-#4, pp. 405-419.

 

-M. Michael and P. Hatzipanayotou (1995). “International Factor Mobility, Nontraded Goods and Tariff Reform”. Japanese Economic Review; V.46-#3, pp. 274-281.

 

-J.P. Neary (1998). “Pitfalls in the Theory of International Trade Policy: Concertina Reforms of Tariffs, and Subsidies to High-Technology Industries”. ScanJE; V.100-#1, pp. 187-206.

 

-J. Ju and K. Krishna (2000). “Evaluating Trade Reform with Many Consumers”. CJE; V.33-#3, pp. 787-79.

 

-J. Ju and K. Krishna (2000). “Welfare and Market Access Effects of Piecemeal Tariff Reforms”. JIE; V.51-#2, pp. 305-316.

 

-C. Kowalczyk (2002). “Reforming Tariffs and Subsidies in International Trade”. Pacific Economic Review; V.7-#2, pp. 305-318.

 

b. Unilateral Reform of Trade and Domestic Taxes

 

-Mitra, Pradeep (1991). “The Coordinated Reform of Tariffs and Indirect Taxes”. In J. Khalilzadeh-Shirazi and A. Shah, eds. Tax Policy in Developing Countries. Washington, DC: World Bank, pp. 86-99.

 

-Mitra, Pradeep (1992). “The Coordinated Reform of Tariffs and Indirect Taxes”. World Bank Research Observer; V.7-#2, pp. 195-218.

 

-W. Diewert, A. Turunen-Red and A. Woodland (1989). “Productivity- and Pareto-Improving Changes in Taxes and Tariffs”. REStud; V.56-#2, pp. 199-216.

 

-J. Beghin and L. Karp (1992). “Tariff Reform in the Presence of Sector-Specific Distortions”. CJE; V.25-#2, pp. 294-309.

 

-J. Beghin and L. Karp (1992). “Piecemeal Trade Reform in the Presence of Producer-Specific Domestic Subsidies”. EcLets; V.39-#?, pp. 65-71.

 

-Michael, Michael, Panos Hatzipanayotou, and Stephen Miller (1993). “Integrated Reforms of Tariffs and Consumption Taxes”. Journal of Public Economics; V.52-#3, pp. 417-428.

 

-Michael, Michael, Panos Hatzipanayotou, and Stephen Miller (1994). “Win-Win Indirect Tax Reform: A Modest Proposal”. Economics Letters; V.44-#1/2, pp. 147-151.

 

-R. Falvey (1994). “Revenue Enhancing Tariff Reform”. WA; V.130-#1, pp. 175-189.

 

-K. Abe (1995). “The Target Rates of Tariff and Tax Reform”. IER; V.36-#4, pp. 875-885.

 

-A. Tsunkei (1995). “Pareto-Improving Changes in Tariffs and Taxes”. Public Finance; V.50-#3, pp. 470-477.

 

-J. Anderson (1999). “Trade Reform with a Government Budget Constraint”. in J. Piggott and A. Woodland, eds. International Trade Policy and the Pacific Rim. London: Macmillan, pp. 217-238. [Comment by A. Turunen-Red follows, pp. 239-244.]

 

-J. Anderson (1997). “Revenue Neutral Trade Reform with Many Households, Quotas, and Tariffs”. RIE; V.?-#?, pp. [NBER Working Paper; #6181.]

 

-Michael Keen and Jenny Ligthart (2002). “Coordinating Tariff Reduction and Domestic Tax Reform”. Journal of International Economics; V.56-#2, pp. 489-507.

 

-J. Edwards (2001). “Trade Tax Reform in a Small Open Economy with Distributional Objectives and Distortionary Taxation”. Topics in Economic Analysis and Policy; V.1-#1, (article 2).

 

-Diewert, W. Erwin (1988). “On Tax Reform”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.21-#1, pp. 1-40.

 

-Rousslang, Donald (1987). “The Opportunity Cost of Import Tariffs”. Kyklos; V.40-#1, pp. 88-102.

 

-Rousslang, Donald and Stephen Tokarick (1995). “Estimating the Welfare Cost of Tariffs: The Roles of Leisure and Domestic Taxes”. Oxford Economic Papers; V.47-#1, pp. 83-97.

 

-Parry, Ian W. H. (2001). “The Costs of Restrictive Trade Policies in the Presence of Factor Tax Distortions”. International Tax and Public Finance; V.8-#2, pp. 147-170.

 

-R. Boadway, S. Maital, and M. Prachowny (1973). “Optimal Tariffs, Optimal Taxes and Public Goods”. Journal of Public Economics; V.2-#4, pp. 391-403.

 

-T. Bertrand and J. Vanek (1971). “The Theory of Tariffs, Taxes, and Subsidies: Some Aspects of the Second Best”. AER; V.61-#5, pp. 925-31.

 

-Michael, Michael and Stephen Miller (1991). “Optimal Tariffs and Capital Taxes When Capital Movements Are Sluggish: An Extension and Synthesis”. Greek Economic Review; V.13-#1, pp. 157-165.

 

-T. Itagaki (1994). “Optimal Tariffs and Income Taxes under Imperfect and Uncertain Foreign Investment”. Southern Economic Journal; V.60-#4, pp. 858-68.

 

c. Unilateral Reform of Quotas and Tariffs

 

-R. Falvey (1988). “Tariffs, Quotas and Piecemeal Policy Reform”. JIE; V.25-#?, pp. 177-183.

 

-J. Anderson and J.P. Neary (1992). “Trade Reform with Quotas, Partial Rent Retention and Tariffs”. Etrica; V.60-#1, pp. 57-76.

 

-J.P. Neary (1995). “Trade Liberalisation and Shadow Prices in the Presence of Tariffs and Quotas”. IER; V.36-#3, pp. 531-554.

 

-S. Lahiri and P. Raimondos (1996). “Correcting Trade Distortions in a Small Open Economy”. RIE; V.4-#3, pp. 287-299.

 

-A.H. Turunen-Red and A. Woodland (1993). “Partial Tariff and Quota Reform in a Small Open Economy”. ms: University of Texas/University of Sydney.

 

C. Multilateral Liberalization

 

1. Liberalization with Price-Taking Firms

 

-A. Turunen-Red and A. Woodland (1996). “Recent Developments in Multilateral Policy Reform”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.29-#? Sp. Iss. Part 2, pp. S394-400.

 

-A. Turunen-Red and A. Woodland (2001). “The Anatomy of Multilateral Trade Policy Reform”. In S. Lahiri, ed. Regionalism and Globalization: Theory and Practice. London: Routledge, pp. 61-91.

 

-J. Vanek (1964). “Unilateral Trade Liberalization and Global World Income”. QJE; V.78-#?, pp. 139-147.

 

-P. Kenen (1974). “A Note on Tariff Changes and World Welfare”. QJE; V.88-#4, pp. 692-697.

 

-T. Hatta and T. Fukushima (1979). “The Welfare Effect of Tariff Rate Reductions in a Many Country World”. JIE; pp. 503-511.

 

-T. Fukushima and N. Kim (1989). “Welfare Improving Tariff Changes: A Case of Many Goods and Countries”. JIE; V.26-#?, pp. 383-388.

 

-K. Kowalczyk (1989). “Trade Negotiations and World Welfare”. AER. V.79-#3, pp. 552-559.

 

-M.J. Keen (1989). “Multilateral Tax and Tariff Reform”. ESQ; V.40-#3, pp. 195-202.

 

-A. Turunen-Red and A. Woodland (1991). “Strict Pareto-Improving Multilateral Reforms of Tariffs”. Etrica; V.59-#4, pp. 1127-1152.

 

-A. Turunen-Red and A. Woodland (1993). “Multilateral Reforms of Tariffs without Transfer Compensation”. in H. Herberg and N.V. Long, eds., Trade, Welfare and Economic Policies. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 145-166.

 

-A. Tsuneki (1992). “A General Theorem on Tariff Harmonization”. EcLets; V.40-#?, pp. 445-447.

 

-N. Nakanishi (1993). “Welfare Analysis of Tariff Change with and without International Transfers”. JIE; V.35-#3/4, pp. 377-387.

 

-A. Turunen-Red and A. Woodland (1995). “International Trade Policy Reforms and their Simulation”. Schweizerische Zeitschrift fur Volkswirtschaft und Statistik/Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics; V.131 -#3, pp. 389-417.

 

-M. Michael and P. Hatzipanayotou (1995). “International Factor Mobility, Nontraded Goods and Tariff Reform”. Japanese Economic Review; V.46-#3, pp. 274-281.

 

-A. Turunen-Red and A. Woodland (2000). “Multilateral Policy Reforms and Quantity Restrictions on Trade”. JIE; V.52-#?, pp. 153-168.

 

-W. Cline, N. Kawanabe, T. Kronsjo and T. Williams (1978). Trade Negotiations in the Tokyo Round. Washington, D.C.: Brookings.

 

-J. Whalley (1986). Trade Liberalization among Major World Trading Areas. Cambridge: MIT Press.

 

-T.N. Srinivasan and J. Whalley, eds. (1986). General Equilibrium Trade Policy Modeling. Cambridge: MIT Press.

 

2. Liberalization with Imperfect Competition

 

-E. Buffie and P. Spiller (1986). “Trade Liberalization in Oligopolistic Industries”. JIE; V.20-#?, pp. 65-81.

 

-T. Ross (1988). “Movements Towards Free Trade and Domestic Market Performance With Imperfect Competition”. CJE; V.21-#3, pp. 507-524.

 

-T. Ross (1988). “On the Price Effects of Mergers with Freer Trade”. IJIO; V.6-#?, pp. 233-246.

 

-R. Eldor and D. Levin (1990). “Trade Liberalization and Domestic Monopoly: A Welfare Analysis”. IER; V.31-#4, pp. 773-782.

 

-N. Schmitt (1990). “Two-Country Trade Liberalization in an Address Model of Product Differentiation”. CJE; V.23-#3, pp. 654-675.

 

-K. Bagwell and R. Staiger (1997). “Strategic Export Subsidies and Reciprocal Trade Agreements: The Natural Monopoly Case”. Japan and the World Economy; V.9-#4, pp. 491-510.

 

-Cox, D. and R. Harris (1985). “Trade Liberalization and Industrial Organization: Some Estimates for Canada”. JPE; V,93-#?, pp. 115-145.

 

-D. Rodrik (1988). “Imperfect Competition, Scale Economies, and Trade Policy in Developing Countries”. in R. Baldwin, ed. Trade Policy Issues and Empirical Analysis. Chicago: University of Chicage Press/NBER, pp. 109-143.

 

-S. Devarajan and D. Rodrik (1989). “Trade Liberalization in Developing Countries: Do Imperfect Competition and Economies of Scale Matter”. AER; V79-#2, pp. 282-287.

 

-J.D. Richardson (1989). “Empirical Research on Trade Liberalisation with Imperfect Competition: A Survey”. OECD Economic Studies; #12; pp. 7-50.

 

-V. Norman (1990). “Assessing Trade and Welfare Effects of Trade Liberalization: A Comparison of Alternative Approaches to CGE Modelling With Imperfect Competition”. EER; V.34-#4, pp. 725-752.

 

3. Strategic Analysis of Liberalization

 

a. Bargaining and Trade Bargaining

 

-I.W. Zartman (1971). The Politics of Trade Negotiations Between Africa and the EEC: The Weak Confront the Strong. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

 

-E. Preeg (1969). Traders and Diplomats. Washington, DC: Brookings.

 

-J. Evans (1971). The Kennedy Round in American Trade Policy: Twilight of the GATT? Princeton: Princeton University Press.

 

-G. Winham (1986). International Trade and the Tokyo Round Negotiations. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

 

-J. Grieco (1990). Cooperation Among Nations: Europe, America and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

 

-G. Winham (1989). “The Pre-Negotiation Phase of the Uruguay Round”. International Journal, V.44-#2, pp. 280-303.

 

-L.A. Winters (1990). “The Road to Uruguay”. Economic Journal; V.100-#403, pp. 1288-1303.

 

-L.A. Winters (1987). “Negotiating the Abolition of Non-Tariff Barriers”. OEP; V.39-#?, pp. 465-480.

 

-M. Kahler and J. Odell (1988). “Developing Country Coalition-Building and International Trade Negotiations”. in J. Whalley, ed. Rules, Power and Credibility. London: Macmillan, pp. 115-129.

 

-C. Hamilton and J. Whalley (1990). “Coalitions in the Uruguay Round”. WA; V.125-#3, pp 545-561.

 

-R. Higgott and A.F. Cooper (1990). “Middle Power Leadership and Coalition Building: Australia, the Cairnes Group, and the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations”. IO; V.44-#4, pp. 589-632.

 

-J. Odell (2000). Negotiating the World Economy. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

 

-G. Winham (1977). “Negotiation as a Management Process”. WP; V.30-#1, pp. 87-114.

 

-G. Winham (1979). “Practitioners Views of International Negotiation”. WP; V.2-#1, pp. 111-135.

 

-H. Raiffa (1982). The Art and Science of Negotiation. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

 

b. Basic Analysis

 

(1) Static Models

 

-J. Markusen (1981). “The Distribution of Gains from Bilateral Tariff Reductions”. JIE; V.11-#?, pp. 553-572.

 

-W. Mayer (1981). “Theoretical Considerations on Negotiated Tariff Adjustments”. OEP; V.33-#1, pp. 135-153.

 

-M. Webb (1984). “A Theoretical Note on Quota Reduction Negotiations”. OEP; V.36-#?, pp. 288-290.

 

-R. Riezman (1982), “Tariff Retaliation from a Strategic Viewpoint”, SEJ. V.48-#3; pp. 583-593.

 

-K. Chan (1988). “Trade Negotiations in a Nash Bargaining Model”. JIE; V.25-#?, pp. 353-363.

 

-B. Copeland (1990). “Strategic Interaction Among Nations: Negotiable and Non-Negotiable Trade Barriers”. CJE; V.23-#1, pp. 84-108.

 

-B. Copeland, E. Tower and M. Webb (1989). “On Negotiated Quotas, Tariffs and Transfers”. OEP; V.41-#?, pp. 774-788.

 

-K.C. Fung and R. Staiger (1996). “Trade Liberalization and Trade Adjustment Assistance”. In M. Canzoneri, W. Ethier, and V. Grilli eds. The New Transatlantic Economy. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 265-286. [discussion by C. Syropoulos follows, pp. 287-294.]

 

-K. Bagwell and R. Staiger (1999). “An Economic Theory of GATT”. American Economic Review; V.89-#1, pp. 215-248.

 

-J. McLaren (1997). “Size, Sunk Cost, and Judge Bowker’s Objection to Free Trade”. AER; V.87-#3, pp. 400-420.

 

-Park, Jee-Hyeong (2000). “International Trade Agreements between Countries of Asymmetric Size”. JIE; V.50-#2, pp. 473-495.

 

-J. McMillan (1988). “A Game Theoretic View of International Trade Negotiations: Implications for Developing Countries”. in J. Whalley, ed. Rules, Power and Credibility. Macmillan: London. pp. 19-32.

 

-M. Gilligan (2004). “Is There a Broader-Deeper Trade-off in International Multilateral Agreements?”. International Organization; V.58-#3, pp. 459-484.

 

(2) Repeated Game Models

 

-R. Jensen and M. Thursby (1984). “Free Trade: Two Noncooperative Approaches”. ms: Ohio State University.

 

-A. Dixit (1987). “Strategic Aspects of Trade Policy”. in Truman Bewley, ed. Advances in Economic Theory: Fifth World Conference. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 329-362.

 

-R. Staiger (1995). “A Theory of Gradual Trade Liberalization”. In J. Levinsohn, A. Deardorff, and R. Stern, eds. New Directions in Trade Theory. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 249-284.

 

-Blume, Andreas and Raymond Riezman (1994). “Dynamic Tariff Games with Imperfect Observability”. in James Friedman, ed. Problems of Coordination in Economic Activity. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, pp. 185-205.

 

-K. Cotter and S. Mitchell (1997). “Renegotiation-Proof Tariff Agreements”. RIE; V.5-#3, pp. 348-372.

 

-T. Furusawa (1999). “The Negotiation of Sustainable Tariffs”. JIE; V.48-#2, pp. 321-345.

 

-T. Furusawa (1999). “The Optimal Penal Code vs. Infinite Nash Reversion in Trade Liberalization”. RIE; V.7-#4, pp. 673-681.

 

-T. Furusawa and Q. Wen (2002). “Disagreement Points in Trade Negotiations”. JIE; V.57-#1, pp. 133-150.

 

-T. Furusawa and E. Lai (1999). “Adjustment Costs and Gradual Trade Liberalization”. JIE; V.49-#2, pp. 333-361.

 

-E. Bond and J.-H. Park (2002). “Gradualism and Trade Agreements with Asymmetric Countries”. REStud; V.69-#2, pp. 379-406.

 

-R. Chisik (2003). “Gradualism in Free Trade Agreements: A Theoretical Justification”. JIE; V.59-#2, pp. 423-451.

 

c. PD Games, Repeated Play and Absolute v. Relative Gains in Bargaining

 

-M. Taylor (1987). The Possibility of Cooperation. Cambridge: CUP.

 

-K. Oye, ed. (1986). Cooperation under Anarchy. Princeton: PUP.

 

-A. Stein (1982). “Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World”. IO; V.36-#?, pp. 294-324.

 

-J. Connybeare (1984). “Public Goods, Prisoners’ Dilemma, and the International Political Economy”. ISQ; V.28-#1, pp. 5-22.

 

-C. Lipson (1984). “International Cooperation in Security and Economic Affairs”. WP, V.37-#1, pp. 1-23.

 

-R. Axelrod and R. Keohane (1985). “Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions”. World Politics; V.38-#?, pp. 226-254.

 

-J. Gowa (1986). “Anarchy, Egoism, and Third Images: The Evolution of Cooperation and International Relations”. IO; V.40-#1, pp. 167-186.

 

-J. Grieco (1988). “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism”. IO; V.42-#3, pp. 485-507.

 

-J. Grieco (1988). “Realist Theory and the Problem of International Cooperation: Analysis with an Amended Prisoners' Dilemma Model”. JOP; V.50-#3, pp. 600-624.

 

-M. Mastanduno (1991). “Do Relative Gains Matter? America's Response to Japanese Industrial Policy”. International Security; V.16-#1, pp. 73-113.

 

-D. Snidal (1991). “Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation”. APSR; V.85-#3, pp. 701-726.

 

-D. Snidal (1991). “International Cooperation among Relative Gains Maximizers”. ISQ; V.35-#?, pp. 387-402.

 

-R. Powell (1991). “Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory”. APSR; V.85-#4, pp. 1303-1320.

 

-J. Grieco, D. Snidal, R. Powell (1993). “The Relative Gains Problem for International Cooperation”. APSR; V.87-#3, pp. 729-743.

 

-R. Powell (1993). “Guns, Butter and Anarchy”. APSR; V.87-#1, pp. 115-132.

 

-J. Gowa and E. Mansfield (1993). “Power Politics and International Trade”. APSR; V.87-#2, pp. 408-420.

 

-M. Busch and E. Reinhardt (1993). “Nice Strategies in a World of Relative Gains: The Problem of Cooperation under Anarchy”. JCR; V.37-#3, pp. 427-445.

 

-J. Morrow (1994). “Modeling the Forms of International Cooperation: Distribution versus Information”. IO; V.48-#3, pp. 387-423.

 

-J. Morrow (1997). “When Do ‘Relative Gains’ Impede Trade?”. JCR; V.41-#1, pp. 12-37.

 

-K. Iida (1993). “Analytic Uncertainty and International Cooperation”. ISQ; V.37-#4, pp. 431-457.

 

-R. Pahre (1994). “Multilateral Cooperation in an Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma”. JCR; V.38-#2, pp. 326-352.

 

-R. Powell (1996). “Bargaining in the Shadow of Power”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.15-#2, pp. 255-289.

 

-R. Powell (1996). “Uncertainty, Shifting Power, and Appeasement”. APSR; V.90-#4, pp. 749-764.

 

-J. Fearon (1997). “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs”. JCR; V.41-#1, pp. 68-90.

 

-J. Fearon (1998). “Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation”. IO; V.52-#2, pp. 269-305.

 

-R. Jervis (1988). “Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation”. WP, V.40-#3, pp. 317-349

 

-J. Nye (1988). “Neorealism and Neoliberalism”. WP; V.40-#2, pp. 235-251.

 

-Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith (2000). “Trust and Cooperation Through Agent-specific Punishments”. IO; V.54-#4, pp. 809-824.

 

-R. Powell (1994). “Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate”. IO; V.48-#2, pp. 313-344.

 

-E.M.S. Niou and P. Ordeshook (1994). “Realism versus Neoliberalism: A Formulation”. AJPS; V.35-#2, pp. 481-511.

 

-E.M.S. Niou and P. Ordeshook (1994). “‘Less Filling, Tastes Great’: The Realist-Neoliberal Debate”. WP; V.46-#2, pp. 209-234.

 

d. Empirical Evaluation/Implementation of Strategic Models

 

-D. Allen (1979). “Tariff Games”. Applied Game Theory. Wuerzberg: Physica-Verlag; pp. 270-284.

 

-K. Chan (198?). “The International Negotiation Game: Some Evidence From the Tokyo Round”. REStat; V.??-#?, pp. 456-464.

 

-K. Chan (1991). “Bilateral Trade Negotiations and Trade Diversification: Evidence from Semi-Industrialized Countries”. JDevE; V.36-#?, pp. 243-257.

 

-R. Baldwin and R. Clarke (1987). “Game Modelling Multilateral Trade Negotiations”. Journal of Policy Modelling; V.9-#2, pp. 257-284.

 

-G. Harrison and E. Rutström (1991). “Trade Wars, Trade Negotiations and Applied Game Theory”. EJ; V.101-#?, pp. 420-435.

 

e. Asymmetric Information and Strategic Equilibrium

 

(1) Self-Enforcing Agreements with Stochastic Shocks

 

(a) Economic (i.e. Terms of Trade or Trade Volume) Shocks

 

-R. Feenstra (1987). “Incentive Compatible Trade Policies”. ScanJE; V.89-#3, pp. 373-387.

 

-K. Bagwell and R. Staiger (1990). “A Theory of Managed Trade”. AER; V.80-#4, pp.779-795.

 

-R. Riezman (1991). “Dynamic Tariffs with Asymmetric Information”. JIE; V.30-#3/4, pp. 267-283.

 

-T. Hungerford (1991). “GATT: A Cooperative Equilibrium in a Noncooperative Trading Regime?” JIE; V.31-#3/4, pp. 357-369.

 

-D. Kovenock and M. Thursby (1992). “GATT, Dispute Settlement and Cooperation”. E&P; V.4-#2, pp. 151-170. [Also in in A. Deardorff and R. Stern, eds. Analytical and Negotiating Issues in the Global Trading System. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 361-390]

 

-S. Mitchell (1997). “GATT, Dispute Settlement and Cooperation: A Note”. E&P; V.9-#1, pp. 87-93. [response by Kovenock and Thursby follows, pp. 95-98]

 

-G. Maggi (1999). “The Role of Multilateral Institutions in International Trade Cooperation”. AER; V.89-#1, pp. 190-214.

 

(b) Political Shocks

 

-R. Jensen and M. Thursby (1986). “Endogenous Tariff Policy under Uncertainty”. ms: Ohio State University.

 

-D. Stahl and A. Turunen-Red (1995). “Tariff Games: Cooperation with Random Variation in Political Regimes”. EJPE; V.11-#?, pp. 215-238.

 

-R. Feenstra and T. Lewis (1991). “Negotiated Trade Restrictions with Private Political Pressure”. QJE; V.106-#4, pp. 1287-1307.

 

-W. Ethier and H. Horn (1996). “Restults-Oriented Trade Policy”. RIE; V.4-#1, pp. 17-39.

 

(2) Equilibria with Asymmetric Information, or Uncertainty, about Type

 

-R. Jensen and M. Thursby (1990). “Tariffs with Private Information and Reputation”. JIE; V.29-#1/2, pp. 43-67.

 

-M. Bac and H. Raff (1997). “A Theory of Trade Concessions”. JIE; V.42-#3/4, pp. 483-504.

 

-G. Schneider and L.-E. Cederman (1994). “The Change of Tide in Political Cooperation: A Limited Information Model of European Integration”. IO; V.48-#4, pp. 633-662.

 

-F. Hahn, ed. (1989). The Economics of Missing Markets, Information and Games. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (esp. Part I)

 

f. On Issue Linkage in General and in Trade Policy

 

(1) Abstract analysis of issue linkage in bargaining

 

-R. Tollison and T. Willett (1979). “An Economic Theory of Mutually Advantageous Issue Linkage”. IO; V.33-#4, pp.

 

-J. Sebenius (1983). “Negotiation Arithmetic: Adding and Subtracting Issues and Parties”. IO; V.37-#2, pp. 281-316.

 

-R. Weber (1985). “Negotiation and Arbitration: A Game-Theoretic Perspective”. Northwestern Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science Working Paper, # 666.

 

-C. Fershtman (1990). “The Importance of the Agenda in Bargaining”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.2-#3, pp. 224-238.

 

-E. Winter (1997). “Negotiations in Multi-issue Committees”. Journal of Public Economics; V.65-#3, pp. 323-42.

 

-L.-A. Busch and I. Horstmann (1997). “Bargaining Frictions, Bargaining Procedures and Implied Costs of Multiple Issue Bargaining”. Eca; V.64-#256, pp. 669-680.

 

-L.-A. Busch and I. Horstmann (1999). “Endogenous Incomplete Contracts: A Bargaining Approach”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.3-#4, pp. 956-975

 

-C. Ponsati and J. Watson (1997). “Multiple-Issue Bargaining and Axiomatic Solutions”. IJGT; V.26-#4, pp. 501-524.

 

-M. Tajima and N. Fraser (1998). “Modelling Multi-issue Negotiation”. In T. Stewart and R. van den Honert, eds. Trends in Multicriteria Decision Making. New York: Springer, pp. 177-186.

 

-R. Inderest (2000). “Multi Issue Bargaining with Endogenous Agenda”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.30-#1, pp. 64-82.

 

-C. Fershtman (2000). “A Note on Multi-Issue Two-Sided Bargaining: Bilateral Procedures”. Games and Economic Behavior V.30-#2, pp. 216-27.

 

-C.J. Weinberger (2000). “Selective Acceptance and Inefficiency in a Two-issue Complete Information Bargaining Game”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.31-#2, (2000), pp. 262–293.

 

-K. Lang and R. Rosenthal (2001). “Bargaining Piecemeal or All At Once”. Economic Journal; V.111-#473, pp. 526-540.

 

-Y. In and R. Serrano (2004). “Agenda Restrictions in Multi-Issue Bargaining”. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization; V.53-#3, pp. 385-399.

 

-Y. In and R. Serrano (2002). “Agenda Restrictions in Multi-Issue Bargaining, II: Unrestricted Agendas”. Economics Letters; V.79-#3, pp. 325-331.

 

-M. Bac and H. Raff (1996). “Issue-by-Issue Negotiations: The Role of Information and Time Preference”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.13-#1, pp. 125-134.

 

-L.-A. Busch and I. Horstmann (1997). “A Comment on Issue-by-Issue Negotiations”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.19-#1, pp. 144-148.

 

-L.-A. Busch and I. Horstmann (1999). “Signaling via an Agenda in Multi-issue Bargaining with Incomplete Information”. Economic Theory; V.13-#3 (May 1999): 561-75.

 

-L.-A. Busch and I. Horstmann (2002). “The Game of Negotiations: Ordering Issues and Implementing Agreements”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.41-#2, pp. 169-191.

 

-A. Chakraborty and R. Harbaugh (2003). “Cheap Talk Comparisons in Multi-Issue Bargaining”. Economics Letters; V.78-#3, pp. 357-363.

 

-G. Spagnolo (1999). “On Interdependent Supergames: Multimarket Contact, Concavity and Collusion”. JET; V.89-#1, pp. 127-139.

 

-G. Spagnolo (1999). “Social Relations and Cooperation in Organizations”. JEBO; V.38-#1, pp. 1-25.

 

-M. Conlin and T. Furusawa (2000). “Strategic Delegation and Delay in Negotiations over the Bargaining Agenda”. Journal of Labor Economics; V.18-#1, 55-73.

 

(2) IPE Theory of Linkage

 

-E. Haas (1980). “Why Collaborate?: Issue-Linkage and International Regimes”. World Politics; V.32-#3, pp. 357-405.

 

-A. Stein (1980). “The Politics of Linkage”. WP, V.32-#?, pp. 62-81.

 

-M. McGinnis (1986). “Issue Linkage and the Evolution of International Cooperation”. Journal of Conflict Resolution, V.30-#1, pp. 141-170.

 

-W. Dixon (1986). “Reciprocity in United States-Soviet Relations: Multiple Symmetry or Issue Linkage?”. American Journal of Political Science, V.30-#2, pp. 421-445.

 

-L. Martin (1993). “International and Domestic Institutions in the EMU Process”. E&P; V5-#2, pp. 125-44.

 

-G. Spagnolo (1999). “Issue Linkage, Delegation and International Policy Coordination”. JIE; forth.

 

-R. Mitchell and P. Keilbach (2001). “Situation Structure and Institutional Design: Reciprocity, Coercion, and Exchange”. IO; V.55-#4, pp. 891-917.

 

-P. Conconi and C. Perroni (2002). “Issue Linkage and Issue Tie-in In Multilateral Negotiations”. JIE; V.57-#2, pp. 423-447.

 

(3) The “Trade and ...” Issue: What are the Boundaries of the WTO

 

(a) Overviews of Issue Linkage in Trade Negotiations

 

-B. Hoekman (1989). “Determining the Need for Issue Linkages in Multilateral Trade Negotiations”. IO; V.43-#?, pp. 693-714.

 

-M. Huelshoff (1994). “Domestic Politics and Dynamic Issue Linkage: A Reformulation of Integration Theory”. International Studies Quarterly, V.38-#2, pp. 255-279.

 

-R. Howse and M. Trebilcock (1997). “The Free Trade-Fair Trade Debate: Trade, Labor and the Environment”. In J. Bhandari and A. Sykes, eds. Economic Dimensions of International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 186-234.

 

-S. Charnovitz (1998). “Linking Topics in Treaties”. University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law; V.19-#2, pp. 329-345.

 

-K. Bagwell and R. Staiger (2001). “ The WTO as a Mechanism for Securing Market Access Property Rights: Implications for Global Labor and Environmental Issues”. Journal of Economic Perspectives; V.15-#3, pp. 69-88.

 

-J. Ederington (2001). “International Coordination of Trade and Domestic Policies”. AER; V.91-#5, pp. 1580-1593.

 

-J. Ederington (2002). “Trade and Domestic Policy Linkage in International Agreements”. IER; V.43-#4, pp. 1347-1367.

 

-C. Davis (2004). “International Institutions and Issue Linkage: Building Support for Agricultural Trade Liberalization”. American Political Science Review; V.98-#1, pp. 153-169.

 

-I. Horstmann, J. Markusen, and J. Robles (2001). “Multi-issue Bargaining and Linked Games: Ricardo Revisited or No Pain No Gain”. NBER Working Paper, #8347.

 

-(1998). “Symposium on Linkage as Phenomenon: An Interdisciplinary Approach”. University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law; V.19-#2, pp. 201-708.

 

-(2002). “Symposium: The Boundaries of the GATT”. American Journal of International Law; V.96-#1, pp. 1-158.

 

(b) Trade and Labor Standards

 

-G. Hanson (1983). Social Clauses and International Trade: An Economic Analysis of Labour Standards in Trade Policy. New York: St. Martins.

 

-S. Charnovitz (1986). “Fair Labor Standards and International Trade”. Journal of World Trade Law; V.20-#1, pp. 61-78.

 

-S. Charnovitz (1987). “The Influence of Labour Standards on the World Trading Regime: A Historical Review”. International Labour Review; V.126-#?, pp. 565-584.

 

-B. Hepple (1987). “New Approaches to International Labour Regulation”. Industrial Law Journal; V.26-#4, pp. 353-366.

 

-K. Swinnerton and G. Schoepfle (1994). “Labor Standards in the Context of a Global Economy”. Monthly Labor Review; V.117-#9, pp. 52-58.

 

-G. Schoepfle and K. Swinnerton, eds. (1994). International Labor Standards and Global Economic Integration: Proceedings of a Symposium. Washington, DC: US Department of Labor.

 

-W. Sengenberger and D. Campbell, eds. (1994). International Labour Standards and Economic Interdependence. Geneva: ILO.

 

-A. Sapir (1995). “The Interaction between Labour Standards and International Trade Policy”. World Economy; V.18-#6, pp. 791-803.

 

-K. Maskus, T. Rutherford, and S. Selby (1995). “Implications of Changes in Labor Standards: A Computational Analysis for Mexico”. North American Journal of Economics and Finance; V6-#2, pp. 171-188.

 

-D. Brown, R. Stern, and A. Deardorff (1996). “International Labor Standards and Trade: A Theoretical Analysis”. in J. Bhagwati and R. Hudec, eds. Fair Trade and Harmonization. V.1: Economic Analysis. Cambridge: MIT, pp. 227-280.

 

-D. Brown, A. Deardorff, and R. Stern (1998). “Trade and Labor Standards”. Open Economies Review; V.9-#2, pp. 171-194.

 

-R. Freeman (1996). “International Labor Standards and World Trade: Friends or Foes?”. in J. Schott, ed.. The world trading system: Challenges ahead. Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, pp. 87-112.

 

-D. Rodrik (1996). “Labor Standards and International Trade: Do They Matter and What Do We Do About Them?”. in R. Lawrence, D. Rodrik, and J. Whalley, Emerging Agenda for Global Trade: High Stakes for Developing Countries. Washington, DC: Overseas Development Council,

 

-A. Krueger (1996). “International Labor Standards and Trade”. Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics–1996. pp. 281-302.

 

-A. Krueger (1996). “Observations on International Labor Standards and Trade”. NBER Working Paper; #5632.

 

-T.N. Srinivasan (1996). “International Trade and Labour Standards from an International Perspective”. in P. van Dijck and G. Faber, eds. Challenges to the New World Trade Organization. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, pp. 219-243.

 

-K. Maskus (1997). “Should Core Labor Standards be Imposed Through International Trade Policy?”. Wold Bank, Policy Research Working Paper, #1817.

 

-K. Swinnerton (1997). “An Essay on Economic Efficiency and Core Labour Standards”. World Economy; V.20-#?, pp. 73-86.

 

-S. Golub (1997). “International Labor Standards and International Trade”. IMF Working Paper; WP/97/37.

 

-S. Golub (1997). “Are International Labor Standards Needed to Prevent Social Dumping?”. Finance and Development; V.34-#4, pp. 20-23.

 

-R. Pahre (1998). “Labor Standards, Trade Sanctions, and the Hijacking Hypothesis”. In A. Deardorff and R. Stern, eds. Constituent Interests and U.S. Trade Policies. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

 

-J. Whalley and R. Wigle (1999). “Quantifying the Effects of Labour Sanctions on Trade”. in P. Brenton and J. Pelkmans, eds. Global Trade and European Workers. London: Macmillan, pp. 199-209.

 

-D. Rodrik (1999). “Globalisation and Labour, or: If Globalisation is a Bowl of Cherries Why Are There So Many Glum Faces around the Table?”. in R. Baldwin, D. Cohen, A. Sapir, and A. Venables, eds. Market Integration, Regionalism and the Global Economy. Cambridge: CUP/CEPR, pp. 117-150.

 

-S. Charnovitz (1999). “The Globalization of Economic Human Rights”. Brooklyn Journal of International Law; V.25-#1, pp. 113-124.

 

-G. Fields (2000). “The Role of Labor Standards in U.S. Trade Policy”. in A. Deardorff and R. Stern, eds. Social Dimensions of U.S. Trade Policy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 167-188.

 

-K. Bagwell and R. Staiger (2000). “The Simple Economics of Labor Standards and the GATT”. in A. Deardorff and R. Stern, eds. Social Dimensions of U.S. Trade Policy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 195-231.

 

-D. Brown (2000). “International Trade and Core Labor Standards: A Survey of Recent Literature”. OECD Labor Market and Social Policy Occasional Papers, #43.

 

-D. Brown (2001). “Labor Standards: Where Do They Belong on the International Trade Agenda?”. Journal of Economic Perspectives; V.15-#?, pp. 89-112.

 

-Will Martin and Keith Maskus (2001). “Core Labor Standards and Competitiveness: Implications for Global Trade Policy”. Review of International Economics, V.9-#2, pp. 317-328.

 

-P. Mackelm (2002). “Labour Law Beyond Borders”. Journal of International Economic Law; V.5-#3, pp. 605-645.

 

-A. Singh (2004). “Labor Standards and the ‘Race to the Bottom’: Rethinking Globalization and Workers Rights from Developmental and Solidaristic Perspectives”. Oxford Review of Economic Policy; V.20-#1, pp. 85-104.

 

-T. Palley (2004). “The Economic Case for Labour Standards”. Cambridge Journal of Economics; V.28-#1, pp. 21-36.

 

-C. Grootaert and R. Kanbur (1995). “Child Labor: An Economic Perspective”. International Labor Review, V.134-#2, pp.

 

-K. Basu and P.H. Van (1998). “The Economics of Child Labor”. AER; V.88-#?, pp. 412-427.

 

-K. Basu (1999). “Child Labor: Cause, Consequence, and Cure, with Remarks on International Labor Standards”. JEL; V.37-#?, pp. 1083-1119.

 

-D. Brown (2000). “A Transactions Cost Politics Analysis of International Child Labor Standards”. in A. Deardorff and R. Stern, eds. Social Dimensions of U.S. Trade Policy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 245-264.

 

-D. Brown, A. Deardorff, and R. Stern (2001). “U.S. Trade and Other Policy Options and Programs to Deter Foreign Exploitation of Child Labor”. in M. Blomstrom and L. Goldberg, eds. Topics in Empirical International Economics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 233-257.

 

(c) Trade and Environment

 

-W. Oates and R. Schwab (1988). “Economic Competition Among Jurisdictions: Efficiency Enhancing or Distortion Inducing?”. JPubE; V.35-#?, pp. 333-354.

 

-R. Revesz (1992). “Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the ‘Race to the Bottom’ Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation”. NYU Law Review; V.67-#?, pp. 1220-1254.

 

-D. Esty (1994). Greening the GATT: Trade, Environment and the Future. Washington, DC: IIE.

 

-J. Markusen, E. Morey, and N. Olewiler (1995). “Competition in Regional Environmental Policies when Plant Locations are Endogenous”. JPubE; V.56-#1, pp. 55-78.

 

-M. Rauscher (1995). “Environmental Regulation and the Location of Polluting Industry”. International Tax and Public Finance; V.2-#?, pp. 229-244.

 

-C. Carraro and D. Siniscalco (1995). “Policy Coordination for Sustainability: Commitments, Transfers and Linked Negotiations”. In I. Goldin and L.A. Winters, eds. The Economics of Sustainable Development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 264-282.

 

-A. Levinson (1996). “Environmental Regulations and Industry Location: International and Domestic Evidence”. in J. Bhagwati and R. Hudec, eds. Harmonization and Fair Trade. V.1. Economic Analysis. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 429-457.

 

-J.D. Wilson (1996). “Capital Mobility and Environmental Standards: Is there A Theoretical Basis for a Race to the Bottom?”. in J. Bhagwati and R. Hudec, eds. Harmonization and Fair Trade. V.1. Economic Analysis. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 393-427.

 

-J. Kim and J.D. Wilson (1997). “Capital Mobility and Environmental Standards: Racing to the Bottom with Multiple Tax Instruments”. Japan and the World Economy; V.9-#4, pp. 537-551.

 

-T. Schoenbaum (1992). “Free International Trade and Protection of the Environment: Irreconcilable Conflict?”. American Journal of International Law; V.86-#4, pp. 700-727.

 

-D. Brack (1995). “Balancing Trade and the Environment”. International Affairs; V.71-#3, pp. 497-514.

 

-A. Deardorff (1997). “International Conflict and Coordination in Environmental Policies”. In J. Bhandari and A. Sykes, eds. Economic Dimensions of International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 248-274.

 

-R. Steinberg (1997). “ Trade-Environment Negotiations in the EU, NAFTA, and WTO: Regional Trajectories of Rule Development”. American Journal of International Law; V.91-#2, pp. 231-267

 

-T. Schoenbaum (1997). “International Trade and Protection of the Environment: The Continuing Search for Reconciliation”. American Journal of International Law; V.91-#2, pp. 268-313.

 

-D. Esty and D. Geradin (1998). “Environmental Protection and International Competitiveness”. Journal of World Trade; V.32-#3, pp. 5-46.

 

-H. Cesar and A. de Zeeuw (1996). “Issue Linkage in Global Environmental Problems”. In A. Xepapadeas, ed. Economic policy for the environment and natural resources: Techniques for the management and control of pollution. Cheltenham: Elgar, pp. 158-73

 

-M. Botteon and C. Carraro (1997). “Strategies for Environmental Negotiations: Issue Linkage with Heterogeneous Countries”. N. Hanley and H. Folmer, eds. Game theory and the environment. Cheltenham: Elgar, pp. 181-203.

 

-L. Abrego, C. Perroni, J. Whalley, and R. Wigle (2001). “Trade and Environment: Bargaining Outcomes from Linked Negotiations”. RIE; V.9-#3, pp. 414-428.

 

Boyce, James (2004). “Green and Brown: Globalization and the Environment”. Oxford Review of Economic Policy; V.20-#1, pp. 105-128.

 

(d) On the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI)

 

Kobrin, Stephen (1998). “The MAI and the Clash of Civilizations”. Foreign Policy; #112, pp. 97-109.

 

(1998). “Symposium on International Regulation of Foreign Investment”. Cornell International Law Review; V.31-#3.

 

Henderson, David (1999). “The MAI Affair: A Story and Its Lessons”. London: RIIA.

 

Walter, Andrew (2001). “NGOs, Business and International Investment: The Multilateral Agreement on Investment, Seattle, and Beyond”. Global Governance; V.7-#?, pp. 51-73.

 

4. Institutional Foundations of the Trading Order

 

a. General

 

(1) Overviews: Historical, Legal, and Institutional

 

-J. Jackson (1989/1997). The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations. Cambridge: MIT Press.

 

-B. Hoekman and M. Kostecki (1995). The Political Economy of the World Trading System: From GATT to WTO. New York: Oxford University Press.

 

-G. Curzon (1965). Multilateral Commercial Diplomacy. London: Michael Joseph.

 

-G. and V. Curzon (1976). “The Management of Trade Relations in the GATT”. A. Shonfield, ed. International Economic Relations of the Western World, 1959-1971. Oxford: Oxford University Press/RIIA, pp. 141-283.

 

-K. Kock (1969). International Trade Policy and the GATT, 1947-1967. Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell.

 

-K. Dam (1970). The GATT: Law and Economic Organization. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

 

-R. Hudec (1975). The Gatt Legal System and World Trade Diplomacy. New York: Praeger.

 

-J.M. Finger and A. Olechowski, eds. (1987). A Handbook for the Multilateral Trade Negotiations. Washington, DC: The World Bank.

 

-J.D. Richardson (1988). “International Coordination of Trade Policy”. in M. Feldstein, ed. International Cooperation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER. pp 167-204.

 

-J.M. Finger and S. Dhar (1994). “Do Rules Control Power? Gatt Articles and Arrangements in the Uruguay Round”. in A. Deardorff and R. Stern, eds. Analytical and Negotiating Issues in the Global Trading System. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 195-223.

 

-J. Jackson (2000). The Jurisprudence of the GATT and the WTO: Insights on Treaty Law and Economic Relations. New York: Cambridge University Press.

 

-R. Wilkinson (2001). Multilateralism and the World Trade Organisation: The Architecture and Extension of International Trade Regulation. Routledge.

 

(2) Analytical Overviews

 

-J.M. Finger (1979). “Trade Liberalization: A Public Choice Perspective”. in R. Amacher, et al. eds. Challenges to a Liberal International Economic Order. Washington, DC: AEI, pp. 421-453.

 

-J. Finlayson and M. Zacher (1981). “The GATT and the Regulation of Trade Barriers”. IO; V.35-#4, pp. 561-602.

 

-R. Staiger (1995). “International Rules and Institutions for Trade Policy”. in G. Grossman and K. Rogoff, eds. Handbook of International Economics--V.III. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 1495-1551.

 

-W. Ethier (1998). “The International Commercial System”. Essays in International Finance, #210.

 

-W. Ethier (2001). “Theoretical Problems in Negotiating Trade Liberalization”. European Journal of Political Economy; V.17-#2, pp. 209-232.

 

-W. Ethier (2004). “Political Externalities, Nondiscrimination, and a Multilateral World”. Review of International Economics; V.12-#3, pp. 303-320.

 

-K. Bagwell and R. Staiger (1999). “ An Economic Theory of GATT”. American Economic Review; V.89-#1, pp. 215-248.

 

-K. Bagwell and R. Staiger (2001). “ Domestic Policies, National Sovereignty, and International Economic Institutions”. Quarterly Journal of Economics; V.116-#2, pp. 519-562.

 

-K. Bagwell and R. Staiger (2003). “ Protection and the Business Cycle”. Advances in Economic Analysis & Policy; V.3-#1, article 3. http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/advances/vol3/iss1/art3.

 

-B. Peter Rosendorff and Helen V. Milner (2001). “The Optimal Design of International Trade Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape”. IO; V.55-#4, pp. 829-857.

 

b. MFN/Non-Discrimination

 

(1) Descriptive and Policy Analyses

 

-G. Patterson (1966). Discrimination in International Trade: The Policy Issues, 1945-1965. Princeton: PUP.

 

-G. Espiell (1971). “The Most-Favored-Nation Clause”. Journal of World Trade Law; V.5-#

 

-T. Sorensen (1974). “Most Favored and Less Favorite Nations”. Foreign Affairs; V.52-#2, pp. 273-286.

 

-G. Hufbauer, J. Shelton Erb, and H.P. Starr (1980). “The GATT Codes and the Unconditional Most-Favored-Nation Principle”. Law and Policy in International Business; V.12-

 

-G. Hufbauer (1986). “Should Unconditional MFN be Revised, Retired or Recast?” in R. Snape, ed. Issues in World Trade Policy: Gatt at the Crossroads.

 

-J. Jackson (1987). “Multilateral and Bilateral Approaches for the Conduct of US Trade Policy”. in R. Stern, ed. US Trade Policies in a Changing World Economy. Cambridge: MIT. pp. 377-401.

 

-R. Snape (1988). “Is Non-Discrimination Really Dead”. World Economy. V.11-#1, pp. 1-17.

 

-W. Schwartz and A. Sykes (1996). “Toward a Positive Theory of the Most Favored Nation Obligation and Its Exceptions in the WTO/GATT System”. International Review of Law and Economics; V.16-#1, pp. 27-51.

 

-W. Schwartz and A. Sykes (1997). “The Economics of the Most Favored Nation Clause”. In J. Bhandari and A. Sykes, eds. Economic Dimensions of International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 43-79.

 

-J. Bhagwati and H. Patrick, eds. (1990). Aggressive Unilateralism. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

 

-J. Bhagwati (1991). Multilateralism at Risk. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

 

-J. Bhagwati (1990). “Departures from Multilateralism: Regional and Aggressive Unilateralism”. EJ; V.100-#403, pp. 1304-1317.

 

-T.N. Srinivasan (1998). “Regionalism and the WTO: Is Nondiscrimination Passe?”. In A.O. Krueger, ed. The WTO as an international organization. Chicago, University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 329-349.

 

(2) Analytical Issues

 

-A. Caplin and K. Krishna (1988). “Tariffs and the Most Favored Nation Clause: A Game Theoretic Approach”. Seoul Journal of Economics; V.3-#?, pp. 267-289.

 

-R. Ludema (1991). “International Trade Bargaining and the Most-Favored-Nation Clause”. E&P; V.3-#1, pp. 1-20.

 

-K. Gatsios (1990). “Preferential Tariffs and the ‘Most Favored Nation’ Principle: A Note”. JIE; V.28-#3/4, pp. 365-373.

 

-W. Ethier (1998). “Reciprocity, Nondiscrimination, and a Multilateral World”. ms: University of Pennsylvania.

 

-Robert Pahre (2001). “Most-Favored-Nation Clauses and Clustered Negotiations”. IO; V.55-#4, pp. 859-890.

 

-P. McCalman (2002). “Most Favored Nation Clause and Multilateral Trade Negotiations”. JIE; V.57-#?, pp. 151-176.

 

-Josh Ederington and Phillip McCalman (2003). “Discriminatory Tariffs and International Negotiations”. JIE; V.61-#2, pp. 397-424.

 

-C. Bown (2004). “Trade Policy under the GATT/WTO: Empirical Evidence of the Equal Treatment Rule”. CJE; forth.

 

c. Reciprocity

 

(1) Descriptive and Policy Issues

 

-R.M. Gadbaw (1982). “Reciprocity and Its Implications for US Trade Policy”. Law and Policy in International Business; V.14-#?

 

-K.A.J. Hay and B.A. Sulzenko (1982). “US Trade Policy and ‘Reciprocity’”. Journal of World Trade Law; V.16-#?, pp.

 

-W. Cline (1983). “‘Reciprocity’: A New Approach to World Trade Policy?”. in W. Cline, ed. Trade Policy in the 1980's. Cambridge: MIT/IIE. pp. 121-158.

 

-L. Weiss (1983). “Reciprocity”. in S. Rubin and T. Graham, eds. Managing Trade Relations in the 1980's. Totowa: Rowman and Allanheld. pp. 165-231.

 

-J.J. Florio (1984). “Beyond Reciprocity: The Need for a New US Trade Policy”. Journal of Legislation; V. 11-#?, pp.

 

-R. Wonnacott (1984). Aggressive Reciprocity Evaluated with a New Analytical Approach to Trade Conflicts. Quebec: Institute for Research on Public Policy.

 

-S. Krasner (1987). Asymmetries in Japanese-American Trade: the Case for Specific Reciprocity. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies.

 

-J. Bhagwati and D. Irwin (1987). “The Return of the Reciprocitarians: US Trade Policy Today”. World Economy; V.10-#?, pp. 109-130.

 

-L.A. Winters (1987). “Reciprocity”. in J.M. Finger and A. Olechowski, eds. The Uruguay Round: A Handbook on the Multilateral Trade Negotiations. Washington, DC: The World Bank, pp. 45-51.

 

-C. Lo (1990). The Reciprocity Principle in the International Regulation of Economic Relations. Taipei: Academia Sinica.

 

-H.W. Arndt (1994). “The Political Economy of Reciprocity”. Banca Nazionale del Lavoro-Quarterly Review; V.47-#190, pp. 259-269.

 

-J. Bhagwati (1994). “Fair Trade, Reciprocity and Harmonization: The New Challenge to the Theory of Policy and Free Trade”. in A. Deardorff and R. Stern, eds. Analytical and Negotiating Issues in the Global Trading System. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 547-598.

 

(2) Analytical Issues

 

-R. Cooper (1964). “Tariff Dispersion and Trade Negotiations”. JPE; V.72-#6, pp. 597-603.

 

-R. Caves (1974). “The Economics of Reciprocity: Theory and Evidence on Bilateral Trading Arrangements”. in W. Sellekaerts, ed. International Trade and Finance. London: Macmillan, pp. 17-54.

 

-R. Blackhurst (1978). “Reciprocity in Trade Negotiations under Flexible Exchange Rates”. in J. Martin and A. Smith, eds.

 

-F. Roessler (1978). “The Rationale for Reciprocity in Trade Negotiations under Floating Currencies”. Kyklos; V.31-#2, pp. 258-274.

 

-J. McMillan (1993). “Trade Accords and Trade Wars”. in H. Herberg and N.V. Long, eds., Trade, Welfare and Economic Policies. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 167-176.

 

-R. Keohane (1986). “Reciprocity in International Relations”. IO; V.40-#1, pp. 1-27.

 

-B. and R. Yarbrough (1986). “Reciprocity, Bilateralism, and Economic ‘Hostages’: Self-Enforcing Agreements in International Trade”. ISQ; V. 30-#1, pp. 7-21.

 

-B. and R. Yarbrough (1987). “Institutions for the Governance of Opportunism in International Trade”. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization; V.3-#1, pp. 129-139.

 

-C. Rhodes (1989). “Reciprocity in Trade: the Utility of a Bargaining Strategy”. IO; V.43-#2, pp. 273-299.

 

-A.L. Hillman and P. Moser (1995). “Trade Liberalization as Politically Optimal Exchange of Market Access”. In M. Canzoneri, W. Ethier, and V. Grilli, eds. The New Transatlantic Economy. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 295-312.

 

-D. Marin and M. Schnitzer (1995). “Tying Trade Flows: A Theory of Countertrade with Evidence”. AER; V.85-#5, pp. 1047-1064.

 

-R. Pahre (1998). “Reactions and Reciprocity: Tariffs and Trade Liberalization from 1815 to 1914”. Journal of Conflict Resolution; V.42-#4, pp. 467-492.

 

-Ronald B. Mitchell and Patricia M. Keilbach (2001). “Situation Structure and Institutional Design: Reciprocity, Coercion, and Exchange”. IO; V.55-#4, pp. 891-917.

 

d. Special and Differential Treatment for LDCs

 

(1) Theoretical Foundations of Arguments for S&D

 

-H.W. Singer (1950). “The Distribution of Gains between Investing and Borrowing Countries”. AER; V.40-#2, pp. 473-485.

 

-R. Prebisch (1959). “Commercial Policy in the Underdeveloped Countries”. AER; V.49-#2, pp. 251-273.

 

-O. Rodriguez (1977). “On the Conception of the Centre-Periphery System”. CEPAL Review, pp. 195-239.

 

-R. Prebisch (1981). “The Latin American Periphery in the Global System of Capitalism”. CEPAL Review, pp. 143-150.

 

-M.J. Flanders (1964). “Prebisch on Protectionism: An Evaluation”. EJ; V.?-#?, pp. 305-326.

 

-L. Taylor (1982). “Back to Basics: Theory for the Rhetoric in the North-South Round”. World Development; V.10-#4, pp. 327-335.

 

-J.A. Ocampo (1986). “New Developments in Trade Theory and LDCs”. JDevEc; V.22-#?, pp. 129-170.

 

(2) Economic Analysis of GSP

 

-R. Baldwin and T. Murray (1977). “MFN Tariff Reductions and Developing Country Trade Benefits Under the GSP”. EJ; V.87-#?, pp. 30-46.

 

-M. Kreinin and J.M. Finger (1976). “A Critical Survey of the New International Economic Order”. Journal of World Trade Law; V.10-#?, pp. 493-512.

 

-J.M. Finger and M. Kreinin (1979). “A Measure of 'Export Similarity' and Its Possible Uses”. EJ; V.89-#?, pp. 905-912.

 

-T. Murray (1977). Trade Preferences for Developing Countries. New York: Halsted Press.

 

-T. Birnberg (1979). “Trade Reform Options: Economic Effects on Developing and Developed Countries”. in W. Cline, ed. Policy Alternatives for a New International Economic Order: An Economic Analysis. New York: Praeger/ODC, pp. 215-283.

 

-A. Sapir (1981). “Trade Benefits under the EEC GSP”. EER; V.15-#?, pp. 339-335.

 

-A. Sapir and L. Lundberg (1984). “The US GSP and its Impacts”. in R. Baldwin and A. Krueger. eds. The Structure and Evolution of Recent US Trade Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. pp. 195-236.

 

-E. Ray and H. Marvel (1986). “Trade Liberalization, Preferential Arrangements and their Impact on Imports from Latin America”. in M. Connolly and C. Gonzalez-Vegas, eds. Economic Reform and Stabilisation in Latin America. New York: Praeger, pp. 253-279.

 

-D. Brown (1987). “The General Equilibrium Effects of the US GSP”. SEJ; V.54-#1, pp. 27-47.

 

-M. Wolf (1984). “Two-Edged Sword: Demands of Developing Countries and the Trading System”. in J. Bhagwati, ed. Power, Passions and Purpose: Prospects for North-South Negotiations. Cambridge: MIT Press. pp. 201-229.

 

-J. Whalley (1990). “Non-Discriminatory Discrimination: Special and Differential Treatment under the GATT for Developing Countries”. EJ; V.100-#403, pp. 1318-1328.

 

-A.J. Yeats (1979). Trade Barriers Facing Developing Countries. New York: St. Martins.

 

-H. Hughes and A. Krueger (1984). “Effects of Protection in Developed Countries on Developing Countries' Exports”. in R. Baldwin and A. Krueger. eds. The Structure and Evolution of Recent US Trade Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. pp. 389-418.

 

-E. Ray and H. Marvel (1984). “The Pattern of Protection in the Industrialized World”. REStat; V.66-#?, pp. 452-458.

 

-E. Ray (1991). “US Protection and Intra-Industry Trade: The Message to Developing Countries”. EDCC; V.40-#1, pp. 169-187.

 

-C. MacPhee, and V. Oguledo (1991). “The Trade Effects of the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences”. Atlantic Economic Journal; V.19-#4, pp. 19-26.

 

(3) Political-Economy of GSP/NIEO

 

-R. Rothstein (1977). The Weak in the World of the Strong: The Developing Countries in the International System. New York: Columbia University Press.

 

-R. Rothstein (1979). Global Bargaining: UNCTAD and the Quest for a New International Economic Order. Princeton: PUP.

 

-A. Fishlow, et al. (1978). Rich Nations and Poor Nations in the World Economy. New York: McGraw Hill.

 

-J. Hart (1983). The New International Economic Order. New York: Macmillan.

 

-C. Murphy (1984). The Emergence of the NIEO Ideology. Boulder: Westview.

 

-J. Finlayson and M. Zacher (1985). “The Third World and the Management of International Commodity Trade”. in W.L. Hollist and F.L. Tullist, eds. An International Political Economy. Boulder: Westview, pp. 199-222.

 

-S. Krasner (1985). Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism. Berkeley: University of California Press.

 

-D. Tussie (1986). The Less Developed Countries and the World Trading System: A Challenge to the GATT. London: Pinter.

 

-M. O'Neill (1984). “HICs, MICs, NICs and LICs: Some Elements in the Political Economy of Graduation and Discrimination”. World Development; V.12-#?, pp. 693-712.

 

-J. Cassing and A.L. Hillman (1991). “Equalizing the Cost of Success: Equitable Graduation Rules and the GSP”. JIEI; V.6-#1, pp. 40-51.

 

-E. Ray (1987). “The Impact of Special Interests on Preferential Tariff Concessions by the US”. REStat; V.69-#2, pp. 187-193.

 

-D. Clark (1987). “Regulation of International Trade: The US GSP Scheme”. WA; V.123-#4, pp. 697-704.

 

-E. Ray (1989). “The Impact of Rent-Seeking Activity on US Preferential Trade and World Debt”. WA; V.125-#?, pp. 619-638.

 

e. Dispute Resolution

 

(1) Institutional and Legal Analysis

 

-R. Hudec (1978). Adjudication of International Trade Disputes.

 

-R. Hudec (1993). Enforcing International Trade Law: The Evolution of the Modern GATT Legal System. Salem: Butterworth Legal Publishers.

 

-E.U. Petersmann (1997). The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System: International Law, International Organizations, and Dispute Settlement. London: Kluwer.

 

-D. Palmeter and P. Mavroidis (1999). Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organization: Practice and Procedure. Hague: Kluwer Law International.

 

-M.M.I. Mora (1993). “A GATT with Teeth: Law Wins over Politics in the Resolution of Trade Disputes”. Columbia Journal of Transnational Law; V.31-#1, pp. 104-179.

 

-K. Stiles (1995). “The New WTO Regime: A Victory of Pragmatism”. Detroit College of Law Journal of International Law and Practice; V.4-#3, pp. 1-37.

 

-M. Young (1995). “Dispute Resolution in the Uruguay Round: Lawyers Triumph over Diplomats”. International Lawyer; V.29-#2, pp. 389-409.

 

-G.R. Shell (1995). “Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade Organization”. Duke Law Journal; V.44-#5, pp. 829-927.

 

-E. Vermulst and B. Driessen (1995). “An Overview of the WTO Dispute Settlement System and Its Relationship with the Uruguay Round Agreements: Nice on Paper but Too Much Stress for the System?”. Journal of World Trade; V.29-#?, pp. 131-162.

 

-P. Nichols (1996). “GATT Doctrine”. Virginia Journal of International Law; V.36-#2, pp. 379-465.

 

-E.-U. Petersmann (1997). The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System: International Law, International Organization and Dispute Settlement. London: Kluwer Law International.

 

-S. Croley and J. Jackson (1996). “The WTO Dispute Procedures, Standard of Review, and Deference to National Governments”. American Journal of International Law; V.90-#?, pp. 193-213.

 

-J. Jackson (1998). “Designing and Implementing Effective Dispute Settlement Procedures: WTO Dispute Settlement, Appraisal and Procedures”. In A. Krueger, ed. The WTO as an International Organization. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 193-213.

 

-J. Jackson (1998). “Dispute Settlement and the WTO: Emerging Problems”. Journal of International Economic Law; V.1-#?, pp. 329-351.

 

-D. Palmeter and P. Mavroidis (1998). “The WTO Legal System: Sources of Law”. American Journal of International Law; V.92-#?, pp. 398-413.

 

-H.U. Petersmann (1990). “From the Hobbesian International Law of Coexistence to Modern Integration Law: The WTO Dispute Settlement System”. Journal of International Economic Law; V.1-#2, pp. 175-198.

 

-R. Hudec (1998). “The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An Overview of the First Three Years”. Minnesota Journal of Global Trade, V.8-#1, pp. 1-50.

 

-W. Davey (1999). “The WTO Dispute Settlement System”. In G. Sampson and W.B. Chambers, eds. Trade, Environment, and the Millemium. New York: UN University Press, pp. 119-142,

 

-E. Vermulst, P. Mavroidis, and P. Waer (1999). “The Functioning of the Appellate Body After Four Years: Towards Rule Integrity”. Journal of World Trade; V.33-#?, pp. 1-50.

 

-J. Jackson (2000). “Dispute Settlement and a New Round”. In J. Schott, ed. The WTO After Seattle. Washington, DC: IIE, pp. 269-282.

 

-J. Jackson (2000). “Dispute Settlement and the WTO.” In R. Porter and P. Sauvé, eds. Seattle, the WTO, and the Future of the Multilateral Trading System. Cambridge: The Center for Business and Government, Harvard University.

 

-J.M. Smith (2000). “The Politics of Dispute Settlement Design: Explaining Legalism in Regional Trade Pacts”. International Organization; V.54-#1, pp. 137-180.

 

-B. Hoekman and P. Mavroidis (2000). “WTO Dispute Settlement, Transparency and Surveillance”. World Economy; V.23-#4, pp. 527-542.

 

-J.H.H. Weiler (2000). “The Role of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections on the Internal and External Legitimacy of WTO Dispute Settlement”. Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper #9/00.

 

-C. Barfield (2001). Free Trade, Sovereignty, and Democracy: The Future of the WTO. Washington, DC: AEI.

 

-R. Cunningham and T. Cribb (2003). “Dispute Settlement Through the Lens of ‘Free Flow of Trade’: A Review of WTO Dispute Settlement of US Antidumping and Countervailing Measures”. Journal of International Economic Law; V.6-#1, pp. 155-170.

 

(2) Formal theory

 

-M. Ryan (1991). “Strategy and Compliance with Bilateral Trade Dispute Settlement Agreements: USTR's Section 300 Experience in the Pacific Basin”. Michigan Journal of International Law; V.12-#4, pp. 799-827.

 

-T. Hungerford (1991). “GATT: A Cooperative Equilibrium in a Noncooperative Trading Regime?” JIE; V.31-#3/4, pp. 357-369.

 

-D. Kovenock and M. Thursby (1992). “GATT, Dispute Settlement and Cooperation”. E&P; V.4-#2, pp. 151-170. [Also in in A. Deardorff and R. Stern, eds. Analytical and Negotiating Issues in the Global Trading System. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 361-390]

 

-S. Mitchell (1997). “GATT, Dispute Settlement and Cooperation: A Note”. E&P; V.9-#1, pp. 87-93. [response by Kovenock and Thursby follows, pp. 95-98]

 

-Chang, Howard F. (1997). “Carrots, Sticks, and International Externalities”. International Review of Law and Economics; V.17-#3, pp. 309-324.

 

-Choi, Gyoung-Gyu (1998). “The Optimal International Trade Agreement and Its Enforcement under Asymmetric Information”. Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics; V.4-#1, pp. 159-195.

 

-G. Maggi (1999). “The Role of Multilateral Institutions in International Trade Cooperation”. AER; V.89-#1, pp. 190-214.

 

-R. Ludema (2001). “Optimal International Trade Agreements and Dispute Settlement Procedures”. European Journal of Political Economy; V.17-#2, pp. 355-376.

 

-C. Brown (2002). “The Economics of Trade Disputes: The GATT’s Article XXIII, and the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding”. Economics & Politics; V.14-#3, pp. 283-323.

 

-T. Furusawa (1999). “The Role of the WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure on International Cooperation”.

 

-B.P. Rosendorff (2000). “Stability and Rigidity: The Dispute Settlement Procedure of the WTO”. Ms: USC.

 

-W. Ethier (2002). “Punishments and Dispute Settlement in Trade Agreements”. Ms: University of Pennsylvania

 

-Chung, Jae Wan (1997). “WTO Settlement of Trade Disputes”. Seoul Journal of Economics; V.10-#2, pp. 95-106.

 

(3) Statistical and Econometric Analyses

 

-R. Hudec, D. Kennedy, and M. Sgarbossa (1993). “A Statistical Profile of GATT Dispute Settlement Cases: 1948-1989". Minnesota Journal of Global Trade; V.2-#?, pp. 1-113.

 

-S.A. Mota (1999). “The World Trade Organization: An Analysis of Disputes”. North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation; V.25-#?, pp. 75-104.

 

-M. Bütler and H. Hauser (2000). “The WTO Dispute Settlement System: A First Assessment from an Economic Perspective”. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization; V.16-#2, pp. 503-533.

 

-Young Duk Park and Marion Panizzon (2002). “WTO Dispute Settlement 1995-2001: A Statistical Analysis”. Journal of International Economic Law; V5-#1, pp. 221-244.

 

-K. Leitner and S. Lester (2003). “WTO Dispute Settlement, 1995-2002: A Statistical Analysis”. Journal of International Economic Law; V6-#1, pp. 251-261.

 

-C. Sevilla (1997). “A Political Economy Model of GATT/WTO Trade Complaints”. Jean Monnet Working Paper, #5/97.

 

-C. Sevilla (1998). “Explaining Patterns of GATT/WTO Trade Complaints”. Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Working Paper; #98/1.

 

-M. Busch (2000). “Democracy, Consultation, and the Paneling of Disputes under GATT”. Journal of Conflict Resolution; V.4-#4, pp. 425-446.

 

-E. Reinhardt (1999). “Aggressive Multilateralism: The Determinants of GATT/WTO Dispute Initiation”. Ms: Department of Political Science, Emory University.

 

-E. Reinhardt (2001). “Adjudication without Enforcement in GATT Disputes”. Journal of Conflict Resolution; V.45-#2, pp. 174-195.

 

-M. Busch and E. Reinhardt (2000). “Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: Early Settlement in GATT/WTO Disputes”. Fordham International Law Journal; V.24-#1/2, pp. 158-172.

 

-M. Busch and E. Reinhardt (2002). “Testing International Trade Law: Empirical Studies of GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement”, in Daniel L. M. Kennedy and James D. Southwick, eds., The Political Economy of International Trade Law: Essays in Honor of Robert E. Hudec. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 457-481.

 

-M. Busch and E. Reinhardt (2002). “Transatlantic Trade Conflicts and GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement”. In E.U. Petersmann and Mark Pollak, eds. Dispute Prevention and Dispute Settlement in the Transatlantic Partnership. New York: Oxford University Press, pp.

 

-E. Grinols and R. Perrelli (2002). “Politics, The WTO and Trade Disputes: Evidence From US Cases”. Pacific Economic Review; V.7-#2, pp. 335-357.

 

-K. Iida (2003). “Why Does the World Trade Organization Appear Neoliberal? The Puzzle of the High Incidence of Guilty Verdicts in WTO Adjudication”. Journal of Public Policy; V.23-#1, pp. 1-21.

 

-C. Bown (2004). “Trade Disputes and the Implementation of Protection under the GATT: An Empirical Assessment”. JIE; V.62-#2, pp. 263-294.

 

-C. Bown (2004). “Developing Countries as Plaintiffs and Defendants in GATT/WTO Trade Disputes”. World Economy; V.27-#1, pp. 59-80.

 

-C. Bown (2004). “On the Economic Success of GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement”. REStat; V.86-#3, pp. 811-823.

 

-C. Bown (2004). “Trade Policy under the GATT/WTO: Empirical Evidence of the Equal Treatment Rule”. CJE; V.37-#3, pp. 678-720.

 

-G. Garrett and J.M. Smith (2000). “The Politics of WTO Dispute Settlement”. Ms: George Washington University.

 

-K. Iida (1999). “Between Power and Principle: Multilateral Trade Dispute Settlement Revisited”. Ms: Aoyama Gakuin University.

 

-K. Iida and M. Suzuki (2001). “Settling Trade Disputes: Law, Diplomacy, and Domestic Politics”. Presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, August 28-September 2, 2001.

 

5. Structural Foundations of Trading Order: Hegemons, Regimes, etc.

 

-J. Ruggie (1972). “Collective Goods and Future International Collaboration”. APSR; V.66-#3, pp. 874-893.

 

-C.P. Kindleberger (1976). “Systems of International Economic Organization”. in D. Calleo, ed. Money and the Coming World Order; New York: NYU Press. pp.

 

-C.P. Kindleberger (1981). “Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy”. ISQ; V.25-#?, pp. 15-39.

 

-S. Krasner (1979). “The Tokyo Round: Particularistic Interests and Prospects for Stability in the Global Trading System”. ISQ; V.23-#4, pp. 491-531.

 

-S. Krasner (1982). “American Policy and Global Economic Stability”. in W. Avery and D. Rapkin, eds. America in a Changing World Political Economy. New York: Longman. pp. 29-48.

 

-R. Keohane (1980). “The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes”. in O. Holsti, et al., eds. Change in the International System. Boulder: Westview, pp.

 

-R. Keohane (1982). “The Demand for International Regimes”. IO; V.36-#2, pp.

 

-D. Snidal (1985). “The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory”. IO; V.39-#4, pp. 579-614.

 

-B. and R. Yarbrough (1985). “Free Trade, Hegemony and the Theory of Agency”. Kyklos; V.38-#?, pp. 348-364.

 

-B. and R. Yarbrough (1987). “Cooperation in the Liberalization of International Trade”. IO; V.41-#1, pp. 1-26.

 

-R. Cooper (1995). “The Coase Theorem and International Economic Relations”. Japan and the World Economy; v.7-#1, pp. 29-44.

 

-P. Guerrieri and P.C. Padoan (1986). “Neomercantilism and Intenational Economic Stability”. IO; V.40-#1, pp. 29-42.

 

-J. Alt, R. Calvert, and B. Humes (1988). “Reputation and Hegemonic Stability: A Game Theoretic Analysis”. APSR; V.82-#2, pp. 445-466.

 

-J. Gowa (1989). “Rational Hegemons, Excludable Goods and Small Groups: An Epitaph for Hegemonic Stability Theory”. WP; V.41-#?, pp. 307-324.

 

-J. Gowa (1989). “Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and Free Trade”. APSR; V.83-#4, pp. 1245-1256.

 

-J. Gowa (1993). “Power Politics and International Trade”. APSR; V.87-#2, pp. 408-420.

 

-J. Gowa (1994). Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade. Princeton: PUP.

 

-D. Lake (1993). “Leadership, Hegemony, and the International Economy: Naked Emperor or Tattered Monarch with Potential”. ISQ; V.37-#4, pp. 459-489.

 

-R. Pahre (1999). Leading Questions: How Hegemony Affects the International Political Economy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

 

-O. Young (1980). “International Regimes: The Problem of Concept Formation”. WP; V.32-#3, pp. 331-356.

 

-C. Lipson (1982). “The Transformation of Trade: The Sources and Effects of Regime Change”. IO; V.36-#3, pp. 417-455.

 

-T. McKeown (1983). “Hegemonic Stability and 19th Century Tariff Levels in Europe”. IO

 

-A. Stein (1984). “The Hegemon's Dilemma: Great Britain, the US and International Economic Order”. IO; V.37-#2, pp.

 

-D. Lake (1984). “Beneath the Commerce of Nations: A Theory of International Economic Structures”. ISQ; V.28-#?, pp. 143-170.

 

-B. Russett (1985). “The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony”. IO; V.39-#2, pp.

 

-J. Rosenau (1986). “Before Cooperation: Hegemons, Regimes, and Habit Driven Actors in World Politics”. IO; V.40-#4, pp. 849-894.

 

-O'Brien, Patrick Geoffrey Pigman (1992). “Free Trade, British Hegemony and the International Economic Order in the Nineteenth Century”. Review of International Studies; V.18-#2, pp. 89-113.

 

-Mansfield, Edward (1992). “The Concentration of Capabilities and International Trade”. International Organization; V.46-#3, pp. 731-764.

 

-Hills, Jill (1994). “A Global Industrial Policy. U.S. Hegemony and GATT. The Liberalization of Telecommunications”. Review of International Political Economy; V.1-#2, pp. 257-279.

 

-Stiles, Kendall (1995). “The Ambivalent Hegemon: Explaining the 'Lost Decade' in Multilateral Trade Talks, 1948-1958". Review of International Political Economy; V.2-#1, pp. 1-26.

 

-Ahnlid, Anders (1996). “Comparing GATT and GATS: Regime Creation under and after Hegemony”. Review of International Political Economy; V.3-#1, pp. 65-94.

 

-Oden, Michael (1999). “The Costs of U.S. Hegemony: Military Power, Military Spending, and U.S. Trade Performance”. Review of Radical Political Economics; V.31-#4, pp. 32-60.

 

6. The Domestic Economic Effects of Liberalization

 

-J. Cheh (1974). “US Concessions in the Kennedy Round and Short-Run Labor Adjustment Costs”. JIE; V.4-#4, pp. 323-340.

 

-M. Bale (1977). “US Concessions in the Kennedy Round and Short-Run Labour Adjustment Costs: Further Evidence”. JIE; V.7-#?, pp. 145-148.

 

-R. Baldwin (1976). “Trade and Employment Effects in the US of Multilateral Tariff Reductions”. AER; V.66-#2, pp. 142-148.

 

-M. Kreinin and L. Officer (1979). “Tariff Reductions under the Tokyo Round: A Review of Their Effects on Trade Flows, Employment and Welfare”. WA; V.115-#?, pp. 542-572.

 

-R. Baldwin, J. Mutti and J.D. Richardson (1980). “Welfare Effects on the US of a Significant Multilateral Tariff Reduction”. JIE; V.10-#?, pp. 405-423.

 

7. The Domestic Politics of Trade Liberalization

 

a. Mainly Historical/Institutional Analysis

 

-J. Rosenau, ed. (1967). Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy. New York: Free Press.

 

-A.W. Wolf (1975). “Evolution of the Executive-Legislative Relationship in the Trade Act of '74". SAIS Review; V.19-#4, pp. 16-23.

 

-M. Blaker, ed. (1978). The Politics of Trade: US and Japanese Policymaking for the GATT Negotiations. New York: Columbia University East Asian Institute.

 

-I.M. Destler (1980). Making Foreign Economic Policy. Washington, DC: Brookings.

 

-I.M. Destler and T.R. Graham (1980). “US Congress and the Tokyo Round: Lessons of a Success Story”. World Economy; V.3-#?, pp. 54-70.

 

-G. Winham (1980). “Robert Strauss, the MTN, and the Control of Faction”. Journal of World Trade Law; V.14-#?, pp. 377-397.

 

-R.C. Cassidy (1981). “Negotiating about Negotiations: The Geneva Multilateral Trade Talks”. in T. Franck, ed. The Tethered Presidency: Congressional Restraints on Executive Power. New York: NYU Press. pp. 264-282.

 

-J.W. Twiggs (1987). The Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: A Case Study in Building Domestic Support for Diplomacy. Lanham: University Press of America.

 

-G.J. Ikenberry (1989). “Manufacturing Consensus: The Institutionalization of American Private Interests in the Tokyo Round”. Comparative Politics; V.?-#?, pp. 289-305.

 

-H. Nau, ed. (1990). Domestic Politics and the Uruguay Round. NY: Columbia University Press.

 

-K. Stiles (1995). “The Ambivalent Hegemon: Explaining the ‘Lost Decade’ in Multilateral Trade Talks, 1948-1958”. Review of International Political Economy V.2-#1, pp. 1-26.

 

b. Mainly Formal Theoretical Analysis

 

(1) Endogenous Policy Approach

 

(a) Theory

 

-W. Mayer (1985). “The Political Economy of Tariff Agreements”. in Probleme und Perspektiven der weltwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung. Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, pp. 423-437.

 

-R. Baldwin (1990). “Optimal Tariff Retaliation Rules”. in R. Jones and A. Krueger, eds. The Political Economy of International Trade. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 108-121.

 

-F. Mayer (1991). “Domestic Politics and the Strategy of International Trade”. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management; V.10-#2, pp. 222-246.

 

-L. Hillman and P. Moser (1995). “Trade Liberalization as Politically Optimal Exchange of Market Access”. In M. Canzoneri, W. Ethier, and V. Grilli eds. The New Transatlantic Economy. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 295-312.

 

-G. Grossman and E. Helpman (1995). “Trade Wars and Trade Talks”. JPE; V.4-#103, pp. 675-708.

 

-G. Maggi and A. Rodríguez-Clare (1998). “The Value of Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressures”. JPE; V.106-#3, pp. 574-601.

 

-P. Levy (1999). “Lobbying and International Cooperation in Tariff Setting”. JIE; V.47-#2, pp. 345-370.

 

-A. Panagariya and R. Findlay (1996). “A Political Economy Analysis of Free-Trade Areas and Customs Unions”. in R. Feenstra, G. Grossman and D. Irwin, eds. The Political Economy of Trade Policy. Cambridge: MIT, pp. 265-287.

 

-D. Gould and G. Woodbridge (1997). “Retaliation, Liberalization and Trade Wars: The Political Economy of Non-Strategic Trade Policy”. EJPE; V.14-#1, pp. 115-137.

 

(b) Applications

 

-H. Marvel and E. Ray (1983). “The Kennedy Round: Evidence on the Regulation of International Trade in the US”. AER; V.73-#?, pp. 190-197.

 

-E. Ray (1987). “The Impact of Special Interests on Preferential Tariff Concessions in the United States”. REStat; V.66-#?, pp. 452-458.

 

-D. Clark (1987). “Regulation of International Trade: The United States’ Generalized System of Preferences Scheme”. WA; V.123-#4, pp. 697-704.

 

-R. Tyers (1990). “Implicit Policy Preferences and the Assessment of Negotiable Trade Policy Reforms”. EER; V.34-#?, pp. 1399-1426.

 

-D. Trefler (1993). “Trade Liberalization and the Theory of Endogenous Protection: An Econometric Study of US Import Policy”. JPE; V.101-#1, pp. 138-160.

 

-E. Rutström (1995). “Political Preference Functions, Trade Wars, and Trade Negotiations”. Empirical Economics; V.20-#?, pp. 49-73.

 

(2) Unmodeled Economies and “Two-Level Games”

 

(a) Some Theory

 

-R. Putnam (1988). “The Logic of Two-Level Games”. IO; V.42-#?, pp. 427-461.

 

-G. Tsebelis (1990). Nested Games. Berkeley: University of California Press.

 

-F. Mayer (1992). “Managing Domestic Differences in International Negotiations: The Strategic Use of Internal Side Payments”. IO; V.46-#4, pp. 793-818.

 

-M. McGinnis and J. Williams (1993). “Policy Uncertainty in Two-Level Games: Examples of Correlated Equilibria”. ISQ; V.37-#1, pp. 29-54.

 

-K. Iida (1993). “When and How Do Domestic Constraints Matter? Two-Level Games with Uncertainty”. JCR; V.37-#3, pp. 403-426.

 

-K. Iida (1996). “Involuntary Defection in Two-Level Games”. PC; V.89-#3/4, pp. 283-303.

 

-J. Fearon (1994). “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes”. APSR; V.88-#3, pp. 577-592.

 

-J. Mo (1994). “The Logic of Two-Level Games with Endogenous Domestic Coalitions”. JCR; V.38-#3, pp. 402-422.

 

-J. Mo (1995). “Domestic Institutions and International Bargaining: The Role of Agent Veto in Two-Level Games”. APSR; V.89-#4, pp. 914-924.

 

-G. Basevi, F. Delbono, and M. Mariotti (1994). “Bargaining with a Composite Player: An Application to the Uruguay Round of GATT Negotiations”. Journal of International and Comparative Economics; V.3-#3, pp. 161-174.

 

-G. Downs and D. Rocke (1995). Optimal Imperfection?: Domestic Uncertainty and Institutions in International Relations. Princeton: PUP.

 

-H. Milner and B.P. Rosendorff (1996). “Trade Negotiations, Information and Domestic Politics: The Role of Domestic Groups”. E&P; V.8-#2, pp. 145-189.

 

-H. Milner and B.P. Rosendorff (1997). “Democratic Politics and International Trade Negotiations: Elections and Divided Government as Constraints on Trade Liberalization”. JCR; V.41-#1, pp. 117-146.

 

-E. Mansfield, H. Milner and B.P. Rosendorff (2000). “Free to Trade: Democracies, Autocracies, and International Trade”. APSR; V.94-#?, pp. 305-321. [Comment by X. Dai and response, APSR, V.96-#1, pp. 159-165.]

 

-S. Lohmann (1997). “Linkage Politics”. JCR; V.41-#1, pp. 38-67.

 

-J. Ederington (2001). “International Coordination of Trade and Domestic Policies”. AER; V.91-#5, pp. 1580-1593.

 

-J. Ederington (2002). “Trade and Domestic Policy Linkage in International Agreements”. IER; V.43-#4, pp. 1347-1367.

 

-J. Morrow (1991). “Electoral and Congressional Incentives and Arms Control”. JCR; V.35-#?, pp. 245-265.

 

-G. Hess and A. Orphanides (1995). “War Politics: An Economic, Rational Voter Framework”. AER; V.85-#4, pp. 667-690.

 

-A. Smith (1996). “Diversionary Foreign Policy in Democratic Systems”. ISQ; V.40-#1, pp. 133-154.

 

(b) Some Applications

 

-P. Evans, H. Jacobson and R. Putnam, eds. (1993). Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics. Berkeley: University of California Press.

 

-P. Cowhey (1993). “Domestic Institutions and International Commitments: Japan and the US”. IO; V.47-#2, pp. 299-326.

 

-L. Schoppa (1993). “Two-level Games and Bargaining Outcomes: Why Gaiatsu Succeeds in Japan in Some Cases but Not Others”. IO; V.47-#3, pp. 353-386.

 

-R. Friman (1993). “Side-payments versus Security Cards: Domestic Bargaining in International Economic Negotiations”. IO; V.47-#3, pp. 387-410.

 

-L. Martin (1993). “International and Domestic Institutions in the EMU Process”. E&P; V5-#2, pp. 125-44.

 

-M. Huelshoff (1994). “Domestic Politics and Dynamic Issue Linkage: A Reformulation of Integration Theory”. International Studies Quarterly, V.38-#2, pp. 255-279.

 

-R. Pahre (1994). “‘Who's on First, What's on Second’: Actors and Institutions in Two-Level Games”. University of Michigan Research Forum on International Economics Discussion Paper: 352.

 

-M.V. Simon and L.R. Alm (1995). “Policy Windows and Two-Level Games: Explaining the Passage of Acid-Rain Legislation in the Clean Air Act of 1990". Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy; V.13-#4, pp. 459-478.

 

-J. Goldstein (1996). “International Law and Domestic Institutions: Reconciling North American ‘Unfair’ Trade Laws”. IO; V.50-#4, pp. 541-564.

 

-H. Milner (1997). Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations. Princeton: PUP.

 

-L.A. Patterson (1997). “Agricultural Policy Reform in the European Community: A Three-Level Game Analysis”. IO; V.51-#1, pp. 135-165.

 

-R. Paarlberg (1997). “Agricultural Policy Reform and the Uruguay Round: Synergistic Linkages in a Two-Level Game?”. IO; V.51-#3, pp. 413-444.

 

-R. Pahre (1997). “Endogenous Domestic Institutions in Two-Level Games and Parliamentary Oversight of the European Union”. JCR; V.41-#1, pp. 147-174.

 

-K. Knopf (1993). “Beyond Two-Level Games: Domestic-International Interaction in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Negotiations”. IO; V.47-#4, pp. 599-628.

 

-J. Gowa (1998). “Politics at the Water’s Edge: Parties, Voters, and the Use of Force Abroad”. IO; V.52-#2, pp. 307-324.

 

8. “Ideas” and Ideology in Trade Policy

 

a. Domestic Doxastic/Epistemic Communities

 

-W. Eiteman (1930). “The Rise and Decline of Othodox Tariff Propaganda”. QJE; V.?-#?, pp. 22-39.

 

-F.W. Fetter (1933). “Congressional Tariff Theory”. AER; V.23-#3, pp. 412-427.

 

-W. Allen (1954). “Issues in Congressional Tariff Debates, 1890-1930". SEJ; V.20-#?, pp. 340-355.

 

-R. Edwards (1970). “Economic Sophistication in 19th Century Tariff Debates”. Journal of Economic History; V.30-#4, pp. 802-838.

 

-R. Pastor (1983). “Cry-and-Sigh Syndrome: Congress and Trade Policy”. in A. Schick, ed. Making Economic Policy in Congress. Washington, DC: AEI. pp. 158-195.

 

-J. Odell (1988). “From London to Bretton Woods: Sources of Change in Bargaining Strategies and Outcomes”. Journal of Public Policy; V.8-#?, pp. 287-316.

 

-J. Goldstein (1988). “Ideas, Institutions and American Trade Policy”. IO; V.42-#1, pp. 179-217.

 

-J. Goldstein (1989). “The Impact of Ideas on Trade Policy: The Origins of US Agricultural and Manufacturing Policies”. IO; V.43-#1, pp. 31-71.

 

-W. Hutchinson (1989). “Economists and the Economics of Trade Legislation: An Examination of the Impact of U.S. Trade Policy on the North Central Region and the South, 1870-1910". Journal of Economics and Finance;

 

-E. Krauss and S. Reich (1992). “Ideology, Interests and the American Executive: Toward a Theory of Foreign Competition and Manufacturing Trade Policy”. IO; V.46-#4, pp. 857-897.

 

-O. Graham (1992). Losing Time: The Industrial Policy Debate. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

 

-K. McNamarra (1999). The Currency of Ideas: Monetary Politics in the European Union. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

 

-J. Legro (2000). Whence American Internationalism”. IO; V.54-#2, pp. 253-289.

 

b. Transnational Doxastic/Epistemic Communities

 

-C. Kindleberger (1975). “The Rise of Free Trade in Western Europe, 1820-1875". Journal of Economic History; V.35-#1, pp. 20-55.

 

-E. Haas (1980). “Why Collaborate? Issue Linkage and International Regimes”. WP; V.32-#?, pp. 357-405.

 

-J. Tumlir (1981). “Evolution of the Concept of International Economic Order”. in F. Cairncross, ed. Changing Perceptions of Economic Policy. New York: Methuen. pp. 152-193.

 

-J. Ruggie (1982). “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Post-War Order”. IO; V.36-#2, pp. 379-415.

 

-R. Cox (1987). Production, Power and World Order. New York: Columbia University Press.

 

-P. Haas (1989). “Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control”. IO; V.43-#3, pp. 376-403.

 

-J. Ikenberry (1989). “Rethinking the Origins of American Hegemony”. Political Science Quarterly; V.104-#?, pp. 375-400.

 

-J. Ikenberry and C. Kupchan (1990). “Socialization and Hegemonic Power”. IO; V.44-#3, pp. 283-315.

 

-G. Modelski (1990). “Is World Politics Evolutionary Learning?”. IO. V.44-#1, pp. 1-24.

 

-J. Keeley (1990). “Toward a Foucauldian Analysis of International Regimes”. IO; V.44-#1, pp. 83-105.

 

-E.A. Nadelmann (1990). “Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International Society”. IO; V.44-#4, pp. 479-426.

 

-P. Haas (1992). “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination”. IO; V.46-#1, pp. 1-36.

 

-W. Drake and K. Nicolaïdis (1992). “Ideas, Interests, and Institutionalization: ‘Trade in Services’ and the Uruguay Round”. IO; V.46-#1, pp. 37-100.

 

-J. Ikenberry (1992). “A World Restored: Expert Consensus and the Anglo-American Post-War Settlement”. IO; V.46-#1, pp. 289-321.

 

-E. Kapstein (1992). “Between Power and Purpose: Central Bankers and the Politics of Regulatory Convergence”. IO; V.46-#1, pp. 265-287.

 

-J. Sebenius (1992). “Challenging Conventional Explanations of International Cooperation: Negotiation Analysis and the Case of Epistemic Communities”. IO; V.46-#1, pp. 323-365.

 

-J. Levy (1994). “Learning and Foreign Policy”. IO; V.48-#?, pp. 279-312.

 

-J.K. Jacobson (1995). “Much Ado About Ideas”. WP; V.47-#2, pp. 283-310.

 

-P. Katzenstein, ed. (1996). The Culture of National Security: Norms, Identity and World Politics. New York: Columbia University Press.

 

-P. Katzenstein (1996). Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

 

-A. Yee (1996). “The Causal Effects of Ideas on Policies”. IO; v.50-#1, pp. 69-108.

 

-A. Wendt (1992). “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics”. IO; V.46-#2, pp. 391-425.

 

-A. Wendt (1994). “Collective Identity Formation and the International State”. APSR; V.88-#2, pp. 384-396.

 

-J. Ruggie (1998). “What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge”. IO; V.52-#4, pp. 855-885.

 

-Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (1998). “Norms and International Relations Theory”. IO; V.52-#4, pp. 887-917.

 

c. Doxastic Communities in General

 

-P. Hall, ed. (1989). The Political Power of Economic Ideas. Princeton: PUP.

 

-M. Taylor (1989). “Structure, Culture, and Action in the Explanation of Social Change”. Politics and Society; V.17-#?, pp. 115-162.

 

-D. Kreps (1990). “Corporate Cultures and Economic Theory”. in J. Alt and K. Shepsle, eds. Perspectives on Positive Political Economy. New York: Cambridge University Press.

 

-M. Tomasello, A. Kruger, and H. Ratner (1993). “Cultural Learning”. Behavioral and Brain Sciences; V.16-#3, pp. 495-511.

 

-P. Hall (1993). “Policy Paradigms, Social Learning and the State”. Comparative Politics; V.?-#?, pp. 275-295.

 

-G. Garrett and B. Weingast (1993). “Ideas, Interests, and Institutions”. in J. Goldstein and R. Keohane, eds. Ideas in Foreign Policy. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp.

 

-A. Denzau and R. North (1994). “Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions”. KYKLOS; V.47-#1, pp. 3-31.

 

-S. Hays (1994). “Structure and Agency and the Sticky Problem of Culture”. Sociological Theory; V.12-#?, pp. 57-72.

 

-S. Ellingson (1995). “Understanding the Dialectic of Discourse and Collective Action: Public Debate and Rioting in Antebellum Cincinnati”. AJS; V.101-#?, pp. 100-145.

 

-M. Gilbert (1996). Living Together: Rationality, Sociality and Obligation. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

 

-J.K. Jacobsen (1995). “Much Ado About Ideas: The Cognitive Factor in Economic Policy”. World Politics; V.47-#2, pp. 283-310.

 

-P. DiMaggio (1997). “Culture and Cognition”. Annual Review of Sociology; V.23, pp. 263-287.

 

-B. Weingast (1996). “A Rational Choice Perspective on the Role of Ideas”. Politics and Society; V.23-#?, pp. 449-464.

 

-R. Bates, R.J.P. de Figueirdo, jr., and B. Weingast (1998). “The Politics of Interpretation: Rationality, Culture, and Transition”. Politics and Society; V.26-#?, pp. 221-256.

 

-S. Berman (2001). “Ideas, Norms and Culture in Political Analysis”. Comparative Politics; V.33-#2, pp. 231-250.

 

D. Regional Integration and Preferential Trading Systems

 

1. Overview/Surveys on Regional Integration

 

-B. Balassa (1961). The Theory of Economic Integration. Homewood, Ill.: Irwin.

 

-F. Machlup (1977). A History of Thought on Economic Integration. London: Macmillan.

 

-P. Robson (1987). The Economics of International Integration. London: Allen and Unwin

 

-R. Hine (1994). “International Economic Integration”. in D. Greenaway and L.A. Winters, eds. Surveys in International Trade. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 234-272.

 

-R. Baldwin and A. Venables (1995). “Regional Economic Integration”. in G. Grossman and K. Rogoff, eds. Handbook of International Economics, V.III. Amsterdam: Eslevier, pp. 1597-1644.

 

-J. Bhagwati, D. Greenaway, and A. Panagariya (1998). “Trading Preferentially: Theory and Policy”. EJ; V.108-#449, pp. 1128-1148

 

-R. Fernández and J. Portes (1998). “Returns to Regionalism: An Analysis of Nontraditional Gains from Regional Trade Agreements”. World Bank Economic Review; V.12-#2, pp. 197-220.

 

-A. Panagariya (2000). “Preferential Trade Liberalization: The Traditional Theory and New Developments”. JEL; V.38-#2, pp. 287-331.

 

-L.A. Winters (2001). “Regionalism for Developing Countries: Assessing the Costs and Benefits”. In S. Lahiri, ed. Regionalism and Globalization: Theory and Practice. London: Routledge, pp. 113-143.

 

-J. Bhagwati, P. Krishna, and A. Panagariya (1999). Trading Blocs: Alternative Approaches to Analyzing Preferential Trade Agreements. Cambridge: MIT Press.

 

2. Regionalization of International Trade

 

a. The Effect of Preferential Trade Agreements on Intra-Union Trade

 

-W. Chadwick and K. Deutsch (1973). “International Trade and Economic Integration: Further Developments in Trade Matrix Analysis”. Comparative Political Studies; V.6-#?, pp. 84-109.

 

-N. Aitken (1973). “The Effect of the EEC and EFTA on European Trade: A Temporal, Cross-Section Analysis”. AER; V.63-#5, pp. 881-892.

 

-E. Truman (1975). “The Effects of European Economic Integration on the Production and Trade of Manufactured Products”. in B. Balassa, ed. European Economic Integration. Amsterdam: North Holland.

 

-A. Jacquemin and A. Sapir (1988). “European Integration or World Integration?”. WA; V.124-#1, pp. 127-139.

 

-A. Jacquemin and A. Sapir (1988). “International Trade and Integration of the European Community: An Econometric Analysis”. EER; V.32-#6, pp. 1439-1449.

 

-D. Neven and L-H. Röller (1991). “Eurpean Integration and Trade Flows”. EER; V.35-#6, pp. 1295-1309.

 

-A. Sapir (1992). “Regional Integration in Eurpope”. EJ; V.102-#?, pp. 1491-1506.

 

-A. Sapir (1996). “The Effects of Europe’s Internal Market Program on Production and Trade: A First Assessment”. WA; V.132-#3, pp. 457475.

 

-G. Chortareas and T. Pelagidis (2004). “Trade Flows: A Facet of Regionalism or Globalization”. Cambridge Journal of Economics; V.28-#2, pp. 253-272.

 

b. The Effect of Preferential Trade Agreements on World Trade Patterns

 

-R. Lawrence (1994). “Regionalism: An Overview”. JJIE; V.8-#4, pp. 365-387.

 

-R. Pomfret (1985). “Discrimination in International Trade: Extent, Motivation, and Implications”. Economia Internazionale; V.38-#?, pp. 49-65.

 

-P. DeGrauwe (1988). “Exchange Rate Variability and the Slowdown in Growth of International Trade”. IMFSP; V.35-#?, pp. 63-84.

 

-J. Garten (1989). “Trading Blocs and the Evolving World Economy”. Current History; V.?-#1, pp. 15-56.

 

-J. Frankel (1991). “Is a Yen Bloc Forming in Asia?”. in R. O’Brien, ed. Finance and the International Economy. Oxford: OUP, pp. 4-20.

 

-R. Lawrence (1991). “Emerging Regional Arrangements: Building Blocks or Stumbling Blocks?”. in R. O’Brien, ed. Finance and the International Economy. Oxford: OUP, pp. 24-36.

 

-N. Fielke (1992). “One Trading World, or Many: The Issue of Regional Trading Blocs”. New England Economic Review; May/June, pp. 3-20.

 

-de la Torre, A. and M. Kelly (1992). Regional Trading Arrangements. IMF Occasional Paper #93.

 

-D. Henderson (1992). “International Economic Integration: Progress, Prospects and Implications”. International Affaris; V.68-#?, pp. 633-653.

 

-C. Hamilton and L.A. Winters (1992). “Opening Up International Trade in Eastern Europe”. Economic Policy; V.#?, pp. 77-116.

 

-P. Petri (1992). “One Bloc, Two Blocs, or None? Political-Economic Factors in Pacific Trade Policy”. In K. Okuzumi, K. Calder, and G. Gong, eds. The US-Japan Economic Relationship in East and Southeast Asia: A Policy Framework for Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, pp. 39-70.

 

-J. Frankel and S. Wei (1992). “Trade Blocs and Currency Blocs”. NBER Working Paper, #4335.

 

-P.J. Lloyd (1992). “Regionalization and World Trade”. OECD Economic Studies; #18, pp. 7-43.

 

-P.J. Lloyd (1993). “Global Integration”. Australian Economic Review; pp. 35-48.

 

-J. Frankel (1993). “Is Japan Creating a Yen Bloc in East Asia and the Pacific?”. In J. Frankel and M. Kahler, eds. Regionalism and Rivalry: Japan and the US in Pacific Asia. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 53-85.

 

-G. Saxonhouse (1993). “Trading Blocs and East Asia”. in J. DeMelo and A. Panagariya, eds. New Dimensions in Regional Integratoin. New York: Cambridge/CEPR, pp. 388-416.

 

-R. Grant, M. Papadakis and J.D. Richardson (1993). “Global Trade Flows: Old Structures, New Issues, Empirical Evidence”. in C.F. Bergsten and M. Noland, eds. Pacific Dynamism and the International System. Washington, DC: IIE, pp. 17-63.

 

-K. Anderson and H. Norheim (1993). “History, Geography and Regional Economic Integration”. in K. Anderson and R. Blackhurst, eds. Regional Integration and the Global Trading System. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, pp. 19-51.

 

-K. Anderson and H. Norheim (1993). “Is World Trade Becoming More Regionalized?”. RIE; V.1-#2, pp. 91-109.

 

-K. Anderson and H. Norheim (1993). “From Imperial to Regional Trade Preferences: Its Effects on Europe's Intra- and Extra-Regional Trade”. WA; V.129-#

 

-K. Anderson and R. Snape (1994). “European and American Regionalism: Effects on and Options for Asia”. JJIE; V.8-#4, pp. 454-477.

 

-J. Eaton and A. Tamura (1994). “Bilateralism and Regionalism in Japanese and US Trade and Direct Investment Patterns”. JJIE; V.8-#4, pp. 478-510.

 

-R. Baldwin (1994). “Potential Trade Patterns”. Chapter 3 of Towards and Integrated Europe. London: CEPR, pp. 80-118.

 

-J. Frankel and S. Wei (1998). “Regionalization of World Trade and Currencies: Economics and Politics”. in J. Frankel, ed. The Regionalization of the World Economy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 189-219.

 

-J. Frankel (1997). Regional Trading Blocs. Washington, DC: IIE.

 

-B. Eichengreen and D. Irwin (1995). “Trade Blocs, Currency Blocs and the Reorientation of Trade in the 1930s”. JIE; V.38-#1/2, pp. 1-24.

 

-T. Bayoumi and B. Eichengreen (1995). “Is Regionalism Simply a Diversion? Evidence from the Evolution of the EC and EFTA”. NBER Working Paper, #5283.

 

-N. de Jong and R. Vos (1995). “Regional Blocs or Global Markets?: A World Accounting Approach to Analyze Trade and Financial Linkages”. WA; V.131-#4, pp. 748-773.

 

-C. Engel and J. Rogers (1998). “Regional Patterns in the Law of One Price: The Roles of Geography and Currencies”. in J. Frankel, ed. The Regionalization of the World Economy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 153-183.

 

-S. Dhar and A. Panagariya (1999). “Is East Asia Less Open than North America and the EEC? No”. in J. Piggott and A. Woodland, eds. International Trade Policy and the Pacific Rim. London: Macmillan, pp. 105-123

 

-D. Karemera, David, et al. (1999). “A Gravity Model Analysis of the Benefits of Economic Integration in the Pacific Rim”. Journal of Economic Integration; V.14-#3, pp. 347-367.

 

-M. Brülhart and M. Kelly (1999). “Ireland's Trading Potential with Central and Eastern European Countries: A Gravity Study”. Economic and Social Review; V.30-#2, pp. 159-174.

 

-F. Sanz (2000). “A Kalman Filter-Gravity Equation Approach to Assess the Trade Impact of Economic Integration: The Case of Spain, 1986-1992". WA; V.136-#1, pp. 84-110.

 

-I Soloaga and L. A. Winters (2001). “Regionalism in the Nineties: What Effect on Trade?”. North American Journal of Economics and Finance; V.12-#1, pp. 1-29.

 

c. Transportation Costs and “Natural” Trading Partners

 

-P. Wonnacott and M. Lutz (1988). “Is There a Case for Free Trade Areas?”. In J. Schott, ed. Free Trade Areas and U.S. Trade Policy. Washington, DC: IIE, pp.

 

-P. Krugman (1991). “The Move to Free Trade Zones”. In Policy Implications of Trade and Currency Zones: A Symposium. Kansas City: Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pp.

 

-L. Summers (1991). “Regionalism and the World Trading System”. In Policy Implications of Trade and Currency Zones: A Symposium. Kansas City: Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pp.

 

-J. Frankel, E. Stein, and S. Wei (1995). “Trading Blocs in the Americas: The Natural, The Unnatural and the Supernatural”. JDevE; V.47-#?, pp. 61-95.

 

-J. Frankel, E. Stein, and S. Wei (1998). “Continental Trading Blocs: Are They Natural or Supernatural?”. in J. Frankel, ed. The Regionalization of the World Economy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 91-113.

 

-J. Frankel (1997). Regional Trading Blocs. Washington, DC: IIE.

 

-J.J. Polak (1996). “Is APEC a Natural Regional Trading Bloc? A Critique of the ‘Gravity Model’ of International Trade”. World Economy; V.19-#5, pp. 533-543.

 

-A. Panagariya (1997). “Preferential Trading and the Myth of Natural Trading Partners”. Japan and the World Economy; V.9-#4, pp. 471-489.

 

-A. Panagariya (1998). “Do Transport Costs Justify Regional Preferential Trading Arrangements? No”. WA; V.134-#2, pp. 280-301.

 

-P. Krishna (2003). “Are Regional Trading Partners ‘Natural’”. JPE; V.111-#1, pp. 202-226.

 

3. Integration with Price-Taking Firms

 

a. The Vinerian Approach

 

(1) Theory

 

-R. Lipsey (1960). “The Theory of Customs Unions: A General Survey”. EJ; V.70-#279, pp. 496-513. also in Bhagwati.

 

-M. Krauss (1972). “Recent Developments in Customs Union Theory: An Interpretive Survey”. JEL; V.10-#?, pp. 413-436.

 

-R. Pomfret (1986). “The Theory of Preferential Trading Arrangements”. WA; V.122-#3, pp. 439-465.

 

-C. Kowalczyk (1992). “Paradoxes in Integration Theory”. Open Economies Review; V.3-#1, pp. 51-59.

 

-A. Panagariya (1997). “The Meade Model of Preferential Trading: History, Analytics, and Policy Implications”. In B. Cohen, ed. International Trade and Finance: New Frontiers for Research. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 57-88. [also in Bhagwati, Krishna, and Panagariya, pp. 157-188.]

 

-R. Pomfret (1997). The Economics of Regional Trading Arrangements. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

 

-J. Viner (1950). The Customs Union Issue. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

 

-J. Meade (1955). The Theory of Customs Unions. Amsterdam: North-Holland.

 

-F. Gehrels (1956). “Customs Union from a Single Country Viewpoint”. REStud; V.24-#1, pp. 61-64.

 

-R. Lipsey and K. Lancaster (1956). “The General Theory of Second Best”. Review of Economic Studies; V.24-#1, pp. 11-32.

 

-R. Lipsey (1957). “The Theory of Customs Unions: Trade Diversion and Welfare”. Eca; V.24-#?, pp. 40-46. [also in Bhagwati, Krishna, and Panagariya, pp. 119-126.]

 

-H.G. Johnson (1960). “The Economic Theory of Customs Unions”. Pakistan Economic Journal; V.10-#1, pp. 14-32. [also in Bhagwati, Krishna, and Panagariya, pp. 127-143.]

 

-J. Spraos (1964). “The Condition for Trade-Creating Customs Union”. EJ; V.74-#?, pp. 101-108.

 

-R. Mundell (1964). “Tariff Preferences and the Terms of Trade”. Manchester School; V.32-#1, pp. 1-13. [also in Bhagwati, Krishna, and Panagariya, pp. 145-156.]

 

-M. Michaely (1965). “On Customs Unions and the Gains from Trade”. EJ; V.75-#?, pp. 577-583.

 

-E. Mishan (1966). “The Welfare Gains of a Trade-Diverting Customs Union”. EJ; V.76-#?, pp. 669-672.

 

-S. Arndt (1968). “On Discriminatory vs. Non-Preferential Tariff Policies”. EJ; V.78-#?, pp. 971-979.

 

-S. Arndt (1969). “Customs Unions and the Theory of Tariffs”. AER; V.59-#?, pp. 108-118.

 

-J. Melvin (1969). “Comments on the Theory of Customs Unions”. MS; V.36-#2, pp. 161-168.

 

-J. Bhagwati (1971). “Trade Diverting Customs Unions and Welfare-Improvement: A Clarification”. EJ; V.81-#?, pp. 580-587.

 

-A. Kirman (1973). “Trade Diverting Customs Unions and Welfare Improvement: A Comment”. EJ; V.83-#?, pp. 890-894. (with a response by Bhagwati).

 

-P. Collier (1979). “The Welfare Effects of Customs Union: An Anatomy”. EJ; V.89-#?, pp. 84-95.

 

-P. Wonnacott and R. Wonnacott (1992). “The Customs Union Issue Reopened”. MS; V.60-#2, pp. 119-135.

 

-M. Michaely (1998). “Partners to a Preferential Trade Agreement: Implications of Varying Size”. JIE; V.46-#1, pp. 73-85.

 

-C. Cooper and B. Massell (1965). “A New Look at Customs Union Theory”. EJ; V.75-#?, pp. 742-747.

 

-C. Cooper and B. Massell (1965). “Towards a General Theory of Customs Unions for Developing Countries”. JPE; V.73-#?, pp. 461-476. [also in Bhagwati, Krishna, and Panagariya, pp. 249-269.]

 

-J. Bhagwati (1968). “Trade Liberalization Among LDCs, Trade Theory and GATT Rules”. in J.N. Wolfe, ed. Value, Capital and Growth: Essays in Honor of Sir John Hicks; Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press; pp. 21-43.

 

-R. McCulloch and J. Pinera (1977). “Trade as Aid: The Political Economy of Tariff Preferences for Developing Countries”. AER; V.67-#5, pp. 959-967.

 

-P. Krishna and J. Bhagwati (1997). “Necessarily Welfare-Enhancing Customs Unions with Industrialization Constraints: The Cooper-Massel-Johnson-Bhagwati Conjecture”. Japan and the World Economy; V.9-#4, pp. 441-446. [also in Bhagwati, Krishna, and Panagariya, pp. 271-296.]

 

-G. Gardner and K. Kimbrough (1990). “The Economics of Country Specific Tariffs”. IER; V.31-#3, pp. 575-588.

 

-B. and R. Yarbrough (1990). “Economic Integration and Governance: The Role of Preferential Trade Agreements”. JIEI; V.5-#2, pp. 1-20.

 

-D.P. O'Brien (1976). “Customs Unions: Trade Creation and Trade Diversion in Historical Perspective”. History of Political Economy; V.8-#4, pp. 540-563.

 

(2) Estimates of Trade Creation and Trade Diversion

 

-B. Balassa (1967). “Trade Creation and Trade Diversion in the European Common Market”. EJ; V.87-#?, pp. 1-21.

 

-E. Truman (1969). “The European Economic Community: Trade Creation and Trade Diversion”. Yale Economic Essays; V..9-#1, pp. 201-57.

 

-M. Kreinin (1969). “Trade Creation and Diversion by the EEC and EFTA”. Economia Internazionale; V.22–#2, pp. 273-280.

 

-M. Kreinin (1972). “Effects of the EEC on Imports of Manufactures”. EJ; V.82-#327, pp. 897-920.

 

-P.J. Verdoorn and C.A. van Bochove (1972). “Measuring Integration Effects: A Survey”. EER; V.3-#?, pp. 337-349.

 

-H. Askari (1974). “A Comment on Empirical Estimates of Trade Creation and Trade Diversion”. EJ; V.84-#334, pp. 392-393.

 

-W. Sellekaerts (1973). “How Meaningful are Empirical Studies on Trade Creation and Diversion?”. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; V.109-#4, pp. 519-553.

 

-B. Balassa (1974). “Trade Creation and Trade Diversion in the European Common Market: An Appraisal of the Evidence”. Manchester School, V.42-#2, pp. 93-135.

 

-R. Dayal and D. Neeru (1977). “Trade Creation and Trade Diversion: New Concepts, New Methods of Measurement”. WA; V.113-#1, pp. 125-169.

 

-D. Mayes (1978). “The Effects of Economic Integration on Trade”. JCMS; V.17-#?, pp.

 

-M. Kreinin (1981). “Static Effect of E.C. Enlargement on Trade Flows in Manufactured Products”. KYKLOS; V.34-#1, pp. 60-71.

 

-O. Aktan (1985). “The Second Enlargement of the European Communities”. EER; V.28-#?, pp.

 

-L.A. Winters (1987). “Britain in Europe: A Survey of Quantitative Estimates”. JCMS; V.25-#4, pp. 315-335.

 

-C. MacPhee (1987). “The Consistency of Partial Equilibrium Estimates of Trade Creation and Diversion”. WA; V.123-#1, pp. 81-92.

 

-W.C. Sawyer and R. Sprinkle (1988). “EC Enlargement and U.S. Exports: An Analysis of Effects”. Journal of World Trade Law; V.22-#1, pp. 89-96.

 

-J. Bröcker (1988). “Interregional Trade and Economic Integration: A Partial Equilibrium Analysis”. RSUE; V.18-#?, pp. 261-281.

 

-W.C. Sawyer and R. Sprinkle (1989). “Alternative Empirical Estimates of Trade Creation and Trade Diversion: A Comparison of the Baldwin-Murray and Verdoorn Models”. WA; V.125-#1, pp. 61-73.

 

-D. Karemera and W. Koo (1994). Trade Creation and Diversion Effects of the U.S.-Canadian Free Trade Agreement”. Contemporary Economic Policy; V.12-#1, pp. 12-23.

 

-S. Devadoss, J. Kropf, and T. Wahl (1995). “Trade Creation and Diversion Effects of the North American Free Trade Agreement of U.S. Sugar Imports from Mexico”. Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics; V.20-#2 , pp. 215-30.

 

-P. Wylie (1995). “Partial Equilibrium Estimates of Manufacturing Trade Creation and Diversion Due to NAFTA”. North American Journal of Economics and Finance; V.6-#1, pp. 65-84.

 

-J. Haveman and D. Hummels (1998). “Trade Creation and Trade Diversion: New Empirical Results”. Journal of Transnational Management Development; V.3-#2,pp. 47-72.

 

-D. Karemera and K. Ojah (1998). “An Industrial Analysis of Trade Creation and Diversion Effects of NAFTA”. Journal of Economic Integration; V.13-#3, pp. 400-425.

 

-W. Wilford (1970). “Trade Creation in the Central American Common Market”. Western Economic Journal; V.8-#1, pp. 61-69.

 

-L. Willmore (1976). “Trade Creation, Trade Diversion and Effective Protection in the Central American Common Market”. Journal of Development Studies; V.12-#4, pp. 396-414.

 

-S.M.A. Nicholls (1998). “Measuring Trade Creation and Trade Diversion in the Central American Common Market: A Hicksian Alternative”. World Development; V.26-#2, pp. 323-335.

 

-J. Pelzman (1977). “Trade Creation and Trade Diversion in the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance: 1954-70". AER; V.67-#4, pp. 713-722.

 

b. Extensions of the Basic Model: Distortions

 

-E. Yu (1977). “Nontraded Goods and Customs Union Theory”. WA; V.115-#?, pp. 716-727.

 

-E. Yu and G. Scully (1975). “Domestic Distortions and the Theory of Customs Unions”. SEJ; V.42-#?, pp. 218-224.

 

-E. Yu (1981). “Trade Diversion, Trade Creation and Factor Market Imperfections”. WA; V.117-#?, pp. 546-561.

 

-E. Yu (1982). “Unemployment and the Theory of Customs Unions”. EJ; V.92-#?, pp. 399-404.

 

-A. Parai and R. Batra (1987). “Customs Unions and Unemployment in LDCs”. JDevE; V.26-#?, pp. 311-319.

 

-H. Beladi and S. Samanta (1990). “Sector Specific Minimum Wages and the Theory of Customs Unions”. Scottish Journal of Political Economy; V.37-#2, pp. 184-192.

 

-H. Beladi (1989). “Urban Unemployment, Economies of Scale and the Theory of Customs Unions”. KES; V.26-#2, pp. 5-15.

 

-A. Parai and E. Yu (1989). “Factor Mobility and Customs Union Theory”. SEJ; V.??-#?, pp. 842-852.

 

-E. Yu and A. Parai (1989). “Endogenous Wage Differentials, Imperfect Labor Mobility and Customs Union Theory”. JIEI; V.4-#1, pp. 15-26.

 

-G. Scully and E. Yu (1974). “International Investment, Trade Creation and Trade Diversion”. EcRec; V??-#?, pp. 600-604.

 

-R. Brecher and J. Bhagwati (1981). “Foreign Ownership and the Theory of Trade and Welfare”. JPE; V.89-#3, pp. 497-512.

 

-E. Tironi (1982). “Customs Union Theory in the Presence of Foreign Firms”. OEP; V.34-#?, pp. 150-171.

 

-S. Patterson (1985). “Trade Creation and Trade Diversion and Transport Costs”. AEJ; V.13-#4, pp. 34-38.

 

c. The Vanek-Negishi-Kemp Approach

 

-J. Vanek (1965). General Equilibrium of International Discrimination--The Case of Customs Unions. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

 

-T. Negishi (1969). “The Customs Union and the Theory of Second Best”. IER; V.10-#?, pp. 391-398.

 

-M. Kemp (1969). A Contribution to the General Equilibrium Theory of Preferential Trading. Amsterdam: North-Holland.

 

-R. Baldwin (1973). “Customs Unions, Preferential Systems and World Welfare”. in M. Conolly and A. Swoboda, eds. International Trade and Money. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, pp.29-44.

 

-W.M. Corden (1976). “Customs Union Theory and the Nonuniformity of Tariffs”. JIE; V.6-#?, pp. 99-106.

 

-E. Berglas (1979). “Preferential Trading Theory: The n Commodity Case”. JPE; V.87-#2, pp. 315-331.

 

-R. Riezman (1977). “A Theory of Customs Union: The Three Country-Two Good Case”. WA; V.115-#?, pp. 701-714.

 

-R. Riezman (1979). “A 3x3 Model of Customs Unions”. JIE; V.9-#?, pp. 341-354.

 

-J. McMillan and E. McCann (1981). “Welfare Effects in Customs Unions”. EJ; V.91-#?, pp. 697-703.

 

-P.J. Lloyd (1982). “3x3 Theory of Customs Unions”. JIE; V.12-#?, pp. 41-63.

 

-P. Wonnacott and R. Wonnacott (1981). “Is Unilateral Tariff Reduction Preferable to a Customs Union? The Curious Case of the Missing Foreign Tariffs”. AER; V.71-#4, pp. 704-714.

 

-E. Berglas (1983). “The Case for Unilateral Tariff Reduction: Foreign Tariffs Rediscovered”. AER; V.73-#5, pp. 1141-1142. [Response by W&W, AER; V.74-#3, pg. 491]

 

-M. Richardson (1990). “Optimal Import Subsidies in a Small, Distant Free Trade Area”. New Zealand Economic Papers; V.24-#1, pp. 57-65.

 

-I. Wooton (1986). “Preferential Trading Agreements: An Investigation”. JIE; V.21-#?, pp. 81-97.

 

-G. Harrison, T. Rutherford and I. Wooton (1993). “An Alternative Welfare Decomposition for Customs Unions”. CJE; V.26-#4, pp. 961-968.

 

-T.N. Srinivasan, J. Whalley and I. Wooton (1993). “Measuring the Effects of Regionalism on Trade and Welfare”. in K. Anderson and R. Blackhurst, eds. Regional Integration and the Global Trading System. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, pp. 52-79..

 

-C. Kowalczyk (2000). “Welfare and Integration”. International Economic Review; V.41-#2, pp. 483-494.

 

-J. Ju and K. Krishna (1997). “Evaluating Trade Reform using Ex post Criteria”. NBER Working Paper, #6152.

 

-J. Ju and K. Krishna (2000). “Necessary Conditions for Welfare Improving Reforms”. EcLets; V.67-#2, pp. 173-178.

 

-Y. Fluckiger (1987). “The Effect of a Unilateral Transfer Between Customs Union Partners on the Terms of Trade”. EcLets; V.22-#?, pp. 289-293.

 

-Y. Fluckiger (1987). “The Theory of Transfers in A Multilateral World: The Customs Union Case”. International Trade Journal; V.2-#2, pp. 173-192.

 

-I. Wooton (1988). “Towards a Common Market: Factor Mobility in a Customs Union”. CJE; V.21-#3, pp. 525-

 

-M. Webb (1990). “Preferential Trading Agreements and Capital Flows”. JDevEc; V.32-#?, pp. 181-190.

 

-M. Michael (1992). “From Customs Union to Common Market: The Need for Factor-Tax Harmonization”. EcLets; V.39-#?, pp. 79-84.

 

-C. Kowalczyk (1993). “Integration in Goods and Factors: The Role of Flows and Revenue”. RSUE; V.23-#?, pp. 355-367.

 

-D. Appleyard, P. Conway and A. Field (1989). “The Effects of Customs Unions on the Pattern and Terms of Trade in a Ricardian Model with a Continuum of Goods”. JIE; V.27-#1/2, pp. 147-164.

 

-P. Conway, D. Appleyard and A. Field (1989). “Trade Agreements vs. Unilateral Tariff Reductions: Evidence from Modelling with a Continuum of Goods”. IER; V.30-#4, pp. 775-794.

 

-G. Harrison, T. Rutherford, and I. Wooton (1989). “The Economic Impact of the European Community”. AER; V.79-2, pp. 288-294.

 

-A. Jaquemin and A. Sapir (1988). “International Trade and Integration in the EC: An Econometric Analysis”. EER; V.32-#?, pp. 1439-1450.

 

d. The Kemp-Wan Theorem

 

-M. Kemp and H. Wan (1976). “An Elementary Proposition Concerning the Formation of Customs Unions”. JIE; V.6-#1, pp. 95-97. [also in Bhagwati, Krishna, and Panagariya, pp. 203-206.]

 

-E. Grinols (1981). “An Extension of the Kemp-Wan Theorem on the Formation of Customs Unions”. JIE; V.11-#2, pp. 259-266. [also in Bhagwati, Krishna, and Panagariya, pp. 215-223.]

 

-E. Grinols (1984). “A Thorn in the Lion's Paw: Has Britain Paid Too Much for Common Market Membership?” JIE; V.16-#3/4, pp. 271-293.

 

-M. Kemp and H. Wan (1986). “The Comparison of Second-Best Equilibria: The Case of Customs Unions”. ZfN, V.93-supplement #5, pp. 161-167. [also in Bhagwati, Krishna, and Panagariya, pp. 207-213.]

 

-C. Kowalczyk and T. Sjöström (2000). “Trade as Transfers, GATT and the Core”. EcLets; V.66-#?, pp. 163-169.

 

-M. Richardson (1995). “On the Interpretation of the Kemp/Wan Theorem”. OEP; V.47-#4, pp. 696-703.

 

-L.A. Winters (1997). “Regionalism and the Rest of the World: The Irrelevance of the Kemp-Wan Theorem”. OEP; V.49-#2, pp. 228-234.

 

-T.N. Srinivasan (1997). “The Common External Tariff of a Customs Union: Alternative Approaches”. Japan and the World Economy; V.9-#4, pp. 447-465. [also in Bhagwati, Krishna, and Panagariya, pp. 225-246.]

 

-N. v.Long and A. Soubeyran (1997). “Customs Unions and Gains from Trade under Imperfect Competition”. Japanese Economic Review; V.48-#2, pp. 166-175.

 

-P. Krishna and J. Bhagwati (1997). “Necessarily Welfare-Enhancing Customs Unions with Industrialization Constraints: The Cooper-Massell-Johnson-Bhagwati Conjecture”. Japan and the World Economy; V.9-#4, pp. 441-446.

 

-Y.-H. Yeh (1998). “Incentives to Form Customs Unions and Quotas”. RIE; V.6-#4, pp. 695-697.

 

-M. Kemp and K. Nishida (2000). “Welfare Comparisons of Customs Unions and Other Free Trade Associations. Pacific Economic Review, V.5-#1, pp. 1-3.

 

-M. Kemp and K. Shimomura (2001). “A Second Elementary Proposition concerning the Formation of Customs Unions”. Japanese Economic Review; V.52-#1, pp. 64-69.

 

-A. Panagariya and P. Krishna (2002). “On necessarily welfare-enhancing free trade areas”. JIE; V.57-#2, pp. 353-367.

 

4. Customs Unions with Imperfect Competition

 

a. Customs Unions with Labor Unions

 

-J. Driffill and F. van der Ploeg (1993). “Monopoly Unions and the Liberalization of International Trade”. EJ; V.103-#?, pp. 379-385.

 

-H. Huzinga (1993). “International Market Integration and Union Wage Bargaining”. ScanJE; V.95-#?, pp. 249-255.

 

-J.R. Sorensen (1993). “Integration of Product Markets when Labour Markets are Unionized”. Recherches Economiques de Louvain; V.59-#?, pp. 485-502.

 

-J.R. Sorensen (1994). “Market Integration and Imperfect Competition in Labor and Product Markets”. Open Economies Review; V.5-#?, pp. 115-130.

 

-T. Andersen and J.R. Sorensen (1993). “Will Product Market Integration Lower Unemployment?”. in J. Fagerberg and L. Lundberg, eds. European Economic Integration: a Nordic Perspective. Aldershot: Avebury.

 

-J.-P. Danthine and J. Hunt (1994). “Wage Bargaining Structure, Employment and Economic Integration”. EJ; V.104-#?, pp. 528-541.

 

-J. Driffill and F. Van der Ploeg (1995). “Trade Liberalization with Imperfect Competition in Goods and Labor Markets”. ScanJE; V.97-#2, pp. 223-243.

 

-R. Naylor (1998). “International Trade and Economic Integration when Labour Markets are Generally Unionised”. EER; V.42-#7, pp. 1251-1267.

 

b. Customs Unions with Economies of Scale

 

-W.M. Corden (1972). “Economies of Scale and Customs Union Theory”. JPE; V.80-#3, pp. 465-475. [also in Bhagwati, Krishna, and Panagariya, pp. 189-200.]

 

-J.-Y. Choi and E. Yu (1984). “Customs Unions Under Increasing Returns to Scale”. Eca; V.??-#?, pp. 195-203.

 

-R. Caballero and R. Lyons (1990). “Internal versus External Economies in European Industry”. EER; V.34-#4, pp. 805-829.

 

-R. Caballero and R. Lyons (1991). “External Effects and Europe's Integration”. in L.A. Winters and A. Venables, eds. European Integration: Trade and Industry. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 34-53.

 

-R. Baldwin (1990). “Factor Market Barriers are Trade Barriers: Gains from Trade 1992". EER; V.34-#4, pp. 831-850.

 

-E. Grinols (1993). “Increasing Returns and the Shift from Customs Union to Common Market”. RSUE; V.23-#?, pp. 315-355.

 

c. Customs Unions with Monopolistic Competition

 

-A. Smith and A. Venables (1991). “Economic Integration and Market Access”. EER; V.35-#?, pp. 388-395.

 

-P. Krugman (1991). “Is Bilateralism Bad?”. in E. Helpman and A. Razin, eds. International Trade and Trade Policy. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 9-23.

 

-P. Krugman (1991). “The Move Toward Free Trade Zones”. in Policy Implications of Trade and Currency Zones. Kansas City: Federal Reserve Bank of Kanas City. pp. 7-41.

 

-P. Krugman (1993). “Regionalism vs. Multilateralism: Analytical Notes”. in J. deMelo and A. Panagariya, eds. New Dimensions in Regional Integration. New York: Cambridge, pp. 58-79. [also in Bhagwati, Krishna, and Panagariya, pp. 381-403.]

 

-A. Deardorff and R. Stern (1991). “Multilateral Trade Negotiations and Preferential Trading Agreements”. in A. Deardorff and R. Stern, eds. Analytical and Negotiating Issues in the Global Trading System. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 27-85. [also in Bhagwati, Krishna, and Panagariya, pp. 405-426.]

 

-J. Frankel, E. Stein, and S.-J. Wei (1995). “Trading Blocs in the Americas: The Natural, The Unnatural and the Supernatural”. JDevE; V.47-#?, pp. 61-95.

 

-S. Wei and J. Frankel (1998). “Open Regionalism in a World of Continental Trading Blocs”. IMF Staff Papers; V.45-#3, pp. 440-453.

 

-A. Splimbergo and E. Stein (1998). “The Welfare Implications of Trading Blocs among Countries with Different Endowments”. in J. Frankel, ed. The Regionalization of the World Economy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 121-145.

 

-J. Haveman (1996). “Some Welfare Effects of Sequential Customs Union Formation”. CJE; V.29-#4, pp. 941-958.

 

-E. Bond and C. Syropoulos (1995). “Trading Blocs and the Sustainability of Inter-Regional Cooperation”. in M. Canzoneri, W. Ethier, and V. Grilli, eds. The New Transatlantic Economy. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 118-141.

 

-E. Bond and C. Syropoulos (1996). “The Size of Trading Blocs: Market Power and World Welfare Effects”. JIE; V.40-#3/4, pp. 411-437.

 

-J.M. Campa and T. Sorenson (1996). “Are Trade Blocs Conducive to Free Trade?”. ScanJE; V.98-#2, pp. 263-273.

 

-V. Nitsch (1996). “Do Three Trade Blocs Minimize World Welfare?”. RIE; V.4-#3, pp. 355-363.

 

-K. Olofsdotter and J. Torstensson (1998). “Economic Integration, Market Size and the Welfare Effects of Trade Liberalisation”. WA; V.134-#2, pp. 302-319.

 

-D. Brown and R. Stern (1989). “US-Canada Bilateral Tariff Elimination: The Role of Product Differentiation and Market Structure”. in R. Feenstra, ed. Trade Policies for International Competitiveness. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 217-253.

 

-A. Venables (1994), “Integration and the Export Behaviour of Firms: Trade Costs, Trade Volumes and Welfare”. WA; V.130-#1, pp. 118-132.

 

-H. Trabold (1998). “Integration, Trade Costs and the Export Behaviour of Firms: Empirical Evidence on the Venables Model”. WA; V.134-#1, pp. 133-139.

 

-J. Goto (1995). “The Impact of EC92 on the Third Country: A Simple Analytical Framework under Imperfect Competition”. in W. Chang and S. Katayama, eds. Imperfect Competition in International Trade. Boston: Kluwer, pp. 249-266.

 

-J. Goto and K. Hamada (1997). “EU, NAFTA, and Asian Responses: A Perspective from the Calculus of Participation”. in T. Ito and A. Krueger, eds. Regionalism versus Multilateral Trade Agreements. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 91-110.

 

-J. Goto and K. Hamada (1998). “Economic Integration and the Welfare of Those Who are Left Behind: An Incentive-Theoretic Approach”. JJIE; V.12-#1, pp. 25-48.

 

-J. Goto and K. Hamada (1999). “Regional Economic Integration and Article XXIV of the GATT”. RIE; V.7-#4, pp. 555-570.

 

d. Customs Unions with Oligopolistic Firms

 

(1) Partial Equilibrium Studies

 

-D. Neven and L. Phlips (1985). “Discriminating Oligopolists and Common Markets”. Journal of Industrial Economics; V.34-#2, pp. 133-149.

 

-P. Krugman (1987). “European Economic Integration: Some Conceptual Issues”. in T. Padoa-Schioppa, ed. Efficiency, Stability and Equity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 117-140.

 

-A. Venables (1987). “Customs Unions and Tariff Reform under Imperfect Competition”. EER; V.31-#1/2, pp. 103-110.

 

-A. Smith and A. Venables (1988). “Completing the Internal Market in the European Community: Some Industry Simulations”. EER; V.32-#?, pp. 1501-1525.

 

-M. Gasiorek, A. Smith and A. Venables (1989). “Tariffs, Subsidies and Retaliation”. EER; V.33-#?, pp. 480-489.

 

-A. Smith (1990). “The Market for Cars in the Enlarged European Community”. in C. Bliss and J. Braga de Macedo, eds. Unity with Diversity in the European Economy: The Community's Southern Frontier. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 78-103.

 

-V. Norman (1990). “EFTA and the Internal European Market”. Economic Policy; V.9, pp. 423-465.

 

-A. Venables (1990). “The Economic Integration of Oligopolistic Markets”. EER; V.34-#4, pp. 753-774.

 

-K.C. Fung (1992). “Economic Integration as Competitive Discipline”. IER; V.33-#4, pp. 837-847.

 

-K. Kiyono (1993). “Who Will be Called Partner? An Importing Country’s Incentive to Form a Free Trade Area”. Economic Studies Quarterly; V.44-#4, pp. 289-310.

 

-J. Haaland and I. Wooton (1992). “Market Integration, Competition and Welfare”. in L.A. Winters, ed. Trade Flows and Trade Policy after `1992`. Cambridge: CUP/CEPR, pp. 125-149.

 

-G. Klepper (1990). “Entry into the Market for Large Transport Aircraft”. EER; V.34-#4, pp. 775-803.

 

-G. Klepper (1992). “Pharmaceuticals: Who's Afraid of `1992`”. in L.A. Winters, ed. Trade Flows and Trade Policy after `1992`. Cambridge: CUP/CEPR, pp. 150-172.

 

-R. Riezman (1999). “Oligopoly and Customs Union Theory”. in James Melvin, James Moore, and Ray Riezman, eds., Trade, Welfare, and Econometrics: Essays in Honor of John S. Chipman. New York: Routledge, pp. 134-148.

 

(2) General Equilibrium Studies

 

-W. Ethier and H. Horn (1984). “A New Look at Economic Integration”. in H. Kierzkowski, ed. Monopolistic Competition and International Trade. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp, 207-229.

 

-L.A. Winters (1988). “Completing the European Internal Market: Some Notes on Trade Policy”. EER; V.32-#?, pp. 1477-1499.

 

-D. Neven (1990). “EEC Integration Toward 1992: Some Distributional Aspects”. Economic Policy; V.10, pp. 13-62.

 

-M. Gasiorek, A. Smith and A. Venables (1991). “Completing the Internal Market in the EC: Factor Demands and Comparative Advantage”. in L.A. Winters and A. Venables, eds. European Integration: Trade and Industry. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 9-33.

 

-M. Gasiorek, A. Smith and A. Venables (1992). “`1992`: Trade and Welfare--A General Equilibrium Model”. in L.A. Winters, ed. Trade Flows and Trade Policy after `1992`. Cambridge: CUP/CEPR, pp. 35-66.

 

-J. Haaland and V. Norman (1992). “Global Production Effects of European Integration”. in L.A. Winters, ed. Trade Flows and Trade Policy after `1992`. Cambridge: CUP/CEPR, pp. 67-91.

 

-J. Francois and C. Shiells, eds. (1995). Modelling Trade Policy: Applied General Equilibrium Assessments of the North American Free Trade Agreement. Cambridge: CUP.

 

-J. Markusen, T. Rutherford and L. Hunter (1995). “Trade Liberalization in a Multinational Dominated Industry”. JIE; V.38-#1/2, pp. 95-117.

 

5. Multilateral Tax Harmonization and Economic Integration

 

a. Multilateral Tax Harmonization

 

-D. Dosser (1967). “Economic Analysis of Tax Harmonisation”. in C. Shoup, ed. Fiscal Harmonisation in Common Markets. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 1-144.

 

-H. Shibata (1967). “The Theory of Economic Unions”. in C. Shoup, ed. Fiscal Harmonisation in Common Markets. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 145-264.

 

-D. Dosser, S. Hans and T. Hitiris (1969). “Trade and Welfare Effects of Tax Harmonisation”. MS; V.?-#?, pp

 

-H.G. Johnson (1968). “The Implications of Free or Freer Trade for the Harmonization of Other Policies”. in Johnson, Aspects of the Theory of Tariffs. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, pp. 395-445.

 

-J. Whalley (1979). “Uniform Domestic Taxes, Trade Distortions, and Economic Integration”; JPubE; V.11-#2, pp. 213-221.

 

-E. Berglas (1981). “Harmonisation of Commodity Taxes”. JPubE; V.16-#3, pp. 377-387.

 

-J. Whalley (1981). “Border Adjustments and Tax Harmonization”. JPubE; V.16-#3, pp. 389-390.

 

-T. Georgakopoulos (1989). “Harmonisation of Commodity Taxes: The Restricted Origin Principle--Comment”. JPubE; V.39-#1, pp. 137-139.

 

-T. Georgakopoulos and T. Hitiris (1991). “On the Equivalence of Destination and Origin Principles of Taxation in the Case of Non-General Product Taxes”. Osaka Economic Papers; V.39-#3/4, pp. 331-335.

 

-T. Georgakopoulos and T. Hitiris (1992). “On the Superiority of the Destination over the Origin Principle for Intra-Union Trade”. EJ; V.102-#410, pp. 117-126.

 

-T. Georgakopoulos (1992). “Trade Deflection, Trade Distortions, and Pareto Inefficiencies under the Restricted Origin Principle”. JPubE; V.47-#?, pp. 381-390.

 

-B. Lockwood (1993). “Commodity Tax Competition under Destination and Origin Principles”. JPubE; V.52-#?, pp. 141-162.

 

-B. Lockwood, D. DeMeza and G. Myles (1994). “When are Origin and Destination Regimes Equivalent?”. International Tax and Public Finance; V.1-#1, pp. 5-24.

 

-B. Lockwood, D. DeMeza and G. Myles (1994). “The Equivalence Between the Destination and Non-Reciprocal Restricted Origin Tax Regimes”. ScanJE; V.96-#3, pp. 311-328.

 

-B. Lockwood, D. DeMeza and G. Myles (1995). “On the European Union VAT Proposals: The Superiority of Origin Over Destination Taxation”. Fiscal Studies; V.16-#1, pp. 1-17.

 

-A. Haufler (1994). “Unilateral Tax Reform under the Restricted Origin Principle”. EJPE; V.10-#?, pp. 511-527.

 

-A.L. Bovenberg (1994). “Destination- and Origin-Based Taxation under International Capital Mobility”. International Tax and Public Finance; V.1-#3, pp. 247-273.

 

-B. Genser (1996). “A Generalized Equivalence Property of Mixed International VAT Regimes”. ScanJE; V.98-#2, pp. 253-262.

 

-M. Keen and S. Lahiri (1998). “The Comparison between Distination and Origin Principles under Imperfect Competition”. JIE; V.45-#2, pp. 323-350.

 

-S. Cnossen (1983). “Harmonisation of Indirect Taxes in the EEC”. in C. McClure, ed. Tax Assignment in Federal Countries. Canberra: Australia National University.

 

-S. Cnossen and C. Shoup (1987). “Coordination of Value Added Taxes”. in S. Cnossen, ed. Tax Coordination in the EC. Deventer: Kluwer, pp. 59-84.

 

-M. Bos and H. Nelson (1988). “Indirect Taxation and Completion of the Internal Market”. JCMS; V.27-#1, pp. 27-44.

 

-H.-W. Sinn (1990). “Tax Competition and Tax Harmonization in Europe”. EER; V.34-#?, pp. 489-504.

 

-J. Frenkel, A. Razin and S. Symansky (1990). “International Spillovers of Taxation”. in A. Razin and J. Slemrod, eds. Taxation in the Global Economy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 211-261.

 

-J. Frenkel, A. Razin and S. Symansky (1990). “Simulations of Global Effects of VAT Harmonisation”. in H. Siebert, ed. Reforming Capital Income Taxation. Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr, pp. 134-152.

 

-M. Rose (1987). “Optimal Tax Perspective on Tax Coordination”. in C. Cnossen, ed. Tax Coordination in the EC. Kluwer. pp. 113-138.

 

-M.J. Keen (1987). “Welfare Effects of Commodity Tax Harmonization”. JPubE; V.33-#?, pp. 107-114.

 

-M.J. Keen (1989). “Pareto-Improving Indirect Tax Harmonisation”. EER; V.33-#1, pp. 1-12.

 

-M.J. Keen (1989). “Multilateral Tax and Tariff Reform”. ESQ; V.40-#3, pp. 195-202.

 

-K. Abe and M. Okamura (1989). “The Welfare Effects of International Tax Harmonization”. ESQ; V.40-#3, pp. 203-211.

 

-A. Turunen-Red and A. Woodland (1990). “Multilateral Reform of Domestic Taxes”. OEP; V.42-#?, pp. 160-186.

 

b. Tax Competition and Tax Harmonization

 

-R. Gordon (1983). “An Optimal Taxation Approach to Fiscal Federalism”. QJE; V.98-#?, pp. 567-586.

 

-J. Mintz and H. Tulkens (1986). “Commodity Tax Competition Between Member States of a Federation: Equilibrium and Efficiency”. JPubE; V.29-#?, pp. 133-172.

 

-J.D. Wilson (1985). “Optimal Property Taxation in the Presence of Interregional Capital Mobility”. JUrbanE; V.18-#?, pp. 73-89.

 

-J.D. Wilson (1986). “A Theory of Interregional Tax Competition”. JUrbanE; V.19-#?, pp. 296-315.

 

-G. Zodrow and P. Mieszkowski (1986). “Pigou, Tiebout, Property Taxation, and the Underprovision of Local Public Goods”. JUrbanE; V.19-#?, pp. 356-370.

 

-J.D. Wilson (1987). “Trade, Capital Mobility, and Tax Competition”. JPE; V.95-#4, pp. 835-856.

 

-D. Wildasin (1988). “Nash Equilibria in Models of Fiscal Competition”. JPubE; V.35-#?, pp. 229-240.

 

-D. Wildasin (1989). “Interjurisdictional Capital Mobility: Fiscal Externality and a Corrective Subsidy”. JUrbanE; V.25-#?, pp. 193-212.

 

-de Combrugghe and H. Tulkens (1990). “On Pareto Improving Commodity Tax Changes under Fiscal Competition”. JPubE; V.41-#?, pp. 335-350.

 

-S. Bucovetsky (1991). “Asymmetric Tax Competition”. JUrbanE; V.30-#?, pp. 167-181.

 

-S. Bucovetsky and J. Wilson (1991). “Tax Competition with Two Tax Instruments”. RSUE; V.21-#3, pp. 333-350.

 

-R. Jensen and E.F. Toma (1991). “Debt in a Model of Tax Competition”. RSUE; V.21-#3, pp. 371-392.

 

-D. Wildasin (1991). “Some Rudimentary `Duopolity` Theory”. RSUE; V.21-#3, pp. 393-421.

 

-J. Wilson (1991). “Tax Competition with Interregional Differences in Factor Endowments”. RSUE; V.21-#3, pp. 423-451.

 

-D. Wildasin (1991). “Income Redistribution in a Common Labor Market”. AER; V.81-#4, pp. 757-774.

 

-A. Ghosh (1991). “Strategic Aspects of Public Finance in a World with High Capital Mobility”. JIE; V.30-#3/4, pp. 229-247.

 

-R. Krelove (1992). “Competitive Tax Theory in Open Economies: Constrained Inefficiency and a Pigovian Remedy”. JPubE; V.48-#?, pp. 361-375.

 

-M. Keen and S. Lahiri (1993). “Domestic Tax Reform and International Oligopoly”. JPubE; V.51-#1, pp. 55-74.

 

-R. Kanbur and M.J. Keen (1993). “Jeux sans Frontiers: Tax Competition and Tax Coordination when Countries Differ in Size”. AER, V.83-#4, pp. 877-892.

 

-B. Lockwood (1997). “Can International Commodity Tax Harmonisation Be Pareto-improving When Governments Supply Public Goods”. JIE; V.43-#3/4, pp. 387-408.

 

-D. Laussel and M. Le Breton (1998). “Existence of Nash Equilibria in Fiscal Competition Models”. RSUE; V.28-#?, pp. 283-296.

 

-T. Persson and G. Tabellini (1992). “The Politics of 1992: Fiscal Policy and European Integration”. REStud; V.59-#4, pp. 689-701

 

-P. Bacchetta and M. Espinosa (1995). “Information Sharing and Tax Competition among Governments”. JIE; V.39-#1/2, pp. 103-121.

 

-A. Haufler (2001). “Regional Integration and the Development of Tax Systems in the European Union”. In S. Lahiri, ed. Regionalism and Globalization: Theory and Practice. London: Routledge, pp. 261-282.

 

6. On Racing to the Bottom

 

a. Social Policy and the “Race to the Bottom”

 

-J. Addison and W. Siebert (1993). “The EC Social Charter: The Nature of the Beast”. National Westminster Quarterly Review; pp. 13-28.

 

-F. Abraham (1994). “Social Protection and Regional Convergence in a EMU”. Open Economies Review; V.5-#?, pp. 89-114.

 

-R. Blank, ed. (1994). Social Protection versus Economic Flexibility: Is There a Tradeoff? Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER.

 

-A. Sapir (1996). “Trade Liberalization and the Harmonization of Social Policies: Lessons from European Integration”. in J. Bhagwati and R. Hudec, eds. Fair Trade and Harmonization. V.1: Economic Analysis. Cambridge: MIT, pp. 543-570.

 

-A. Jacquemin and A. Sapir (1996). “Is European Hard Core Credible? A Statistical Analysis”. Kyklos; V.49-#2, pp. 105-117.

 

-J.J. Gabszewicz and T. van Ypersele (1996). “Social Protection and Political Competition”. JPubE; V.61-#?, pp. 193-208.

 

-C. Bean, S. Bentolila, G. Bertola, and J. Dolado (1998). Social Europe: One for All? London: CEPR, Monitoring European Integration, #8.

 

-C. Hefeker (1996). “Regional Free Trade and Social Integration”. PC; V.87-#?, pp. 379-393.

 

b. Regional Labor Markets and Integration

 

-R. Topel (1986). “Local Labor Markets”. JPE; V.94-#3/Part 2, pp. S111-143.

 

-G. Neumann and R. Topel (1991). “Employment Risk, Diversification, and Unemployment”. QJE; V.106-#4, pp. 1341-1365.

 

-R. Topel (1994). “Regional Labor markets and the Determinants of Wage Inequality”. AER; V.84-#2, pp. 17-22.

 

-R. Topel (1994). “Wage Inequality and Regional Labour Market Performance in the US”. in T. Tachibanaki, ed.. Labour Market and Economic Performance: Europe, Japan and the USA. New York: St. Martin's Press; pp. 93-127.

 

-O. Blanchard and L. Katz (1992). “Regional Evolutions”. BPEA; #1, pp. 1-61.

 

-E. Montgomery (1994). “Patterns in Regional Labor Market Adjustment: The United States versus Japan”. in R. Blank, ed.. Social protection versus economic flexibility: Is there a trade-off?. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 95-117.

 

-T. Bartik (1993). “Who Benefits from Local Job Growth: Migrants or the Original Residents?”. Regional Studies; V.27-#4, pp. 297-311.

 

-T. Bartik (1996). “The Distributional Effects of Local Labor Demand and Industrial Mix: Estimates Using Individual Panel Data”. Journal of Urban Economics; V.40-#2, pp. 150-178.

 

-T. Clark (1998). “Employment Fluctuations in U.S. Regions and Industries: The Roles of National, Region-specific, and Industry-Specific Shocks”. Journal of Labor Economics; V.16-#1, pp. 202-229.

 

-J. Bound and H. Holzer (2000). “Demand Shifts, Population Adjustments, and Labor Market Outcomes during the 1980s”. Journal of Labor Economics; V.18-#1, pp. 20-54.

 

-B. Eichengreen (1993). “Labor Markets and European Monetary Unification”. in P. Masson and M. Taylor, eds. Policy Issues in the Operation of Currency Unions. Cambridge: CUP/CEPR, pp. 130-162.

 

-J. Decressin and A. Fatas (1995). “Regional Labor Market Dynamics in Europe”. EER; V.39-#9, pp. 1627-1655.

 

-F. Abraham (1996). “Regional Adjustment and Wage Flexibility in the European Union”. RSUE; V.26-#1, pp. 51-75.

 

-M. Allais (1997). “The Liberalization of Trade and the European Community's Experience”. RISEC: International Review of Economics and Business; V.44-#3, pp. 465-83.

 

-O. Cadot, R. Faini, and J. deMelo (1995). “Early Trade Patterns under the Europe Agreements: France, Germany, and Italy”. EER; V.39-#3/4, pp. 601-610.

 

-R. Faini, G. Galli, P. Gennari and F. Rossi (1997). “An Empirical Puzzle: Falling Migration and Growing Unemployment Differentials among Italian Regions”. EER; V.41-#?, pp. 571-579.

 

-R. Faini (1999). “European Migrants: An Endangered Species?”. in R. Baldwin, D. Cohen, A. Sapir, and A. Venables, eds. Market Integration, Regionalism, and the Global Economy. Cambridge: CUP/CEPR, pp. 228-251.

 

-C. Pissarides and J. Wadsworth (1989). “Unemployment and the Inter-regional Mobility of Labour”. EJ; V.99-#?, pp. 739-755.

 

-C. Pissarides and and I. McMaster (1990). “Regional Migration, Wages and Unemployment: Empirical Evidence and Implications for Policy”. OEP; V.42-#?, pp. 812-831.

 

-B. McCormick (1997). “Regional Unemployment and Labour Mobility in the UK”. EER; V.41-#?, pp. 581-589.

 

-S. Bentolila (1997). “Sticky Labor in Spanish Regions”. EER; V.41-#?, pp. 591-598.

 

-Paolo Mauro and Antonio Spilimbergo (1999). “How Do the Skilled and the Unskilled Respond to Regional Shocks?: The Case of Spain”. IMFSP; V.46-#1, pp. 1-17.

 

-H. Vandenbussche and J. Konigs (1998). “Globalisation and the Effects of National Versus International Competition on the Labour Market: Theory and Evidence from Belgian Firm Level Data”. World Economy; V.21-#8, pp. 1151-1177.

 

-G. Debelle and J. Vickery (1999). “Labour Market Adjustment: Evidence on Interstate Labour Mobility”. Australian Economic Review; V.32-#3, pp. 249-263.

 

c. Integration and the Endogenous Emergence of Cores and Peripheries

 

-G. Ottaviano and D. Puga (1998). “Agglomeration in the Global Economy: A Survey of the ‘New Economic Geography’”. World Economy; V.21-#6, pp. 707 -731.

 

-P. Krugman and A. Venables (1990). “Integration and the Competitiveness of a Peripheral Industry”. in C. Bliss and J. Braga de Macedo, eds. Unity with Diversity in the European Economy: The Community's Southern Frontier. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 56-75.

 

-G. Bertola (1993). “Models of Economic Integration and Localized Growth”. in F. Torres and F. Giavazzi, eds. Adjustment and Growth in the European Monetary Union. Cambridge: CUP/CEPR, pp. 159-179.

 

-A. Venables (1994). “Economic Integration and Industrial Agglomeration”. Economic and Social Review; V.26-#1, pp. 1-17.

 

-A. Venables (1995). “Economic Integration and the Location of Firms”. AER; V.85-#2, pp. 296-300.

 

-A. Venables and P. Krugman (1996). “Integration, Specialization, and Adjustment”. EER; V.40-#3/5, pp. 959-967.

 

-D. Puga and A. Venables (1997). “Preferential Trading Arrangements and Industrial Location”. JIE; V.43-#3/4, pp. 347-368.

 

-D. Puga (1999). “The Rise and Fall of Regional Inequalities”. EER; V.43-#2, pp. 303-334.

 

d. Regionalization or Convergence in the EU

 

-P. Krugman (1993). “Lessons of Massachusetts for EMU”. in F. Torres and F. Giavazzi, eds. Adjustment and Growth in the European Monetary Union. Cambridge: CUP/CEPR, pp. 241-261.

 

-L. Mauro and E. Podrecca (1994). “The Case of Italian Regions: Convergence or Dualism?”. Economic Notes; V.24-#3, pp. 447-472.

 

-D. Neven and C. Gouyette (1995). “Regional Convergence in the European Community”. JCMS; V.33-#?, pp. 47-65.

 

-R. Helg, P. Manasse, T. Monacelli, and R. Rovelli (1995). “How Much (A)symmetry in Europe? Evidence from Industrial Sectors”. EER; V.39-#?, pp. 1017-1041.

 

-S. De Nardis, A. Goglio, and M. Malgarini (1996). “Regional Specialization and Shocks in Europe: Some Evidence from Regional Data”. WA; V.132-#2, pp. 197-214.

 

-D. Quah (1996). “Regional Convergence Clusters Across Europe”. EER; V.40-#3-5, pp. 951-958.

 

-J. Fagerberg and B. Verspagen (1996). “Heading for Divergence? Regional Growth in Europe Reconsidered”. JCMS; V.34-#3, pp. 431-448.

 

-F. Trionfetti (1997). “Public Expenditure and Economic Geography”. Annales d'Economie et de Statistique; #47, pp. 101-120.

 

-M. Brülhart (1998). “Economic Geography, Industry Location and Trade: The Evidence”. World Economy; V.21-#6, pp. 775 -801.

 

-G. Hanson (1998). “North American economic integration and industry location”. Oxford Review of Economic Policy; V.14-#2, pp. 30-44.

 

-M. Amiti (1998). “New trade theories and industrial location in the EU: a survey of evidence”. Oxford Review of Economic Policy; V.14-#2, pp. 45-53.

 

-S. Magrini (1999). “The Evolution of Income Disparities Among the Regions of the European Union”. RSUE; V.29-#?, pp. 257-281.

 

-J. Esteban (2000). “Regional Convergence in Europe and the Industry Mix: A Shift-share Analysis”. RSUE; V.30-#3, pp. 353-364.

 

-M. Brülhart (2001). “Growing Alike or Growing Apart? Industrial Specialisation of EU Countries”. in Charles Wyplosz (ed.) The Impact of EMU on Europe and the Developing Countries. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

 

-M. Brülhart (2001). “Evolving Geographical Specialisation of European Manufacturing Industries”. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; V.137-#2, pp. 215-243.

 

-M. Brülhart and F. Trionfetti (2001). “Industrial Structure and Public Procurement: Theory and Empirical Evidence”. Journal of Economic Integration; V.16-#1, pp. 106-127.

 

-M. Storper, Y.-c. Chen, and D. De Paolis (2002). “Trade and Location of Industries in the OECD and European Union”. Journal of Economic Geography; V.2-#1, pp. 73-107.

 

7. Political-Economy of Integration

 

a. Integration Experience

 

(1) General Discussions

 

-L. Lindberg and S. Scheingold, eds. (1971). Regional Integration: Theory and Research. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

 

-J. Nye (1971). Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization. Boston: Little, Brown.

 

-D. Puchala (1972). “Of Blind Men, Elephants and International Integration”. Journal of Common Market Studies; V.10-#?, pp.267-284.

 

-E. Haas (1975). The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies.

 

-P. Cocks (1980). “Toward a Marxist Theory of European Integration”. IO; V.34-#1, pp. 1-40.

 

(2) The EC/EU Case

 

-K. Deutsch (1957). Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

 

-E. Haas (1958). The Uniting of Europe: Political Social and Economic Forces, 1950-1957. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

 

-L. Lindberg and S. Scheingold (1970). Europe's Would Be Polity. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.

 

-P. Taylor (1983). The Limits of European Integration. New York: Columbia University Press.

 

-P. Cecchini (1988). European Challenge, 1992: The Benefits of a Single Market. Aldershot: Wildwood House.

 

-J. Pelkmans and L.A. Winters (1988). Europe's Domestic Market. London: RIIA.

 

-G.C. Hufbauer, ed. (1990). Europe 1992: An American Perspective. Washington, D.C.: Brookings.

 

-W. Sandholtz and J. Zysman (1990). “1992: Recasting the European Bargain”. WP, V.?-#?, pp. 95-128.

 

-M. Wolf (1990). “1992: Global Implications of the European Community's Programme for Completing the Internal Market”. Lehrman Institute Policy Paper (Global Economy Series--#1).

 

-A. Moravcsik (1991). “Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and Conventional Statecraft in the European Community”. IO; V.45-#1, pp. 19-56.

 

-W. Streeck and P. Schmitter (1991). “From National Corporatism to Transnational Pluralism: Organized Interests in the Single European Market”. Politics and Society; V.19-#2, pp. 133-164.

 

-L.A. Winters (1991). “International Trade and '1992': An Overview”. EER; V.35-#?, pp. 367-377.

 

-W.S. Pierce (1991). “After 1992: The Redistribution of Rents”. KYKLOS; V.44-#4, pp. 521-536.

 

-G. Garrett (1992). “International Cooperation and Institutional Choice: The Internal Market”. IO; V.46-#2, pp. 533-560.

 

-S. Collins (1995). “Economic Integration: Conflict versus Cohesion”. AER; V.85-#2, pp. 307-311.

 

-B. Hanson (1998). “What Happened to Fortress Europe?: External Trade Policy Liberalization in the European Union”. IO; V.52-#1, pp. 55-85.

 

-A. Sapir (1998). “The Political Economy of EC Regionalism”. EER; V.42=#3/5, pp. 717-732

 

(3) The NAFTA Case

 

-H.R. Perot and P. Choate (1993). Save Your Job, Save Our Country: Why Nafta Must be Stopped, Now! New York: Hyperion.

 

-B. Ackerman and D. Golove (1995). Is Nafta Constitutional? Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

 

-D. Orden (1996). “Agricultural Interest Groups and the North American Free Trade Agreement”. in A. Krueger, ed. The Political Economy of American Trade Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 335-382.

 

-W. Orme (1996). Understanding Nafta : Mexico, Free Trade, and the New North America. Austin: University of Texas Press.

 

-A. Tornell and G. Esquivel (1997). “The Political Economy of Mexico’s Entry into NAFTA”. in T. Ito and A. Krueger, eds. Regionalism versus Multilateral Trade Arrangements. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 25-55.

 

-F. Mayer (1998). Interpreting NAFTA: The Science and Art of Politcal Analysis. New York: Columbia University Press.

 

-C. Wise, ed. (1998). The Post-Nafta Political Economy C : Mexico and the Western Hemisphere. : Pennsylvania State University Press.

 

-K. Granzin, J. Painter, J. Brazell, and J. Olsen (1998). “Public Support for Free Trade Agreements: The Influence of Economic Concerns, Group Indentification, and Cognitive Involvement”. Journal of Macromarketing; V.18-#1, pp. 11-23.

 

b. Formal Theories of the Internal Political Economy of Integration

 

-A. Casella (1992). “On Markets and Clubs: Economic and Political Integration of Regions with Unequal Productivity”. AER; V.82-#2, pp.115-121.

 

-J. Feinstein (1992). “Public-Good Provision and Political Stability in Europe”. AER; V.82-#2, pp. 323-329.

 

-A. Casella and J. Feinstein (2002). “Public Goods in Trade: On the Formation of Markets and Political Jurisdictions”. International Economic Review; V.43-#2, pp. 437-462.

 

-A. Casella and B. Frey (1992). “Federalism and Clubs: Towards an Economic Theory of Overlapping Political Jurisdictions”. EER; V.36-#?, pp. 639-646.

 

-A. Casella (19944). “Trade as an Engine of Political Change: A Parable”. Eca; V.61-#243, pp. 267-284.

 

-R. Clarida and R. Findlay (1994). “After Maastricht: Public Investment, Economic Integration and International Capital Mobility”. Eca; V.61-#243, pp. 319-339.

 

-J. deMelo, A. Panagariya and D. Rodrik (1993). “The New Regionalism: A Country Perspective”. in J. deMelo and A. Panagariya, ed. New Dimensions in Regional Integration. New York: Cambridge/CEPR, pp.159-193 [esp. section 3).

 

-M. Richardson (1993). “Endogenous Protection and Trade Diversion”. JIE; V.34-#3/4, pp. 309-324.

 

-M. Richardson (1994). “Why a Free Trade Area: The Tariff Also Rises”. E&P; V.6-#1, pp. 79-96. [also in Bhagwati, Krishna, and Panagariya, pp. 357-376.]

 

-M. Richardson (1995). “Tariff Revenue Competition in a Free Trade Area”. EER; V.39-#7, pp. 1429-1437.

 

-D. Desruelle and M. Richardson (1997). “Fortress Europe: Jericho or Chateau d’If?”. RIE; V.5-#1, pp. 32-46.

 

-S. Nagaoka (1994). “Does Regional Integration Promote Liberalization? A Case of Endogenous Protection”. JJIE; V.8-#4, pp. 551-564.

 

-G. Grossman and E. Helpman (1995). “The Politics of Free Trade Areas”. AER; V.85-#4, pp. 667-690. [also in Bhagwati, Krishna, and Panagariya, pp. 299-334.]

 

-A. Panagariya and R. Findlay (1995). “A. Political Economy Analysis of Free Trade Areas and Customs Unions”. in G. Grossman, R. Feenstra and D. Irwin eds. The Political Economy of Trade Policy. Cambridge: MIT, pp. 265-287. [also in Bhagwati, Krishna, and Panagariya, pp. 335-356.]

 

-S. Bilal (1998). “Political Economy Considerations in the Supply of Trade Protection in Regional Integration Agreements”. JCMS; V.36-#1, pp. 1-31.

 

-Stephen P. Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1999). “Endogenous Regionalism's Free Trade Bias: Special Interests in the EEC, 1968-1983”. in Bernardo Bortolotti and Gianluca Fiorentini, eds, Pressure Groups and Self Regulation. New York: Oxford Press, 1999, 51-85

 

-S. Magee and H.-O. Lee (1997). “Tariff Creation and Tariff Diversion in Customs Unions: The Endogenous External Tariff of the EEC, 1968-1983”. EER; forthcoming. [Nota di Lavoro; V.38-#97, pp. 1-39.]

 

-M. Olarreaga and I. Soloaga (1998). “Endogenous Tariff Formation: The Case of Mercosur”. WBER; V.12-#2, pp. 297-320.

 

-O. Cadot, J. deMelo, and M. Olarreaga (1999). “Regional Integration and Lobbying for Tariffs Against Non-members”. IER; V.40-#3, pp. 635-657.

 

-O. Cadot, J. de Melo, and M. Olarraga (1999). “Can Bilateralism Ease the Pains of Multilateral Trade Liberalization?”. European Economic Review; V.45-#1, pp. 27-44.

 

-S. Bandyopadhyay and H. Wall (1999). “Customs Union or Free Trade Area? The Role of Political Asymmetries”. RIE; V.7-#4, pp. 665-672.

 

-A. Panagariya and R. Duttagupta (2002). “Politics of Free Trade Areas: Tariffs versus Quotas”. JIE; V.58-#2, pp. 413-427.

 

-I.-C. Cheng (2003). “On the Lobbying Behavior Response to Political Asymmetries in International Economic Integration”. Journal of Economic Integration; V.18-#3, pp. 506-529.

 

-A. Casella and J. Feinstein (1989). “Management of a Common Currency”. in A. Giovannini and M. de Cecco, eds. A European Central Bank? Cambridge: CUP. pp. 131-156.

 

-A. Casella (1992). “Participation in a Currency Union”. AER; V.82-#4, pp. 847-863.

 

-A. Casella (1992). “Voting on the Adoption of a Common Currency”. in M Canzoneri, V. Grilli and P. Masson, eds. Designing a Central Bank for Europe. Cambridge, CUP

 

-A. Alesina and R. Perotti (1998). “Economic Risk and Political Risk in Fiscal Unions”. EJ; V.108-#449, pp. 989-1008.

 

c. International Strategy and the Customs Union

 

-R. Caves (1974). “The Economics of Reciprocity: Theory and Evidence on Bilateral Trading Agreements”. in W. Sellekaerts, ed. International Trade and Finance: Essays in Honor of Jan Tinbergen. White Plains: International Arts and Sciences Press, pp. 17-54.

 

-R. Riezman (1985). “Customs Unions and the Core”. JIE; V.19-#?, pp. 355-365.

 

-A.L. Hillman (1989). “Resolving the Puzzle of Welfare-Reducing Trade Diversion: A Prisoners' Dilemma Interpretation”. OEP; V.41-#?, pp. 452-455.

 

-J. Kennan and R. Riezman (1990). “Optimal Tariff Equilibria with Customs Unions”. EJ; V.23-#1, pp. 69-83.

 

-K. Gatsios and L. Karp (1991). “Delegation Games in Customs Unions”. REStud; V.58-#2, pp. 391-397.

 

-K. Gatsios and L. Karp (1992). “The Welfare Effects of Imperfect Harmonisation of Trade and Industrial Policy”. EJ; V.102-#410; pp. 107-116.

 

-K. Gatsios and L. Karp (1995). “Delegation in a General Equilibrium Model of Customs Union”. EER; V.39-#2, pp. 319-333.

 

-H. Flam (1994). “EC Members Fighting About Surplus: VERs, FDI and Japanese Cars”. JIE; V.36-#1/2, pp. 117-131.

 

-J. Aizenman (1994). “World Integration, Competitive and Bargaining-Regime Switch: An Exploration”. CJE; V.27-#2, pp. 458-483.

 

-R. Baldwin (1995). “A Domino Theory of Regionalism”. in R.Baldwin, P. Haaparanta, and J. Kiander (eds), Expanding Membership of the European Union. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 25-48.

 

-C. Kowalczyk and T. Sjöström (1993). “Bringing GATT into the Core”. Eca; V.61-#243, pp. 301-317.

 

-S.-S. Yi (1996). “Endogenous Formation of Customs Unions under Imperfect Competition: Open Regionalism is Good”. JIE; V.41-#1/2, pp. 153-177.

 

-J. Burbidge, J. DePater, G. Myers, and A. Sengupta (1997). “A Coalition-Formation Approach to Equilibrium Federations and Trading Blocs”. AER; V.87-#5, pp. 940-956.

 

-I. Macho-Stadler, D. Pérez-Castrillo and C. Ponsati (1998). “Stable Multilateral Trade Agreements”. Eca; V.65-#?, pp. 161-177.

 

-E. Mansfield (1993). “Effects of International Politics on Regionalism in International Trade”. In K. Anderson and R. Blackhurst, eds. Regional Integration and the Global Trading System. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

 

-G. Downs, D. Rocke, and P. Barsoom (1998). “Managing the Evolution of Multilateralism”. IO; V.52-#2, pp. 397-409.

 

-M. Schiff and L.A. Winters (1998). “Regional Integration as Diplomacy”. WBER; V.12-#2, pp. 271-295.

 

-D. Lazer (1999). “The Free Trade Epidemic of the 1860s and Other Outbreaks of Economic Discrimination”. World Politics; V.51-#4, pp.

 

-H. Haller and Y. Ioannides (2001). “Propaedeutics of Strategic Theories of Economic Integration”. Economics Letters; V.70-#2, pp. 215-221.

 

-H. Haller and Y. Ioannides (1995). “Strategic Game Models of Economic Integration”. London School of Economics, Centre for Economic Performance Discussion Paper; #208.

 

-C. Syropoulos (2002). “On Tariff Preferences and Delegation Decisions in Customs Unions: A Heckscher-Ohlin Approach”. Economic Journal; V.112-#481, pp. 623-630.

 

-R. Ludema (2002). “Increasing Returns, Multinationals and Geography of Preferential Trade Agreements”. JIE; V.56-#2, pp. 329-358.

 

d. Multilateralism versus Regionalism?

 

(1) General Issues

 

-A. Sapir (1990). “Does 1992 Come Before or After 1990? On Regional versus Multilateral Integration”. in R. Jones and A. Krueger, eds. The Political Economy of International Trade. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 197-222.

 

-L. Summers (1991). “Regionalism and the World Trading System”. in Policy Implications of Trade and Currency Zones. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas, pp. 295-303. [also in Bhagwati, Krishna, and Panagariya, pp. 561-566.]

 

-N. Fielke (1992). “One Trading World, or Many: The Issue of Regional Trading Blocs”. New England Economic Review; May/June, pp. 3-20.

 

-B. Hoekman and M. Leidy (1992). “Holes and Loopholes in Regional Trade Arrangements and the Multilateral Trading System”. Aussenwirtschaft, V.47-#3, pp. 325-360.

 

-R. Snape (1993). “History and Economics of GATT’s Article XXIV”. in K. Anderson and R. Blackhurst, eds. Regional Integration and the Global Trading System. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, pp. 273-291.

 

-J. McMillan (1993). “Does Regional Integration Foster Open Trade? Economic Theory and GATT’s Article XXIV”. in K. Anderson and R. Blackhurst, eds. Regional Integration and the Global Trading System. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, pp. 292-310.

 

-F. Roessler (1993). “The Relationship between Regional Integration Agreements and the Multilateral Trading Order”. in K. Anderson and R. Blackhurst, eds. Regional Integration and the Global Trading System. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, pp. 311-325.

 

-R. Blackhurst and D. Henderson (1993). “Regional Integration Agreements, World Intergration, and the GATT”. in K. Anderson and R. Blackhurst, eds. Regional Integration and the Global Trading System. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, pp. 408-435.

 

-D. Lal (1993). “Trade Blocs and Multilateral Free Trade”. JCMS; V.31-#3, pp. 349-358.

 

-J. Bhagwati (1993). “Regionalism and Multilateralism: An Overview”. in J. deMelo and A. Panagariya, eds. New Dimensions in Regional Integration. Cambridge: CUP/CEPR, pp. 22-51. [also in Bhagwati, Krishna, and Panagariya, pp. 3-32.]

 

-P. Krugman (1993). “Regionalism versus Multilateralism: Analytical Notes”. in J. deMelo and A. Panagariya, eds. New Dimensions in Regional Integration. Cambridge: CUP/CEPR, pp. 58-79.

 

-D. Irwin (1993). “Multilateral and Bilateral Trade Policies in the World Trading System: An Historical Perspective”. in J. deMelo and A. Panagariya, eds. New Dimensions in Regional Integration. Cambridge: CUP/CEPR, pp. 90-119.

 

-J. Bhagwati (1995). “US Trade Policy: The Infatuation with Free Trade”. in J. Bhagwati and A. Krueger, eds. The Dangerous Drift to Preferential Trade Agreements. Washington, DC: AEI, pp. 1-18.

 

-A. Krueger (1995). “NAFTA: Strengthening or Weakening the International Trading System?”. in J. Bhagwati and A. Krueger, eds. The Dangerous Drift to Preferential Trade Agreements. Washington, DC: AEI, pp. 19-33.

 

-J. Bhagwati and A. Panagariya (1996). “Preferential Trading Areas and Multilateralism– Strangers, Friends, or Foes?”. in J. Bhagwati and A. Panagariya, eds. The Economics of Preferential Trade Agreements. Washington, DC: AEI, pp. 1-78. [also in Bhagwati, Krishna, and Panagariya, pp. 33-100.]

 

-J. Bhagwati and A. Panagariya (1996). “The Theory of Preferential Trade Agreements: Historical Evolution and Current Trends”. AER; V.86-#2, pp. 82-87.

 

-A. Krueger (1997). “Free Trade Agreements versus Customs Unions”. JDevE; V.54-#?, pp. 169-187.

 

-A. Krueger (1997). “Problems with Overlapping Free Trade Areas”. in T. Ito and A. Krueger, eds. Regionalism versus Multilateral Trade Agreements. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 9-23.

 

-T. Bayoumi and B. Eichengreen (1997). “Is Regionalism Simply a Diversion: Evidence from the Evolution of the EC and NAFTA”. in T. Ito and A. Krueger, eds. Regionalism versus Multilateral Trade Agreements. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 141-164.

 

-J. Frankel and S.-J. Wei (1998). “Regionalization of World Trade and Currencies: Economics and Politics”. in J. Frankel, ed. The Regionalization of the World Economy. Chicago: University of Chicage Press/NBER, pp. 189-219.

 

-A. Panagariya (1997). “Preferential Trading and the Myth of Natural Trading Partners”. Japan and the World Economy; V.9-#4, pp. 471-489.

 

-A. Panagariya (1998). “Do Transport Costs Justify Regional Preferential Trading Arrangements? No”. WA; V.134-#2, pp. 280-301.

 

-T.N. Srinivasan (1998). “Regionalism and the the WTO: Is Nondiscrimination Passé?”. in A. Krueger, ed. The WTO as an International Organization. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 329-349.

 

-W. Ethier (1998). “Multilateral Roads to Regionalism”. in J. Piggot and A. Woodland, eds. International Trade Policy and the Pacific Rim. London: Macmillan, pp. 131-152.

 

-W. Ethier (2001). “Regional Regionalism”. In S. Lahiri, ed. Regionalism and Globalization: Theory and Practice. London: Routledge, pp. 3-15.

 

-L.A. Winters (1999). “Regionalism versus Multilateralism”. in R. Baldwin, D. Cohen, A. Sapir, and A. Venables, eds. Market Integration, Regionalism and the Global Economy. Cambridge: CUP/CEPR, pp. 7-49.

 

-C. Freund (2000). “Different Paths to Free Trade: The Gains from Regionalism”. Quarterly Journal of Economics; V.115-#?, pp. 1317-1341.

 

-D. Greenaway and C. Milner (2001). “Mulitlateral Trade Reform, Regionalism and Developing Countries”. In S. Lahiri, ed. Regionalism and Globalization: Theory and Practice. London: Routledge, pp. 144-169.

 

(2) Internal Politics

 

-B. Hoekman and M. Leidy (1993). “What to Expect from Regional and Multilateral Trade Negotiations: A Public Choice Perspective”. in K. Anderson and R. Blackhurst, eds. Regional Integration and the Global Trading System. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, pp. 246-269.

 

-A.O. Krueger (1995). “The Role of the NAFTA Debate in US Trade Policy”. Australian Economic Papers; V.?-#?, pp. 5-16.

 

-Wei, S.-J. and J. Frankel (1996). “Can Regional Blocs be a Stepping Stone to Global Free Trade?”. International Review of Economics and Finance; V.5-#4, pp. 339-347.

 

-R. Baldwin (1996). “A Domino Theory of Regionalism”. In R. Baldwin, P. Haaparanta, and J. Kiander, eds. Expanding Membership of the EU. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 25-48. [also in Bhagwati, Krishna, and Panagariya, pp. 479-502.]

 

-P. Krishna (1996). “A Political Economy Analysis of Preferential Trading and Multilateralism”. Eastern Economic Journal; V.22-#4, pp. 477-483.

 

-P. Krishna (1998). “Regionalism and Multilateralism: A Political Economy Approach”. QJE; V.?-#?, pp. 228-250. [also in Bhagwati, Krishna, and Panagariya, pp. 453-477.]

 

-P. Levy and T.N. Srinivasan (1996). “Regionalism and the (Dis)advantage of Dispute-Settlement Access”. AER; V.86-#2, pp. 93-98.

 

-P. Levy (1997). “A Political-Economic Analysis of Free-Trade Agreements”. AER; V.87-#4, pp. 506-519. [also in Bhagwati, Krishna, and Panagariya, pp. 429-451.]

 

-J. McLaren (2002). “A Theory of Insidious Regionalism”. QJE; V.117-#2, pp. 571-608.

 

-P. Levy (1998). “Learning from Trade Agreements”. ms: Yale University.

 

(3) International Politics

 

-R. Baldwin (1993). “Adapting the GATT to a More Regionalized World: A Political Economy Perspective”. in K. Anderson and R. Blackhurst, eds. Regional Integration and the Global Trading System. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, pp. 387-407.

 

-A. Hughes Hallett and C. Primo Braga (1994). “The New Regionalism and the Threat of Protection”. JJIE; V.8-#4, pp. 388-421.

 

-F. Westhoff, B. Yarbrough, and R. Yarbrough (1994). “Preferential Trade Agreements and the GATT: Can Bilateralism and Multilateralism Coexist?”. KYKLOS; V.47-#2, pp. 179-195.

 

-J. Campa and T. Sorenson (1996). “Are Trade Blocs Conducive to Free Trade?”. Scandinavian Journal of Economics; V.98-#2, pp. 263-273.

 

-K. Bagwell and R. Staiger (1997). “Multilateral Cooperation during the Formation of Free Trade Areas”. IER; V.38-#2, pp. 291-319.

 

-K. Bagwell and R. Staiger (1997). “Multilateral Cooperation during the Formation of Customs Unions”. JIE; V.42-#1/2, pp. 91-123.

 

-K. Bagwell and R. Staiger (1998). “Will Preferential Agreements Undermine the Multilateral Trading System?”. EJ; V.108-#449, pp. 1162-1182. [also in Bhagwati, Krishna, and Panagariya, pp. 505-529.]

 

-K. Bagwell and R. Staiger (1999). “Preferential Agreements and the Multilateral Trading System”. in R. Baldwin, D. Cohen, A. Sapir, and A. Venables, eds. Market Integration, Regionalism and the Global Economy. Cambridge: CUP/CEPR, pp. 53-79. [Comment by R. Fernandez follows.]

 

-K. Bagwell and R. Staiger (1999). “Regionalism and Multilateral Tariff Cooperation”. in J. Piggott and A. Woodland, ed. International Trade Policy and the Pacific Rim. London: Macmillan, pp. 157-185.

 

-K. Bagwell and R. Staiger (2001). “Reciprocity, Non-Discrimination and Preferential Agreements in the Multilateral Trading System”. European Journal of Political Economy; V.17-#2, pp. 281-325.

 

-J. Whalley (1998). Why Do Countries Seek Regional Trade Agreements?”. in J. Frankel, ed. The Regionalization of the World Economy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 63-87.

 

-C. Peronni and J. Whalley (2000). “The New Regionalism: Trade Liberalization or Insurance?”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.33-#1, pp. 1-24.

 

-C. Kowalczyk and D. Davis (1998). “Tariff Phase-Outs: Theory and Evidence from GATT and NAFTA”. in J. Frankel, ed. The Regionalization of the World Economy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 227-250.

 

-W. Ethier (1998). “The New Regionalism”. EJ; V.108-#449, pp. 1149-1161.

 

-W. Ethier (1998). “Regionalism in a Multilateral World”. JPE; V.106-#6, pp. 1214-1245.

 

-W. Ethier (1999). “Multilateral Roads to Regionalism”. in J. Piggott and A. Woodland, eds. International Trade Policy and the Pacific Rim. London: Macmillan, pp. 131-152.

 

-W. Ethier (2001). “The New Regionalism in the Americas: A Theoretical Framework”. North American Journal of Economics and Finance; V.12-#2, pp. 159-172.

 

-W. Ethier (2002). “Unilateralism in a Multilateral World”. Economic Journal; V112-#479, pp. 266-292.

 

-E. Fernandez-Arias and M. Spiegel (1998). “Nort-South Customs Unions and International Capital Mobility”. JIE; V.46-#2, pp. 229-251.

 

-C. Syrapoulos (1999). “Customs Unions and Comparative Advantage”. OEP; V.51-#2, pp. 239-266.

 

-R. Riezman (1999). “Can Bilateral Trade Agreements Help to Induce Free Trade?”. CJE; V.32-#3, pp. 751-766.

 

-C. Freund (2000). “Multilateralism and the endogenous formation of preferential trade agreements”. JIE; V.52-#2, pp. 359-376.

 

-E. Bond (2001). “Multilateralism versus Regionalism: Tariff Cooperation and Inter-regional Transport Costs”. In S. Lahiri, ed. Regionalism and Globalization: Theory and Practice. London: Routledge, pp. 18-38.

 

-C. Hadjiyiannis (2004). “Regionalism and Multilateral Trade Liberalization with Asymmetric Countries”. Review of International Economics; V.12-#3, pp. 395-411.

 

-E. Mansfield (1998). “The Proliferation of Preferential Trading Arrangements”. Journal of Conflict Resolution; V.42-#5, pp. 523-543.

 

-E. Mansfield and E. Reinhardt (2003). “Multilateral Determinants of Regionalism: The Effects of GATT/WTO on the Formation of Preferential Trading Arrangements”. International Organization; V.57-#4, pp. 829-862.