I. THE POLITICAL-ECONOMY OF PROTECTION
1. Institutional Context of the Domestic Politics of Trade Policy: US
-R. Baldwin (1985). The Political Economy of US Import Policy. Cambridge: MIT Press.
-I.M. Destler (1986). American Trade Politics: System Under Stress. Washington, DC: IIE.
-R. Barrie (1987). Congress and the Executive: The Making of US Foreign Trade Policy, 1789-1968. New York: Garland Press.
-R. Baldwin (1988). “US Trade Policy, 1945-1988: From Foreign Policy to Domestic Policy”. in C. Pearson and J. Riedel, eds. The Directions of Trade Policy. Oxford: Blackwell.
-E. Ray (1988). “Changing Patterns in Protectionism: The Fall in Tariffs and the Rise in Non-Tariff Barriers”. Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business; V.8-#2, pp. 285-327.
-P. Nivola (1993). Regulating Unfair Trade. Washington, DC: Brookings.
-S. O’Halloran (1994). Politics, Process, and American Trade Policy. Ann Arbor: Michigan.
-E. Kaplan (1995). American Trade Policy, 1923-1995. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press.
-A. Eckes (1995). Opening America’s Market: U.S. Foreign Trade Policy Since 1776. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
b. Legislative Structure, Process, and General Political Economy
-F. Taussig (1931). The Tariff History of the US. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons.
-J.J. Pincus (1975). “Pressure Groups and the Pattern of Tariffs”. JPE; V.83-#4, pp. 757-778.
-Pincus, J.J. (1977). Pressure Groups and Politics in Ante-Bellum Tariffs. New York: Columbia University Press.
-Pope, Clayne (1972). “The Impact of the Ante-Bellum Tariff on Income Distribution”. Explorations in Economic History; V.9-#4, pp. 375-421.
-Baack, Ben and Edward John Ray (1973/4). “Tariff Policy and Income Distribution: The Case of the United States, 1830-1860”. Explorations in Economic History; V.11-#2, pp. 103-121.
-James, John (1978). “The Welfare Effects of the Antebellum Tariff: A General Equilibrium Analysis”. Explorations in Economic History; V.15-#3, pp. 231-256.
-B. Baack and E. Ray (1983). “The Political Economy of Tariff Policy: A Case Study of the US”. Explorations in Economic History; V.20-#?, pp. 73-93.
-J.A.C. Conybeare (1991). “Voting for Protection: An Electoral Model of Tariff Policy”. IO; V.45-#1, pp. 57-81.
-W. Becker (1982). The Dynamics of Business Government Relations: Industry and Exports, 1893-1921. Chicago: University of Chicago Press
-J. Kenkel (1983). Progressives and Protection: The Search for a Tariff Policy, 1866-1936. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America.
-C. Hody (1996). Politics of Trade: American Political Development and Foreign Economic Policy. Hanover, NH: Dartmouth/University Press of New England.
-E. Stanwood (1904). American Tariff Controversies in the 19th Century (Two Vols.). Boston: Houghton Miflin and Co.
-T. Terrill (1973). The Tariff, Politics and American Foreign Policy, 1874-1901. Westport: Greenwood Press.
-F.W. Poulshock (1965). The Two Parties and the Tariff in the 1880's. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.
-C. Stern (1971). Protectionist Republicanism: Republican Tariff Policy in the McKinley Period. Oshkosh: Stern.
-D. Detzer (1973). “Business Reformers and Tariff Revision: The Payne-Aldrich Tariff of 1909”. The Historian; V.35-#?, pp. 196-204.
-D. Verdier (1993). “The Politics of Trade Preference Formation: The US from the Civil War to the New Deal”. Politics and Society; V.21-#4, pp. 365-392.
-J. Reitano (1994). The Tariff Question in the Gilded Age. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
-C. Calhoun (1996). “Political Economy in the Gilded Age: The Republican Party’s Industrial Policy”. Journal of Policy History; V.8-#3, pp. 291-309.
-K. Schneitz (1994). “The 1916 Tariff Commission: Democrats' Use of Expert Information to Constrain Tariff Protection”. Business and Economic History; V.23-#1, pp.176-189.
-K. Schneitz (1998). “Democrats’ 1916 Tariff Commission: Responding to Dumping Fears and Illustrating the Consumer Costs of Protectionism”. Business History Review; V.72-#1, pp.1-45.
(a) Political Economy
-E.E. Schattschneider (1935). Politics, Pressure and the Tariff. New York: Prentice Hall.
-B. Eichengreen (1989). “The Political Economy of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff”. Research in Economic History; V.12, pp. 1-43.
-M. Hayford and C. Pasurka (1992). “The Political Economy of the Fordney-McCumber and Smoot-Hawley Tariff Acts”. Explorations in Economic History; V.29-#1, pp. 30-50.
-C. Callahan, J. McDonald, and A. O’Brien (1994). “Who Voted for Smoot-Hawley?”. Journal of Economic History; V.54-#3, pp. 683-690.
-R. Cupitt and E. Elliott (1994). “Schattschneider Revisited: Senate Voting on the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930". Economics and Politics; V.6-#4, pp. 187-199.
-D. Irwin and R. Kroszner (1996). “Economic Interests and Logrolling in the Passage of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff”. Carnegie-Rochester Series on Public Policy, #45, pp. 173-200. [Comments by M. Bordo, pp. 201-205.]
(b) How High Was the Smoot-Hawley Tariff?
-M. Hayford and C. Pasurka (1991). “Effeective Rates of Protection and the Fordney-McCumber and Smoot-Hawley Tariff Acts”. Applied Economics; V.23-#?, pp. 1385-1392.
-R. Archibald, D. Feldman, M. Hayford, and C. Pasurka (2000). “Effective Rates of Protection and the Fordney-McCumber and Smoot-Hawley Tariff Acts: Comments and Revised Estimates”. Applied Economics; V.32-#9, pp. 1223-1226.
-M. Crucini (1994). “Sources of Variation in Real Tariff Rates: The US, 1900-1940". AER; V.84-#3, pp. 732-743.
-D. Irwin (1998). “Changes in U.S. Tariffs: The Role of Import Prices and Commercial Policies”. American Economic Review; V.88-#4, pp. 1015-1026.
(c) Macroeconomic Consequences of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff
-P. Friedman (1974). The Impact of Trade Destruction on National Incomes. Gainesville: University of Florida Press.
-B. Eichengreen and D. Irwin (1995). “Trade Blocs, Currency Blocks, and the Reorientation of World Trade in the 1930s”. JIE; V.38-#1/2, pp. 1-24.
-M. Crucini and J. Kahn (1996). “Tariffs and Aggregate Economic Activity: Lessons from the Great Depression”. JMonE; V.38-#3, pp. 427-467.
-D. Irwin (1998). “The Smoot-Hawley Tariff: A Quantitative Assessment”. REStat; V.53-#2, pp. 326-334.
-R. Archibald and D. Feldman (1998). “Investment during the Great Depression: Uncertainty and the Role of Smoot-Hawley Tariff”. SEJ; V.64-#4, pp. 857-879.
-J. McDonald, A. O'Brien, and C. Callahan (1997). “Trade Wars: Canada's Reaction to the Smoot-Hawley Tariff”. Journal of Economic History; V.57-#4, pp. 802-826.
-A. Eckes (1995). “Revisiting Smoot-Hawley”. Journal of Policy History; V.7-#3, pp. 295-310.
-A. Eckes (1998). “Smoot-Hawley and the Stock Market Crash, 1929-1930". International Trade Journal; V.12-#1, pp. 65-82.
-K. Carey (1999). “Investigating a Debt Channel for the Smoot-Hawley Tariffs: Evidence from the Sovereign Bond Market”. Journal of Economic History; V.59-#3, pp. 748-761.
-J. Madsen (2001). “Trade Barriers and the Collapse of World Trade During the Great Depression”. SEJ; V.67-#4, pp. 848-868.
(3) The RTAA and the Transition to the Modern System
-S. Haggard (1988). “The Institutional Foundations of Hegemony: Explaining the Trade Agreements Act of 1934". International Organization. V.42-#1; pp. 91-119.
-D. Nelson (1989). “Domestic Political Preconditions of US Trade Policy: Liberal Structure and Protectionist Dynamics”. Journal of Public Policy; V.9-#1, pp. 83-108.
-W. Hansen and T. Prusa (1993). “Congressional Decision-Making and the Rise of Delegation: An Application to Trade Policy”. ms: SUNY Stony Brook.
-K. Schneitz (1996). “To Delegate or Not To Delegate: Congressional Institutional Choices in the Regulation of Foreign Trade”. Business and Society; V.35-#1, pp. 129-36.
-M. Bailey, J. Goldstein and B. Weingast (1997). “The Institutional Roots of American Trade Policy: Politics, Coalitions, and International Trade”. WP; V.49-#3, pp. 309-338.
-M. Gilligan (1997). Empowering Exporters: Reciprocity, Delegation and Collective Action in American Trade Policy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
-D. Irwin (1997). “From Smoot-Hawley to the Reciprocal Trade Agreements: Changing the Course of U.S. Trade Policy in the 1930's”. in M. Bordo, C. Goldin, and E. White, eds. The Definint Moment: The Great Depression and the American Economy in the Twentieth Century. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 325-352.
-D. Irwin and R. Kroszner (1999). “Interests, Institutions, and Ideology in Securing Policy Change: The Republican Conversion to Trade Liberalization after Smoot-Hawley”. Journal of Law and Economics; V.42-#2, pp. 643-674.
-M. Hiscox (1999). “The Magic Bullet? The RTAA, Institutional Reform, and Trade Liberalization”. IO; V.53-#4, pp. 669-698.
-K. Schnietz (2000). “The Institutional Foundations of U.S. Trade Policy: Revisiting Explanations for the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act”. Journal of Policy History, V.12-#4, pp. 417-444.
-K. Schnietz (2003). “The 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act: Investor Response to Political Institutional Change”. International Organization; V.53-#4, pp. 669-698.
-M. Butler (1998). Cautious Visionary: Cordell Hull and Trade Reform, 1933-1937. Kent: Kent State University Press.
(4) The Modern Trade Policy System
-R. Bauer, I.deS. Pool and L.A. Dexter (1963). American Business and Public Policy. Chicago: Aldine.
-T. Lowi (1964). “American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies and Political Theory”. WP; V.16-#4, pp. 347-382.
-J.R. Wilkinson (1960). Politics and Trade Policy. Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press.
-R. Pastor (1980). Congress and the Politics of US Foreign Economic Policy, 1929-1976. Berkeley: University of California Press.
-S. Lande and C. VanGrasstek (1986). The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984: Trade Policy in the Reagan Administration. Lexington: DC Heath.
-P.S. Nivola (1986). “The New Protectionism: US Trade Policy in Historical Perspective”. Political Science Quarterly; V.101-#4, pp. 577-600.
-P.S. Nivola (1990). “Trade Policy: Refereeing the Playing Field”. in T. Mann, ed. A Question of Balance: The President, Congress and Foreign Policy. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 201-253.
-D. Yoffie (1989). “American Trade Policy: An Obsolete Bargain?”. in J. Chubb and P. Peterson, eds. Can Government Govern? Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 100-138.
-C. Pearson (1989). Free Trade, Fair Trade? The Reagan Record. Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute.
-S. Schwab (1994). Trade-Offs: Negotiating the Ombibus Trade and Competitiveness Act. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
-S. Dryden (1995). Trade Warriors: USTR and the American Crusade for Free Trade. New York: Oxford University Press.
-B. Fordham (1998). “Economic Interests, Party, and Ideology in Early Cold War Era U.S. Foreign Policy”. IO; V.52-#2, pp. 359-396.
-J. Schoch (1998). “Party Politics and International Economic Activism: The Reagan-Bush Years”. Political Science Quarterly; V.113-#?, pp. 113-131.
-Mayer, F. (2000). “Labor, Environment and the State of U.S. Trade Politics”. NAFTA: Law and Business Review of the Americas; V.6-#3, pp. 335-346.
-Uslaner, E. (2000). “The Democratic Party and Free Trade: An Old Romance Restored”. NAFTA: Law and Business Review of the Americas; V.6-#3, pp. 347-362
-Schiller, W.J. (2000). “Has Free Trade Won the War in Congress, or is the Battle Still Raging”. NAFTA: Law and Business Review of the Americas; V.6-#3, pp. 363-387
-Schiller, Wendy (1999). “Trade Politics in the American Congress: A Study of the Interaction of Political Geography and Interest Group Behavior”. Political Geography; V.18-#7, pp. 769-789.
-M. Bailey (1998). “Trade-Security Linkage in Congress and the Origins of Cold War Trade Policy”. ms: Georgetown University.
-R. Phelps (1993). “International Perspective: American Public Opinion on Trade, 1950-1990”. Business Economics; V.28-#3, pp. 35-40.
c. Administrative Structure and Process
-I.B. Kravis (1954). “The Trade Agreements Escape Clause”. AER; V.44-#3, pp. 319-338.
-W.B. Kelly (1962). “The 'Expanded' Trade-Agreements Escape Clause, 1955-61". AER; V.70-#1, pp. 37-63.
-W.B. Kelly, ed. (1963). Studies in US Commercial Policy. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
-J. Goldstein (1986). “The Political Economy of Trade: Institutions of Protection”. APSR; V.80-#1, pp. 161-184.
-D. Nelson (1989). “On the High Track to Protection: The US Automobile Industry, 1979-1981". in S. Haggard and C. Moon, eds. Pacific Dynamics. Boulder: Westview Press, pp. 97-128.
-J.M. Finger and T. Murray (1990). “Policing Unfair Imports: The US Example”. Journal of World Trade; V.24-#4, pp. 39-53.
-E. Grinols (1990). “Procedural Protectionism: The New American Trade Bill and the New Interventionist Mode”. WA; V.?-#?, pp. 501-521.
-D. Palmeter (1989). “The Capture of Anti-Dumping Law”. Yale Journal of International Law; V.14-#1, pp.
-M. Leidy and B. Hoekman (1991). “Spurious Injury as Indirect Rent-Seeking: Free Trade under the Prospect of Protection”. E&P; V.3-#4, pp. 111-137.
-M. Leidy (1994). “Quid Quo Pro Restraint and Spurious Injury: Subsidies and Prospect for CVDs”. in A. Deardorff and R. Stern, eds. Analytical and Negotiating Issues in the Global Trading System. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 263-305.
-R. Baldwin (1998). “Imposing Multilateral Discipline on Administered Protection”. in A. Krueger, ed. The WTO as an International Organization. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 297-327.
2. Historical Studies in the Politics of Protection
-C. Kindleberger (1951). “Group Behavior and International Trade”. JPE; V.59-#1, pp. 30-46.
-A. Gerschenkron (1962). Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of Essays. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
-J. Kurth (1979). “The Political Consequences of the Product Cycle”. IO; V.33-#1, pp. 1-34.
-A. Milward (1981). “Tariffs as Constitutions”. in S. Strange and R. Tooze, eds. The International Politics of Surplus Capacity. London: Allen and Unwin. pp. 57-66.
-P. Gourevitch (1986). Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
-P. Bairoch (1988). “European Trade Policy, 1815-1914". in P. Mathias and S. Pollard, eds. Cambridge Economic History of Europe. V.8, Industrial Economies. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 1-160.
-R. Rogowski (1989). Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments. Princeton: PUP.
-D. Verdier (1994). Democracy and International Trade: Britain, France and the US, 1860-1990. Princeton: PUP.
-J. Hobson (1997). The Wealth of States: A Comparative Sociology of International Economic and Political Change. Cambridge: CUP.
-B. Brown (1943). The Tariff Reform Movement in Great Britain, 1881-1895. New York: Columbia University Press.
-W. Chaloner (1970). “The Agitation Against the Corn Laws”. in J. Ward, ed. Popular Movements c. 1830-1850. London: Macmillan.
-W. Grampp (1982). “Economic Opinion When Britain Turned to Free Trade”. History of Political Economy; V.14-#?, pp. 496-520.
-W. Grampp (1987). “Britain and Free Trade: In Whose Interest?”. Public Choice; V.55-#?, pp. 245-256.
-W. Grampp (1987). “How Britain Turned to Free Trade”. Business History Review; V.61-#?, pp. 86-112.
-G. Anderson and R. Tollison (1985). “Ideology, Interest Groups, and the Repeal of the Corn Laws”. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, V.141-#2, pp. 197-212.
-D. Irwin (1989). “Political Economy and Peel’s Repeal of the Corn Laws”. E&P; V.1-#1, pp. 41-59.
-T. McKeown (1989). “The Politics of Corn Law Repeal and Theories of Commercial Policy”. BJPS; V.19-#?, pp. 353-380.
-J. Williamson (1990). “The Impact of the Corn Laws Just Prior to Repeal”. Explorations in Economic History; V.27-#2, pp. 123-156.
-C. Schonhardt-Bailey (1991). “Lessons in Lobbying for Free Trade in 19th-Century Britain: To Concentrate or Not”. APSR; V.85-#1, pp. 37-58.
-C. Schonhardt-Bailey (1991). “Specific Factors, Capital Markets, Portfolio Diversification and Free Trade: Domestic Determinants of the Repeal of the Corn Laws”. WP; V.43-#4, pp. 545-569.
-K. O’Rourke (1994). “The Repeal of the Corn Laws and Irish Emigration”. Explorations in Economic History; V.31-#1, pp. 120-138.
-M. Lusztig (1995). “Solving Peel’s Puzzle: Repeal of the Corn Laws and Institutional Preservation”. Comparative Politics; V.?-#?, pp. 393-408.
-P. Fraser (1962). “Unionism and Tariff Reform: The Crisis of 1906”. Historical Journal; V.5-#?, pp. 149-166.
-K. Brown (1970). “The Trade Union Tariff Reform Association, 1904-1913”. Journal of British Studies; V.9-#2, pp. 141-153.
-A.W. Coats (1968). “The Political Economy of the Tariff Reform Campaign of 1903”. Journal of Law and Economics; V.11-#?, pp. 181-229.
-A. Sykes (1979). Tariff Reform in British Politics, 1903-1913. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
-F. Capie (1983). Depression and Protectionism: Britain Between the Wars. London: Allen and Unwin.
A.J. Marrison (1983). “Businessmen, Industries and Tariff Reform in Great Britain, 1903-1930". Business History; V.25-#?, pp. 148-178.
-D. Irwin (1994). “The Political Economy of Free Trade: Voting in the British General Election of 1906". Journal of Law and Economics; V.37-#1, pp. 75-108.
-D. Irwin (1996). “Industry or Class Cleavages over Trade Policy?: Evidence from the British General Election of 1923". in R. Feenstra, G. Grossman and D. Irwin, eds. The Political Economy of Trade Policy. Cambridge: MIT, pp. 53-75.
-B. Eichengreen (1992). “The Eternal Fiscal Question: Free Trade and Protection in Britain, 1860-1929. in F. Capie, ed. Protectionism in the World Economy. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
-F. Capie (1981). “Shaping the British Tariff Structure in the 1930's”. Explorations in Economic History; V.18-#?, pp. 155-173.
-R. Johnston and M. Percy (1980). “Reciprocity, Imperial Sentiment and Party Politics in the 1911 Election”. Canadian Journal of Political Science; V.13-#?, pp. 711-729.
-A. Gerschenkron (1943). Bread and Democracy in Germany. Berkeley: University of California Press.
-I. Lambi (1963). Free Trade and Protection in Germany, 1868-1896. Weisbaden: Steiner.
-H. Böhme (1968). “Big Business Pressure Groups and Bismarck’s Trun to Protectionsim, 1873-1879". Historical Journal; V.10-#2, pp. 218-236.
-S. Webb (1977). “Tariff Protection for the Iron Industry, Cotton Textiles and Agriculture in Germany, 1979-1914". Jahrbucher für Nationalökonomie und Stastik; V.192-#3/4, pp. 336-357.
-S. Webb (1980). “Tariffs, Cartels, Technology and Growth in the German Steel Industry, 1879-1914". Journal of Economic History; V.40-#2, pp. 309-329.
-S. Webb (1982). “Agricultural Protection in Wilhelminan Germany: Forging and Empire with Pork and Rye”. Journal of Economic History; V.42-#2, pp. 309-326.
-R. Moeller (1981). “Peasants and Tariffs in the Kaiserreich: How Backward were the ‘Bauern’?”. Agricultural History; V.55-#4, pp. 370-384.
-M. Smith (1977). “Free Trade versus Protection in the Early Third Republic: Economic Interests, Tariff Policy, and the Making of the Republican Synthesis”. French Historical Studies; V.10-#2, pp. 293-314.
-M. Smith (1980). Tariff Reform in France, 1860-1900. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
-B. Ratcliffe (1978). “The Tariff Reform in France, 1831-1836". Journal of European Economic History; V.7-#1, pp. 61-138.
-J. Nye (1991). “The Myth of Free Trade Britain and Fortress France: Tariffs and Trade in the Nineteenth Century”. Journal of Economic History; V.51-#1, pp. 23-46.
-J. Nye (1991). “Revisionist Tariff History and the Theory of Hegemonic Stability”. Politics and Society; V.19-#2, pp.209-232.
3. Comparative Institutional Analysis
-I. Magaziner and T. Hout (1980). Japanese Industrial Policy. Berkeley: University of California Institute of International Studies.
-C. Johnson (1982). Miti and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
-K. Yamamura, ed. (1982). Policy and Trade Issues in the Japanese Economy: American and Japanese Perspectives. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
-C. Higashi (1983). Japanese Trade Policy Formulation. New York: Praeger.
-M. Schmieglow (1985). “Cutting Across Doctrines: Positive Adjustment in Japan”. IO; V39-#2, pp. 261-296.
-M. Schmieglow (1986). “The Reform of Japan's Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law: A Case of Qualitative Economic Policy”. in M. Schmieglow, ed. Japan's Response to Crisis and Change in the World Economy. Armonk: M.E. Sharp, pp. 1-27.
-G. Saxonhouse and K. Yamamura, eds. (1986). Law and Trade Issues in the Japanese Economy: American and Japanese Perspectives. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
-K. Yamamura (1986). “Caveat Emptor: The Industrial Policy of Japan”. in P. Krugman, ed. Strategic Trade Policy and the New International Economics. Cambridge: MIT Press. pp. 169-209.
-K. Suzumura and M. Okuno-Fujiwara (1987). “Industrial Policy in Japan: Overview and Evaluation”. in R. Sato and P. Wachtel, eds. Trade Friction and Economic Policy. Cambridge: CUP. pp. 50-79.
-R. Komiya, M. Okuno and K. Suzumura, eds. (1988). Industrial Policy of Japan. San Diego: Academic Press.
-K. Calder (1988). “Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation: Explaining the Reactive State”. WP; V.40-#?, pp. 517-541.
-M. Anchordoguy (1988). “Mastering the Market: Japanese Government Targeting of the Computer Industry”. IO; V.42-#3, pp. 509-453.
-D. Okimoto (1989). Between MITI and the Market: Japanese Industrial Policy for High Technology. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
-C. Johnson, L. Tyson and J. Zysman, eds. (1989). Politics and Productivity: The Real Story of How Japan Works. Cambridge: Ballinger.
-H. and M. Schmieglow (1990). “How Japan Affects the International System”. IO; V.44-#4, pp. 553-588.
-F. Weil and N. Glick (1979). “Japan: Is the Market Open? A View of the Japanese Market Drawn from US Corporate Experience”. Law and Policy in International Business. V.3-#?, pp. 815-907.
-G. Saxonhouse (1983). “The Micro- and Macro- Economics of Foreign Sales in Japan”. in W. Cline, ed. Trade Policies in the 1980s. Washington, DC: IIE. pp. 259-304.
-G. Saxonhouse (1983). “What's All This About 'Industrial Targeting' in Japan?”. World Economy; V.?-#?, pp. 253-274.
-G. Saxonhouse (1985). “Industrial Policy and Factor Markets: Biotechnology in Japan”. Prometheus; V.3-#?, pp. 277-314.
-G. Saxonhouse (1986). “What's Wrong with Japanese Trade Structure”. Pacific Economic Papers; V.?-#?, pp. 1-36.
-R.Z. Lawrence (1987). “Imports in Japan: Closed Markets or Minds?” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity; 1987-#2, pp. 517-548.
-R. Staiger, A. Deardorff and R. Stern (1987). “An Evaluation of Factor Endowments and Protection as Determinants of Japanese and American Foreign Trade”. CJE; V.20-#?, pp. 449-463.
-R. Staiger, A. Deardorff and R. Stern (1988). “The Effects of Protection on the Factor Content of Japanese and American Foreign Trade”. REStat; V.70-#?, pp. 475-483.
-G. Saxonhouse (1989). “Differentiated Products, Economies of Scale, and Access to Japanese Markets”. in R. Feenstra, ed. Trade Policies for International Competitiveness. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 145-183.
-R.E. Lawrence (1991). “Efficient of Exclusionist? The Import Behavior of Japanese Corporate Groups”. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity; 1991:1; pp. (comment by Saxonhouse)
-M. Noland (1993). “The Impact of Industrial Policy on Japan’s Trade Specialization”. REStat; V.75-#?, pp. 241-248.
-B. Balassa and M. Noland (1988). Japan and the World Economy. Washington, DC: IIE.
-P. Krugman, ed. (1991). Trade with Japan: Has the Door Opened Wider. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER.
b. Australia
-A. Capling and B. Galligan (1992). Beyond the Protective State: The Political Economy of Australia’s Manufacturing Industry Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
-A. Woodland (1992). “Trade Policies in Australia”. In D. Salvatore, ed. National Trade Policies. Westport: Greenwood Press, pp. 241-260.
-W.M. Corden (1996). “Protection and Liberalization in Australia and Abroad”. Australian Economic Review; V.114-#2, pp. 141-154.
c. European Countries and the EC
-W. Feld (1979). “Implementation of the EC's Common Agricultural Policy: Expectations, Fears, Failures”. IO; V.33-#3, pp. 335-363.
-L. Tsoukalis and A. daS. Ferreira (1980). “Management of Industrial Surplus Capacity in the EC”. IO, V.34-#3, pp. 355-376.
-E. Verreydt and J. Waelbroek (1982). “European Community Protection Against Manufactured Imports from Developing Countries: A Case Study in the Political Economy of Protection”. in J. Bhagwati, ed. Import Competition and Response. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 368-393.
-J. Pearce, J. Sutton and R. Batchelor (1985). Protection and Industrial Policy in Europe. London: RKP.
-R. Hine (1985). The Political Economy of European Trade: An Introduction to the Trade Policies of the EEC. New York: St. Martins.
-J. Hayes (1993). Making Trade Policy in the European Community. New York: St. Martins.
-S.A.B. Page (1981). “The Revival of Protectionism and Its Consequences for Europe”. Journal of Common Market Studies; V.20-#?, pp. 17-40.
-M. Kahler (1985). “European Protectionism in Theory and Practice”. WP; V.37-#?, pp. 475-502.
-V. Cable (1983). “Economics and Politics of Protection: Some Case Studies of Industries”. World Bank Staff Working Paper. #569. (UK case)
-B. Bobe (1983). “Public Assistance to Industries and Trade Policy in France”. World Bank Staff Working Paper, #570.
-P. Messerlin (1986). “Export-credit Mercantilism a la Francaise”. World Economy; V.9-#4, pp.385-408.
-E. Grilli (1980). “Italian Commercial Policies in the 1970's”. World Bank Staff Working Paper, #428.
-E. Grilli and M. LaNoce (1983). “The Political Economy of Protection in Italy”. World Bank Staff Working Paper, #567.
-P.K.M. Tharakan (1980). “The Political Economy of Protection in Belgium”. World Bank Staff Working Paper; #431.
-K.A. Koekkoek, J. Kol and L.B.M. Mennes (1981). “On Protectionism in the Netherlands”. World Bank Staff Working Paper; #493.
-H.H. Glismann and F.D. Weiss (1980). “On the Political Economy of Protection in Germany”. World Bank Staff Working Paper; #427.
-P. Katzenstein, ed. (1978). Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
-P. Katzenstein (1984). Corporatism and Change: Austria, Switzerland and the Politics of Industry. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
-P. Katzenstein (1985). Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
-B. Cummings (1984). “The Origins and Development of the Northeast Asian Political Economy”. IO; V.38-#1, pp. 1-40.
-G. White and R. Wade, eds. (1985). Developmental States in East Asia. Brighton, UK: IDS, Research Report #16.
-F. Deyo, ed. (1987). The Political Economy of New Asian Industrialism. Ithaca: Cornell.
-S. Haggard (1990). Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in Newly Industrializing Countries. Ithaca: Cornell.
-G. Gereffi and D. Wyman (1990). Manufacturing Miracles: Paths of Industrialization in Latin America and East Asia. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
(1) Mostly Taiwan
-A. Amsden (1985). “The State and Taiwan’s Economic Development”. in P. Evans, et al., eds. Bringing the State Back In. New York: Cambridge University Press.
-T. Gold (1986). State and Society in the Taiwan Miracle. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe.
-K.S. Liang and C.H. Liang (1986). “The Industrial Policy of Taiwan”. in H. Mutoh, et al., Industrial Policies for Pacific Economic Growth. Sydney: Allen & Unwin, pp. 104-125.
-S. Chan (1987). “The Mouse that Roared: Taiwan's Management of Trade Relations with the US”. Comparative Political Studies. V.20-#3, pp. 251-292.
-E. Winckler and S. Greenhalgh, eds. (1988). Contending Approaches to the Political Economy of Taiwan. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe.
-R. Wade (1990). Governing the Market. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
(2) Mostly Korea
-J. Odell (1985). “The Outcomes of International Trade Conflicts: The US and South Korea”. ISQ; V.29-#?, pp. 263-386.
-A. Amsden (1989). Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization. New York: Oxford University Press.
-S. Haggard and C. Moon (1983). “Liberal, Dependent or Mercantile?: The South Korean State in the International System”. in J. Ruggie, ed. Antinomies of Interdependence. New York: Columbia University Press.
-S. Haggard and C. Moon (1990). “Institutions and Economic Policy: Theory and a Korean Case Study”. WP; V.42-#2, pp. 210-237.
-S. Haggard, D. Kim and C. Moon (1991). “The Transition to Export-led Growth in South Korea: 1954-1966". Journal of Asian Studies; V.50-#4, pp. 850-873.
-D.R. Mares (1990). “Domestic Institutions and Shifts in Trade and Development Policy”. in J. Odell and T. Willett, eds. International Trade Policies: Gains from Exchange Between Economics and Political Science. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. pp. 193-223.
-S. Sanderson (1992). The Politics of Trade in Latin American Development. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
-P. Smith (1992). “The Political Impact of Free Trade on Mexico”. Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs; V.34-#?, pp. 1-25.
-M. Pastor and C. Wise (1994). “The Origins and Sustainability of Mexico's Free Trade Policy”. IO; V.48-#3, pp. 459-489.
4. Empirical Studies on the Political Economy of Protection
a. Correlates of Interindustry Variation in Protection
-N. Fielke (1976). “The Tariff Structure for Manufacturing Industries in the US: A Test of Some Traditional Explanations”. Columbia Journal of World Business; V.11-#4, pp. 98-104.
-R. Caves (1976). “Economic Models of Political Choice: Canada's Tariff Structure”. CJE; V.9-#2, pp. 278-300.
-G. Helleiner (1977). “The Political Economy of Canada's Tariff Structure: An Alternative Model”. CJE; V.10-#2, pp. 318-326.
-R. Saunders (1980). “The Political Economy of Effective Tariff Protection in Canada's Manufacturing Sector”. CJE; V.13-#2, pp. 340-348.
-J.A.C. Conybeare (1978). “Public Policy and the Australian Tariff Structure”. Australian Journal of Management; V.??-#?, pp.49-59.
-J.A.C. Conybeare (1984). “Politicians and Protection: Tariffs and Elections in Australia”. PC; V.43-#2, pp. 203-209.
-K. Anderson (1980). “The Political Market for Assistance to Australian Manufacturing Industries”. EcRec; V.56-#153, pp. 132-144.
-C. Aislabie (1988). “Economic Incentives and the Pattern of the Australian Tariff”. Australian Economic Papers; V.27-#50, pp. 20-32.
-D. Feaver and K. Wilson (1998). “Unlocking Australia’s Contingent Protection Black Box”. Economic Record; V.74-#224, pp. 62-73.
-J. Hartigan (1981). “Does Factor Content Determine Protection?”. SEJ; V.48-#?, pp. 144-148.
-R. Lavergne (1983). The Political Economy of US Tariffs: An Empirical Study. New York: Academic Press.
-W. Cline (1984). “The Determinants of Protection in Industrial Countries”. Chapter 2 of Exports of Manufactures from Developing Countries. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 34-84.
-D. Greenaway and C. Milner (1994). “Determinants of the Inter-Industry Structure of Protection in the UK”. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics; V.56-#4, pp. 399-419
-M. Metcalfe and B. Goodwin (1999). “An Empirical Analysis of the Determinants of Trade Policy Protection in the U.S. Manufacturing Sector”. Journal of Policy Modeling; V.21-#2, pp. 153-165.
-R. Lopez and E. Pagoulatos (1996). “Trade Protection and the Role of Campaign Contributions in US Food and Tobacco Industries”. EcInq; V.34-#2, pp. 237-248.
-F. McGillvray (1997). “Party Discipline as a Determinant of the Endogenous Formation of Tariffs”. AJPS; V.41-#2, pp. 584-607
b. Regulation Theory: Partial Equilibrium Models of Endogenous Protection
(a) General Papers on Regulation Theory
-G. Stigler (1971). “The Theory of Economic Regulation”. Bell Journal; V.2-#1, pp. 3-21.
-S. Peltzman (1976). “Toward a More General Theory of Regulation”. JLawEcon; V.19-#2, pp. 211-240.
-G. Becker (1983). “A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence”. QJE; V.98-#3, pp. 371-400.
-G. Becker (1985). “Public Policies, Pressure Groups and Deadweight Costs”. JPubE; V.28-#?, pp. 329-347.
-S. Peltzman (1989). “The Economic Theory of Regulation After a Decade of Deregulation”. BPEA; Microeconomics, pp. 1-41.
-D. Wittman (1989). “Pressure Group Size and the Politics of Income Redistribution”. SC&W; V.6-#?, pp. 275-286.
-E. Rasmusen and M. Zupan (1991). “Extending the Economic Theory of Regulation to the Form of Policy”. PC; V.72-#< pp. 167-191.
-G. Becker and C. Mulligan (1998). “Deadweight Costs and the Size of Government”. NBER Working Paper, #6789.
(b) Regulation Theoretic Approaches to Trade Policy
-A.L. Hillman (1982). “Declining Industries and Political Support Protectionist Motives”. AER; V.72-#5, pp. 1180-1187.
-J. Cassing and A.L. Hillman (1986). “Shifting Comparative Advantage and Senescent Industry Collapse”. AER; V.76-#?, pp. 516-523.
-N.V. Long and N. Vousden (1991). “Protectionist Responses and Declining Industries”. JIE; V.30-#1/2, pp. 87-103.
-J.P. Choi (2001). “Protectionist Response to Import Competition in Declining Industries Reconsidered”. European Journal of Political Economy; V.17-#1, pp. 193-201
-D. Feldman and I. Gang (1996). “Revenue Motives and Trade Liberalization”. RIE; V.4-#3, pp. 276-281.
-S. Wellisz and J.D. Wilson (1986). “Lobbying and Tariff Formation: A Deadweight Loss Consideration”. JIE; V.20-#?, pp. 367-375.
-J.D. Wilson (1990). “Are Efficiency Improvements in Government Transfer Policies Self-Defeating in Political Equilibrium?”. E&P; V.2-#3, pp. 241-258.
-R.V. Fabella (1991). “The Bias in Favor of Pro-Tariff Lobbies”. JPubE; V.44-#1, pp. 87-93.
-M. Leidy (1994). “Trade Policy and Indirect Rent-Seeking: A Synthesis of Recent Work”. E&P; V.6-#2, pp. 97-118.
-D. Gould and G. Woodbridge (1997). “Building Trade Barriers and Knocking them Down”. RIE; V.5-#2, pp. 256-271.
-J. Devereux and L.L. Chen (1999). “Growth, the External Terms of Trade and Endogenous Trade Liberalization”. PC; V.98-#1/2, pp. 43-57.
-P. Messerlin (1981). “The Political Economy of Protectionism: The Bureaucratic Case”. WA; V.117-#3, pp. 469-495.
-W. Mayer (1999). “The Political Economy of Administering Trade Laws”. in J. Piggott and A. Woodland, eds. International Trade Policy and the Pacific Rim. London: Macmillan, pp. 245-262.
-K. Anderson and R. Baldwin (1987). “The Political Market for Protection in Industrial Countries”. in A.M. El-Agraa, ed., Protection, Cooperation, Integration and Development. New York: Macmillan.
-E. Ray (1981). “The Determinants of Tariffs and Nontariff Trade Restrictions in the US”. JPE; V.89-#?, pp. 105-121.
-E. Ray (1981). “Tariff and Nontariff Barriers to Trade in the US and Abroad”. REStat; V.68-#2, pp. 161-168.
-E. Ray (1991). “Protection of Manufactures and the US”. in D. Greenaway, ed. Global Protectionism: Is the US Playing on a Level Field. London: MacMillan, pp. 12-36.
-W. Dougan (1985). “Tariffs and the Economic Theory of Regulation”. Research in Law and Economics; V.6, pp. 187-210.
-P. Godek (1985). “Industry Structure and Redistribution Through Trade Restrictions”. Journal of Law and Economics; V.28-#3, pp. 687-703.
-D. Trefler (1993). “Trade Liberalization and the Theory of Endogenous Protection: An Econometric Study of US Import Policy”. JPE; V.101-#1, pp. 138-160.
-A. Dick (1996). “Explaining Managed Trade as Rational Cheating”. RIE’ V.4-#1, pp. 1-16.
-J.W. Lee and P. Swagel (1997). “Trade Barriers and Trade Flows across Countries and Industries”. Review of Economics and Statistics; V.79-#3, pp. 372-82.
-K. Gawande (1997). “Testing Theories of Endogenous Protection: Robust Evidence From U.S. Nontariff Barrier Data”. in K. Maskus, P. Hooper, E. Leamer, and J.D. Richardson, eds. Quiet Pioneering: Robert M. Stern and His International Economic Legacy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 37-70.
-K. Gawande (1998). “Comparing Theories of Endogenous Protection: Bayesian Comparison of Tobit Models Using Gibbs Sampling Output”. REStat; V.?-#?, pp. 128-140.
-Kishore Gawande and Alok Bohara (2000). “Errors-in-Variables Bounds in a Tobit Model of Endogenous Protection”. Southern Economic Journal; V.66-#4, pp. 881-905.
-M. Busch and E. Reinhardt (1999). “Industrial Location and Protection: The Political and Economic Geography of U.S. Nontariff Barriers”. AJPS; V.43-#4, pp. 1028-1050.
-P. Goldberg and G. Maggi (1997). “Protection for Sale: An Empirical Analysis”. AER; V.89-#5, pp. 1135-1155.
-C. Hamilton (1990). “The Political Economy of Transient 'New' Protectionism”. WA; V.?-#?, pp. 522-545.
c. Explaining Legislative Votes on Protection
-R. Watson (1956). “The Tariff Revolution: A Study of Shifting Party Attitudes”. Journal of Politics; V.18-#4, pp. 678-701.
-R. Baldwin (1976). “The Political Economy of Postwar US Trade Policy”. NYU C.J. Devine Institute of Finance Bulletin--#4.
-C. Coughlin (1985). “Domestic Content Legislation: House Voting and the Economic Theory of Regulation”. EcInq; V.23-#?, pp. 437-448.
-S. Tosini and E. Tower (1987). “The Textile Bill of 1985: The Determinants of Congressional Voting Patterns”. PC; V.54-#?, pp. 19-25.
-J. McCarthur and S. Marks (1988). “Constituent Interest vs. Legislator Ideology: The Role of Political Opportunity Cost”. EcInq; V.26-#?, pp. 461-470.
-J. McCarthur and S. Marks (1989). “Empirical Analyses of the Determinants of Protection: A Survey and Some New Results”. in J. Odell and T. Willett, eds. International Trade Policies: Gains from Exchange Between Economics and Political Science. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. pp. 105-139.
-S. Nollen and H. Iglarsh (1990). “Explanations of Protectionism in International Trade”. PC; V.66-#?, pp. 137-153.
-L. Wade and J. Gates (1990). “A New Tariff Map of the United States (House of Representatives)”. Political Geography Quarterly; V.9-#3, pp. 284-304.
-J. Lutz (1991). “Determinants of Protectionist Attitudes in the United States House of Representatives”. International Trade Journal; V.5-#3, pp. 301-328.
-S. Marks (1993). “Economic Interests and Voting on the Omnibus Trade Bill of 1987". PC, V.75-#1, pp. 21-42.
-S. Nollen and D. Quinn (1994). “Free Trade, Fair Trade, Strategic Trade, and Protectionism in the US Congress, 1987-1988". IO; V.48-#3, pp. 491-525.
-K. Srinivasan (1997). “An Empirical Analysis of the Political Economy of Tariffs”. E&P; V.9-#1, pp. 55-70.
-E. Gartzke and J.M. Wrighton (1998). “Thinking Globally or Acting Locally? Determinants of the GATT Vote in Congress”. LSQ; V.23-#1, pp. 33-55.
-M. Bailey and D. Brady (1998). “Heterogeneity and Representation: The Senate and Free Trade”. AJPS; V.42-#2, pp. 524-544.
-Michael Bailey (2001). “Quiet Influence: The Representation of Diffuse Interests on Trade Policy, 1983–94". Legislative Studies Quarterly; V.26-#1, pp. 45-80.
-R. Baldwin and C. Magee (2000). “Is Trade Policy for Sale? Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Bills”. Public Choice; V.105-#1/2, pp. 79-101.
-S. O’Halloran (1994). Politics, Process, and American Trade Policy. Ann Arbor: Michigan.
-W. Keech and K. Pak (1995). “Partisanship, Institutions, and Change in American Trade Politics”. JoP; V.57-#4, pp. 1130-1142.
-W. Hansen and T. Prusa (1997). “The Role of the Median Legislator in US Trade Policy: A Historical Analysis”. EcInq; V.35-#1, pp. 97-107.
-M. Gilligan (1997). Empowering Exporters: Reciprocity, Delegation and Collective Action in American Trade Policy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
-W. Kaempfer and S. Marks (1993). “The Expected Effects of Trade Liberalisation: Evidence from U.S. Congressional Action on Fast-Track Authority”. World Economy; V.16-#6, pp. 725-740.
-F. Boadu and M. Thompson (1993). “The Political Economy of the U.S.-Mexico Free Trade Agreement: Analysis of the Congressional Fast Track Vote”. Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics; V.25-#2, pp. 27-35.
-L. Kahane (1996). “Senate Voting Patterns on the 1991 Extension of the Fast Track Trade Procedures: Prelude to NAFTA”. PC; V.87-#1, pp. 35-53.
-L. Kahane (1996). “Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA: An Empirical Analysis”. American Journal of Economics and Sociology; V.55-#4, pp. 395-409.
-J. Conybeare and M. Zinkula (1996). “Who Voted Against the NAFTA”. World Economy; V.19-#1, pp. 1-12.
-J. Steagall and K. Jennings (1996). “Unions, PAC Contributions, and the NAFTA Vote”. Journal of Labor Research; V.17-#3, pp. 515-521.
-J. Steagall and K. Jennings (1996). “Unions and NAFTA’s Legislative Passage: Confrontation and Cover”. Labor Studies Journal, V21-#1, pp. 61-79.
-J. Garand, C.D, Livingston, and K. Wink (1996). “Dispositions, Constituencies, and Cross-Pressures: Modelling Roll-Call Voting on the North American Free Trade Agreement”. Political Research Quarterly; V.49-#4, pp. 729-748.
-J. Box-Steffenmeister, L. Arnold, C. Zorn (1997). “The Strategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress: A Study of the North American Free Trade Agreement”. APSR; V.91-#2, pp. 324-338.
-W. Thorbecke (1997). “Explaining House Voting on the North American Free Trade Agreement”. PC; V.92-#3/4, pp. 231-242.
-D. Holian, T. Krebs, and M. Walsh (1997). “Constituency Opinion, Ross Perot, and Roll-Call Behavior in the U.S. House: The Case of the NAFTA”. LSQ; V.22-#3, pp. 369-392.
-Kamdar, Nipoli and Jorge Gonzalez (1998). “An Empirical Analysis of the U.S. Senate Vote on NAFTA and GATT”. International Advances in Economic Research; V.4-#2, pp. 105-14.
-I.-B. Kang and K. Greene (1999). “A Political Economic Analysis of Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA”. PC; V.98-#3/4, pp. 385-397.
-K. Schnietz and T. Nieman (1999). “Politics Matter: The 1997 Derailment of Fast-Track Negotiating Authority”. Business and Politics, V.1-#?, pp. 233-251.
-K. Bardwell (2000). “The Puzzling Decline in House Support for Free Trade: Was Fast Track a Referendum on NAFTA?”. Legislative Studies Quarterly; V.25-#4, pp. 591-610.
d. Explaining Administered Protection Outcomes
(1) Presidential Preferences and Discretion
-R. Baldwin (1981). “US Political Pressures Against Adjustment to Greater Imports”. in W. Hong and L. Krause, eds. Trade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of the Pacific Basin. Seoul: Korea Development Institute.
-F. Boadu, F. Ruppel and A. Angel (1992). “An Empirical Model of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in Trade Restrictions”. Eurpoean Journal of Political Economy; V.8-#?, pp. 281-293.
-J.M. Finger, H.K. Hall and D.R. Nelson (1982). “The Political Economy of Administered Protection”. AER; V.72-#3, pp. 452-466.
-R. Baldwin and M. Moore (1992). “Political Aspects of the Administration of the Trade Remedy Law”. in R. Boltuck and R. Litan, eds. Down in the Dumps: Administration of the Unfair Trade Laws. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 253-280.
-Hansen, W. L. and K. O. Park (1995). Nation-state and pluralistic decision making in trade policy: The case of the international trade administration. International Studies Quarterly; V.39-#2, pp. 181-211.
-J. Goldstein and S. Lenway (1989). “Interests or Institutions: An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC Relations”. ISQ; V.33-#?, pp. 303-327.
-S. Lenway and K. Rehbein (1989). “Rent Seekers in the U.S. International Trade Commission Escape Clause Investigations”. International Trade Journal; V.4-#2, pp. 119-142.
-S. Lenway and D. Schuler, “The Determinants of Corporate Political Involvement in Trade Protection: The Case of the Steel Industry”. In R. Baldwin, ed. Empirical Studies of Commercial Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 75-105.
-W. Hansen (1990). “The International Trade Commission and the Poltics of Protection”. APSR; V.84-#1, pp. 21-46.
-R. Baldwin and J. Steagall (1991). “An Analysis of Factors Influencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping, Countervailing Duty and Safeguards Cases”. WA; V.130-#2, pp. 290-307.
-M. Moore (1992). “Rules or Politics? An Empirical Analysis of Antidumping Decisions”. EcInq; V.30-#3, pp. 449-466.
-T. Prusa (1991). “The Selection of Antidumping Cases for ITC Determination”. in R. Baldwin, ed. Empirical Studies of Commercial Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 47-71.
-J. DeVault (1993). “Economics and the International Trade Commission”. SEJ; V60-#?, pp. 463-478.
-K. Anderson (1993). “Agency Discretion or Statutory Direction: Decision Making at the US ITC”. Journal of Law and Economics; V.36-#?, pp. 915-935.
-K. Rehbein and S. Lenway (1993). “Industry Structure or Managerial Discretion: The Determinants of Industry Political Success in the U.S. International Trade Commission’s Escape Clause Investigations”. In J. Post, ed. Research in corporate social performance and policy. Volume 14. Greenwich, Conn: JAI press, pp. 3-18.
-C. Rowley and W. Thorbecke (1996). “Congressional Influence over Decision-Making at the ITC”. In F. Schneider and J. Casas Pardo, eds. Current Issues in Public Choice. Cheltenham: Elgar, pp. 189-199.
-D. Butler (1995). Does ‘Independent’ Mean ‘Free From Influence’?: Escape Clause Decision Making at the U.S. International Trade Commission. New York: Garland Press.
-W. Hansen and T. Prusa (1996). “Cumulation and ITC Decision-Making: The Sum of the Parts is Greater than the Whole”. EcInq; V.34-#4, pp. 746-769.
-W. Hansen and T. Prusa (1997). “The Economics and Politics of Trade Policy: An Empirical Analysis of ITC Decision Making”. RIE; V.5-#2, pp. 230-245.
-R. Cumby and T. Moran (1997). “Testing Models of the Trade Policy Process: Antidumping and the ‘New Issues’”. In R. Feenstra, ed. The Effect of U.S. Trade Protection and Promotion Policies. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 161-190.
-M. Czinkota and M. Kotabe (1997). “A Marketing Perspective on the US ITC’s Antidumping Actions: An Empirical Inquiry”. V32-#2, pp. 169-187.
-J. DeVault (2002). “Congressional Dominance and the International Trade Commission”. Public Choice; V.110-#1/2, pp. 1-22.
-R. Feinberg (1989). “Exchange Rates and ‘Unfair Trade’”. REStat; V.71-#4, pp. 704-707.
(4) Harassment and Withdrawal: Who Files and Why?
-J.M. Finger (1981). “The Industry-Country Incidence of Less-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Trade”. Quarterly Review of Economics and Business; V.21-#?, pp. 260-279.
-M. Herander and J.B. Schwartz (1984). “An Empirical Test of the Impact of the Threat of US Trade Policy: The Case of Antidumping Duties”. SEJ; V.51-#1, pp. 59-79.
-R. Feinberg and B. Hirsch (1989). “Industry Rent-Seeking and the Filing of 'Unfair' Trade Complaints”. International Journal of Industrial Organization; V.7-#?, pp. 325-340.
-T. Prusa (1992). “Why are So Many Antidumping Petitions Withdrawn”. JIE; V.33-#1/2.
-R. Staiger and F. Wolak (1994). “Measuring Industry-specific Protection: Antidumping in the US”. BPEA; 1994: Microeconomics, pp. 51-118.
-R. Staiger and F. Wolak (1996). “Differences in Uses and Effects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sources”. in A. Krueger, ed. The Political Economy of American Trade Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 385-415.
-P. Messerlin (1990). “The EC Antidumping Regulations: A First Economic Appraisal”. WA; V.126-#?, pp. 562-587.
-P.K.M. Thrakan (1991). “The Poltical Economy of Antidumping Undertakings in the European Communities”. EER; V.35-#?, pp. 1341-1359.
-P.K.M. Tharakan and J. Waelbroeck (1994). “Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and in the US: An Experiment in Comparative Political Economy”. EER; V.38-#1, pp. 171-193.
-A. Eymann and L. Schuknecht (1996). “Antidumping Policy in the European Community: Political Discretion or Technical Determination”. E&P; V.8-#2, pp. 111-131.
e. The Income Tax and the Political Economy of the Tariff
-B. Baack and E. Ray (1985). “Special Interests and the Adoption of the Income Tax in the US”. Journal of Economic History; V.45-#3, pp. 607-625.
-B. Baack and E. Ray (1985). “The Political Economy of the Origin and Development of the Federal Income Tax”. in R. Higgs, ed. Emergence of Modern Political Economy (Research in Economic History, supplement 4). Greenwood: JAI Press, pp. 121-138.
-J.M. Hansen (1990). “Taxation and the Political Economy of the Tariff”. IO; V.44-#4, pp. 527-551.
-G. Gardner and K. Kimbrough (1992). “Tax Regimes, Tariff Revenues and Government Spending”. Eca; V.59-#1, pp. 75-92.
-G. Gardner and K. Kimbrough (1992). “Tax Smoothing and Tariff Behavior in the US”. Journal of Macroeconomics; V.14-#4, pp. 711-729.
f. Macroeconomic Conditions and Protection
-T. McKeown (1984). “Firms and Tariff Change: Explaining the Demand for Protection”. WP; V.36-#2, pp. 215-233.
-J. Cassing, T. McKeown and J. Ochs (1986). “The Political Economy of the Tariff Cycle”. APSR; V.80-#3, pp. 843-862.
-R. Dornbusch and J. Frankel (1987). “Macroeconomics and Protection”. in R. Stern, ed. US Trade Policies in a Changing World Economy. Cambridge: MIT. pp. 77-130.
-Magee, Stephen P. (1987). “The Political-Economy of US Protectionism”. in H. Giersch, ed. Free Trade and the World Economy: Towards and Opening of Markets. Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr, pp. 368-402.
-Magee, Stephen P. and Leslie Young (1987). “Endogenous Protection in the United States, 1900-1984". in Stern, ed., pp. 145-195.
-G. Gardner and K. Kimbrough (1989). “The Behavior of US Tariff Rates”. AER; V.79-#1, pp. 91-110. [comment by Sadorsky, 1994, V.84-#4, pp. 1097-1103.]
-A. Bohara and W. Kaempfer (1991). “A Test of Tariff Endogeneity in the United States”. AER; V.81-#4, pp. 952-960.
-A. Bohara and W. Kaempfer (1991). “Testing the Endogeneity of Tariff Policy in the US: Further Evidence”. EcLets; V.35-#?, pp. 311-315.
-S. Das and S.P. Das (1994). “Quantitative Assessment of Tariff Endogeneity: Interwar vs. Postwar”. EcLets; V.44-#?, pp. 139-146.
-S. Lohmann and S. O’Halloran (1994). “Divided Government and US Trade Policy: Theory and Evidence”. IO; V.48-#4, pp. 592-632.
-D. Epstein and S. O’Halloran (1996). “The Partisan Paradox and the US Tariff, 1877-1934". IO; V.50-#2, pp. 301-324.
-H.K. Hall, C. Kao, and D. Nelson (1998). “Women and Tariffs: Testing the Gender Gap Hypothesis in a Downs-Mayer Political-Economy Model”. Economic Inquiry, 1998, V.36-#2, pp. 320-332.
-A. Bohara and W. Kaempfer (1992). “Endogenous Protection and Retaliation Between Canada and the US”. EcLets; V.38-#?, pp. 335-339.
-G. Gardner, D. Slottje and K. Kimbrough (1992). “Tariff Behavior in Five European Countries”. EcLets; V. 39-#?, pp. 73-78.
-A. Bohara and W. Kaempfer (1994). “Tariff Behavior in Five European Countries: Further Evidence”. EcLets; V.45-#?, pp. 213-216.
-I. Henriques and P. Sadorsky (1994). “The Determinants and Persistence of Canadian Tariff Rates”. CJE; V.27-#1, pp. 112-128.
-W. Thompson and L. Vescera (1992). “Growth Waves, Systemic Openness, and Protectionism”. IO; V.46-#2, pp. 493-532.
-R. Reuveny and W. Thompson (1997). “The Timing of Protectionism”. Review of International Political Economy; V.4-#?, pp. 179-213.
-W. Thompson and R. Reuveny (1998). “Tariffs and Trade Fluctuations: Does Protectionism Matter as Much as We Think?”. IO; V.52-#2, pp. 421-440.
-W. Takacs (1981). “Pressures for Protectionism: An Empirical Analysis”. EcInq; V.19-#?, pp. 687-693.
-S. Feigenbaum, H. Ortiz and T. Willett (1985). “Protectionist Pressures and Aggregate Economic Conditions: Comment on Takacs”. EcInq; V.23-#1, pp. 175-182.
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-Salvatore, Dominick (1987). “Import Penetration, Exchange Rates, and Protectionism in the US”. Journal of Policy Modelling; V.9: pp. 125-141.
-E. Grilli (1988). “Macro-economic Determinants of Trade Protection”. World Economy; V.11-#3, pp. 313-326.
-C. Coughlin, J. Terza and N.A. Kahlifah (1989). “The Determinants of Escape Clause Petitions”. REStat; V.??-#?, pp. 341-347.
-M. Leidy (1997). “Macroeconomic Conditions and Pressures for Protection under Antidumping and Countervaling Duty Laws: Empirical Evidence from the US”. IMFSP; V.44-#1, pp. 132-144.
-M. Knetter and T. Prusa (2000). “Macroeconomic Factors and Antidumping Filings: Evidence from Four Countries”. JIE; V.61-#1, pp. 1-17.
-D. Nelson (1988). “Endogenous Tariff Theory: A Critical Survey”. AJPS; V.32-#3, pp. 796-837.
-A.L. Hillman (1988). The Political Economy of Protection. Chur: Harwood Academic Publishers.
-S. Magee, W. Brock and L. Young (1989). Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
-D. Austen-Smith (1991). “Rational Consumers and Irrational Voters: A Review Essay on Magee, Brock and Young”. E&P; V.3-#1, pp. 73-92.
-W. Mitchell and M. Munger (1991). “Economic Models of Interest Groups”. AJPS; V.35-#2, pp. 512-546.
-D. Rodrik (1995). “Political Economy of Trade Policy”. in G. Grossman and K Rogoff, eds. Handbook of International Economics--V.III. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 1457-1494.
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-J. Bhagwati (1982). “Shifting Comparative Advantage, Protectionist Demands and Policy Response”. in J. Bhagwati, ed. Import Competition and Response. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 153-184.
-E. Dinopoulos (1983). “Import Competition, International Factor Mobility and Lobbying Responses”. JIE; V.14-#?, pp. 395-410.
-J. deMelo and S. Robinson (1982). “Trade Adjustment Policies and Income Distribution in Three Archetype Developing Economies”. JDevEc; V.10-#?, pp. 67-92.
-R. Baldwin (1984). “Rent-Seeking and Trade Policy: An Industry Approach”. WA; V.120-#4, pp. 662-676.
-L. Leger (1993). “Land Rents and the Demand for Protection”. International Trade Journal; V.7-#4, pp. 435-462.
-T. Pugel and I. Walter (1985). “US Corporate Interests and the Political Economy of Trade”. REStat; V.??-#?, pp. 465-473.
-V. Aggarwal, R. Keohane and D. Yoffie (1987). “The Dynamics of Negotiated Protection”. American Political Science Review; V.81-#2, pp. 345-366.
-H. Milner and D. Yoffie (1989). “Between Free Trade and Protectionism: Strategic Trade Policy and a Theory of Corporate Trade Demands”. IO; V.43-#2, pp. 239-272.
-S. Magee (1978). “Three Simple Tests of the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem”. in P. Oppenheimer, ed. Issues in International Economics; Stocksfield: Oriel Press, pp. 138-153.
-D. Nelson and C. Wasley (1989). “Two is Not Enough: A Capital Market Test of 3x2 Endogenous Tariff Theory”. ms: Murphy Institute, Tulane University.
-A. Krueger (1980). “Protectionist Pressures, Imports and Employment in the US”. ScanJE; V.??-#?, pp. 133-146.
-I.M. Destler and J. Odell (1987). Anti-Protection: Changing Forces in US Trade Politics. Washington, DC: IIE.
-H. Milner (1988). Resisting Protectionism: Global Industries and the Politics of International Trade. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
-E. Balistreri (1997). “The Performance of the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek Model in Predicting Endogenous Trade Policy Forces at the Individual Level”. CJE; V.30-#1, pp. 1-17.
-K. Scheve and M. Slaughter (2001). “What Determines Individual Trade Policy Preferences”. JIE; V.54-#2, pp. 267-292.
-K. O’Rourke and R. Sinnott (2001). “The Determinants of Individual Trade Policy Preferences: International Survey Evidence”. Brookings Trade Policy Forum 2001, forthcoming.
-A.M. Mayda and D. Rodrik (2001). “Why Are Some People (and Countries) More Protectionist Than Others?”. ms: Kennedy School of Government.
c. The Organization of Interests
-P. Murrell (1981?). “Comparative Growth and Comparative Advantage: Tests of the Effects of Interest Group Behavior on Foreign Trade Patterns”. PC; V.??-#?, pp. 35-53
-D. Yoffie and S. Bergenstein (1985). “Creating Political Advantage: The Rise of the Corporate Political Entrepreneur”. California Management Review; V.28-#1, pp. 124-139.
-G. Lehmbruch (1986). “Interest Groups, Government and the Politics of Protectionism”. Aussenwirtschaft; V.41-#2/3, pp. 273-302.
-H.K. Hall and D. Nelson (1989). “Institutional Structure and Time Horizon in a Simple Political-Economy Model: The Lowi Effect”. International Spectator; V.24-#3/4, pp.153-173.
-A.L. Hillman (1991). “Protection, Politics and Market Structure”. in E. Helpman and A. Razin, eds. International Trade and Trade Policy. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 120-140.
-M. Herander and R. Pupp (1991). “Firm Participation in Steel Industry Lobbying”. EcInq; V.29-#?, pp. 134-147.
-S. Lenway and D. Schuler (1991). “The Determinants of Corporate Political Involvement in Trade Protection: The Case of the Steel Industry.” in R. Baldwin, ed. Empirical Studies of Commercial Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 75-105.
-P. Midford (1993). “International Trade and Domestic Politics: Improving on Rogowski’s Model of Political Alignments”. IO; V.47-#?, pp. 535-564.
-J. Alt and M. Gilligan (1994). “The Political Economy of Trading States: Factor Specificity, Collective Action Problems and Domestic Political Institutions”. Journal of Political Philosophy; V.2-#?, pp. 165-192.
-K. Gawande (1997). “US Non-Tariff Barriers as Privately Provided Public Goods”. JpubE; V.64-#?, pp. 61-81.
-K. Gawande (1998). “Stigler-Olson Lobbying Behavior in Protectionist Industries: Evidence from the Lobbying Power Function”. JEBO; V.35-#?, pp. 477-499.
-Y. S. Chiu (1998). “Politics, Structure of Protection, and Welfare”. RIE; V.6-#3, pp.
-D. Mitra (1999). “Endogenous Lobby Formation and Endogenous Protection: A Long-Run Model of Trade Policy Determination”. AER; V.89-#5, pp. 1116-1134.
-R. Damania and P.G. Fredriksson (2000). “On the Formation of Industry Lobby Groups”. JEBO. V.41-#4, pp. 315-335.
-L. Salamon and J. Siegfried (1977). “Economic Power and Political Influence: The Impact of Industry Structure on Public Policy”. APSR; V.71-#?, pp. 1026-1043.
-E. Esty and R. Caves (1983). “Market Structure and Political Influence: New Data on Political Expenditures, Activity and Success”. EcInq; V.?-#?, pp. 24-38.
-D. Jacobs (1988). “Corporate Economic Power and the State: A Longitudinal Assessment”. American Journal of Sociology; V.93-#4, pp. 852-881.
-D. Clawson and A. Neustadtl (1989). “Interlocks, PACs, and Corporate Conservatism”. American Journal of Sociology; V.94-#4, pp. 749-793.
-K. Grier, M. Munger and B. Roberts (1991). “The Industrial Organization of Corporate Political Participation”. SEJ; V.57-#3, pp. 727-738.
-B. Kennelly and P. Murrell (1991). “Industry Characteristics and Interest Group Formation: An Empirical Study”. PC; V.70-#1, pp. 21-40.
-L. Kristov, P. Lindert and R. McClelland (1992). “Pressure Groups and Redistribution”. JPubE; V.48-#?, pp. 135-163.
-T. Moe (1980). The Organization of Interests. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
-G.K. Wilson (1977). Unions in American National Politics. London: Macmillan.
-G.K. Wilson (1985). Business and Politics: A Comparative Introduction. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House.
-L. Lynn and T. McKeown (1988). Organizing Business: Trade Associations in America and Japan. Washington,DC: AEI.
-D. Mitchell (1970). “Labor and the Tariff Question”. Industrial Relations; V.1-#3, pp. 268-276.
d. Equilibrium Policy Choice: Levels
-R. Findlay and S. Wellisz (1982). “Endogenous Tariffs, the Political Economy of Trade Restrictions and Welfare”. in J. Bhagwati, ed. Import Competition and Response. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 223-234.
-R. Findlay and S. Wellisz (1983). “Some Aspects of the Political Economy of Trade Restrictions”. KYKLOS, V.36-#3, pp. 469-481.
-S. Donnenfeld and S. Weber (1985). “Lobbying for Tariffs and the Cost of Protection”. Recherches Economiques de Louvain; V.51-#1, pp. 21-27.
-R. Baldwin (1982). “The Political Economy of Protectionism”. in J. Bhagwati, ed. Import Competition and Response. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 263-292.
-R. Feenstra and J. Bhagwati (1982). “Tariff Seeking and the Efficient Tariff”. in J. Bhagwati, ed. Import Competition and Response. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 245-258.
-R. Baldwin (1987). “Politically Realistic Objective Functions and Trade Policy: PROFs and Tariffs”. EcLets; V.24-#?, pp. 287-290.
-P. Wagstaff (1975). “Consensus Tariff Policy”. EcRec; V.51-#?, pp. 105-108
-W. Mayer (1993). “Lobbying for Tariff Policies”. RIE; V.1-#3, pp. 221-233.
-K. Kiyono, M. Okuno-Fujiwara and K. Ueda (1991). “Industry Specific Interests and Trade Protection: A Game Theoretic Analysis”. ESQ; V.42-#4, pp. 347-361.
-H.K. Hall and D. Nelson (1992). “Institutional Structure in the Political Economy of Protection: Legislated versus Administered Protection”. E&P; V.4-#1, pp. 61-77.
-M. Moore (1992). “Bureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a Repeated Game”. JITE; V.148-#?, pp. 607-627.
-D. Gould and G. Woodbridge (1997). “Building Trade Barriers and Knocking Them Down”. RIE; V.5-#2, pp. 256-271.
-P. Pecorino (1997). “Exogenous Tariff Changes with Endogenous Lobbying Response”. PC; V.92-#1/2, pp. 91-108.
-J. Conlon and P. Pecorino (1998). “Primary and Secondary Reform”. Economic Inquiry; V.36-#4, pp. 590-602.
-P. Pecorino (1999). “Endogenous Export Subsidies as a Revenue-Seeking Activity: Some Implications for the Evolution of Protection”. CJE; V.32-#3, pp. 785-798.
-S. Bradford (2003). “Protection and Jobs: Explaining the Structure of Trade Barriers across Industries”. JIE; V.61-#1, pp. 19-39.
-R. Jensen and M. Thursby (1986). “Endogenous Tariff Policy under Uncertainty”. ms.: Ohio State University.
-M. Fafchamps, E. Sadoulet, and A. de Janvry (1993). “Tariff Seeking in a General Equilibrium Framework”. Journal of International Trade and Economic Development; V.2-#?, pp. 167-189.
-M. Fafchamps, A. de Janvry, and E. Sadoulet (1999). “Social Heterogeneity and Wasteful Lobbying”. PC; V.98-#1/2, pp. 5-27.
-R. Findlay (1990). “The New Political Economy: Its Explanatory Power for LDCs”. E&P; V.2-#2, pp. 193-221.
-R. Clarida and R. Findlay (1991). “Endogenous Comparative Advantage, Government, and the Pattern of Trade”. NBER Working Paper, #3813.
-J. Coggins, T. Graham-Tomasi and T. Roe (1991). “Existence of Equilibrium in a Lobbying Economy”. IER; V.32-#3, pp. 533-550.
-R. Smith (1995). “Interest Group Influence in Congress”. Legislative Studies Quarterly; V.20-#1, pp. 89-139.
-W. Mayer (1984). “Endogenous Tariff Formation”. AER; V.74-#5, pp. 970-985.
-H. Weck-Hannemann (1990). “Protectionism in Direct Democracy”. JITE; V.146-#3, pp. 389-418.
-H.K. Hall, C. Kao, and D. Nelson (1998). “Women and Tariffs: Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer Model”. Economic Inquiry; V.36-#2, pp. 320-332.
-J. Rotemberg (2000). “Commercial Policy with Altruistic Voters”. JPE; V.111-#1, pp. 174-201.
-R. Fischer and P. Serra (1996). “Income Inequality and Choice of Free Trade in a Model of Intraindustry Trade”. QJE; V.111-#1, pp. 41-64.
(3) Partisan Competition with Probabilistic Voting
-W. Mayer and J. Li (1994). “Interest Groups, Electoral Competition, and Probabilistic Voting for Trade Policies”. E&P; V.6-#1, pp. 59-77.
-D. Clark and J. Thomas (1995). “Probabilistic Voting, Campaign Contributions, and Efficiency”. AER; V.85-#1, pp. 254-259.
-C.C. Yang (1995). “Endogenous Tariff Formation under Representative Democracy: A Probabilistic Voting Model”. AER; V.85-#4, pp. 956-963.
-W. Mayer (1998). “Trade Policy Platforms of Competing Parties: What Makes Them Different?”. RIE; V.6-#2, pp. 185-203.
(4) Influence-driven Contributions
-G. Grossman and E. Helpman (1994). “Protection for Sale”. AER; V.84-#4, pp. 833-850.
-A. Dixit (1996). “Special-Interest Lobbying and Endogenous Commodity Taxation”. Eastern Economic Journal; V.22-#4, pp. 375-388.
-A. Dixit, G. Grossman, and E. Helpman (1997). “Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Tax Policy”. JPE; V.105-#4, pp. 752-69.
-S.L. Brainard and T. Verdier (1994). “Lobbying and Adjustment in Declining Industries”. EER; V.38-#?, pp. 586-595.
-S.L. Brainard and T. Verdier (1997). “The Political Economy of Declining Industries: Senescent Industry Collapse Revisited”. JIE; V.42-#1/2, pp. 221-237.
-C. Magee (2002). “Declining Industries and Persistent Tariff Protection”. RIE; V.10-#4, pp. 749-762.
-M. Rama and G. Tabellini (1998). “Lobbying by Capital and Labor over Trade and Labor Market Policies”. EER; V.42-#7, pp. 1295-1316.
-Y.S. Chiu (1998). “Politics, Structure of Protection, and Welfare”. RIE; V.6-#3, pp. 472-487.
-Hideo Konishi, Kamal Saggi, and Shlomo Weber (1999). “Endogenous Trade Policy under Foreign Direst Investment”. Journal of International Economics; V.49-#2, pp. 289-308.
-R. Boylan (2000). “An Optimal Auction Perspective on Lobbying”. SC&W; V.17-#1, pp. 55-68.
-R. Riezman and J. Wilson (1997). “Political Reform and Trade Policy”. JIE; V.42-#1/2, pp. 67-90.
-P. Goldberg and G. Maggi (1999). “Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation”. AER; V.89-#5, pp. 1135-1155.
-U. Bandyopadhyay and K. Gawande (2000). “Is Protection for Sale? Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of Endogenous Protection”. REStat; V.82-#1, pp. 139-152.
e. Equilibrium Policy Choice: Instruments
-J. Cassing and A.L. Hillman (1985). “Political Influence Motives and the Choice Between Tariffs and Quotas”. JIE; V.19-#?, pp. 279-290.
-W. Mayer and R. Riezman (1987). “Endogenous Choice of Trade Policy Instruments”. JIE; V.23-#3/4, pp. 377-381.
-W. Mayer and R. Riezman (1989). “Tariff Formation in a Multidimensional Voting Model”. E&P; V.1-#1, pp. 61-79.
-W. Mayer and R. Riezman (1990). “Voter Preferences for Trade Policy Instruments”. E&P; V.2-#3, pp. 259-273.
-W. Mayer (2002). “Systematic Political Grass-Root Support for Tariffs”. RIE; V.10-#4, pp. 657-670.
-R. Findlay and S. Wellisz (1986). “Tariffs, Quotas and Domestic-Content Protection: Some Political Economy Considerations”. PC; V.50-#?, pp. 221-242.
-P. Lloyd and R. Falvey (1986). “The Choice of Instrument for Industry Protection”. in R. Snape, ed. Issues in World Trade Policy: GATT at the Crossroads. New York: St. Martins, pp. 152-170.
-A. Deardorff (1987). “Why Do Governments Prefer Nontariff Barriers”. Carnegie Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy; #24, pp. 191-216.
-S. Magee, W. Brock, and L. Young (1989). “Optimal Obfuscation and the Theory of the Second Worst: The Politically Efficient Policy”. Chapter 18 in Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 257-263. [Mathematical appendix, pp. 363-364.]
-W. Kaempfer, J.H. McClure and T. Willett (1989). “Incremental Protection and Efficient Political Choice Between Tariffs and Quotas”. CJE; V.22-#2, pp. 228-236.
-M. Moore and S. Suranovic (1992). “Lobbying vs. Administered Protection: Endogenous Industry Choice and National Welfare”. JIE; V.32-#3/4, pp. 289-303.
-B.P. Rosendorff (1996). “Endogenous Trade Restrictions and Domestic Political Pressure”. in R. Feenstra, G. Grossman and D. Irwin, eds. The Political Economy of Trade Policy. Cambridge: MIT, pp. 245-264.
-B.P. Rosendorff (1996). “Voluntary Export Restraints, Antidumping Procedure, and Domestic Politics”. American Economic Review; V.86-#3, pp. 544-561.
-D. Mitra (2000). “On the Endogenous Choice between Protection and Promotion”. E&P; V.12-#1, pp. 33-51.
-G. Maggi and A. Rodriguez-Clare (2000). “Import Penetration and the Politics of Protection”. JIE; V.51-#2, pp. 287-304.
f. Equilibrium Policy Choice: The Role of Foreign Interests
-A.L. Hillman and H. Ursprung (1988). “Domestic Politics, Foreign Interests, and International Trade Policy”. AER; V.78-#4, pp. 729-745. [comment by Hofer/Woodruf, AER; V.84-#5, pp. 1474-1475.]
-S. Das (1990). “Foreign Lobbying and the Political Economy of Protection”. Japan and the World Economy; V.2-#2, pp. 169-179.
-S. Husted (1991). “Foreign Lobbying: A Theoretical Analysis”. Eastern Economic Journal; V.17-#1, pp. 89-99.
-R. Fischer (1992). “Endogenous Probability of Protection and Firm Behavior”. JIE; V.32-#1/2, pp. 149-163.
-R. Fischer and L. Mirman (1994). “Learning about Enforcement: A Model of Dumping”. JEI; V.9-#2, pp. 214-240.
-A.L. Hillman and H. Ursprung (1993). “Multinational Firms, Political Competition, and International Trade Policy”. IER; V.34-#2, pp. 347-363.
-A.L. Hillman and H. Ursprung (1999). “Foreign Investment and Endogenous Protection with Protectionist Quid Pro Quo”. E&P; V.11-#1, pp. 1-12.
-M. Moore and S. Suranovic (1993). “Lobbying and Cournot-Nash Competition: Implications for Strategic Trade Policy”. JIE; V.35-#3/4, pp. 367-376.
-K. Rehbein (1995). “Foreign-owned Firms’ Campaign Contributions in the United States: An Exploratory Survey”. Policy Studies Journal; V.23-#1, pp. 41-61.
-K. Gawande, P. Krishna, and M. Robbins (2004). “Foreign Lobbies and US Trade Policy”. NBER Working Paper; #10205.
g. Equilibrium Policy Choice: The Role of State-Society Relations
-D. North (1979). “A Framework for Analyzing the State in Economic History”. Explorations in Economic History;
-T.N. Srinivasan (1985). “Neoclassical Political Economy, the State and Economic Development”. Asian Development Review; V.3-#2, pp.