

## I. THE POLITICAL-ECONOMY OF PROTECTION

### A. Domestic Political Economy

#### 1. Institutional Context of the Domestic Politics of Trade Policy: US

##### a. Overviews

- R. Baldwin (1985). *The Political Economy of US Import Policy*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- I.M. Destler (1986). *American Trade Politics: System Under Stress*. Washington, DC: IIE.
- R. Barrie (1987). *Congress and the Executive: The Making of US Foreign Trade Policy, 1789-1968*. New York: Garland Press.
- R. Baldwin (1988). "US Trade Policy, 1945-1988: From Foreign Policy to Domestic Policy". in C. Pearson and J. Riedel, eds. *The Directions of Trade Policy*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- E. Ray (1988). "Changing Patterns in Protectionism: The Fall in Tariffs and the Rise in Non-Tariff Barriers". *Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business*; V.8-#2, pp. 285-327.
- P. Nivola (1993). *Regulating Unfair Trade*. Washington, DC: Brookings.
- S. O'Halloran (1994). *Politics, Process, and American Trade Policy*. Ann Arbor: Michigan.
- E. Kaplan (1995). *American Trade Policy, 1923-1995*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press.
- A. Eckes (1995). *Opening America's Market: U.S. Foreign Trade Policy Since 1776*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

##### b. Legislative Structure, Process, and General Political Economy

###### (1) The Classic Tariff System

- F. Taussig (1931). *The Tariff History of the US*. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons.
- J.J. Pincus (1975). "Pressure Groups and the Pattern of Tariffs". *JPE*; V.83-#4, pp. 757-778.
- Pincus, J.J. (1977). *Pressure Groups and Politics in Ante-Bellum Tariffs*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Pope, Clayne (1972). "The Impact of the Ante-Bellum Tariff on Income Distribution". *Explorations in Economic History*; V.9-#4, pp. 375-421.
- Baack, Ben and Edward John Ray (1973/4). "Tariff Policy and Income Distribution: The Case of the United States, 1830-1860". *Explorations in Economic History*; V.11-#2, pp. 103-121.
- James, John (1978). "The Welfare Effects of the Antebellum Tariff: A General Equilibrium Analysis". *Explorations in Economic History*; V.15-#3, pp. 231-256.
- B. Baack and E. Ray (1983). "The Political Economy of Tariff Policy: A Case Study of the US". *Explorations in Economic History*; V.20-#?, pp. 73-93.
- J.A.C. Conybeare (1991). "Voting for Protection: An Electoral Model of Tariff Policy". *IO*; V.45-#1, pp. 57-81.

- W. Becker (1982). *The Dynamics of Business Government Relations: Industry and Exports, 1893-1921*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press
- J. Kenkel (1983). *Progressives and Protection: The Search for a Tariff Policy, 1866-1936*. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America.
- C. Hody (1996). *Politics of Trade: American Political Development and Foreign Economic Policy*. Hanover, NH: Dartmouth/University Press of New England.
- E. Stanwood (1904). *American Tariff Controversies in the 19th Century* (Two Vols.). Boston: Houghton Mifflin and Co.
- T. Terrill (1973). *The Tariff, Politics and American Foreign Policy, 1874-1901*. Westport: Greenwood Press.
- F.W. Poulshock (1965). *The Two Parties and the Tariff in the 1880's*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.
- C. Stern (1971). *Protectionist Republicanism: Republican Tariff Policy in the McKinley Period*. Oshkosh: Stern.
- D. Detzer (1973). "Business Reformers and Tariff Revision: The Payne-Aldrich Tariff of 1909". *The Historian*; V.35-#?, pp. 196-204.
- D. Verdier (1993). "The Politics of Trade Preference Formation: The US from the Civil War to the New Deal". *Politics and Society*; V.21-#4, pp. 365-392.
- J. Reitano (1994). *The Tariff Question in the Gilded Age*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- C. Calhoun (1996). "Political Economy in the Gilded Age: The Republican Party's Industrial Policy". *Journal of Policy History*; V.8-#3, pp. 291-309.
- K. Schneitz (1994). "The 1916 Tariff Commission: Democrats' Use of Expert Information to Constrain Tariff Protection". *Business and Economic History*; V.23-#1, pp.176-189.
- K. Schneitz (1998). "Democrats' 1916 Tariff Commission: Responding to Dumping Fears and Illustrating the Consumer Costs of Protectionism". *Business History Review*; V.72-#1, pp.1-45.

## (2) The Smoot-Hawley Tariff

### (a) Political Economy

- E.E. Schattschneider (1935). *Politics, Pressure and the Tariff*. New York: Prentice Hall.
- B. Eichengreen (1989). "The Political Economy of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff". *Research in Economic History*; V.12, pp. 1-43.
- M. Hayford and C. Pasurka (1992). "The Political Economy of the Fordney-McCumber and Smoot-Hawley Tariff Acts". *Explorations in Economic History*; V.29-#1, pp. 30-50.
- C. Callahan, J. McDonald, and A. O'Brien (1994). "Who Voted for Smoot-Hawley?". *Journal of Economic History*; V.54-#3, pp. 683-690.

-R. Cupitt and E. Elliott (1994). "Schattschneider Revisited: Senate Voting on the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930". *Economics and Politics*; V.6-#4, pp. 187-199.

-D. Irwin and R. Kroszner (1996). "Economic Interests and Logrolling in the Passage of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff". *Carnegie-Rochester Series on Public Policy*, #45, pp. 173-200.  
[Comments by M. Bordo, pp. 201-205.]

#### (b) How High Was the Smoot-Hawley Tariff?

-M. Hayford and C. Pasurka (1991). "Effective Rates of Protection and the Fordney-McCumber and Smoot-Hawley Tariff Acts". *Applied Economics*; V.23-#?, pp. 1385-1392.

-R. Archibald, D. Feldman, M. Hayford, and C. Pasurka (2000). "Effective Rates of Protection and the Fordney-McCumber and Smoot-Hawley Tariff Acts: Comments and Revised Estimates". *Applied Economics*; V.32-#9, pp. 1223-1226.

-M. Crucini (1994). "Sources of Variation in Real Tariff Rates: The US, 1900-1940". *AER*; V.84-#3, pp. 732-743.

-D. Irwin (1998). "Changes in U.S. Tariffs: The Role of Import Prices and Commercial Policies". *American Economic Review*; V.88-#4, pp. 1015-1026.

#### (c) Macroeconomic Consequences of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff

-P. Friedman (1974). *The Impact of Trade Destruction on National Incomes*. Gainesville: University of Florida Press.

-B. Eichengreen and D. Irwin (1995). "Trade Blocs, Currency Blocks, and the Reorientation of World Trade in the 1930s". *JIE*; V.38-#1/2, pp. 1-24.

-M. Crucini and J. Kahn (1996). "Tariffs and Aggregate Economic Activity: Lessons from the Great Depression". *JMonE*; V.38-#3, pp. 427-467.

-D. Irwin (1998). "The Smoot-Hawley Tariff: A Quantitative Assessment". *REStat*; V.53-#2, pp. 326-334.

-R. Archibald and D. Feldman (1998). "Investment during the Great Depression: Uncertainty and the Role of Smoot-Hawley Tariff". *SEJ*; V.64-#4, pp. 857-879.

-J. McDonald, A. O'Brien, and C. Callahan (1997). "Trade Wars: Canada's Reaction to the Smoot-Hawley Tariff". *Journal of Economic History*; V.57-#4, pp. 802-826.

-A. Eckes (1995). "Revisiting Smoot-Hawley". *Journal of Policy History*; V.7-#3, pp. 295-310.

-A. Eckes (1998). "Smoot-Hawley and the Stock Market Crash, 1929-1930". *International Trade Journal*; V.12-#1, pp. 65-82.

-K. Carey (1999). "Investigating a Debt Channel for the Smoot-Hawley Tariffs: Evidence from the Sovereign Bond Market". *Journal of Economic History*; V.59-#3, pp. 748-761.

-J. Madsen (2001). "Trade Barriers and the Collapse of World Trade During the Great Depression". *SEJ*; V.67-#4, pp. 848-868.

### (3) The RTAA and the Transition to the Modern System

- S. Haggard (1988). "The Institutional Foundations of Hegemony: Explaining the Trade Agreements Act of 1934". *International Organization*. V.42-#1; pp. 91-119.
- D. Nelson (1989). "Domestic Political Preconditions of US Trade Policy: Liberal Structure and Protectionist Dynamics". *Journal of Public Policy*; V.9-#1, pp. 83-108.
- W. Hansen and T. Prusa (1993). "Congressional Decision-Making and the Rise of Delegation: An Application to Trade Policy". ms: SUNY Stony Brook.
- K. Schmeitz (1996). "To Delegate or Not To Delegate: Congressional Institutional Choices in the Regulation of Foreign Trade". *Business and Society*; V.35-#1, pp. 129-36.
- M. Bailey, J. Goldstein and B. Weingast (1997). "The Institutional Roots of American Trade Policy: Politics, Coalitions, and International Trade". *WP*; V.49-#3, pp. 309-338.
- M. Gilligan (1997). *Empowering Exporters: Reciprocity, Delegation and Collective Action in American Trade Policy*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- D. Irwin (1997). "From Smoot-Hawley to the Reciprocal Trade Agreements: Changing the Course of U.S. Trade Policy in the 1930's". in M. Bordo, C. Goldin, and E. White, eds. *The Defining Moment: The Great Depression and the American Economy in the Twentieth Century*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 325-352.
- D. Irwin and R. Kroszner (1999). "Interests, Institutions, and Ideology in Securing Policy Change: The Republican Conversion to Trade Liberalization after Smoot-Hawley". *Journal of Law and Economics*; V.42-#2, pp. 643-674.
- M. Hiscox (1999). "The Magic Bullet? The RTAA, Institutional Reform, and Trade Liberalization". *IO*; V.53-#4, pp. 669-698.
- K. Schmeitz (2000). "The Institutional Foundations of U.S. Trade Policy: Revisiting Explanations for the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act". *Journal of Policy History*, V.12-#4, pp. 417-444.
- K. Schmeitz (1999). "The 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act: Investor Response to Political Institutional Change". ms: Jones Graduate School of Management, Rice University.
- M. Butler (1998). *Cautious Visionary: Cordell Hull and Trade Reform, 1933-1937*. Kent: Kent State University Press.

### (4) The Modern Trade Policy System

- R. Bauer, I.deS. Pool and L.A. Dexter (1963). *American Business and Public Policy*. Chicago: Aldine.
- T. Lowi (1964). "American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies and Political Theory". *WP*; V.16-#4, pp. 347-382.
- J.R. Wilkinson (1960). *Politics and Trade Policy*. Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press.
- R. Pastor (1980). *Congress and the Politics of US Foreign Economic Policy, 1929-1976*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

- S. Lande and C. VanGrasstek (1986). *The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984: Trade Policy in the Reagan Administration*. Lexington: DC Heath.
- P.S. Nivola (1986). "The New Protectionism: US Trade Policy in Historical Perspective". *Political Science Quarterly*; V.101-#4, pp. 577-600.
- P.S. Nivola (1990). "Trade Policy: Refereeing the Playing Field". in T. Mann, ed. *A Question of Balance: The President, Congress and Foreign Policy*. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 201-253.
- D. Yoffie (1989). "American Trade Policy: An Obsolete Bargain?". in J. Chubb and P. Peterson, eds. *Can Government Govern?* Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 100-138.
- C. Pearson (1989). *Free Trade, Fair Trade? The Reagan Record*. Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute.
- S. Schwab (1994). *Trade-Offs: Negotiating the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act*. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
- S. Dryden (1995). *Trade Warriors: USTR and the American Crusade for Free Trade*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- B. Fordham (1998). "Economic Interests, Party, and Ideology in Early Cold War Era U.S. Foreign Policy". *IO*; V.52-#2, pp. 359-396.
- J. Schoch (1998). "Party Politics and International Economic Activism: The Reagan-Bush Years". *Political Science Quarterly*; V.113-#?, pp. 113-131.
- Mayer, F. (2000). "Labor, Environment and the State of U.S. Trade Politics". *NAFTA: Law and Business Review of the Americas*; V.6-#3, pp. 335-346.
- Uslaner, E. (2000). "The Democratic Party and Free Trade: An Old Romance Restored". *NAFTA: Law and Business Review of the Americas*; V.6-#3, pp. 347-362
- Schiller, W.J. (2000). "Has Free Trade Won the War in Congress, or is the Battle Still Raging". *NAFTA: Law and Business Review of the Americas*; V.6-#3, pp. 363-387
- Schiller, Wendy (1999). "Trade Politics in the American Congress: A Study of the Interaction of Political Geography and Interest Group Behavior". *Political Geography*; V.18-#7, pp. 769-789.
- M. Bailey (1998). "Trade-Security Linkage in Congress and the Origins of Cold War Trade Policy". ms: Georgetown University.
- R. Phelps (1993). "International Perspective: American Public Opinion on Trade, 1950-1990". *Business Economics*; V.28-#3, pp. 35-40.

### c. Administrative Structure and Process

- I.B. Kravis (1954). "The Trade Agreements Escape Clause". *AER*; V.44-#3, pp. 319-338.
- W.B. Kelly (1962). "The 'Expanded' Trade-Agreements Escape Clause, 1955-61". *AER*; V.70-#1, pp. 37-63.
- W.B. Kelly, ed. (1963). *Studies in US Commercial Policy*. Chapel Hill: University of North

Carolina Press.

-J. Goldstein (1986). "The Political Economy of Trade: Institutions of Protection". *APSR*; V.80-#1, pp. 161-184.

-D. Nelson (1989). "On the High Track to Protection: The US Automobile Industry, 1979-1981". in S. Haggard and C. Moon, eds. *Pacific Dynamics*. Boulder: Westview Press, pp. 97-128.

-J.M. Finger and T. Murray (1990). "Policing Unfair Imports: The US Example". *Journal of World Trade*; V.24-#4, pp. 39-53.

-E. Grinols (1990). "Procedural Protectionism: The New American Trade Bill and the New Interventionist Mode". *WA*; V.?-#?, pp. 501-521.

-D. Palmeter (1989). "The Capture of Anti-Dumping Law". *Yale Journal of International Law*; V.14-#1, pp.

-M. Leidy and B. Hoekman (1991). "Spurious Injury as Indirect Rent-Seeking: Free Trade under the Prospect of Protection". *E&P*; V.3-#4, pp. 111-137.

-M. Leidy (1994). "Quid Quo Pro Restraint and Spurious Injury: Subsidies and Prospect for CVDs". in A. Deardorff and R. Stern, eds. *Analytical and Negotiating Issues in the Global Trading System*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 263-305.

-R. Baldwin (1998). "Imposing Multilateral Discipline on Administered Protection". in A. Krueger, ed. *The WTO as an International Organization*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 297-327.

## 2. Historical Studies in the Politics of Protection

### a. Comparative Studies

-C. Kindleberger (1951). "Group Behavior and International Trade". *JPE*; V.59-#1, pp. 30-46.

-A. Gerschenkron (1962). *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of Essays*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

-J. Kurth (1979). "The Political Consequences of the Product Cycle". *IO*; V.33-#1, pp. 1-34.

-A. Milward (1981). "Tariffs as Constitutions". in S. Strange and R. Tooze, eds. *The International Politics of Surplus Capacity*. London: Allen and Unwin. pp. 57-66.

-P. Gourevitch (1986). *Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

-P. Bairoch (1988). "European Trade Policy, 1815-1914". in P. Mathias and S. Pollard, eds. *Cambridge Economic History of Europe. V.8, Industrial Economies*. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 1-160.

-R. Rogowski (1989). *Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments*. Princeton: PUP.

-D. Verdier (1994). *Democracy and International Trade: Britain, France and the US, 1860-1990*. Princeton: PUP.

-J. Hobson (1997). *The Wealth of States: A Comparative Sociology of International Economic and Political Change*. Cambridge: CUP.

b. Britain

-B. Brown (1943). *The Tariff Reform Movement in Great Britain, 1881-1895*. New York: Columbia University Press.

-W. Chaloner (1970). "The Agitation Against the Corn Laws". in J. Ward, ed. *Popular Movements c. 1830-1850*. London: Macmillan.

-W. Grampp (1982). "Economic Opinion When Britain Turned to Free Trade". *History of Political Economy*; V.14-#?, pp. 496-520.

-W. Grampp (1987). "Britain and Free Trade: In Whose Interest?". *Public Choice*; V.55-#?, pp. 245-256.

-W. Grampp (1987). "How Britain Turned to Free Trade". *Business History Review*; V.61-#?, pp. 86-112.

-G. Anderson and R. Tollison (1985). "Ideology, Interest Groups, and the Repeal of the Corn Laws". *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics*, V.141-#2, pp. 197-212.

-D. Irwin (1989). "Political Economy and Peel's Repeal of the Corn Laws". *E&P*; V.1-#1, pp. 41-59.

-T. McKeown (1989). "The Politics of Corn Law Repeal and Theories of Commercial Policy". *BJPS*; V.19-#?, pp. 353-380.

-J. Williamson (1990). "The Impact of the Corn Laws Just Prior to Repeal". *Explorations in Economic History*; V.27-#2, pp. 123-156.

-C. Schonhardt-Bailey (1991). "Lessons in Lobbying for Free Trade in 19th-Century Britain: To Concentrate or Not". *APSR*; V.85-#1, pp. 37-58.

-C. Schonhardt-Bailey (1991). "Specific Factors, Capital Markets, Portfolio Diversification and Free Trade: Domestic Determinants of the Repeal of the Corn Laws". *WP*; V.43-#4, pp. 545-569.

-K. O'Rourke (1994). "The Repeal of the Corn Laws and Irish Emigration". *Explorations in Economic History*; V.31-#1, pp. 120-138.

-M. Luszti (1995). "Solving Peel's Puzzle: Repeal of the Corn Laws and Institutional Preservation". *Comparative Politics*; V.?-#?, pp. 393-408.

-P. Fraser (1962). "Unionism and Tariff Reform: The Crisis of 1906". *Historical Journal*; V.5-#?, pp. 149-166.

-K. Brown (1970). "The Trade Union Tariff Reform Association, 1904-1913". *Journal of British Studies*; V.9-#2, pp. 141-153.

-A.W. Coats (1968). "The Political Economy of the Tariff Reform Campaign of 1903". *Journal of Law and Economics*; V.11-#?, pp. 181-229.

-A. Sykes (1979). *Tariff Reform in British Politics, 1903-1913*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

-F. Capie (1983). *Depression and Protectionism: Britain Between the Wars*. London: Allen and Unwin.

A.J. Marrison (1983). "Businessmen, Industries and Tariff Reform in Great Britain, 1903-1930". *Business History*; V.25-#?, pp. 148-178.

-D. Irwin (1994). "The Political Economy of Free Trade: Voting in the British General Election of 1906". *Journal of Law and Economics*; V.37-#1, pp. 75-108.

-D. Irwin (1996). "Industry or Class Cleavages over Trade Policy?: Evidence from the British General Election of 1923". in R. Feenstra, G. Grossman and D. Irwin, eds. *The Political Economy of Trade Policy*. Cambridge: MIT, pp. 53-75.

-B. Eichengreen (1992). "The Eternal Fiscal Question: Free Trade and Protection in Britain, 1860-1929". in F. Capie, ed. *Protectionism in the World Economy*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

-F. Capie (1981). "Shaping the British Tariff Structure in the 1930's". *Explorations in Economic History*; V.18-#?, pp. 155-173.

#### c. Canada

-R. Johnston and M. Percy (1980). "Reciprocity, Imperial Sentiment and Party Politics in the 1911 Election". *Canadian Journal of Political Science*; V.13-#?, pp. 711-729.

#### d. Germany

-A. Gerschenkron (1943). *Bread and Democracy in Germany*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

-I. Lambi (1963). *Free Trade and Protection in Germany, 1868-1896*. Weisbaden: Steiner.

-H. Böhme (1968). "Big Business Pressure Groups and Bismarck's Turn to Protectionism, 1873-1879". *Historical Journal*; V.10-#2, pp. 218-236.

-S. Webb (1977). "Tariff Protection for the Iron Industry, Cotton Textiles and Agriculture in Germany, 1879-1914". *Jahrbucher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik*; V.192-#3/4, pp. 336-357.

-S. Webb (1980). "Tariffs, Cartels, Technology and Growth in the German Steel Industry, 1879-1914". *Journal of Economic History*; V.40-#2, pp. 309-329.

-S. Webb (1982). "Agricultural Protection in Wilhelminan Germany: Forging and Empire with Pork and Rye". *Journal of Economic History*; V.42-#2, pp. 309-326.

-R. Moeller (1981). "Peasants and Tariffs in the Kaiserreich: How Backward were the 'Bauern'?". *Agricultural History*; V.55-#4, pp. 370-384.

#### e. France

-M. Smith (1977). "Free Trade versus Protection in the Early Third Republic: Economic Interests, Tariff Policy, and the Making of the Republican Synthesis". *French Historical Studies*; V.10-#2, pp. 293-314.



-M. Smith (1980). *Tariff Reform in France, 1860-1900*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

-B. Ratcliffe (1978). "The Tariff Reform in France, 1831-1836". *Journal of European Economic History*; V.7-#1, pp. 61-138.

-J. Nye (1991). "The Myth of Free Trade Britain and Fortress France: Tariffs and Trade in the Nineteenth Century". *Journal of Economic History*; V.51-#1, pp. 23-46.

-J. Nye (1991). "Revisionist Tariff History and the Theory of Hegemonic Stability". *Politics and Society*; V.19-#2, pp.209-232.

### 3. Comparative Institutional Analysis

#### a. Japan

-I. Magaziner and T. Hout (1980). *Japanese Industrial Policy*. Berkeley: University of California Institute of International Studies.

-C. Johnson (1982). *Miti and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

-K. Yamamura, ed. (1982). *Policy and Trade Issues in the Japanese Economy: American and Japanese Perspectives*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

-C. Higashi (1983). *Japanese Trade Policy Formulation*. New York: Praeger.

-M. Schmieglow (1985). "Cutting Across Doctrines: Positive Adjustment in Japan". *IO*; V39-#2, pp. 261-296.

-M. Schmieglow (1986). "The Reform of Japan's Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law: A Case of Qualitative Economic Policy". in M. Schmieglow, ed. *Japan's Response to Crisis and Change in the World Economy*. Armonk: M.E. Sharp, pp. 1-27.

-G. Saxonhouse and K. Yamamura, eds. (1986). *Law and Trade Issues in the Japanese Economy: American and Japanese Perspectives*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

-K. Yamamura (1986). "Caveat Emptor: The Industrial Policy of Japan". in P. Krugman, ed. *Strategic Trade Policy and the New International Economics*. Cambridge: MIT Press. pp. 169-209.

-K. Suzumura and M. Okuno-Fujiwara (1987). "Industrial Policy in Japan: Overview and Evaluation". in R. Sato and P. Wachtel, eds. *Trade Friction and Economic Policy*. Cambridge: CUP. pp. 50-79.

-R. Komiya, M. Okuno and K. Suzumura, eds. (1988). *Industrial Policy of Japan*. San Diego: Academic Press.

-K. Calder (1988). "Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation: Explaining the Reactive State". *WP*; V.40-#?, pp. 517-541.

-M. Anchordoguy (1988). "Mastering the Market: Japanese Government Targeting of the Computer Industry". *IO*; V.42-#3, pp. 509-453.

- D. Okimoto (1989). *Between MITI and the Market: Japanese Industrial Policy for High Technology*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- C. Johnson, L. Tyson and J. Zysman, eds. (1989). *Politics and Productivity: The Real Story of How Japan Works*. Cambridge: Ballinger.
- H. and M. Schmieglow (1990). "How Japan Affects the International System". *IO*; V.44-#4, pp. 553-588.
- F. Weil and N. Glick (1979). "Japan: Is the Market Open? A View of the Japanese Market Drawn from US Corporate Experience". *Law and Policy in International Business*. V.3-#?, pp. 815-907.
- G. Saxonhouse (1983). "The Micro- and Macro- Economics of Foreign Sales in Japan". in W. Cline, ed. *Trade Policies in the 1980s*. Washington, DC: IIE. pp. 259-304.
- G. Saxonhouse (1983). "What's All This About 'Industrial Targeting' in Japan?". *World Economy*; V.?-#?, pp. 253-274.
- G. Saxonhouse (1985). "Industrial Policy and Factor Markets: Biotechnology in Japan". *Prometheus*; V.3-#?, pp. 277-314.
- G. Saxonhouse (1986). "What's Wrong with Japanese Trade Structure". *Pacific Economic Papers*; V.?-#?, pp. 1-36.
- R.Z. Lawrence (1987). "Imports in Japan: Closed Markets or Minds?" *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity*; 1987-#2, pp. 517-548.
- R. Staiger, A. Deardorff and R. Stern (1987). "An Evaluation of Factor Endowments and Protection as Determinants of Japanese and American Foreign Trade". *CJE*; V.20-#?, pp. 449-463.
- R. Staiger, A. Deardorff and R. Stern (1988). "The Effects of Protection on the Factor Content of Japanese and American Foreign Trade". *REStat*; V.70-#?, pp. 475-483.
- G. Saxonhouse (1989). "Differentiated Products, Economies of Scale, and Access to Japanese Markets". in R. Feenstra, ed. *Trade Policies for International Competitiveness*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 145-183.
- R.E. Lawrence (1991). "Efficient or Exclusionist? The Import Behavior of Japanese Corporate Groups". *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity*; 1991:1; pp. (comment by Saxonhouse)
- M. Noland (1993). "The Impact of Industrial Policy on Japan's Trade Specialization". *REStat*; V.75-#?, pp. 241-248.
- B. Balassa and M. Noland (1988). *Japan and the World Economy*. Washington, DC: IIE.
- P. Krugman, ed. (1991). *Trade with Japan: Has the Door Opened Wider*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER.

#### **b. Australia**

- A. Capling and B. Galligan (1992). *Beyond the Protective State: The Political Economy of Australia's Manufacturing Industry Policy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

-A. Woodland (1992). "Trade Policies in Australia". In D. Salvatore, ed. *National Trade Policies*. Westport: Greenwood Press, pp. 241-260.

-W.M. Corden (1996). "Protection and Liberalization in Australia and Abroad". *Australian Economic Review*; V.114-#2, pp. 141-154.

### c. European Countries and the EC

-W. Feld (1979). "Implementation of the EC's Common Agricultural Policy: Expectations, Fears, Failures". *IO*; V.33-#3, pp. 335-363.

-L. Tsoukalis and A. daS. Ferreira (1980). "Management of Industrial Surplus Capacity in the EC". *IO*, V.34-#3, pp. 355-376.

-E. Verreydt and J. Waelbroek (1982). "European Community Protection Against Manufactured Imports from Developing Countries: A Case Study in the Political Economy of Protection". in J. Bhagwati, ed. *Import Competition and Response*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 368-393.

-J. Pearce, J. Sutton and R. Batchelor (1985). *Protection and Industrial Policy in Europe*. London: RKP.

-R. Hine (1985). *The Political Economy of European Trade: An Introduction to the Trade Policies of the EEC*. New York: St. Martins.

-J. Hayes (1993). *Making Trade Policy in the European Community*. New York: St. Martins.

-S.A.B. Page (1981). "The Revival of Protectionism and Its Consequences for Europe". *Journal of Common Market Studies*; V.20-#?, pp. 17-40.

-M. Kahler (1985). "European Protectionism in Theory and Practice". *WP*; V.37-#?, pp. 475-502.

-V. Cable (1983). "Economics and Politics of Protection: Some Case Studies of Industries". *World Bank Staff Working Paper*. #569. (UK case)

-B. Bobe (1983). "Public Assistance to Industries and Trade Policy in France". *World Bank Staff Working Paper*, #570.

-P. Messerlin (1986). "Export-credit Mercantilism *a la Francaise*". *World Economy*; V.9-#4, pp.385-408.

-E. Grilli (1980). "Italian Commercial Policies in the 1970's". *World Bank Staff Working Paper*, #428.

-E. Grilli and M. LaNoce (1983). "The Political Economy of Protection in Italy". *World Bank Staff Working Paper*, #567.

-P.K.M. Tharakan (1980). "The Political Economy of Protection in Belgium". *World Bank Staff Working Paper*; #431.

-K.A. Koekkoek, J. Kol and L.B.M. Mennes (1981). "On Protectionism in the Netherlands". *World Bank Staff Working Paper*; #493.

-H.H. Glismann and F.D. Weiss (1980). "On the Political Economy of Protection in Germany". *World Bank Staff Working Paper*; #427.

-P. Katzenstein, ed. (1978). *Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

-P. Katzenstein (1984). *Corporatism and Change: Austria, Switzerland and the Politics of Industry*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

-P. Katzenstein (1985). *Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

#### d. East Asian NICs

-B. Cummings (1984). "The Origins and Development of the Northeast Asian Political Economy". *IO*; V.38-#1, pp. 1-40.

-G. White and R. Wade, eds. (1985). *Developmental States in East Asia*. Brighton, UK: IDS, Research Report #16.

-F. Deyo, ed. (1987). *The Political Economy of New Asian Industrialism*. Ithaca: Cornell.

-S. Haggard (1990). *Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in Newly Industrializing Countries*. Ithaca: Cornell.

-G. Gereffi and D. Wyman (1990). *Manufacturing Miracles: Paths of Industrialization in Latin America and East Asia*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

#### (1) Mostly Taiwan

-A. Amsden (1985). "The State and Taiwan's Economic Development". in P. Evans, *et al.*, eds. *Bringing the State Back In*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

-T. Gold (1986). *State and Society in the Taiwan Miracle*. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe.

-K.S. Liang and C.H. Liang (1986). "The Industrial Policy of Taiwan". in H. Mutoh, et al., *Industrial Policies for Pacific Economic Growth*. Sydney: Allen & Unwin, pp. 104-125.

-S. Chan (1987). "The Mouse that Roared: Taiwan's Management of Trade Relations with the US". *Comparative Political Studies*. V.20-#3, pp. 251-292.

-E. Winckler and S. Greenhalgh, eds. (1988). *Contending Approaches to the Political Economy of Taiwan*. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe.

-R. Wade (1990). *Governing the Market*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

#### (2) Mostly Korea

-J. Odell (1985). "The Outcomes of International Trade Conflicts: The US and South Korea". *ISQ*; V.29-#?, pp. 263-386.

-A. Amsden (1989). *Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization*. New York: Oxford University Press.

-S. Haggard and C. Moon (1983). "Liberal, Dependent or Mercantile?: The South Korean State in the International System". in J. Ruggie, ed. *Antinomies of Interdependence*. New York: Columbia University Press.

-S. Haggard and C. Moon (1990). "Institutions and Economic Policy: Theory and a Korean Case Study". *WP*; V.42-#2, pp. 210-237.

-S. Haggard, D. Kim and C. Moon (1991). "The Transition to Export-led Growth in South Korea: 1954-1966". *Journal of Asian Studies*; V.50-#4, pp. 850-873.

#### **e. Latin America**

-D.R. Mares (1990). "Domestic Institutions and Shifts in Trade and Development Policy". in J. Odell and T. Willett, eds. *International Trade Policies: Gains from Exchange Between Economics and Political Science*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. pp. 193-223.

-S. Sanderson (1992). *The Politics of Trade in Latin American Development*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

-P. Smith (1992). "The Political Impact of Free Trade on Mexico". *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*; V.34-#?, pp. 1-25.

-M. Pastor and C. Wise (1994). "The Origins and Sustainability of Mexico's Free Trade Policy". *IO*; V.48-#3, pp. 459-489.

### **4. Empirical Studies on the Political Economy of Protection**

#### **a. Correlates of Interindustry Variation in Protection**

-N. Fielke (1976). "The Tariff Structure for Manufacturing Industries in the US: A Test of Some Traditional Explanations". *Columbia Journal of World Business*; V.11-#4, pp. 98-104.

-R. Caves (1976). "Economic Models of Political Choice: Canada's Tariff Structure". *CJE*; V.9-#2, pp. 278-300.

-G. Helleiner (1977). "The Political Economy of Canada's Tariff Structure: An Alternative Model". *CJE*; V.10-#2, pp. 318-326.

-R. Saunders (1980). "The Political Economy of Effective Tariff Protection in Canada's Manufacturing Sector". *CJE*; V.13-#2, pp. 340-348.

-J.A.C. Conybeare (1978). "Public Policy and the Australian Tariff Structure". *Australian Journal of Management*; V.??-#?, pp.49-59.

-J.A.C. Conybeare (1984). "Politicians and Protection: Tariffs and Elections in Australia". *PC*; V.43-#2, pp. 203-209.

-K. Anderson (1980). "The Political Market for Assistance to Australian Manufacturing Industries". *EcRec*; V.56-#153, pp. 132-144.

-C. Aislabie (1988). "Economic Incentives and the Pattern of the Australian Tariff". *Australian Economic Papers*; V.27-#50, pp. 20-32.

- D. Feaver and K. Wilson (1998). "Unlocking Australia's Contingent Protection Black Box". *Economic Record*; V.74-#224, pp. 62-73.
- J. Hartigan (1981). "Does Factor Content Determine Protection?". *SEJ*; V.48-#?, pp. 144-148.
- R. Lavergne (1983). *The Political Economy of US Tariffs: An Empirical Study*. New York: Academic Press.
- W. Cline (1984). "The Determinants of Protection in Industrial Countries". Chapter 2 of *Exports of Manufactures from Developing Countries*. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 34-84.
- D. Greenaway and C. Milner (1994). "Determinants of the Inter-Industry Structure of Protection in the UK". *Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics*; V.56-#4, pp. 399-419
- M. Metcalfe and B. Goodwin (1999). "An Empirical Analysis of the Determinants of Trade Policy Protection in the U.S. Manufacturing Sector". *Journal of Policy Modeling*; V.21-#2, pp. 153-165.
- R. Lopez and E. Pagoulatos (1996). "Trade Protection and the Role of Campaign Contributions in US Food and Tobacco Industries". *EcInq*; V.34-#2, pp. 237-248.
- F. McGillvray (1997). "Party Discipline as a Determinant of the Endogenous Formation of Tariffs". *AJPS*; V.41-#2, pp. 584-607

#### **b. Regulation Theory: Partial Equilibrium Models of Endogenous Protection**

##### (1) Theoretical Framework

##### (a) General Papers on Regulation Theory

- G. Stigler (1971). "The Theory of Economic Regulation". *Bell Journal*; V.2-#1, pp. 3-21.
- S. Peltzman (1976). "Toward a More General Theory of Regulation". *JLawEcon*; V.19-#2, pp. 211-240.
- G. Becker (1983). "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence". *QJE*; V.98-#3, pp. 371-400.
- G. Becker (1985). "Public Policies, Pressure Groups and Deadweight Costs". *JPubE*; V.28-#?, pp. 329-347.
- S. Peltzman (1989). "The Economic Theory of Regulation After a Decade of Deregulation". *BPEA*; Microeconomics, pp. 1-41.
- D. Wittman (1989). "Pressure Group Size and the Politics of Income Redistribution". *SC&W*; V.6-#?, pp. 275-286.
- E. Rasmusen and M. Zupan (1991). "Extending the Economic Theory of Regulation to the Form of Policy". *PC*; V.72-#< pp. 167-191.
- G. Becker and C. Mulligan (1998). "Deadweight Costs and the Size of Government". *NBER Working Paper*, #6789.

## (b) Regulation Theoretic Approaches to Trade Policy

- A.L. Hillman (1982). "Declining Industries and Political Support Protectionist Motives". *AER*; V.72-#5, pp. 1180-1187.
- J. Cassing and A.L. Hillman (1986). "Shifting Comparative Advantage and Senescent Industry Collapse". *AER*; V.76-#?, pp. 516-523.
- N.V. Long and N. Vousden (1991). "Protectionist Responses and Declining Industries". *JIE*; V.30-#1/2, pp. 87-103.
- J.P. Choi (2001). "Protectionist Response to Import Competition in Declining Industries Reconsidered". *European Journal of Political Economy*; V.17-#1, pp. 193-201
- D. Feldman and I. Gang (1996). "Revenue Motives and Trade Liberalization". *RIE*; V.4-#3, pp. 276-281.
- S. Wellisz and J.D. Wilson (1986). "Lobbying and Tariff Formation: A Deadweight Loss Consideration". *JIE*; V.20-#?, pp. 367-375.
- J.D. Wilson (1990). "Are Efficiency Improvements in Government Transfer Policies Self-Defeating in Political Equilibrium?". *E&P*; V.2-#3, pp. 241-258.
- R.V. Fabella (1991). "The Bias in Favor of Pro-Tariff Lobbies". *JPubE*; V.44-#1, pp. 87-93.
- M. Leidy (1994). "Trade Policy and Indirect Rent-Seeking: A Synthesis of Recent Work". *E&P*; V.6-#2, pp. 97-118.
- D. Gould and G. Woodbridge (1997). "Building Trade Barriers and Knocking them Down". *RIE*; V.5-#2, pp. 256-271.
- J. Devereux and L.L. Chen (1999). "Growth, the External Terms of Trade and Endogenous Trade Liberalization". *PC*; V.98-#1/2, pp. 43-57.
- W. Mayer (1999). "The Political Economy of Administering Trade Laws". in J. Piggott and A. Woodland, eds. *International Trade Policy and the Pacific Rim*. London: Macmillan, pp. 245-262.
- P. Messerlin (1981). "The Political Economy of Protectionism: The Bureaucratic Case". *WA*; V.117-#?, pp. 469-495.

## (2) Empirical Findings

- K. Anderson and R. Baldwin (1987). "The Political Market for Protection in Industrial Countries". in A.M. El-Agraa, ed., *Protection, Cooperation, Integration and Development*. New York: Macmillan.
- E. Ray (1981). "The Determinants of Tariffs and Nontariff Trade Restrictions in the US". *JPE*; V.89-#?, pp. 105-121.
- E. Ray (1981). "Tariff and Nontariff Barriers to Trade in the US and Abroad". *REStat*; V.68-#2, pp. 161-168.
- E. Ray (1991). "Protection of Manufactures and the US". in D. Greenaway, ed. *Global*

*Protectionism: Is the US Playing on a Level Field*. London: MacMillan, pp. 12-36.

-W. Dougan (1985). "Tariffs and the Economic Theory of Regulation". *Research in Law and Economics*; V.6, pp. 187-210.

-P. Godek (1985). "Industry Structure and Redistribution Through Trade Restrictions". *Journal of Law and Economics*; V.28-#3, pp. 687-703.

-D. Trefler (1993). "Trade Liberalization and the Theory of Endogenous Protection: An Econometric Study of US Import Policy". *JPE*; V.101-#1, pp. 138-160.

-A. Dick (1996). "Explaining Managed Trade as Rational Cheating". *RIE* V.4-#1, pp. 1-16.

-J.W. Lee and P. Swagel (1997). "Trade Barriers and Trade Flows across Countries and Industries". *Review of Economics and Statistics*; V.79-#3, pp. 372-82.

-K. Gawande (1997). "Testing Theories of Endogenous Protection: Robust Evidence From U.S. Nontariff Barrier Data". in K. Maskus, P. Hooper, E. Leamer, and J.D. Richardson, eds. *Quiet Pioneering: Robert M. Stern and His International Economic Legacy*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 37-70.

-K. Gawande (1998). "Comparing Theories of Endogenous Protection: Bayesian Comparison of Tobit Models Using Gibbs Sampling Output". *REStat*; V.?-#?, pp. 128-140.

-Kishore Gawande and Alok Bohara (2000). "Errors-in-Variables Bounds in a Tobit Model of Endogenous Protection". *Southern Economic Journal*; V.66-#4, pp. 881-905.

-M. Busch and E. Reinhardt (1999). "Industrial Location and Protection: The Political and Economic Geography of U.S. Nontariff Barriers". *AJPS*; V.43-#4, pp. 1028-1050.

-P. Goldberg and G. Maggi (1997). "Protection for Sale: An Empirical Analysis". *AER*; V.89-#5, pp. 1135-1155.

-C. Hamilton (1990). "The Political Economy of Transient 'New' Protectionism". *WA*; V.?-#?, pp. 522-545.

### **c. Explaining Legislative Votes on Protection**

#### (1) General Trade Legislation

-R. Watson (1956). "The Tariff Revolution: A Study of Shifting Party Attitudes". *Journal of Politics*; V.18-#4, pp. 678-701.

-R. Baldwin (1976). "The Political Economy of Postwar US Trade Policy". *NYU C.J. Devine Institute of Finance Bulletin*-#4.

-C. Coughlin (1985). "Domestic Content Legislation: House Voting and the Economic Theory of Regulation". *EcInq*; V.23-#?, pp. 437-448.

-S. Tosini and E. Tower (1987). "The Textile Bill of 1985: The Determinants of Congressional Voting Patterns". *PC*; V.54-#?, pp. 19-25.

-J. McCarthur and S. Marks (1988). "Constituent Interest vs. Legislator Ideology: The Role of



Political Opportunity Cost". *EcInq*; V.26-#?, pp. 461-470.

-J. McCarthur and S. Marks (1989). "Empirical Analyses of the Determinants of Protection: A Survey and Some New Results". in J. Odell and T. Willett, eds. *International Trade Policies: Gains from Exchange Between Economics and Political Science*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. pp. 105-139.

-S. Nollen and H. Iglarsh (1990). "Explanations of Protectionism in International Trade". *PC*; V.66-#?, pp. 137-153.

-L. Wade and J. Gates (1990). "A New Tariff Map of the United States (House of Representatives)". *Political Geography Quarterly*; V.9-#3, pp. 284-304.

-J. Lutz (1991). "Determinants of Protectionist Attitudes in the United States House of Representatives". *International Trade Journal*; V.5-#3, pp. 301-328.

-S. Marks (1993). "Economic Interests and Voting on the Omnibus Trade Bill of 1987". *PC*, V.75-#1, pp. 21-42.

-S. Nollen and D. Quinn (1994). "Free Trade, Fair Trade, Strategic Trade, and Protectionism in the US Congress, 1987-1988". *IO*; V.48-#3, pp. 491-525.

-K. Srinivasan (1997). "An Empirical Analysis of the Political Economy of Tariffs". *E&P*; V.9-#1, pp. 55-70.

-E. Gartzke and J.M. Wrighton (1998). "Thinking Globally or Acting Locally? Determinants of the GATT Vote in Congress". *LSQ*; V.23-#1, pp. 33-55.

-M. Bailey and D. Brady (1998). "Heterogeneity and Representation: The Senate and Free Trade". *AJPS*; V.42-#2, pp. 524-544.

-Michael Bailey (2001). "Quiet Influence: The Representation of Diffuse Interests on Trade Policy, 1983-94". *Legislative Studies Quarterly*; V.26-#1, pp. 45-80.

-R. Baldwin and C. Magee (2000). "Is Trade Policy for Sale? Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Bills". *Public Choice*; V.105-#1/2, pp. 79-101.

-S. O'Halloran (1994). *Politics, Process, and American Trade Policy*. Ann Arbor: Michigan.

-W. Keech and K. Pak (1995). "Partisanship, Institutions, and Change in American Trade Politics". *JoP*; V.57-#4, pp. 1130-1142.

-W. Hansen and T. Prusa (1997). "The Role of the Median Legislator in US Trade Policy: A Historical Analysis". *EcInq*; V.35-#1, pp. 97-107.

-M. Gilligan (1997). *Empowering Exporters: Reciprocity, Delegation and Collective Action in American Trade Policy*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

## (2) NAFTA

-W. Kaempfer and S. Marks (1993). "The Expected Effects of Trade Liberalisation: Evidence from U.S. Congressional Action on Fast-Track Authority". *World Economy*; V.16-#6, pp. 725-740.

- F. Boadu and M. Thompson (1993). "The Political Economy of the U.S.-Mexico Free Trade Agreement: Analysis of the Congressional Fast Track Vote". *Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics*; V.25-#2, pp. 27-35.
- L. Kahane (1996). "Senate Voting Patterns on the 1991 Extension of the Fast Track Trade Procedures: Prelude to NAFTA". *PC*; V.87-#1, pp. 35-53.
- L. Kahane (1996). "Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA: An Empirical Analysis". *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*; V.55-#4, pp. 395-409.
- J. Conybeare and M. Zinkula (1996). "Who Voted Against the NAFTA". *World Economy*; V.19-#1, pp. 1-12.
- J. Steagall and K. Jennings (1996). "Unions, PAC Contributions, and the NAFTA Vote". *Journal of Labor Research*; V.17-#3, pp. 515-521.
- J. Steagall and K. Jennings (1996). "Unions and NAFTA's Legislative Passage: Confrontation and Cover". *Labor Studies Journal*, V21-#1, pp. 61-79.
- J. Garand, C.D, Livingston, and K. Wink (1996). "Dispositions, Constituencies, and Cross-Pressures: Modelling Roll-Call Voting on the North American Free Trade Agreement". *Political Research Quarterly*; V.49-#4, pp. 729-748.
- J. Box-Steffenmeister, L. Arnold, C. Zorn (1997). "The Strategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress: A Study of the North American Free Trade Agreement". *APSR*; V.91-#2, pp. 324-338.
- W. Thorbecke (1997). "Explaining House Voting on the North American Free Trade Agreement". *PC*; V.92-#3/4, pp. 231-242.
- D. Holian, T. Krebs, and M. Walsh (1997). "Constituency Opinion, Ross Perot, and Roll-Call Behavior in the U.S. House: The Case of the NAFTA". *LSQ*; V.22-#3, pp. 369-392.
- Kamdar, Nipoli and Jorge Gonzalez (1998). "An Empirical Analysis of the U.S. Senate Vote on NAFTA and GATT". *International Advances in Economic Research*; V.4-#2, pp. 105-14.
- I.-B. Kang and K. Greene (1999). "A Political Economic Analysis of Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA". *PC*; V.98-#3/4, pp. 385-397.
- K. Schnietz and T. Nieman (1999). "Politics Matter: The 1997 Derailment of Fast-Track Negotiating Authority". *Business and Politics*, V.1-#?, pp. 233-251.
- K. Bardwell (2000). "The Puzzling Decline in House Support for Free Trade: Was Fast Track a Referendum on NAFTA?". *Legislative Studies Quarterly*; V.25-#4, pp. 591-610.

#### **d. Explaining Administered Protection Outcomes**

##### (1) Presidential Preferences and Discretion

- R. Baldwin (1981). "US Political Pressures Against Adjustment to Greater Imports". in W. Hong and L. Krause, eds. *Trade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of the Pacific Basin*. Seoul: Korea Development Institute.
- F. Boadu, F. Ruppel and A. Angel (1992). "An Empirical Model of Presidential Popularity and

Presidential Discretion in Trade Restrictions". *European Journal of Political Economy*; V.8-#?, pp. 281-293.

### (2) The ITA's LTFV Decision

-J.M. Finger, H.K. Hall and D.R. Nelson (1982). "The Political Economy of Administered Protection". *AER*; V.72-#3, pp. 452-466.

-R. Baldwin and M. Moore (1992). "Political Aspects of the Administration of the Trade Remedy Law". in R. Boltuck and R. Litan, eds. *Down in the Dumps: Administration of the Unfair Trade Laws*. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 253-280.

-Hansen, W. L. and K. O. Park (1995). Nation-state and pluralistic decision making in trade policy: The case of the international trade administration. *International Studies Quarterly*; V.39-#2, pp. 181-211.

### (3) The ITC's Injury Decision

-J. Goldstein and S. Lenway (1989). "Interests or Institutions: An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC Relations". *ISQ*; V.33-#?, pp. 303-327.

-S. Lenway and K. Rehbein (1989). "Rent Seekers in the U.S. International Trade Commission Escape Clause Investigations". *International Trade Journal*; V.4-#2, pp. 119-142.

-S. Lenway and D. Schuler, "The Determinants of Corporate Political Involvement in Trade Protection: The Case of the Steel Industry". In R. Baldwin, ed. *Empirical Studies of Commercial Policy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 75-105.

-W. Hansen (1990). "The International Trade Commission and the Politics of Protection". *APSR*; V.84-#1, pp. 21-46.

-R. Baldwin and J. Steagall (1991). "An Analysis of Factors Influencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping, Countervailing Duty and Safeguards Cases". *WA*; V.130-#2, pp. 290-307.

-M. Moore (1992). "Rules or Politics? An Empirical Analysis of Antidumping Decisions". *EcInq*; V.30-#3, pp. 449-466.

-T. Prusa (1991). "The Selection of Antidumping Cases for ITC Determination". in R. Baldwin, ed. *Empirical Studies of Commercial Policy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 47-71.

-J. DeVault (1993). "Economics and the International Trade Commission". *SEJ*; V60-#?, pp. 463-478.

-K. Anderson (1993). "Agency Discretion or Statutory Direction: Decision Making at the US ITC". *Journal of Law and Economics*; V.36-#?, pp. 915-935.

-K. Rehbein and S. Lenway (1993). "Industry Structure or Managerial Discretion: The Determinants of Industry Political Success in the U.S. International Trade Commission's Escape Clause Investigations". In J. Post, ed. *Research in corporate social performance and policy*. Volume 14. Greenwich, Conn: JAI press, pp. 3-18.

-C. Rowley and W. Thorbecke (1996). "Congressional Influence over Decision-Making at the

ITC". In F. Schneider and J. Casas Pardo, eds. *Current Issues in Public Choice*. Cheltenham: Elgar, pp. 189-199.

-D. Butler (1995). *Does 'Independent' Mean 'Free From Influence'? : Escape Clause Decision Making at the U.S. International Trade Commission*. New York: Garland Press.

-W. Hansen and T. Prusa (1996). "Cumulation and ITC Decision-Making: The Sum of the Parts is Greater than the Whole". *EcInq*; V.34-#4, pp. 746-769.

-W. Hansen and T. Prusa (1997). "The Economics and Politics of Trade Policy: An Empirical Analysis of ITC Decision Making". *RIE*; V.5-#2, pp. 230-245.

-R. Cumby and T. Moran (1997). "Testing Models of the Trade Policy Process: Antidumping and the 'New Issues'". In R. Feenstra, ed. *The Effect of U.S. Trade Protection and Promotion Policies*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 161-190.

-M. Czinkota and M. Kotabe (1997). "A Marketing Perspective on the US ITC's Antidumping Actions: An Empirical Inquiry". V32-#2, pp. 169-187.

-J. DeVault (2002). "Congressional Dominance and the International Trade Commission". *Public Choice*; V.110-#1/2, pp. 1-22.

-R. Feinberg (1989). "Exchange Rates and 'Unfair Trade'". *REStat*; V.71-#4, pp. 704-707.

#### (4) Harassment and Withdrawal: Who Files and Why?

-J.M. Finger (1981). "The Industry-Country Incidence of Less-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Trade". *Quarterly Review of Economics and Business*; V.21-#?, pp. 260-279.

-M. Herander and J.B. Schwartz (1984). "An Empirical Test of the Impact of the Threat of US Trade Policy: The Case of Antidumping Duties". *SEJ*; V.51-#1, pp. 59-79.

-R. Feinberg and B. Hirsch (1989). "Industry Rent-Seeking and the Filing of 'Unfair' Trade Complaints". *International Journal of Industrial Organization*; V.7-#?, pp. 325-340.

-T. Prusa (1992). "Why are So Many Antidumping Petitions Withdrawn". *JIE*; V.33-#1/2.

-R. Staiger and F. Wolak (1994). "Measuring Industry-specific Protection: Antidumping in the US". *BPEA*; 1994: Microeconomics, pp. 51-118.

-R. Staiger and F. Wolak (1996). "Differences in Uses and Effects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sources". in A. Krueger, ed. *The Political Economy of American Trade Policy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 385-415.

#### (5) Comparative Analysis

-P. Messerlin (1990). "The EC Antidumping Regulations: A First Economic Appraisal". *WA*; V.126-#?, pp. 562-587.

-P.K.M. Tharakan (1991). "The Political Economy of Antidumping Undertakings in the European Communities". *EER*; V.35-#?, pp. 1341-1359.

-P.K.M. Tharakan and J. Waelbroeck (1994). "Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in

the EC and in the US: An Experiment in Comparative Political Economy". *EER*; V.38-#1, pp. 171-193.

-A. Eymann and L. Schuknecht (1996). "Antidumping Policy in the European Community: Political Discretion or Technical Determination". *E&P*; V.8-#2, pp. 111-131.

#### **e. The Income Tax and the Political Economy of the Tariff**

-B. Baack and E. Ray (1985). "Special Interests and the Adoption of the Income Tax in the US". *Journal of Economic History*; V.45-#3, pp. 607-625.

-B. Baack and E. Ray (1985). "The Political Economy of the Origin and Development of the Federal Income Tax". in R. Higgs, ed. *Emergence of Modern Political Economy (Research in Economic History, supplement 4)*. Greenwood: JAI Press, pp. 121-138.

-J.M. Hansen (1990). "Taxation and the Political Economy of the Tariff". *IO*; V.44-#4, pp. 527-551.

-G. Gardner and K. Kimbrough (1992). "Tax Regimes, Tariff Revenues and Government Spending". *Eca*; V.59-#1, pp. 75-92.

-G. Gardner and K. Kimbrough (1992). "Tax Smoothing and Tariff Behavior in the US". *Journal of Macroeconomics*; V.14-#4, pp. 711-729.

#### **f. Macroeconomic Conditions and Protection**

##### (1) Tariff Protection

-T. McKeown (1984). "Firms and Tariff Change: Explaining the Demand for Protection". *WP*; V.36-#2, pp. 215-233.

-J. Cassing, T. McKeown and J. Ochs (1986). "The Political Economy of the Tariff Cycle". *APSR*; V.80-#3, pp. 843-862.

-R. Dornbusch and J. Frankel (1987). "Macroeconomics and Protection". in R. Stern, ed. *US Trade Policies in a Changing World Economy*. Cambridge: MIT. pp. 77-130.

-Magee, Stephen P. (1987). "The Political-Economy of US Protectionism". in H. Giersch, ed. *Free Trade and the World Economy: Towards and Opening of Markets*. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, pp. 368-402.

-Magee, Stephen P. and Leslie Young (1987). "Endogenous Protection in the United States, 1900-1984". in Stern, ed., pp. 145-195.

-G. Gardner and K. Kimbrough (1989). "The Behavior of US Tariff Rates". *AER*; V.79-#1, pp. 91-110. [comment by Sadorsky, 1994, V.84-#4, pp. 1097-1103.]

-A. Bohara and W. Kaempfer (1991). "A Test of Tariff Endogeneity in the United States". *AER*; V.81-#4, pp. 952-960.

-A. Bohara and W. Kaempfer (1991). "Testing the Endogeneity of Tariff Policy in the US: Further Evidence". *EcLets*; V.35-#?, pp. 311-315.

- S. Das and S.P. Das (1994). "Quantitative Assessment of Tariff Endogeneity: Interwar vs. Postwar". *EcLets*; V.44-#?, pp. 139-146.
- S. Lohmann and S. O'Halloran (1994). "Divided Government and US Trade Policy: Theory and Evidence". *IO*; V.48-#4, pp. 592-632.
- D. Epstein and S. O'Halloran (1996). "The Partisan Paradox and the US Tariff, 1877-1934". *IO*; V.50-#2, pp. 301-324.
- H.K. Hall, C. Kao, and D. Nelson (1998). "Women and Tariffs: Testing the Gender Gap Hypothesis in a Downs-Mayer Political-Economy Model". *Economic Inquiry*, 1998, V.36-#2, pp. 320-332.
- A. Bohara and W. Kaempfer (1992). "Endogenous Protection and Retaliation Between Canada and the US". *EcLets*; V.38-#?, pp. 335-339.
- G. Gardner, D. Slottje and K. Kimbrough (1992). "Tariff Behavior in Five European Countries". *EcLets*; V. 39-#?, pp. 73-78.
- A. Bohara and W. Kaempfer (1994). "Tariff Behavior in Five European Countries: Further Evidence". *EcLets*; V.45-#?, pp. 213-216.
- I. Henriques and P. Sadorsky (1994). "The Determinants and Persistence of Canadian Tariff Rates". *CJE*; V.27-#1, pp. 112-128.
- W. Thompson and L. Vescera (1992). "Growth Waves, Systemic Openness, and Protectionism". *IO*; V.46-#2, pp. 493-532.
- R. Reuveny and W. Thompson (1997). "The Timing of Protectionism". *Review of International Political Economy*; V.4-#?, pp. 179-213.
- W. Thompson and R. Reuveny (1998). "Tariffs and Trade Fluctuations: Does Protectionism Matter as Much as We Think?". *IO*; V.52-#2, pp. 421-440.

## (2) Administered Protection

- W. Takacs (1981). "Pressures for Protectionism: An Empirical Analysis". *EcInq*; V.19-#?, pp. 687-693.
- S. Feigenbaum, H. Ortiz and T. Willett (1985). "Protectionist Pressures and Aggregate Economic Conditions: Comment on Takacs". *EcInq*; V.23-#1, pp. 175-182.
- S. Feigenbaum and T. Willett (1985). "Domestic versus International Influences on Protectionist Pressures in the US". in S. Arndt, R. Sweeney and T. Willett, eds. *Exchange Rates, Trade and The US Economy*. Cambridge: Ballinger, pp. 181-190.
- W. Shughart and R. Tollison (1985). "The Cyclical Character of Regulatory Activity". *PC*; V.45-#?, pp. 303-311.
- Salvatore, Dominick (1987). "Import Penetration, Exchange Rates, and Protectionism in the US". *Journal of Policy Modelling*; V.9: pp. 125-141.
- E. Grilli (1988). "Macro-economic Determinants of Trade Protection". *World Economy*; V.11-#3,

pp. 313-326.

-C. Coughlin, J. Terza and N.A. Kahlifah (1989). "The Determinants of Escape Clause Petitions". *REStat*; V.??-#?, pp. 341-347.

-M. Leidy (1997). "Macroeconomic Conditions and Pressures for Protection under Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws: Empirical Evidence from the US". *IMFSP*; V.44-#1, pp. 132-144.

-M. Knetter and T. Prusa (2000). "Macroeconomic Factors and Antidumping Filings: Evidence from Four Countries". *NBER Working Paper*; #8010.

## 5. Endogenous Tariff Theory

### a. Surveys/Overviews

-D. Nelson (1988). "Endogenous Tariff Theory: A Critical Survey". *AJPS*; V.32-#3, pp. 796-837.

-A.L. Hillman (1988). *The Political Economy of Protection*. Chur: Harwood Academic Publishers.

-S. Magee, W. Brock and L. Young (1989). *Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

-D. Austen-Smith (1991). "Rational Consumers and Irrational Voters: A Review Essay on Magee, Brock and Young". *E&P*; V.3-#1, pp. 73-92.

-W. Mitchell and M. Munger (1991). "Economic Models of Interest Groups". *AJPS*; V.35-#2, pp. 512-546.

-D. Rodrik (1995). "Political Economy of Trade Policy". in G. Grossman and K. Rogoff, eds. *Handbook of International Economics--V.III*. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 1457-1494.

-E. Helpman (1995). "Politics and Trade Policy". in D. Kreps and K. Wallis, eds. *Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 19-45. Also in in R. Baldwin, D. Cohen, A. Sapir, and A. Venables, eds. *Market Integration, Regionalism and the Global Economy*. Cambridge: CUP/CEPR, pp. 86-112.

-J. Alt, J. Frieden, M. Gilligan, D. Rodrik, and R. Rogowski (1997). "The Politics of International Trade: Enduring Puzzles and an Agenda for Inquiry". *Comparative Political Studies*; V.29-#?, pp. 689-717.

### b. Deriving Agent Preferences

-J. Bhagwati (1982). "Shifting Comparative Advantage, Protectionist Demands and Policy Response". in J. Bhagwati, ed. *Import Competition and Response*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 153-184.

-E. Dinopoulos (1983). "Import Competition, International Factor Mobility and Lobbying Responses". *JIE*; V.14-#?, pp. 395-410.

-J. deMelo and S. Robinson (1982). "Trade Adjustment Policies and Income Distribution in Three Archetype Developing Economies". *JDevEc*; V.10-#?, pp. 67-92.

-R. Baldwin (1984). "Rent-Seeking and Trade Policy: An Industry Approach". *WA*; V.120-#4, pp.

662-676.

-L. Leger (1993). "Land Rents and the Demand for Protection". *International Trade Journal*; V.7-#4, pp. 435-462.

-T. Pugel and I. Walter (1985). "US Corporate Interests and the Political Economy of Trade". *REStat*; V.??-#?, pp. 465-473.

-V. Aggarwal, R. Keohane and D. Yoffie (1987). "The Dynamics of Negotiated Protection". *American Political Science Review*; V.81-#2, pp. 345-366.

-H. Milner and D. Yoffie (1989). "Between Free Trade and Protectionism: Strategic Trade Policy and a Theory of Corporate Trade Demands". *IO*; V.43-#2, pp. 239-272.

-S. Magee (1978). "Three Simple Tests of the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem". in P. Oppenheimer, ed. *Issues in International Economics*; Stocksfield: Oriol Press, pp. 138-153.

-D. Nelson and C. Wasley (1989). "Two is Not Enough: A Capital Market Test of 3x2 Endogenous Tariff Theory". ms: Murphy Institute, Tulane University.

-A. Krueger (1980). "Protectionist Pressures, Imports and Employment in the US". *ScanJE*; V.??-#?, pp. 133-146.

-I.M. Destler and J. Odell (1987). *Anti-Protection: Changing Forces in US Trade Politics*. Washington, DC: IIE.

-H. Milner (1988). *Resisting Protectionism: Global Industries and the Politics of International Trade*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

-E. Balistreri (1997). "The Performance of the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek Model in Predicting Endogenous Trade Policy Forces at the Individual Level". *CJE*; V.30-#1, pp. 1-17.

-K. Scheve and M. Slaughter (2001). "What Determines Individual Trade Policy Preferences". *JIE*; V.54-#2, pp. 267-292.

-K. O'Rourke and R. Sinnott (2001). "The Determinants of Individual Trade Policy Preferences: International Survey Evidence". *Brookings Trade Policy Forum 2001*, forthcoming.

-A.M. Mayda and D. Rodrik (2001). "Why Are Some People (and Countries) More Protectionist Than Others?". ms: Kennedy School of Government.

### c. The Organization of Interests

-P. Murrell (1981?). "Comparative Growth and Comparative Advantage: Tests of the Effects of Interest Group Behavior on Foreign Trade Patterns". *PC*; V.??-#?, pp. 35-53

-D. Yoffie and S. Bergenstein (1985). "Creating Political Advantage: The Rise of the Corporate Political Entrepreneur". *California Management Review*; V.28-#1, pp. 124-139.

-G. Lehbruch (1986). "Interest Groups, Government and the Politics of Protectionism". *Aussenwirtschaft*; V.41-#2/3, pp. 273-302.

-H.K. Hall and D. Nelson (1989). "Institutional Structure and Time Horizon in a Simple Political-



Economy Model: The Lowi Effect". *International Spectator*; V.24-#3/4, pp.153-173.

-A.L. Hillman (1991). "Protection, Politics and Market Structure". in E. Helpman and A. Razin, eds. *International Trade and Trade Policy*. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 120-140.

-M. Herander and R. Pupp (1991). "Firm Participation in Steel Industry Lobbying". *EcInq*; V.29-#?, pp. 134-147.

-S. Lenway and D. Schuler (1991). "The Determinants of Corporate Political Involvement in Trade Protection: The Case of the Steel Industry." in R. Baldwin, ed. *Empirical Studies of Commercial Policy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 75-105.

-P. Midford (1993). "International Trade and Domestic Politics: Improving on Rogowski's Model of Political Alignments". *IO*; V.47-#?, pp. 535-564.

-J. Alt and M. Gilligan (1994). "The Political Economy of Trading States: Factor Specificity, Collective Action Problems and Domestic Political Institutions". *Journal of Political Philosophy*; V.2-#?, pp. 165-192.

-K. Gawande (1997). "US Non-Tariff Barriers as Privately Provided Public Goods". *JpubE*; V.64-#?, pp. 61-81.

-K. Gawande (1998). "Stigler-Olson Lobbying Behavior in Protectionist Industries: Evidence from the Lobbying Power Function". *JEBO*; V.35-#?, pp. 477-499.

-Y. S. Chiu (1998). "Politics, Structure of Protection, and Welfare". *RIE*; V.6-#3, pp.

-D. Mitra (1999). "Endogenous Lobby Formation and Endogenous Protection: A Long-Run Model of Trade Policy Determination". *AER*; V.89-#5, pp. 1116-1134.

-R. Damania and P.G. Fredriksson (2000). "On the Formation of Industry Lobby Groups". *JEBO*. V.41-#4, pp. 315-335.

-L. Salamon and J. Siegfried (1977). "Economic Power and Political Influence: The Impact of Industry Structure on Public Policy". *APSR*; V.71-#?, pp. 1026-1043.

-E. Esty and R. Caves (1983). "Market Structure and Political Influence: New Data on Political Expenditures, Activity and Success". *EcInq*; V.?-#?, pp. 24-38.

-D. Jacobs (1988). "Corporate Economic Power and the State: A Longitudinal Assessment". *American Journal of Sociology*; V.93-#4, pp. 852-881.

-D. Clawson and A. Neustadt (1989). "Interlocks, PACs, and Corporate Conservatism". *American Journal of Sociology*; V.94-#4, pp. 749-793.

-K. Grier, M. Munger and B. Roberts (1991). "The Industrial Organization of Corporate Political Participation". *SEJ*; V.57-#3, pp. 727-738.

-B. Kennelly and P. Murrell (1991). "Industry Characteristics and Interest Group Formation: An Empirical Study". *PC*; V.70-#1, pp. 21-40.

-L. Kristov, P. Lindert and R. McClelland (1992). "Pressure Groups and Redistribution". *JPubE*; V.48-#?, pp. 135-163.

- T. Moe (1980). *The Organization of Interests*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- G.K. Wilson (1977). *Unions in American National Politics*. London: Macmillan.
- G.K. Wilson (1985). *Business and Politics: A Comparative Introduction*. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House.
- L. Lynn and T. McKeown (1988). *Organizing Business: Trade Associations in America and Japan*. Washington,DC: AEI.
- D. Mitchell (1970). "Labor and the Tariff Question". *Industrial Relations*; V.1-#3, pp. 268-276.

#### d. Equilibrium Policy Choice: Levels

##### (1) Lobbying

- R. Findlay and S. Wellisz (1982). "Endogenous Tariffs, the Political Economy of Trade Restrictions and Welfare". in J. Bhagwati, ed. *Import Competition and Response*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 223-234.
- R. Findlay and S. Wellisz (1983). "Some Aspects of the Political Economy of Trade Restrictions". *KYKLOS*, V.36-#3, pp. 469-481.
- S. Donnenfeld and S. Weber (1985). "Lobbying for Tariffs and the Cost of Protection". *Recherches Economiques de Louvain*; V.51-#1, pp. 21-27.
- R. Baldwin (1982). "The Political Economy of Protectionism". in J. Bhagwati, ed. *Import Competition and Response*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 263-292.
- R. Feenstra and J. Bhagwati (1982). "Tariff Seeking and the Efficient Tariff". in J. Bhagwati, ed. *Import Competition and Response*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 245-258.
- R. Baldwin (1987). "Politically Realistic Objective Functions and Trade Policy: PROFs and Tariffs". *EcLets*; V.24-#?, pp. 287-290.
- P. Wagstaff (1975). "Consensus Tariff Policy". *EcRec*; V.51-#?, pp. 105-108
- W. Mayer (1993). "Lobbying for Tariff Policies". *RIE*; V.1-#3, pp. 221-233.
- K. Kiyono, M. Okuno-Fujiwara and K. Ueda (1991). "Industry Specific Interests and Trade Protection: A Game Theoretic Analysis". *ESQ*; V.42-#4, pp. 347-361.
- H.K. Hall and D. Nelson (1992). "Institutional Structure in the Political Economy of Protection: Legislated versus Administered Protection". *E&P*; V.4-#1, pp. 61-77.
- M. Moore (1992). "Bureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a Repeated Game". *JITE*; V.148-#?, pp. 607-627.
- D. Gould and G. Woodbridge (1997). "Building Trade Barriers and Knocking Them Down". *RIE*; V.5-#2, pp. 256-271.
- P. Pecorino (1997). "Exogenous Tariff Changes with Endogenous Lobbying Response". *PC*; V.92-#1/2, pp. 91-108.

-J. Conlon and P. Pecorino (1998). "Primary and Secondary Reform". *Economic Inquiry*; V.36-#4, pp. 590-602.

-P. Pecorino (1999). "Endogenous Export Subsidies as a Revenue-Seeking Activity: Some Implications for the Evolution of Protection". *CJE*; V.32-#3, pp. 785-798.

-R. Jensen and M. Thursby (1986). "Endogenous Tariff Policy under Uncertainty". ms.: Ohio State University.

-M. Fafchamps, E. Sadoulet, and A. de Janvry (1993). "Tariff Seeking in a General Equilibrium Framework". *Journal of International Trade and Economic Development*; V.2-#?, pp. 167-189.

-M. Fafchamps, A. de Janvry, and E. Sadoulet (1999). "Social Heterogeneity and Wasteful Lobbying". *PC*; V.98-#1/2, pp. 5-27.

-R. Findlay (1990). "The New Political Economy: Its Explanatory Power for LDCs". *E&P*; V.2-#2, pp. 193-221.

-R. Clarida and R. Findlay (1991). "Endogenous Comparative Advantage, Government, and the Pattern of Trade". *NBER Working Paper*, #3813.

-J. Coggins, T. Graham-Tomasi and T. Roe (1991). "Existence of Equilibrium in a Lobbying Economy". *IER*; V.32-#3, pp. 533-550.

-R. Smith (1995). "Interest Group Influence in Congress". *Legislative Studies Quarterly*; V.20-#1, pp. 89-139.

## (2) Voting

-W. Mayer (1984). "Endogenous Tariff Formation". *AER*; V.74-#5, pp. 970-985.

-H. Weck-Hannemann (1990). "Protectionism in Direct Democracy". *JITE*; V.146-#3, pp. 389-418.

-H.K. Hall, C. Kao, and D. Nelson (1998). "Women and Tariffs: Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer Model". *Economic Inquiry*; V.36-#2, pp. 320-332.

-J. Rotemberg (2000). "Commercial Policy with Altruistic Voters". *NBER Working Paper*; #7984.

-R. Fischer and P. Serra (1996). "Income Inequality and Choice of Free Trade in a Model of Intraindustry Trade". *QJE*; V.111-#1, pp. 41-64.

## (3) Partisan Competition with Probabilistic Voting

-W. Mayer and J. Li (1994). "Interest Groups, Electoral Competition, and Probabilistic Voting for Trade Policies". *E&P*; V.6-#1, pp. 59-77.

-D. Clark and J. Thomas (1995). "Probabilistic Voting, Campaign Contributions, and Efficiency". *AER*; V.85-#1, pp. 254-259.

-C.C. Yang (1995). "Endogenous Tariff Formation under Representative Democracy: A Probabilistic Voting Model". *AER*; V.85-#4, pp. 956-963.

-W. Mayer (1998). "Trade Policy Platforms of Competing Parties: What Makes Them Different?". *RIE*; V.6-#2, pp. 185-203.

#### (4) Influence-driven Contributions

-G. Grossman and E. Helpman (1994). "Protection for Sale". *AER*; V.84-#4, pp. 833-850.

-A. Dixit (1996). "Special-Interest Lobbying and Endogenous Commodity Taxation". *Eastern Economic Journal*; V.22-#4, pp. 375-388.

-A. Dixit, G. Grossman, and E. Helpman (1997). "Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Tax Policy". *JPE*; V.105-#4, pp. 752-69.

-S.L. Brainard and T. Verdier (1994). "Lobbying and Adjustment in Declining Industries". *EER*; V.38-#?, pp. 586-595.

-S.L. Brainard and T. Verdier (1997). "The Political Economy of Declining Industries: Senescent Industry Collapse Revisited". *JIE*; V.42-#1/2, pp. 221-237.

-C. Magee (2002). "Declining Industries and Persistent Tariff Protection". *RIE*; V.10-#4, pp. 749-762.

-M. Rama and G. Tabellini (1998). "Lobbying by Capital and Labor over Trade and Labor Market Policies". *EER*; V.42-#7, pp. 1295-1316.

-Y.S. Chiu (1998). "Politics, Structure of Protection, and Welfare". *RIE*; V.6-#3, pp. 472-487.

-Hideo Konishi, Kamal Saggi, and Shlomo Weber (1999). "Endogenous Trade Policy under Foreign Direct Investment". *Journal of International Economics*; V.49-#2, pp. 289-308.

-R. Boylan (2000). "An Optimal Auction Perspective on Lobbying". *SC&W*; V.17-#1, pp. 55-68.

-R. Riezman and J. Wilson (1997). "Political Reform and Trade Policy". *JIE*; V.42-#1/2, pp. 67-90.

-P. Goldberg and G. Maggi (1999). "Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation". *AER*; V.89-#5, pp. 1135-1155.

-U. Bandyopadhyay and K. Gawande (2000). "Is Protection for Sale? Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of Endogenous Protection". *REStat*; V.82-#1, pp. 139-152.

#### e. Equilibrium Policy Choice: Instruments

-J. Cassing and A.L. Hillman (1985). "Political Influence Motives and the Choice Between Tariffs and Quotas". *JIE*; V.19-#?, pp. 279-290.

-W. Mayer and R. Riezman (1987). "Endogenous Choice of Trade Policy Instruments". *JIE*; V.23-#3/4, pp. 377-381.

-W. Mayer and R. Riezman (1989). "Tariff Formation in a Multidimensional Voting Model". *E&P*; V.1-#1, pp. 61-79.

-W. Mayer and R. Riezman (1990). "Voter Preferences for Trade Policy Instruments". *E&P*; V.2-

#3, pp. 259-273.

-W. Mayer (2002). "Systematic Political Grass-Root Support for Tariffs". *RIE*; V.10-#4, pp. 657-670.

-R. Findlay and S. Wellisz (1986). "Tariffs, Quotas and Domestic-Content Protection: Some Political Economy Considerations". *PC*; V.50-#?, pp. 221-242.

-P. Lloyd and R. Falvey (1986). "The Choice of Instrument for Industry Protection". in R. Snape, ed. *Issues in World Trade Policy: GATT at the Crossroads*. New York: St. Martins, pp. 152-170.

-A. Deardorff (1987). "Why Do Governments Prefer Nontariff Barriers". *Carnegie Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy*; #24, pp. 191-216.

-S. Magee, W. Brock, and L. Young (1989). "Optimal Obfuscation and the Theory of the Second Worst: The Politically Efficient Policy". Chapter 18 in *Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory*. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 257-263. [Mathematical appendix, pp. 363-364.]

-W. Kaempfer, J.H. McClure and T. Willett (1989). "Incremental Protection and Efficient Political Choice Between Tariffs and Quotas". *CJE*; V.22-#2, pp. 228-236.

-M. Moore and S. Suranovic (1992). "Lobbying vs. Administered Protection: Endogenous Industry Choice and National Welfare". *JIE*; V.32-#3/4, pp. 289-303.

-B.P. Rosendorff (1996). "Endogenous Trade Restrictions and Domestic Political Pressure". in R. Feenstra, G. Grossman and D. Irwin, eds. *The Political Economy of Trade Policy*. Cambridge: MIT, pp. 245-264.

-B.P. Rosendorff (1996). "Voluntary Export Restraints, Antidumping Procedure, and Domestic Politics". *American Economic Review*; V.86-#3, pp. 544-561.

-D. Mitra (2000). "On the Endogenous Choice between Protection and Promotion". *E&P*; V.12-#1, pp. 33-51.

-G. Maggi and A. Rodriguez-Clare (2000). "Import Penetration and the Politics of Protection". *JIE*; V.51-#2, pp. 287-304.

#### f. Equilibrium Policy Choice: The Role of Foreign Interests

-A.L. Hillman and H. Ursprung (1988). "Domestic Politics, Foreign Interests, and International Trade Policy". *AER*; V.78-#4, pp. 729-745. [comment by Hofer/Woodruff, *AER*; V.84-#5, pp. 1474-1475.]

-S. Das (1990). "Foreign Lobbying and the Political Economy of Protection". *Japan and the World Economy*; V.2-#?, pp. 169-179.

-S. Husted (1991). "Foreign Lobbying: A Theoretical Analysis". *Eastern Economic Journal*; V.17-#1, pp. 89-99.

-R. Fischer (1992). "Endogenous Probability of Protection and Firm Behavior". *JIE*; V.32-#1/2, pp. 149-163.

-R. Fischer and L. Mirman (1994). "Learning about Enforcement: A Model of Dumping". *JEI*; V.9-#2, pp. 214-240.

-A.L. Hillman and H. Ursprung (1993). "Multinational Firms, Political Competition, and International Trade Policy". *IER*; V.34-#2, pp. 347-363.

-A.L. Hillman and H. Ursprung (1999). "Foreign Investment and Endogenous Protection with Protectionist *Quid Pro Quo*". *E&P*; V.11-#1, pp. 1-12.

-M. Moore and S. Suranovic (1993). "Lobbying and Cournot-Nash Competition: Implications for Strategic Trade Policy". *JIE*; V.35-#3/4, pp. 367-376.

-K. Rehbein (1995). "Foreign-owned Firms' Campaign Contributions in the United States: An Exploratory Survey". *Policy Studies Journal*; V.23-#1, pp. 41-61.

#### **g. Equilibrium Policy Choice: The Role of State-Society Relations**

-D. North (1979). "A Framework for Analyzing the State in Economic History". *Explorations in Economic History*;

-T.N. Srinivasan (1985). "Neoclassical Political Economy, the State and Economic Development". *Asian Development Review*; V.3-#2, pp.

-R. Findlay and J. Wilson (1987). "The Political Economy of Leviathan". in A. Razin and E. Sadka, eds. *Economic Policy in Theory and Practice*. New York: St. Martins, pp. 289-306.

#### **6. International Structures and the Domestic Politics of Trade**

-T. Ferguson (1984). "From Normalcy to New Deal: Industrial Structure, Party Competition and American Public Policy". *IO*; V.38-#1, pp. 41-94.

-C. Deubner (1984). "Change and Internationalization in Industry: Toward a Sectoral Interpretation of West German Politics". *IO*; V.38-#3, pp. 501-535.

-D. Lake (1988). *Power, Protection, and Free Trade: International Sources of U.S. Commercial Strategy, 1887-1939*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

-R. Baldwin (1987). "The New Protectionism: A Response to Shifts in National Economic Power". in D. Salvatore, ed. *The New Protectionist Threat to World Welfare*. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 95-112.

-A. Deardorff and R. Stern (1977). "American Labor's Stake in International Trade". in W. Adams, et al., eds. *Tariffs, Quotas and Protection*. San Francisco: ICS. pp. 125-148.

### **B. International Political Economy**

#### **1. The Optimum Tariff with Retaliation and Trade War**

##### **a. The Basic Analysis**

-T. Scitovsky (1942). "A Reconsideration of the Theory of Tariffs". *REStud*; V.9-#?, pp. 89-110.

-H.G. Johnson (1953-4). "Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation". *REStud*; V.21-#2, pp. 142-153.

- W.M. Gorman (1958). "Tariffs, Retaliation, and the Elasticity of Demand for Imports". *REStud*; V.25-#?, pp. 133-162.
- E. Tower (1976). "The Optimum Tariff, Retaliation and Autarky". *Eastern Economic Journal*; V.3-#?, pp. 72-75.
- V.R. Panchamukhi (1961), "A Theory for Optimum Tariff Policy", *Indian Economic Journal*. V.9-#2; pp. 178-198.
- M. Kemp (1964). "Trade Warfare: A Sketch". in *The Pure Theory of International Trade*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, pp. 208-217.
- D.J. Horwell (1966), "Optimum Tariffs and Tariff Policy". *REStud*; V.33-#?:?; pp. 147-158.
- K. Kuga (1973), "Tariff Retaliation and Policy Equilibrium", *JIE*. V.3-#?; pp. 351-366.
- Y. Otani (1980), "Strategic Equilibrium of Tariffs and General Equilibrium", *Etrica*. V.48-#3; pp. 643-662.
- K.H. Kim and F.W. Roush (1988). "Strategic Tariff Equilibrium and Optimal Tariffs". *Mathematical Social Sciences*; V.15-#?, pp. 105-134.
- J. Kennan and R. Riezman (1988). "Do Big Countries Win Tariff Wars". *IER*; V.29-#1, pp. 81-85.
- M. Thursby and R. Jensen (1983). "A Conjectural Variation Approach to Strategic Tariff Equilibrium". *JIE*; V.14-#?, pp. 145-161.
- S. Turnovsky (1986). "Optimal Tariffs in Consistent Conjectural Variations Equilibrium". *JIE*; V.21-#?, pp. 301-312.
- G. Post (1987). "Optimal Tariffs and Retaliation with Perfect Foresight". *JIEI*; V.2-#1, pp. 54-70.
- C.C. Yang and T.-r. Tsai (1992). "Optimum Tariffs: North-South". *JIE*; V.32-#3/4, pp. 369-377.
- J. McLaren (1997). "Size, Sunk Cost, and Judge Bowker's Objection to Free Trade". *AER*; V.87-#3, pp. 400-420.
- W.M. Cox and R. Ruffin (1998). "Country-bashing Tariffs: Do Bilateral Trade Deficits Matter?". *JIE*; V.46-#1, pp. 61-72.
- B. Lockwood and K.-y. Wong (2000). "Specific and ad valorem Tariffs are Not Equivalent in Trade Wars". *JIE*; V.52-#1, pp. 183-195.
- C. Syropoulos (2002). "Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation Revisited: How Country Size Matters". *REStud*; V.69-#3, pp. 707-727.
- M. Nicholson (1967), "Tariff Wars and a Model of Conflict", *Journal of Peace Research*; V.4-#1; pp. 26-38.
- A. Dixit (1987). "How Should the US Respond to Other Countries' Trade Policies". in R. Stern, ed. *US Trade Policies in a Changing World Economy*. Cambridge: MIT Press; pp. 245-282.

- R. Baldwin (1990). "Optimal Tariff Retaliation Rules". in R. Jones and A. Krueger, eds. *The Political Economy of International Trade*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell; pp. 108-121.
- D. Gros (1987). "A Note on the Optimal Tariff, Retaliation and the Welfare Loss from Tariff Wars in a Framework of Intra-Industry Trade". *JIE*; V.23-#?, pp. 357-367.
- J. Shoven and J. Whalley (1974). "On the Computation of Competitive Equilibrium on International Markets with Tariffs". *JIE*; V.4-#?, pp. 341-354.
- B. Hamilton and J. Whalley (1983). "Optimal Tariff Calculations in Alternative Trade Models and Some Possible Implications for Current World Trading Arrangements". *JIE*; V.15-#?, pp. 323-348.
- A. Deardorff and R. Stern (1987). "Tariffs and Defensive Responses: A Computational Analysis". *IEJ*; V.1-#2, pp. 1-23.
- J. Markusen and R. Wigle (1989). "Nash Equilibrium Tariffs for the U.S. and Canada: The Roles of Country Size, Scale Economies and Capital Mobility". *JPE*; V.97-#2, pp. 368-386.
- H. Lee and D. Roland-Holst (1999). "Cooperation or Confrontation in US-Japan Trade? Some General Equilibrium Estimates". *Journal of the Japanese and International Economies*; V.13-#?, pp. 119-139.
- Pahre, Robert (1998). "Reactions and Reciprocity: Tariffs and Trade Liberalization from 1815 to 1914". *JCR*; V.42-#4, pp. 467-492.
- A. Bohara, K. Gawande, and W. Kaempfer (1998). "The Dynamics of Tariff Retaliation Between the United States and Canada: Theory and Evidence". *RIE*; V.6-#1, pp. 30-49.

#### **b. Quotas**

- C. Rodriguez (1974). "The Non-equivalence of Tariffs and Quotas under Retaliation". *JIE*; V.4-#?, pp. 295-298.
- E. Tower (1975). "The Optimum Quota and Retaliation", *REStud*; V.62-#?; pp. 623-630.
- R. Falvey (1985). "Quotas and Retaliation: A Reexamination". *EcLets*; V.17-#?, pp. 373-377.
- J. Melvin (1986). "The Nonequivalence of Tariffs and Import Quotas". *AER*; V.76-#5, pp. 1131-1134.
- D. Bernhardt and A. Enders (1989). "Free Trade Equilibria to Multi-Country Quota Games". *JIE*; V.27-#3/4, pp. 319-333.
- K. Chan (1988). "Optimum Trade Policies and Retaliation", *CJE*. v.21-#2; pp. 427-433.
- B. Copeland (1989). "Tariffs and Quotas: Retaliation and Negotiation with Two Instruments of Protection". *JIE*; V.26-#?, pp. 179-188.
- C. Syropoulos (1994). "Endogenous Timing in Games of Commercial Policy". *CJE*; V.27-#?, pp. 847-864.
- W. Csaplar (1995). "Quota Wars in Conjectural Variations". *RIE*; V.3-#3, pp. 355-365.



-C. Syropoulos, E. Dinopoulos and M. Kreinin (1995). "Bilateral Quota Wars". *CJE*; V.28-#4a, pp. 939-944.

-S. Grant and J. Quiggin (1997). "Strategic Trade Policy under Uncertainty". *IER*; V.38-#1, pp. 187-204.

-N. Nakanishi (1999). "Reexamination of the International Export Quota Game through the Theory of Social Situations". *Games and Economic Behavior*; V.27-#1, pp. 132-152.

## 2. Political-Economy of Trade Conflict

-A. Dixit and A. Kyle (1985). "The Use of Protection and Subsidies for Entry Promotion and Deterrence". *AER*; V.75-#1, pp. 139-152.

-K. Ishibashi (1991). "The Role of Tariffs in Entry Promotion and Deterrence under International Oligopoly". *KES*; V.28-#2, pp. 13-29.

-D. Collie (1994). "Endogenous Timing in Trade Policy Games: Should Governments Use Countervailing Duties?". *WA*, V.?-#1, pp. 191-209.

-J.A.C. Conybeare (1987). Trade Wars: The Theory and Practice of Commercial Rivalry. New York: Columbia University Press.

-S. James and D. Lake (1989). "The Second Face of Hegemony: Britain's Repeal of the Corn Laws and the American Walker Tariff of 1846". *IO*; V.43-#1, pp. 1-29

-K. Stegemann (1989). "Policy Rivalry Among Industrial States: What Can We Learn from Models of Strategic Trade Policy?". *IO*; V.43-#1, pp. 73-100.

### a. Textiles and Apparel

-J. de al Torre, et al. (1978). Corporate Responses to Import Competition in the US Apparel Industry. Atlanta: Georgia State University Press.

-I.M. Destler, et al. (1979). The Textile Wrangle: Conflict in Japanese-American Relations, 1969-1971. Ithaca: Cornell.

-C. Farrands (1979). "Textile Diplomacy: The Making and Implementation of European Textile Policy". Journal of Common Market Studies; V.18-#?, pp. 22-39.

-J. de la Torre and M. Bachetta (1980). "The Uncommon Market: European Policies Toward the Clothing Industry in the 1970s". Journal of Common Market Studies; V.19-#2, pp. 95-122.

-R.B. Brandis (1982). The Making of Textile Trade Policy, 1935-1981. Washington, DC: American Textile Manufacturers Institute.

-R. Mahon and L.K. Mytelka (1983). "Industry, the State and Protectionism in Canada and France". *IO*; V.37-#4, pp. 551-581.

-M. Dolan (1983). "European Restructuring and Import Policies for a Textile Industry in Crisis". *IO*; V.37-#4, pp. 583-615.

-D. Keesing and M. Wolf (1980). Textile Quotas Against Developing Countries. London: Trade

Policy Research Centre.

-H.H. Glismann, D. Spinanger, J. Pelzman and M. Wolf (1983). Trade, Protection and Employment in Textiles. London: Trade Policy Research Centre.

-M. Wolf (1983). "Managed Trade in Practice: Implications of the Textile Arrangements". in W. Cline ed. Trade Policy in the 1980's. Washington, DC: IIE, pp. 455-482.

-D. Yoffie (1983). Power and Protectionism: Strategies of the Newly Industrializing Countries. New York: Columbia University Press.

-V. Aggarwal (1985). Liberal Protectionism: The International Politics of Organized Textile Trade. Berkeley: University of California Press.

-H.R. Friman (1990). Patchwork Protectionism: Textile Trade Policy in the US, Japan and West Germany. New York: Columbia University Press.

-C. Hamilton, ed. (1990). Textiles Trade and the Developing Countries: Eliminating the MFA in the 1990's. Washington, DC: The World Bank.

#### **b. Steel**

-Woolcock, Stephen (1982). "The International Politics of Trade and Production in Steel". in J. Pinder, ed. National Industrial Strategies in the World Economy. London: Croom Helm.

-Jones, Kent (1983). Impasse and Crisis in Steel Trade Policy. London: Trade Policy Research Centre.

-Walter, Ingo (1983). "Structural Adjustment and Trade Policy in the International Steel Industry". in W. Cline, ed. Trade Policy in the 1980s. Washington, DC: IIE, pp. 483-525.

-Jones, Kent (1985). "Trade in Steel: Another Turn in the Protectionist Spiral". World Economy; V.?-#?, pp. 393-408.

-Jones, Kent (1986). Politics vs. Economics in World Steel Trade. London: Allen and Unwin.

-Nam, Chong Hyun (1986). "Changing Comparative Advantage and Trade and Adjustment Policies in the Steel Industry". in H. Mutoh, et al., eds. Industrial Policies for Pacific Economic Growth. Sydney: Allen and Unwin, pp. 211-232.

-T. Howell, W. Noellert, J. Dreier and A.W. Wolff (1988). Steel and the State: Government Intervention and Steel's Structural Crisis. Boulder: Westview Press.

#### (1) Basic Economics of Steel Production and Trade

-Crandall, Robert (1981). The US Steel Industry in Recurrent Crisis. Washington, DC: Brookings.

-Barnett, Donald and Louis Schorsch (1983). Steel: Upheaval in a Basic Industry. Cambridge: Ballinger.

-Barnett, Donald and R. Crandall (1986). Up From the Ashes: The Rise of the Minimill in the United States. Washington, DC: Brookings.

- Adams, Walter and Hans Mueller (1986). "The Steel Industry". in Walter Adams, ed. The Structure of American Industry. New York: Macmillan, pp. 74-125.
- Adams, Walter and Joel Dirlam (1964). "Steel Imports and Vertical Oligopoly Power". American Economic Review; V.54-#?, pp. 626-655.
- Kreinin, M. (1982). "US Comparative Advantage in Motor Vehicles and Steel". in H. Brazer and D. Laren, eds. Michigan Fiscal and Economic Structure. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Kreinin, M. (1984). "Wage Competitiveness in the US Auto and Steel Industries". Contemporary Policy Issues; V.4-#1, pp. 39-50.
- US Federal Trade Commission (1977). The US Steel Industry and Its International Rivals: Trends and Factors Determining International Competitiveness. Washington, DC: USGPO.
- Eichengreen, Barry (1988). "International Competition in the Products of US Basic Industries". in M. Feldstein, ed. The United States in the World Economy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 279-353.

## (2) Consequences of Steel Protection

- Adams, Walter and Joel Dirlam (1979). "Unfair Competition in International Trade". in Tariffs, Quotas and Trade: The Politics of Protectionism. San Francisco: ICS, pp. 95-107.
- Dirlam, Joel and Hans Mueller (1982). "Import Restraints and Reindustrialization: The Case of the US Steel Industry". Journal of International Law; V.14-#3, pp. 419-446.
- Cline, William (1986). "US Trade and Industrial Policy: The Experience of Textiles, Steel and Automobiles". in P. Krugman, ed. Strategic Trade Policy and the New International Economics. Cambridge: MIT, pp. 211-239.
- Koo, Anthony Y.C. (1979). "On the Equivalence of Reference Price with Tariffs and Quotas". American Economic Review; V.69-#5, pp. 964-967.
- Eichengreen, Barry and Hans van der Ven (1984). "US Antidumping Policies: The Case of Steel". in R. Baldwin and A. Krueger, eds. The Structure and Evolution of Recent US Trade Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 67-103.
- Kaplan, Daniel (1986). Has Trade Protection Revitalized Domestic Industries. Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office.
- Tarr, David (1987). "Costs and Benefits to the US of the 1985 Steel Import Quota Program". in R. Sato and P. Wachtel, eds. Trade Friction and Economic Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 159-183.
- Tarr, David (1987). "Effects of Restraining Steel Exports from the Republic of Korea and Other Countries to the US and the EEC". WBER; V.1-#3, pp. 397-418.
- Tarr, David (1988). "The Steel Crisis in the US and the EC: Causes and Adjustments". in R. Baldwin, et al. eds. Issues in US-EC Trade Relations. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 173-198.
- Boorstein, Randi and Robert Feenstra (1991). "Quality Upgrading and Its Welfare Cost in US

Steel Imports, 1969-1974". in E. Helpman and A. Razin, eds. International Trade and Trade Policy. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 167-186.

### (3) Domestic Political-Economy of Steel: US

-Urofsky, Melvin (1969). Big Steel and the Wilson Administration: A Study in Business-Government Relations. Columbus: Ohio State University Press.

-Levine, Michael (1985). Inside International Trade Policy Formulation: A History of the US-EC Steel Arrangements. New York: Praeger.

-Marcus, Maeva (1977). Truman and the Steel Seizure Case. New York: Columbia University Press.

-McConnell, Grant (1963). Steel and the Presidency, 1962. New York: Norton.

-Hoopes, Roy (1963). The Steel Crisis. New York: The John Day Company.

-Boruss, Michael (1983). "The Politics of Competitive Erosion in the US Steel Industry". in J. Zysman and L. Tyson, eds. American Industry in International Competition: Government Policies and Corporate Strategies. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. pp. 60-105.

-S. Lenway and D. Schuler (1991). "The Determinants of Corporate Political Involvement in Trade Protections: The Case of the Steel Industry". in R. Baldwin, ed. Empirical Studies of Commercial Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 75-105.

### (4) EC Steel Policy and US-EC Steel Conflict

-Joliet, R. (1981). "Cartelisation, Dirigism and Crisis in the EC". World Economy; V.3-#?, pp. 403-445.

-Messerlin, Patrick and Christopher Saunders (1983). "Steel: Too Much Investment Too Late". in G. Shepherd *et al.* Europe's Industries: Public and Private Strategies for Change. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 52-81.

-Benyon, Frank and Jacques Bourgeois (1984). "The EC-US Steel Arrangement". Common Market Law Review; V.21-#?, pp. 305-354.

-Tsoukalis, Loukas and Robert Strauss (1985). "Crisis and Adjustment in European Steel: Beyond Laissez-Faire". Journal of Common Market Studies; V.23-#3, pp. 207-228.

-Crandall, Robert (1986). "The EC-US Steel Trade Crisis". in L. Tsoukalis, ed. Europe, America and the World Economy. Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 17-35.

-Messerlin, Patrick (1987). "The European Iron and Steel Industry and the World Crisis". in Yves Meny and Vincent Wright, eds. The Politics of Steel: Western Europe and the Steel Industry in the Crisis Years, 1974-1984. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

-Dicke, Hugo and Hans Glismann (1987). "The Rise and Decline of West German Steel Industry: The Role of National and Supranational Agencies". Aussenwirtschaft, V.42-#4, pp. 421-441.

-W. Goldberg, ed. (1986). Ailing Steel: The Transoceanic Quarrel. New York: St. Martins.

-Y. Meny and V. Wright, eds. (1987). The Politics of Steel: Western Europe and the Steel Industry Industry in the Crisis Years, 1974-1984. Berlin: de Gruyther.

#### (5) Japanese Steel Policy and the US-Japan Steel Conflict

-Kawahito, Kiyoshi (1981). "Japanese Steel in the American Market: Conflict and Causes". World Economy; V.?-#?, pp. 229-250.

-Patrick, Hugh and Hideo Sato (1982). "The Political-Economy of US-Japan Trade in Steel". in C. Yamamura, ed. Policy and Trade Issues of the Japanese Economy. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

-Sato, Hideo and Michael Hodin (1982). "The US-Japanese Steel Issue of 1977". in I.M. Destler and H. Sato, eds. Coping with US-Japanese Economic Conflicts. Lexington: DC Heath, pp. 27-72.

-Yonekura, Seiichiro (1991). "The Postwar Japanese Iron and Steel Industry: Continuity and Discontinuity". in E. Abe and Y. Suzuki, eds. Changing Patterns of International Rivalry. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, pp. 193-241.

### c. Automobiles

#### (1) General Analysis of Auto Industry

OECD (1983). *Long Term Outlook for the World Automobile Industry*. Paris: OECD.

Altschuler, A. et al. (1984). *The Future of the Automobile*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Cole, R. and T. Yakushiji (1984). *The American and Japanese Industries in Transition: Report of the Joint US-Japan Automotive Study*. Ann Arbor: Center for Japanese Studies, University of Michigan.

Adams, W. and J. Brock (1986). "The Automobile Industry". in W. Adams, ed. *The Structure of American Industry*. New York: Macmillan, pp. 126-171.

Katz, H. (1985). *Shifting Gears: Changing Labor Relations in the US Automobile Industry*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Katz, H., T. Kochan and J. Keefe (1987). "Industrial Relations and Productivity in the US Automobile Industry". *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity*; #3, pp. 685-727.

J. Womack, D. Jones and D. Roos (1990). *The Machine that Changed the World*. New York: Harper-Collins.

Rothschild, E. (1973). *Paradise Lost: The Decline of the Auto-Industrial Age*. New York: Random House.

Halberstam, D. (1986). *The Reckoning*. New York: Morrow.

Flink, J.J. (1988). *The Automobile Age*. Cambridge: MIT.

#### (2) Microeconomic Analysis of the Auto Industry

Fuss, M. and L. Waverman (1985). "Productivity Growth in the Automobile Industry, 1970-1980: A Comparison of Canada, Japan and the US". *NBER Working Paper* #1735.

Fuss, M. and L. Waverman (1986). "The Extent and Sources of Cost Efficiency Differences Between US and Japanese Automobile Producers". *NBER Working Paper* #1849.

Fuss, M. and L. Waverman (1992). *Costs and Productivity in Automobile Production: The Challenge of Japanese Efficiency*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Cowling, K. and J. Cubbin (1971). "Price, Quality and Advertising Competition: An Econometric Investigation of the UK Car Market". *Economica*; V.38-#152, pp. 378-394.

Griliches, Z. (1971). "Hedonic Price Indices for Automobiles: An Econometric Analysis of Quality Change". in Z. Griliches, ed. *Price Indices and Quality Change*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Hess, A. (1977). "A Comparison of Automobile Demand Equations". *Econometrica*; V.45-#3, pp. 683-701.

Hunker, J.A. (1983). *Structural Change in the US Automobile Industry*. Lexington: DC Heath.

Carlson, R. (1978). "Seemingly Unrelated Regression and the Demand for Automobiles of Different Sizes, 1965-1975: A Disaggregate Approach". *Journal of Business*; V.51-#2, pp. 243-262.

Blomqvist, A. and W. Haessel (1978). "Small Cars, Large Cars, and the Price of Gasoline". *Canadian Journal of Economics*; V.11-#3, pp. 470-489.

Irvine, F. (1983). "Demand Equations for Individual New Car Models Estimated Using Transactions Prices, with Implications for Regulatory Issues". *Southern Economic Journal*; V.49-#?, pp. 764-782.

Ohta, M. and Z. Griliches (1976). "Automobile Prices Revisited: Extensions of the Hedonic Hypothesis". in N. Terleckyj, ed. *Household Production and Consumption*. New York: Columbia University Press/NBER.

Smith, R.P. (1975). *Consumer Demand for Cars in the USA*. Cambridge: CUP.

Westin, R.B. (1975). "Empirical Implications of Infrequent Purchase Behavior in a Stock Adjustment Model". *American Economic Review*; V.65-#3, pp. 384-396.

Boyle, S. and T. Hogarty (1975). "Pricing Behavior in the American Automobile Industry, 1957-1971". *Journal of Industrial Economics*; V.24-#?, pp.

Bresnahan, T. (1981). "Departures from Marginal Cost Pricing in the American Automobile Industry". *Journal of Econometrics*; V.17-#?, pp. 201-227.

Kwoka, J. (1984). "Market Power and Market Change in the US Automobile Industry". *Journal of Industrial Economics*; V.32-#4, pp. 509-522.

Bresnahan, T. (1987). "Competition and Collusion in the American Automobile Oligopoly: The 1955 Price War". *Journal of Industrial Economics*; V.35-#?, pp. 437-455.

Clark, K., W.B. Chew and T. Fujimoto (1987). "Product Development in the World Auto Industry". *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity*; #3, pp. 729-781.

### (3) International Competition and the US Auto Industry

House Committee on Ways and Means (Subcommittee on Trade) (1980). *World Auto Trade: Current Trends and Structural Problems*. Serial 96-78. Washington, DC: US GPO.

Anderson, R. and M. Kreinin (1981). "Labor Costs in the American Steel and Auto Industries". *World Economy*. V.4-#?, pp. 199-208.

- Kreinin, M. (1982). "US Comparative Advantage in Motor Vehicles and Steel". in H. Brazer and D. Laren, eds. *Michigan Fiscal and Economic Structure*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Kreinin, M. (1984). "Wage Competitiveness in the US Auto and Steel Industries". *Contemporary Policy Issues*; V.4-#1, pp. 39-50.
- USITC (1980). *Certain Motor Vehicles and Certain Chassis and Bodies Therefor: Report to the President on Investigation TA-201-44 Under Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974*. Publication #1110.
- USITC (1985). *The Internationalization of the Automobile Industry and Its Effects on the US Auto Industry*. Publication #1712.
- USITC (1985). *The US Automobile Industry: US Factory Sales, Imports, Exports, Apparent Consumption, Suggested Retail Prices, and Trade Balances for Selected Countries in Motor Vehicles, 1964-1984*. Publication #1762.
- USITC (1986). *US Trade Related Employment, 1978-1984*. Publication #1855.
- Abernathy, W. (1983). *The Competitive Status of the US Auto Industry*. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
- Abernathy, W., K. Clark and A. Kantrow (1983). *Industrial Renaissance: Producing a Competitive Future for America*. New York: Basic Books.
- Abernathy, W., J. Harbour and J. Henn (1981). *Productivity and Comparative Cost Advantage: Some Estimates for Major Automotive Producers*. Report to the Transportation Systems Center, Department of Transportation. Cambridge, Massachusetts.
- Flynn, M. (1982). "Differentials in Vehicles' Landed Costs: Japanese Vehicles in the US Marketplace". Working Paper Series, #3, Center for Japanese Studies, University of Michigan.
- Flynn, M. (1983). "A Note on the Treatment of Labor Content as a Source of the Manufacturing Cost Differential". Working Paper Series, #19, Center for Japanese Studies, University of Michigan.
- Flynn, M. (1984). "Estimating Comparative Compensation Costs and Their Contribution to the Manufacturing Cost Differences". Working Paper Series, #21, Center for Japanese Studies, University of Michigan.
- Salter, M., A. Webber and D. Dyer (1985). "US Competitiveness in Global Industries: Lessons from the Auto Industry". in B. Scott and G. Lodge, eds. *US Competitiveness in the World Economy*. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
- Scott, R. (1988). "Trade and Employment in Automobiles: The Short-Run Success and Long-Run Failure of Protectionist Measures". in L. D'A. Tyson, W. Dickens and J. Zysman, eds. *The Dynamics of Trade and Employment*. Cambridge: Ballinger, pp. 157-203.
- Cline, W. (1986). "US Trade and Industrial Policy: The Experience of Textiles, Steel and Automobiles". in P. Krugman, ed. *Strategic Trade Policy and the New International Economics*. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 211-239.
- Eichengreen, B. (1988). "International Competition in the Products of US Basic Industries". in M. Feldstein, ed. *The United States in the World Economy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 279-353.
- Richardson, J.D. (1988). "Exchange Rates and US Auto Competitiveness". in R. Marston, ed. *Misalignment of Exchange Rates: Effects on Trade and Industry*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 215-240.

#### (4) Effects of Trade Policy on the US Auto Industry

##### (a) Welfare Costs

- B. Munk (1969). "The Welfare Costs of Content Protection: The Automotive Industry in Latin America". *Journal of Political Economy*; V.77-#1, pp. 85-98.
- E.J. Toder, with N. Cardell and E. Burton (1978). *Trade Policy and the US Automobile Industry*. New York: Praeger.
- J. Gomez-Ibanez and D. Harrison (1982). "Imports and the Future of the US Auto Industry". *American Economic Review*; V.72-#3, pp. 319-323.
- J. Gomez-Ibanez, R. Leone and S. O'Connell (1983). "Restraining Auto Imports: Does Anyone Win?". *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management*; V.2-#?, pp. 196-218.
- D. Tarr and M. Morkre (1984). *Aggregate Costs to the US of Tariffs and Quotas on Imports*. Washington, DC: Federal Trade Commission.
- R. Crandall (1984). "Import Quotas and the Auto Industry: The Costs of Protection". *Brookings Review*; V.2-#4, pp. 8-16.
- A. Denzau (1986). "Made in America: The 1981 Automobile Cartel". St. Louis: Center for the Study of American Business (publication #76).
- D. Kaplan (1986). "Automobiles". Chapter 5 of *Has Trade Protection Revitalized Domestic Industries*. US: Congressional Budget Office.
- OECD (1987). *The Costs of Restricting Imports: The Auto Industry*. Paris: OECD.
- R. Crandall (1987). "The Effects of US Trade Protection for Autos and Steel". *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity*; #1, pp. 271-288.
- E. Dinopoulos and M. Kreinin (1988). "Effects of the US-Japan Auto VER on European Prices and on US Welfare". *Review of Economics and Statistics*, V.70-#3, pp. 484-491.
- USITC (1985). *A Review of Recent Developments in the US Automobile Industry Including an Assessment of the Japanese Voluntary Restrain Agreement*. Publication # 1648.
- D. Tarr (1989). *A General Equilibrium Analysis of the Welfare and Employment Effects of US Quotas in Textiles, Autos and Steel*. Washington, D.C.: Federal Trade Commission.
- C. Winston and Associates (1987). *Blind Intersection? Policy and the US Automobile Industry*. Washington, DC: Brookings.

##### (b) Costs of Protection with Monopolistic Competition and Quality Upgrading

- R. Feenstra (1984) "Voluntary Export Restraint in US Autos, 1980-81: Quality, Employment and Welfare Effects". in R. Baldwin and A. Krueger, eds. *The Structure and Evolution of Recent US Trade Policies*; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 35-65. also in Bhagwati.
- R. Feenstra (1985). "Automobile Prices and Protection: The US-Japan Trade Restraint". *Journal*



*of Policy Modeling*; V.7-#1, pp. 49-68.

-R. Feenstra (1988). "Quality Change Under Trade Restraints in Japanese Autos". *Quarterly Journal of Economics*; V.103-#1, pp. 131-146.

-R. Feenstra (1988). "Gains from Trade in Differentiated Products: Japanese Compact Trucks". in R. Feenstra, ed. *Empirical Methods for International Trade*. Cambridge: MIT, pp. 120-139.

-J. Levinsohn (1988). "Empirics of Taxes on Differentiated Products: The Case of Tariffs in the US Automobile Industry". in R. Baldwin, ed. *Trade Policy Issues and Empirical Analysis*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 11-44.

-J. Levinsohn and R. Feenstra (1990). "Identifying the Competition". *Journal of International Economics*; V.28-#3/4, pp.199-215.

-J. Levinsohn (1993). "Testing the Imports-as-Market-Discipline Hypothesis". *JIE*; V.35-#1/2, pp. 1-22.

-R. Feenstra and J. Levinsohn (1995). "Estimating Markups and Market Conduct with Multidimensional Product Attributes". *REStud*; V.69-#1, pp. 19-52.

-C. Collins and S. Dunaway (1987). "The Cost of Trade Restraints: The Case of Japanese Automobile Exports to the US". *IMF Staff Papers*; V.34-#1, pp. 150-175.

-Y. Mertens and V. Ginsburgh (1985). "Product Differentiation and Price Discrimination in the European Community: The Case of Automobiles". *Journal of Industrial Economics*; V.34-#2, pp. 151-166.

-J. deMelo and P. Messerlin (1988). "Price, Quality and Welfare Effects of European VERs on Japanese Autos". *European Economic Review*; V.32-#?, pp. 1527-1546.

### (c) Oligopolistic Competition

-A. Dixit (1987). "Tariffs and Subsidies under Oligopoly: The case of the US Automobile Industry". in R. Feenstra, ed. *Empirical Research in International Trade*. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 112-127.

-A. Dixit (1987). "Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy for the US Automobile Industry". in R. Feenstra, ed. *Empirical Research in International Trade*. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 141-169.

-K. Krishna, K. Hogan, and P. Swagel (1994). "The Non-Optimality of Optimal Trade Policies: The US Automobile Industry Revisited, 1979-1985". in P. Krugman and A. Smith, eds. *Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 11-37.

-M. Fuss, S. Murphy and L. Waverman (1992). "The State of North American and Japanese Motor Vehicle Industries: A Partially Calibrated Model to Examine the Impacts of Trade Policy Changes". *NBER Working Paper*; #4225.

-D. Laussel, C. Montet and A. Peguin-Feissolle (1988). "Optimal Trade Policy under Oligopoly: A Calibrated Model of the Europe-Japan Rivalry in the EEC Car Market". *EER*; V.32-#?, pp. 1547-1565.

-A. Smith (1990). "The Market for Cars in the Enlarged European Community". in C. Bliss and J.

B.de Macedo, eds. *Unity With Diversity in the European Economy*. Cambridge: CUP\CEPR.

-A. Smith and A. Venables (1990). "Automobiles". in G.C. Hufbauer, ed. *Europe 1992: An American Perspective*. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 119-158.

-A. Smith and A. Venables (1991). "Counting the Cost of Voluntary Export Restraints in the European Car Market". in E. Helpman and A. Razin, eds. *International Trade and Trade Policy*. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 187-220.

-A. Smith (1994). "Strategic Trade Policy in the European Car Market". in P. Krugman and A. Smith, eds. *Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 67-81.

-V. Lambson and J.D. Richardson (1987). "Tacit Collusion and Voluntary Restraint Agreements in the US Auto Market". ms: University of Wisconsin, Madison.

-J. deMelo and D. Tarr (1992). *A General Equilibrium Analysis of US Trade Policy*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

-J. de Melo and D. Tarr 1993. "Industrial Policy in the Presence of Wage Distortions: The Case of the US Auto and Steel Industries". *IER*; V.34-#4, pp. 833-851.

-J. Levinsohn (1994). "International Trade and the US Automobile Industry: Current Research, Issues, and Questions". *Japan and the World Economy*; V.6-#4, pp. 335-357.

-P. Goldberg (1994). "Trade Policies in the US Automobile Industry". *Japan and the World Economy*; V.6-#2, pp. 175-208. [comments by N. Yanagawa and J. Levinsohn follow]

-P. Goldberg (1995). "Product differentiation and Oligopoly in International Markets: The Case of the US Automobile Industry". *Etrica*; V.63-#4, pp. 891-952.

-S. Berry, J. Levinsohn, and A. Pakes (1995). "Automobile Prices in Market Equilibrium". *Etrica*; V.63-#4, pp. 841-890.

-S. Berry, J. Levinsohn, and A. Pakes (1999). "Voluntary Export Restraints in Automobiles: Evaluating a Trade Policy". *AER*; V.89-#3, pp. 400-430.

#### (5) Political Economy of Auto Policy--US

-R. Cohen (1983). "The Prospects for Trade and Protectionism in the Auto Industry". in W. Cline, ed. *Trade Policy in the 1980s*. Washington, DC: IIE, pp. 527-563.

-S. Cohen and R. Meltzer (1982). "Braking Japanese Automobile Import Competition". Chapter 3 in Cohen and Meltzer, *US International Economic Policy in Action*. New York: Praeger, pp. 65-90.

-L. White (1986). "The US Auto Industry: A Case Study of a *de facto* Industrial Policy". in H. Mutoh, et al., eds. *Industrial Policies for Pacific Economic Growth*. Sydney: Allen and Unwin, pp. 196-210.

-I. Kabashima and H. Sato (1986). "Local Content and Congressional Politics: Interest Group Theory and Foreign Policy Implications". *International Studies Quarterly*; V.?-#?, pp. 295-314.

- J. Keely (1983). "Cast In Concrete for All Time? The Negotiation of the Auto Pact". *Canadian Journal of Political Science*; V.16-#?, pp. 281-298.
- D. Nelson (1989). "On the High Track to Protection: The US Automobile Industry, 1979-1981". in S. Haggard and C. Moon, eds. *Pacific Dynamics*. Boulder: Westview Press, pp. 97-128.
- R. Reich (1985). "Bailout: A Comparative Study in Law and Industrial Structure". *Yale Journal on Regulation*; V.2-#2, pp. 163-224.
- R. Reich and J. Donahue (1985). *New Deals: The Chrysler Revival and the American System*. New York: Basic Books.
- D. Dyer, M. Salter and A. Webber (1987). *Changing Alliances: The Harvard Business School Project on the Auto Industry and the American Economy*. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
- G. Winham and I. Kabashima (1982). "The Politics of US-Japanese Auto Trade". in I.M. Destler and H. Sato, eds. *Coping with US-Japanese Economic Conflicts*. Lexington: DC Heath, pp. 73-119.
- S. Cohen and R. Meltzer (1982). "Braking Japanese Automobile Import Competition". Chapter 3 in Cohen and Meltzer, *US International Economic Policy in Action*. New York: Praeger, pp. 65-90.
- R. Cohen (1983). "The Prospects for Trade and Protectionism in the Auto Industry". in W. Cline, ed. *Trade Policy in the 1980s*. Washington, DC: IIE, pp. 527-563.
- A. Laffer, V. Canto, R. Easterlin and C. Kadlec (1985). "A High Road for the American Automobile Industry". *World Economy*; V.8-#?, pp. 267-286.
- I. Kabashima and H. Sato (1986). "Local Content and Congressional Politics: Interest Group Theory and Foreign Policy Implications". *ISQ*; V.?-#?, pp. 295-314.
- L. White (1986). "The US Auto Industry: A Case Study of a *de facto* Industrial Policy". in H. Mutoh, et al., eds. *Industrial Policies for Pacific Economic Growth*. Sydney: Allen and Unwin, pp. 196-210.
- A. Denzau (1986). "Made in America: The 1981 Automobile Cartel". St. Louis: Center for the Study of American Business (publication #76).
- P. Donahue (1992). "'Free Trade' Unions and the State: Trade Liberalization's Endorsement by the AFL-CIO, 1943-1962". *Research in Political Economy*; V.13, pp. 1-73.
- D. Nelson (1995). "Political Economy of Protection for the US Automobile Industry". in A. Krueger, ed. *Political Economy of American Trade Policy*. 1995. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 133-191.
- D. Nelson (1995). "Making Sense of the 1981 Automobile VER: Economics, Politics and the Political Economy of Protection". in A. Krueger, ed. *The Political Economy of Trade Protection*. 1995. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 35-42.

(6) Political Economy of Auto Policy: Comparative and International

- D. Bennett and K. Sharpe (1979) "Agenda Setting and Bargaining Power: The Mexican State

versus Transnational Automobile Corporations,” *World Politics*; V.32-#1, pp. 57- 89.

-D. Bennett and K. Sharpe (1979) “Transnational Corporations and the Political Economy of Export Promotion,” *International Organization*; V.33-#2, pp. 177-201.

-F. Coronil and J. Skurski (1982) “Reproducing Dependency: Auto-Industrial Policy and Petrodollar Circulation in Venezuela,” *International Organization*, V.36-#1, pp. 61-94.

-J. Dunn (1987). “Automobiles in International Trade: Regime Change or Persistence”. *International Organization*; V.41-#2, pp. 225-252.

-J. Dunn (1989). “The Asian Auto Imbroglia: Patterns of Trade Policy and Business Strategy. in S. Haggard and C. Moon, eds. *Pacific Dynamics*. Boulder: Westview, pp. 155-183.

-R. Gregory (1988). “A Sad and Sorry Story: Industrial Policy for the Australian Motor Vehicle Industry”. in A.M. Spence and H. Hazard, eds. *International Competitiveness*. Cambridge: Ballinger, pp. 173-196.

-S. Wilks (1984). *Industrial Policy and the Motor Industry*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

-M. Mason (1994). “Elements of Consensus: Europe’s Response to the Japanese Automotive Challenge”. *JCMS*; V.32-#?, pp. 433-453.

-A. Mattoo and P. Mavroidis (1995). “The EC-Japan Consensus on Cars: Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy”. *World Economy*; V.18-#?, pp. 345-365.

#### **d. Machine Tools**

-A. Amsden (1977). “The Division of Labor is Limited by the Type of the Market: The Case of the Taiwanese Machine Tool Industry”. *World Development*; V.5-#3, pp. 217-233.

-S. Jacobsson (1982). “Electronics and the Technology Gap: The Case of Numerically Controlled Machine Tools”. *IDS Bulletin*; V.13-#2, pp.

-S. Jacobsson (1984). “Industrial Policy for the Machine Tool Industries of South Korea and Taiwan”. *IDS Bulletin*; V.15-#2, pp. 44-49.

-M. Fransman (1986). “International Competitiveness, Technical Change and the State: The Machine Tool Industry in Taiwan and Japan”. *World Development*; V.14-#12, pp. 1375-1396.

-A. Amsden (1985). “The Division of Labor is Limited by the Rate of Growth of the Market: The Taiwan Machine Tool Industry Revisited”. *Cambridge Journal of Economics*; V.9-#?, pp. 271-284.

-D. Jones (1983). “Machine Tools: A Competitive New European Industry”. in G. Shepherd, et al. *Europe's Industries: Public and Private Strategies for Change*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 186-208.

-D. Collins (1988). “The Machine Tool Industry and Industrial Policy, 1955-1982”. in M. Spence and H. Hazard, eds. *International Competitiveness*. Cambridge: Ballinger, pp. 75-114.

-D. Friedman (1988). *The Misunderstood Miracle: Industrial Development and Political Change in*

Japan. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

-R. Sarathy (1989). "The Interplay of Industrial Policy and International Strategy: Japan's Machine Tool Industry". California Management Review; V.31-#3, pp. 132-160.

-E. Dinopoulos and M. Kreinin (1991). "The US VER on Machine Tools: Causes and Effects". in R. Baldwin, ed. Empirical Studies of Commercial Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 113-129.

-D. Noble (1984). Forces of Production: A Social History of Industrial Automation. New York: Knopf.

### **e. Semiconductors and Computers**

-M. Borrus, J. Millstein and J. Zysman (1983). "Trade and Development in the Semiconductor Industry: Japanese Challenge and American Response." in J. Zysman and L. Tyson, eds. *American Industry in International Competition: Government Policies and Corporate Strategies*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. pp. 142-248.

-G. Dosi (1983). "Semiconductors: Europe's Precarious Survival in High Technology"; in G. Shepard, et al., *Europe's Industries: Public and Private Strategies for Change*. London: Frances Pinter.

-D. Okimoto, T. Sugano and F. Weinstein (1984). *The Competitive Edge: The Semiconductor Industry in the US and Japan*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

-T. Pugel (1987). "Limits of Trade Policy Toward High Technology Industries: The Case of Semiconductors". in R. Sato and P. Wachtel, eds. *Trade Friction and Economic Policy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 184-237.

-M. Borrus, L. Tyson and J. Zysman (1987). "Creating Advantage: How Government Policies Shape International Trade in the Semiconductor Industry". in P. Krugman, ed. *Strategic Trade Policy and the New International Economics*. Cambridge: MIT, pp. 91-113.

-A. Denzau (1988). "Trade Protection Comes to Silicon Valley". St Louis: Center for the Study of American Business (#86).

-D. Okimoto (1989). *Between MITI and the Market: Japanese Industrial Policy for High Technology*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

-J. Hart (1989). "The Origins of the US-Japan Semiconductor Dispute". in S. Haggard and C. Moon, eds. *Pacific Dynamics: The International Politics of Industrial Change*. Boulder: Westview Press. pp. 129-153.

-L. Tyson (1992). *Who's Bashing Whom?: Trade Conflict in High-Technology Industries*. Washington, DC: IIE.

-D. Irwin (1996). "Trade Politics and the Semiconductor Industry". in A. Krueger, ed. *The Political Economy of American Trade Policy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 11-66.

-M. Kreinin (1985). "US Trade Policies and Possible Restrictions in High Technology Products". *Journal of Policy-Modelling*, V.7-#, pp. 69-105.

- W. Finan and C. Amundsen (1985). *An Analysis of the Effects of Targeting on the Competitiveness of the US Semiconductor Industry*. Washington, DC: USTR.
- Finan, W.F. and C.B. Amundsen (1986). "Modeling US-Japan Competition in Semiconductors". *Journal of Policy Modeling*; V.8-#3, pp. 305-326.
- Mody, A. and D. Wheeler (1987). "Prices, Costs and Competition at the Technological Frontier: A Model for Semiconductor Memories"; *Journal of Policy Modeling*; V.9-#2, pp.
- R. Baldwin and P. Krugman (1988). "Market Access and International Competition: A Simulation Study of 16K Random Access Memories". in R. Feenstra, ed. *Empirical Methods in International Trade*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. pp. 171-202.
- R. Wilson, P. Ashton and T. Egan (1980). *Innovation, Competition and Government Policy in the Semiconductor Industry*. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington.
- M.T. Flaherty (1984). "Field Research on the Link between Technological Innovation and Growth: Evidence from the International Semiconductor Industry". *AER*; V.74-#2, pp. 67-72.
- G. Dosi (1984). *Technical Change and Industrial Innovation*. New York: St. Martins.
- C. Parsons (1988). "The Changing Shape of Domestic Employment in a High-Tech Industry: The Case of International Trade in Semiconductors". in L. Tyson, W. Dickens and J. Zysman, eds. *The Dynamics of Trade and Employment*. Cambridge: Ballinger, pp.
- Y. Kimura (1988). *The Japanese Semiconductor Industry: Structure, Competitive Strategies and Performance*. Greenwich: JAI Press.
- Y. Kimura (1990). "Sustainable Competitive Advantages and Market Share Performance of Firms: The Case of the Japanese Semiconductor Industry". *IJIO*; V.8-#?, pp. 73-92.
- K. Flamm (1987). *Targeting the Computer: Government Support and International Competition*. Washington, DC: Brookings.
- K. Flamm (1988). *Creating the Computer: Government, Industry, and High Technology*. Washington, DC: Brookings.
- K. Flam (1985). "Internationalization in Semiconductors". in J. Grunwald and K. Flamm, eds. *The Global Factory: Foreign Assembly in International Trade*. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp.
- K. Flamm (198?). "Measurement of DRAM Prices: Technology and Market Structure". in M. Foss, M. Manser and A. Young, ed. *Price Measurements and their Uses*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER
- K. Flamm (1993). "Forward Pricing vs. Fair Market Value: An Analytic Assessment of 'Dumping' in DRAMs". in T. Ito and A. Krueger, eds. *Trade and Protectionism*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 47-93.
- K. Flamm (1993). "Semiconductor Dependency and Strategic Trade Policy". *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics*. pp. 249-233.
- A. Dick (1994). "Accounting for Semiconductor Industry Dynamics". *International Journal of Industrial Organization*; V.12-#?, pp. 35-51.

-D. Irwin and P. Kleinow (1994). "Learning by Doing Spillovers in the Semiconductor Industry". *JPE*; v.102-#6, pp. 1200-1227.

-R. Baldwin (1994). "The Impact of the 1986 US-Japan Semiconductor Agreement". *Japan and the World Economy*; V.6-#2, pp. 129-152. [comment by K. Krishna follows]

### 3. The Macro Political-Economy of Economic Power and Policy Compliance

#### a. General

-M. Doxey (1971). *Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement*. Oxford: Oxford University Press/RIIA. (2nd Edition, 1980)

-D. Baldwin (1971). "The Power of Positive Sanctions". *World Politics*. V.24-#1, pp. 19-38.

-N.R. Richardson (1976). "Political Compliance and US Trade Dominance". *APSR*; V.70-#?, pp. 1098-1109.

-N.R. Richardson (1980). "Economic Dependence and Foreign Policy Compliance". in C. Kegley and P. McGowan, eds. *The Political Economy of Foreign Policy Behavior*. Beverley Hills: Sage, pp.

-R. Renwick (1981). *Economic Sanctions*. Cambridge: Harvard Center for International Affairs.

-M. Daoudi and M. Dajani (1983). *Economic Sanctions: Ideals and Experience*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

-T. Bayard, J. Pelzman and J. Perez-Lopez (1983). "Stakes and Risks in Economic Sanctions". *World Economy*; V.5-#?, pp. 73-87.

-D. Baldwin (1985). *Economic Statecraft*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

-G. Hufbauer and J. Schott (1985). *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy*. Washington, DC: IIE.

-J. Lindsay (1986). "Trade Sanctions as Policy Instruments: A Reexamination". *ISQ*; V.?-#?, pp. 153-173.

-S. Lenway (1988). "Between War and Commerce: Economic Sanctions as Tools of Statecraft". *IO*; V.42-#2, pp. 397-426.

-K. Nossal (1989). "International Sanctions as International Punishment". *IO*; V.43-#2, pp. 301-322.

-P. van Bergeijk (1989). "Success and Failure of Economic Sanctions". *KYKLOS*; V.42-#?, pp. 385-404.

-P. van Bergeijk (1992). "Diplomatic Barriers to Trade". *De Economist*; V.140-#?, pp. 44-63.

-P. van Bergeijk and C. van Marrewijk (1993). "Economic Sanctions: A Hidden Cost of the New World Order". in M. Chatterji, H. Jager and A. Rima, eds. *Economics of International Security*. London: Macmillan.

-J. Eaton and M. Engers (1992). "Sanctions". *JPE*; V.100-#5, pp. 899-928.

-L. Martin (1992). *Coercive Cooperation*. Princeton: PUP.

-J. Dashti-Gibson, P. Davis and B. Radcliff (1997). "On the Determinants of the Success of Economic Sanctions: An Empirical Analysis". *AJPS*; V.41-#2, pp. 608-618

#### b. Against the (now "former") Soviet Union

-G. Adler-Karlsson (1968). *Western Economic Warfare 1947-1967: A Case Study in Foreign Economic Policy*. Stockholm: Almqvist and Wicksell.

-A.J. Hughes Hallett and A. Brandsma (1983). "How Effective Could Sanctions Against the Soviet Union Be?". *WA*; V.119-#?, pp. 498-522.

-B. Crawford and S. Lenway (1985). "Decision Modes and Regime Change: Western Collaboration on East-West Trade". *WP*; V.37-#?, pp. 375-402.

-M. Mastanduno (1985). "Strategies of Economic Containment: US Trade Relations with the Soviet Union". *WP*; V.37-#?, pp. 503-531.

-M. Mastanduno (1988). "Trade as a Strategic Weapon: American and Alliance Export Control Policy in the Early Postwar Period". *IO*; V.42-#1, pp. 121-150.

-G. Bertsch, ed. (1988). *Controlling East-West Trade and Technology Transfer*. Durham: Duke University Press.

-B. Jentelson (1986). *Pipeline Politics: The Complex Politics of East-West Energy Trade*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

-J. Alt and B. Eichengreen (1989). "Parallel and Overlapping Games: Theory and an Application to the European Gas Trade". *E&P*; V.1-#2, pp. 119-144.

#### c. Against South Africa

-H.A. Khan (1989). *The Political Economy of Sanctions Against Apartheid*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

#### (1) International Aspects

-R. Porter (1979). "International Trade and Investment Sanctions: Potential Impact on the South African Economy". *Journal of Conflict Resolution*; V.23-#4, pp. 579-612.

-D. Gordon (1983). "The Politics of International Sanctions: A Case Study of South Africa". in M. Nincic and P. Wallenstein, eds. *Dilemmas of Economic Coercion: Sanctions in World Politics*. New York: Praeger, pp. 183-210.

-M. Lundahl (1984). "Economic Effects of a Trade and Investment Boycott Against South Africa". *ScanJE*; V.86-#1, pp. 68-83.

-J. Cooper (1984). "Southern Africa and the Threat of Economic Sanctions". *South African Journal of Economics*; V.52-#3, pp. 266-281.



- J. Cooper (1986). "The Welfare Effects of Sanctions". *Journal for Studies in Economics and Econometrics*; V.25-#?, pp. 3-11.
- C. Becker (1987). "Economic Sanctions Against South Africa". *WP*; V.39-#?, pp. 147-173.
- P. Black and H. Cooper (1987). "On the Welfare and Employment Effects of Economic Sanctions". *South African Journal of Economics*; V.55-#1, pp. 1-15.
- J. Cooper (1989). "On Income Distribution and Economic Sanctions". *South African Journal of Economics*; V.57-#1, pp. 14-21.
- M. Holden (1989). "Unemployment in a Sector-Specific Trade Model in the Presence of Economic Sanctions". *South African Journal of Economics*; V.57-#2, pp. 137-141.
- H.A. Khan (1988). "Impact of Trade Sanctions on South Africa: A Social Accounting Matrix Approach". *Contemporary Policy Issues*; V.6-#?, pp. 130-140.
- W. Kaempfer, J. Lehman and A. Lowenberg (1987). "Divestment, Investment Sanctions, and Disinvestment: An Evaluation of Anti-Apartheid Instruments". *IO*; V.41-#3, pp. 457-473.
- B. Feigenbaum and A. Lowenberg (1988). "South African Disinvestment: Causes and Effects". *Contemporary Policy Issues*; V.6-#?, pp. 105-117.
- W. Kaempfer and Moffett (1988). "Impact of Anti-Apartheid Sanctions on South Africa: Some Trade and Financial Evidence". *Contemporary Policy Issues*; V.6-#?, pp. 118-129.
- W. Kaempfer and A. Lowenberg (1990). "South Africa's Vulnerability to Oil Sanctions". *Journal of Energy and Development*; V.14-#1, pp. 19-44.
- W. Kaempfer and A. Lowenberg (1990). "Analyzing Economic Sanctions: Toward a Public Choice Framework". in J. Odell and T. Willett, eds. *International Trade Policies: Gains from Exchange Between Economics and Political Science*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. pp. 173-192.

## (2) Domestic Aspects

- J.B. Knight (1964). "A Theory of Income Distribution in South Africa". *Bulletin of the Oxford University Institute of Economics and Statistics*; V.27-#4, pp. 289-310.
- J.B. Knight and M. McGrath (1977). "An Analysis of Racial Wage Discrimination in South Africa". *Bulletin of the Oxford University Institute of Economics and Statistics*; V.39-#?, pp. 245-271.
- R. Porter (1978). "A Model of the Southern African-type Economy". *AER*; V.68-#5, pp. 743-755.
- M. Lundahl (1982). "The Rationale of Apartheid". *AER*; V.72-#5, pp. 1169-1179.
- R. Findlay and M. Lundahl (1987). "Racial Discrimination, Dualistic Labor Markets and Foreign Investment". *JDevE*; V.27-#?, pp. 139-148.
- W. Kaempfer and A. Lowenberg (1986). "A Model of the Political Economy of International Investment Sanctions". *KYKLOS*; V.39-#3, pp. 377-396.

-W. Kaempfer and A. Lowenberg (1988). "The Theory of International Sanctions: A Public Choice Approach". *AER*; V.78-#?, pp. 786-793.

-W. Kaempfer and A. Lowenberg (1988). "Determinants of the Economic and Political Effects of Trade Sanctions". *South African Journal of Economics*. V.56-#4, pp. 270-277.

-W. Kaempfer and A. Lowenberg (1989). "Sanctioning South Africa: The Politics Behind the Policies". *Cato Journal*; V.8-#3, pp. 713-727.

-A. Lowenberg (1989). "An Economic Theory of Apartheid". *Economic Inquiry*; V.27-#1, pp. 57-74.

-P. Black and J. Cooper (1989). "Economic Sanctions and Interest Group Behavior: Some Reservations". *South African Journal of Economics*; V.57-#2, pp. 188-193.

#### 4. Political Power and Trade Structure

-T. Baumgartner and T.R. Burns (1975). "The Structuring of International Economic Relations". *ISQ*; V.19-#2, pp. 126-159.

-S. Krasner (1976). "State Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade". *WP*; V.28-#3, pp. 317-347.

-C. Christensen (1977). "Structural Power and National Security"; in K. Knorr and F. Trager, eds. *Economic Issues and National Security*. Lawrence: Regents Press of Kansas. pp. 127-159.

-J.E. Roemer (1977). "The Effect of Sphere of Influence and Economic Distance on the Commodity Composition of Trade in Manufactures". *REStat*; V.59-#3, pp. 318-327.

-G. Gaile and R. Grant (1989). "Trade, Power, and Location: The Spatial Dynamics of the Relationship between Exchange and Political-Economic Strength". *Economic Geography*; V.65-#4, pp. 329-337.

-B. Pollins (1989). "Does Trade Still Follow the Flag?". *APSR*; V.83-#2, pp. 465-480.

-E. Mansfield (1992). "The Concentration of Capabilities and International Trade". *IO*; V.46-#3, pp. 731-764.

-J. Gowa and E. Mansfield (1993). "Power Politics and International Trade". *APSR*; V.87-#2, pp. 408-420.

-E. Mansfield and R. Bronson (1997). "Alliances, Preferential Trading Arrangements, and International Trade". *APSR*; V.91-#1, pp. 94-107.

-J. Morrow, R. Siverson, and T. Tabares (1998). "The Political Determinants of International Trade: The Major Powers, 1907-1990". *APSR*; V.92-#3, pp. 649-661.

-C.P. Kindleberger (1980). "Government Policies and Changing Shares in World Trade". *AER*; V.70-#2, pp. 293-298.

-A. Hirschman (1945). *National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

-S. Sideri (1970). *Trade and Power*. Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press.

## 5. Imperialism, Neoimperialism and Political-Economic Domination

-P. Baran (1957). *The Political Economy of Growth*. New York: Monthly Review.

-A.G. Frank (1966). "The Development of Underdevelopment". *Monthly Review*, V.18-#4, pp. 17-31.

-I. Wallerstein (1974). "The Rise and Future Demise of the Capitalist World System". *Comparative Studies in Society and History*; V.16-#4, pp. 387-415.

-F. Cardoso and E. Faletto (1979). *Dependency and Development in Latin America*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

-B. Warren (1980). *Imperialism: Pioneer of Capitalism*. London: New Left Books.

## 6. Trade, War and Peace

### a. Economic Interdependence and Political Conflict

-K. Barbieri and G. Schneider (1999). "Globalization and Peace: Assessing New Directions in the Study of Trade and Conflict". *Journal of Peace Research*; V.36-#4, pp. 387-404.

-S. Polachek (1980). "Conflict and Trade". *Journal of Conflict Resolution*; V.24-#1, pp. 55-78.

-M. Gasiorowski and S. Polachek (1982). "Conflict and Interdependence: East-West Trade and Linkages in the Era of Detente". *Journal of Conflict Resolution*; V.26-#4, pp. 709-729.

-M. Gasiorowski (1986). "Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: Some Cross-National Evidence". *ISQ*; V.30-#1, pp. 23-38.

-B. Pollins (1989). "Conflict, Cooperation and Commerce: The Effect of International Political Interactions on Bilateral Trade Flows". *American Journal of Political Science*; V.33-#?, pp. 465-480.

-S. Polachek (1992). "Conflict and Trade: An Economics Approach to Political International Interactions". In W. Isard and C. Anderton, eds. *Economics of Arms Reduction and the Peace Process*. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 89-120.

-K. Barbieri (1996). "Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or a Source of Interstate Conflict". *Journal of Peace Research*; V.33-#1, pp. 29-49.

-K. Barbieri (1997). "Risky Business: The Impact of Trade Linkages on Interstate Conflict, 1870-1985". In G. Schneider and P. Weitsman, eds. *Enforcing Cooperation: 'Risky' States in the Intergovernmental Management of Conflict*. London: Macmillan, pp. 202-231.

-R. Reuveny and H. Kang (1996). "International Trade, Political Conflict/Cooperation, and Granger Causality". *American Journal of Political Science*, V.40-#3, pp. 943-970.

-S. McMillan (1997). "Interdependence and Conflict". *Mershon International Studies Review*; V.41-#1, pp. 94-107.

-S. Polachek, J. Robst, and Y.-C. Chang (1999). "Liberalism and Interdependence: Extending the Trade-Conflict Model". *Journal of Peace Research*; V.36-#4, pp. 405-422.

- J. Oneal and B. Russett (1999). "Assessing the Liberal Peace with Alternative Specifications: Trade Still Reduces Conflict". *Journal of Peace Research*; V.36-#4, pp. 423-442.
- H. Dorussen (1999). "Balance of Power Revisited: A Multi-Country Model of Trade and Conflict" *Journal of Peace Research*; V.36-#4, pp. 443-462. [comment by H. Hegre and response, 2001, V.39-#1, pp. 109-118.]
- J. Levy and K. Barbieri (1999). "Sleeping with the Enemy: The Impact of War on Trade". *Journal of Peace Research*; V.36-#4, pp. 463-479.
- J. Morrow (1999). "How Could Trade Affect Conflict?". *Journal of Peace Research*; V.36-#4, pp. 481-489.
- E. Gartzke, Qi Li, and C. Boehmer (2001). "Investing in the Peace: Economic Interdependence and International Conflict". *IO*; V.55-#2, pp. 391-438.
- Q. Li and D. Sacko (2002). "The (Ir)Relevance of Militarized Interstate Disputes for International Trade". *International Studies Quarterly*, V.46-#1, pp. 11-43.
- E. Mansfield (1994). *Power, Trade, and War*. Princeton: PUP.
- Special Issue (1983): "The Economic Foundations of War". *ISQ*; V.27-#4.
- R. Gilpin (1981). *War and Change in World Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- J. Levy (1985). "Theories of General War". *WP*; V.37-#?, pp. 345-374.
- P. Kennedy (1987). *The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*. New York: Random House.
- G. Modelski (1987). *Long Cycles in World Politics*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
- J. Goldstein (1988). *Long Cycles: Prosperity and War in the Modern Age*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- W. Thomson (1988). *On Global War: Historical-Structural Approaches to World Politics*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.

#### b. Regime Type, Economic Interdependence and Political Conflict

- M. Brown, S. Lynn-Jones, S. Miller eds. (1996). *Debating the Democratic Peace*. Cambridge: MIT.
- S. Chan (1984). "Mirror, Mirror on the Wall ... Are the Freer Countries More Pacific". *JCR*; V.28-#?, pp. 617-648.
- M. Doyle (1986). "Liberalism and World Politics". *APSR*; V.80-#4, pp. 1151-1169.
- Z. Maoz and N. Absolali (1989). "Regime Types and International Conflict, 1816-1976". *JCR*; V.33-#1, pp. 3-36.
- C. Ember, M. Ember, and B. Russett (1992). "Peace Between Participatory Polities: A Cross Cultural Test of the 'Democracies Rarely Fight Each Other' Hypothesis". *WP*; V.44-#?, pp. 573-

599.

-Z. Maoz and B. Russett (1993). "Normative and Structural Causes of the Democratic Peace, 1946-1986". *APSR*; V.87-#?, pp. 624-638.

-S. Bremer (1993). "Democracy and Militarized Interstate Conflict, 1816-1965". *International Interactions*; V.18-#?, pp. 231-249.

-W. Dixon and B. Moon (1993). "Political Similarity and American Foreign Trade Patterns". *Political Research Quarterly*; V.46-#?, pp. 5-25.

-E. Weede (1995). "Economic Policy and International Security: Rent-Seeking, Free Trade and Democratic Peace". *European Journal of International Relations*; V.1-#4, pp. 519-537.

-E. Mansfield and J. Snyder (1995). "Democratization and the Danger of War". *International Security*; V.20-#?, pp. 5-38.

-E. Mansfield and J. Snyder (1995). "Democratization and War". *Foreign Affairs*; V.74-#?, pp. 79-97.

-E. Mansfield and J. Snyder (1996). "The Effects of Democratization on War". *International Security*; V.21-#?, pp. 196-207.

-W. Thompson (1996). "Democracy and Peace: Putting the Cart Before the Horse?". *IO*; V.50-#?, pp. 141-174.

-D.S. Bennett (1996). "Democracy, Regime Change, and Rivalry Termination". *International Interactions*; V.22-#4, pp. 369-397.

-J. Oneal, F. Oneal, Z. Maoz, and B. Russett (1996). "The Liberal Peace: Interdependence, Democracy, and International Conflict". *Journal of Peace Research*; V.33-#1, pp. 11-28.

-J. Oneal and B. Russett (1997). "The Classical Liberals were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-1985". *ISQ*; V.41-#2, pp. 267-293.

-J. Oneal and J.L. Ray (1997). "New Tests of the Democratic Peace: Controlling for Economic Interdependence". *Political Research Quarterly*; V.50-#4, pp. 751-775.

-A. Raknerud and H. Hegre (1997). "The Hazards of War: Reassessing Evidence of the Democratic Peace". *Journal of Peace Research*; V.34-#4, pp. 385-404.

-H. Farber and J. Gowa (1997). "Common Interests or Common Polities? Reinterpreting the Democratic Peace". *Journal of Politics*; V.59-#2, pp. 393-417.

-W. Thompson and R. Tucker (1997). "A Tale of Two Democratic Peace Critiques". *Journal of Conflict Resolution*; V.41-#3, pp. 428-454. [comments by Farber/Gowa, Mansfield/Snyder and response follows 457-477.]

-S. Polachek (1997). "Why Democracies Cooperate More and Fight Less: The Relationship between International Trade and Cooperation". *RIE*; V.5-#3, pp. 295-309.

-E. Gartzke (1998). "Kant We All Just Get Along? Opportunity, Willingness, and the Origins of the Democratic Peace". *AJPS*; V.42-#1, pp. 1-27.

- M. Ward and K. Gleditsch (1998). "Democratizing for Peace". *APSR*; V.92-#1, pp. 51-61.
- E. Henderson (1998). "The Democratic Peace through the Lens of Culture, 1820-1989". *ISQ*; V.40-#3, pp. 461-484.
- H. Bliss and B. Russett (1998). "Democratic Trading Partners: The Liberal Connections, 1962-1989". *Journal of Politics*; V.60-#4, pp. 1126-1147.
- B. Russett, J. Oneal, and D. Davis (1998). "The Third Leg of the Kantian Tripod for Peace: International Organizations and Militarized Disputes, 1950-1985". *IO*; V.52-#3, pp. 441-467.
- J. Morrow, R. Siverson, and T. Tabares (1998). "The Wages of Peace: Trade, Democracy, Interests and International Conflict Among the Major Powers". in G. Geeraerts and P. Stouthuysen, eds. *Democratic Peace in Europe: Myth or Reality?* Brussels: Free University of Brussels Press, pp. 131-149.
- N. Beck, J. Katz, and R. Tucker (1998). "Taking Time Seriously: Time-Series/Cross-Section Analysis with Binary Dependent Variables". *AJPS*; V.42-#4, pp. 1260-1288. [erratum *AJPS*; V.43-#3 pg. 978.]
- J. Oneal and B. Russett (1999). "The Kantian Peace: The Pacific Benefits of Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1886-1992". *World Politics*; V.52-#1, pp. 1-37.
- B. Leeds and D. Davis (1999). "Beneath the Surface: Regime Type and International Interaction, 1953-1978". *Journal of Peace Research*; V.36-#1, pp. 5-21.
- J. Gowa (1999). *Ballots and Bullets: The Elusive Democratic Peace*. Princeton: PUP.
- G. Flynn and H. Farrell (1999). "Piecing Together the Democratic Peace: The CSCE and the 'Construction' of Security in Post-Cold War Europe". *International Organization*; V.53-#3, pp. 505-535.
- Lars-Erik Cederman (2001). "Back to Kant: Reinterpreting the Democratic Peace as a Macrohistorical Learning Process". *APSR*; V.95-#1, pp. 15-31.
- Christopher F. Gelpi and Michael Griesdorf (2001). "Winners or Losers? Democracies in International Crisis, 1918-94". *American Political Science Review*; V.95-#3, pp. 633-647.
- J. Box-Steffensmeier and C. Zorn (2001). "Duration Models and Proportional Hazards in Political Science". *AJPS*; V.45-#4, pp.
- Donald P Green, Soo Yeon Kim and David H Yoon (2001). "Dirty Pool". *International Organization*; V.55-#2, pp. 441-468.
- John Oneal and Bruce Russett (2001). "Clear and Clean: The Fixed Effects of the Liberal Peace". *International Organization*; V.55-#2, pp. 469-486.
- Nathaniel Beck and Jonathan N Katz (2001). "Throwing Out the Baby with the Bath Water: A Comment on Green, Kim, and Yoon". *International Organization*; V.55-#2, pp. 487-496.
- Gary King (2001). "Proper Nouns and Methodological Propriety: Pooling Dyads in International Relations Data". *International Organization*; V.55-#2, pp. 497-507.

-M. Peceny, C. Beer, and S. Sanchez-Terry (2002). "Dictatorial Peace?". *APSR*; V.96-#1, pp. 15-26.

### c. Regime Type and Trade Conflict

-R. Sherman (2001). "Democracy and Trade Conflict". *International Interactions*; V.27-#1, pp. 1-28.

-K. Zeng (2002). "Trade Structure and the Effectiveness of America's "Aggressively Unilateral" Trade Policy". *International Studies Quarterly*; V.46-#1, pp. 93-115.

-K. Zeng (1999). "Why Do Democracies Fight More Trade Wars? The Importance of Competitive versus Complementary Structure".

-Edward D. Mansfield, Helen V. Milner and B. Peter Rosendorf (2002). "Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements". *International Organization*; V.56-#3, pp. 477-513.

## II. THE POLITICAL-ECONOMY OF LIBERALIZATION

### A. Interdependence: Theory, Measurement and Political Economy

#### 1. The Measurement of Interdependence

-A. Hirschman (1945). *National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

-I.R. Savage and K. Deutsch (1960). "A Statistical Model of the Gross Analysis of Transaction Flows". *Etrica*; V.28-#3, pp. 551-572.

-K. Deutsch and A. Eckstein (1961). "National Industrialization and the Decline of the International Economic Sector". *WP*; V.?-#?, pp. 267-299.

-K. Deutsch, C. Bliss, and A. Eckstein (1962). "Population, Sovereignty, and the Share of Foreign Trade". *EDCC*; V.?-#?, pp. 353-366.

-S. Kuznets (1964). "Quantitative Aspects of the Economic Growth of Nations, IX. Level and Structure of Foreign Trade: Comparisons for Recent Years". *EDCC*; V.13-#1, Part II, pp. 1-106.

-S. Kuznets (1967). "Quantitative Aspects of the Economic Growth of Nations, X. Level and Structure of Foreign Trade: Long Term Trends". *EDCC*; V.15-#2, Part II, pp. 1-140.

-H. Alker and D. Puchala (1968). "Trends in Economic Partnership: The North Atlantic Area, 1928-1963". In J. D. Singer, ed. *Quantitative International Politics*. New York: Free Press.

-B. Russett (1967). *International Regions and the International System*. Chicago: Rand McNally.

-B. Russett (1968). "'Regional' Trading Patterns 1938-1963". *ISQ*; V.12-#4, pp. 360-379.

-B. Russett (1968). "Delineating International Regions". in J. D. Singer, ed. *Quantitative International Politics*. New York: Free Press.

-R. Tollison and T. Willett (1973). "International Integration and the Interdependence of

Economic Variables". *IO*; V.27-#2, pp. 255-271.

-P. Katzenstein (1975). "International Interdependence: Some Long Term Trends and Recent Changes". *IO*; V.29-#4, pp. 1021-1034.

-R. Rosecrance, *et al.* (1977). "Whither Interdependence?". *International Organization*; V.31-#3, pp. 425-445.

-S. Grassman (1980). "Long-term Trends in Openness of National Economies". *OEP*; V.32-#1, pp. 123-133.

Thygesen, Niels, Yutaka Kosai, and Robert Lawrence (1996). *Globalization and Trilateral Labor Markets: Evidence and Implications: A report to the Trilateral Commission*. New York: Trilateral Commission.

Lee, Eddy (1996). "Globalization and Employment: Is Anxiety Justified?". *International Labour Review*; V.135-#5, pp. 485-497.

-P. Bairoch (1996). "Globalization Myths and Realities: One Century of External Trade and Foreign Investment". In R. Boyer and D. Drache, eds. *States against markets: The limits of globalization*. New York: Routledge, pp. 173-192.

-P. Bairoch, R. Kozul-Wright (1998). "Globalization Myths: Some Historical Reflections on Integration, Industrialization and Growth in the World Economy". In R. Kozul-Wright and R. Rowthorn eds. *Transnational corporations and the global economy*. New York: St. Martins, pp. 37-68.

-Lipsey, Robert (1998). "Gallop, Creeping, or Receding Internationalization". *International Trade Journal*; V.12-#2, pp. 181-191.

-Lipsey, Robert E., Magnus Blomstrom, and Eric Ramstetter (2000). "Geography and Ownership as Bases for Economic Accounting". in Robert E. Baldwin, Robert E. Lipsey, and J. David Richardson, eds., *Geography and Ownership as Bases for Economic Accounting*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 83-135.

-Gundlach, Erich and Peter Nunnenkamp (1997). "Globalization and Labour Markets in the Triad: Different Adjustment Patterns". *Transnational Corporations*; V.6-#3, pp. 57-85.

-Rodrik, Dani (1999). "Globalisation and Labour, or: If Globalisation is a Bowl of Cherries, Why are There So Many Glum Faces Around the Table?". in R. Baldwin, D. Cohen, A. Sapir, and A. Venables, eds. *Market Integration, Regionalism, and the Global Economy*. Cambridge: CUP/CEPR, pp. 117-150.

-Bordo, Michael, Barry Eichengreen, Douglas A. Irwin (1999). "Fin de Siècle Déjà Vu: Is Globalization Today Really Different than Globalization a Hundred Years Ago?". *NBER Working Paper*; #7195. Forthcoming in *Brookings Trade Forum-1999*.

-R. Baldwin and P. Martin (1999). "Two Waves of Globalization: Superficial Similarities, Fundamental Differences". In H. Siebert, ed. *Globalization and Labor*. Tübingen: Mohr, pp. 3-58.

-P. Temin (1999). "Globalization". *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*; V.15-#4, pp. 76-89.

J. McCallum (1995). "National Borders Matter: Canada-U.S. Regional Trade Patterns". *AER*;



V.85-#3, pp. 615-623.

-C. Engel and J. Rogers (1996). "How Wide Is the Border?". *AER*; V.86-#5, pp. 1112-1125.

-S.-J. Wei (1996). "Intra-National versus International Trade: How Stubborn are National in Global Integration?". *NBER Working Paper*; #5531.

M. A. Anderson and S. Smith (1999). "Do National Borders Really Matter? Canada-US Regional Trade Reconsidered". *RIE*; V.7-#2, pp. 219-227.

M. A. Anderson and S. Smith (1999). "Canadian Provinces in World Trade: Engagement and Detachment". *CJE*; V.32-#1, pp. 22-38.

-J. Helliwell and R. McKittrick (1999). "Comparing Capital Mobility Across Provincial and National Borders". *CJE*; V.32-#5, pp. 1164-1173.

-M. Jenkins (1997). "Cities, Borders, Distances, Non-traded Goods and Purchasing Power Parity". *Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics*; V.59-#2, pp. 203-213.

-J. Helliwell (1996). "Do National Borders Matter for Quebec's Trade?". *CJE*; V.29-#3, pp. 507-522.

-J. Ceglowski (1998). "Has the Border Narrowed?". *Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Research Working Paper*, #98/15.

## **2. Theoretical Analysis of Political Implications of Economic Interdependence**

-R. Cooper (1968). *The Economics of Interdependence*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

-B. Russett (1971). "Transactions, Community, and International Political Integration". *JCMS*; V.?-#?, pp. 224-245.

-R. Rosencrance and A. Stein (1973). "Interdependence: Myth or Reality?". *WP*; V.26-#1, pp. 1-27.

-H. Alker (1977). "A Methodology for Design Research on Interdependence Alternatives". *IO*; V.31-#1, pp. 29-61.

-R. Keohane and J. Nye (197?). *Power and Interdependence*. Boston: Little-Brown.

## **B. The General Theory of Second-Best and Unilateral Trade Policy Reform**

### **1. The General Theory of Second-Best and Policy Reform**

-R. Lipsey and K. Lancaster (1956). "The General Theory of Second Best". *REStud*; V.24-#1, pp. 11-32.

-J. Green (1961). "The Social Optimum in the Presence of Monopoly and Taxation". *REStud*; V.29-#1, pp. 66-77.

-E. Foster and H. Sonnenschein (1970). "Price Distortion and Economic Welfare". *Etrica*; V.38-#2, pp. 281-297.

- K. Kawamata (1974). "Price Distortion and Potential Welfare". *Etrica*; V.42-#3, pp. 435-460.
- T. Rader (1976). "The Welfare Loss from Price Distortions". *Etrica*; V.44-#6, pp. 1253-1257.
- T. Hatta (1975). "Radial Change in Distortion and Choice of Numeraire". *Etrica*; V.43-#3, pp. 519-520.
- M. Bruno (1972). "Market Distortion and Gradual Reform". *REStud*; V.39-#4, pp. 373-383.
- A. Dixit (1975). "Welfare Effects of Tax and Price Changes". *JPubE*; V.4-#?, pp. 103-123.
- T. Hatta (1977). "A Theory of Piecemeal Policy Recommendations". *REStud*; V.44-#1, pp. 1-21.
- R. Guesnerie (1977). "On the Direction of Tax Reform". *JPubE*; V.7-#?, pp. 179-202.
- W.E. Diewert (1978). "Optimal Tax Perturbations". *JPubE*; V.10-#?, pp. 139-177.
- J. Weymark (1979). "A Reconciliation of Recent Results in Optimal Taxation Theory". *JPubE*; V.12-#?, pp. 171-189.
- K. Roberts (1980). "Price-Dependent Welfare Prescriptions". *JPubE*; V.13-#?, pp. 277-297.
- J. Tirole and R. Guesnerie (1981). "Tax Reform from the Gradient Projection Viewpoint". *JPubE*; V.15-#3, pp. 275-293.
- J. Weymark (1981). "Undominated Directions of Tax Reform". *JPubE*; V.16-#?, pp. 343-369.
- A. Turunen-Red (1990). "On the Hatta Normality Condition: Policy Reforms and Shadow Pricing". *JPubE*; V.43-#?, pp. 253-262.
- R. Roberts (1992). "When Does a Decrease in a Distortion Increase Welfare". *EcLets*; V.39-#?, pp. 37-42.
- C.C. Yang and H. Haller (1993). "On Directions of Commodity Price Reform in the Presence of a Given Non-Linear Income Tax Schedule". *CJE*; V.26-#2, pp. 469-480.
- P. Hatzipanayotou, M. Michael and S. Miller (1994). "Win-Win Indirect Tax Reform: A Modest Proposal". *EcLets*; V.44-#?, pp. 147-151.
- S. Kanbur and G. Myles (1993). "Policy Choice and Political Constraints". *EJPE*; V.8-#1, pp. 1-29.

## 2. Second-Best Trade Policy Reform

### a. Unilateral Reform of Tariffs

- T. Bertrand and J. Vanek (1971). "The Theory of Tariffs, Taxes and Subsidies: Some Aspects of the Second Best". *AER*; V.61-#?, pp. 925-931.
- P.J. Lloyd (1974). "A More General Theory of Price Distortions in Open Economies". *JIE*; V.4-#4, pp. 365-386.
- T. Hatta (1977). "A Recommendation for a Better Tariff Structure". *Etrica*; V.45-#8, pp. 1859-

1869.

-T. Fukushima (1979). "Tariff Structure, Nontraded Goods and Theory of Piecemeal Policy Recommendations". *IER*; V.20-#2, pp. 427-435.

-T. Fukushima (1981). "A Dynamic Quantity Adjustment Process in a Small Open Economy, and Welfare Effects of Tariff Changes". *JIE*; V.11-#?, pp. 513-529.

-A. Dixit (1987). "On Pareto-Improving Redistributions of Economic Welfare". *JET*; V.41-#1, pp. 133-153.

-W.E. Diewert, A. Turunen-Red and A. Woodland (1991). "Tariff Reform in a Small Open Many-Household Economy with Domestic Distortions and Non-Traded Goods". *IER*; V.32-#4, pp. 937-957.

-G. Fane (1991). "The Global Efficiency of Radial Tax Reductions". *IER*; V.32-#4, pp. 853-857.

-K. Abe (1992). "Tariff Reform in a Small Open Economy with Public Production". *IER*; V.33-#1, pp. 209-222.

-A. Panagariya (1992). "Input Tariffs, Duty Drawbacks, and Tariff Reforms". *JIE*; V.32-#1/2, pp. 131-147.

-R. Lopez and A. Panagariya (1992). "On the Theory of Piecemeal Tariff Reform: The Case of Pure Imported Intermediate Inputs". *AER*; V.82-#3, pp. 615-625.

-A. Turunen-Red (1987). "Economic Inequality and Public Policy in a Small Open Economy". *ScanJE*; V.89-#4, pp. 405-419.

-M. Michael and P. Hatzipanayotou (1995). "International Factor Mobility, Nontraded Goods and Tariff Reform". *Japanese Economic Review*; V.46-#3, pp. 274-281.

-J.P. Neary (1998). "Pitfalls in the Theory of International Trade Policy: Concertina Reforms of Tariffs, and Subsidies to High-Technology Industries". *ScanJE*; V.100-#1, pp. 187-206.

-J. Ju and K. Krishna (2000). "Evaluating Trade Reform with Many Consumers". *CJE*; V.33-#3, pp. 787-79.

-J. Ju and K. Krishna (2000). "Welfare and Market Access Effects of Piecemeal Tariff Reforms". *JIE*; V.51-#2, pp. 305-316.

#### b. Unilateral Reform of Trade and Domestic Taxes

-Mitra, Pradeep (1991). "The Coordinated Reform of Tariffs and Indirect Taxes". In J. Khalilzadeh-Shirazi and A. Shah, eds. *Tax Policy in Developing Countries*. Washington, DC: World Bank, pp. 86-99.

-Mitra, Pradeep (1992). "The Coordinated Reform of Tariffs and Indirect Taxes". *World Bank Research Observer*; V.7-#2, pp. 195-218.

-W. Diewert, A. Turunen-Red and A. Woodland (1989). "Productivity- and Pareto-Improving Changes in Taxes and Tariffs". *REStud*; V.56-#2, pp. 199-216.

- J. Beghin and L. Karp (1992). "Tariff Reform in the Presence of Sector-Specific Distortions". *CJE*; V.25-#2, pp. 294-309.
- J. Beghin and L. Karp (1992). "Piecemeal Trade Reform in the Presence of Producer-Specific Domestic Subsidies". *EcLets*; V.39-#?, pp. 65-71.
- Michael, Michael, Panos Hatzipanayotou, and Stephen Miller (1993). "Integrated Reforms of Tariffs and Consumption Taxes". *Journal of Public Economics*; V.52-#3, pp. 417-428.
- Michael, Michael, Panos Hatzipanayotou, and Stephen Miller (1994). "Win-Win Indirect Tax Reform: A Modest Proposal". *Economics Letters*; V.44-#1/2, pp. 147-151.
- R. Falvey (1994). "Revenue Enhancing Tariff Reform". *WA*; V.130-#1, pp. 175-189.
- K. Abe (1995). "The Target Rates of Tariff and Tax Reform". *IER*; V.36-#4, pp. 875-885.
- A. Tsunkei (1995). "Pareto-Improving Changes in Tariffs and Taxes". *Public Finance*; V.50-#3, pp. 470-477.
- J. Anderson (1999). "Trade Reform with a Government Budget Constraint". in J. Piggott and A. Woodland, eds. *International Trade Policy and the Pacific Rim*. London: Macmillan, pp. 217-238. [Comment by A. Turunen-Red follows, pp. 239-244.]
- J. Anderson (1997). "Revenue Neutral Trade Reform with Many Households, Quotas, and Tariffs". *RIE*; V.?-#?, pp. [NBER Working Paper; #6181.]
- Michael Keen and Jenny Ligthart (2002). "Coordinating Tariff Reduction and Domestic Tax Reform". *Journal of International Economics*; V.56-#2, pp. 489-507.
- J. Edwards (2001). "Trade Tax Reform in a Small Open Economy with Distributional Objectives and Distortionary Taxation". *Topics in Economic Analysis and Policy*; V.1-#1, (article 2).
- Diewert, W. Erwin (1988). "On Tax Reform". *Canadian Journal of Economics*; V.21-#1, pp. 1-40.
- Rousslang, Donald (1987). "The Opportunity Cost of Import Tariffs". *Kyklos*; V.40-#1, pp. 88-102.
- Rousslang, Donald and Stephen Tokarick (1995). "Estimating the Welfare Cost of Tariffs: The Roles of Leisure and Domestic Taxes". *Oxford Economic Papers*; V.47-#1, pp. 83-97.
- Parry, Ian W. H. (2001). "The Costs of Restrictive Trade Policies in the Presence of Factor Tax Distortions". *International Tax and Public Finance*; V.8-#2, pp. 147-170.
- R. Boadway, S. Maital, and M. Prachowny (1973). "Optimal Tariffs, Optimal Taxes and Public Goods". *Journal of Public Economics*; V.2-#4, pp. 391-403.
- T. Bertrand and J. Vanek (1971). "The Theory of Tariffs, Taxes, and Subsidies: Some Aspects of the Second Best". *AER*; V.61-#5, pp. 925-31.
- Michael, Michael and Stephen Miller (1991). "Optimal Tariffs and Capital Taxes When Capital Movements Are Sluggish: An Extension and Synthesis". *Greek Economic Review*; V.13-#1, pp. 157-165.

-T. Itagaki (1994). "Optimal Tariffs and Income Taxes under Imperfect and Uncertain Foreign Investment". *Southern Economic Journal*; V.60-#4, pp. 858-68.

#### c. Unilateral Reform of Quotas and Tariffs

-R. Falvey (1988). "Tariffs, Quotas and Piecemeal Policy Reform". *JIE*; V.25-#?, pp. 177-183.

-J. Anderson and J.P. Neary (1992). "Trade Reform with Quotas, Partial Rent Retention and Tariffs". *Etrica*; V.60-#1, pp. 57-76.

-J.P. Neary (1995). "Trade Liberalisation and Shadow Prices in the Presence of Tariffs and Quotas". *IER*; V.36-#3, pp. 531-554.

-S. Lahiri and P. Raimondos (1996). "Correcting Trade Distortions in a Small Open Economy". *RIE*; V.4-#3, pp. 287-299.

-A.H. Turunen-Red and A. Woodland (1993). "Partial Tariff and Quota Reform in a Small Open Economy". ms: University of Texas/University of Sydney.

### C. Multilateral Liberalization

#### 1. Liberalization with Price-Taking Firms

-A. Turunen-Red and A. Woodland (1996). "Recent Developments in Multilateral Policy Reform". *Canadian Journal of Economics*; V.29-#? Sp. Iss. Part 2, pp. S394-400.

-A. Turunen-Red and A. Woodland (2001). "The Anatomy of Multilateral Trade Policy Reform". In S. Lahiri, ed. *Regionalism and Globalization: Theory and Practice*. London: Routledge, pp. 61-91.

-J. Vanek (1964). "Unilateral Trade Liberalization and Global World Income". *QJE*; V.78-#?, pp. 139-147.

-P. Kenen (1974). "A Note on Tariff Changes and World Welfare". *QJE*; V.88-#4, pp. 692-697.

-T. Hatta and T. Fukushima (1979). "The Welfare Effect of Tariff Rate Reductions in a Many Country World". *JIE*; pp. 503-511.

-T. Fukushima and N. Kim (1989). "Welfare Improving Tariff Changes: A Case of Many Goods and Countries". *JIE*; V.26-#?, pp. 383-388.

-K. Kowalczyk (1989). "Trade Negotiations and World Welfare". *AER*. V.79-#3, pp. 552-559.

-M.J. Keen (1989). "Multilateral Tax and Tariff Reform". *ESQ*; V.40-#3, pp. 195-202.

-A. Turunen-Red and A. Woodland (1991). "Strict Pareto-Improving Multilateral Reforms of Tariffs". *Etrica*; V.59-#4, pp. 1127-1152.

-A. Turunen-Red and A. Woodland (1993). "Multilateral Reforms of Tariffs without Transfer Compensation". in H. Herberg and N.V. Long, eds., *Trade, Welfare and Economic Policies*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 145-166.

-A. Tsuneki (1992). "A General Theorem on Tariff Harmonization". *EcLets*; V.40-#?, pp. 445-

447.

-N. Nakanishi (1993). "Welfare Analysis of Tariff Change with and without International Transfers". *JIE*; V.35-#3/4, pp. 377-387.

-A. Turunen-Red and A. Woodland (1995). "International Trade Policy Reforms and their Simulation". *Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Volkswirtschaft und Statistik/Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics*; V.131 -#3, pp. 389-417.

-M. Michael and P. Hatzipanayotou (1995). "International Factor Mobility, Nontraded Goods and Tariff Reform". *Japanese Economic Review*; V.46-#3, pp. 274-281.

-A. Turunen-Red and A. Woodland (2000). "Multilateral Policy Reforms and Quantity Restrictions on Trade". *JIE*; V.52-#?, pp. 153-168.

-W. Cline, N. Kawanabe, T. Kronsjo and T. Williams (1978). *Trade Negotiations in the Tokyo Round*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings.

-J. Whalley (1986). *Trade Liberalization among Major World Trading Areas*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

-T.N. Srinivasan and J. Whalley, eds. (1986). *General Equilibrium Trade Policy Modeling*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

## **2. Liberalization with Imperfect Competition**

-E. Buffie and P. Spiller (1986). "Trade Liberalization in Oligopolistic Industries". *JIE*; V.20-#?, pp. 65-81.

-T. Ross (1988). "Movements Towards Free Trade and Domestic Market Performance With Imperfect Competition". *CJE*; V.21-#3, pp. 507-524.

-T. Ross (1988). "On the Price Effects of Mergers with Freer Trade". *IJIO*; V.6-#?, pp. 233-246.

-R. Eldor and D. Levin (1990). "Trade Liberalization and Domestic Monopoly: A Welfare Analysis". *IER*; V.31-#4, pp. 773-782.

-N. Schmitt (1990). "Two-Country Trade Liberalization in an Address Model of Product Differentiation". *CJE*; V.23-#3, pp. 654-675.

-K. Bagwell and R. Staiger (1997). "Strategic Export Subsidies and Reciprocal Trade Agreements: The Natural Monopoly Case". *Japan and the World Economy*; V.9-#4, pp. 491-510.

-Cox, D. and R. Harris (1985). "Trade Liberalization and Industrial Organization: Some Estimates for Canada". *JPE*; V,93-#?, pp. 115-145.

-D. Rodrik (1988). "Imperfect Competition, Scale Economies, and Trade Policy in Developing Countries". in R. Baldwin, ed. *Trade Policy Issues and Empirical Analysis*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 109-143.

-S. Devarajan and D. Rodrik (1989). "Trade Liberalization in Developing Countries: Do Imperfect Competition and Economies of Scale Matter". *AER*; V79-#2, pp. 282-287.

-J.D. Richardson (1989). "Empirical Research on Trade Liberalisation with Imperfect Competition: A Survey". *OECD Economic Studies*; #12; pp. 7-50.

-V. Norman (1990). "Assessing Trade and Welfare Effects of Trade Liberalization: A Comparison of Alternative Approaches to CGE Modelling With Imperfect Competition". *EER*; V.34-#4, pp. 725-752.

### 3. Strategic Analysis of Liberalization

#### a. Bargaining and Trade Bargaining

-I.W. Zartman (1971). *The Politics of Trade Negotiations Between Africa and the EEC: The Weak Confront the Strong*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

-E. Preeg (1969). *Traders and Diplomats*. Washington, DC: Brookings.

-J. Evans (1971). *The Kennedy Round in American Trade Policy: Twilight of the GATT?* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

-G. Winham (1986). *International Trade and the Tokyo Round Negotiations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

-J. Grieco (1990). *Cooperation Among Nations: Europe, America and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

-G. Winham (1989). "The Pre-Negotiation Phase of the Uruguay Round". *International Journal*, V.44-#2, pp. 280-303.

-L.A. Winters (1990). "The Road to Uruguay". *Economic Journal*; V.100-#403, pp. 1288-1303.

-L.A. Winters (1987). "Negotiating the Abolition of Non-Tariff Barriers". *OEP*; V.39-#?, pp. 465-480.

-M. Kahler and J. Odell (1988). "Developing Country Coalition-Building and International Trade Negotiations". in J. Whalley, ed. *Rules, Power and Credibility*. London: Macmillan, pp. 115-129.

-C. Hamilton and J. Whalley (1990). "Coalitions in the Uruguay Round". *WA*; V.125-#3, pp 545-561.

-R. Higgott and A.F. Cooper (1990). "Middle Power Leadership and Coalition Building: Australia, the Cairnes Group, and the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations". *IO*; V.44-#4, pp. 589-632.

-J. Odell (2000). *Negotiating the World Economy*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

-G. Winham (1977). "Negotiation as a Management Process". *WP*; V.30-#1, pp. 87-114.

-G. Winham (1979). "Practitioners Views of International Negotiation". *WP*; V.2-#1, pp. 111-135.

-H. Raiffa (1982). *The Art and Science of Negotiation*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

#### b. On Issue Linkage in General and in Trade Policy

-R. Tollison and T. Willett (1979). "An Economic Theory of Mutually Advantageous Issue

Linkage". *IO*; V.33-#4, pp.

-E. Haas (1980). "Why Collaborate?: Issue-Linkage and International Regimes". *World Politics*; V.32-#3, pp. 357-405.

-A. Stein (1980). "The Politics of Linkage". *WP*, V.32-#?, pp. 62-81.

-J. Sebenius (1983). "Negotiation Arithmetic: Adding and Subtracting Issues and Parties". *IO*; V.37-#2, pp. 281-316.

-M. McGinnis (1986). "Issue Linkage and the Evolution of International Cooperation". *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, V.30-#1, pp. 141-170.

-W. Dixon (1986). "Reciprocity in United States-Soviet Relations: Multiple Symmetry or Issue Linkage?". *American Journal of Political Science*, V.30-#2, pp. 421-445.

-B. Hoekman (1989). "Determining the Need for Issue Linkages in Multilateral Trade Negotiations". *IO*; V.43-#?, pp. 693-714.

-L. Martin (1993). "International and Domestic Institutions in the EMU Process". *E&P*; V5-#2, pp. 125-44.

-M. Huelshoff (1994). "Domestic Politics and Dynamic Issue Linkage: A Reformulation of Integration Theory". *International Studies Quarterly*, V.38-#2, pp. 255-279.

-K. Stiles (1995). "The Ambivalent Hegemon: Explaining the 'Lost Decade' in Multilateral Trade Talks, 1948-1958". *Review of International Political Economy* V.2-#1, pp. 1-26.

-S. Charnovitz (1998). "Linking Topics in Treaties". *University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law*; V.19-#2, pp. 329-345.

-(1998). "Symposium on Linkage as Phenomenon: An Interdisciplinary Approach". *University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law*; V.19-#2, pp. 201-708.

-G. Spagnolo (1999). "Issue Linkage, Delegation and International Policy Coordination". *JIE*; forth.

-H. Cesar and A. de Zeeuw (1996). "Issue Linkage in Global Environmental Problems". In A. Xepapadeas, ed. *Economic policy for the environment and natural resources: Techniques for the management and control of pollution*. Cheltenham: Elgar, pp. 158-73

-M. Botteon and C. Carraro (1997). "Strategies for Environmental Negotiations: Issue Linkage with Heterogeneous Countries". N. Hanley and H. Folmer, eds. *Game theory and the environment*. Cheltenham: Elgar, pp. 181-203.

-L. Abrego, C. Perroni, J. Whalley, and R. Wigle (2001). "Trade and Environment: Bargaining Outcomes from Linked Negotiations". *RIE*; V.9-#3, pp. 414-428.

-R. Mitchell and P. Keilbach (2001). "Situation Structure and Institutional Design: Reciprocity, Coercion, and Exchange". *IO*; V.55-#4, pp. 891-917.

-P. Conconi and C. Perroni (2002). "Issue Linkage and Issue Tie-in In Multilateral Negotiations". *JIE*; V.57-#2, pp. 423-447.



- J. Ederington (2001). "International Coordination of Trade and Domestic Policies". *AER*; V.91-#5, pp. 1580-1593.
- J. Ederington (2002). "Trade and Domestic Policy Linkage in International Agreements". *IER*; V.43-#4, pp. 1347-1367.
- (2002). "Symposium: The Boundaries of the GATT". *American Journal of International Law*; V.96-#1, pp. 1-158.
- I. Horstmann, J. Markusen, and J. Robles (2001). "Multi-issue Bargaining and Linked Games: Ricardo Revisited or No Pain No Gain". *NBER Working Paper*, #8347.
- G. Spagnolo (1999). "On Interdependent Supergames: Multimarket Contact, Concavity and Collusion". *JET*; V.89-#1, pp. 127-139.
- G. Spagnolo (1999). "Social Relations and Cooperation in Organizations". *JEBO*; V.38-#1, pp. 1-25.
- R. Weber (1985). "Negotiation and Arbitration: A Game-Theoretic Perspective". *Northwestern Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science Working Paper*, # 666.
- C. Fershtman (1990). "The Importance of the Agenda in Bargaining". *Games and Economic Behavior*; V.2-#3, pp. 224-238.
- E. Winter (1997). "Negotiations in Multi-issue Committees". *Journal of Public Economics*; V.65-#3, pp. 323-42.
- L.-A. Busch and I. Horstmann (1997). "Bargaining Frictions, Bargaining Procedures and Implied Costs of Multiple Issue Bargaining". *Eca*; V.64-#256, pp. 669-680.
- L.-A. Busch and I. Horstmann (1999). "Endogenous Incomplete Contracts: A Bargaining Approach". *Canadian Journal of Economics*; V.3-#4, pp. 956-975
- C. Ponsati and J. Watson (1997). "Multiple-Issue Bargaining and Axiomatic Solutions". *IJGT*; V.26-#4, pp. 501-524.
- M. Tajima and N. Fraser (1998). "Modelling Multi-issue Negotiation". In T. Stewart and R. van den Honert, eds. *Trends in Multicriteria Decision Making*. New York: Springer, pp. 177-186.
- R. Inderest (2000). "Multi Issue Bargaining with Endogenous Agenda". *Games and Economic Behavior*; V.30-#1, pp. 64-82.
- C. Fershtman (2000). "A Note on Multi-Issue Two-Sided Bargaining: Bilateral Procedures". *Games and Economic Behavior* V.30-#2, pp. 216-27.
- M. Bac and H. Raff (1996). "Issue-by-Issue Negotiations: The Role of Information and Time Preference". *Games and Economic Behavior*; V.13-#1, pp. 125-134.
- L.-A. Busch and I. Horstmann (1997). "A Comment on Issue-by-Issue Negotiations". *Games and Economic Behavior*; V.19-#1, pp. 144-148.
- L.-A. Busch and I. Horstmann (1999). "Signaling via an Agenda in Multi-issue Bargaining with Incomplete Information". *Economic Theory*; V.13-#3 (May 1999): 561-75.

### c. Basic Analysis

#### (1) Static Models

- J. Markusen (1981). "The Distribution of Gains from Bilateral Tariff Reductions". *JIE*; V.11-#?, pp. 553-572.
- W. Mayer (1981). "Theoretical Considerations on Negotiated Tariff Adjustments". *OEP*; V.33-#1, pp. 135-153.
- M. Webb (1984). "A Theoretical Note on Quota Reduction Negotiations". *OEP*; V.36-#?, pp. 288-290.
- R. Riezman (1982), "Tariff Retaliation from a Strategic Viewpoint", *SEJ*. V.48-#3; pp. 583-593.
- K. Chan (1988). "Trade Negotiations in a Nash Bargaining Model". *JIE*; V.25-#?, pp. 353-363.
- B. Copeland (1990). "Strategic Interaction Among Nations: Negotiable and Non-Negotiable Trade Barriers". *CJE*; V.23-#1, pp. 84-108.
- B. Copeland, E. Tower and M. Webb (1989). "On Negotiated Quotas, Tariffs and Transfers". *OEP*; V.41-#?, pp. 774-788.
- K.C. Fung and R. Staiger (1996). "Trade Liberalization and Trade Adjustment Assistance". In M. Canzoneri, W. Ethier, and V. Grilli eds. *The New Transatlantic Economy*. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 265-286. [discussion by C. Syropoulos follows, pp. 287-294.]
- K. Bagwell and R. Staiger (1999). "An Economic Theory of GATT". *American Economic Review*; V.89-#1, pp. 215-248.
- J. McLaren (1997). "Size, Sunk Cost, and Judge Bowker's Objection to Free Trade". *AER*; V.87-#3, pp. 400-420.
- Park, Jee-Hyeong (2000). "International Trade Agreements between Countries of Asymmetric Size". *JIE*; V.50-#2, pp. 473-495.
- J. McMillan (1988). "A Game Theoretic View of International Trade Negotiations: Implications for Developing Countries". in J. Whalley, ed. *Rules, Power and Credibility*. Macmillan: London. pp. 19-32.

#### (2) Repeated Game Models

- R. Jensen and M. Thursby (1984). "Free Trade: Two Noncooperative Approaches". ms: Ohio State University.
- A. Dixit (1987). "Strategic Aspects of Trade Policy". in Truman Bewley, ed. *Advances in Economic Theory: Fifth World Conference*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 329-362.
- K. Bagwell and R. Staiger (1990). "A Theory of Managed Trade". *AER*; V.80-#4, pp.779-795.
- R. Staiger (1995). "A Theory of Gradual Trade Liberalization". In J. Levinsohn, A. Deardorff, and R. Stern, eds. *New Directions in Trade Theory*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 249-284.

- Blume, Andreas and Raymond Riezman (1994). "Dynamic Tariff Games with Imperfect Observability". in James Friedman, ed. *Problems of Coordination in Economic Activity*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, pp. 185-205.
- K. Cotter and S. Mitchell (1997). "Renegotiation-Proof Tariff Agreements". *RIE*; V.5-#3, pp. 348-372.
- T. Furusawa (1999). "The Negotiation of Sustainable Tariffs". *JIE*; V.48-#2, pp. 321-345.
- T. Furusawa (1999). "The Optimal Penal Code vs. Infinite Nash Reversion in Trade Liberalization". *RIE*; V.7-#4, pp. 673-681.
- T. Furusawa and Q. Wen (2002). "Disagreement Points in Trade Negotiations". *JIE*; V.57-#1, pp. 133-150.
- E. Bond and J.-H. Park (2002). "Gradualism and Trade Agreements with Asymmetric Countries". *REStud*; V.

#### d. PD Games, Repeated Play and Absolute v. Relative Gains in Bargaining

- M. Taylor (1987). *The Possibility of Cooperation*. Cambridge: CUP.
- K. Oye, ed. (1986). *Cooperation under Anarchy*. Princeton: PUP.
- A. Stein (1982). "Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World". *IO*; V.36-#?, pp. 294-324.
- J. Connybeare (1984). "Public Goods, Prisoners' Dilemma, and the International Political Economy". *ISQ*; V.28-#1, pp. 5-22.
- C. Lipson (1984). "International Cooperation in Security and Economic Affairs". *WP*, V.37-#1, pp. 1-23.
- R. Axelrod and R. Keohane (1985). "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions". *World Politics*; V.38-#?, pp. 226-254.
- J. Gowa (1986). "Anarchy, Egoism, and Third Images: The Evolution of Cooperation and International Relations". *IO*; V.40-#1, pp. 167-186.
- J. Grieco (1988). "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism". *IO*; V.42-#3, pp. 485-507.
- J. Grieco (1988). "Realist Theory and the Problem of International Cooperation: Analysis with an Amended Prisoners' Dilemma Model". *JOP*; V.50-#3, pp. 600-624.
- M. Mastanduno (1991). "Do Relative Gains Matter? America's Response to Japanese Industrial Policy". *International Security*; V.16-#1, pp. 73-113.
- D. Snidal (1991). "Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation". *APSR*; V.85-#3, pp. 701-726.
- D. Snidal (1991). "International Cooperation among Relative Gains Maximizers". *ISQ*; V.35-#?, pp. 387-402.

- R. Powell (1991). "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory". *APSR*; V.85-#4, pp. 1303-1320.
- J. Grieco, D. Snidal, R. Powell (1993). "The Relative Gains Problem for International Cooperation". *APSR*; V.87-#3, pp. 729-743.
- R. Powell (1993). "Guns, Butter and Anarchy". *APSR*; V.87-#1, pp. 115-132.
- J. Gowa and E. Mansfield (1993). "Power Politics and International Trade". *APSR*; V.87-#2, pp. 408-420.
- M. Busch and E. Reinhardt (1993). "Nice Strategies in a World of Relative Gains: The Problem of Cooperation under Anarchy". *JCR*; V.37-#3, pp. 427-445.
- J. Morrow (1994). "Modeling the Forms of International Cooperation: Distribution versus Information". *IO*; V.48-#3, pp. 387-423.
- J. Morrow (1997). "When Do 'Relative Gains' Impede Trade?". *JCR*; V.41-#1, pp. 12-37.
- K. Iida (1993). "Analytic Uncertainty and International Cooperation". *ISQ*; V.37-#4, pp. 431-457.
- R. Pahre (1994). "Multilateral Cooperation in an Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma". *JCR*; V.38-#2, pp. 326-352.
- R. Powell (1996). "Bargaining in the Shadow of Power". *Games and Economic Behavior*; V.15-#2, pp. 255-289.
- R. Powell (1996). "Uncertainty, Shifting Power, and Appeasement". *APSR*; V.90-#4, pp. 749-764.
- J. Fearon (1997). "Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs". *JCR*; V.41-#1, pp. 68-90.
- J. Fearon (1998). "Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation". *IO*; V.52-#2, pp. 269-305.
- R. Jervis (1988). "Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation". *WP*, V.40-#3, pp. 317-349
- J. Nye (1988). "Neorealism and Neoliberalism". *WP*; V.40-#2, pp. 235-251.
- Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith (2000). "Trust and Cooperation Through Agent-specific Punishments". *IO*; V.54-#4, pp. 809-824.
- R. Powell (1994). "Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate". *IO*; V.48-#2, pp. 313-344.
- E.M.S. Niou and P. Ordeshook (1994). "Realism versus Neoliberalism: A Formulation". *AJPS*; V.35-#2, pp. 481-511.
- E.M.S. Niou and P. Ordeshook (1994). "'Less Filling, Tastes Great': The Realist-Neoliberal Debate". *WP*; V.46-#2, pp. 209-234.

#### e. Empirical Evaluation of Strategic Models

-D. Allen (1979). "Tariff Games". *Applied Game Theory*. Wuerzberg: Physica-Verlag; pp. 270-284.

-K. Chan (1987). "The International Negotiation Game: Some Evidence From the Tokyo Round". *REStat*; V.??-#?, pp. 456-464.

-K. Chan (1991). "Bilateral Trade Negotiations and Trade Diversification: Evidence from Semi-Industrialized Countries". *JDevE*; V.36-#?, pp. 243-257.

-R. Baldwin and R. Clarke (1987). "Game Modelling Multilateral Trade Negotiations". *Journal of Policy Modelling*; V.9-#2, pp. 257-284.

-G. Harrison and E. Rutström (1991). "Trade Wars, Trade Negotiations and Applied Game Theory". *EJ*; V.101-#?, pp. 420-435.

#### f. Asymmetric Information and Strategic Equilibrium

##### (1) Self-Enforcing Agreements with Stochastic Shocks

###### (a) Economic (i.e. Terms of Trade or Trade Volume) Shocks

-R. Feenstra (1987). "Incentive Compatible Trade Policies". *ScanJE*; V.89-#3, pp. 373-387.

-R. Riezman (1991). "Dynamic Tariffs with Asymmetric Information". *JIE*; V.30-#3/4, pp. 267-283.

-T. Hungerford (1991). "GATT: A Cooperative Equilibrium in a Noncooperative Trading Regime?" *JIE*; V.31-#3/4, pp. 357-369.

-D. Kovenock and M. Thursby (1992). "GATT, Dispute Settlement and Cooperation". *E&P*; V.4-#2, pp. 151-170. [Also in in A. Deardorff and R. Stern, eds. *Analytical and Negotiating Issues in the Global Trading System*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 361-390]

-S. Mitchell (1997). "GATT, Dispute Settlement and Cooperation: A Note". *E&P*; V.9-#1, pp. 87-93. [response by Kovenock and Thursby follows, pp. 95-98]

-G. Maggi (1999). "The Role of Multilateral Institutions in International Trade Cooperation". *AER*; V.89-#1, pp. 190-214.

###### (b) Political Shocks

-R. Jensen and M. Thursby (1986). "Endogenous Tariff Policy under Uncertainty". ms: Ohio State University.

-D. Stahl and A. Turunen-Red (1995). "Tariff Games: Cooperation with Random Variation in Political Regimes". *EJPE*; V.11-#?, pp. 215-238.

-R. Feenstra and T. Lewis (1991). "Negotiated Trade Restrictions with Private Political Pressure". *QJE*; V.106-#4, pp. 1287-1307.

-W. Ethier and H. Horn (1996). "Results-Oriented Trade Policy". *RIE*; V.4-#1, pp. 17-39.

## (2) Equilibria with Asymmetric Information, or Uncertainty, about Type

-R. Jensen and M. Thursby (1990). "Tariffs with Private Information and Reputation". *JIE*; V.29-#1/2, pp. 43-67.

-M. Bac and H. Raff (1997). "A Theory of Trade Concessions". *JIE*; V.42-#3/4, pp. 483-504.

-G. Schneider and L.-E. Cederman (1994). "The Change of Tide in Political Cooperation: A Limited Information Model of European Integration". *IO*; V.48-#4, pp. 633-662.

-F. Hahn, ed. (1989). *The Economics of Missing Markets, Information and Games*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (esp. Part I)

## 4. Institutional Foundations of the Trading Order

### a. General

#### (1) Overviews: Historical, Legal, and Institutional

-J. Jackson (1989/1997). *The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

-B. Hoekman and M. Kostecki (1995). *The Political Economy of the World Trading System: From GATT to WTO*. New York: Oxford University Press.

-G. Curzon (1965). *Multilateral Commercial Diplomacy*. London: Michael Joseph.

-G. and V. Curzon (1976). "The Management of Trade Relations in the GATT". A. Shonfield, ed. *International Economic Relations of the Western World, 1959-1971*. Oxford: Oxford University Press/RIIA, pp. 141-283.

-K. Kock (1969). *International Trade Policy and the GATT, 1947-1967*. Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell.

-K. Dam (1970). *The GATT: Law and Economic Organization*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

-R. Hudec (1975). *The Gatt Legal System and World Trade Diplomacy*. New York: Praeger.

-J.M. Finger and A. Olechowski, eds. (1987). *A Handbook for the Multilateral Trade Negotiations*. Washington, DC: The World Bank.

-J.D. Richardson (1988). "International Coordination of Trade Policy". in M. Feldstein, ed. *International Cooperation*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER. pp 167-204.

-J.M. Finger and S. Dhar (1994). "Do Rules Control Power? Gatt Articles and Arrangements in the Uruguay Round". in A. Deardorff and R. Stern, eds. *Analytical and Negotiating Issues in the Global Trading System*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 195-223.

-J. Jackson (2000). *The Jurisprudence of the GATT and the WTO: Insights on Treaty Law and Economic Relations*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

-R. Wilkinson (2001). *Multilateralism and the World Trade Organisation: The Architecture and*

*Extension of International Trade Regulation*. Routledge.

(2) Analytical Overviews

-J.M. Finger (1979). "Trade Liberalization: A Public Choice Perspective". in R. Amacher, et al. eds. *Challenges to a Liberal International Economic Order*. Washington, DC: AEI, pp. 421-453.

-J. Finlayson and M. Zacher (1981). "The GATT and the Regulation of Trade Barriers". *IO*; V.35-#4, pp. 561-602.

-R. Staiger (1995). "International Rules and Institutions for Trade Policy". in G. Grossman and K. Rogoff, eds. *Handbook of International Economics--V.III*. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 1495-1551.

-W. Ethier (1998). "The International Commercial System". *Essays in International Finance*, #210.

-W. Ethier (2001). "Theoretical Problems in Negotiating Trade Liberalization". *European Journal of Political Economy*; V.17-#2, pp. 209-232.

-K. Bagwell and R. Staiger (1999). "An Economic Theory of GATT". *American Economic Review*; V.89-#1, pp. 215-248.

-K. Bagwell and R. Staiger (2001). "Domestic Policies, National Sovereignty, and International Economic Institutions". *Quarterly Journal of Economics*; V.116-#2, pp. 519-562.

-B. Peter Rosendorff and Helen V. Milner (2001). "The Optimal Design of International Trade Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape". *IO*; V.55-#4, pp. 829-857.

**b. MFN/Non-Discrimination**

(1) Descriptive and Policy Analyses

-G. Patterson (1966). *Discrimination in International Trade: The Policy Issues, 1945-1965*. Princeton: PUP.

-G. Espiell (1971). "The Most-Favored-Nation Clause". *Journal of World Trade Law*; V.5-#

-T. Sorensen (1974). "Most Favored and Less Favorite Nations". *Foreign Affairs*; V.52-#2, pp. 273-286.

-G. Hufbauer, J. Shelton Erb, and H.P. Starr (1980). "The GATT Codes and the Unconditional Most-Favored-Nation Principle". *Law and Policy in International Business*; V.12-

-G. Hufbauer (1986). "Should Unconditional MFN be Revised, Retired or Recast?" in R. Snape, ed. *Issues in World Trade Policy: Gatt at the Crossroads*.

-J. Jackson (1987). "Multilateral and Bilateral Approaches for the Conduct of US Trade Policy". in R. Stern, ed. *US Trade Policies in a Changing World Economy*. Cambridge: MIT. pp. 377-401.

-R. Snape (1988). "Is Non-Discrimination Really Dead". *World Economy*. V.11-#1, pp. 1-17.

-W. Schwartz and A. Sykes (1996). "Toward a Positive Theory of the Most Favored Nation

Obligation and Its Exceptions in the WTO/GATT System”. *International Review of Law and Economics*; V.16-#1, pp. 27-51.

-W. Schwartz and A. Sykes (1997). “The Economics of the Most Favored Nation Clause”. In J. Bhandari and A. Sykes, eds. *Economic Dimensions of International Law*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 43-79.

-J. Bhagwati and H. Patrick, eds. (1990). *Aggressive Unilateralism*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

-J. Bhagwati (1991). *Multilateralism at Risk*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

-J. Bhagwati (1990). “Departures from Multilateralism: Regional and Aggressive Unilateralism”. *EJ*; V.100-#403, pp. 1304-1317.

-T.N. Srinivasan (1998). “Regionalism and the WTO: Is Nondiscrimination Passe?”. In A.O. Krueger, ed. *The WTO as an international organization*. Chicago, University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 329-349.

## (2) Analytical Issues

-A. Caplin and K. Krishna (1988). “Tariffs and the Most Favored Nation Clause: A Game Theoretic Approach”. *Seoul Journal of Economics*; V.3-#?, pp. 267-289.

-R. Ludema (1991). “International Trade Bargaining and the Most-Favored-Nation Clause”. *E&P*; V.3-#1, pp. 1-20.

-K. Gatsios (1990). “Preferential Tariffs and the ‘Most Favored Nation’ Principle: A Note”. *JIE*; V.28-#3/4, pp. 365-373.

-W. Ethier (1998). “Reciprocity, Nondiscrimination, and a Multilateral World”. ms: University of Pennsylvania.

-Robert Pahre (2001). “Most-Favored-Nation Clauses and Clustered Negotiations”. *IO*; V.55-#4, pp. 859-890.

## c. Reciprocity

### (1) Descriptive and Policy Issues

-R.M. Gadbaw (1982). “Reciprocity and Its Implications for US Trade Policy”. *Law and Policy in International Business*; V.14-#?

-K.A.J. Hay and B.A. Sulzenko (1982). “US Trade Policy and ‘Reciprocity’”. *Journal of World Trade Law*; V.16-#?, pp.

-W. Cline (1983). “‘Reciprocity’: A New Approach to World Trade Policy?”. in W. Cline, ed. *Trade Policy in the 1980's*. Cambridge: MIT/IIE. pp. 121-158.

-L. Weiss (1983). “Reciprocity”. in S. Rubin and T. Graham, eds. *Managing Trade Relations in the 1980's*. Totowa: Rowman and Allanheld. pp. 165-231.

-J.J. Florio (1984). “Beyond Reciprocity: The Need for a New US Trade Policy”. *Journal of*



*Legislation*; V. 11-#?, pp.

-R. Wonnacott (1984). *Aggressive Reciprocity Evaluated with a New Analytical Approach to Trade Conflicts*. Quebec: Institute for Research on Public Policy.

-S. Krasner (1987). *Asymmetries in Japanese-American Trade: the Case for Specific Reciprocity*. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies.

-J. Bhagwati and D. Irwin (1987). "The Return of the Reciprocitarians: US Trade Policy Today". *World Economy*; V.10-#?, pp. 109-130.

-L.A. Winters (1987). "Reciprocity". in J.M. Finger and A. Olechowski, eds. *The Uruguay Round: A Handbook on the Multilateral Trade Negotiations*. Washington, DC: The World Bank, pp. 45-51.

-C. Lo (1990). *The Reciprocity Principle in the International Regulation of Economic Relations*. Taipei: Academia Sinica.

-H.W. Arndt (1994). "The Political Economy of Reciprocity". *Banca Nazionale del Lavoro-Quarterly Review*; V.47-#190, pp. 259-269.

-J. Bhagwati (1994). "Fair Trade, Reciprocity and Harmonization: The New Challenge to the Theory of Policy and Free Trade". in A. Deardorff and R. Stern, eds. *Analytical and Negotiating Issues in the Global Trading System*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 547-598.

## (2) Analytical Issues

-R. Cooper (1964). "Tariff Dispersion and Trade Negotiations". *JPE*; V.72-#6, pp. 597-603.

-R. Caves (1974). "The Economics of Reciprocity: Theory and Evidence on Bilateral Trading Arrangements". in W. Sellekaerts, ed. *International Trade and Finance*. London: Macmillan, pp. 17-54.

-R. Blackhurst (1978). "Reciprocity in Trade Negotiations under Flexible Exchange Rates". in J. Martin and A. Smith, eds.

-F. Roessler (1978). "The Rationale for Reciprocity in Trade Negotiations under Floating Currencies". *Kyklos*; V.31-#2, pp. 258-274.

-J. McMillan (1993). "Trade Accords and Trade Wars". in H. Herberg and N.V. Long, eds., *Trade, Welfare and Economic Policies*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 167-176.

-R. Keohane (1986). "Reciprocity in International Relations". *IO*; V.40-#1, pp. 1-27.

-B. and R. Yarbrough (1986). "Reciprocity, Bilateralism, and Economic 'Hostages': Self-Enforcing Agreements in International Trade". *ISQ*; V. 30-#1, pp. 7-21.

-B. and R. Yarbrough (1987). "Institutions for the Governance of Opportunism in International Trade". *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*; V.3-#1, pp. 129-139.

-C. Rhodes (1989). "Reciprocity in Trade: the Utility of a Bargaining Strategy". *IO*; V.43-#2, pp. 273-299.

-A.L. Hillman and P. Moser (1995). "Trade Liberalization as Politically Optimal Exchange of Market Access". In M. Canzoneri, W. Ethier, and V. Grilli, eds. *The New Transatlantic Economy*. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 295-312.

-D. Marin and M. Schnitzer (1995). "Tying Trade Flows: A Theory of Countertrade with Evidence". *AER*; V.85-#5, pp. 1047-1064.

-R. Pahre (1998). "Reactions and Reciprocity: Tariffs and Trade Liberalization from 1815 to 1914". *Journal of Conflict Resolution*; V.42-#4, pp. 467-492.

-Ronald B. Mitchell and Patricia M. Keilbach (2001). "Situation Structure and Institutional Design: Reciprocity, Coercion, and Exchange". *IO*; V.55-#4, pp. 891-917.

#### **d. Special and Differential Treatment for LDCs**

##### (1) Theoretical Foundations of Arguments for S&D

-H.W. Singer (1950). "The Distribution of Gains between Investing and Borrowing Countries". *AER*; V.40-#2, pp. 473-485.

-R. Prebisch (1959). "Commercial Policy in the Underdeveloped Countries". *AER*; V.49-#2, pp. 251-273.

-O. Rodriguez (1977). "On the Conception of the Centre-Periphery System". *CEPAL Review*, pp. 195-239.

-R. Prebisch (1981). "The Latin American Periphery in the Global System of Capitalism". *CEPAL Review*, pp. 143-150.

-M.J. Flanders (1964). "Prebisch on Protectionism: An Evaluation". *EJ*; V.?-#?, pp. 305-326.

-L. Taylor (1982). "Back to Basics: Theory for the Rhetoric in the North-South Round". *World Development*; V.10-#4, pp. 327-335.

-J.A. Ocampo (1986). "New Developments in Trade Theory and LDCs". *JDevEc*; V.22-#?, pp. 129-170.

##### (2) Economic Analysis of GSP

-R. Baldwin and T. Murray (1977). "MFN Tariff Reductions and Developing Country Trade Benefits Under the GSP". *EJ*; V.87-#?, pp. 30-46.

-M. Kreinin and J.M. Finger (1976). "A Critical Survey of the New International Economic Order". *Journal of World Trade Law*; V.10-#?, pp. 493-512.

-J.M. Finger and M. Kreinin (1979). "A Measure of 'Export Similarity' and Its Possible Uses". *EJ*; V.89-#?, pp. 905-912.

-T. Murray (1977). *Trade Preferences for Developing Countries*. New York: Halsted Press.

-T. Birnberg (1979). "Trade Reform Options: Economic Effects on Developing and Developed Countries". in W. Cline, ed. *Policy Alternatives for a New International Economic Order: An Economic Analysis*. New York: Praeger/ODC, pp. 215-283.

- A. Sapir (1981). "Trade Benefits under the EEC GSP". *EER*; V.15-#?, pp. 339-335.
- A. Sapir and L. Lundberg (1984). "The US GSP and its Impacts". in R. Baldwin and A. Krueger. eds. *The Structure and Evolution of Recent US Trade Policy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. pp. 195-236.
- E. Ray and H. Marvel (1986). "Trade Liberalization, Preferential Arrangements and their Impact on Imports from Latin America". in M. Connolly and C. Gonzalez-Vegas, eds. *Economic Reform and Stabilisation in Latin America*. New York: Praeger, pp. 253-279.
- D. Brown (1987). "The General Equilibrium Effects of the US GSP". *SEJ*; V.54-#1, pp. 27-47.
- M. Wolf (1984). "Two-Edged Sword: Demands of Developing Countries and the Trading System". in J. Bhagwati, ed. *Power, Passions and Purpose: Prospects for North-South Negotiations*. Cambridge: MIT Press. pp. 201-229.
- J. Whalley (1990). "Non-Discriminatory Discrimination: Special and Differential Treatment under the GATT for Developing Countries". *EJ*; V.100-#403, pp. 1318-1328.
- A.J. Yeats (1979). *Trade Barriers Facing Developing Countries*. New York: St. Martins.
- H. Hughes and A. Krueger (1984). "Effects of Protection in Developed Countries on Developing Countries' Exports". in R. Baldwin and A. Krueger. eds. *The Structure and Evolution of Recent US Trade Policy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. pp. 389-418.
- E. Ray and H. Marvel (1984). "The Pattern of Protection in the Industrialized World". *REStat*; V.66-#?, pp. 452-458.
- E. Ray (1991). "US Protection and Intra-Industry Trade: The Message to Developing Countries". *EDCC*; V.40-#1, pp. 169-187.
- C. MacPhee, and V. Oguledo (1991). "The Trade Effects of the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences". *Atlantic Economic Journal*; V.19-#4, pp. 19-26.

### (3) Political-Economy of GSP/NIEO

- R. Rothstein (1977). *The Weak in the World of the Strong: The Developing Countries in the International System*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- R. Rothstein (1979). *Global Bargaining: UNCTAD and the Quest for a New International Economic Order*. Princeton: PUP.
- A. Fishlow, et al. (1978). *Rich Nations and Poor Nations in the World Economy*. New York: McGraw Hill.
- J. Hart (1983). *The New International Economic Order*. New York: Macmillan.
- C. Murphy (1984). *The Emergence of the NIEO Ideology*. Boulder: Westview.
- J. Finlayson and M. Zacher (1985). "The Third World and the Management of International Commodity Trade". in W.L. Hollist and F.L. Tullist, eds. *An International Political Economy*. Boulder: Westview, pp. 199-222.

- S. Krasner (1985). *Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- D. Tussie (1986). *The Less Developed Countries and the World Trading System: A Challenge to the GATT*. London: Pinter.
- M. O'Neill (1984). "HICs, MICs, NICs and LICs: Some Elements in the Political Economy of Graduation and Discrimination". *World Development*; V.12-#?, pp. 693-712.
- J. Cassing and A.L. Hillman (1991). "Equalizing the Cost of Success: Equitable Graduation Rules and the GSP". *JIEI*; V.6-#1, pp. 40-51.
- E. Ray (1987). "The Impact of Special Interests on Preferential Tariff Concessions by the US". *REStat*; V.69-#2, pp. 187-193.
- D. Clark (1987). "Regulation of International Trade: The US GSP Scheme". *WA*; V.123-#4, pp. 697-704.
- E. Ray (1989). "The Impact of Rent-Seeking Activity on US Preferential Trade and World Debt". *WA*; V.125-#?, pp. 619-638.

### **e. Dispute Resolution**

#### (1) Institutional and Legal Analysis

- R. Hudec (1978). *Adjudication of International Trade Disputes*.
- R. Hudec (1993). *Enforcing International Trade Law: The Evolution of the Modern GATT Legal System*. Salem: Butterworth Legal Publishers.
- E.U. Petersmann (1997). *The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System: International Law, International Organizations, and Dispute Settlement*. London: Kluwer.
- D. Palmeter and P. Mavroidis (1999). *Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organization: Practice and Procedure*. Hague: Kluwer Law International.
- M.M.I. Mora (1993). "A GATT with Teeth: Law Wins over Politics in the Resolution of Trade Disputes". *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law*; V.31-#1, pp. 104-179.
- K. Stiles (1995). "The New WTO Regime: A Victory of Pragmatism". *Detroit College of Law Journal of International Law and Practice*; V.4-#3, pp. 1-37.
- M. Young (1995). "Dispute Resolution in the Uruguay Round: Lawyers Triumph over Diplomats". *International Lawyer*; V.29-#2, pp. 389-409.
- G.R. Shell (1995). "Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade Organization". *Duke Law Journal*; V.44-#5, pp. 829-927.
- E. Vermulst and B. Driessen (1995). "An Overview of the WTO Dispute Settlement System and Its Relationship with the Uruguay Round Agreements: Nice on Paper but Too Much Stress for the System?". *Journal of World Trade*; V.29-#?, pp. 131-162.
- P. Nichols (1996). "GATT Doctrine". *Virginia Journal of International Law*; V.36-#2, pp. 379-

465.

-E.-U. Petersmann (1997). *The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System: International Law, International Organization and Dispute Settlement*. London: Kluwer Law International.

-S. Croley and J. Jackson (1996). "The WTO Dispute Procedures, Standard of Review, and Deference to National Governments". *American Journal of International Law*; V.90-#?, pp. 193-213.

-J. Jackson (1998). "Designing and Implementing Effective Dispute Settlement Procedures: WTO Dispute Settlement, Appraisal and Procedures". In A. Krueger, ed. *The WTO as an International Organization*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 193-213.

-J. Jackson (1998). "Dispute Settlement and the WTO: Emerging Problems". *Journal of International Economic Law*; V.1-#?, pp. 329-351.

-D. Palmeter and P. Mavroidis (1998). "The WTO Legal System: Sources of Law". *American Journal of International Law*; V.92-#?, pp. 398-413.

-H.U. Petersmann (1990). "From the Hobbesian International Law of Coexistence to Modern Integration Law: The WTO Dispute Settlement System". *Journal of International Economic Law*; V.1-#2, pp. 175-198.

-R. Hudec (1998). "The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An Overview of the First Three Years". *Minnesota Journal of Global Trade*, V.8-#1, pp. 1-50.

-W. Davey (1999). "The WTO Dispute Settlement System". In G. Sampson and W.B. Chambers, eds. *Trade, Environment, and the Millemium*. New York: UN University Press, pp. 119-142,

-E. Vermulst, P. Mavroidis, and P. Waer (1999). "The Functioning of the Appellate Body After Four Years: Towards Rule Integrity". *Journal of World Trade*; V.33-#?, pp. 1-50.

-J. Jackson (2000). "Dispute Settlement and a New Round". In J. Schott, ed. *The WTO After Seattle*. Washington, DC: IIE, pp. 269-282.

-J. Jackson (2000). "Dispute Settlement and the WTO." In R. Porter and P. Sauv , eds. *Seattle, the WTO, and the Future of the Multilateral Trading System*. Cambridge: The Center for Business and Government, Harvard University.

-J.M. Smith (2000). "The Politics of Dispute Settlement Design: Explaining Legalism in Regional Trade Pacts". *International Organization*; V.54-#1, pp. 137-180.

-B. Hoekman and P. Mavroidis (2000). "WTO Dispute Settlement, Transparency and Surveillance". *World Economy*; V.23-#4, pp. 527-542.

-J.H.H. Weiler (2000). "The Role of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections on the Internal and External Legitimacy of WTO Dispute Settlement". *Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper* #9/00.

-C. Barfield (2001). *Free Trade, Sovereignty, and Democracy: The Future of the WTO*. Washington, DC: AEI.

(2) Formal theory

-M. Ryan (1991). "Strategy and Compliance with Bilateral Trade Dispute Settlement Agreements: USTR's Section 300 Experience in the Pacific Basin". *Michigan Journal of International Law*; V.12-#4, pp. 799-827.

-T. Hungerford (1991). "GATT: A Cooperative Equilibrium in a Noncooperative Trading Regime?" *JIE*; V.31-#3/4, pp. 357-369.

-D. Kovenock and M. Thursby (1992). "GATT, Dispute Settlement and Cooperation". *E&P*; V.4-#2, pp. 151-170. [Also in in A. Deardorff and R. Stern, eds. *Analytical and Negotiating Issues in the Global Trading System*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 361-390]

-S. Mitchell (1997). "GATT, Dispute Settlement and Cooperation: A Note". *E&P*; V.9-#1, pp. 87-93. [response by Kovenock and Thursby follows, pp. 95-98]

-Chang, Howard F. (1997). "Carrots, Sticks, and International Externalities". *International Review of Law and Economics*; V.17-#3, pp. 309-324.

-Choi, Gyoung-Gyu (1998). "The Optimal International Trade Agreement and Its Enforcement under Asymmetric Information". *Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics*; V.4-#1, pp. 159-195.

-G. Maggi (1999). "The Role of Multilateral Institutions in International Trade Cooperation". *AER*; V.89-#1, pp. 190-214.

-R. Ludema (2001). "Optimal International Trade Agreements and Dispute Settlement Procedures". *European Journal of Political Economy*; V.17-#2, pp. 355-376.

-C. Brown (2002). "The Economics of Trade Disputes: The GATT's Article XXIII, and the WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding". *Economics & Politics*; V.14-#3, pp. 283-323.

-T. Furusawa (1999). "The Role of the WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure on International Cooperation".

-B.P. Rosendorff (2000). "Stability and Rigidity: The Dispute Settlement Procedure of the WTO". Ms: USC.

-W. Ethier (2002). "Punishments and Dispute Settlement in Trade Agreements". Ms: University of Pennsylvania

-Chung, Jae Wan (1997). "WTO Settlement of Trade Disputes". *Seoul Journal of Economics*; V.10-#2, pp. 95-106.

### (3) Statistical and Econometric Analyses

-R. Hudec, D. Kennedy, and M. Sgarbossa (1993). "A Statistical Profile of GATT Dispute Settlement Cases: 1948-1989". *Minnesota Journal of Global Trade*; V.2-#?, pp. 1-113.

-S.A. Mota (1999). "The World Trade Organization: An Analysis of Disputes". *North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation*; V.25-#?, pp. 75-104.

-M. Büttler and H. Hauser (2000). "The WTO Dispute Settlement System: A First Assessment from an Economic Perspective". *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*; V.16-#2, pp. 503-533.

- Young Duk Park and Marion Panizzon (2002). "WTO Dispute Settlement 1995-2001: A Statistical Analysis". *Journal of International Economic Law*; V5-#1, pp. 221-244.
- C. Sevilla (1997). "A Political Economy Model of GATT/WTO Trade Complaints". *Jean Monnet Working Paper*, #5/97.
- C. Sevilla (1998). "Explaining Patterns of GATT/WTO Trade Complaints". *Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Working Paper*; #98/1.
- M. Busch (2000). "Democracy, Consultation, and the Paneling of Disputes under GATT". *Journal of Conflict Resolution*; V.4-#4, pp. 425-446.
- E. Reinhardt (1999). "Aggressive Multilateralism: The Determinants of GATT/WTO Dispute Initiation". Ms: Department of Political Science, Emory University.
- E. Reinhardt (2001). "Adjudication without Enforcement in GATT Disputes". *Journal of Conflict Resolution*; V.45-#2, pp. 174-195.
- M. Busch and E. Reinhardt (2000). "Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: Early Settlement in GATT/WTO Disputes". *Fordham International Law Journal*; V.24-#1/2, pp. 158-172.
- M. Busch and E. Reinhardt (2002). "Testing International Trade Law: Empirical Studies of GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement", in Daniel L. M. Kennedy and James D. Southwick, eds., *The Political Economy of International Trade Law: Essays in Honor of Robert E. Hudec*. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 457-481.
- M. Busch and E. Reinhardt (2002). "Transatlantic Trade Conflicts and GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement". In E.U. Petersmann and Mark Pollak, eds. *Dispute Prevention and Dispute Settlement in the Transatlantic Partnership*. New York: Oxford University Press, pp.
- G. Garrett and J.M. Smith (2000). "The Politics of WTO Dispute Settlement". Ms: George Washington University.
- K. Iida (1999). "Between Power and Principle: Multilateral Trade Dispute Settlement Revisited". Ms: Aoyama Gakuin University.
- K. Iida and M. Suzuki (2001). "Settling Trade Disputes: Law, Diplomacy, and Domestic Politics". Presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, August 28-September 2, 2001.

#### f. The "Trade and ..." Issue: What are the Boundaries of the WTO

##### (1) Overviews

- R. Howse and M. Trebilcock (1997). "The Free Trade-Fair Trade Debate: Trade, Labor and the Environment". In J. Bhandari and A. Sykes, eds. *Economic Dimensions of International Law*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 186-234.
- K. Bagwell and R. Staiger (2001). "The WTO as a Mechanism for Securing Market Access Property Rights: Implications for Global Labor and Environmental Issues". *Journal of Economic Perspectives*; V.15-#3, pp. 69-88.
- (1998). "Symposium on Linkage as Phenomenon: An Interdisciplinary Approach". *University of*

*Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law*; V.19-#2, pp. 201-708.

-(2002). "Symposium: The Boundaries of the GATT". *American Journal of International Law*; V.96-#1, pp. 1-158.

## (2) Trade and Labor Standards

-G. Hanson (1983). *Social Clauses and International Trade: An Economic Analysis of Labour Standards in Trade Policy*. New York: St. Martins.

-S. Charnovitz (1986). "Fair Labor Standards and International Trade". *Journal of World Trade Law*; V.20-#1, pp. 61-78.

-S. Charnovitz (1987). "The Influence of Labour Standards on the World Trading Regime: A Historical Review". *International Labour Review*; V.126-#?, pp. 565-584.

-B. Hepple (1987). "New Approaches to International Labour Regulation". *Industrial Law Journal*; V.26-#4, pp. 353-366.

-K. Swinnerton and G. Schoepfle (1994). "Labor Standards in the Context of a Global Economy". *Monthly Labor Review*; V.117-#9, pp. 52-58.

-G. Schoepfle and K. Swinnerton, eds. (1994). *International Labor Standards and Global Economic Integration: Proceedings of a Symposium*. Washington, DC: US Department of Labor.

-W. Sengenberger and D. Campbell, eds. (1994). *International Labour Standards and Economic Interdependence*. Geneva: ILO.

-A. Sapir (1995). "The Interaction between Labour Standards and International Trade Policy". *World Economy*; V.18-#6, pp. 791-803.

-K. Maskus, T. Rutherford, and S. Selby (1995). "Implications of Changes in Labor Standards: A Computational Analysis for Mexico". *North American Journal of Economics and Finance*; V6-#2, pp. 171-188.

-D. Brown, R. Stern, and A. Deardorff (1996). "International Labor Standards and Trade: A Theoretical Analysis". in J. Bhagwati and R. Hudec, eds. *Fair Trade and Harmonization. V.1: Economic Analysis*. Cambridge: MIT, pp. 227-280.

-D. Brown, A. Deardorff, and R. Stern (1998). "Trade and Labor Standards". *Open Economies Review*; V.9-#2, pp. 171-194.

-R. Freeman (1996). "International Labor Standards and World Trade: Friends or Foes?". in J. Schott, ed.. *The world trading system: Challenges ahead*. Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, pp. 87-112.

-D. Rodrik (1996). "Labor Standards and International Trade: Do They Matter and What Do We Do About Them?". in R. Lawrence, D. Rodrik, and J. Whalley, *Emerging Agenda for Global Trade: High Stakes for Developing Countries*. Washington, DC: Overseas Development Council,

-A. Krueger (1996). "International Labor Standards and Trade". *Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics-1996*. pp. 281-302.



- A. Krueger (1996). "Observations on International Labor Standards and Trade". *NBER Working Paper*; #5632.
- T.N. Srinivasan (1996). "International Trade and Labour Standards from an International Perspective". in P. van Dijck and G. Faber, eds. *Challenges to the New World Trade Organization*. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, pp. 219-243.
- K. Maskus (1997). "Should Core Labor Standards be Imposed Through International Trade Policy?". *World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper*, #1817.
- K. Swinnerton (1997). "An Essay on Economic Efficiency and Core Labour Standards". *World Economy*; V.20-#?, pp. 73-86.
- S. Golub (1997). "International Labor Standards and International Trade". *IMF Working Paper*; WP/97/37.
- S. Golub (1997). "Are International Labor Standards Needed to Prevent Social Dumping?". *Finance and Development*; V.34-#4, pp. 20-23.
- R. Pahre (1998). "Labor Standards, Trade Sanctions, and the Hijacking Hypothesis". In A. Deardorff and R. Stern, eds. *Constituent Interests and U.S. Trade Policies*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- J. Whalley and R. Wigle (1999). "Quantifying the Effects of Labour Sanctions on Trade". in P. Brenton and J. Pelkmans, eds. *Global Trade and European Workers*. London: Macmillan, pp. 199-209.
- D. Rodrik (1999). "Globalisation and Labour, or: If Globalisation is a Bowl of Cherries Why Are There So Many Glum Faces around the Table?". in R. Baldwin, D. Cohen, A. Sapir, and A. Venables, eds. *Market Integration, Regionalism and the Global Economy*. Cambridge: CUP/CEPR, pp. 117-150.
- G. Fields (2000). "The Role of Labor Standards in U.S. Trade Policy". in A. Deardorff and R. Stern, eds. *Social Dimensions of U.S. Trade Policy*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 167-188.
- K. Bagwell and R. Staiger (2000). "The Simple Economics of Labor Standards and the GATT". in A. Deardorff and R. Stern, eds. *Social Dimensions of U.S. Trade Policy*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 195-231.
- D. Brown (2000). "International Trade and Core Labor Standards: A Survey of Recent Literature". *OECD Labor Market and Social Policy Occasional Papers*, #43.
- D. Brown (2001). "Labor Standards: Where Do They Belong on the International Trade Agenda?". *Journal of Economic Perspectives*; V.15-#?, pp. 89-112.
- Will Martin and Keith Maskus (2001). "Core Labor Standards and Competitiveness: Implications for Global Trade Policy". *Review of International Economics*, V.9-#2, pp. 317-328.
- P. Mackelm (2002). "Labour Law Beyond Borders". *Journal of International Economic Law*; V.5-#3, pp. 605-645.
- C. Grootaert and R. Kanbur (1995). "Child Labor: An Economic Perspective". *International*

*Labor Review*, V.134-#2, pp.

-K. Basu and P.H. Van (1998). "The Economics of Child Labor". *AER*; V.88-#?, pp. 412-427.

-K. Basu (1999). "Child Labor: Cause, Consequence, and Cure, with Remarks on International Labor Standards". *JEL*; V.37-#?, pp. 1083-1119.

-D. Brown (2000). "A Transactions Cost Politics Analysis of International Child Labor Standards". in A. Deardorff and R. Stern, eds. *Social Dimensions of U.S. Trade Policy*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 245-264.

-D. Brown, A. Deardorff, and R. Stern (2001). "U.S. Trade and Other Policy Options and Programs to Deter Foreign Exploitation of Child Labor". in M. Blomstrom and L. Goldberg, eds. *Topics in Empirical International Economics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 233-257.

### (3) Trade and Environment

-W. Oates and R. Schwab (1988). "Economic Competition Among Jurisdictions: Efficiency Enhancing or Distortion Inducing?". *JPubE*; V.35-#?, pp. 333-354.

-R. Revesz (1992). "Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the 'Race to the Bottom' Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation". *NYU Law Review*; V.67-#?, pp. 1220-1254.

-J. Markusen, E. Morey, and N. Olewiler (1995). "Competition in Regional Environmental Policies when Plant Locations are Endogenous". *JPubE*; V.56-#1, pp. 55-78.

-M. Rauscher (1995). "Environmental Regulation and the Location of Polluting Industry". *International Tax and Public Finance*; V.2-#?, pp. 229-244.

-A. Levinson (1996). "Environmental Regulations and Industry Location: International and Domestic Evidence". in J. Bhagwati and R. Hudec, eds. *Harmonization and Fair Trade. V.1. Economic Analysis*. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 429-457.

-J.D. Wilson (1996). "Capital Mobility and Environmental Standards: Is there A Theoretical Basis for a Race to the Bottom?". in J. Bhagwati and R. Hudec, eds. *Harmonization and Fair Trade. V.1. Economic Analysis*. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 393-427.

-J. Kim and J.D. Wilson (1997). "Capital Mobility and Environmental Standards: Racing to the Bottom with Multiple Tax Instruments". *Japan and the World Economy*; V.9-#4, pp. 537-551.

-T. Schoenbaum (1992). "Free International Trade and Protection of the Environment: Irreconcilable Conflict?". *American Journal of International Law*; V.86-#4, pp. 700-727.

-D. Brack (1995). "Balancing Trade and the Environment". *International Affairs*; V.71-#3, pp. 497-514.

-A. Deardorff (1997). "International Conflict and Coordination in Environmental Policies". In J. Bhandari and A. Sykes, eds. *Economic Dimensions of International Law*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 248-274.

-R. Steinberg (1997). "Trade-Environment Negotiations in the EU, NAFTA, and WTO: Regional Trajectories of Rule Development". *American Journal of International Law*; V.91-#2, pp. 231-267

-T. Schoenbaum (1997). "International Trade and Protection of the Environment: The Continuing Search for Reconciliation". *American Journal of International Law*; V.91-#2, pp. 268-313.

-H. Cesar and A. de Zeeuw (1996). "Issue Linkage in Global Environmental Problems". In A. Xepapadeas, ed. *Economic policy for the environment and natural resources: Techniques for the management and control of pollution*. Cheltenham: Elgar, pp. 158-73

-M. Botteon and C. Carraro (1997). "Strategies for Environmental Negotiations: Issue Linkage with Heterogeneous Countries". N. Hanley and H. Folmer, eds. *Game theory and the environment*. Cheltenham: Elgar, pp. 181-203.

-L. Abrego, C. Perroni, J. Whalley, and R. Wigle (2001). "Trade and Environment: Bargaining Outcomes from Linked Negotiations". *RIE*; V.9-#3, pp. 414-428.

### **5. Structural Foundations of Trading Order: Hegemons, Regimes, etc.**

-J. Ruggie (1972). "Collective Goods and Future International Collaboration". *APSR*; V.66-#3, pp. 874-893.

-C.P. Kindleberger (1976). "Systems of International Economic Organization". in D. Calleo, ed. *Money and the Coming World Order*; New York: NYU Press. pp.

-C.P. Kindleberger (1981). "Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy". *ISQ*; V.25-#?, pp. 15-39.

-S. Krasner (1979). "The Tokyo Round: Particularistic Interests and Prospects for Stability in the Global Trading System". *ISQ*; V.23-#4, pp. 491-531.

-S. Krasner (1982). "American Policy and Global Economic Stability". in W. Avery and D. Rapkin, eds. *America in a Changing World Political Economy*. New York: Longman. pp. 29-48.

-R. Keohane (1980). "The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes". in O. Holsti, et al., eds. *Change in the International System*. Boulder: Westview, pp.

-R. Keohane (1982). "The Demand for International Regimes". *IO*; V.36-#2, pp.

-D. Snidal (1985). "The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory". *IO*; V.39-#4, pp. 579-614.

-B. and R. Yarbrough (1985). "Free Trade, Hegemony and the Theory of Agency". *Kyklos*; V.38-#?, pp. 348-364.

-B. and R. Yarbrough (1987). "Cooperation in the Liberalization of International Trade". *IO*; V.41-#1, pp. 1-26.

-R. Cooper (1995). "The Coase Theorem and International Economic Relations". *Japan and the World Economy*; v.7-#1, pp. 29-44.

-P. Guerrieri and P.C. Padoan (1986). "Neomercantilism and International Economic Stability". *IO*; V.40-#1, pp. 29-42.

-J. Alt, R. Calvert, and B. Humes (1988). "Reputation and Hegemonic Stability: A Game Theoretic Analysis". *APSR*; V.82-#2, pp. 445-466.

- J. Gowa (1989). "Rational Hegemons, Excludable Goods and Small Groups: An Epitaph for Hegemonic Stability Theory". *WP*; V.41-#?, pp. 307-324.
- J. Gowa (1989). "Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and Free Trade". *APSR*; V.83-#4, pp. 1245-1256.
- J. Gowa (1993). "Power Politics and International Trade". *APSR*; V.87-#2, pp. 408-420.
- J. Gowa (1994). *Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade*. Princeton: PUP.
- D. Lake (1993). "Leadership, Hegemony, and the International Economy: Naked Emperor or Tattered Monarch with Potential". *ISQ*; V.37-#4, pp. 459-489.
- R. Pahre (1999). *Leading Questions: How Hegemony Affects the International Political Economy*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- O. Young (1980). "International Regimes: The Problem of Concept Formation". *WP*; V.32-#3, pp. 331-356.
- C. Lipson (1982). "The Transformation of Trade: The Sources and Effects of Regime Change". *IO*; V.36-#3, pp. 417-455.
- T. McKeown (1983). "Hegemonic Stability and 19th Century Tariff Levels in Europe". *IO*
- A. Stein (1984). "The Hegemon's Dilemma: Great Britain, the US and International Economic Order". *IO*; V.37-#2, pp.
- D. Lake (1984). "Beneath the Commerce of Nations: A Theory of International Economic Structures". *ISQ*; V.28-#?, pp. 143-170.
- B. Russett (1985). "The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony". *IO*; V.39-#2, pp.
- J. Rosenau (1986). "Before Cooperation: Hegemons, Regimes, and Habit Driven Actors in World Politics". *IO*; V.40-#4, pp. 849-894.
- O'Brien, Patrick Geoffrey Pigman (1992). "Free Trade, British Hegemony and the International Economic Order in the Nineteenth Century". *Review of International Studies*; V.18-#2, pp. 89-113.
- Mansfield, Edward (1992). "The Concentration of Capabilities and International Trade". *International Organization*; V.46-#3, pp. 731-764.
- Hills, Jill (1994). "A Global Industrial Policy. U.S. Hegemony and GATT. The Liberalization of Telecommunications". *Review of International Political Economy*; V.1-#2, pp. 257-279.
- Stiles, Kendall (1995). "The Ambivalent Hegemon: Explaining the 'Lost Decade' in Multilateral Trade Talks, 1948-1958". *Review of International Political Economy*; V.2-#1, pp. 1-26.
- Ahnliid, Anders (1996). "Comparing GATT and GATS: Regime Creation under and after Hegemony". *Review of International Political Economy*; V.3-#1, pp. 65-94.
- Oden, Michael (1999). "The Costs of U.S. Hegemony: Military Power, Military Spending, and U.S. Trade Performance". *Review of Radical Political Economics*; V.31-#4, pp. 32-60.

## 6. The Domestic Economic Effects of Liberalization

- J. Cheh (1974). "US Concessions in the Kennedy Round and Short-Run Labor Adjustment Costs". *JIE*; V.4-#4, pp. 323-340.
- M. Bale (1977). "US Concessions in the Kennedy Round and Short-Run Labour Adjustment Costs: Further Evidence". *JIE*; V.7-#?, pp. 145-148.
- R. Baldwin (1976). "Trade and Employment Effects in the US of Multilateral Tariff Reductions". *AER*; V.66-#2, pp. 142-148.
- M. Kreinin and L. Officer (1979). "Tariff Reductions under the Tokyo Round: A Review of Their Effects on Trade Flows, Employment and Welfare". *WA*; V.115-#?, pp. 542-572.
- R. Baldwin, J. Mutti and J.D. Richardson (1980). "Welfare Effects on the US of a Significant Multilateral Tariff Reduction". *JIE*; V.10-#?, pp. 405-423.

## 7. The Domestic Politics of Trade Liberalization

### a. Mainly Historical/Institutional Analysis

- J. Rosenau, ed. (1967). *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy*. New York: Free Press.
- A.W. Wolf (1975). "Evolution of the Executive-Legislative Relationship in the Trade Act of '74". *SAIS Review*; V.19-#4, pp. 16-23.
- M. Blaker, ed. (1978). *The Politics of Trade: US and Japanese Policymaking for the GATT Negotiations*. New York: Columbia University East Asian Institute.
- I.M. Destler (1980). *Making Foreign Economic Policy*. Washington, DC: Brookings.
- I.M. Destler and T.R. Graham (1980). "US Congress and the Tokyo Round: Lessons of a Success Story". *World Economy*; V.3-#?, pp. 54-70.
- G. Winham (1980). "Robert Strauss, the MTN, and the Control of Faction". *Journal of World Trade Law*; V.14-#?, pp. 377-397.
- R.C. Cassidy (1981). "Negotiating about Negotiations: The Geneva Multilateral Trade Talks". in T. Franck, ed. *The Tethered Presidency: Congressional Restraints on Executive Power*. New York: NYU Press. pp. 264-282.
- J.W. Twigg (1987). *The Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: A Case Study in Building Domestic Support for Diplomacy*. Lanham: University Press of America.
- G.J. Ikenberry (1989). "Manufacturing Consensus: The Institutionalization of American Private Interests in the Tokyo Round". *Comparative Politics*; V.?-#?, pp. 289-305.
- H. Nau, ed. (1990). *Domestic Politics and the Uruguay Round*. NY: Columbia University Press.

### b. Mainly Formal Theoretical Analysis

#### (1) Endogenous Policy Approach

(a) Theory

- W. Mayer (1985). "The Political Economy of Tariff Agreements". in *Probleme und Perspektiven der weltwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung*. Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, pp. 423-437.
- R. Baldwin (1990). "Optimal Tariff Retaliation Rules". in R. Jones and A. Krueger, eds. *The Political Economy of International Trade*. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 108-121.
- F. Mayer (1991). "Domestic Politics and the Strategy of International Trade". *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management*; V.10-#2, pp. 222-246.
- L. Hillman and P. Moser (1995). "Trade Liberalization as Politically Optimal Exchange of Market Access". In M. Canzoneri, W. Ethier, and V. Grilli eds. *The New Transatlantic Economy*. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 295-312.
- G. Grossman and E. Helpman (1995). "Trade Wars and Trade Talks". *JPE*; V.4-#103, pp. 675-708.
- G. Maggi and A. Rodríguez-Clare (1998). "The Value of Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressures". *JPE*; V.106-#3, pp. 574-601.
- P. Levy (1999). "Lobbying and International Cooperation in Tariff Setting". *JIE*; V.47-#2, pp. 345-370.
- A. Panagariya and R. Findlay (1996). "A Political Economy Analysis of Free-Trade Areas and Customs Unions". in R. Feenstra, G. Grossman and D. Irwin, eds. *The Political Economy of Trade Policy*. Cambridge: MIT, pp. 265-287.
- D. Gould and G. Woodbridge (1997). "Retaliation, Liberalization and Trade Wars: The Political Economy of Non-Strategic Trade Policy". *EJPE*; V.14-#1, pp. 115-137.

(b) Applications

- H. Marvel and E. Ray (1983). "The Kennedy Round: Evidence on the Regulation of International Trade in the US". *AER*; V.73-#?, pp. 190-197.
- E. Ray (1987). "The Impact of Special Interests on Preferential Tariff Concessions in the United States". *REStat*; V.66-#?, pp. 452-458.
- D. Clark (1987). "Regulation of International Trade: The United States' Generalized System of Preferences Scheme". *WA*; V.123-#4, pp. 697-704.
- R. Tyers (1990). "Implicit Policy Preferences and the Assessment of Negotiable Trade Policy Reforms". *EER*; V.34-#?, pp. 1399-1426.
- D. Trefler (1993). "Trade Liberalization and the Theory of Endogenous Protection: An Econometric Study of US Import Policy". *JPE*; V.101-#1, pp. 138-160.
- E. Rutström (1995). "Political Preference Functions, Trade Wars, and Trade Negotiations". *Empirical Economics*; V.20-#?, pp. 49-73.

(2) Unmodeled Economies and "Two-Level Games"

(a) Some Theory

- R. Putnam (1988). "The Logic of Two-Level Games". *IO*; V.42-#?, pp. 427-461.
- G. Tsebelis (1990). *Nested Games*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- F. Mayer (1992). "Managing Domestic Differences in International Negotiations: The Strategic Use of Internal Side Payments". *IO*; V.46-#4, pp. 793-818.
- M. McGinnis and J. Williams (1993). "Policy Uncertainty in Two-Level Games: Examples of Correlated Equilibria". *ISQ*; V.37-#1, pp. 29-54.
- K. Iida (1993). "When and How Do Domestic Constraints Matter? Two-Level Games with Uncertainty". *JCR*; V.37-#3, pp. 403-426.
- K. Iida (1996). "Involuntary Defection in Two-Level Games". *PC*; V.89-#3/4, pp. 283-303.
- J. Fearon (1994). "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes". *APSR*; V.88-#3, pp. 577-592.
- J. Mo (1994). "The Logic of Two-Level Games with Endogenous Domestic Coalitions". *JCR*; V.38-#3, pp. 402-422.
- J. Mo (1995). "Domestic Institutions and International Bargaining: The Role of Agent Veto in Two-Level Games". *APSR*; V.89-#4, pp. 914-924.
- G. Basevi, F. Delbono, and M. Mariotti (1994). "Bargaining with a Composite Player: An Application to the Uruguay Round of GATT Negotiations". *Journal of International and Comparative Economics*; V.3-#3, pp. 161-174.
- G. Downs and D. Rocke (1995). *Optimal Imperfection?: Domestic Uncertainty and Institutions in International Relations*. Princeton: PUP.
- H. Milner and B.P. Rosendorff (1996). "Trade Negotiations, Information and Domestic Politics: The Role of Domestic Groups". *E&P*; V.8-#2, pp. 145-189.
- H. Milner and B.P. Rosendorff (1997). "Democratic Politics and International Trade Negotiations: Elections and Divided Government as Constraints on Trade Liberalization". *JCR*; V.41-#1, pp. 117-146.
- E. Mansfield, H. Milner and B.P. Rosendorff (2000). "Free to Trade: Democracies, Autocracies, and International Trade". *APSR*; V.94-#?, pp. 305-321. [Comment by X. Dai and response, *APSR*, V.96-#1, pp. 159-165.
- S. Lohmann (1997). "Linkage Politics". *JCR*; V.41-#1, pp. 38-67.
- J. Ederington (2001). "International Coordination of Trade and Domestic Policies". *AER*; V.91-#5, pp. 1580-1593.
- J. Ederington (2002). "Trade and Domestic Policy Linkage in International Agreements". *IER*; V.43-#4, pp. 1347-1367.
- J. Morrow (1991). "Electoral and Congressional Incentives and Arms Control". *JCR*; V.35-#?, pp.

245-265.

-G. Hess and A. Orphanides (1995). "War Politics: An Economic, Rational Voter Framework". *AER*; V.85-#4, pp. 667-690.

-A. Smith (1996). "Diversionary Foreign Policy in Democratic Systems". *ISQ*; V.40-#1, pp. 133-154.

(b) Some Applications

-P. Evans, H. Jacobson and R. Putnam, eds. (1993). *Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

-P. Cowhey (1993). "Domestic Institutions and International Commitments: Japan and the US". *IO*; V.47-#2, pp. 299-326.

-L. Schoppa (1993). "Two-level Games and Bargaining Outcomes: Why *Gaiatsu* Succeeds in Japan in Some Cases but Not Others". *IO*; V.47-#3, pp. 353-386.

-R. Friman (1993). "Side-payments versus Security Cards: Domestic Bargaining in International Economic Negotiations". *IO*; V.47-#3, pp. 387-410.

-L. Martin (1993). "International and Domestic Institutions in the EMU Process". *E&P*; V5-#2, pp. 125-44.

-M. Huelshoff (1994). "Domestic Politics and Dynamic Issue Linkage: A Reformulation of Integration Theory". *International Studies Quarterly*, V.38-#2, pp. 255-279.

-R. Pahre (1994). "'Who's on First, What's on Second': Actors and Institutions in Two-Level Games". University of Michigan Research Forum on International Economics Discussion Paper: 352.

-M.V. Simon and L.R. Alm (1995). "Policy Windows and Two-Level Games: Explaining the Passage of Acid-Rain Legislation in the Clean Air Act of 1990". *Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy*; V.13-#4, pp. 459-478.

-J. Goldstein (1996). "International Law and Domestic Institutions: Reconciling North American 'Unfair' Trade Laws". *IO*; V.50-#4, pp. 541-564.

-H. Milner (1997). *Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations*. Princeton: PUP.

-L.A. Patterson (1997). "Agricultural Policy Reform in the European Community: A Three-Level Game Analysis". *IO*; V.51-#1, pp. 135-165.

-R. Paarlberg (1997). "Agricultural Policy Reform and the Uruguay Round: Synergistic Linkages in a Two-Level Game?". *IO*; V.51-#3, pp. 413-444.

-R. Pahre (1997). "Endogenous Domestic Institutions in Two-Level Games and Parliamentary Oversight of the European Union". *JCR*; V.41-#1, pp. 147-174.

-K. Knopf (1993). "Beyond Two-Level Games: Domestic-International Interaction in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Negotiations". *IO*; V.47-#4, pp. 599-628.



-J. Gowa (1998). "Politics at the Water's Edge: Parties, Voters, and the Use of Force Abroad". *IO*; V.52-#2, pp. 307-324.

## 8. "Ideas" and Ideology in Trade Policy

### a. Domestic Doxastic/Epistemic Communities

-W. Eiteman (1930). "The Rise and Decline of Othodox Tariff Propaganda". *QJE*; V.?-#?, pp. 22-39.

-F.W. Fetter (1933). "Congressional Tariff Theory". *AER*; V.23-#3, pp. 412-427.

-W. Allen (1954). "Issues in Congressional Tariff Debates, 1890-1930". *SEJ*; V.20-#?, pp. 340-355.

-R. Edwards (1970). "Economic Sophistication in 19th Century Tariff Debates". *Journal of Economic History*; V.30-#4, pp. 802-838.

-R. Pastor (1983). "Cry-and-Sigh Syndrome: Congress and Trade Policy". in A. Schick, ed. *Making Economic Policy in Congress*. Washington, DC: AEI. pp. 158-195.

-J. Odell (1988). "From London to Bretton Woods: Sources of Change in Bargaining Strategies and Outcomes". *Journal of Public Policy*; V.8-#?, pp. 287-316.

-J. Goldstein (1988). "Ideas, Institutions and American Trade Policy". *IO*; V.42-#1, pp. 179-217.

-J. Goldstein (1989). "The Impact of Ideas on Trade Policy: The Origins of US Agricultural and Manufacturing Policies". *IO*; V.43-#1, pp. 31-71.

-W. Hutchinson (1989). "Economists and the Economics of Trade Legislation: An Examination of the Impact of U.S. Trade Policy on the North Central Region and the South, 1870-1910". *Journal of Economics and Finance*;

-E. Krauss and S. Reich (1992). "Ideology, Interests and the American Executive: Toward a Theory of Foreign Competition and Manufacturing Trade Policy". *IO*; V.46-#4, pp. 857-897.

-O. Graham (1992). *Losing Time: The Industrial Policy Debate*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

-K. McNamarra (1999). *The Currency of Ideas: Monetary Politics in the European Union*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

-J. Legro (2000). "Whence American Internationalism". *IO*; V.54-#2, pp. 253-289.

### b. Transnational Doxastic/Epistemic Communities

-C. Kindleberger (1975). "The Rise of Free Trade in Western Europe, 1820-1875". *Journal of Economic History*; V.35-#1, pp. 20-55.

-E. Haas (1980). "Why Collaborate? Issue Linkage and International Regimes". *WP*; V.32-#?, pp. 357-405.

-J. Tumlir (1981). "Evolution of the Concept of International Economic Order". in F. Cairncross,

- ed. *Changing Perceptions of Economic Policy*. New York: Methuen. pp. 152-193.
- J. Ruggie (1982). "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Post-War Order". *IO*; V.36-#2, pp. 379-415.
- R. Cox (1987). *Production, Power and World Order*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- P. Haas (1989). "Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control". *IO*; V.43-#3, pp. 376-403.
- J. Ikenberry (1989). "Rethinking the Origins of American Hegemony". *Political Science Quarterly*; V.104-#?, pp. 375-400.
- J. Ikenberry and C. Kupchan (1990). "Socialization and Hegemonic Power". *IO*; V.44-#3, pp. 283-315.
- G. Modelski (1990). "Is World Politics Evolutionary Learning?". *IO*. V.44-#1, pp. 1-24.
- J. Keeley (1990). "Toward a Foucauldian Analysis of International Regimes". *IO*; V.44-#1, pp. 83-105.
- E.A. Nadelmann (1990). "Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International Society". *IO*; V.44-#4, pp. 479-426.
- P. Haas (1992). "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination". *IO*; V.46-#1, pp. 1-36.
- W. Drake and K. Nicolaïdis (1992). "Ideas, Interests, and Institutionalization: 'Trade in Services' and the Uruguay Round". *IO*; V.46-#1, pp. 37-100.
- J. Ikenberry (1992). "A World Restored: Expert Consensus and the Anglo-American Post-War Settlement". *IO*; V.46-#1, pp. 289-321.
- E. Kapstein (1992). "Between Power and Purpose: Central Bankers and the Politics of Regulatory Convergence". *IO*; V.46-#1, pp. 265-287.
- J. Sebenius (1992). "Challenging Conventional Explanations of International Cooperation: Negotiation Analysis and the Case of Epistemic Communities". *IO*; V.46-#1, pp. 323-365.
- J. Levy (1994). "Learning and Foreign Policy". *IO*; V.48-#?, pp. 279-312.
- J.K. Jacobson (1995). "Much Ado About Ideas". *WP*; V.47-#2, pp. 283-310.
- P. Katzenstein, ed. (1996). *The Culture of National Security: Norms, Identity and World Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- P. Katzenstein (1996). *Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- A. Yee (1996). "The Causal Effects of Ideas on Policies". *IO*; v.50-#1, pp. 69-108.
- A. Wendt (1992). "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics". *IO*; V.46-#2, pp. 391-425.

-A. Wendt (1994). "Collective Identity Formation and the International State". *APSR*; V.88-#2, pp. 384-396.

-J. Ruggie (1998). "What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge". *IO*; V.52-#4, pp. 855-885.

-Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (1998). "Norms and International Relations Theory". *IO*; V.52-#4, pp. 887-917.

### c. Doxastic Communities in General

-P. Hall, ed. (1989). *The Political Power of Economic Ideas*. Princeton: PUP.

-M. Taylor (1989). "Structure, Culture, and Action in the Explanation of Social Change". *Politics and Society*; V.17-#?, pp. 115-162.

-D. Kreps (1990). "Corporate Cultures and Economic Theory". in J. Alt and K. Shepsle, eds. *Perspectives on Positive Political Economy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

-M. Tomasello, A. Kruger, and H. Ratner (1993). "Cultural Learning". *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*; V.16-#3, pp. 495-511.

-P. Hall (1993). "Policy Paradigms, Social Learning and the State". *Comparative Politics*; V.?-#?, pp. 275-295.

-G. Garrett and B. Weingast (1993). "Ideas, Interests, and Institutions". in J. Goldstein and R. Keohane, eds. *Ideas in Foreign Policy*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp.

-A. Denzau and R. North (1994). "Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions". *KYKLOS*; V.47-#1, pp. 3-31.

-S. Hays (1994). "Structure and Agency and the Sticky Problem of Culture". *Sociological Theory*; V.12-#?, pp. 57-72.

-S. Ellingson (1995). "Understanding the Dialectic of Discourse and Collective Action: Public Debate and Rioting in Antebellum Cincinnati". *AJS*; V.101-#?, pp. 100-145.

-M. Gilbert (1996). *Living Together: Rationality, Sociality and Obligation*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

-J.K. Jacobsen (1995). "Much Ado About Ideas: The Cognitive Factor in Economic Policy". *World Politics*; V.47-#2, pp. 283-310.

-P. DiMaggio (1997). "Culture and Cognition". *Annual Review of Sociology*; V.23, pp. 263-287.

-B. Weingast (1996). "A Rational Choice Perspective on the Role of Ideas". *Politics and Society*; V.23-#?, pp. 449-464.

-R. Bates, R.J.P. de Figueirido, jr., and B. Weingast (1998). "The Politics of Interpretation: Rationality, Culture, and Transition". *Politics and Society*; V.26-#?, pp. 221-256.

-S. Berman (2001). "Ideas, Norms and Culture in Political Analysis". *Comparative Politics*; V.33-#2, pp. 231-250.

## D. Regional Integration and Preferential Trading Systems

### 1. Overview/Surveys on Regional Integration

- B. Balassa (1961). *The Theory of Economic Integration*. Homewood, Ill.: Irwin.
- F. Machlup (1977). *A History of Thought on Economic Integration*. London: Macmillan.
- P. Robson (1987). *The Economics of International Integration*. London: Allen and Unwin
- R. Hine (1994). "International Economic Integration". in D. Greenaway and L.A. Winters, eds. *Surveys in International Trade*. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 234-272.
- R. Baldwin and A. Venables (1995). "Regional Economic Integration". in G. Grossman and K. Rogoff, eds. *Handbook of International Economics, V.III*. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 1597-1644.
- J. Bhagwati, D. Greenaway, and A. Panagariya (1998). "Trading Preferentially: Theory and Policy". *EJ*; V.108-#449, pp. 1128-1148
- R. Fernández and J. Portes (1998). "Returns to Regionalism: An Analysis of Nontraditional Gains from Regional Trade Agreements". *World Bank Economic Review*; V.12-#2, pp. 197-220.
- A. Panagariya (2000). "Preferential Trade Liberalization: The Traditional Theory and New Developments". *JEL*; V.38-#2, pp. 287-331.
- L.A. Winters (2001). "Regionalism for Developing Countries: Assessing the Costs and Benefits". In S. Lahiri, ed. *Regionalism and Globalization: Theory and Practice*. London: Routledge, pp. 113-143.
- J. Bhagwati, P. Krishna, and A. Panagariya (1999). *Trading Blocs: Alternative Approaches to Analyzing Preferential Trade Agreements*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

### 2. Regionalization of International Trade

#### a. The Effect of Preferential Trade Agreements on Intra-Union Trade

- W. Chadwick and K. Deutsch (1973). "International Trade and Economic Integration: Further Developments in Trade Matrix Analysis". *Comparative Political Studies*; V.6-#?, pp. 84-109.
- N. Aitken (1973). "The Effect of the EEC and EFTA on European Trade: A Temporal, Cross-Section Analysis". *AER*; V.63-#5, pp. 881-892.
- E. Truman (1975). "The Effects of European Economic Integration on the Production and Trade of Manufactured Products". in B. Balassa, ed. *European Economic Integration*. Amsterdam: North Holland.
- A. Jacquemin and A. Sapir (1988). "European Integration or World Integration?". *WA*; V.124-#1, pp. 127-139.
- A. Jacquemin and A. Sapir (1988). "International Trade and Integration of the European Community: An Econometric Analysis". *EER*; V.32-#6, pp. 1439-1449.
- D. Neven and L-H. Röller (1991). "European Integration and Trade Flows". *EER*; V.35-#6, pp.

1295-1309.

-A. Sapir (1992). "Regional Integration in Europe". *EJ*; V.102-#?, pp. 1491-1506.

-A. Sapir (1996). "The Effects of Europe's Internal Market Program on Production and Trade: A First Assessment". *WA*; V.132-#3, pp. 457-475.

b. The Effect of Preferential Trade Agreements on World Trade Patterns

-R. Lawrence (1994). "Regionalism: An Overview". *JJIE*; V.8-#4, pp. 365-387.

-R. Pomfret (1985). "Discrimination in International Trade: Extent, Motivation, and Implications". *Economia Internazionale*; V.38-#?, pp. 49-65.

-P. DeGrauwe (1988). "Exchange Rate Variability and the Slowdown in Growth of International Trade". *IMFSP*; V.35-#?, pp. 63-84.

-J. Garten (1989). "Trading Blocs and the Evolving World Economy". *Current History*; V.?-#1, pp. 15-56.

-J. Frankel (1991). "Is a Yen Bloc Forming in Asia?". in R. O'Brien, ed. *Finance and the International Economy*. Oxford: OUP, pp. 4-20.

-R. Lawrence (1991). "Emerging Regional Arrangements: Building Blocks or Stumbling Blocks?". in R. O'Brien, ed. *Finance and the International Economy*. Oxford: OUP, pp. 24-36.

-N. Fielke (1992). "One Trading World, or Many: The Issue of Regional Trading Blocs". *New England Economic Review*; May/June, pp. 3-20.

-de la Torre, A. and M. Kelly (1992). *Regional Trading Arrangements*. IMF Occasional Paper #93.

-D. Henderson (1992). "International Economic Integration: Progress, Prospects and Implications". *International Affairs*; V.68-#?, pp. 633-653.

-C. Hamilton and L.A. Winters (1992). "Opening Up International Trade in Eastern Europe". *Economic Policy*; V.#?, pp. 77-116.

-P. Petri (1992). "One Bloc, Two Blocs, or None? Political-Economic Factors in Pacific Trade Policy". In K. Okuzumi, K. Calder, and G. Gong, eds. *The US-Japan Economic Relationship in East and Southeast Asia: A Policy Framework for Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation*. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, pp. 39-70.

-J. Frankel and S. Wei (1992). "Trade Blocs and Currency Blocs". *NBER Working Paper*, #4335.

-P.J. Lloyd (1992). "Regionalization and World Trade". *OECD Economic Studies*; #18, pp. 7-43.

-P.J. Lloyd (1993). "Global Integration". *Australian Economic Review*; pp. 35-48.

-J. Frankel (1993). "Is Japan Creating a Yen Bloc in East Asia and the Pacific?". In J. Frankel and M. Kahler, eds. *Regionalism and Rivalry: Japan and the US in Pacific Asia*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 53-85.

- G. Saxonhouse (1993). "Trading Blocs and East Asia". in J. DeMelo and A. Panagariya, eds. *New Dimensions in Regional Integration*. New York: Cambridge/CEPR, pp. 388-416.
- R. Grant, M. Papadakis and J.D. Richardson (1993). "Global Trade Flows: Old Structures, New Issues, Empirical Evidence". in C.F. Bergsten and M. Noland, eds. *Pacific Dynamism and the International System*. Washington, DC: IIE, pp. 17-63.
- K. Anderson and H. Norheim (1993). "History, Geography and Regional Economic Integration". in K. Anderson and R. Blackhurst, eds. *Regional Integration and the Global Trading System*. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, pp. 19-51.
- K. Anderson and H. Norheim (1993). "Is World Trade Becoming More Regionalized?". *RIE*; V.1-#2, pp. 91-109.
- K. Anderson and H. Norheim (1993). "From Imperial to Regional Trade Preferences: Its Effects on Europe's Intra- and Extra-Regional Trade". *WA*; V.129-#
- K. Anderson and R. Snape (1994). "European and American Regionalism: Effects on and Options for Asia". *JJIE*; V.8-#4, pp. 454-477.
- J. Eaton and A. Tamura (1994). "Bilateralism and Regionalism in Japanese and US Trade and Direct Investment Patterns". *JJIE*; V.8-#4, pp. 478-510.
- R. Baldwin (1994). "Potential Trade Patterns". Chapter 3 of *Towards and Integrated Europe*. London: CEPR, pp. 80-118.
- J. Frankel, E. Stein, and S. Wei (1995). "Trading Blocs and the Americas: The Natural, the Unnatural, and the Super-Natural". *JDevE*; V.47-#?, pp. 61-95.
- J. Frankel, E. Stein, and S. Wei (1996). "Continental Trading Blocs: Are they Natural or Supernatural?". in J. Frankel, ed. *The Regionalization of the World Economy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 91-113.
- J. Frankel and S. Wei (1998). "Regionalization of World Trade and Currencies: Economics and Politics". in J. Frankel, ed. *The Regionalization of the World Economy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 189-219.
- J. Frankel (1997). *Regional Trading Blocs*. Washington, DC: IIE.
- J.J. Polak (1996). "Is APEC a Natural Regional Trading Bloc? A Critique of the 'Gravity Model' of International Trade". *World Economy*; V.19-#5, pp. 533-543.
- B. Eichengreen and D. Irwin (1995). "Trade Blocs, Currency Blocs and the Reorientation of Trade in the 1930s". *JIE*; V.38-#1/2, pp. 1-24.
- T. Bayoumi and B. Eichengreen (1995). "Is Regionalism Simply a Diversion? Evidence from the Evolution of the EC and EFTA". *NBER Working Paper*, #5283.
- N. de Jong and R. Vos (1995). "Regional Blocs or Global Markets?: A World Accounting Approach to Analyze Trade and Financial Linkages". *WA*; V.131-#4, pp. 748-773.
- C. Engel and J. Rogers (1998). "Regional Patterns in the Law of One Price: The Roles of Geography and Currencies". in J. Frankel, ed. *The Regionalization of the World Economy*.

Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 153-183.

-S. Dhar and A. Panagariya (1999). "Is East Asia Less Open than North America and the EEC? No". in J. Piggott and A. Woodland, eds. *International Trade Policy and the Pacific Rim*. London: Macmillan, pp. 105-123

-D. Karemera, David, *et al.* (1999). "A Gravity Model Analysis of the Benefits of Economic Integration in the Pacific Rim". *Journal of Economic Integration*; V.14-#3, pp. 347-367.

-M. Brühlhart and M. Kelly (1999). "Ireland's Trading Potential with Central and Eastern European Countries: A Gravity Study". *Economic and Social Review*; V.30-#2, pp. 159-174.

-F. Sanz (2000). "A Kalman Filter-Gravity Equation Approach to Assess the Trade Impact of Economic Integration: The Case of Spain, 1986-1992". *WA*; V.136-#1, pp. 84-110.

-I Soloaga and L. A. Winters (2001). "Regionalism in the Nineties: What Effect on Trade?". *North American Journal of Economics and Finance*; V.12-#1, pp. 1-29.

### 3. Integration with Price-Taking Firms

#### a. The Vinerian Approach

##### (1) Theory

-R. Lipsey (1960). "The Theory of Customs Unions: A General Survey". *EJ*; V.70-#279, pp. 496-513. also in Bhagwati.

-M. Krauss (1972). "Recent Developments in Customs Union Theory: An Interpretive Survey". *JEL*; V.10-#?, pp. 413-436.

-R. Pomfret (1986). "The Theory of Preferential Trading Arrangements". *WA*; V.122-#3, pp. 439-465.

-C. Kowalczyk (1992). "Paradoxes in Integration Theory". *Open Economies Review*; V.3-#1, pp. 51-59.

-A. Panagariya (1997). "The Meade Model of Preferential Trading: History, Analytics, and Policy Implications". In B. Cohen, ed. *International Trade and Finance: New Frontiers for Research*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 57-88. [also in Bhagwati, Krishna, and Panagariya, pp. 157-188.]

-R. Pomfret (1997). *The Economics of Regional Trading Arrangements*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

-J. Viner (1950). *The Customs Union Issue*. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

-J. Meade (1955). *The Theory of Customs Unions*. Amsterdam: North-Holland.

-F. Gehrels (1956). "Customs Union from a Single Country Viewpoint". *REStud*; V.24-#1, pp. 61-64.

-R. Lipsey and K. Lancaster (1956). "The General Theory of Second Best". *Review of Economic*

*Studies*; V.24-#1, pp. 11-32.

-R. Lipsey (1957). "The Theory of Customs Unions: Trade Diversion and Welfare". *Eca*; V.24-#?, pp. 40-46. [also in Bhagwati, Krishna, and Panagariya, pp. 119-126.]

-H.G. Johnson (1960). "The Economic Theory of Customs Unions". *Pakistan Economic Journal*; V.10-#1, pp. 14-32. [also in Bhagwati, Krishna, and Panagariya, pp. 127-143.]

-J. Spraos (1964). "The Condition for Trade-Creating Customs Union". *EJ*; V.74-#?, pp. 101-108.

-R. Mundell (1964). "Tariff Preferences and the Terms of Trade". *Manchester School*; V.32-#1, pp. 1-13. [also in Bhagwati, Krishna, and Panagariya, pp. 145-156.]

-M. Michaely (1965). "On Customs Unions and the Gains from Trade". *EJ*; V.75-#?, pp. 577-583.

-E. Mishan (1966). "The Welfare Gains of a Trade-Diverting Customs Union". *EJ*; V.76-#?, pp. 669-672.

-S. Arndt (1968). "On Discriminatory vs. Non-Preferential Tariff Policies". *EJ*; V.78-#?, pp. 971-979.

-S. Arndt (1969). "Customs Unions and the Theory of Tariffs". *AER*; V.59-#?, pp. 108-118.

-J. Melvin (1969). "Comments on the Theory of Customs Unions". *MS*; V.36-#2, pp. 161-168.

-J. Bhagwati (1971). "Trade Diverting Customs Unions and Welfare-Improvement: A Clarification". *EJ*; V.81-#?, pp. 580-587.

-A. Kirman (1973). "Trade Diverting Customs Unions and Welfare Improvement: A Comment". *EJ*; V.83-#?, pp. 890-894. (with a response by Bhagwati).

-P. Collier (1979). "The Welfare Effects of Customs Union: An Anatomy". *EJ*; V.89-#?, pp. 84-95.

-P. Wonnacott and R. Wonnacott (1992). "The Customs Union Issue Reopened". *MS*; V.60-#2, pp. 119-135.

-M. Michaely (1998). "Partners to a Preferential Trade Agreement: Implications of Varying Size". *JIE*; V.46-#1, pp. 73-85.

-C. Cooper and B. Massell (1965). "A New Look at Customs Union Theory". *EJ*; V.75-#?, pp. 742-747.

-C. Cooper and B. Massell (1965). "Towards a General Theory of Customs Unions for Developing Countries". *JPE*; V.73-#?, pp. 461-476. [also in Bhagwati, Krishna, and Panagariya, pp. 249-269.]

-J. Bhagwati (1968). "Trade Liberalization Among LDCs, Trade Theory and GATT Rules". in J.N. Wolfe, ed. *Value, Capital and Growth: Essays in Honor of Sir John Hicks*; Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press; pp. 21-43.

-R. McCulloch and J. Pinera (1977). "Trade as Aid: The Political Economy of Tariff Preferences for Developing Countries". *AER*; V.67-#5, pp. 959-967.



-P. Krishna and J. Bhagwati (1997). "Necessarily Welfare-Enhancing Customs Unions with Industrialization Constraints: The Cooper-Massel-Johnson-Bhagwati Conjecture". *Japan and the World Economy*; V.9-#4, pp. 441-446. [also in Bhagwati, Krishna, and Panagariya, pp. 271-296.]

-G. Gardner and K. Kimbrough (1990). "The Economics of Country Specific Tariffs". *IER*; V.31-#3, pp. 575-588.

-B. and R. Yarbrough (1990). "Economic Integration and Governance: The Role of Preferential Trade Agreements". *JIEI*; V.5-#2, pp. 1-20.

-D.P. O'Brien (1976). "Customs Unions: Trade Creation and Trade Diversion in Historical Perspective". *History of Political Economy*; V.8-#4, pp. 540-563.

## (2) Estimates of Trade Creation and Trade Diversion

-B. Balassa (1967). "Trade Creation and Trade Diversion in the European Common Market". *EJ*; V.87-#?, pp. 1-21.

-E. Truman (1969). "The European Economic Community: Trade Creation and Trade Diversion". *Yale Economic Essays*; V.9-#1, pp. 201-57.

-M. Kreinin (1969). "Trade Creation and Diversion by the EEC and EFTA". *Economia Internazionale*; V.22-#2, pp. 273-280.

-M. Kreinin (1972). "Effects of the EEC on Imports of Manufactures". *EJ*; V.82-#327, pp. 897-920.

-P.J. Verdoorn and C.A. van Bochove (1972). "Measuring Integration Effects: A Survey". *EER*; V.3-#?, pp. 337-349.

-H. Askari (1974). "A Comment on Empirical Estimates of Trade Creation and Trade Diversion". *EJ*; V.84-#334, pp. 392-393.

-W. Sellekaerts (1973). "How Meaningful are Empirical Studies on Trade Creation and Diversion?". *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv*; V.109-#4, pp. 519-553.

-B. Balassa (1974). "Trade Creation and Trade Diversion in the European Common Market: An Appraisal of the Evidence". *Manchester School*, V.42-#2, pp. 93-135.

-R. Dayal and D. Neeru (1977). "Trade Creation and Trade Diversion: New Concepts, New Methods of Measurement". *WA*; V.113-#1, pp. 125-169.

-D. Mayes (1978). "The Effects of Economic Integration on Trade". *JCMS*; V.17-#?, pp.

-M. Kreinin (1981). "Static Effect of E.C. Enlargement on Trade Flows in Manufactured Products". *KYKLOS*; V.34-#1, pp. 60-71.

-O. Aktan (1985). "The Second Enlargement of the European Communities". *EER*; V.28-#?, pp.

-L.A. Winters (1987). "Britain in Europe: A Survey of Quantitative Estimates". *JCMS*; V.25-#4, pp. 315-335.

-C. MacPhee (1987). "The Consistency of Partial Equilibrium Estimates of Trade Creation and

Diversion". *WA*; V.123-#1, pp. 81-92.

-W.C. Sawyer and R. Sprinkle (1988). "EC Enlargement and U.S. Exports: An Analysis of Effects". *Journal of World Trade Law*; V.22-#1, pp. 89-96.

-J. Bröcker (1988). "Interregional Trade and Economic Integration: A Partial Equilibrium Analysis". *RSUE*; V.18-#?, pp. 261-281.

-W.C. Sawyer and R. Sprinkle (1989). "Alternative Empirical Estimates of Trade Creation and Trade Diversion: A Comparison of the Baldwin-Murray and Verdoorn Models". *WA*; V.125-#1, pp. 61-73.

-D. Karemera and W. Koo (1994). Trade Creation and Diversion Effects of the U.S.-Canadian Free Trade Agreement". *Contemporary Economic Policy*; V.12-#1, pp. 12-23.

-S. Devadoss, J. Kropf, and T. Wahl (1995). "Trade Creation and Diversion Effects of the North American Free Trade Agreement of U.S. Sugar Imports from Mexico". *Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics*; V.20-#2, pp. 215-30.

-P. Wylie (1995). "Partial Equilibrium Estimates of Manufacturing Trade Creation and Diversion Due to NAFTA". *North American Journal of Economics and Finance*; V.6-#1, pp. 65-84.

-J. Haveman and D. Hummels (1998). "Trade Creation and Trade Diversion: New Empirical Results". *Journal of Transnational Management Development*; V.3-#2, pp. 47-72.

-D. Karemera and K. Ojah (1998). "An Industrial Analysis of Trade Creation and Diversion Effects of NAFTA". *Journal of Economic Integration*; V.13-#3, pp. 400-425.

-W. Wilford (1970). "Trade Creation in the Central American Common Market". *Western Economic Journal*; V.8-#1, pp. 61-69.

-L. Willmore (1976). "Trade Creation, Trade Diversion and Effective Protection in the Central American Common Market". *Journal of Development Studies*; V.12-#4, pp. 396-414.

-S.M.A. Nicholls (1998). "Measuring Trade Creation and Trade Diversion in the Central American Common Market: A Hicksian Alternative". *World Development*; V.26-#2, pp. 323-335.

-J. Pelzman (1977). "Trade Creation and Trade Diversion in the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance: 1954-70". *AER*; V.67-#4, pp. 713-722.

#### **b. Extensions of the Basic Model: Distortions**

-E. Yu (1977). "Nontraded Goods and Customs Union Theory". *WA*; V.115-#?, pp. 716-727.

-E. Yu and G. Scully (1975). "Domestic Distortions and the Theory of Customs Unions". *SEJ*; V.42-#?, pp. 218-224.

-E. Yu (1981). "Trade Diversion, Trade Creation and Factor Market Imperfections". *WA*; V.117-#?, pp. 546-561.

-E. Yu (1982). "Unemployment and the Theory of Customs Unions". *EJ*; V.92-#?, pp. 399-404.

-A. Parai and R. Batra (1987). "Customs Unions and Unemployment in LDCs". *JDevE*; V.26-#?,

pp. 311-319.

-H. Beladi and S. Samanta (1990). "Sector Specific Minimum Wages and the Theory of Customs Unions". *Scottish Journal of Political Economy*; V.37-#2, pp. 184-192.

-H. Beladi (1989). "Urban Unemployment, Economies of Scale and the Theory of Customs Unions". *KES*; V.26-#2, pp. 5-15.

-A. Parai and E. Yu (1989). "Factor Mobility and Customs Union Theory". *SEJ*; V.??-#?, pp. 842-852.

-E. Yu and A. Parai (1989). "Endogenous Wage Differentials, Imperfect Labor Mobility and Customs Union Theory". *JIEI*; V.4-#1, pp. 15-26.

-G. Scully and E. Yu (1974). "International Investment, Trade Creation and Trade Diversion". *EcRec*; V??-#?, pp. 600-604.

-R. Brecher and J. Bhagwati (1981). "Foreign Ownership and the Theory of Trade and Welfare". *JPE*; V.89-#3, pp. 497-512.

-E. Tironi (1982). "Customs Union Theory in the Presence of Foreign Firms". *OEP*; V.34-#?, pp. 150-171.

-S. Patterson (1985). "Trade Creation and Trade Diversion and Transport Costs". *AEJ*; V.13-#4, pp. 34-38.

### c. The Vanek-Negishi-Kemp Approach

-J. Vanek (1965). *General Equilibrium of International Discrimination--The Case of Customs Unions*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

-T. Negishi (1969). "The Customs Union and the Theory of Second Best". *IER*; V.10-#?, pp. 391-398.

-M. Kemp (1969). *A Contribution to the General Equilibrium Theory of Preferential Trading*. Amsterdam: North-Holland.

-R. Baldwin (1973). "Customs Unions, Preferential Systems and World Welfare". in M. Conolly and A. Swoboda, eds. *International Trade and Money*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, pp.29-44.

-W.M. Corden (1976). "Customs Union Theory and the Nonuniformity of Tariffs". *JIE*; V.6-#?, pp. 99-106.

-E. Berglas (1979). "Preferential Trading Theory: The n Commodity Case". *JPE*; V.87-#2, pp. 315-331.

-R. Riezman (1977). "A Theory of Customs Union: The Three Country-Two Good Case". *WA*; V.115-#?, pp. 701-714.

-R. Riezman (1979). "A 3x3 Model of Customs Unions". *JIE*; V.9-#?, pp. 341-354.

-J. McMillan and E. McCann (1981). "Welfare Effects in Customs Unions". *EJ*; V.91-#?, pp. 697-

703.

- P.J. Lloyd (1982). "3x3 Theory of Customs Unions". *JIE*; V.12-#?, pp. 41-63.
- P. Wonnacott and R. Wonnacott (1981). "Is Unilateral Tariff Reduction Preferable to a Customs Union? The Curious Case of the Missing Foreign Tariffs". *AER*; V.71-#4, pp. 704-714.
- E. Berglas (1983). "The Case for Unilateral Tariff Reduction: Foreign Tariffs Rediscovered". *AER*; V.73-#5, pp. 1141-1142. [Response by W&W, *AER*; V.74-#3, pg. 491]
- M. Richardson (1990). "Optimal Import Subsidies in a Small, Distant Free Trade Area". *New Zealand Economic Papers*; V.24-#1, pp. 57-65.
- I. Wooton (1986). "Preferential Trading Agreements: An Investigation". *JIE*; V.21-#?, pp. 81-97.
- G. Harrison, T. Rutherford and I. Wooton (1993). "An Alternative Welfare Decomposition for Customs Unions". *CJE*; V.26-#4, pp. 961-968.
- T.N. Srinivasan, J. Whalley and I. Wooton (1993). "Measuring the Effects of Regionalism on Trade and Welfare". in K. Anderson and R. Blackhurst, eds. *Regional Integration and the Global Trading System*. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, pp. 52-79..
- C. Kowalczyk (2000). "Welfare and Integration". *International Economic Review*; V.41-#2, pp. 483-494.
- J. Ju and K. Krishna (1997). "Evaluating Trade Reform using Ex post Criteria". *NBER Working Paper*, #6152.
- J. Ju and K. Krishna (2000). "Necessary Conditions for Welfare Improving Reforms". *EcLets*; V.67-#2, pp. 173-178.
- Y. Fluckiger (1987). "The Effect of a Unilateral Transfer Between Customs Union Partners on the Terms of Trade". *EcLets*; V.22-#?, pp. 289-293.
- Y. Fluckiger (1987). "The Theory of Transfers in A Multilateral World: The Customs Union Case". *International Trade Journal*; V.2-#2, pp. 173-192.
- I. Wooton (1988). "Towards a Common Market: Factor Mobility in a Customs Union". *CJE*; V.21-#3, pp. 525-
- M. Webb (1990). "Preferential Trading Agreements and Capital Flows". *JDevEc*; V.32-#?, pp. 181-190.
- M. Michael (1992). "From Customs Union to Common Market: The Need for Factor-Tax Harmonization". *EcLets*; V.39-#?, pp. 79-84.
- C. Kowalczyk (1993). "Integration in Goods and Factors: The Role of Flows and Revenue". *RSUE*; V.23-#?, pp. 355-367.
- D. Appleyard, P. Conway and A. Field (1989). "The Effects of Customs Unions on the Pattern and Terms of Trade in a Ricardian Model with a Continuum of Goods". *JIE*; V.27-#1/2, pp. 147-164.

-P. Conway, D. Appleyard and A. Field (1989). "Trade Agreements vs. Unilateral Tariff Reductions: Evidence from Modelling with a Continuum of Goods". *IER*; V.30-#4, pp. 775-794.

-G. Harrison, T. Rutherford, and I. Wooton (1989). "The Economic Impact of the European Community". *AER*; V.79-2, pp. 288-294.

-A. Jaquemin and A. Sapir (1988). "International Trade and Integration in the EC: An Econometric Analysis". *EER*; V.32-#?, pp. 1439-1450.

#### d. The Kemp-Wan Theorem

-M. Kemp and H. Wan (1976). "An Elementary Proposition Concerning the Formation of Customs Unions". *JIE*; V.6-#1, pp. 95-97. [also in Bhagwati, Krishna, and Panagariya, pp. 203-206.]

-E. Grinols (1981). "An Extension of the Kemp-Wan Theorem on the Formation of Customs Unions". *JIE*; V.11-#2, pp. 259-266. [also in Bhagwati, Krishna, and Panagariya, pp. 215-223.]

-E. Grinols (1984). "A Thorn in the Lion's Paw: Has Britain Paid Too Much for Common Market Membership?" *JIE*; V.16-#3/4, pp. 271-293.

-M. Kemp and H. Wan (1986). "The Comparison of Second-Best Equilibria: The Case of Customs Unions". *ZfN*, V.93-supplement #5, pp. 161-167. [also in Bhagwati, Krishna, and Panagariya, pp. 207-213.]

-C. Kowalczyk and T. Sjöström (2000). "Trade as Transfers, GATT and the Core". *EcLets*; V.66-#?, pp. 163-169.

-M. Richardson (1995). "On the Interpretation of the Kemp/Wan Theorem". *OEP*; V.47-#4, pp. 696-703.

-L.A. Winters (1997). "Regionalism and the Rest of the World: The Irrelevance of the Kemp-Wan Theorem". *OEP*; V.49-#2, pp. 228-234.

-T.N. Srinivasan (1997). "The Common External Tariff of a Customs Union: Alternative Approaches". *Japan and the World Economy*; V.9-#4, pp. 447-465. [also in Bhagwati, Krishna, and Panagariya, pp. 225-246.]

-N. v.Long and A. Soubeyran (1997). "Customs Unions and Gains from Trade under Imperfect Competition". *Japanese Economic Review*; V.48-#2, pp. 166-175.

-P. Krishna and J. Bhagwati (1997). "Necessarily Welfare-Enhancing Customs Unions with Industrialization Constraints: The Cooper-Massell-Johnson-Bhagwati Conjecture". *Japan and the World Economy*; V.9-#4, pp. 441-446.

-Y.-H. Yeh (1998). "Incentives to Form Customs Unions and Quotas". *RIE*; V.6-#4, pp. 695-697.

-M. Kemp and K. Nishida (2000). "Welfare Comparisons of Customs Unions and Other Free Trade Associations". *Pacific Economic Review*, V.5-#1, pp. 1-3.

-M. Kemp and K. Shimomura (2001). "A Second Elementary Proposition concerning the Formation of Customs Unions". *Japanese Economic Review*; V.52-#1, pp. 64-69.

-A. Panagariya and P. Krishna (2002). "On necessarily welfare-enhancing free trade areas". *JIE*;

V.57-#2, pp. 353-367.

#### 4. Customs Unions with Imperfect Competition

##### a. Customs Unions with Labor Unions

-J. Driffill and F. van der Ploeg (1993). "Monopoly Unions and the Liberalization of International Trade". *EJ*; V.103-#?, pp. 379-385.

-H. Huzinga (1993). "International Market Integration and Union Wage Bargaining". *ScanJE*; V.95-#?, pp. 249-255.

-J.R. Sorensen (1993). "Integration of Product Markets when Labour Markets are Unionized". *Recherches Economiques de Louvain*; V.59-#?, pp. 485-502.

-J.R. Sorensen (1994). "Market Integration and Imperfect Competition in Labor and Product Markets". *Open Economies Review*; V.5-#?, pp. 115-130.

-T. Andersen and J.R. Sorensen (1993). "Will Product Market Integration Lower Unemployment?". in J. Fagerberg and L. Lundberg, eds. *European Economic Integration: a Nordic Perspective*. Aldershot: Avebury.

-J.-P. Danthine and J. Hunt (1994). "Wage Bargaining Structure, Employment and Economic Integration". *EJ*; V.104-#?, pp. 528-541.

-J. Driffill and F. Van der Ploeg (1995). "Trade Liberalization with Imperfect Competition in Goods and Labor Markets". *ScanJE*; V.97-#2, pp. 223-243.

-R. Naylor (1998). "International Trade and Economic Integration when Labour Markets are Generally Unionised". *EER*; V.42-#7, pp. 1251-1267.

##### b. Customs Unions with Economies of Scale

-W.M. Corden (1972). "Economies of Scale and Customs Union Theory". *JPE*; V.80-#3, pp. 465-475. [also in Bhagwati, Krishna, and Panagariya, pp. 189-200.]

-J.-Y. Choi and E. Yu (1984). "Customs Unions Under Increasing Returns to Scale". *Eca*; V.??-#?, pp. 195-203.

-R. Caballero and R. Lyons (1990). "Internal versus External Economies in European Industry". *EER*; V.34-#4, pp. 805-829.

-R. Caballero and R. Lyons (1991). "External Effects and Europe's Integration". in L.A. Winters and A. Venables, eds. *European Integration: Trade and Industry*. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 34-53.

-R. Baldwin (1990). "Factor Market Barriers are Trade Barriers: Gains from Trade 1992". *EER*; V.34-#4, pp. 831-850.

-E. Grinols (1993). "Increasing Returns and the Shift from Customs Union to Common Market". *RSUE*; V.23-#?, pp. 315-355.

##### c. Customs Unions with Monopolistic Competition

- A. Smith and A. Venables (1991). "Economic Integration and Market Access". *EER*; V.35-#?, pp. 388-395.
- P. Krugman (1991). "Is Bilateralism Bad?". in E. Helpman and A. Razin, eds. *International Trade and Trade Policy*. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 9-23.
- P. Krugman (1991). "The Move Toward Free Trade Zones". in *Policy Implications of Trade and Currency Zones*. Kansas City: Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. pp. 7-41.
- P. Krugman (1993). "Regionalism vs. Multilateralism: Analytical Notes". in J. deMelo and A. Panagariya, eds. *New Dimensions in Regional Integration*. New York: Cambridge, pp. 58-79. [also in Bhagwati, Krishna, and Panagariya, pp. 381-403.]
- A. Deardorff and R. Stern (1991). "Multilateral Trade Negotiations and Preferential Trading Agreements". in A. Deardorff and R. Stern, eds. *Analytical and Negotiating Issues in the Global Trading System*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 27-85. [also in Bhagwati, Krishna, and Panagariya, pp. 405-426.]
- J. Frankel, E. Stein, and S.-J. Wei (1995). "Trading Blocs in the Americas: The Natural, The Unnatural and the Supernatural". *JDevE*; V.47-#?, pp. 61-95.
- S. Wei and J. Frankel (1998). "Open Regionalism in a World of Continental Trading Blocs". *IMF Staff Papers*; V.45-#3, pp. 440-453.
- A. Splimbergo and E. Stein (1998). "The Welfare Implications of Trading Blocs among Countries with Different Endowments". in J. Frankel, ed. *The Regionalization of the World Economy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 121-145.
- J. Haveman (1996). "Some Welfare Effects of Sequential Customs Union Formation". *CJE*; V.29-#4, pp. 941-958.
- E. Bond and C. Syropoulos (1995). "Trading Blocs and the Sustainability of Inter-Regional Cooperation". in M. Canzoneri, W. Ethier, and V. Grilli, eds. *The New Transatlantic Economy*. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 118-141.
- E. Bond and C. Syropoulos (1996). "The Size of Trading Blocs: Market Power and World Welfare Effects". *JIE*; V.40-#3/4, pp. 411-437.
- J.M. Campa and T. Sorenson (1996). "Are Trade Blocs Conducive to Free Trade?". *ScanJE*; V.98-#2, pp. 263-273.
- V. Nitsch (1996). "Do Three Trade Blocs Minimize World Welfare?". *RIE*; V.4-#3, pp. 355-363.
- K. Olofsdotter and J. Torstensson (1998). "Economic Integration, Market Size and the Welfare Effects of Trade Liberalisation". *WA*; V.134-#2, pp. 302-319.
- D. Brown and R. Stern (1989). "US-Canada Bilateral Tariff Elimination: The Role of Product Differentiation and Market Structure". in R. Feenstra, ed. *Trade Policies for International Competitiveness*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 217-253.
- A. Venables (1994). "Integration and the Export Behaviour of Firms: Trade Costs, Trade Volumes and Welfare". *WA*; V.130-#1, pp. 118-132.

-H. Trabold (1998). "Integration, Trade Costs and the Export Behaviour of Firms: Empirical Evidence on the Venables Model". *WA*; V.134-#1, pp. 133-139.

-J. Goto (1995). "The Impact of EC92 on the Third Country: A Simple Analytical Framework under Imperfect Competition". in W. Chang and S. Katayama, eds. *Imperfect Competition in International Trade*. Boston: Kluwer, pp. 249-266.

-J. Goto and K. Hamada (1997). "EU, NAFTA, and Asian Responses: A Perspective from the Calculus of Participation". in T. Ito and A. Krueger, eds. *Regionalism versus Multilateral Trade Agreements*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 91-110.

-J. Goto and K. Hamada (1998). "Economic Integration and the Welfare of Those Who are Left Behind: An Incentive-Theoretic Approach". *JJIE*; V.12-#1, pp. 25-48.

-J. Goto and K. Hamada (1999). "Regional Economic Integration and Article XXIV of the GATT". *RIE*; V.7-#4, pp. 555-570.

#### **d. Customs Unions with Oligopolistic Firms**

##### (1) Partial Equilibrium Studies

-D. Neven and L. Philips (1985). "Discriminating Oligopolists and Common Markets". *Journal of Industrial Economics*; V.34-#2, pp. 133-149.

-P. Krugman (1987). "European Economic Integration: Some Conceptual Issues". in T. Padoa-Schioppa, ed. *Efficiency, Stability and Equity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 117-140.

-A. Venables (1987). "Customs Unions and Tariff Reform under Imperfect Competition". *EER*; V.31-#1/2, pp. 103-110.

-A. Smith and A. Venables (1988). "Completing the Internal Market in the European Community: Some Industry Simulations". *EER*; V.32-#?, pp. 1501-1525.

-M. Gasiorek, A. Smith and A. Venables (1989). "Tariffs, Subsidies and Retaliation". *EER*; V.33-#?, pp. 480-489.

-A. Smith (1990). "The Market for Cars in the Enlarged European Community". in C. Bliss and J. Braga de Macedo, eds. *Unity with Diversity in the European Economy: The Community's Southern Frontier*. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 78-103.

-V. Norman (1990). "EFTA and the Internal European Market". *Economic Policy*; V.9, pp. 423-465.

-A. Venables (1990). "The Economic Integration of Oligopolistic Markets". *EER*; V.34-#4, pp. 753-774.

-K.C. Fung (1992). "Economic Integration as Competitive Discipline". *IER*; V.33-#4, pp. 837-847.

-K. Kiyono (1993). "Who Will be Called Partner? An Importing Country's Incentive to Form a Free Trade Area". *Economic Studies Quarterly*; V.44-#4, pp. 289-310.

-J. Haaland and I. Wooton (1992). "Market Integration, Competition and Welfare". in L.A. Winters, ed. *Trade Flows and Trade Policy after '1992'*. Cambridge: CUP/CEPR, pp. 125-149.



-G. Klepper (1990). "Entry into the Market for Large Transport Aircraft". *EER*; V.34-#4, pp. 775-803.

-G. Klepper (1992). "Pharmaceuticals: Who's Afraid of '1992'". in L.A. Winters, ed. *Trade Flows and Trade Policy after '1992'*. Cambridge: CUP/CEPR, pp. 150-172.

-R. Riezman (1999). "Oligopoly and Customs Union Theory". in James Melvin, James Moore, and Ray Riezman, eds., *Trade, Welfare, and Econometrics: Essays in Honor of John S. Chipman*. New York: Routledge, pp. 134-148.

## (2) General Equilibrium Studies

-W. Ethier and H. Horn (1984). "A New Look at Economic Integration". in H. Kierzkowski, ed. *Monopolistic Competition and International Trade*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 207-229.

-L.A. Winters (1988). "Completing the European Internal Market: Some Notes on Trade Policy". *EER*; V.32-#?, pp. 1477-1499.

-D. Neven (1990). "EEC Integration Toward 1992: Some Distributional Aspects". *Economic Policy*; V.10, pp. 13-62.

-M. Gasiorek, A. Smith and A. Venables (1991). "Completing the Internal Market in the EC: Factor Demands and Comparative Advantage". in L.A. Winters and A. Venables, eds. *European Integration: Trade and Industry*. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 9-33.

-M. Gasiorek, A. Smith and A. Venables (1992). "'1992': Trade and Welfare--A General Equilibrium Model". in L.A. Winters, ed. *Trade Flows and Trade Policy after '1992'*. Cambridge: CUP/CEPR, pp. 35-66.

-J. Haaland and V. Norman (1992). "Global Production Effects of European Integration". in L.A. Winters, ed. *Trade Flows and Trade Policy after '1992'*. Cambridge: CUP/CEPR, pp. 67-91.

-J. Francois and C. Shiells, eds. (1995). *Modelling Trade Policy: Applied General Equilibrium Assessments of the North American Free Trade Agreement*. Cambridge: CUP.

-J. Markusen, T. Rutherford and L. Hunter (1995). "Trade Liberalization in a Multinational Dominated Industry". *JIE*; V.38-#1/2, pp. 95-117.

## 5. Multilateral Tax Harmonization and Economic Integration

### a. Multilateral Tax Harmonization

-D. Dosser (1967). "Economic Analysis of Tax Harmonisation". in C. Shoup, ed. *Fiscal Harmonisation in Common Markets*. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 1-144.

-H. Shibata (1967). "The Theory of Economic Unions". in C. Shoup, ed. *Fiscal Harmonisation in Common Markets*. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 145-264.

-D. Dosser, S. Hans and T. Hitiris (1969). "Trade and Welfare Effects of Tax Harmonisation". *MS*; V.-#?, pp

-H.G. Johnson (1968). "The Implications of Free or Freer Trade for the Harmonization of Other

Policies". in Johnson, *Aspects of the Theory of Tariffs*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, pp. 395-445.

-J. Whalley (1979). "Uniform Domestic Taxes, Trade Distortions, and Economic Integration"; *JPubE*; V.11-#2, pp. 213-221.

-E. Berglas (1981). "Harmonisation of Commodity Taxes". *JPubE*; V.16-#3, pp. 377-387.

-J. Whalley (1981). "Border Adjustments and Tax Harmonization". *JPubE*; V.16-#3, pp. 389-390.

-T. Georgakopoulos (1989). "Harmonisation of Commodity Taxes: The Restricted Origin Principle--Comment". *JPubE*; V.39-#1, pp. 137-139.

-T. Georgakopoulos and T. Hitiris (1991). "On the Equivalence of Destination and Origin Principles of Taxation in the Case of Non-General Product Taxes". *Osaka Economic Papers*; V.39-#3/4, pp. 331-335.

-T. Georgakopoulos and T. Hitiris (1992). "On the Superiority of the Destination over the Origin Principle for Intra-Union Trade". *EJ*; V.102-#410, pp. 117-126.

-T. Georgakopoulos (1992). "Trade Deflection, Trade Distortions, and Pareto Inefficiencies under the Restricted Origin Principle". *JPubE*; V.47-#?, pp. 381-390.

-B. Lockwood (1993). "Commodity Tax Competition under Destination and Origin Principles". *JPubE*; V.52-#?, pp. 141-162.

-B. Lockwood, D. DeMeza and G. Myles (1994). "When are Origin and Destination Regimes Equivalent?". *International Tax and Public Finance*; V.1-#1, pp. 5-24.

-B. Lockwood, D. DeMeza and G. Myles (1994). "The Equivalence Between the Destination and Non-Reciprocal Restricted Origin Tax Regimes". *ScanJE*; V.96-#3, pp. 311-328.

-B. Lockwood, D. DeMeza and G. Myles (1995). "On the European Union VAT Proposals: The Superiority of Origin Over Destination Taxation". *Fiscal Studies*; V.16-#1, pp. 1-17.

-A. Haufler (1994). "Unilateral Tax Reform under the Restricted Origin Principle". *EJPE*; V.10-#?, pp. 511-527.

-A.L. Bovenberg (1994). "Destination- and Origin-Based Taxation under International Capital Mobility". *International Tax and Public Finance*; V.1-#3, pp. 247-273.

-B. Genser (1996). "A Generalized Equivalence Property of Mixed International VAT Regimes". *ScanJE*; V.98-#2, pp. 253-262.

-M. Keen and S. Lahiri (1998). "The Comparison between Destination and Origin Principles under Imperfect Competition". *JIE*; V.45-#2, pp. 323-350.

-S. Cnossen (1983). "Harmonisation of Indirect Taxes in the EEC". in C. McClure, ed. *Tax Assignment in Federal Countries*. Canberra: Australia National University.

-S. Cnossen and C. Shoup (1987). "Coordination of Value Added Taxes". in S. Cnossen, ed. *Tax Coordination in the EC*. Deventer: Kluwer, pp. 59-84.

- M. Bos and H. Nelson (1988). "Indirect Taxation and Completion of the Internal Market". *JCMS*; V.27-#1, pp. 27-44.
- H.-W. Sinn (1990). "Tax Competition and Tax Harmonization in Europe". *EER*; V.34-#?, pp. 489-504.
- J. Frenkel, A. Razin and S. Symansky (1990). "International Spillovers of Taxation". in A. Razin and J. Slemrod, eds. *Taxation in the Global Economy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 211-261.
- J. Frenkel, A. Razin and S. Symansky (1990). "Simulations of Global Effects of VAT Harmonisation". in H. Siebert, ed. *Reforming Capital Income Taxation*. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, pp. 134-152.
- M. Rose (1987). "Optimal Tax Perspective on Tax Coordination". in C. Cnossen, ed. *Tax Coordination in the EC*. Kluwer. pp. 113-138.
- M.J. Keen (1987). "Welfare Effects of Commodity Tax Harmonization". *JPubE*; V.33-#?, pp. 107-114.
- M.J. Keen (1989). "Pareto-Improving Indirect Tax Harmonisation". *EER*; V.33-#1, pp. 1-12.
- M.J. Keen (1989). "Multilateral Tax and Tariff Reform". *ESQ*; V.40-#3, pp. 195-202.
- K. Abe and M. Okamura (1989). "The Welfare Effects of International Tax Harmonization". *ESQ*; V.40-#3, pp. 203-211.
- A. Turunen-Red and A. Woodland (1990). "Multilateral Reform of Domestic Taxes". *OEP*; V.42-#?, pp. 160-186.

#### b. Tax Competition and Tax Harmonization

- R. Gordon (1983). "An Optimal Taxation Approach to Fiscal Federalism". *QJE*; V.98-#?, pp. 567-586.
- J. Mintz and H. Tulkens (1986). "Commodity Tax Competition Between Member States of a Federation: Equilibrium and Efficiency". *JPubE*; V.29-#?, pp. 133-172.
- J.D. Wilson (1985). "Optimal Property Taxation in the Presence of Interregional Capital Mobility". *JUrbanE*; V.18-#?, pp. 73-89.
- J.D. Wilson (1986). "A Theory of Interregional Tax Competition". *JUrbanE*; V.19-#?, pp. 296-315.
- G. Zodrow and P. Mieszkowski (1986). "Pigou, Tiebout, Property Taxation, and the Underprovision of Local Public Goods". *JUrbanE*; V.19-#?, pp. 356-370.
- J.D. Wilson (1987). "Trade, Capital Mobility, and Tax Competition". *JPE*; V.95-#4, pp. 835-856.
- D. Wildasin (1988). "Nash Equilibria in Models of Fiscal Competition". *JPubE*; V.35-#?, pp. 229-240.
- D. Wildasin (1989). "Interjurisdictional Capital Mobility: Fiscal Externality and a Corrective

Subsidy". *JUrbanE*; V.25-#?, pp. 193-212.

-de Combrugghe and H. Tulkens (1990). "On Pareto Improving Commodity Tax Changes under Fiscal Competition". *JPubE*; V.41-#?, pp. 335-350.

-S. Bucovetsky (1991). "Asymmetric Tax Competition". *JUrbanE*; V.30-#?, pp. 167-181.

-S. Bucovetsky and J. Wilson (1991). "Tax Competition with Two Tax Instruments". *RSUE*; V.21-#3, pp. 333-350.

-R. Jensen and E.F. Toma (1991). "Debt in a Model of Tax Competition". *RSUE*; V.21-#3, pp. 371-392.

-D. Wildasin (1991). "Some Rudimentary 'Duopoly' Theory". *RSUE*; V.21-#3, pp. 393-421.

-J. Wilson (1991). "Tax Competition with Interregional Differences in Factor Endowments". *RSUE*; V.21-#3, pp. 423-451.

-D. Wildasin (1991). "Income Redistribution in a Common Labor Market". *AER*; V.81-#4, pp. 757-774.

-A. Ghosh (1991). "Strategic Aspects of Public Finance in a World with High Capital Mobility". *JIE*; V.30-#3/4, pp. 229-247.

-R. Krellove (1992). "Competitive Tax Theory in Open Economies: Constrained Inefficiency and a Pigovian Remedy". *JPubE*; V.48-#?, pp. 361-375.

-M. Keen and S. Lahiri (1993). "Domestic Tax Reform and International Oligopoly". *JPubE*; V.51-#1, pp. 55-74.

-R. Kanbur and M.J. Keen (1993). "Jeux sans Frontiers: Tax Competition and Tax Coordination when Countries Differ in Size". *AER*, V.83-#4, pp. 877-892.

-B. Lockwood (1997). "Can International Commodity Tax Harmonisation Be Pareto-improving When Governments Supply Public Goods". *JIE*; V.43-#3/4, pp. 387-408.

-D. Laussel and M. Le Breton (1998). "Existence of Nash Equilibria in Fiscal Competition Models". *RSUE*; V.28-#?, pp. 283-296.

-T. Persson and G. Tabellini (1992). "The Politics of 1992: Fiscal Policy and European Integration". *REStud*; V.59-#4, pp. 689-701

-P. Bacchetta and M. Espinosa (1995). "Information Sharing and Tax Competition among Governments". *JIE*; V.39-#1/2, pp. 103-121.

-A. Haufler (2001). "Regional Integration and the Development of Tax Systems in the European Union". In S. Lahiri, ed. *Regionalism and Globalization: Theory and Practice*. London: Routledge, pp. 261-282.

## 6. On Racing to the Bottom

### a. Social Policy and the "Race to the Bottom"

- J. Addison and W. Siebert (1993). "The EC Social Charter: The Nature of the Beast". *National Westminster Quarterly Review*; pp. 13-28.
- F. Abraham (1994). "Social Protection and Regional Convergence in a EMU". *Open Economies Review*; V.5-#?, pp. 89-114.
- R. Blank, ed. (1994). *Social Protection versus Economic Flexibility: Is There a Tradeoff?* Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER.
- A. Sapir (1996). "Trade Liberalization and the Harmonization of Social Policies: Lessons from European Integration". in J. Bhagwati and R. Hudec, eds. *Fair Trade and Harmonization. V.1: Economic Analysis*. Cambridge: MIT, pp. 543-570.
- A. Jacquemin and A. Sapir (1996). "Is European Hard Core Credible? A Statistical Analysis". *Kyklos*; V.49-#2, pp. 105-117.
- J.J. Gabszewicz and T. van Ypersele (1996). "Social Protection and Political Competition". *JPubE*; V.61-#?, pp. 193-208.
- C. Bean, S. Bentolila, G. Bertola, and J. Dolado (1998). *Social Europe: One for All?* London: CEPR, Monitoring European Integration, #8.
- C. Hefeker (1996). "Regional Free Trade and Social Integration". *PC*; V.87-#?, pp. 379-393.

#### b. Regional Labor Markets and Integration

- R. Topel (1986). "Local Labor Markets". *JPE*; V.94-#3/Part 2, pp. S111-143.
- G. Neumann and R. Topel (1991). "Employment Risk, Diversification, and Unemployment". *QJE*; V.106-#4, pp. 1341-1365.
- R. Topel (1994). "Regional Labor markets and the Determinants of Wage Inequality". *AER*; V.84-#2, pp. 17-22.
- R. Topel (1994). "Wage Inequality and Regional Labour Market Performance in the US". in T. Tachibanaki, ed.. *Labour Market and Economic Performance: Europe, Japan and the USA*. New York: St. Martin's Press; pp. 93-127.
- O. Blanchard and L. Katz (1992). "Regional Evolutions". *BPEA*; #1, pp. 1-61.
- E. Montgomery (1994). "Patterns in Regional Labor Market Adjustment: The United States versus Japan". in R. Blank, ed.. *Social protection versus economic flexibility: Is there a trade-off?*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 95-117.
- T. Bartik (1993). "Who Benefits from Local Job Growth: Migrants or the Original Residents?". *Regional Studies*; V.27-#4, pp. 297-311.
- T. Bartik (1996). "The Distributional Effects of Local Labor Demand and Industrial Mix: Estimates Using Individual Panel Data". *Journal of Urban Economics*; V.40-#2, pp. 150-178.
- T. Clark (1998). "Employment Fluctuations in U.S. Regions and Industries: The Roles of National, Region-specific, and Industry-Specific Shocks". *Journal of Labor Economics*; V.16-#1, pp. 202-229.

- J. Bound and H. Holzer (2000). "Demand Shifts, Population Adjustments, and Labor Market Outcomes during the 1980s". *Journal of Labor Economics*; V.18-#1, pp. 20-54.
- B. Eichengreen (1993). "Labor Markets and European Monetary Unification". in P. Masson and M. Taylor, eds. *Policy Issues in the Operation of Currency Unions*. Cambridge: CUP/CEPR, pp. 130-162.
- J. Decressin and A. Fatas (1995). "Regional Labor Market Dynamics in Europe". *EER*; V.39-#9, pp. 1627-1655.
- F. Abraham (1996). "Regional Adjustment and Wage Flexibility in the European Union". *RSUE*; V.26-#1, pp. 51-75.
- M. Allais (1997). "The Liberalization of Trade and the European Community's Experience". *RISEC: International Review of Economics and Business*; V.44-#3, pp. 465-83.
- O. Cadot, R. Faini, and J. deMelo (1995). "Early Trade Patterns under the Europe Agreements: France, Germany, and Italy". *EER*; V.39-#3/4, pp. 601-610.
- R. Faini, G. Galli, P. Gennari and F. Rossi (1997). "An Empirical Puzzle: Falling Migration and Growing Unemployment Differentials among Italian Regions". *EER*; V.41-#?, pp. 571-579.
- R. Faini (1999). "European Migrants: An Endangered Species?". in R. Baldwin, D. Cohen, A. Sapir, and A. Venables, eds. *Market Integration, Regionalism, and the Global Economy*. Cambridge: CUP/CEPR, pp. 228-251.
- C. Pissarides and J. Wadsworth (1989). "Unemployment and the Inter-regional Mobility of Labour". *EJ*; V.99-#?, pp. 739-755.
- C. Pissarides and I. McMaster (1990). "Regional Migration, Wages and Unemployment: Empirical Evidence and Implications for Policy". *OEP*; V.42-#?, pp. 812-831.
- B. McCormick (1997). "Regional Unemployment and Labour Mobility in the UK". *EER*; V.41-#?, pp. 581-589.
- S. Bentolila (1997). "Sticky Labor in Spanish Regions". *EER*; V.41-#?, pp. 591-598.
- Paolo Mauro and Antonio Spilimbergo (1999). "How Do the Skilled and the Unskilled Respond to Regional Shocks?: The Case of Spain". *IMFSP*; V.46-#1, pp. 1-17.
- H. Vandebussche and J. Konigs (1998). "Globalisation and the Effects of National Versus International Competition on the Labour Market: Theory and Evidence from Belgian Firm Level Data". *World Economy*; V.21-#8, pp. 1151-1177.
- G. Debelle and J. Vickery (1999). "Labour Market Adjustment: Evidence on Interstate Labour Mobility". *Australian Economic Review*; V.32-#3, pp. 249-263.

#### c. Integration and the Endogenous Emergence of Cores and Peripheries

- G. Ottaviano and D. Puga (1998). "Agglomeration in the Global Economy: A Survey of the 'New Economic Geography'". *World Economy*; V.21-#6, pp. 707 -731.
- P. Krugman and A. Venables (1990). "Integration and the Competitiveness of a Peripheral

Industry". in C. Bliss and J. Braga de Macedo, eds. *Unity with Diversity in the European Economy: The Community's Southern Frontier*. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 56-75.

-G. Bertola (1993). "Models of Economic Integration and Localized Growth". in F. Torres and F. Giavazzi, eds. *Adjustment and Growth in the European Monetary Union*. Cambridge: CUP/CEPR, pp. 159-179.

-A. Venables (1994). "Economic Integration and Industrial Agglomeration". *Economic and Social Review*; V.26-#1, pp. 1-17.

-A. Venables (1995). "Economic Integration and the Location of Firms". *AER*; V.85-#2, pp. 296-300.

-A. Venables and P. Krugman (1996). "Integration, Specialization, and Adjustment". *EER*; V.40-#3/5, pp. 959-967.

-D. Puga and A. Venables (1997). "Preferential Trading Arrangements and Industrial Location". *JIE*; V.43-#3/4, pp. 347-368.

-D. Puga (1999). "The Rise and Fall of Regional Inequalities". *EER*; V.43-#2, pp. 303-334.

#### d. Regionalization or Convergence in the EU

-P. Krugman (1993). "Lessons of Massachusetts for EMU". in F. Torres and F. Giavazzi, eds. *Adjustment and Growth in the European Monetary Union*. Cambridge: CUP/CEPR, pp. 241-261.

-L. Mauro and E. Podrecca (1994). "The Case of Italian Regions: Convergence or Dualism?". *Economic Notes*; V.24-#3, pp. 447-472.

-D. Neven and C. Gouyette (1995). "Regional Convergence in the European Community". *JCMS*; V.33-#?, pp. 47-65.

-R. Helg, P. Manasse, T. Monacelli, and R. Rovelli (1995). "How Much (A)symmetry in Europe? Evidence from Industrial Sectors". *EER*; V.39-#?, pp. 1017-1041.

-S. De Nardis, A. Goglio, and M. Malgarini (1996). "Regional Specialization and Shocks in Europe: Some Evidence from Regional Data". *WA*; V.132-#2, pp. 197-214.

-D. Quah (1996). "Regional Convergence Clusters Across Europe". *EER*; V.40-#3-5, pp. 951-958.

-J. Fagerberg and B. Verspagen (1996). "Heading for Divergence? Regional Growth in Europe Reconsidered". *JCMS*; V.34-#3, pp. 431-448.

-F. Trionfetti (1997). "Public Expenditure and Economic Geography". *Annales d'Economie et de Statistique*; #47, pp. 101-120.

-M. Brühlhart (1998). "Economic Geography, Industry Location and Trade: The Evidence". *World Economy*; V.21-#6, pp. 775 -801.

-G. Hanson (1998). "North American economic integration and industry location". *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*; V.14-#2, pp. 30-44.

-M. Amiti (1998). "New trade theories and industrial location in the EU: a survey of evidence".

*Oxford Review of Economic Policy*; V.14-#2, pp. 45-53.

-S. Magrini (1999). "The Evolution of Income Disparities Among the Regions of the European Union". *RSUE*; V.29-#?, pp. 257-281.

-J. Esteban (2000). "Regional Convergence in Europe and the Industry Mix: A Shift-share Analysis". *RSUE*; V.30-#3, pp. 353-364.

-M. Brühlhart (2001). "Growing Alike or Growing Apart? Industrial Specialisation of EU Countries". in Charles Wyplosz (ed.) *The Impact of EMU on Europe and the Developing Countries*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

-M. Brühlhart (2001). "Evolving Geographical Specialisation of European Manufacturing Industries". *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv*; V.137-#2, pp. 215-243.

-M. Brühlhart and F. Trionfetti (2001). "Industrial Structure and Public Procurement: Theory and Empirical Evidence". *Journal of Economic Integration*; V.16-#1, pp. 106-127.

-M. Storper, Y.-c. Chen, and D. De Paolis (2002). "Trade and Location of Industries in the OECD and European Union". *Journal of Economic Geography*; V.2-#1, pp. 73-107.

## **7. Political-Economy of Integration**

### **a. Integration Experience**

#### (1) General Discussions

-L. Lindberg and S. Scheingold, eds. (1971). *Regional Integration: Theory and Research*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

-J. Nye (1971). *Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization*. Boston: Little, Brown.

-D. Puchala (1972). "Of Blind Men, Elephants and International Integration". *Journal of Common Market Studies*; V.10-#?, pp.267-284.

-E. Haas (1975). *The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory*. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies.

-P. Cocks (1980). "Toward a Marxist Theory of European Integration". *IO*; V.34-#1, pp. 1-40.

#### (2) The EC Case

-K. Deutsch (1957). *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

-E. Haas (1958). *The Uniting of Europe: Political Social and Economic Forces, 1950-1957*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

-L. Lindberg and S. Scheingold (1970). *Europe's Would Be Polity*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.

-P. Taylor (1983). *The Limits of European Integration*. New York: Columbia University Press.



- P. Cecchini (1988). *European Challenge, 1992: The Benefits of a Single Market*. Aldershot: Wildwood House.
- J. Pelkmans and L.A. Winters (1988). *Europe's Domestic Market*. London: RIIA.
- G.C. Hufbauer, ed. (1990). *Europe 1992: An American Perspective*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings.
- W. Sandholtz and J. Zysman (1990). "1992: Recasting the European Bargain". *WP*, V.?-#?, pp. 95-128.
- M. Wolf (1990). "1992: Global Implications of the European Community's Programme for Completing the Internal Market". *Lehrman Institute Policy Paper* (Global Economy Series-#1).
- A. Moravcsik (1991). "Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and Conventional Statecraft in the European Community". *IO*; V.45-#1, pp. 19-56.
- W. Streeck and P. Schmitter (1991). "From National Corporatism to Transnational Pluralism: Organized Interests in the Single European Market". *Politics and Society*; V.19-#2, pp. 133-164.
- L.A. Winters (1991). "International Trade and '1992': An Overview". *EER*; V.35-#?, pp. 367-377.
- W.S. Pierce (1991). "After 1992: The Redistribution of Rents". *KYKLOS*; V.44-#4, pp. 521-536.
- G. Garrett (1992). "International Cooperation and Institutional Choice: The Internal Market". *IO*; V.46-#2, pp. 533-560.
- S. Collins (1995). "Economic Integration: Conflict versus Cohesion". *AER*; V.85-#2, pp. 307-311.
- B. Hanson (1998). "What Happened to Fortress Europe?: External Trade Policy Liberalization in the European Union". *IO*; V.52-#1, pp. 55-85.
- A. Sapir (1998). "The Political Economy of EC Regionalism". *EER*; V.42-#3/5, pp. 717-732

### (3) The NAFTA Case

- H.R. Perot and P. Choate (1993). *Save Your Job, Save Our Country: Why Nafta Must be Stopped, Now!* New York: Hyperion.
- B. Ackerman and D. Golove (1995). *Is Nafta Constitutional?* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- D. Orden (1996). "Agricultural Interest Groups and the North American Free Trade Agreement". in A. Krueger, ed. *The Political Economy of American Trade Policy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 335-382.
- W. Orme (1996). *Understanding Nafta : Mexico, Free Trade, and the New North America*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- A. Tornell and G. Esquivel (1997). "The Political Economy of Mexico's Entry into NAFTA". in T. Ito and A. Krueger, eds. *Regionalism versus Multilateral Trade Arrangements*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 25-55.

-F. Mayer (1998). *Interpreting NAFTA: The Science and Art of Political Analysis*. New York: Columbia University Press.

-C. Wise, ed. (1998). *The Post-Nafta Political Economy C : Mexico and the Western Hemisphere*. : Pennsylvania State University Press.

-K. Granzin, J. Painter, J. Brazell, and J. Olsen (1998). "Public Support for Free Trade Agreements: The Influence of Economic Concerns, Group Identification, and Cognitive Involvement". *Journal of Macromarketing*; V.18-#1, pp. 11-23.

#### **b. Formal Theories of the Internal Political Economy of Integration**

-A. Casella (1992). "On Markets and Clubs: Economic and Political Integration of Regions with Unequal Productivity". *AER*; V.82-#2, pp.115-121.

-J. Feinstein (1992). "Public-Good Provision and Political Stability in Europe". *AER*; V.82-#2, pp. 323-329.

-A. Casella and J. Feinstein (2002). "Public Goods in Trade: On the Formation of Markets and Political Jurisdictions". *International Economic Review*; V.43-#2, pp. 437-462.

-A. Casella and B. Frey (1992). "Federalism and Clubs: Towards an Economic Theory of Overlapping Political Jurisdictions". *EER*; V.36-#?, pp. 639-646.

-A. Casella (1994). "Trade as an Engine of Political Change: A Parable". *Eca*; V.61-#243, pp. 267-284.

-R. Clarida and R. Findlay (1994). "After Maastricht: Public Investment, Economic Integration and International Capital Mobility". *Eca*; V.61-#243, pp. 319-339.

-J. deMelo, A. Panagariya and D. Rodrik (1993). "The New Regionalism: A Country Perspective". in J. deMelo and A. Panagariya, ed. *New Dimensions in Regional Integration*. New York: Cambridge/CEPR, pp.159-193 [esp. section 3).

-M. Richardson (1993). "Endogenous Protection and Trade Diversion". *JIE*; V.34-#3/4, pp. 309-324.

-M. Richardson (1994). "Why a Free Trade Area: The Tariff Also Rises". *E&P*; V.6-#1, pp. 79-96. [also in Bhagwati, Krishna, and Panagariya, pp. 357-376.]

-M. Richardson (1995). "Tariff Revenue Competition in a Free Trade Area". *EER*; V.39-#7, pp. 1429-1437.

-D. Desruelle and M. Richardson (1997). "Fortress Europe: Jericho or Chateau d'If?". *RIE*; V.5-#1, pp. 32-46.

-S. Nagaoka (1994). "Does Regional Integration Promote Liberalization? A Case of Endogenous Protection". *JJIE*; V.8-#4, pp. 551-564.

-G. Grossman and E. Helpman (1995). "The Politics of Free Trade Areas". *AER*; V.85-#4, pp. 667-690. [also in Bhagwati, Krishna, and Panagariya, pp. 299-334.]

-A. Panagariya and R. Findlay (1995). "A. Political Economy Analysis of Free Trade Areas and

Customs Unions”. in G. Grossman, R. Feenstra and D. Irwin eds. *The Political Economy of Trade Policy*. Cambridge: MIT, pp. 265-287. [also in Bhagwati, Krishna, and Panagariya, pp. 335-356.]

-S. Bilal (1998). “Political Economy Considerations in the Supply of Trade Protection in Regional Integration Agreements”. *JCMS*; V.36-#1, pp. 1-31.

-Stephen P. Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1999). “Endogenous Regionalism's Free Trade Bias: Special Interests in the EEC, 1968-1983”. in Bernardo Bortolotti and Gianluca Fiorentini, eds, *Pressure Groups and Self Regulation*. New York: Oxford Press, 1999, 51-85

-S. Magee and H.-O. Lee (1997). “Tariff Creation and Tariff Diversion in Customs Unions: The Endogenous External Tariff of the EEC, 1968-1983”. *EER*; forthcoming. [*Nota di Lavoro*; V.38-#97, pp. 1-39.]

-M. Olarreaga and I. Soloaga (1998). “Endogenous Tariff Formation: The Case of Mercosur”. *WBER*; V.12-#2, pp. 297-320.

-O. Cadot, J. deMelo, and M. Olarreaga (1999). “Regional Integration and Lobbying for Tariffs Against Non-members”. *IER*; V.40-#3, pp. 635-657.

-O. Cadot, J. de Melo, and M. Olarraga (1999). “Can Bilateralism Ease the Pains of Multilateral Trade Liberalization?”. *European Economic Review*; V.45-#1, pp. 27-44.

-S. Bandyopadhyay and H. Wall (1999). “Customs Union or Free Trade Area? The Role of Political Asymmetries”. *RIE*; V.7-#4, pp. 665-672.

-A. Casella and J. Feinstein (1989). “Management of a Common Currency”. in A. Giovannini and M. de Cecco, eds. *A European Central Bank?* Cambridge: CUP. pp. 131-156.

-A. Casella (1992). “Participation in a Currency Union”. *AER*; V.82-#4, pp. 847-863.

-A. Casella (1992). “Voting on the Adoption of a Common Currency”. in M. Canzoneri, V. Grilli and P. Masson, eds. *Designing a Central Bank for Europe*. Cambridge, CUP

-A. Alesina and R. Perotti (1998). “Economic Risk and Political Risk in Fiscal Unions”. *EJ*; V.108-#449, pp. 989-1008.

### **c. International Strategy and the Customs Union**

-R. Caves (1974). “The Economics of Reciprocity: Theory and Evidence on Bilateral Trading Agreements”. in W. Sellekaerts, ed. *International Trade and Finance: Essays in Honor of Jan Tinbergen*. White Plains: International Arts and Sciences Press, pp. 17-54.

-R. Riezman (1985). “Customs Unions and the Core”. *JIE*; V.19-#?, pp. 355-365.

-A.L. Hillman (1989). “Resolving the Puzzle of Welfare-Reducing Trade Diversion: A Prisoners' Dilemma Interpretation”. *OEP*; V.41-#?, pp. 452-455.

-J. Kennan and R. Riezman (1990). “Optimal Tariff Equilibria with Customs Unions”. *EJ*; V.23-#1, pp. 69-83.

-K. Gatsios and L. Karp (1991). “Delegation Games in Customs Unions”. *REStud*; V.58-#2, pp. 391-397.

- K. Gatsios and L. Karp (1992). "The Welfare Effects of Imperfect Harmonisation of Trade and Industrial Policy". *EJ*; V.102-#410; pp. 107-116.
- K. Gatsios and L. Karp (1995). "Delegation in a General Equilibrium Model of Customs Union". *EER*; V.39-#2, pp. 319-333.
- H. Flam (1994). "EC Members Fighting About Surplus: VERs, FDI and Japanese Cars". *JIE*; V.36-#1/2, pp. 117-131.
- J. Aizenman (1994). "World Integration, Competitive and Bargaining-Regime Switch: An Exploration". *CJE*; V.27-#2, pp. 458-483.
- R. Baldwin (1995). "A Domino Theory of Regionalism". in R. Baldwin, P. Haaparanta, and J. Kiander (eds), *Expanding Membership of the European Union*. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 25-48.
- C. Kowalczyk and T. Sjöström (1993). "Bringing GATT into the Core". *Eca*; V.61-#243, pp. 301-317.
- S.-S. Yi (1996). "Endogenous Formation of Customs Unions under Imperfect Competition: Open Regionalism is Good". *JIE*; V.41-#1/2, pp. 153-177.
- J. Burbidge, J. DePater, G. Myers, and A. Sengupta (1997). "A Coalition-Formation Approach to Equilibrium Federations and Trading Blocs". *AER*; V.87-#5, pp. 940-956.
- I. Macho-Stadler, D. Pérez-Castrillo and C. Ponsati (1998). "Stable Multilateral Trade Agreements". *Eca*; V.65-#?, pp. 161-177.
- E. Mansfield (1993). "Effects of International Politics on Regionalism in International Trade". In K. Anderson and R. Blackhurst, eds. *Regional Integration and the Global Trading System*. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
- G. Downs, D. Rocke, and P. Barsoom (1998). "Managing the Evolution of Multilateralism". *IO*; V.52-#2, pp. 397-409.
- M. Schiff and L.A. Winters (1998). "Regional Integration as Diplomacy". *WBER*; V.12-#2, pp. 271-295.
- D. Lazer (1999). "The Free Trade Epidemic of the 1860s and Other Outbreaks of Economic Discrimination". *World Politics*; V.51-#4, pp.
- H. Haller and Y. Ioannides (2001). "Propaedeutics of Strategic Theories of Economic Integration". *Economics Letters*; V.70-#2, pp. 215-221.
- C. Syropoulos (2002). "On Tariff Preferences and Delegation Decisions in Customs Unions: A Heckscher-Ohlin Approach". *Economic Journal*; V.112-#481, pp. 623-630.
- H. Haller and Y. Ioannides (1995). "Strategic Game Models of Economic Integration". *London School of Economics, Centre for Economic Performance Discussion Paper*; #208.
- R. Ludema (2002). "Increasing Returns, Multinationals and Geography of Preferential Trade Agreements". *JIE*; V.56-#2, pp. 329-358.

#### d. Multilateralism versus Regionalism?

(1) General Issues

- A. Sapir (1990). "Does 1992 Come Before or After 1990? On Regional versus Multilateral Integration". in R. Jones and A. Krueger, eds. *The Political Economy of International Trade*. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 197-222.
- L. Summers (1991). "Regionalism and the World Trading System". in *Policy Implications of Trade and Currency Zones*. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas, pp. 295-303. [also in Bhagwati, Krishna, and Panagariya, pp. 561-566.]
- N. Fielke (1992). "One Trading World, or Many: The Issue of Regional Trading Blocs". *New England Economic Review*; May/June, pp. 3-20.
- B. Hoekman and M. Leidy (1992). "Holes and Loopholes in Regional Trade Arrangements and the Multilateral Trading System". *Aussenwirtschaft*, V.47-#3, pp. 325-360.
- R. Snape (1993). "History and Economics of GATT's Article XXIV". in K. Anderson and R. Blackhurst, eds. *Regional Integration and the Global Trading System*. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, pp. 273-291.
- J. McMillan (1993). "Does Regional Integration Foster Open Trade? Economic Theory and GATT's Article XXIV". in K. Anderson and R. Blackhurst, eds. *Regional Integration and the Global Trading System*. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, pp. 292-310.
- F. Roessler (1993). "The Relationship between Regional Integration Agreements and the Multilateral Trading Order". in K. Anderson and R. Blackhurst, eds. *Regional Integration and the Global Trading System*. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, pp. 311-325.
- R. Blackhurst and D. Henderson (1993). "Regional Integration Agreements, World Intergration, and the GATT". in K. Anderson and R. Blackhurst, eds. *Regional Integration and the Global Trading System*. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, pp. 408-435.
- D. Lal (1993). "Trade Blocs and Multilateral Free Trade". *JCMS*; V.31-#3, pp. 349-358.
- J. Bhagwati (1993). "Regionalism and Multilateralism: An Overview". in J. deMelo and A. Panagariya, eds. *New Dimensions in Regional Integration*. Cambridge: CUP/CEPR, pp. 22-51. [also in Bhagwati, Krishna, and Panagariya, pp. 3-32.]
- P. Krugman (1993). "Regionalism versus Multilateralism: Analytical Notes". in J. deMelo and A. Panagariya, eds. *New Dimensions in Regional Integration*. Cambridge: CUP/CEPR, pp. 58-79.
- D. Irwin (1993). "Multilateral and Bilateral Trade Policies in the World Trading System: An Historical Perspective". in J. deMelo and A. Panagariya, eds. *New Dimensions in Regional Integration*. Cambridge: CUP/CEPR, pp. 90-119.
- J. Bhagwati (1995). "US Trade Policy: The Infatuation with Free Trade". in J. Bhagwati and A. Krueger, eds. *The Dangerous Drift to Preferential Trade Agreements*. Washington, DC: AEI, pp. 1-18.
- A. Krueger (1995). "NAFTA: Strengthening or Weakening the International Trading System?". in J. Bhagwati and A. Krueger, eds. *The Dangerous Drift to Preferential Trade Agreements*. Washington, DC: AEI, pp. 19-33.

- J. Bhagwati and A. Panagariya (1996). "Preferential Trading Areas and Multilateralism—Strangers, Friends, or Foes?". in J. Bhagwati and A. Panagariya, eds. *The Economics of Preferential Trade Agreements*. Washington, DC: AEI, pp. 1-78. [also in Bhagwati, Krishna, and Panagariya, pp. 33-100.]
- J. Bhagwati and A. Panagariya (1996). "The Theory of Preferential Trade Agreements: Historical Evolution and Current Trends". *AER*; V.86-#2, pp. 82-87.
- A. Krueger (1997). "Free Trade Agreements versus Customs Unions". *JDevE*; V.54-#?, pp. 169-187.
- A. Krueger (1997). "Problems with Overlapping Free Trade Areas". in T. Ito and A. Krueger, eds. *Regionalism versus Multilateral Trade Agreements*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 9-23.
- T. Bayoumi and B. Eichengreen (1997). "Is Regionalism Simply a Diversion: Evidence from the Evolution of the EC and NAFTA". in T. Ito and A. Krueger, eds. *Regionalism versus Multilateral Trade Agreements*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 141-164.
- J. Frankel and S.-J. Wei (1998). "Regionalization of World Trade and Currencies: Economics and Politics". in J. Frankel, ed. *The Regionalization of the World Economy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 189-219.
- A. Panagariya (1997). "Preferential Trading and the Myth of Natural Trading Partners". *Japan and the World Economy*; V.9-#4, pp. 471-489.
- A. Panagariya (1998). "Do Transport Costs Justify Regional Preferential Trading Arrangements? No". *WA*; V.134-#2, pp. 280-301.
- T.N. Srinivasan (1998). "Regionalism and the the WTO: Is Nondiscrimination Passé?". in A. Krueger, ed. *The WTO as an International Organization*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 329-349.
- W. Ethier (1998). "Multilateral Roads to Regionalism". in J. Piggot and A. Woodland, eds. *International Trade Policy and the Pacific Rim*. London: Macmillan, pp. 131-152.
- W. Ethier (2001). "Regional Regionalism". In S. Lahiri, ed. *Regionalism and Globalization: Theory and Practice*. London: Routledge, pp. 3-15.
- L.A. Winters (1999). "Regionalism versus Multilateralism". in R. Baldwin, D. Cohen, A. Sapir, and A. Venables, eds. *Market Integration, Regionalism and the Global Economy*. Cambridge: CUP/CEPR, pp. 7-49.
- D. Greenaway and C. Milner (2001). "Multilateral Trade Reform, Regionalism and Developing Countries". In S. Lahiri, ed. *Regionalism and Globalization: Theory and Practice*. London: Routledge, pp. 144-169.

## (2) Internal Politics

- B. Hoekman and M. Leidy (1993). "What to Expect from Regional and Multilateral Trade Negotiations: A Public Choice Perspective". in K. Anderson and R. Blackhurst, eds. *Regional Integration and the Global Trading System*. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, pp. 246-269.

- A.O. Krueger (1995). "The Role of the NAFTA Debate in US Trade Policy". *Australian Economic Papers*; V.?-#?, pp. 5-16.
- Wei, S.-J. and J. Frankel (1996). "Can Regional Blocs be a Stepping Stone to Global Free Trade?". *International Review of Economics and Finance*; V.5-#4, pp. 339-347.
- R. Baldwin (1996). "A Domino Theory of Regionalism". In R. Baldwin, P. Haaparanta, and J. Kiander, eds. *Expanding Membership of the EU*. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 25-48. [also in Bhagwati, Krishna, and Panagariya, pp. 479-502.]
- P. Krishna (1996). "A Political Economy Analysis of Preferential Trading and Multilateralism". *Eastern Economic Journal*; V.22-#4, pp. 477-483.
- P. Krishna (1998). "Regionalism and Multilateralism: A Political Economy Approach". *QJE*; V.?-#?, pp. 228-250. [also in Bhagwati, Krishna, and Panagariya, pp. 453-477.]
- P. Levy and T.N. Srinivasan (1996). "Regionalism and the (Dis)advantage of Dispute-Settlement Access". *AER*; V.86-#2, pp. 93-98.
- P. Levy (1997). "A Political-Economic Analysis of Free-Trade Agreements". *AER*; V.87-#4, pp. 506-519. [also in Bhagwati, Krishna, and Panagariya, pp. 429-451.]
- J. McLaren (2002). "A Theory of Insidious Regionalism". *QJE*; V.117-#2, pp. 571-608.
- P. Levy (1998). "Learning from Trade Agreements". ms: Yale University.

### (3) International Politics

- R. Baldwin (1993). "Adapting the GATT to a More Regionalized World: A Political Economy Perspective". in K. Anderson and R. Blackhurst, eds. *Regional Integration and the Global Trading System*. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, pp. 387-407.
- A. Hughes Hallett and C. Primo Braga (1994). "The New Regionalism and the Threat of Protection". *JJIE*; V.8-#4, pp. 388-421.
- F. Westhoff, B. Yarbrough, and R. Yarbrough (1994). "Preferential Trade Agreements and the GATT: Can Bilateralism and Multilateralism Coexist?". *KYKLOS*; V.47-#2, pp. 179-195.
- J. Campa and T. Sorenson (1996). "Are Trade Blocs Conducive to Free Trade?". *Scandinavian Journal of Economics*; V.98-#2, pp. 263-273.
- K. Bagwell and R. Staiger (1997). "Multilateral Cooperation during the Formation of Free Trade Areas". *IER*; V.38-#2, pp. 291-319.
- K. Bagwell and R. Staiger (1997). "Multilateral Cooperation during the Formation of Customs Unions". *JIE*; V.42-#1/2, pp. 91-123.
- K. Bagwell and R. Staiger (1998). "Will Preferential Agreements Undermine the Multilateral Trading System?". *EJ*; V.108-#449, pp. 1162-1182. [also in Bhagwati, Krishna, and Panagariya, pp. 505-529.]
- K. Bagwell and R. Staiger (1999). "Preferential Agreements and the Multilateral Trading System". in R. Baldwin, D. Cohen, A. Sapir, and A. Venables, eds. *Market Integration*,

*Regionalism and the Global Economy*. Cambridge: CUP/CEPR, pp. 53-79. [Comment by R. Fernandez follows.]

-K. Bagwell and R. Staiger (1999). "Regionalism and Multilateral Tariff Cooperation". in J. Piggott and A. Woodland, ed. *International Trade Policy and the Pacific Rim*. London: Macmillan, pp. 157-185.

-K. Bagwell and R. Staiger (2001). "Reciprocity, Non-Discrimination and Preferential Agreements in the Multilateral Trading System". *European Journal of Political Economy*; V.17-#2, pp. 281-325.

-J. Whalley (1998). "Why Do Countries Seek Regional Trade Agreements?". in J. Frankel, ed. *The Regionalization of the World Economy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 63-87.

-C. Peronni and J. Whalley (2000). "The New Regionalism: Trade Liberalization or Insurance?". *Canadian Journal of Economics*; V.33-#1, pp. 1-24.

-C. Kowalczyk and D. Davis (1998). "Tariff Phase-Outs: Theory and Evidence from GATT and NAFTA". in J. Frankel, ed. *The Regionalization of the World Economy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 227-250.

-W. Ethier (1998). "The New Regionalism". *EJ*; V.108-#449, pp. 1149-1161.

-W. Ethier (1998). "Regionalism in a Multilateral World". *JPE*; V.106-#6, pp. 1214-1245.

-W. Ethier (1999). "Multilateral Roads to Regionalism". in J. Piggott and A. Woodland, eds. *International Trade Policy and the Pacific Rim*. London: Macmillan, pp. 131-152.

-W. Ethier (2001). "The New Regionalism in the Americas: A Theoretical Framework". *North American Journal of Economics and Finance*; V.12-#2, pp. 159-172.

-W. Ethier (1998). "Unilateralism in a Multilateral World". ms: University of Pennsylvania.

-E. Fernandez-Arias and M. Spiegel (1998). "North-South Customs Unions and International Capital Mobility". *JIE*; V.46-#2, pp. 229-251.

-C. Syrapoulos (1999). "Customs Unions and Comparative Advantage". *OEP*; V.51-#2, pp. 239-266.

-R. Riezman (1999). "Can Bilateral Trade Agreements Help to Induce Free Trade?". *CJE*; V.32-#3, pp. 751-766.

-C. Freund (2000). "Multilateralism and the endogenous formation of preferential trade agreements". *JIE*; V.52-#2, pp. 359-376.

-E. Bond (2001). "Multilateralism versus Regionalism: Tariff Cooperation and Inter-regional Transport Costs". In S. Lahiri, ed. *Regionalism and Globalization: Theory and Practice*. London: Routledge, pp. 18-38.

-E. Mansfield (1998). "The Proliferation of Preferential Trading Arrangements". *Journal of Conflict Resolution*; V.42-#5, pp. 523-543.