I. THE ECONOMICS OF TARIFF AND NON-TARIFF BARRIERS TO TRADE

 

A. International Trade and Welfare: The Gains from Trade

 

1. General Analysis of Economic Welfare

 

a. Overviews

 

-F. Bator (1947). “The Simple Analytics of Welfare Maximization”. AER; V.37-#?, pp. 22-59.

 

-J. Chipman (1976). “The Paretian Heritage”. Cahiers Vilfredo Pareto, Revue Européenne des Sciences Sociales; V.14-#37, pp. 65-171.

 

-J. Chipman and J. Moore (1978). “The New Welfare Economics, 1939-1974". IER; V.19-#3, pp. 547-584.

 

-Y.K. Ng (1983). Welfare Economics. London: Macmillan.

 

-R. Boadway and N. Bruce (1984). Welfare Economics. Oxford: Blackwell.

 

b. Compensation and the Kaldor-Hicks Criterion

 

-L. Robbins (1938). “Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: A Comment”. EJ; V.48-#192, pp. 635-641.

 

-N. Kaldor (1939). “Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility”. EJ; V.49-#195, pp. 549-552.

 

-J. Hicks (1939). “Foundations of Welfare Economics”. EJ; V.49-#?, pp. 696-712.

 

-T. de Scitovsky (1941-42). “A Note on Welfare Propositions in Economics”. REStud; V.9-#1, pp. 77-88.

 

-W. Baumol (1946-47). “Community Indifference”. REStud; V.14-#1, pp. 44-48.

 

-I.M.D. Little (1950). A Critique of Welfare Economics. Oxford: OUP.

 

-K. Arrow (1951). “Little's Critique of Welfare Economics”. AER; V.41-#5, pp. 923-934.

 

-C. Kennedy (1952-53). “The Economic Welfare Function and Dr. Little's Criterion”. REStud; V.20-#2, pp. 137-142.

 

-R. Baldwin (1953-54). “A Comparison of Welfare Criteria”. REStud; V.21-#2, pp. 154-161.

 

-A. Sen (1963). “Distribution, Transitivity and Little's Welfare Criteria”. EJ; V.73-#?, pp. 771-778.

 

-J. Chipman and J. Moore (1971). “The Compensation Principle in Welfare Economics”. in A. Zarley, ed. Papers in Quantitative Economics, V.2. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, pp. 1-77.

 

-K. Suzumura (1980). “On Distributional Value Judgements and Piecemeal Welfare Criteria”. Eca; V.47-#?, pp. 125-139.

 

-R. Cooter and P. Rappoport (1984). “Were the Ordinalists Wrong About Welfare Economics?”. JEL; V.22-#2, pp. 507-530. [Comment by Little and Response, JEL; V.23-#3, pp. 1186-1191.]

 

-C. Blackorby and D. Donaldson (1990). “A Review Article: The Case Against the Use of the Sum of Compensating Variations in Cost-Benefit Analysis”. CJE; V.23-#3, pp. 471-495.

 

-D. Deenan and A. Snow (1999). “A Complete Characterization of Potential Compensation Tests in Terms of Hicksian Welfare Measures”. CJE; V.32-#1, pp. 215-233.

 

-N. Gravel (2001). “On the Difficulty of Combining Actual and Potential Criteria for an Increase in Welfare”. Economic Theory; V.17-#?, pp. 163-180.

 

c. Evaluation of Real National Income

 

-J. Hicks (1940). “The Valuation of the Social Income”. Eca; V.7-#26, pp. 105-124.

 

-P. Samuelson (1950). “Evaluation of Real National Income”. OEP; V.2-#1, pp. 1-29.

 

-C. Kennedy (1954). “Alternative Proof of a Theorem in Welfare Economics”. OEP; V.6-#?, pp. 98-99.

 

-J. Chipman and J. Moore (1973). “Aggregate Demand, Real National Income and the Compensation Principle”. IER; V.14-#1, pp. 153-181.

 

-A. Sen (1976). “Real National Income”. REStud; V.43-#?, pp. 19-39.

 

-A. Sen (1979). “The Welfare Basis of Real Income Comparisons”. JEL; V.17-#1, pp. 1-45.

 

-J. Chipman and J. Moore (1980). “Real National Income with Homothetic Preferences and a Fixed Distribution of Income”. Etrica; V.48-#2, pp. 401-422.

 

d. Bergson-Samuelson Social Welfare Functions

 

-A. Bergson (1938). “A Reformulation of Certain Aspects of Welfare Economics”. QJE; V.52-#?, pp. 310-334.

 

-O. Lange (1942). “The Foundations of Welfare Economics”. Etrica; V.10-#?, pp. 215-228.

 

-P. Samuelson (1947). “Welfare Economics”. Chapter 8 of Foundations of Economic Analysis. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, pp. 203-253.

 

-P. Samuelson (1981). “Bergsonian Welfare Economics”. in S. Rosefielde, ed. Economic Welfare and the Economics of Soviet Socialism. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 223-266.

 

-J. Chipman (1982). “Samuelson and Welfare Economics”. in G. Feiwel, ed. Samuelson and Neoclassical Economics. Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff, pp. 152-184.

 

-K. Arrow (1983). “Contributions to Welfare Economics”. E.C. Brown and R. Solow, eds. Paul Samuelson and Modern Economic Theory. New York: McGraw Hill, pp. 15-30.

 

-P. Samuelson (1967). “Arrow's Mathematical Politics”. in S. Hook, ed. Human Values and Economic Policy. New York: NYU Press, pp. 41-57.

 

-P. Hammond (1976). “Why Ethical Measures of Inequality Need Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility”. Theory and Decision; V.7-#?, pp. 263-274.

 

-R. Parks (1976). “An Impossibility Theorem for Fixed Preferences: A Dictatorial Bergson-Samuelson Welfare Function”. REStud; V.43-#?, pp. 447-450.

 

-M. Kemp and Y.K. Ng (1976). “On the Existence of Social Welfare Functions, Social Orderings and Social Decision Functions”. Eca; V.43-#1, pp. 59-66. [Comment by Samuelson and Response, Eca (1977) V.44-#?, pp. 81-90.]

 

-R. Pollak (1979). “Bergson-Samuelson Social Welfare Functions and the Theory of Social Choice”. QJE; V.?-#?, pp. 73-90.

 

-K.W.S. Roberts (1980). “Social Choice Theory: The Single-profile and Multi-profile Approaches”. REStud; V.47-#?, pp. 441-450.

 

-K. Suzumura (1976). “Remarks on the Theory of Social Choice”. Eca; V.43-#4, pp. 381-390.

 

-N. Schofield (1980). “Generic Properties of Simple Bergson-Samuelson Welfare Functions”. JMathE; V.7-#?, pp. 175-192.

 

-A. Rubinstein (1984). “The Single Profile Analogues to Multi Profile Theorems: Mathematical Logic's Approach”. IER; V.25-#3, pp. 719-730.

 

2. The Gains from International Trade

 

a. Consumption Sets, Utility Possibility Sets, and Social Welfare Functions

 

-J. Viner (1937). “Gains from Trade: The Maximization of Real Income”. Chapter 9 in Studies in the Theory of International Trade. Clifton: A.M. Kelley, pp. 527-593.

 

-P. Samuelson (1939). “The Gains from International Trade”. CJEPS; V.5-#?, pp. 195-205.

 

-R. Baldwin (1952). “The New Welfare Economics and the Gains from Trade”. QJE; V.66-#1, pp. 91-101.

 

-P. Kenen (1957). “On the Geometry of Welfare Economics: A Suggested Diagrammatic Treatment of Some Basic Propositions”. QJE; V.71-#3, pp. 426-447.

 

-M. Kemp (1962). “The Gain From International Trade”. EJ; V.72-#?, pp. 803-819.

 

-P. Samuelson (1962). “The Gains from International Trade Once Again”. EJ; V.72-#?, pp. 820-829.

 

-J. Bhagwati (1968). “The Gains from Trade Once Again”. OEP; V.20-#?, pp. 137-148.

 

-M. Kemp (1968). “Some Issues in the Analysis of Trade Gains”. OEP; V.20-#?, pp. 149-161.

 

-A. Krueger and H. Sonnenschein (1967). “The Terms of Trade, the Gains from Trade and Price Divergence”. IER; V.8-#1, pp. 121-127.

 

-Y. Otani (1972). “Gains from Trade Revisited”. JIE; V.2-#2, pp. 127-156.

 

-S. Lahiri and Y. Ono (1989). “Terms of Trade and Welfare: A General Analysis”. EcRec; V.?-#?, pp. 27-31.

 

b. Trade and Welfare with Lump-Sum Compensation

 

-A. Takayama (1972). “Compensation Principle and the Theory of International Trade Policy”. Chapter 17 in International Trade: An Approach to the Theory. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, pp. 495-540.

 

-M. Kemp and H. Wan (1993). The Welfare Economics of International Trade. Chur: Harwood.

 

-J. Chipman and J. Moore (1972). “Social Utility and the Gains from Trade”. JIE; V.2-#2, pp. 157-172.

 

-M. Ohyama (1972). “Trade and Welfare in General Equilibrium”. KES; V.9-#1, pp. 37-73.

 

-M. Kemp and H. Wan (1972). “The Gains from Free Trade”. IER; V.13-#?, pp. 509-522.

 

-J.M. Grandmont and D. McFadden (1972). “A Technical Note on the Classical Gains from Trade”. JIE; V.2-#2, pp. 109-125.

 

-P. Hammond (1996). “Notes on the Existence of Walrasian Equilibrium and the Gains from Trade”. ms: Stanford University.

 

-M. Kemp and K. Shimomura (1999). “The Internationalization of the World Economy and its Implication for National Welfare”. RIE; V.7-#1, pp. 1-7.

 

-H. Wan (1972). “A Note on Trading Gains and Externalities”. JIE; V.2-#2, pp. 173-180.

 

-K.Y. Wong (1991). “Welfare Comparison of Trade Situations”. JIE; V.30-#1/2, pp. 49-68.

 

-E. Grinols and K. Wong (1991). “An Exact Measure of Welfare Change”. CJE; V.24-#2, pp. 428-449.

 

-T. Cordella and L. Ventura (1992). “A Note on Redistributions and Gains from Trade”. EcLets; V.39-#?, pp. 449-453.

 

c. Duality, Trade Utility Functions and Gains from Trade

 

-H. Wan (1965). “Maximum Bonus--an Alternative Measure for Trading Gains”. REStud; V.32-#?, pp. 49-58.

 

-J. Chipman (1979). “The Theory and Application of Trade Utility Functions”. in J. Green and J. Scheinkman, eds. General Equilibrium, Growth and Trade. New York: Academic Press, pp. 277-296.

 

-A. Dixit and V. Norman (1980). “International Equilibrium and the Gains from Trade”. Chapter 3 in Theory of International Trade. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 65-92.

 

-A.D. Woodland (1980). “Direct and Indirect Trade Utility Functions”. REStud; V.47-#?, pp. 907-926.

 

-A.D. Woodland (1982). “Consumer Demand, Income Distribution and General Equilibrium”. Chapter 3 in International Trade and Resource Allocation. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 147-177.

 

-A.D. Woodland (1982). “The Welfare Effects of International Trade”. Chapter 9 in International Trade and Resource Allocation. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 255-287.

 

-P.J. Lloyd and A. Schweinberger (1988). “Trade Expenditure Functions and the Gains from Trade”. JIE; V.24-#?, pp. 275-297.

 

-M. Kemp and K. Shimomura (1997). “Trade Gains: A Unified Exposition Based on Duality”. Japanese Economic Review; V.48-#2, pp. 121-131.

 

-M.S. Michael (1992). “International Factor Mobility, Non-traded Goods, Tariffs, and the Terms of Trade”. CJE; V.25-#4, pp. 493-499.

 

d. Gains from Trade without Lump-Sum Compensation

 

(1) Basic Analysis of Gains without Lump-Sum Compensation

 

-A. Dixit and V. Norman (1980). “Gains from Trade: Commodity Taxes”. in Theory of International Trade. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 79-80.

 

-J. Bhagwati and T.N. Srinivasan (1983). “The Superiority of Trade over Autarky, without Lump-Sum Transfers”. in Lectures on International Trade. Cambridge: MIT, pp. 161-166.

 

-F. Casas and J.D. Han (1988). “Achieving Pareto Superiority under Free Trade: An Alternative to the Dixit-Norman Scheme”. IEJ; V.2-#4, pp. 1-7.

 

-W. Diewert, A. Turunen-Red and A. Woodland (1989). “Productivity- and Pareto-Improving Changes in Taxes and Tariffs”. REStud; V.56-#2, pp. 199-216.

 

-R. Brecher and E. Choudhri (1990). “Gains from International Factor Movements without Lump-Sum Compensation: Taxation by Location versus Nationality”. CJE; V.23-#1, pp. 44-59.

 

-R. Feenstra and T. Lewis (1991). “Distributing the Gains from Trade with Incomplete Information”. E&P; V.3-#1, pp. 21-39.

 

-R. Feenstra and T. Lewis (1994). “Trade Adjustment Assistance and Pareto Gains from Trade”. JIE; V.36-#3/4, pp. 201-222.

 

-P. Hammond and J. Sempere (1995). “Limits to the Potential Gains from Economic Integration and Other Supply Side Policies”. EJ; V.105-#432, pp. 1180-1204.

 

-R. Guesnerie (2001). “Second Best Redistributive Policies: The Case of International Trade”. Journal of Public Economic Theory; V.3-#1, pp. 15-25.

 

-R. Guesnerie (1998). “Peut-on Toujours Redistribuer les Gains à la Spécialisation et à l’Échange? Un Retour en Pointillé sur Ricardo et Heckscher-Ohlin”. Revue Economique; V.49-#?, pp. 555-579.

 

-H. Naito (1996). “Tariffs and Production Subsidies for Income Redistribution under Asymmetric Information”. Research Seminar in International Economics; # 391 .

 

-H. Naito (1999). “Re-examination of Uniform Commodity taxes under Non-linear Income Taxation and Its Implication for Production Efficiency”. Journal of Public Economics; V.71-#2, pp. 165-188.

 

-A. Deardorff (1999). “International Externalities in the Use of Domestic Policies for Income Redistribution”. in Mordechai E. Kreinin, Michael G. Plummer, and Shigeyuki Abe, eds., Asia-Pacific Economic Linkages. Amsterdam: Pergamon, pp.

 

-D. Spector (2001). “Is it Possible to Redistribute the Gains from Trade using Income Taxation?”. JIE; V.55-#2, pp. 441-460.

 

(2) Comparing Schemes

 

-P. Hammond (1995). “Credible Liberalization: Beyond the Three Theorems of Welfare Economics”. in D. Bos, ed. Economics in a Changing World, Vol. 3: Public Policy and Economic Organization. London: Macmillan, pp. 21-39.

 

-M. Kemp and H. Wan (1986). “Gains from Trade with and without Lump-Sum Compensation”. JIE; V.21-#1/2, pp. 99-110.

 

-A. Dixit and V. Norman (1986). “Gains from Trade without Lump-Sum Compensation”. JIE; V.21-#1/2, pp. 111-122.

 

-M. Kemp and H. Wan (1995). “On Lumpsum Compensation”. in M. Kemp, The Gains from Trade and the Gains from Aid: Essays in International Trade Theory. London: Routledge, pp. 296-316. [also in (1999), James Melvin, James Moore, and Ray Riezman, eds., Trade, Welfare, and Econometrics: Essays in Honor of John S. Chipman. New York: Routledge, pp. 185-205.]

 

-E. Grinols (1996). “Pure and Mixed Price and Income Compensation Schemes: Breaking Political Roadblocks to Trade Reform”. in R. Feenstra, G. Grossman and D. Irwin, eds. The Political Economy of Trade Policy. Cambridge: MIT, pp. 129-144.

 

-K.Y. Wong (1997). “Gains from Trade with Lump-Sum Compensation”. Japanese Economic Review; V.48-#2, pp. 132-146.

 

-H. Wan (1997). “A Note on Compensation Schemes”. Japanese Economic Review; V.48-#2, pp. 147-155.

 

-J. Ju and K. Krishna (2000). “Evaluating Trade Reform with Many Consumers”. CJE; V.33-#3, pp. 787-798.

 

e. International Distributive Justice

 

(1) On International Justice

 

-Beitz, Charles (1979). Political Theory and International Relations. Princeton: PUP.

 

-Hoffman, Stanley (1981). Duties Beyond Borders. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.

 

-Nardin, Terry (1983). Law, Morality, and the Relations of States. Princeton: PUP.

 

-Walzer, Michael (1983). Spheres of Justice. Oxford: OUP.

 

-Beitz, Charles (1983). “Cosmopolitan Ideals and National Sentiment”. Journal of Philosophy; V.80-#10, Part 1, pp. 591-600.

 

-Shue, Henry (1983). “The Burdens of Justice”. Journal of Philosophy; V.80-#10, Part 1, pp. 600-608.

 

-Doyle, Michael (1983). “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs”. Philosophy and Public Affairs; Part I: V.12-#3, pp. 205-235; Part II: V.12-#4, pp. 323-353.

 

-Pogge, Thomas (1986). “Liberalism and Global Justice: Hoffmann and Nardin on Morality in International Affairs”. Philosophy and Public Affairs; V15-#1, pp. 67-81.

 

-“Symposium on Duties Beyond Borders”. Ethics; V.98-#4, pp. 647-756.

 

Miller, David (1988). “The Ethical Significance of Nationality”. pp. 647-662.

 

Goodin, Robert (1988). “What is So Special about Our Fellow Countrymen?”. pp. 663-686 .

 

Shue, Henry (1988). “Mediating Duties”. pp. 687-704 .

 

O’Neill, Onora (1988). “Ethical Reasoning and Ideological Pluralism”. pp. 705-722 .

 

Balibar, Etienne (1988). “Propositions on Citizenship”. pp. 723-730.

 

Van Gunsteren, Herman (1988). “Admission to Citizenship”. pp. 731-741.

 

Carty, Anthony (1988). “Liberal Economic Rhetoric as an Obstacle to the Democratization of the World Economy”. pp. 742-756.

 

-Goodin, Robert (1990). “International Ethics and the Environmental Crisis”. Ethics and International Affarirs; V.4-#?, pp. 91-105.

 

-Pogge, Thomas (1995). “How Should Human Rights be Conceived?”. Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik; V.3, pp. 103-120.

 

-Moravcsik (1997). “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics”. International Organization; V.51-#?, pp.

 

-Rawls, John (1999). The Law of Peoples. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

 

-Pogge, Thomas (1994). “An Egalitarian Law of Peoples”. Philosophy and Public Affairs; V.23-#3, pp. 195-224.

 

(2) General Analyses of International Distributive Justice

 

-C. Beitz (1999). “International Liberalism and Distributive Justice: A Survey of Recent Thought”. World Politics; V.51-#2, pp. 269-296.

 

-Singer, Peter (1972). “Famine, Affluence, and Morality”. Philosophy and Public Affairs; V.1-#3, pp. 229-243.

 

-Little, Ian (1978). “Distributive Justice and the New International Order”. In P. Oppenheimer, ed. Issues in International Economics. London: Oriel Press, pp. 37-53.

 

-Sen, Amartya (1981). “Ethical Issues in Income Distribution: National and International”. In S. Grassman and E. Lundberg, eds. The World Economic Order: Past and Prospects. London: Macmillan, pp. 464-493.

 

-Findlay, Ronald (1982). “International Distributive Justice”. Journal of International Economics; V.13-#1/2, pp. 1-14.

 

-Barry, Brian (1982). “Humanity and Justice in Global Perspective”. in J. Pennock and J. Chapman, eds. Ethics, Economics and the Law. New York: NYU Press, pp. 219-267.

 

-Richards, D.A.J. (1982). “International Distributive Justice”. in J. Pennock and J. Chapman, eds. Ethics, Economics and the Law. New York: NYU Press, pp. 275-299.

 

-Shue, Henry (1980). Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy. Princeton: PUP.

 

(3) Ethical Analysis of Nationality/Citizenship

 

-Barry, Brian (1983). “Self Government Revisited”. in D. Miller and L. Siedentop, eds. The Nature of Political Theory. Oxford: Clarendon.

 

-Miller, David (1988). “The Ethical Significance of Nationality”. Ethics; V.98-#4, pp. 647-662.

 

-Goodin, Robert (1988). “What is So Special about Our Fellow Countrymen?”. Ethics; V.98-#4, pp. 663-686 .

 

-Gewirth, Alan (1988). “Ethical Universalism and Particularism”. Journal of Philosophy; V.85-#6, pp. 283-302.

 

-Raz, Joseph and Avishai Margalit (1990). “National Self-Determination”. Journal of Philosophy; V.88-#?, pp. 439-461.

 

-Pogge, Thomas (1992). “Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty”. Ethics; V.103-#1, pp. 48-75.

 

-Waldron, Jeremy (1993). “Special Ties and Natural Duties”. Philosophy and Public Affairs; V.22-#1, pp. 3-30.

 

-Taylor, Charles (1994). “The Politics of Recognition”. in Amy Gutmann, ed. Multiculturalism. Princeton: PUP, pp. 25-73. [Comments by Susan Wolf, Steven Rockefeller, and Michael Walzer follow, pp. 75-103.]

 

-Habermas, Jürgen (1994). “Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State”. in Amy Gutmann, ed. Multiculturalism. Princeton: PUP, pp. 107-148. [also Cptr. 8 in Habermas (1998). The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 203-236.]

 

-Appiah, K. Anthony (1994). “Identity, Authenticity, Survival: Multicultural Societies and Social Reproduction”. in Amy Gutmann, ed. Multiculturalism. Princeton: PUP, pp. 149-163.

 

-Miller, David (1995). On Nationality. Oxford: OUP/Clarendon Press.

 

B. The Tariff and the Terms of Trade

 

1. The Optimum Tariff

 

a. Theory

 

-Corden, Chapter 7

 

-B&S, Chapter 17

 

-T. Scitovsky (1942). “A Reconsideration of the Theory of Tariffs”. REStud. V.9-#2, pp. 89-110.

 

-R. Baldwin (1952). “The New Welfare Economics and the Gains from Trade”. QJE. V.66-#1, pp. 91-101. also in Caves and Johnson.

 

-J. Graaf (1949-50). “On Optimum Tariff Structures”. REStud. V.17-#42, pp. 47-59.

 

-M. Kemp (1967). “Notes on the Theory of Optimal Tariffs”. EcRec; V.43-#?, pp. 395-404.

 

-D.J. Horwell and I. Pearce (1970). “A Look at the Structure of Optimal Tariff Rates”. IER; V.11-#?, pp. 147-161.

 

-S.P. Das (1983). “Optimum Tariffs on Final and Intermediate Goods”. IER; V.24-#2, pp. 493-508.

 

-R. Feenstra (1986). “Trade Policy with Several Goods and 'Market Linkages'”. JIE; V.20-#?, pp. 249-267.

 

-M. Itoh and K. Kiyono (1987). “Welfare Enhancing Export Subsidies”. JPE; V.95-#1, pp. 115-137.

 

-E. Bond (1990). “The Optimum Tariff Structure in Higher Dimensions”. IER; V.31-#1, pp. 103-116.

 

-L. Young (1991). “Optimal Tariffs: A Generalization”. IER; V.32-#2, pp. 341-370.

 

-J. Chipman (1993). “Bickerdike's Theory of Incipient and Optimal Tariffs”. History of Political Economy; V.25-#3, pp. 461-492.

 

-E. Tower (1993). “Separability: The One Principal and Serious Defect of Bickerkike’s and Edgeworth’s Elasticity Approach to Balance-of-Payments Adjustment Problems”. History of Political Economy; V.25-#3, pp. 493-

 

-D. Rodrik (1989). “Optimal Trade Taxes for a Large Country with Non-Atomistic Firms”. JIE; V.26-#?, pp. 157-167.

 

-J. Bhagwati and M. Kemp (1969). “Ranking of Tariffs Under Monopoly Power in Trade”. QJE; V.83-#?, pp. 330-335.

 

-J. Riley (1970). “Ranking of Tariffs under Monopoly Power in Trade: An Extension”. QJE; V.84-#?, pp. 709-712.

 

-E. Tower (1975). “On the Functional Relationship Between Tariffs and Welfare”. JIE; V.5-#2, pp. 189-199.

 

-W. Chang and M. Michael (1988). “The Optimum Tariff and Its Optimum Income Distribution”. EcLets; V.28-#?, pp. 369-374.

 

-W. Chang and M. Michael (1991). “Income Distribution and the Optimum Tariff”. KES; V.28-#2, pp. 1-11.

 

-W. Chang (1993). “The Optimum Tariff Structure in a Small, Open, Multi-Household Economy”. in H. Herberg and N.V. Long, eds., Trade, Welfare and Economic Policies. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 177-191.

 

b. Empirical Research

 

-L. Yeager (1964). “The Size of the Gain from and Optimum Tariff”. SEJ; V.31-#?, pp. 140-148.

 

-H.G. Johnson (1968). “The Gain from Exploiting Monopoly or Monopsony Power in International Trade”. Eca; V.35-#138, pp. 151-156.

 

-L. Thurow and H. White (1976). “Optimum Trade Restrictions and Their Consequences”. Etrica; V.44-#4, pp. 777-786.

 

-E. Tower, A. Sheer and H. Bass (1978). “Alternative Optimum Tariff Strategies for Transferring Real Income”. SEJ; V.45-#1, pp. 18-31.

 

-D. McCloskey (1980). “Magnanimous Albion: Free Trade and British National Income, 1841-1881". Explorations in Economic History; V.17-#3, pp. 303-320.

 

-D. Irwin (1988). “Welfare Effects of British Free Trade: Debate and Evidence from the 1840s”. JPE; V.96-#6, pp. 1142-1164.

 

-J. Williamson (1990). “The Impact of the Corn Laws Just Prior to Repeal”. Explorations in Economic History; V.27-#2, pp. 123-156.

 

-J. James (1981). “The Optimal Tariff in the Antebellum US”. AER; V.71-#4, pp. 726-734.

 

2. The Welfare Optimal and Maximum Revenue Tariffs

 

a. Theory

 

-Corden, Chapter 4

 

-H.G. Johnson (1951). “Optimum Welfare and the Maximum Revenue Tariff”. REStud; V.19-#?, pp. 38-35.

 

-T. Bertrand (1973). “Optimal Tariff Policy Designed for Government Gain”. CJE; V.?-#?, pp. 257-266.

 

-E. Tower (1976). “The Maximum Revenue Tariff”. Malayan Economic Review; V.21-#?; pp. 33-37.

 

-E. Tower (1977). “Ranking the Optimum Tariff and the Maximum Revenue Tariff”. JIE; V.7-#?, pp. 73-79.

 

-Y.-H. Yeh (1978). “A Note on the Maximum Revenue Tariff”. JIE; V.?-#?, pp. 575-577.

 

-J. Weymark (1980). “Welfare Optimal Tariff Revenues and Maximum Tariff Revenues”. CJE; V.13-#4, pp. 615-631.

 

-P. Wagstaff (1984). “The Cost of Maximum Revenue Trade Taxes”. Eca; V.51-#?, pp. 43-52.

 

-Y.-H. Yeh (1986). “The Maximum Revenue Tariff vs. Transfer Payments”. Eastern Economic Journal; V.12-#2, pp. 142144.

 

-E. Tower (1988). “Explaining the Yeh Paradox: A Comment”. Eastern Economic Journal; V.14-#2, pp. 189-192.

 

-D. Collie (1991). “Optimum Welfare and Maximum Revenue Tariffs under Oligopoly”. Scottish Journal of Political Economy; V.38-#4, pp. 398-401.

 

Gardner, Grant and Kent Kimbrough (1992). “Tax Regimes, Tariff Revenues and Government Spending”. Economica; V.59-#233, pp. 75-92.

 

-A. Panagariya and M. Schiff (1994). “Can Revenue Maximizing Export Taxes Yield Higher Welfare than Welfare Maximizing Export Taxes?”. EcLets; V.45-#1, pp. 79-84.

 

b. Taxation, Development and Public Production

 

-V.K. Ramaswami and T.N. Srinivasan (1968). “Optimal Subsidies and Taxes when Some Factors are Traded”. JPE; V.36-#4, pp. 940-943.

 

-J. Vanek (1971). “Tariffs, Economic Welfare and Development Potential”. EJ; V.81-#?, pp. 904-913.

 

-A. Blomqvist (1974). “Tariff Revenue and Optimal Capital Accumulation in LDCs”. EJ; V.84-#?, pp. 70-89.

 

-P. Dasgupta and J. Stiglitz (1974). “Benefit Cost Analysis and Trade Policies”. JPE; V.82-#1, pp. 1-33.

 

-R. Boadway, S. Maital and M. Prachowny (1973). “Optimal Tariffs, Optimal Taxes and Public Goods”. JPubE; V.2-#?, pp. 391-403.

 

-C. Heady and P. Mitra (1982). “Restricted Redistributive Taxation, Shadow Prices and Trade Policy”. JPubE; V.17-#1, pp. 1-22.

 

-C. Heady and P. Mitra (1987). “Distributional and Revenue Raising Arguments for Protection”. JDevE; V.26-#?, pp. 77-101.

 

-J. Feehan (1988). “Efficient Tariff Financing of Public Goods”. JIE; V.25-#?, pp. 155-164.

 

-E.K. Choi and H. Lapan (1991). “Optimal Trade Policies for a Developing Country under Uncertainty”. JDevE; V.35-#?, pp. 243-260.

 

-J. Stiglitz and P. Dasgupta (1971). “Differential Taxation, Public Goods, and Economic Efficiency”. REStud; V.38-#?, pp. 151-174.

 

-R. Guesnerie (1975). “On Production of the Public Sector and Taxation in a Simple Model”. JET; V.10-#2, pp. 127-156.

 

-R. Guesnerie (1979). “Financing Public Goods with Commodity Taxes: The Tax Reform Viewpoint”. Etrica; V.47-#2, pp. 393-422.

 

c. Empirical Research on Trade Taxes and Government Revenue

 

-S. Lewis (1963). “Government Revenue from Foreign Trade: An International Comparison”. MS; V.31-#?, pp. 39-46.

 

-R. Chelliah, H. Bass and M. Kelly (1975). “Tax Ratios and Tax Effort in Developing Countries, 1969-1971". IMFSP; V.22-#?, pp. 187-205.

 

-M. Kostecki and D. Seck (1982). “Treasury Revenue and Foreign Trade Taxation”. WA; V.118-#?, pp. 116-123.

 

-D. Greenaway (1980). “Trade Taxes as a Source of Government Revenue: An International Comparison”. Scottish Journal of Political Economy; V.27-#?, pp. 175-182. [Comment by Bedrossian and Hitiris and Response by Greenaway (1985), V.27-#?, pp. 199-208]

 

-D. Greenaway (1984). “A Statistical Analysis of Fiscal Dependence on Trade Taxes and Economic Development”. Public Finance; V.39-#?, pp. 70-89. [Comment by Hitiris and Weekes and Response by Greenaway and Sapsford (1987), V.42-#?, pp. 297-319]

 

-R. Riezman and Joel Slemrod (1987). “Tariffs and Collection Costs”. WA; V.123-#3, pp. 545-549.

 

-G. Shaw (1988). “Revenue Implications of Trade Taxes”. in D. Greenaway, ed. Economic Development and International Trade. London: Macmillan, pp. 174-187.

 

-D. Greenaway and C. Milner (1991). “Fiscal Dependence on Trade Taxes and Trade Policy Reform”. Journal of Development Studies; V.27-#3, pp. 95-132.

 

-N. Gemmel (1993). “Fiscal Dependence on Trade Taxes and Economic Development: Some New Evidence”. Scottish Journal of Political Economy; V.40-#1, pp.56-68.

 

-R. Ram (1994). “Level of Economic Development and Share of Trade Taxes in Government Revenue: Some Evidence from Individual-Country Time-Series Data”. Public Finance; V.49-#3, pp. 409-26.

 

-L. Pritchett and G. Sethi (1994). “Tariff Rates, Tariff Revenue, and Tariff Reform: Some New Facts”. World Bank Economic Review; V.8-#1, pp. 1-16.

 

3. Lerner Symmetry and The Lerner and Metzler Tariff Paradoxes

 

-A. Lerner (1936). “The Symmetry Between Import and Export Taxes”. Eca. V.??-#3, pp. 306-313; also in Caves and Johnson.

 

-W. Kaempfer and E. Tower (1982). “The Balance of Payments Approach to Trade Tax Symmetry Theorems”. WA; V.118-#?, pp. 148-165.

 

-A. Razin and L. Svensson (1983). “Trade Taxes and the Current Account”. EcLets; V.13-#1, pp. 55-57.

 

-Y.-H. Yeh (1990). “On the Symmetry between Import and Export Quotas”. JIEI; V.5-#1, pp. 26-30.

 

-F. Casas (1991). “Lerner's Symmetry Theorem Revisited”. KES; V.28-#1, pp. 15-19.

 

-L.A. Metzler (1949). “Tariffs, the Terms of Trade, and the Distribution of National Income”. JPE. V.57-#1, pp. 1-29. also in Caves and Johnson.

 

-L.A. Metzler (1949). “Tariffs, International Demand, and Domestic Prices”. JPE. V.57-#?, pp. 345-349.

 

-I.A. McDougall (1966). “Tariffs and Relative Prices”. EcRec; V.42-#2, pp. 219-243.

 

-R. Jones (1969). “Tariffs and Trade in General Equilibrium”. AER. V.59-#3, pp. 418-423.

 

-N. Minabe (1974). “Stolper-Samuelson Theorem and Metzler Paradox”. OEP; V.26-#?, pp. 328-333.

 

-K. Suzuki (1976). “The Deterioration of the Terms of Trade by a Tariff”. JIE; V.6-#?, pp. 173-182.

 

-R. Jones (1989). “Protection and the Optimal Tariff”. JIEI; V.4-#1, pp. 1-4.

 

-H.G. Johnson (1959). “International Trade, Income Distribution and the Offer Curve”. MS; V.27-#3, pp. 241-260.

 

-R. Baldwin (1960). “The Effect of Tariffs on International and Domestic Prices. QJE. V.74-#1, pp. 65-78.

 

-J. Bhagwati and H.G. Johnson (1961). “A Generalized Theory of the Effect of Tariffs on the Terms of Trade”. OEP; V.13-#3, pp. 225-253.

 

-R. Jones (1987). “Tax Wedges and Mobile Capital”. ScanJE. V.89-#3, pp. 335-346.

 

-P.-L. Tsai (1989). “A Note on the Symmetry Between Lerner's Case and Metzler's Paradox”. JIE; V.27-#?, pp. 373-379.

 

4. Extending the General Structure

 

-Corden, Chapter 4

 

-A. Friedlander and A. Vandendorpe (1968). “Excise Taxes and the Gains from Trade”. JPE. V.76-#5, pp. 1058-1068.

 

-J. Melvin (1970). “Commodity Taxation as a Determinant of Trade”. CJE; V.3-#1, pp. 62-78.

 

-R. Dornbusch (1971). “Optimal Commodity Taxes and Trade Taxes”. JPE. V.79-#?, pp. 1360-1368.

 

-T.H. Dong (1987). “Optimal Countervailing Intervention”. IEJ; V.1-#3, pp. 19-29.

 

-N. Saidi and P. Srinagesh (1981). “On Non-Linear Tariff Schedules”. JIE; V.11-#?, pp. 173-195.

 

-J. Melvin (1982). “The Corporate Income Tax in an Open Economy”. JPubE. V.17-#?, pp. 393-403.

 

-J. Melvin (1979). “Short-Run Price Effects of the Corporate Income Tax and Implications for International Trade”. AER. V.69-#5, pp. 765-774.

 

-D. Rousslang (1987). “The Effects of Recent Corporate Tax Changes on US International Trade”. NTJ; V.40-#4, pp. 603-615.

 

-R. Gordon and J. Levinsohn (1990). “The Linkage Between Domestic Taxes and Border Taxes”. in A. Razin and J. Slemrod, eds. Taxation in the Global Economy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 357-389.

 

C. Economic Distortions and the Theory of Economic Policy

 

1. The General Theory of Distortions and Welfare

 

a. Distortions, Optimal Intervention and National Welfare

 

-Corden, chapters 2 and 3

 

-B&S, chapters 13-17

 

-G. Haberler (1950). “Some Problems in the Pure Theory of International Trade”. EJ; V.60-#?, pp. 215-229. also in Caves and Johnson.

 

-J. Bhagwati and V.K. Ramaswami (1963). “Domestic Distortions, Tariffs, and the Theory of the Optimum Subsidy”. Journal of Political Economy; V.71-#1, pp. 44-50.

 

-H.G. Johnson (1965). “Optimal Trade Intervention in the Presence of Domestic Distortion”. R. Caves, et al. Trade, Growth and the Balance of Payments. Chicago: Rand McNally, pp. 3-34. also in Bhagwati.

 

-J. Bhagwati (1971). “The Generalized Theory of Distortions and Welfare”. J. Bhagwati, et al. Trade, Balance of Payments and Growth. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 69-90. also in Bhagwati.

 

-A. Vandendorpe (1972). “Optimal Tax Structures in a Model with Traded and Non-Traded Goods”. JIE; V.2-#?, pp. 235-256.

 

-A. Takayama (1972). “On the Analytical Framework of Tariffs and Trade Policy”. in G. Horwich and P. Samuelson, Trade Stability and Macroeconomics. New York: Academic Press, pp. 153-178.

 

-M. Ohyama (1972). “Trade and Welfare in General Equilibrium”. KES. V.9-#2, pp. 37-73.

 

-P. Lloyd (1974). “A More General Theory of Price Distortions in Open Economies”. JIE; V.39-#?, pp. 365-386.

 

-S. Anand and V. Joshi (1979). “Domestic Distortions, Income Distribution and the Theory of the Optimum Subsidy”. EJ; V.89-#?, pp. 336-352.

 

-A. Smith (1980). “Optimal Tariffs, Optimal Taxes and Shadow Prices”. in J. Black and B. Hindley, eds. Current Issues in Commercial Policy. NY: St. Martins, pp. 10-25.

 

-A. Dixit (1985). “Tax Policy in Open Economies”. in A. Auerbach and M. Feldstein, Handbook of Public Economics (V.I). Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 313-374.

 

-R. Chambers and R. López (1993). “Fixed Price Controls and ad valorem Distortions in an Open Economy”. EcLets; V.41-#?, pp. 287-292.

 

T.N. Srinivasan (1996). “The Generalized Theory of Distortions and Welfare Two Decades Later”. in R. Feenstra, G. Grossman, and D. Irwin, eds. The Political Economy of Trade Policy. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 3-25.

 

P. Krishna and A. Panagariya (1997). “A Unification of the Theory of Second Best”. JIE; V.52-#?, pp. 235-257.

 

b. Existence of Equilibrium with Distortions

 

-K. Sontheimer (1971). “The Existence of International Trade Equilibrium with Trade Tax-Subsidy Distortions”. Etrica; V.39-#6, pp. 1015-1035.

 

-K. Sontheimer (1971). “An Existence Theorem for the Second-Best”. JET; V.3-#1, pp. 1-22.

 

-J. Shoven (1974). “A Proof of the Existence of Equilibrium with ad valorem Commodity Taxes”. JET; V.8-#1, pp. 1-25.

 

-R. Mantel (1975). “General Equilibrium and Optimal Taxes”. JMathE; V.2-#?, pp. 187-200.

 

-W. Shafer and H. Sonnenschein (1976). “Equilibrium with Externalities, Commodity Taxation, and Lump Sum Transfers”. IER; V.17-#3, pp. 601-611.

 

2. Factor Market Distortions and Trade Policy

 

a. Overviews

 

-Corden, Chapter 6

 

-S. Magee (1973). “Factor Market Distortions, Production, and Trade: A Survey”. OEP; V.25-#1, pp.1-43.

 

-S. Magee (1976). International Trade and Distortions in Factor Markets. New York: Marcel Dekker.

 

-J.P. Neary (1978). “Dynamic Stability and the Theory of Factor-Market Distortions”. AER; V.68-#4, pp. 671-682. (comment by Herberg and Kemp, with response, AER, V70-#4, pp. 812-818.)

 

-K. Okuguchi (1980). “Stability of Equilibrium in a Factor Market Distortion Model”. Economic Studies Quarterly; V.31-#?, pp. 156-158.

 

-M. Kemp and M. Yamada (2001). “Factor-Market Distortions, Dynamic Stabilty, and Paradoxical Comparative Statics”. RIE; V.9-#3, pp. 383-400.

 

b. Factor Immobility and Adjustment Costs (see Ricardo-Viner Model)

 

c. Economy-wide Minimum Wage

 

-B&S, Chapter 22

 

-L. Lefeber (1971). “Trade and Minimum Wage Rates”. in J. Bhagwati, et al. Trade, Balance of Payments and Growth. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 91-114.

 

-R. Brecher (1974). “Minimum Wage Rates and the Pure Theory of International Trade”. QJE; V.88-#1, pp. 98-116.

 

-R. Brecher (1974). “Optimal Commercial Policy for a Minimum Wage Economy”. JIE; V.4-#2, pp. 139-149.

 

-T. Inoue and Y. Itsumi (1992). “A Note on International Trade with a Minimum Wage and an Endogenous Labor Supply Economy”. IER; V.33-#1, pp. 239-244.

 

-R. Batra and A. Seth (1977). “Unemployment, Tariffs and the Theory of International Trade”. JIE; V.7-#?, pp. 295-306.

 

-A. Parai (1982). “Optimal Tariff Under Domestic Distortions”. JIE; V.12-#?, pp. 371-375.

 

-W. Chang and M. Michael (1989). “Optimal Commercial Policy for an Open Economy with Domestic Distortions”. EcLets; V.31-#?, pp. 163-167.

 

-A. Schweinberger (1978). “Employment Subsidies and the Theory of Minimum Wage Rates in General Equilibrium”. QJE; V.92-#3, pp. 361-374.

 

-R. Brecher (1980). “Increased Unemployment from Capital Accumulation in a Minimum-wage Model of an Open Economy”. CJE; V.13-#3, pp. 152-158.

 

-A.L. Hillman (1981). “Unilateral and Bilateral Trade Policies for a Minimum Wage Economy”. JIE; V.11-#?, pp. 407-413.

 

-J.P. Neary (1985). “International Factor Mobility, Minimum Wage Rates, and Factor-Price Equalization: A Synthesis”. QJE; V.100-#?, pp. 551-570.

 

-R. Brecher (1993). “Incurable Unemployment in a Minimum-Wage Economy”. in H. Herberg and N.V. Long, eds., Trade, Welfare and Economic Policies. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 193-202.

 

-D. Davis (1998). “Does European Unemployment Prop Up American Wages? National Labor Markets and Global Free Trade”. AER; V.88-#3, pp. 478-494.

 

-D. Davis (1998). “Technology, Unemployment, and Relative Wages in a Global Economy”. EER; V.42-#9, pp. 1613-1633.

 

-P. Oslington (2000). “Factor Price Equalization and Trade Patterns with Unemployment”. Journal of Economic Integration; V.15-#1, pp. 127-144.

 

d. Wage Differentials in an HOS Economy

 

-B&S, Chapter 21

 

-E. Hagen (1958). “An Economic Justification of Protectionism”. QJE; V.72-#?, pp. 496-514.

 

-J. Bhagwati and V.K. Ramaswami (1963). “Domestic Distortions, Tariffs and the Theory of Optimum Subsidy”. JPE; V.71-#1, pp. 44-50. (Comment by Kemp/Negishi and response, V.77-#6, pp. 1005-1013.)

 

-J. Bhagwati, V.K. Ramaswami and T.N. Srinivasan (1969). “Domestic Distortions, Tariffs and the Theory of Optimum Subsidy: Some Further Results”. JPE, V.77-#6, pp. 1005-1010.

 

-H.G. Johnson (1966). “Factor Market Distortions and the Shape of the Transformation Curve”. Etrica; V.34-#3, pp. 686-698.

 

-Y. Mundlak (1970). “Further Implications of Distortions in the Factor Markets”. Etrica; V.38-#?, pp. 517-532.

 

-P.J. Lloyd (1970). “The Shape of the Transformation Curve with and without Factor Market Distortions”. Australian Economic Papers; V.V.9-#?, pp. 52-61.

 

-J. Bhagwati and T.N. Srinivasan (1971). “The Theory of Wage Differentials: Production Response and Factor-Price Equalisation”. JIE; V.1-#1, pp. 19-35.

 

-H. Herberg and M. Kemp (1971). “Factor Market Distortions, The Shape of the Locus of Competitive Outputs, and the Relation Between Product Prices and Equilibrium Outputs”. in J. Bhagwati, et al. Trade, Balance of Payments and Growth. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 22-48.

 

-R. Jones (1971). “Distortions in Factor Markets and the General Equilibrium Model of Production”. JPE; V.74-#3, pp. 437-459.

 

-S. Magee (1971). “Factor Market Distortions, Production, Distribution, and the Pure Theory of International Trade”. QJE; V.85-#4, pp. 621-643.

 

-H. Herberg, M. Kemp and S. Magee (1971). “Factor Market Distortions, the Reversal of Relative Factor Intensities, and the Relation between Product Prices and Equilibrium Outputs”. EcRec; V.47-#?, pp. 518-530.

 

-R. Batra and G. Scully (1971). “The Theory of Wage Differentials: Welfare and Immiserizing Growth”. JIE; V.1-#2, pp. 241-247.

 

-R. Batra and P. Pattanaik (1971). “Factor Market Imperfection, the Terms of Trade and Welfare”. AER; V.61-#5, pp. 946-955.

 

-I.F. Pearce (1971). “The Theory of Wage Differentials: The nxn Case”; JIE; V.1-#2, pp. 205-214.

 

-A.G. Schweinberger (1979). “The Theory of Factor Price Differentials: The Case of Constant Absolute Differentials”. JIE; V.9-#1, pp. 95-115.

 

-M. Hayashibara and R. Jones (1989). “Should a Factor-Market Distortion Be Widened?” EcLets; V.31-#?, pp. 159-162.

 

-G. Fields (1997). “Wage Floors and Unemployment: A Two-Sector Analysis”. Labour Economics; V.4-#1, pp. 85-91.

 

e. Wage Differentials, Specific-Factors and Unemployment

 

(1) The Specific-K Harris-Todaro Model: Comparative Static Analysis

 

-B&S, Chapter 23

 

-J. Harris and M. Todaro (1970). “Migration, Unemployment and Development: A Two-Sector Analysis”. AER; V.60-#1, pp. 126-142.

 

-J. Bhagwati and T.N. Srinivasan (1974). “On Reanalyzing the Harris-Todaro Model: Policy Ranking in the Case of Sector-Specific Sticky Wages”. AER, V.64-#3, pp. 502-508.

 

-J. Bhagwati and T.N. Srinivasan (1974). “The Ranking of Policy Interventions under Factor Market Distortions: The Case of Sector Specific Sticky Wages and Unemployment”. Sankhya 35 (series b), Part 4, pp. 405-420.

 

-T.N. Srinivasan and J. Bhagwati (1975). “Alternative Policy Rankings in a Large Open Economy with Sector-Specific Minimum Wages”. JET; V.11-#3, pp. 356-371.

 

-K. Basu (1980). “Optimal Policies in Dual Economies”. QJE; V94-#?, pp. 187-196. (Comment by Gang and Gangopadhyay in QJE, 1985, pp. 1067-1071).

 

-I.N. Gang and S. Gangopadhyay (1987). “Employment, Output and the Choice of Techniques: The Trade-offs Revisited”. JDevEc; V.25-#?, pp. 321-327.

 

-P. Raimondos (1993). “On the Todaro Paradox”. EcLets; V.42-#2/3, pp. 261-267.

 

-H. Beladi and C.C. Chao (1993). “Non-Traded Goods, Urban Unemployment and Welfare in LDCs”. EJPE; V.9-#?, pp. 281-292.

 

-G. Fields (1975). “Rural-Urban Migration, Urban Unemployment and Underemployment, and Job Search Activity in LDCs”. JDevEc; V.2-#?, pp. 165-187.

 

-K.B. Bhatia (1979). “Rural-Urban Migration and Surplus Labor”. OEP; V.31-#?, pp. 354-367. (Comment by O. Stark, 1982; Response, 1983).

 

-I.N. Gang and S. Gangopadhyay (1987). “Optimal Policies in a Dual Economy with Open Unemployment and Surplus Labour”. OEP; V.39-#?, pp. 378-387.

 

-I.N. Gang and E. Tower (1990). “Allocating Jobs under a Minimum Wage: Queues and Lotteries”. EcRec; V.?-#?, pp. 186-194.

 

-G. Calvo (1978). “Urban Unemployment and Wage Determination in LDCs: Trade Unions in the Harris-Todaro Model”. IER; V.19-#1, pp. 65-81.

 

-M.G. Quibria (1988). “Migration, Trade Unions and the Informal Sector: A Note on Calvo”. IER; V.29-#3, pp. 557-563.

 

(2) Dynamics and Stability of the Specific-K Harris-Todaro Model

 

-P. Robertson and S. Welliz (1977). “Steady State Growth of an Economy with Intersectoral Migration”. OEP; V.29-#?, pp 370-388.

 

-S. Das (1982). “Sector Specific Minimum Wages, Economic Growth and Some Policy Implications”. JDevE; V.10-#?, pp. 127-131.

 

-R.H. Day, S. Dasgupta, S.K. Datta and J.B. Nugent (1987). “Instability in Rural-Urban Migration”. EJ; V.97-#?, pp. 940-950.

 

-B. Dutta, I. Gang and S. Gangopadhyay (1989). “Subsidy Policies with Capital Accumulation: Maintaining Employment Levels”. Journal of Population Economics; V.2-#?, pp. 301-318.

 

(3) The Mobile Capital H-T Model: Comparative Static Analysis

 

-W.M. Corden and R. Findlay (1975). “Urban Unemployment, Inter-sectoral Capital Mobility and Development Policy”. Eca; V.62-#165, pp. 59-78.

 

-M.A. Khan (1980). “The Harris-Todaro Hypothesis and the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson Trade Model: A Synthesis”. JIE; V.10-#4, pp. 527-547.

 

-M.A. Khan (1982). “Tariffs, Foreign Capital and Immiserizing Growth with Urban Unemployment and Specific Factors of Production”. JDevE; V.10-#?, pp. 245-256.

 

-M.A. Khan and L. Po-Sheng (1982). “Sub-Optimal Tariff Policy in the Presence of Urban Unemployment”. PDR; V.21-#?, pp. 105-126.

 

-M.A. Khan and S.N.H. Naqvi (1983). “Capital Markets and Urban Unemployment”. JIE; V.15-#?, pp. 367-385.

 

-T. McCool (1982). “Wage Subsidies and Distortionary Taxes in a Mobile Capital Harris-Todaro Model”. Eca; V.49-#?, pp. 69-80.

 

-M.H. Imam and J. Whalley (1985). “Incidence Analysis of A Sector-Specific Minimum Wage in a Two-Sector Harris Todaro Model”. QJE, V.?-#?, pp. 206-224.

 

-M. Anam (1988). “On the Policy Intervention in the Harris-Todaro Model with Intersectoral Capital Mobility”. Eca; V.55-#?, pp. 403-407.

 

-R. Batra and S. Lahiri (1988). “Labour Turnover Costs and the Curious Properties of the Mobile Capital Harris-Todaro Model”. EER; V.32-#?, pp. 1369-1374.

 

-R. Batra and S. Lahiri (1987). “Imported Technologies, Urban Unemployment and the North-South Dialogue”. JDevEc; V.25-#?, pp. 21-32.

 

-R. Batra and N. Naqvi (1987). “Urban Unemployment and Gains from Trade”. Eca; V.54-#?, pp. 381-395.

 

-H. Beladi and N. Naqvi (1988). “Urban Unemployment and Non-Immiserizing Growth”. JDevE; V.28-#?, pp. 365-376.

 

-H. Beladi (1990). “Sector Specific Wage Rigidity and Factor Accumulation”. EcRec; V.?-#?, pp. 32-36.

 

-C.C. Chao and E.S.H. Yu (1990). “Urban Unemployment, Terms of Trade and Welfare”. SEJ; V.56-#?, pp. 743-751.

 

-B. Hazari and P. Sgro (1991). “Urban-Rural Structural Adjustment, Urban Unemployment with Traded and Non-traded Goods”. JDevEc; V.35-#1, pp. 187-196.

 

-C.C. Chao and E.S.H. Yu (1992). “Capital Markets, Urban Unemployment and Land”. JDevE; V.38-#?, pp. 407-413.

 

-H. Beladi and S. Marjit (1992). “Foreign Capital and protectionism”. CJE V.25-#?, pp. 233-238.

 

-H. Beladi and C.C. Chao (1993). “Non-traded Goods, Urban Unemployment and Welfare in LDCs”. EJPE; V.9-#?, pp. 281-292.

 

-C.C. Chao and E.S.H. Yu (1995). “The Shadow Price of Foreign Exchange in a Dual Economy”. JDevE; V.46-#1, pp. 195-202.

 

-E. Grinols (1991). “Unemployment and Foreign Capital: The Relative Opportunity Costs of Domestic Labor and Welfare”. Eca; V.58-#?, pp. 107-121.

 

-V. Chandra and M.A. Khan (1993). “Foreign Investment in the Presence of an Informal Sector”. Eca; V.60-#1, pp. 79-103.

 

-P. Sen, A. Ghosh and A. Barman (1997). “The Possibility of Welfare Gains with Capital Inflows in a Small Tariff-Ridden Economy”. Eca; V.64-#?, pp. 345-352.

 

M.R. Gupta (1997). “Foreign Capital and the informal Sector: Comments on Chandra and Khan”. Eca; V.64-#?, pp. 353-363.

 

-S. Marjit, U. Broll and S. Mitra (1997). “Targeting Sectors for Foreign Capital Inflow in a Small Developing Economy”. RIE; V.5-#1, pp. 101-106.

 

-E. Katz and O. Stark (1986). “Labor Migration and Risk Aversion in LDCs”. Journal of Labor Economics; V.4-#1, pp. 134-149.

 

(4) The Mobile Capital H-T Analysis: Dynamics and Stability

 

-M.A. Khan (1980). “Dynamic Stability, Wage Subsidies and the Generalized Harris-Todaro Model”. Pakistan Development Review; V.19-#1, pp. 1-24.

 

-J.P. Neary (1981). “On the Harris-Todaro Model with Intersectoral Capital Mobility”. Eca; V.48-#?, pp. 219-234.

 

-M.A. Khan (1982). “Social Opportunity Costs and Immiserizing Growth: Some Observations on the Long Run versus the Short Run”. QJE; V.?-#?, pp. 353-362.

 

-M. Amano (1983). “On the Harris-Todaro Model with Intersectoral Migration of Labor”. Eca; V.50-#?, pp. 311-323.

 

-M.A. Khan and T.D. Chaudhuri (1985). “Development Policies in LDC's with Several Ethnic Groups--A Theoretical Analysis”. ZfN; V.45-#1, pp. 1-19.

 

-M.R. Gupta (1986). “Shadow Wage Rate in a Dynamic HT Model”. OEP; V.38-?, pp.

 

-H. Funatsu (1987). “A Note on the Stability of the Harris-Todaro with Capital Mobility”. Eca; V.55-#?, pp. 119-121.

 

-J.P. Neary (1987). “Stability of the Mobile-capital Harris-Todaro Model: Some Further Results”. Eca; V.55-#7, pp. 123-127.

 

-J.-Y. Choi and E.S.H. Yu (1992). “Technical Progress, Terms of Trade and Welfare in a Mobile Capital Harris-Todaro Model”. in W. Neuefeind and R. Riezman, ed. Economic Theory and International Trade. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, pp. 129-142.

 

f. Unions, Unemployment and Trade

 

(1) Overviews

 

-R. Freeman and J. Medoff (1984). What Do Unions Do? New York: Basic Books.

 

-B. Hirsch and J. Addison (1986). The Economic Analysis of Unions: New Approaches and Evidence. Boston: Allen and Unwin.

 

-Lewis, H. Gregg (1986). Union Relative Wage Effects: A Survey. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

 

-M. Kemp, N.v. Long and K. Shimomura (1991). Labour Unions and the Theory of International Trade. Amsterdam: North-Holland.

 

(2) General Equilibrium with Unions: Closed Economy

 

-H.G. Johnson and P. Mieszkowski (1970). “The Effects of Unionization on the Distribution of Income: A General Equilibrium Approach”. QJE; V.84-#4, pp. 539-561.

 

-S.C. Hu (1973). “Capital Mobility and the Effects of Unionization”. SEJ. V.39-#?, pp. 526-534.

 

-W.E. Diewert (1974). “The Effects of Unionization on Wages and Employment: A General Equilibrium Analysis”. EcInq; V.12-/3, pp. 319-339.

 

-J.G. Ballentine and W. Thirsk (1977). “Labor Unions and Income Distribution Reconsidered”. CJE; V.10-#1, pp. 141-148.

 

-A.J. Oswald (1979). “Wage Determination in an Economy with Many Trade Unions”. OEP; V.31-#?, pp. 369-385.

 

-A.A. Caruth and A.J. Oswald (1981). “The Determination of Union and Non-Union Wage Rates”. EER; V.16-#?, pp. 285-302.

 

-I. McDonald and R. Solow (1981). “Wage Bargaining and Unemployment”. AER; V.71-#?, pp. 896-908.

 

-A.J. Oswald (1982). “The Microeconomic Theory of the Trade Union” EJ; V.92-#367; pp. 576-595.

 

-A.K. Parai (1985). “Unionization and the Distribution of Income under Variable Returns to Scale”. EcLets; V.19-#?, pp. 95-98.

 

-S. Anderson and M. Devereux (1988). “Trade Unions and the Choice of Capital Stock”. ScanJE; V.90-#1, pp. 27-44.

 

-L. Calmfors and H. Horn (198?). “Employment Policies and Centralized Wage-setting”. Eca; V.53-#2, pp. 281-302.

 

-L. Calmfors and J. Driffill (1988). “Bargaining Structure, Corporatism and Macroeconomic Performance”. Economic Policy; #6, pp. 12-61.

 

-M. Wallerstein (1990). “Centralized Bargaining and Wage Restraint”. AJPS; V.34-#4, pp. 982-1004.

 

-J. Dertouzos and J. Pencavel (1981). “Wage and Employment Determination under Trade Unionism: The Case of the International Typographical Union”. JPE; V.89-#6, pp. 1162-1181.

 

-T. MaCurdy and J. Pencavel (1986). “Testing Between Competing Models of Wage and Employment Determination in Unionized Markets”. JPE; V.94-#3/II, pp. s3-s39.

 

-J. Brown and O. Ashenfelter (1986). “Testing the Efficiency of Employment Contracts”. JPE; V.94-#3/II, pp. s40-s87.

 

-R. Eberts and J. Stone (1986). “On the Contract Curve: A Test of Alternative Models of Collective Bargaining”. Journal of Labor Economics; V.4-#?, pp. 66-81.

 

(3) General Equilibrium with Unions: Open Economy

 

-J.K. Hill (1984). “Comparative Statics in General Equilibrium Models with a Unionized Sector”. JIE; V.16-#3/4, pp. 345-356.

 

-J. Melvin (1988). “The International and Interregional Effects of Minimum Wages and Unionization”. International Trade Journal; V.2-#3, pp. 223-.

 

-R. Brecher and N.V. Long (1989). “Trade Unions in an Open Economy: A General Equilibrium Analysis”. EcRec; V.65-#190, pp. 234-239.

 

-G. Grossman (1984). “International Competition and the Unionized Sector”. CJE; V.17-#3, pp. 541-556.

 

-R. Staiger (1988). “Organized Labor and the Scope of International Specialization”. JPE; V.96-#5, pp. 1022-1047.

 

-M. Kemp and K. Shimomura (1985). “Do Labor Unions Drive out Capital”. EJ; V.95-#380, pp. 1087-1090.

 

-M. Kemp and K. Shimomura (1989). “A Neglected Corner: Labor Unions and the Pattern of International Trade”. in G. Feiwel, ed. Joan Robinson and Modern Economic Theory. London: Macmillan, pp. 744-790.

 

-B.S. Rasmussen (1992). “Union Cooperation and Nontraded Goods in General Equilibrium”. ScanJE; V.94-#4, pp. 561-579.

 

-J. Driffill and F. van der Ploeg (1993). “Monopoly Unions and the Liberalization of International Trade”. EJ; V.103-#417, pp. 379-385.

 

-H. Huzinga (1993). “International Market Integration and Union Wage Bargaining”. ScanJE; V.95-#?, pp. 249-255.

 

-J.R. Sorensen (1993). “Integration of Product Markets when Labour Markets are Unionized”. Recherches Economiques de Louvain; V.59-#4, pp. 485-502.

 

-J.R. Sorensen (1994). “Integration of Product Markets and Lower Welfare in an Economy with Centralized Wage Setting “. Scottish Journal of Political Economy; V.40-#3, pp. 323-329.

 

-J.R. Sorensen (1994). “Market Integration and Imperfect Competition in Labor and Product Markets”. Open Economies Review; V.5-#1, pp. 115-130.

 

-T. Andersen and J.R. Sorensen (1993). “Will Product Market Integration Lower Unemployment?”. in J. Fagerberg and L. Lundberg, eds. European Economic Integration: a Nordic Perspective. Aldershot: Avebury.

 

-J.-P. Danthine and J. Hunt (1994). “Wage Bargaining Structure, Employment and Economic Integration”. EJ; V.104-#424, pp. 528-541.

 

-J. Driffill and F. Van der Ploeg (1995). “Trade Liberalization with Imperfect Competition in Goods and Labor Markets”. ScanJE; V.97-#2, pp. 223-243.

 

-H. Kierzkowski (1982). “Wage Relativities in an Open Economy”. WA; V.118-#4, pp. 690-705.

 

-H. Kierzkowski (1984). “Trade Unions, Wage Relativities and Unemployment”. Australian Economic Papers; V.23-#42, pp. 91-104.

 

-D. Knies and H. Herberg (1988). “Employment Effects of a Rigid Wage Ratio in Small Open Economies with Sector Specific Capital”. JITE; V.144-#4, pp. 671-683.

 

-H. Herberg and D. Knies (1989). “Employment Effects of a Rigid Wage Ratio in Small Open Economies with Intersectoral Capital Mobility”. EJPE; V.5-#4, pp. 459-472.

 

(4) Strategic Unions and Trade

 

-C. Lawrence and R. Lawrence (1985). “Manufacturing Wage Dispersion: An End Game Interpretation”. BPEA; #1, pp. 47-106.

 

-J. Brander and B. Spencer (1988). “Unionized Oligopoly and International Trade Policy”. JIE; V.24-#3/4, pp. 217-234.

 

-C. Mezzetti and E. Dinopoulos (1991). “Domestic Unionization and Import Competition”. JIE; V.31-#1/2, pp. 79-100.

 

-S. Dowrick and B. Spencer (1994). “Union Attitudes to Labor-Saving Innovation: When Are Unions Luddites?”. Journal of Labor Economics; V.12-#2, pp. 316-344.

 

-N. Gaston and D. Trefler (1995). “Union Wage Sensitivity to Trade and Protection: Theory and Evidence”. JIE; V.39-#1/2, pp. 1-25.

 

-M. Santoni (1996). “Union-Oligopoly Sequential Bargaining: Trade and Industrial Policies”. OEP; V.48-#4, pp. 640-663.

 

-R. Naylor (1998). “International Trade and Economic Integration when Labour Markets are Generally Unionised”. EER; V.42-#?, pp. 1251-1267.

 

-R. Naylor (1999). “Union Wage Strategies and International Trade”. EJ; V.109-#?, pp. 102-125.

 

-R. Naylor (2000). “Trade and Wages When the Trade Regime is Endogenously Determined”. RIE; V.8-#3, pp. 556-565.

 

-K.C. Fung and H. Huizinga (1999). “Economic Integration and Firm-Union Bargaining: The Role of Market Structure”. Journal of Economic Integration; V.14-#4, pp. 554-571.

 

-T. Fisher and D. Wright (1999). “Unionized Oligopoly and Trade Liberalization”. CJE; V.32-#3, pp. 799-816.

 

-D. Geide-Stevenson (2000). “Labor Unions, Unemployment, and Trade and Capital Liberalization”. Journal of Economic Integration; V.15-#1, pp. 76-99.

 

(5) Empirical Research on Unions and Trade

 

-D. McPherson and J. Stewart (1990). “The Effects of International Competition on Union and Non-union Wages”. Industrial and Labor Relations Review; V.43-#4, pp. 434-446.

 

-D. Byrne and R. King (1986). “Import Penetration and Strike Activity in Manufacturing”. AEJ; V.14-#?, pp. 77-84.

 

-J. Abowd and T. Lemieux (1991). “The Effects of International Trade on Collective Bargaining Outcomes: A Comparison of the US and Canada”. in J. Abowd and R. Freeman, eds. Immigration, Trade and Labor Markets. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 407-421.

 

-R. Freeman and L. Katz (1991). “Industrial Wage and Employment Determination in an Open Economy”. in J. Abowd and R. Freeman, eds. Immigration, Trade and Labor Markets. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 235-259.

 

-J. de Melo and D. Tarr (1993). “Industrial Policy in the Presence of Wage Distortions: The Case of the US Auto and Steel Industries”. IER; V.34-#4, pp. 833-851.

 

-M. Partridge (1993). “Technology, International Competitiveness, and Union Behavior”. Journal of Labor Research; V.14-#2, pp. 131-149.

 

-S. Blumenfeld and M. Partridge (1996). “The Long-Run and Short-Run Impacts of Global Competition on U.S. Union Wages”. Journal of Labor Research; V.17-#1, pp. 149-171

 

-B. Shippen and A. Lynch (2002). “How International Trade Affects Union Wages: New Evidence”. Journal of Labor Research; V.23-#1, pp. 131-144.

 

g. Implicit Contracts, Efficiency Wages and Job Search

 

(1) Overviews

 

-J. Stiglitz (1986). “Theories of Wage Rigidity”. in J. Butkiewicz, K. Kofford and J. Miller, eds. Keynes' Economic Legacy: Contemporary Economic Theory. New York: Praeger, pp. 153-206.

 

-J. Stiglitz (1987). “The Causes and Consequences of the Dependence of Quality on Price”. JEL; V.25-#1, pp. 1-48.

 

-W. Mayer (1990). “International Trade with Unemployment: A Non-Walrasian Model”. ESQ; V.41-#2, pp. 97-114.

 

-C. Davidson (1990). Recent Developments in the Theory of Involuntary Unemployment. Kalamazoo: Upjohn Institute.

 

(2) Implicit Contracts

 

-W. Ethier (1982). “Dumping”. JPE; V.90-#?, pp. 487-506.

 

-W. Ethier (1985). “International Trade and Labor Migration”. AER; V.75-#4, pp. 691-707.

 

-S. Matusz (1985). “The Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson Model with Implicit Contracts”. QJE; V.100-#?, pp. 1313-1329.

 

-S. Matusz (1986). “Implicit Contracts, Unemployment and International Trade”. EJ; V.96-#?, pp. 307-322.

 

-R. Fernandez (1992). “Terms-of-trade Uncertainty, Incomplete Markets and Unemployment”. IER; V.33-#4, pp. 881-894.

 

-O. Hart (1983). “Optimal Labour Contracts Under Asymmetric Information: An Introduction”. REStud; V.50-#1, pp. 3-35.

 

-C. Azariadis and J. Stiglitz (1983). “Implicit Contracts and Fixed Price Equilibria”. QJE; V.98-#3, pp. 1-22.

 

-S. Rosen (1985). “Implicit Contracts: A Survey”. JEL; V.23-#3, pp. 1144-1175.

 

(3) Efficiency Wages

 

-J. Bulow and L. Summers (1986). “A Theory of Dual Labor Markets with Application to Industrial Policy, Discrimination, and Keynesian Unemployment”. Journal of Labor Economics; V.4-#3, part 1, pp. 376-414.

 

-H. Salehi-Esfahani (1988). “Informationally Imperfect Labour Markets and the `Dutch Disease` Problem”. CJE; V.21-#3, pp. 617-624.

 

-B. Copeland (1989). “Efficiency Wages in a Ricardian Model of International Trade”. JIE; V.27-#3/4, pp. 221-244.

 

-J. Wilson (1990). “The Optimal Taxation of Internationally Mobile Capital in an Efficiency Wage Model”. in A. Razin and J. Slemrod, eds. Taxation in the Global Economy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 397-429.

 

-H.T. Hoon (1991). “Comparative Advantage and the Equilibrium Rate of Unemployment”. EcLets; V.37-#3, pp. 299-304.

 

-R. Brecher (1992). “An Efficiency-Wage Model with Explicit Monitoring: Unemployment and Welfare in an Open Economy”. JIE; V.32-#1/2, pp. 179-191.

 

-R. Brecher and E. Choudhri (1994). “Pareto Gains from Trade, Recondered: Compensating for Jobs Lost”. JIE; V.36-#3/4, pp. 223-238.

 

-L. Arvan and F. Schoumaker (1987). “Is Public Opinion Right and Conventional Economics Wrong About Commercial Policy”. Ms: University of Illinois.

 

-S. Matusz (1994). “International Trade Policy in a Model of Unemployment and Wage Differentials”. CJE; V.27-#4, pp. 939-949.

 

-S. Matusz (1996). “International Trade, the Division of Labor, and Unemployment”. IER; V.37-#1, pp. 71-84.

 

-S. Matusz (1998). “Calibrating the Employment Effects of Trade”. RIE; V.64-#4, pp. 592-603.

 

-G. Clemenz (1995). “Adverse Selection in Labor Markets and International Trade”. ScanJE; V.97-#1, pp. 73-88.

 

-J. Agell and P. Lundborg (1995). “Fair Wages in the Open Economy”. Eca; V.62-#247, pp. 335-351.

 

-H.T. Hoon (1999). “Intraindustry Trade, High-Wage Jobs, and the Wage Gap”. Economics Letters; V.65-#2, pp. 213-220.

 

-H.T. Hoon (2000). Trade, Jobs, and Wages. Northampton: Elgar.

 

-H.T. Hoon (2001). “General Equilibrium Implications of International Product Market Competition for Jobs and Wages”. Oxford Economic Papers; V.53-#1, pp. 138-156.

 

-H.T. Hoon (2001). “Adjustment of Wages and Equilibrium Unemployment in a Ricardian Global Economy”. JIE; V.54-#1, pp. 193-209.

 

-J. Stiglitz (1974). “Alternative Theories of Wage Determination and Unemployment in LDCs: The Labor Turnover Model”. QJE; V.88-#2, pp. 194-227.

 

-J. Stiglitz (1982). “Alternative Theories of Wage Determination and Unemployment: The Efficiency Wage Model”. in M. Gersovitz, et al. eds. The Theory and Experience of Economic Development. London: Allen and Unwin. pp. 78-106.

 

-L. Katz (1986). “Efficiency Wage Theories: A Partial Evaluation”. NBER Macroeconomics Annual--1986. Cambridge: MIT, pp. 235-276.

 

-A. Weiss (1991). Efficiency Wages: Models of Unemployment, Layoffs, and Wage Dispersion. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

 

(4) Job Search

 

-C. Davidson, L. Martin, and S. Matusz (1987). “Search, Unemployment and the Production of Jobs”. EJ; V.97-#?, pp. 857-875.

 

-C. Davidson, L. Martin, and S. Matusz (1988). “The Structure of Simple General Equilibrium Models with Frictional Unemployment”. JPE; V.96-6, pp. 1267-1293.

 

-C. Davidson, L. Martin, and S. Matusz (1989). “A Search Theoretic Approach to Unemployment and International Trade: Where Have all the Good Jobs Gone”. ms: Michigan State University.

 

-A. Hosios (1990). “Factor Market Search and the Structure of Simple General Equilibrium Models”. JPE; V.98-#2, pp. 325-355.

 

-C. Davidson, L. Martin, and S. Matusz (1991). “Multiple Free Trade Equilibria in Micro Models of Unemployment”. JIE; V.31-#1/2, pp. 157-169.

 

-G. Fields and E. Grinols (1991). “Import Competition in the High-Wage Sector and Trade Policy Effects on Labor”. Quarterly Review of Economics and Business; V.31-#2, pp. 33-56.

 

-C. Davidson, L. Martin, and S. Matusz (1999). “Trade and Search Generated Unemployment”. JIE; V.48-#2, pp. 271-299.

 

-F. Serner (2001). “Schumpeterian Unemployment, Trade and Wages”. JIE; V.54-#1, pp. 119-148.

 

-D. Acemoglu (2001). “Good Jobs versus Bad Jobs”. Journal of Labor Economics; V.19-#1, pp. 1-21.

 

-C. Davidson and S. Matusz (2002). International Trade, Labor Markets and the Poor. Kalamazoo: Uphohn.

 

-P. Diamond (1984). A Search Theoretic Approach to the Microfoundations of Macroeconomics. Cambridge: MIT.

 

-A. Mortensen (1986). “Job Search and Labor Market Analysis”. in O. Ashenfelter and R. Layard, eds. Handbook of Labor Economics. Cambridge: North-Holland.

 

-C. Pissarides (2000). Equilibrium Unemployment Theory. Cambridge: MIT Press.

 

(5) X-Efficiency and Trade

 

-J.P. Martin (1978). “X-Inefficiency, Managerial Effort and Protection”. Eca; V.45-#?, pp. 273-286.

 

-D. Rodrik (1992). “Closing the Technology Gap: Does Trade Liberalization Really Help?”. in G. Helleiner, ed. Trade Policy, Industrialization, and Development: New Perspectives. Oxford: OUP, pp. 155-175.

 

-N. Vousden (1993). “Variable Specific Factors and the `X-Efficiency Cost` of Protection”. RIE; V.1-#3, pp. 234-242.

 

-N. Vousden and N. Campbell (1994). “The Organizational Cost of Protection”. JIE; V.37-#3/4, pp.

 

-H. Horn, H. Lang and S. Lundgren (1995). “Managerial Effort Incentives, X-Inefficiency and International Trade”. EER; V.39-#1, pp. 117-138.

 

(6) Interindustry Wage Differences and Trade Policy: Empirical Research

 

-W. Dickens and K. Lang (1988). “Why it Matters What We Trade: A Case for Active Trade Policy”. in L. Tyson, W. Dickens and J. Zysman eds. The Dynamics of Trade and Employment. Cambridge: Ballinger, pp. 87-112.

 

-L. Katz and L. Summers (1989). “Can Inter-Industry Wage Differentials Justify Strategic Trade Policy?”. in R. Feenstra, ed. Trade Policies for International Competitiveness. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 85-116.

 

-L. Katz and L. Summers (1989). “Industry Rents: Evidence and Implications”. Brookings Papers (Microeconomics), pp. 209-275.

 

-W. Dickens (1995). “Do Labor Rents Justify Strategic Trade and Industrial Policy?”. NBER Working Paper Series; #5137.

 

-A. Krueger and L. Summers (1988). “Efficiency Wages and the Iner-Industry Wage Structure”. Etrica; V.56-#2, pp. 259-294.

 

-W. Dickens and L. Katz (1987). “Interindustry Wage Differences and Industry Characteristics”. in K. Lang and J. Leonard, eds. Unemployment and the Structure of Labor Markets. New York: Blackwell, pp. 48-89.

 

-K. Murphy and R. Topel (1987). “Unemployment, Risk, and Earnings: Testing for Equalizing Differences in the Labor Market”. in K. Lang and J. Leonard, eds. Unemployment and the Structure of Labor Markets. New York: Blackwell, pp. 103-141.

 

-J. Wagner (1990). “An International Comparison of Sector Wage Differentials”. EcLets; V.34-#?, pp. 93-97.

 

-E. Groshen (1991). “Five Reasons Why Wages Vary Among Employers”. Industrial Relations; V.30-#3, pp. 350-381.

 

-R. Gibbons and L. Katz (1992). “Does Unmeasured Ability Explain Inter-Industry Wage Differentials”. REStud; V.59-#?, pp. 515-535.

 

-J. Helwege (1992). “Sectoral Shifts and Interindustry Wage Differentials”. Journal of Labor Economics; V.10-#1, pp. 55-84.

 

-J. Borland and A. Suen (1992). “The Source of Inter-Industry Wage Differences in Australia”. in E. Bairam, ed. Studies in Labor Economics. London: Ashgate Publishing, pp. 46-71.

 

-A. Grey (1993). “Interindustry Wage Differentials in Manufacturing: Rents and Industrial Structure”. CJE; V.26-#3, pp. 525-535.

 

-M. Gittleman and E. Wolff (1993). “International Comparisons of Inter-Industry Wage Differentials”. Review of Income and Wealth; V.39-#3, pp. 295-312.

 

-E. Leamer and C. Thornberg (1998). “Efforts and Wages: A New Look at the Inter-Industry Wage Differentials”. NBER Working Paper, #6626.

 

h. Variable Factor Supply

 

-J. Vanek (1959). “An Afterthought on the “Real Cost-Opportunity Cost” Dispute and Some Aspects of General Equilibrium under Conditions of Variable Factor Supply”. REStud; V.26-#?, pp. 198-208.

 

-M. Kemp and R. Jones (1962). “Variable Labor Supply and the Theory of International Trade”. JPE; V.70-#?, pp. 30-36.

 

-J. Bhagwati and H.G. Johnson (1961). “A Generalized Theory of the Effect of Tariffs on the Terms of Trade”. OEP; V.13-#3, pp. 225-253. (part IV)

 

-J. Frenkel and A. Razin (1975). “Variable Factor Supplies and the Production Possiblity Frontier”. SEJ; V.41-#?, pp. 410-419.

 

-J. Martin (1976). “Variable Factor Supplies and the HOS Model”. EJ; V.86-#344, pp. 820-831.

 

-J.P. Neary (1978). “Capital Subsidies and Employment in an Open Economy”. OEP; V.30-#?, pp. 334-356.

 

-J. Martin and J.P. Neary (1980). “Variable Labor Supply and the Pure Theory of International Trade: An Empirical Note”. JIE; V.10-#?, pp. 549-559.

 

-W. Mayer (1991). “Endogenous Labor Supply in International Trade Theory: Two Alternative Models”. JIE; V.30-#1/2, pp. 105-120.

 

-R. Waschik (1992). “Some Theorems of International Trade with Endogenous Factor Supply”. EcLets; V.39-#1, pp. 59-64.

 

-M. Ohyama (1993). “International Trade and Work Efforts”. in H. Herberg and N.V. Long, eds., Trade, Welfare and Economic Policies. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 113-119.

 

-P. Hatzipanayotou and M. Michael (1995). “Tariffs, Quotas, and VERs with Endogenous Labor Supply”. ZfN; V.62-#2, pp. 185-201.

 

3. Temporary Equilibrium Models

 

a. Basic Structure of Temporary Equilibrium Models

 

-R. Barro and H. Grossman (1971). “A General Disequilibrium Model of Income and Employment”. AER; V.61-#1, pp. 82-93.

 

-R. Barro and H. Grossman (1976). Money, Employment and Inflation. Cambridge: CUP.

 

-E. Malinvaud (1977). The Theory of Unemployment Reconsidered. Oxford: Blackwell.

 

-J.-P. Benassy (1975). “Neo-Keynesian Disequilibrium Theory in a Monetary Economy”. REStud; V.42-#132, pp. 503-524.

 

-J.-P. Benassy (1977). “On Quantity Signals and the Foundation of Effective Demand Theory”. ScanJE; V.79-#2, pp. 147-148.

 

-J.-M. Grandmont (1977). “Temporary General Equilibrium Theory”. Etrica; V.45-#3, pp. 535-572.

 

-J. Muellbauer and R. Portes (1978). “Macroeconomic Models with Quantity Rationing”. EJ; V.88-#352, pp. 788-821.

 

-J.P. Neary and K. Roberts (1980). “The Theory of Household Behavior under Rationing”. EER; V.13-#1, pp. 25-42.

 

-R. Cornes and R. Albon (1981). “Evaluation of Welfare Change in Quantity-Constrained Regimes”. EcRec; V.?-#?, pp. 186-190.

 

-J.P. Neary and J. Stiglitz (1983). “Towards a Reconstruction of Keynesian Economics: Expectations and Constrained Equilibria”. QJE; V.98-supplement, pp. 199-228.

 

b. Open Economy Temporary Equilibrium Analysis: Small Country

 

-E. Helpman (1976). “Macroeconomic Policy in a Model of International Trade with a Wage Restriction”. IER; V.17-#2, pp. 262-277.

 

-A. Dixit (1978). “The Balance of Trade in a Model of Temporary Equilibrium with Rationing”. REStud; V.45-#3, pp. 393-404.

 

-J.P. Neary (1980). “Nontraded Goods and the Balance of Trade in a Neo-Keynesian, Temporary Equilibrium”. QJE; V.95-#3, pp. 403-430.

 

-R.F. Lucas (1980). “Tariffs, Nontraded Goods, and the Optimal Stabilization Policy”. AER; V.70-#4, pp. 611-625.

 

-E. Steigum (1980). “Keynesian and Classical Unemployment in an Open Economy”. ScanJE; V.82-#2, pp. 147-166.

 

-P.-O. Johansson and K.-G. Löfgren (1980). “The Effects of Tariffs and Real Wages on Employment in a Barro-Grossman Model of an Open Economy”. ScanJE; V.82-#2, pp. 167-183.

 

-J. Cuddington (1980). “Fiscal and Exchange Rate Policies in a Fix-Price Trade Model with Export Rationing”. JIE; V.10-#3, pp. 319-340.

 

-J. Cuddington (1981). “Import Substitution Policies: A Two-sector, Fix-Price Model”. REStud; V.48-#152, pp. 327-342.

 

-J. Mercenier and J. Waelbroeck (1985). “The Impact of Protection on Developing Countries: A General Equilibrium Analysis”. in K. Jugenfelt and D. Hague, eds. Structural Adjustment in Developed Open Economies. New York: St. Martins, pp. 219-239.

 

c. Open Economy Temporary Equilibrium Analysis: Large Country

 

-H. Lorie and J. Sheen (1982). “Supply Shocks in a Two-Country World with Wage and Price Rigidities”. EJ; V.92-#368, pp. 849-867.

 

-D. Laussel and C. Montet (1983). “Fixed-price Equilibria in a Two-country Model of Trade: Existence and Comparative Statics”. EER; V.22-#?, pp. 305-329.

 

-U. Schittko and A. Eckwert (1983). “A Two-country Temporary Equilibrium Model with Quantity Rationing”. Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik; V.198-#2, pp. 97-121.

 

-J. Benassy (1984). “Tariffs and Pareto Optimality in International Trade: The Case of Unemployment”. EER; V.21-#?, pp. 301-316.

 

-R. Owen (1985). “A Two-Country Disequilibrium Model”. JIE; V.18-#?, pp. 339-355.

 

-M.E. Kumcu (1985). “the Theory of Commercial Policy in a Monetary Economy with Sticky Wages”. JIE; V.18-#?, pp. 159-170.

 

4. Public Goods, Pollution and International Trade

 

a. Optimal Policy with Externalities and Public Goods

 

-A. Tsunkei (1987). “The Measurement of Waste in a Public Goods Economy”. JPubE; V.33-#?, pp. 73-94.

 

-H. Shibata and A. Shibata (1987). “Rent Redistribution through Provision of Public Goods”. in A. El-Agraa, ed. Protection, Cooperation, Integration and Development. London: Macmillan, pp. 268-284.

 

-D.K. Foley (1967). “Resource Allocation and the Public Sector”. Yale Economic Essays; V.?-#1, pp. 45-98.

 

-R. Dorfman (1969). “General Equilibrium with Public Goods”. in J. Margolis and H. Guitton, eds. Public Economics. New York: St. Martins; pp. 247-275.

 

-J.-C. Milleron (1972). “Theory of Value with Public Goods: A Survey Article”. JET; V.5-#?, pp. 419-477.

 

-W. Baumol and D. Bradford (1972). “Detrimental Externalities and Non-Convexity of the Production Set”. Etrica; V.39-#?, pp. 160-176.

 

-A. Denzau and R. Parks (1977). “A Problem with Public Sector Preferences”. JET; V.14-#?, pp. 454-457.

 

-D.A. Starrett (1972). “Fundamental Nonconvexities in the Theory of Externalities”. JET; V.4-#?, pp. 180-199.

 

-W.P. Heller and D.A. Starrett (1976). “On the Nature of Externalities”. in S.A.Y. Lin, ed. Theory and Measurement of Economic Externalities. New York: Academic Press.

 

-T. Bergstrom, L. Blume and H. Varian (1986). “On the Private Provision of Public Goods”. JPubE; V.29-#?, pp. 25-49.

 

-W. Baumol and W. Oates (1988). The Theory of Environmental Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

 

-E. Ostrom (1990). Governing the Commons. Cambridge: CUP.

 

-R. Cornes and T. Sandler (1986). The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

 

-J.-J. Laffont (1988). Fundamentals of Public Economics. Cambridge: MIT Press. (Chapter 1)

 

b. General Equilibrium Models of Trade and Pollution

 

-W. Baumol (1971). Environmental Protection, Spillovers and International Trade. Stockholm: Almqvist and Wicksell.

 

-I. Walter (1975). International Economics of Pollution. New York:

 

-H. Siebert, J. Eichberger, R. Gronych and R. Pethig (1980). Trade and Environment: A Theoretical Enquiry. Amsterdam: North-Holland.

 

-H. Siebert (1985). “Spatial Aspects of Environmental Economics”. in A. Kneese and J. Sweeney, eds. Handbook of Natural Resources and Energy Economics. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 125-164.

 

-J. Dean (1991). “Trade and the Environment: A Survey of the Literature”. in P. Low, ed. International Trade and the Envioronment. Washington, DC: World Bank, pp. 15-28.

 

-H. Siebert ed. (1991) Environmental Scarcity: The International Dimension. Tubingen: Mohr-Siebeck.

 

-P. Low, ed. (1991) International Trade and the Environment. World Bank Discussion Paper.

 

-J. Beghin, D. Roland-Holst, and D. van der Mensbrugghe (1994). “A Survey of the Trade and Environment Nexus: Global Dimensions”. OECD Economic Studies; V.23-#?, pp. 167-192.

 

(1) Trade and Comparative Advantage with Pollution/Public Goods

 

-M. Connolly (1972). “Trade in Public Goods: A Diagrammatic Analysis”. QJE; V.86-#?, pp. 61-78.

 

-H. Kiesling (1974). “Public Goods and the Possibilities for Trade”. CJE; V.7-#?, pp. 402-417.

 

-M. Connolly (1976). “Optimal Trade in Public Goods”. CJE; V.9-#?, pp. 702-705.

 

-H. Siebert (1974). “Trade and Environment”. in H. Giersch, ed. The International Division of Labor: Problems and Perspectives. Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr, pp. 108-121.

 

-H. Siebert (1977). “Environmental Quality and the Gains from Trade”. KYKLOS; V.30-#?, pp. 657-673.

 

-J. Stiglitz (1983). “Public Goods in Open Economies with Heterogeneous Individuals”. in J. Thisse and H. Zoller, eds. Locational Analysis of Public Facilities. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 55-78.

 

-B. Copeland and M.S. Taylor (1994). “North-South Trade and the Environment”. QJE; V.109-#?, pp. 755-787.

 

-Ramón López (1994). “The Environment as a Factor of Production: The Effects of Economic Growth and Trade Liberalization”. JEEM; V.27-#2, pp. 163-184.

 

-L. Leger (1995). “Environmental Degradation as an Incentive for Trade”. RIE; V.3-#3, pp. 307-318.

 

-H. Lee and D. Roland-Holst (1997). “The Environment and Welfare Implications of Trade and Tax Policy”. JDevE; V.52-#1, pp. 65-82.

 

-J. Beghin, D. Roland-Holst, and D. van der Mensbrugghe (1999). “Long-term Modelling of Trade and Environmental Linkages”. in R. Baldwin and J. Francois, eds. Dynamic Issues in Applied Commercial Policy Analysis. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 345-366.

 

-B. Copeland and M.S. Taylor (1999). “Trade, Spatial Separation, and the Environment”. JIE; V.47-#1, pp. 137-168.

 

-Olaf Unteroberdoerster (2001). “Trade and Transboundary Pollution: Spatial Separation Reconsidered”. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management; V.41-#3, pp. 269-285.

 

-P. Eliste and P.G. Fredriksson (2002). “Environmental Regulations, Transfers, and Trade: Theory and Evidence”. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management; V.43-#2, pp. 234-250.

 

-S. Magee and W. Ford (1972). “Environmental Pollution, the Terms of Trade and the Balance of Payments of the US”. KYKLOS; V.25-#?, pp. 101-118.

 

-I. Walter (1973). “The Pollution Content of American Trade”. Western Economic Journal; V.11-#?, pp. 61-70.

 

(2) Environmental Regulation and Comparative Advantage

 

(a) Theory

 

-R. d'Arge and A. Kneese (1972). “Environmental Quality and International Trade”. IO; V.26-#?, pp. 419-465.

 

-A. Majocchi (1972). “The Impact of Environmental Measures on International Trade”. Revista Internazionale di Scienze Economiche e Commericali; V.19-#?, pp. 458-479.

 

-H. Siebert (1974). “Environmental Protection and International Specialization”. WA; V.110-#?, pp. 494-507.

 

-H. Siebert (1974). “Comparative Advantage and Environmental Policy: A Note”. Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie; V.34-#?, pp. 397-402.

 

-I. Walter (1974). “International Trade and Resource Diversion: The Case of Environmental Management”. WA; V.110-#?, 482-493.

 

-H. Siebert (1976). “Environmental Control, Economic Structure and International Trade”. in I. Walter, ed. Studies in International Environmental Economics; New York: ?, pp. 29-56.

 

-R. Pethig (1976). “Pollution, Welfare and Environmental Policy in the Theory of Comparative Advantage”. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management; V.2-#?, pp. 160-169.

 

-H. Siebert (1977). “Environmental Quality and the Gains from Trade”. Kyklos; V.30-#?, pp. 657-673.

 

-R. Blackhurst (1977). “International Trade and Domestic Environmental Policies in a Growing World Economy”. in R. Blackhurst, ed. International Relations in a Changing World. Geneva: Sythoff-Leiden.

 

-M. McGuire (1982). “Regulation, Factor Rewards, and International Trade”. JPubE; V.17-#?, pp. 335-354.

 

-J. Merrifield (1988). “The Impact of Selected Abatement Strategies on Transnational Pollution, the Terms of Trade, and Factor Rewards: A General Equilibrium Approach”. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management; V.15-#?, pp. 259-284.

 

-M. Rauscher (1991). “National Environmental Policies and the Effects of Economic Integration”. EJPE; V.7-#?, pp. 313-329.

 

-G. Chichilnisky (1994). “North-South Trade and the Global Environment”. AER; V.84-#4, pp. 851-874.

 

-J. Dean (1995). “Export Bans, Environment, and Developing Country Welfare”. RIE; V.3-#3, pp. 319-329.

 

-A. Schweinberger (1997). “Environmental Policies, Comparative Advantage and the Gains/Losses from International Trade”. Japanese Economic Review; V.48-#2, pp. 199-212.

 

-N. Hung and Y. richelle (1997). “Trade Gains, Paretian Transfer and the Tragedy of the Commons”. Japanese Economic Review; V.48-#2, pp. 214-225.

 

-B. Copeland and M. Taylor (1999). “Trade, Spatial Separation and the Environment”. JIE; V.47-#?, pp. 137-168.

 

-M. Benarroch and H. Thille (2001). “Transboundary Pollution and the Gains from Trade”. JIE; V.55-#1, pp. 139-159.

 

(b) Empirics

 

-R. D'Arge (1974). “International Trade, Domestic Income, and Environmental Controls: Some Empirical Estimates”. in A. Kneese, ed. Managing the Environment: International Economic Cooperation for Pollution Control. New York: Praeger, pp. 289-315.

 

-I. Walter (1982). “Environmentally Induced Industrial Relocation to Developing Countries”. in S. Rubin and T. Graham, eds. Environment and Trade. pp. 67-101.

 

-J. Kalt (1988). “The Impact of Domestic Environmental Regulatory Policies on US International Competitiveness”. in A.M. Spence and H.A. Hazard, eds. International Competitiveness. Cambridge: Ballinger, pp. 221-262.

 

-J. Tobey (1990). “The Effects of Domestic Environmental Policies on Patterns of World Trade: An Empirical Test”. Kyklos; V.43-#2, pp. 191-209.

 

-G. Grossman and A. Krueger (1993). “Environmental Impacts of a North American Free Trade Area”. in P. Garber, ed. The Mexico-US Free Trade Agreement. Cambridge: MIT, pp. 13-56.

 

-J. Whalley (1991). “The Interface Between Environmental and Trade Policies”. EJ; V.101-#?, pp. 100-189.

 

-P. Low and A. Yeats (1992). “Do `Dirty` Industries Migrate?”. in P. Low, ed. International Trade and the Environment. Washington, DC: World Bank.

 

-R.E.B. Lucas, D. Wheeler and H. Hettige (1992). “Economic Development, Environmental Regulation and the International Migration of Toxic Industrial Pollution: 1960-1988". in P. Low, ed. International Trade and the Environment. Washington, DC: World Bank.

 

-J. Dean (1992). “Environmentally Induced Trade Restraints and Developing Country Welfare”. ms: Johns Hopkins SAIS.

 

-R. d'Arge and A. Kneese (1980). “State Liability for International Environmental Degradation: An Economic Perspective”, Natural Resource Journal; V.20-#?, pp.

 

(3) Optimal Policy

 

(a) Competitive Economy

 

-J. Markusen (1975). “International Externalities and Optimal Tax Structures”. JIE; V.4-#?, pp. 15-29.

 

-K. Krutilla (1991). “Environmental Regulation in an Open Economy”. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management; V.20-#?, pp. 127-142.

 

-M. Rauscher (1991). “Foreign Trade and the Environment”. in H. Siebert, ed. Environmental Scarcity: The International Dimension. Tubingen: Mohr-Siebeck.

 

-K. Anderson (1992). “The Standard Welfare Economics of Policies Affecting Trade and the Environment”. in K. Anderson R. Blackhurst, eds. The Greening of World Trade Issues. Hemmel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

 

-B. Copeland (1994). “International Trade and the Environment: Policy Reform in a Polluted Small Open Economy”. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management; V.26-#?, pp. 44-65.

 

-B. Copeland and M.S. Taylor (1995). “Trade and Transboundary Pollution”. American Economic Review; V.85-#4, pp. 716-737.

 

-E. Mohr (1995). “International Environmental Permit Trade and Debt: The Consequences of Country Sovereignty and Cross-Default Policies”. RIE; V.3-#1, pp. 1-19.

 

-B. Copeland (1996). “Pollution Content Tariffs, Environmental Rent Shifting, and the Control of Cross-border Pollution”. JIE; V.40-#3/4, pp. 459-476.

 

-J. Beghin, D. Roland-Holst, D. Van Der Mensbrugghe (1997). “Trade and Pollution Linkages: Piecemeal Reform and Optimal Intervention”. CJE; V.30-#2, pp. 442-455.

 

Antweiler, Werner, Brian Copeland, and M. Scott Taylor (2001). “Is Free Trade Good for the Environment?”. American Economic Review; V.91-#4, pp. 877-908.

 

-L. Karp, S. Sacheti, and J. Zhao (2001). “Common Ground between Free-Traders and Environmentalists”. International Economic Review; V.42-#3, pp. 617-647.

 

-A. Panagariya, K. Palmer, W. Oates, and A. Krupnick (1993). “Toward an Integrated Theory of Open Economy Environmental and Trade Policy”. ms: University of Maryland.

 

(b) Oligopoly–Strategic Trade and Environmental Policy

 

-A. Ulph (1992). “The Choice of Environmental Policy Instruments and Strategic International Trade”. in R. Pethig, ed. Conflicts and Cooperation in Managing Environmental Resources. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.

 

-K. Conrad (1993). “Taxes and Subsidies for Pollution-Intensive Industries as Trade Policy”. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management; V.25-#2, pp. 121-135.

 

-S. Barrett (1994). “Strategic Environmental Policy and International Trade”. JPubE; V.54-#3, pp. 325-338.

 

-J. Stranlund (1996). “On the Strategic Potential of Technological Aid in International Environmental Relations”. ZfN; V.64-#1, pp. 1-22.

 

-N.V. Long and A. Soubeyran (1999). “Pollution, Pigouvian Taxes and Asymmetric International Oligopoly”. In E. Petrakis, E. Satzetakis, and A. Xepapadeas, eds. Environmental regulation and market power: Competition, time consistency and international trade. Cheltenham: Elgar, pp. 175-194.

 

-E. Feess and G. Taistra (2000). “Porter's Hypothesis on Environmental Policy in an Oligopoly Model with Cost Asymmetry Caused by Innovation”. Jahrbucher fur Nationalokonomie und Statistik; V.220-#1, pp. 18-31.

 

-A. Mattoo (2001). “Discriminatory Consequences of Non-Discriminatory Standards”. Journal of Economic Integration; V.16-#1, pp. 78-105.

 

c. Strategic Analysis of Trade and Pollution

 

-M. Connolly (1970). “Public Goods, Externalities and International Relations”. JPE; V. 87-#?, pp. 279-290.

 

-J. Markusen (1975). “Cooperative Control of International Pollution and Common Property Resources”. QJE; V.89-#3, pp. 618-632.

 

-H. Tulkens (1979). “An Economic Model of International Negotiations Relating to Transfrontier Pollution”. in K. Krippendorf, ed. Communication and Control in Society. New York: Gordon and Breach, pp. 199-212.

 

-K.G. Maler (1989). “The Acid Rain Game”. in H. Folmer and E. Ierland, eds. Valuation Methods and Policy Making in Environmental Economics. New York: Elsevier.

 

-M. Hoel (1991). “Efficient International Agreements for Reducing Emissions of CO2". Energy Journal; V.12-#2, pp. 93-107.

 

-M. Hoel (1992). “International Environment Conventions: The Case of Uniform Reductions of Emissions”. Environmental and Resource Economics; forthcoming.

 

-M. Hoel (1992). “Emission Taxes in a Dynamic Game of CO2 Emissions”. in R. Pethig, ed. Conflicts and Cooperation in Managing Environmental Resources. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.

 

-M. Hoel (1992). “Carbon Taxes: An International Tax or Harmonized Domestic Taxes”. EER; V.36-#?, pp. 400-406.

 

-S. Barrett (1990). “The Problem of Global Environmental Protection”. Oxford Review of Economic Policy; V.6-#1, pp. 68-79.

 

-K.G. Maler (1990). “International Environmental Problems”. Oxford Review of Economic Policy; V.6-#1, pp. 80-108.

 

-N.V. Long and H. Siebert (1991). “Institutional Competition versus ex-ante Harmonization: The Case of Environemental Policy”. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics; V.147-#2, pp. 296-311.

 

-C. Carraro and D. Siniscalco (1992). “The International Protection of the Environment: Voluntary Agreements Among Sovereign Countries”. in P. Dasgupta, et al., eds. The Protection of the Transnational Commons. Oxford: Clarendon.

 

-C. Carraro and D. Siniscalco (1992). “The International Dimension of Environmental Policy”. EER; V.36-#?, pp. 379-387.

 

-C. Carraro and D. Siniscalco (1993). “Strategies for the International Protection of the Environment”. JPubE; V.52-#?, pp. 309-328.

 

-P. Chander and H. Tulkens (1992). “Theoretical Foundations of Negotiations and Cost Sharing in Transfrontier Pollution Problems”. EER; V.36-#?, pp. 388-398.

 

-B. Copeland (1990). Stragegic Enhancement and Destruction of Fisheries and the Environment in the Presence of International Externalities”. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management; V.19-#?, pp. 212-226.

 

-M. Rauscher (1991). “National Environmental Policies and the Effects of Economic Integration”. EJPE; V.7-#3, pp. 313-329.

 

-J. Black, M. Levi and D. de Meza (1993). “Creating a Good Atmosphere: Minimum Participation for Tackling the ‘Greenhouse Effect’”. Eca; V.60-#?, pp. 281-293.

 

-R. Ludema and I. Wooton (1994). “Cross-Border Externalities and Trade Liberalization: The Strategic Control of Pollution”. CJE; V.27-#4, pp. 950-966.

 

-S. Barrett (1994). “Self Enforcing International Environmental Agreements”. OEP; V.46-#?, pp. 878-894.

 

-P. Kennedy (1994). “Equilibrium Pollution Taxes in Open Economies with Imperfect Competition”. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management; V.27-#?, pp. 49-63.

 

-M. Rauscher (1994). “On Ecological Dumping”. OEP; V.46-#?, pp. 822-840.

 

-B. Copeland and M.S. Taylor (1995). “Trade and Transboundary Pollution”. AER; V.85-#4, pp. 716-737.

 

-J. Brander and M.S. Taylor (1998). “International Trade and Open Access Renewable Resources: The Small Open Economy Case”. JIE; V.44-#2, pp. 181-209.

 

-L.T.M. Bui (1998). “Gains from Trade and Strategic Interaction: Equilibrium Acid Rain Abatement in the Eastern United States and Canada”. AER; V.88-#4, pp. 984-1001.

 

-J. Stranlund (1996). “On the Strategic Potential of Technological Aid in International Environmental Relations”. ZfN; V.64-#1, pp. 1-22.

 

-B. Copeland (2000). “Trade and Environment: Policy Linkages”. Environment and Development Economics; V.5-#4, pp. 405-32.

 

5. Noneconomic Objectives

 

a. General Analysis of Noneconomic Objectives

 

-B&S, Chapter 24

 

-H.G. Johnson (1960). “The Cost of Protection and the Scientific Tariff”. JPE; V.68-#4, pp. 327-345. (see comment in JPE, V.89-#1, pp. 192-195)

 

-H.G. Johnson (1964). “Tariffs and Economic Development: Some Theoretical Issues”. Journal of Development Studies; V.1-#?, pp. 3-30.

 

-J. Bhagwati and T.N. Srinivasan (1969). “Optimal Intervention to Achieve Non-Economic Objectives”. REStud. V.36-#?, pp. 27-38.

 

-A. Vandendorpe (1974). “On the Theory of Non-Economic Objectives in Open Economies”. JIE. V.4-#1, pp. 15-24.

 

-A. Ray (1974). “A General Theorem on Uniform versus Differentiated Tax-Subsidy Structure”. JET; V.7-#?, pp. 109-114.

 

-A. Panagariya (1983). “Import Objective, Distortions and Optimal Tax Structure: A Generalization”. QJE; V.?-#?, pp. 515-524.

 

-A. Tan (1971). “Optimal Trade Policies and Non-Economic Objectives in Models Involving Imported Materials, Inter-Industry Flows, and Non-Traded Goods”. REStud. V.38-#113, pp. 105-112.

 

-E.S. Yu (1975). “A Pure Intermediate Good and Optimal Intervention to Achieve Non-economic Objectives”. EcRec. V.??-#??, pp. 99-104.

 

-R. Baldwin (1982). “The Inefficacy of Trade Policy”. Princeton Essays in International Finance. #150.

 

-R. Baldwin and R. Green (1988). “The Effects of Protection on Domestic Output”. in R. Baldwin, ed. Trade Policy Issues and Empirical Analysis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 205-231.

 

b. The Tariff and the Income Distribution

 

-Corden, Chapter 5

 

-G.C. Hufbauer and H.O. Balkhy (1974). “The Cost of Redistributing Income Through Trade Policy”. WA. V.110-#?, pp. 38-52.

 

-D.F. Burgess (1976). “Tariffs and Income Distribution: Some Empirical Evidence from the United States”. JPE; V.84-#1, pp. 17-45.

 

-P.J. Lloyd (1987). “Protection Policy and the Assignment Rule”. in H. Kierzkowski, Protection and Competition in International Trade. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 4-21.

 

-R. Feenstra and T. Lewis (1991). “Distributing the Gains from Trade with Imperfect Information”. E&P; V.3-#1, pp. 21-39.

 

-B. Gardner (1983). “Efficient Redistribution through Commodity Markets”. American Journal of Agricultural Economics; V.65-#2, pp. 225-234.

 

-J. Hartigan and E. Tower (1982). “Trade Policy and the American Income Distribution”. REStat; V.64-#2, pp. 261-270.

 

-A. Deardorff (1999) “International Externalities in the Use of Domestic Policies to Redistribute Income”. in M. Kreinin, M. Plummer, and S. Abe, eds., Asia-Pacific Economic Linkages. New York: Pergamon, 1999.

 

c. Foreign Dependence and Trade Policy for a Risky World

 

-J. Bhagwati and T.N. Srinivasan (1976). “Optimal Trade Policy and Compensation Under Endogenous Uncertainty: The Phenomenon of Market Disruption”. JIE; V.6-#?, pp. 317-336.

 

-M. Kemp and H. Ohta (1978). “The Optimal Level of Exports Under Threat of Foreign Import Restriction”. CJE; V.11-#?, pp. 720-725.

 

-W. Mayer (1977). “The National Defense Tariff Argument Reconsidered”. JIE. V.7-#?, pp. 363-377.

 

-G.S. Tolley and J.D. Wilman (1977). “The Foreign Dependence Question”. JPE, V.85-#2, pp. 323-347.

 

-R. Arad and A.L. Hillman (1979). “Embargo Threat, Learning and Departure from Comparative Advantage”. JIE. V.9-#?, pp. 265-275.

 

-Z. Eckstein and M. Eichenbaum (1985). “Oil Supply Disruptions and the Optimal Tariff in a Dynamic Stochastic Environment”. in T. Sargent, ed. Energy, Foresight and Strategy. Washington, DC: Resources for the Future.

 

-L. Cheng (1983). “Ex Ante Plant Design, Portfolio Theory, and Uncertain Terms of Trade”. JIE. V.14-#?, pp. 25-51.

 

-L. Cheng (1987). “Uncertainty and Economic Self-Sufficiency”. JIE. V.23-#?, pp. 167-178.

 

-L. Cheng (1989). “Intermittent Trade Disruptions and Optimal Production”. IER. V.30-#4, pp. 753-774.

 

-T.N. Srinivasan (1987). “The National Defense Argument for Government Intervention in Foreign Trade”. in R. Stern, U.S. Trade Policies in a Changing World Economy. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 337-375.

 

-A.L. Hillman and N.V. Long (1983). “Pricing and Depletion of an Exhaustible Resource when There is Anticipation of Trade Disrutpion”. QJE; V.97-#?, pp. 215-234.

 

-G. Tolley and J. Wilman (1984). “A Depletable Resource under International Uncertainty”. Resources and Energy; V.6-#?, pp. 205-234.

 

-G. Loury (1983). “The Welfare Effects of Intermittent Interruptions of Trade”. AER; V.73-#2, pp. 272-277.

 

-C. Bergstrom, G. Loury and M. Persson (1985). “Embargo Threats and the Management of Energy Reserves”. JPE; V.93-#1, pp. 26-42.

 

-R. Lindsey (1989). “Import Disruptions, Exhaustible Resources, and Intertemporal Security of Supply”. CJE, V.22-#2, pp. 340-363.

 

-C. van Marrewijk and P. van Bergeijk (1990). “Trade Uncertainty and Specialization: Social versus Private Planning”. De Economist; V.138-#?, pp. 15-32.

 

-C. van Marrewijk (1992). “Trade Uncertainty and the Two-Step Procedure: the Choice of Numeraire and Exact Indexation”. De Economist; V.140-#?, pp. 357-372.

 

-C. van Marrewijk and P. van Bergeijk (1995). “Endogenous Trade Uncertainty: Why Countries May Specialize Against Comparative Advantage”. RSUE; V.23-#?, pp. 681-694.

 

-M. Mcguire (1991). “Factor Migration, Trade, and Welfare under Threat of Commercial Disruption”. Osaka Economic Papers; V.40-#3/4, pp. 165-180.

 

D. The Economics of Non-Tariff Barriers

 

1. Quantitative Restrictions

 

a. Basic Economic Analysis of Quotas

 

-W.M. Corden (1971). The Theory of Protection. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Chapters 9 and 10).

 

-W.A. deHaan and P. Visser (1979). “Quotas and Equilibrium Relative Prices in the Trade Restricting Country”. EcLets; V.3-#?, pp. 251-255.

 

-J. Anderson (1988). The Relative Inefficiency of Quotas. Cambridge: MIT Press.

 

-B. Spencer (1997). “Quota Licenses for Imported Capital Equipment: Could Bureaucrats Ever Do Better than the Market?”. JIE; V.43-#1/2, pp. 1-27.

 

-K. Krishna and L.H. Tan (1999). “Transferable License versus Nontransferable Licenses: What is the Difference?”. IER; V.40-#3, pp. 785-800.

 

b. Economic Analysis of Auction Quotas

 

-C.F. Bergsten, K.A. Elliott, J.J. Schott and W.E. Takacs (1987). Auction Quotas and US Trade Policy. Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics.

 

-W. Takacs (1988). “Economic Aspects of Quota License Auctions”. Journal of World Trade; V.22-#?, pp. 39-51.

 

-R. Feenstra (1989). “Auctioning US Import Quotas: Foreign Response and Alternative Polices”. International Trade Journal; V.3-#3, pp. 239-260.

 

-R.C. Feenstra, T.R. Lewis and J. McMillan (1990). “Designing Policies to Open Trade”. E&P; V.2-#3, pp. 223-240.

 

-K. Krishna (1990). “The Case of the Vanishing Revenues: Auction Quotas with Monopoly”. AER; V.80-#4, pp. 828-836.

 

-K. Krishna (1993). “The Case of the Vanishing Revenues: Auction Quotas with Oligopoly”. in W. Ethier, E. Helpman and J.P. Neary, eds. Theory, Policy and Dynamics in International Trade. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 157-172.

 

-K. Krishna (1993). “Theoretical Implications of Imperfect Competition on Quota License Prices and Auctions”. WBER; V.7-#1, pp. 113-136.

 

R.P. McAfee, W. Takacs and D. Vincent (1999). “Tarrifying Auctions”. RandJE; V.30-#1, pp. 158-179.

 

c. Tariffs v. Quotas Under Uncertainty

 

-G. Fishelson and F. Flatters (1975). “The (Non)Equivalence of Optimal Tariffs and Quotas Under Uncertainty”. JIE; V.5-#?, pp. 385-393.

 

-M. Pelcovits (1976). “Quotas versus Tariffs”. JIE; V.6-#?, pp. 363-370.

 

-C. Vastrup (1979). “The Choice Between a Tariff and a Quota under Uncertainty”. WA; V.115-#4, pp. 729-734.

 

-H. Ohta (1978). “On the Ranking of Price and Quantity Controls Under Uncertainty”. JIE; V.8-#?, pp. 543-550.

 

-L. Young (1979). “Ranking Optimal Tariffs and Quotas for a Large Country under Uncertainty”. JIE; V.9-#?, pp. 249-264.

 

-L. Young and J. Anderson (1980). The Optimal Policies for Restricting Trade under Uncertainty”. REStud; V.46-#4, pp. 927-932.

 

-L. Young (1982). “Quantity Controls vs. Expenditure Controls in International Trade under Uncertainty”. JIE; V.12-#?, pp. 143-163.

 

-L. Young and J. Anderson (1982). “Risk Aversion and Optimal Trade Restrictions”. REStud, V.49-#?, pp. 291-305.

 

-M.J. Driscoll and J.L. Ford (198?). “Protection and Optimal Trade Restricting Policies under Uncertainty”. MS; V.??-#?, pp. 21-32.

 

-H. Lapan and E.K. Choi (1988). “Tariffs versus Quotas under Uncertainty: Restricting Imports and the Role of Preference”. IEJ; V.2-#4, pp. 35-55.

 

-M. Anam (1989). “Terms of Trade Shocks and Domestic Prices Under Tariffs and Quotas: A Note”. EER; V.33-#?, pp. 1279-1282.

 

-E. Helpman and A. Razin (1980). “Efficient Protection under Uncertainty”. AER; V.70-#2, pp. 716-731.

 

-R. Eldor (1986). “The Effective Protection Rate Under Uncertainty: A Note”. EcRec; V.??-#?, pp. 485-489.

 

-P. Dasgupta and J. Stiglitz (1977). “Tariffs vs. Quotas as Revenue Raising Devices under Uncertainty”. AER; V.67-#5, pp. 975-981.

 

-L. Young (1980). “Tariffs vs. Quotas under Uncertainty: An Extension”. AER; V.70-#3, pp. 522-527.

 

2. Voluntary Export Restraints

 

a. Basic Theory: Effect on Importing Country

 

(1) Partial Equilibrium

 

R. Pomfret (1989). “The Economics of Voluntary Export Restraint Agreements”. Journal of Economic Surveys; V.3-#3, pp. 199-211.

 

-T. Murray, W. Schmidt and I. Walter (1978). “Alternative Forms of Protection against Market Disruption”. Kyklos; V.31-#4, pp. 624-637.

 

-B. Hindley (1980). “Voluntary Export Restraints and Article XIX of the GATT”. in J. Black and B. Hindley, eds. Current Issues in Commercial Policy and Diplomacy; New York: St. Martins, pp. 52-72.

 

-B. Hindley (198?). “Voluntary Export Restrains and the GATT's Main Escape Clause”. World Economy, V.??-#?, pp. 313-341.

 

-C. Turner (1983). “Voluntary Export Restraints on Trade Going to the United States”. SEJ; V.49-#3, pp. 793-803.

 

-B.J. Liu (1986). “On Voluntary Export Restraints”. Economic Essays; V.15-#1, pp. 45-62.

 

-C. Hamilton (1985). “Voluntary Export Restraints and Trade Diversion”. Journal of Common Market Studies; V.23-#4, pp. 345-355.

 

-F. Dei (1985). “Voluntary Export Restraints and Foreign Investment”. JIE; V.19-#?, pp. 305-312.

 

R. Pomfret (1989). “Voluntary Export Restraints in the Presence of Monopoly Power”. Kyklos; V.42-#1, pp. 61-72 .

 

Eldor, Rafael and Dan Levin (1991). “Trade Liberalization and Domestic Monopoly: A Welfare Analysis”. International Economic Review; V.31-#4, pp. 773-82.

 

Wolf, Martin (1991). “Why Voluntary Export Restraints? A Historical Analysis”. In A. Koekkoek and L. Mennes, eds. International trade and global development: Essays in honour of Jagdish Bhagwati. London: Routledge, pp. 83-104.

 

C. Hamilton and G. Reed (1996). “Economic Aspects of Voluntary Export Restraints”. In D. Greenaway, ed. Current issues in international trade. London: Macmillan, pp. 100-123.

 

D. Clark (1999). “Nontariff Measures and U.S. Imports from Western Hemisphere Developing Countries”. Social and Economic Studies; V.48-#3, pp. 137-52.

 

(2) General Equilibrium

 

S. Suranovic (1991). “The Ineffectiveness of Quantitative Restrictions with Production Diversion”. Southern Economic Journal; V.58-#2, pp. 379-91.

 

S. Suranovic (1993). “Supply Diversion, Ineffective Quantitative Restrictions, and the Nonequivalence of Tariffs, Quotas, and VERs”. International Trade Journal; V.7-#3, pp. 295-319.

 

Y. Ono (1991). “Orderly Marketing Arrangement in the Context of the GATT”. E&P; V.3-#2, pp. 151-162.

 

K. Jones (1994). Export restraint and the new protectionism: The political economy of discriminatory trade restrictions. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

 

M. Kemp, K. Shimomura, and M. Okawa (1997). “Voluntary Export Restraints and Economic Welfare: A General Equilibrium Analysis”. Japanese Economic Review; V.48-#2, pp. 187-98.

 

P. Hatzipanayotou and M. Michael (1995). “Tariffs, Quotas, and Voluntary Export Restraints with Endogenous Labor Supply”. Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie; V.62-#2, pp. 185-201.

 

M. Michael and P. Hatzipanayotou (1999). “General Equilibrium Effects of Import Constraints under Variable Labour Supply, Public Goods and Income Taxation”. Economica; V.66-#263, pp. 389-401.

 

C. Yoshida (1998/9). “Pareto-Inferior Voluntary Export Restraints: A Note”. Indian Economic Journal; V.46-#3, pp. 98-103.

 

Chi-Chur Chao, Eden S. H. Yu (1996). “Product Differentiation, Voluntary Export Restraints, and Profits”. Managerial and Decision Economics; V.17-#1, pp. 103-110.

 

D. Collie and Y.-T. Su (1998). “Trade Policy and Product Variety: When Is a VER Superior to a Tariff?”. Journal of Development Economics; V.55-#1, pp. 249-55.

 

b. Basic Theory: Effect on Exporting Country

 

-C. Hamilton (1986). “Import Quotas and Voluntary Export Restraints: Focusing on Exporting Countries”. in. C. Findlay and R. Garnaut, eds. The Political Economy of Manufacturing Sector Protection in ASEAN and Australia; Sydney: Allen and Unwin, pp. 214-234.

 

-C. Hamilton (1986). “ASEAN Systems for Allocation of Export Licenses under VERs”. in. C. Findlay and R. Garnaut, eds. The Political Economy of Manufacturing Sector Protection in ASEAN and Australia; Sydney: Allen and Unwin, pp. 235-247.

 

-C. Hamilton (1986). “An Assessment of Voluntary Export Restraints on Hong Kong Exports to Europe and the US”. Eca; V.53-#2, pp. 159-178.

 

-C. Hamilton (1988). “Restrictiveness and International Transmission of the 'New' Protectionism”. in R. Baldwin, C. Hamilton and A. Sapir, eds. Issues in US-EC Trade Relations. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 199-224.

 

-T. Bark and J. deMelo (1988). “Export Quota Allocations, Export Earnings, and Market Diversification”. WBER; V.2-#3, pp. 341-348.

 

-T. Bark and J. deMelo (1989). “Efficiency and Export Earnings Implications of Two-Tier Quota Allocation Rules”. IEJ; V.3-#3, pp. 31-42.

 

-J. de Melo and L.A. Winters (1990). “Voluntary Export Restraints and Resource Allocation in Exporting Countries”. WBER; V.2-#4, pp. 209-233.

 

-J. deMelo and L.A. Winters (1993). “Do Exporters Gain from VERs?”. EER; V.37-#?, pp. 1331-1349.

 

c. VERs and Expectations

 

-M. Yano (1989). “Voluntary Export Restraints and Expectations: An Analysis of Export Quotas in Oligopolistic Markets”. International Economic Review; V.30-#4, pp. 707-23.

 

-J. Anderson (1992). “Domino Dumping, I: Competitive Exporters”. AER; V.82-#1, pp. 65-83.

 

-J. Anderson (1993). “Domino Dumping, II: Anti-Dumping”. JIE; V.35-#1/2, pp. 133-150.

 

-G. Hariharan and H. Wall (1992). “Intertemporal Optimization under Threat of VER”. JIEI; V.7-#1, pp. 45-57.

 

-B. Hoekman and M. Leidy (1990). “Policy Responses to Shifting Comparative Advantage: Designing A System of Emergency Protection”. KYKLOS; V.23-#5, pp. 27-44.

 

-W. Ethier (1991). “Voluntary Export Restraints”. in A. Takayama, et al. eds. Trade, Policy and International Adjustments. New York: Academic Press, pp. 3-18.

 

-L.A. Winters (1994). “VERs and Expectations: Extensions and Evidence”. EJ; V.104-#422, pp. 113-123.

 

-L.A. Winters (1994). “Import Surveillance as a Strategic Trade Policy”. in P. Krugman and A. Smith, eds. Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 211-232.

 

-I. Jans, H. Wall and G. Harihan (1995). “Protectionist Expectations and the Threat of Voluntary Export Restraint”. RIE; V.3-#2, pp. 199-208.

 

-O. Gokcekus and E. Tower (1997). “Can a Periodic VER Raise Importing Country Welfare?”. Journal of Economic Integration; V.12-#4, pp. 485-504.

 

-O. Gokcekus and E. Tower (1996). “Is A Protectionist Reputation Worth the Protection?: Extending Jans, Wall, and Harihan”. ms: Duke University.

 

d. VER’s under Oligopoly

 

-K. Krishna (1989). “What do VERs Do?”. in R. Sato and J. Nelson, eds. Beyond Trade Friction: Japan-US Economic Relations. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 76-92.

 

H. Quirmbach (1988). “Comparative Statics for Oligopoly: Demand Shift Effects”. International Economic Review; V.29-#3, pp. 451-59.

 

Y. Tanaka (1991). “Consumers' Preference and the Profitability of Voluntary Export Restraints in an International Duopoly under Integrated Markets”. Manchester School of Economics and Social Studies; V.59-#2, pp. 173-88.

 

J. Dean and S. Gangopadhyay (1991). “Market Equilibrium under the ‘Threat’ of a VER”. Journal of International Economics; V.30-#1/2, pp. 137-52.

 

J. Dean and S. Gangopadhyay (1992). “Strategic Trade Practices in the Presence of a VER”. International Economic Review; V.33-#3, pp. 645-59.

 

J. Ries (1993). “Voluntary Export Restraints, Profits, and Quality Adjustment”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.26-#3, pp. 688-706.

 

N. Bjorksten (1994). “Voluntary Import Expansions and Voluntary Export Restraints in an Oligopoly Model with Capacity”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.27-#2, pp. 446-57.

 

L. Qiu (1995). “Why Can't Countervailing Duties Deter Export Subsidization?”. Journal of International Economics; V.39-#3/4, pp. 249-72.

 

C. Syropoulos (1996). “On Pareto-Improving Voluntary Export Restraints”. International Journal of Industrial Organization; V.14-#1, pp. 71-84.

 

C. Syropoulos (1996). “Nontariff Trade Controls and Leader-Follower Relations in International Competition”. Economica; V.63-#252, pp. 633-48.

 

R. Acharyya (1995). “Protective Effects of Source-Specific 'VER' and Global Quota under Oligopoly”. Keio Economic Studies; V.32-#3, pp. 65-70.

 

R. Marchionatti and S. Usai (1997). “Voluntary Export Restraints, Dumping and Excess Capacity”. Manchester School of Economic and Social Studies; V.65-#5, pp. 499-512.

 

S. McCorriston and I. Sheldon (1997). “The (Non-)Equivalence of Tariffs and Quantity Restraints as ‘Rent-Shifting’ Policies”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.30-#4, pp. 1220-33.

 

K. Suzumura and J. Ishikawa (1997). “Voluntary Export Restraints and Economic Welfare”. Japanese Economic Review; V.48-#2, pp. 176-86.

 

J. Ishikawa (1998). “Who Benefits from Voluntary Export Restraints?”. Review of International Economics; V.6-#1, pp. 129-41.

 

K. Miyagiwa and Y. Ohno (1998). “Planting Disinformation through Voluntary Export Restraints”. Pacific Economic Review; V.3-#2, pp. 91-103.

 

-C. Yoshida (1999). “The Welfare Effects of Voluntary Export Restraints”. Seoul Journal of Economics; V.12-#2, pp. 143-55.

 

-R. Acharyya (1999). “Who Prefers Quotas to VER and When? A Case of Differentiated Oligopoly”. Keio Economic Studies; V.36-#1, pp. 51-60.

 

e. Empirical Evaluations

 

(1) Textiles

 

J. Goto (1989). “The Multifibre Arrangement and Its Effects on Developing Countries”. World Bank Research Observer; V.4-#2, pp. 203-27.

 

H.P. Gray (1989). “The Multi-Fibre Arrangement and the Least Developed Countries”. Industry and Development; #26, pp. 89-96.

 

J. Dean (1990). “The Effects of the U.S. MFA on Small Exporters”. Review of Economics and Statistics; V.72-#1, pp. 63-69.

 

W. Martin and S. Suphachalasai (1990). “Effects of the Multi-fibre Arrangement on Developing Country Exporters: A Simple Theoretical Framework”. In C. Hamilton, ed. Textiles trade and the developing countries: Eliminating the Multi-Fibre Arrangement in the 1990s. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, pp. 46-62.

 

-R. Erzan, J. Goto and P. Holmes (1990). “Effects of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement on Developing Countries’ Trade: An Empirical Investigation”. in C. Hamilton, ed. Textiles Trade and the Developing Countries. Washington, DC: The World Bank.

 

-I. Trela and J. Whalley (1990). “Global Effects of Developed Country Trade Restrictions in Textiles and Apparel”. EJ; V.100-#403, pp. 1190-1205.

 

H. Hill and S. Suphachalasai (1992). “The Myth of Export Pessimism (Even) under the MFA: Evidence from Indonesia and Thailand”. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; V.128-#2, pp. 310-29.

 

R. Faini, J. de Melo, and W. Takacs (1992). “The Effects of EC-92 on the Multi-fibre Arrangement”. European Economic Review; V.36-#2/3, pp. 527-38.

 

Aw, Bee-Yan (1993). Price Discrimination and Markups in Export Markets”. Journal of Development Economics; V.42-#2, pp. 315-36.

 

-K. Krishna and L.H. Tan (1994). “On the Importance of Rent Sharing in the Multi-Fibre Arrangement: Evidence from US-Hong Kong Trade in Textiles”. in A. Deardorff and R. Stern, eds. Analytical and Negotiating Issues in the Global Trading System. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 95-131.

 

-K. Krishna, R. Erzan and L.H. Tan (1994). “Rent Sharing in the Multi-Fibre Arrangement: Theory and Evidence from US Apparel Imports from Hong Kong”. RIE; V.2-#1, pp. 62-73.

 

K. Krishna and L.H. Tan (1997). “A Note on India's MFA Quota Allocation System: The Effect of Subcategorization”. Annales d'Economie et de Statistique; #47, pp. 39-50.

 

K. Krishna, W. Martin and L.H. Tan (1997). “Imputing License Prices: Limitations of a Cost-Based Approach”. Journal of Development Economics; V.52-#2, pp. 355-374.

 

-K. Krishna and L.H. Tan (1998). Rags and Riches: Implementing Apparel Quotas under the Multi-Fibre Arrangement. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

 

R. Faini, J. de Melo and W. Takacs (1995). “A Primer on the MFA Maze”. World Economy; V.18-#1, pp. 113-35.

 

-I. Trela and J. Whalley (1995). “Internal Quota-Allocation Schemes and the Costs of the MFA”. RIE; V.3-#3, pp. 284-306.

 

J. Dean (1995). “Market Disruption and the Incidence of VERs under the MFA”. Review of Economics and Statistics; V.77-#2, pp. 383-88.

 

J. Cassing and F.-Y. Hu (1996). “More Evidence on the Costs of the MFA and Liberalization Proposals from an Exporter's Viewpoint: The Interests of Taiwan”. Indian Journal of Applied Economics; V.5-#2, pp. 21-57.

 

Finger, J. Michael and Ann Harrison (1996). “The MFA Paradox: More Protection and More Trade?”. In A. Krueger, ed. The political economy of American trade policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 197-254.

 

L. Moore (1997). “US Imports of Clothing from Asian Developing Countries “. Journal of International Development; V.9-#3, pp. 309-30.

 

Yang, Yongzheng ; Martin, Will ; Yanagishima, Koji (1997). “Evaluating the Benefits of Abolishing the MFA in the Uruguay Round Package”. T. Hertel, ed. Global trade analysis: Modeling and applications. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 253-79.

 

Yazdani, Talat (1998). “Impact of MFA on Pakistan's Textiles and Clothing Industry with Special Reference to the United States “. Pakistan Economic and Social Review; V.36-#2, pp. 203-24.

 

Spinanger, Dean (1999). “Textiles beyond the MFA Phase-Out”. World Economy; V.22-#4, pp. 455-76.

 

(2) Footwear

 

-D. Greenaway (1986). “Estimating the Welfare Affects of Voluntary Export Restraints and Tariffs: An Application to Non-Leather Footwear in the UK. Applied Economics; V.18-#?, pp. 1065-1083.

 

-L.A. Winters (1990). “Voluntary Export Restraints and the Prices of UK Imports of Footwear”. WA; V.126-#?, pp. 523-542.

 

-L.A. Winters and P. Brenton (1991). “Quantifying the Economic Effects of Non-Tariff Barriers: The Case of UK Footwear”. KYKLOS; V.44-#?, pp. 71-91.

 

-W. Takacs and L.A. Winters (1991). “Labour Adjustment Costs and British Footwear Protection”. OEP; V.43-#?, pp. 479-501.

 

-C. Hamilton, J. deMelo and L.A. Winters (1992). “Who Wins and Who Loses from VERs: The Case of Footwear”. WBRO; V.4-#1, pp. 17-34.

 

-L.A. Winters and P. Brenton (1993). “Modelling Quantitative Trade Restrictions: Rationing in the Rotterdam Model”. De Economist; V.141-#1, pp. 112-125.

 

-P. Brenton and L.A. Winters (1993). “Voluntary Export Restraints and Rationing: UK Leather Footwear Imports from Eastern Europe”. JIE; V.34-#3/4, pp. 289-308.

 

(3) Steel

 

-Tarr, David (1987). “Costs and Benefits to the US of the 1985 Steel Import Quota Program”. in R. Sato and P. Wachtel, eds. Trade Friction and Economic Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 159-183.

 

-D. Tarr (1987). “Effects of Restraining Steel Exports from the Republic of Korea and Other Countries to the US and the EEC”. World Bank Economic Review; V.1-#3, pp. 397-418.

 

-Tarr, David (1988). “The Steel Crisis in the US and the EC: Causes and Adjustments”. in R. Baldwin, et al. eds. Issues in US-EC Trade Relations. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 173-198.

 

-Eichengreen, Barry and Hans van der Ven (1984). “US Antidumping Policies: The Case of Steel”. in R. Baldwin and A. Krueger, eds. The Structure and Evolution of Recent US Trade Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press\NBER, pp. 67-103.

 

-Boorstein, Randi and Robert Feenstra (1991). “Quality Upgrading and Its Welfare Cost in US Steel Imports, 1969-1974". in E. Helpman and A. Razin, eds. International Trade and Trade Policy. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 167-186.

 

(4) Autos

 

-J. Gomez-Ibanez and D. Harrison (1982). “Imports and the Future of the US Auto Industry”. AER; V.72-#3, pp. 319-323.

 

-J. Gomez-Ibanez, R. Leone and S. O'Connell (1983). “Restraining Auto Imports: Does Anyone Win?”. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management; V.2-#?, pp. 196-218.

 

-Tarr, D. and M. Morkre (1984). Aggregate Costs to the US of Tariffs and Quotas on Imports. Washington, DC: Federal Trade Commission.

 

-Crandall, R. (1984). “Import Quotas and the Auto Industry: The Costs of Protection”. Brookings Review; V.2-#4, pp. 8-16.

 

-Kaplan, Daniel (1986). “Automobiles”. Chapter 5 of Has Trade Protection Revitalized Domestic Industries. US: Congressional Budget Office.

 

-Crandall, R. (1987). “The Effects of US Trade Protection for Autos and Steel”. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity; #1, pp. 271-288.

 

-Dinopoulos, E. and M. Kreinin (1988). “Effects of the US-Japan Auto VER on European Prices and on US Welfare”. Review of Economics and Statistics, V.70-#3, pp. 484-491.

 

-Tarr, D. (1989). A General Equilibrium Analysis of the Welfare and Employment Effects of US Quotas in Textiles, Autos and Steel. Washington, D.C.: Federal Trade Commission.

 

-Winston, C. and Associates (1987). Blind Intersection? Policy and the US Automobile Industry. Washington, DC: Brookings.

 

-Feenstra, R. (1984) “Voluntary Export Restraint in US Autos, 1980-81: Quality, Employment and Welfare Effects”. in R. Baldwin and A. Krueger, eds. The Structure and Evolution of Recent US Trade Policies; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 35-65. also in Bhagwati.

 

-Feenstra, R. (1985). “Automobile Prices and Protection: The US-Japan Trade Restraint”. Journal of Policy Modeling; V.7-#1, pp. 49-68.

 

-Feenstra, R. (1988). “Quality Change Under Trade Restraints in Japanese Autos”. Quarterly Journal of Economics; V.103-#1, pp. 131-146.

 

-Feenstra, R. (1988). “Gains from Trade in Differentiated Products: Japanese Compact Trucks”. in R. Feenstra, ed. Empirical Methods for International Trade. Cambridge: MIT, pp. 120-139.

 

-Levinsohn, J. (1988). “Empirics of Taxes on Differentiated Products: The Case of Tariffs in the US Automobile Industry”. in R. Baldwin, ed. Trade Policy Issues and Empirical Analysis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 11-44.

 

-R. Feenstra and J. Levinsohn (1995). “Estimating Markups and market Conduct with Multidimensional Product Attributes”. REStat; V.62-#1, pp. 19-52.

 

-Collyns, C. and S. Dunaway (1987). “The Cost of Trade Restraints: The Case of Japanese Automobile Exports to the US”. IMF Staff Papers; V.34-#1, pp. 150-175.

 

-J. Levinsohn (1994). “International Trade and the US Automobile Industry: Current Research, Issues, and Questions”. Japan and the World Economy; V.6-#4, pp. 335-357.

 

-P. Goldberg (1994). “Trade Policies in the US Automobile Industry”. Japan and the World Economy; V.6-#2, pp. 175-208. [comments by N. Yanagawa and J. Levinsohn follow]

 

-P. Goldberg (1995). “Product differentiation and Oligopoly in International Markets: The Case of the US Automobile Industry”. Etrica; V.63-#4, pp. 891-952.

 

-S. Berry, J. Levinsohn, and A. Pakes (1995). “Automobile Prices in Market Equilibrium”. Etrica; V.63-#4, pp. 841-890.

 

-S. Berry, J. Levinsohn, and A. Pakes (1999). “Voluntary Export Restraints in Automobiles: Evaluating a Trade Policy”. AER; V.89-#3, pp. 400-430.

 

-F.G. Adams, B. Gangnes, and S. Shuntaro (1994). “Macro and Industry Implications of Voluntary Export Restraints on U.S.-Japan Trade”. World Economy; V.17-#5, pp. 737-57.

 

-F.G. Adams, B. Gangnes, and B. Huang (1994). “The Impact of Japanese Auto VRAs on the U.S. and Japanese Economies”. Journal of Policy Modeling; V.16-#2, pp. 147-64.

 

-J. Ries (1995). “Windfall Profits and Vertical Relationships: Who Gained in the Japanese Auto Industry from VERs?”. Journal of Industrial Economics; V.41-#3, pp. 259-76

 

-Kim, Jin-Sup (1997). “Evaluation of the Price Trend under a Discriminatory Quantitative Trade Restraint”. Journal of Economic Research; V.2-#1, pp. 149-77.

 

-A. Dixit (1987). Tariffs and Subsidies under Oligopoly: The case of the US Automobile Industry”. in R. Feenstra, ed. Empirical Research in International Trade. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 112-127.

 

-A. Dixit (1987). “Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy for the US Automobile Industry”. in R. Feenstra, ed. Empirical Research in International Trade. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 141-169.

 

-K. Krishna, K. Hogan, and P. Swagel (1994). “The Non-Optimality of Optimal Trade Policies: The US Automobile Industry Revisited, 1979-1985". in P. Krugman and A. Smith, eds. Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 11-37.

 

-M. Fuss, S. Murphy and L. Waverman (1992). “The State of North American and Japanese Motor Vehicle Industries: A Partially Calibrated Model to Examine the Impacts of Trade Policy Changes”. NBER Working Paper; #4225.

 

-deMelo, J. and D. Tarr (1996). “VERs Under Imperfect Competition and Foreign Direct Investment: A Case Study of the US-Japan Auto VER”. Japan and the World Economy; V.8-1, pp. 11-33.

 

-D. Laussel, C. Montet and A. Peguin-Feissolle (1988). “Optimal Trade Policy under Oligopoly: A Calibrated Model of the Europe-Japan Rivalry in the EEC Car Market”. EER; V.32-#?, pp. 1547-1565.

 

-deMelo, J. and P. Messerlin (1988). “Price, Quality and Welfare Effects of European VERs on Japanese Autos”. European Economic Review; V.32-#?, pp. 1527-1546.

 

-Smith, A. and A. Venables (1991). “Counting the Cost of Voluntary Export Restraints in the European Car Market”. in E. Helpman and A. Razin, eds. International Trade and Trade Policy. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 187-220.

 

-A. Smith (1994). “Strategic Trade Policy in the European Car Market”. in P. Krugman and A. Smith, eds. Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 67-81.

 

-H. Flam (1994). “EC Members Fighting about Surplus: VERs, FDI and Japanese Cars”. Journal of International Economics; V.36-#1/2, pp. 117-31.

 

-A. Turrini (1996). “Liberalization vs. Optimal Trade Policies in Oligopoly. The Case of the Italian Car Imports from Japan”. Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Economiche e Commerciali; V.43-#3, pp. 649-67.

 

-A. Turrini (1999). “Liberalization, Quality and Welfare: Removing the Italian VER on Japanese Car Exports”. Applied Economics; V.31-#10, pp. 1183-94.

 

-Y. Mertens and V. Ginsburgh (1985). “Product Differentiation and Price Discrimination in the European Community: The Case of Automobiles”. Journal of Industrial Economics; V.34-#2, pp. 151-166.

 

f. Political Economy of VERs

 

-M. Morkre (1979). “Rent-Seeking and Hong Kong’s Textile Quota System”. Developing Economies; V.22-#?, pp. 110-118. [Comment by C.K. Law, 1981, V.19: 271-275]

 

-K. Jones (1984). “The Political Economy of Voluntary Export Restraints”. KYKLOS; V.37-#1, pp. 82-101.

 

-M. Wolf (1989). “Why Voluntary Export Restraints? An Historical Analysis”. World Economy; V.12-#3, pp. 273-292.

 

-R. Pomfret (1989). “Voluntary Export Restraints in the Presence of Market Power”. KYKLOS; V.42-#1, pp. 61-72.

 

3. Tariff-Quota-VER (Non)Equivalence Arguments in General Equilibrium

 

-R. Falvey (1975). “A Note on the Distinction between Tariffs and Quotas”. Eca; V.??-#??, pp. 319-326.

 

-E. Tower (1977). “Inelastic Offer Curves, Stability and the Difference between Tariffs and Quotas”. AEJ; V.5-#3, pp. 64-67.

 

-W.A. deHaan and P. Visser (1979). “A Note on Tariffs, Quotas and the Metzler Paradox: An Alternative Approach”. WA; V.115-#?, pp. 736-741.

 

Y.-H. Yeh (1983). “On the Distribution of Tariff and Import Quota Revenues”. AEJ; V.11-#4, pp. 42-44.

 

-W.M. Corden and R. Falvey (1985). “Quotas and the Second Best”. EcLets; V.18-#?, pp. 67-70.

 

-J. Melvin (1986). “The Non-Equivalence of Tariffs and Import Quotas”. AER; V.76-#5, pp. 1131-1134.

 

-Y.H. Yeh (1989). “Tariffs vs. Export Quotas”. AEJ; V.17-#2, pp. 65-67.

 

-J.S. Lizondo (1984). “A Note on the Nonequivalence of Import Barriers and Voluntary Export Restraints”. JIE; V.16-#?, pp. 183-187.

 

-R. Brecher and J. Bhagwati (1987). “Voluntary Export Restrictions versus Import Restrictions: A Welfare Theoretic Comparison”. in H. Kierzkowski, ed. Protection and Competition in International Trade. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 41-53.

 

M. Anam and F. Zandi (1989). “Immiserising Factor Growth and the Non-equivalence of Quotas and VERs”. International Economic Journal; V.3-#3, pp. 23-30.

 

-E. Dinopoulos and M. Kreinin (1989). “Import Quotas and VERs: A Comparative Analysis in a Three-Country Framework”. JIE; V.26-#?, pp. 169-178.

 

-M. Kreinin and E. Dinopoulos (1992). “Alternative Quota and VER Allocation Schemes: A Welfare Comparison”. Eca; V.59-#?, pp. 337-349.

 

-D. Dickinson and S.M. Murshed (1994). “Import Quotas or VERs to Protect Domestic Industry? A Three Country General Equilibrium Model”. Japan and the World Economy; v.6-#3, pp. 285-307.

 

-M. Moore and S. Suranovic (1993). “A Welfare Comparison between VERs and Tariffs under the GATT”. CJE; V.26-#2, pp. 447-456.

 

-P. Neary (1988). “Tariffs, Quotas, and Voluntary Export Restraints with and without Internationally Mobile Capital”. CJE; V.21-#?, pp. 714-735.

 

-N. Naqvi and P. Wiener (1991). “External Increasing Returns and the Shadow Price of Foreign Exchange”. JIE; V.30-#1/2, pp. 177-184.

 

-H. Herberg (1990). “Welfare Effects of Non-Tariff Barriers: A General Equilibrium Analysis”. WA; V.126-#?, pp. 511-522.

 

-H. Herberg (1993). “Terms-of-Trade and Welfare Effects of Quantitative Import Restrictions in a Three-Country World”. in H. Herberg and N.V. Long, eds., Trade, Welfare and Economic Policies. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 203-214.

 

M. Murshed (1992). “Comparing Quotas with VERs: A Three-Region, North-South-NICs Macroeconomic Analysis”. Open Economies Review; V.3-#3, pp. 255-70.

 

-E. Dinopoulos and M. Kreinin (1990). “An Analysis of Import Expansion Policies”. EcInq; V.?-#1, pp. 99-108.

 

-D. Gros (1987). “Protectionism in a Framework with Intra-industry Trade: Tariffs, Quotas, Retaliation, and Welfare Losses”. IMF Staff Papers; V.34-#1, pp. 86-114.

 

4. Content Protection

 

a. Partial Equilibrium Analysis

 

-H.G. Johnson (1963, 1971). “The Theory of Content Protection”. in H.G. Johnson, Aspects of the Theory of Tariffs. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. pp. 285-305.

 

-B. Munk (1969). “The Welfare Costs of Content Protection: The Automotive Industry in Latin America”. JPE; V.77-#1, pp. 85-98.

 

-W.M. Corden (1971). The Theory of Protection. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (pp. 45-50)

 

-R. McCulloch and H.G. Johnson (1973). “A Note on Proportionally Distributed Quotas”. AER; V.63-#4, pp. 726-732.

 

-G. Grossman (1981). “The Theory of Domestic Content Protection and Content Preference”. QJE; V.96-#4, pp. 583-603.

 

-M. Mussa (1993). “The Economics of Content Protection”. in D. Salvatore, ed. Protectionism and World Welfare. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 266-289.

 

-R. Färe, J. Logan and C.A.K. Lovell (1989). “Some Economics of Content Protection”. Zeitschrift für Nationalöknomie; V.50-#2, pp. 171-180.

 

-J. Ju and K. Krishna (2002). “Regulations, regime switches and non-monotonicity when non-compliance is an option: an application to content protection and preference”. EcLets; V.77-#3, pp. 315-321.

 

-W. Takacs (1994). “Domestic Content and Compensatory Export Requirements: Protection of the Motor Vehicle Industry in the Philippines”. WBER; V.8-#1, pp. 127-149.

 

-N. Vousden (1987). “Content Protection and Tariffs under Monopoly and Competition”. JIE; V.23-#?, pp. 263-282.

 

-A. Hollander (1987). “Content Protection and Transnational Monopoly”. JIE; V.23-#?, pp. 283-297.

 

-R. Strange (1995). “Production Subsidies, Local Content Requirements and Foreign Direct Investment: A Theoretical Analysis”. Kobe Economic and Business Review; #40, pp. 129-141.

 

b. General Equilibrium Analysis

 

-V.E. Lambson (1988). “Trade Restraints, Intermediate Goods, and World Market Conditions”. in R. Baldwin, ed. Trade Policy Issues and Empirical Analysis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 233-255.

 

-M. Richardson (1993). “Content Protection with Foreign Capital”. OEP; V.45-#1, pp. 103-117.

 

-C.C. Chao and E.S.H. Yu (1993). “Content Protection, Urban Unemployment and Welfare”. CJE; V.26-#2, pp. 481-492.

 

-M. K.-y. Fujg (1994). “Content Protection, Resource Allocation, and Variable Labor Supply”. CJE; V.27-#1, pp. 175-182.

 

-M.K.-Y. Fung and P. Flacco (1995). “Export Share Requirements, Content Protection and the Multinational Firm under Production Uncertainty”. JEcStud; V.22-#2, pp. 21-32.

 

c. Strategic Interaction between Firms

 

-C. Davidson, S. Matusz and M. Kreinin (1985). “Analysis of Performance Standards for Direct Foreign Investment”. CJE; V.18-#4, pp. 876-890.

 

-M. Richardson (1991). “The Effects of a Content Requirement on a Foreign Duopolist”. JIE; V.31-#1/2, pp. 143-155.

 

-K. Krishna and M. Itoh (1988). “Content Protection and Oligopolistic Interaction”. REStud; V.55-#?, pp. 107-125.

 

-J. Beghin and D. Sumner (1992). “Domestic Content Requirements with Bilateral Monopoly”. OEP; V.44-#?, pp. 306-316.

 

-F. Lopez-de-Silanes, J. Markusen, and T. Rutherford (1996). “Trade Policy Subtleties with Multinational Firms”. EER; V.40-#6, pp. 1605-1627.

 

-R. Belderbos and L. Sleuwaegen (1997). “Local Content Requirements and Vertical Market Structure”. EJPE; V.13-#1, pp. 101-119.

 

-S. Lahiri and Y. Ono (1998). “Foreign Direct Investment, Local Content Requirement, and Profit Taxation”. EJ; V.108-#447, pp. 444-457.

 

-J. Ishikawa (1999). “Expanding the Purchase of a Foreign Intermediate Good: An Analysis of VIEs and Content Protection under Oligopoly”. In R. Sato, R. Ramachandran, and K. Mino, eds. Global Competition and Integration. Boston: Kluwer.

 

-Larry D. Qiu and Zhigang Tao (2001). “Export, Foreign Direct Investment, and Local Content Requirement”. Journal of Development Economics; V.66-#1, pp. 101-125.

 

d. Export Performance Requirements

 

-M. Herander and C. Thomas (1986). “Export Performance and Export-Import Linkage Requirements”. QJE; V.101-#?; pp. 591-607.

 

-D. Rodrik (1987). “The Economics of Export Performance Requirements”. QJE; V.102-#3, pp. 633-650.

 

-C.C. Chao and E.S.H. Yu (1991). “Export-Share Requirements and Unemployment: The Case of Quota”. SEJ; V.?-#2, pp. 368-378.

 

-C.C. Chao and E.S.H. Yu (1994). “Should Export-Share Requirements Be Implemented under Quota Protection?”. CJE; V.28-#3, pp. 568-579.

 

-K. Maskus and D. Eby (1990). “Developing New Rules and Disciplines on Trade-Related Investment Measures”. World Economy; V.13-#?, pp. 523-540.

 

-J. Mutti (1994). “TRIMs, Policy Change and the Role of the GATT”. in A. Deardorff and R. Stern, eds. Analytical and Negotiating Issues in the Global Trading System. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 455-492.

 

e. Content Protection under Preferential Trade Agreements: Rules of Origin

 

(1) Legal and Institutional Aspects of ROOs

 

-N.D. Palmeter (1987). “Rules of Origin or Rules of Restriction? A Commentary on a New Form of Protection”. Fordham International Law Journal; V.11-#1, pp. 1-50.

 

-N.D. Palmeter (1990). “The US Rules of Origin to GATT: Monotheism or Polytheism?”. Journal of World Trade Law; V.24-#2, pp. 25-36.

 

-N.D. Palmeter (1992). “The Honda Decision: Rules of Origin Turned Upside Down”. Free Trade Observer, Issue 32 A, pp. 513-523.

 

-N.D. Palmeter (1993). “Rules of Origin in Customs Unions and Free Trade Areas”. in K. Anderson and R. Blackhurst eds.. Regional Integration and the Global Trading System. New York: St. Martin's Press, pp. 326-343.

 

-E. Vermulst and P. Waer (1990). “European Community Rules of Origin as Commercial Policy Instruments?”. Journal of World Trade; V24-#3, pp. 55-99.

 

-USITC (1991). “Rules of Origin Issues Related to NAFTA and the North American Automotive Industry”. USITC Publication # 2460. Washington, DC: USITC.

 

-B. Pearson (1993). “Rules of Origin, Internationalization and Regional Trade Agreements”. Asian-Pacific Economic Literature; V.7-#2, pp. 14-27.

 

-E. Vermulst, P. Waer and J. Bourgeois, eds. (1993). Rules of Origin: A Comparative Study. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

 

-P. Wonnacott and R. Wonnacott (1995). “Liberalization in the Western Hemisphere: New Challenges in the Design of a Free Trade Agreement”. North American Journal of Economics and Finance; V.6-#2, pp. 107-119.

 

-E. Vermulst (1996). “Rules of Origin as Commercial Policy Instruments–Revisited”. Journal of World Trade; V.26-#?, pp. 61-102.

 

-J. Jensen-Moran (1996). “Trade Battles as Investment Wars: The Coming Rules of Origin Debate”. in B. Roberts, ed. New forces in the world economy. Washington Quarterly Reader series. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 193-204.

 

-L. Nowicki (1997). “Rules of Origin and Local Content Requirements: Protectionism after the Uruguay Round”. International Trade Journal; V.11-#3, pp. 349-387.

 

-S. Silber (1997). “Convergence of Rules of Origin in Preferential Trade Agreements: The Case of the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas”. Economia Aplicada/Brazilian Journal of Applied Economics; V.1-#3, pp. 425-441.

 

-L.S. Ho (1998). “Country-of-Origin Rules: Its Origin, Nature, and Directions for Reform”. Pacific Economic Review; V.3-#2, pp. 161-166.

 

-A. Krueger (1999). “Free Trade Agreements as Protectionist Devices: Rules of Origin”. in James Melvin, James Moore, and Ray Riezman, eds., Trade, Welfare, and Econometrics: Essays in Honor of John S. Chipman. New York: Routledge, pp. 91-102.

 

-W. James and M. Umemoto (2000). “NAFTA Trade with East Asia: Rules of Origin and Market Access in Textiles, Apparel, Footwear and Electrical Machinery”. ASEAN Economic Bulletin; V.17-#3, pp. 293-311.

 

(2) Economic Analysis of ROOs

 

-P.J. Lloyd (1993). “A Tariff Substitute for Rules of Origin in Free Trade Areas”. World Economy; V.16-#6, pp. 699-712.

 

-K. Krishna and A. Krueger (1995). “Implementing Free Trade Areas: Rules of Origin and Hidden Protection”. In J. Levinsohn, A. Deardorff, and R. Stern, eds. New Directions in Trade Theory. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 149-187

 

-E. Gitli (1995). “Rules of Origin: New Implications”. CEPAL Review; #56, pp. 111-125.

 

-F. Lopez-de-Silanes, J. Markusen, and T. Rutherford (1996). “Trade Policy Subtleties with Multinational Firms”. EER; V.40-#8, pp. 1605-1627.

 

-R. Falvey and G. Reed (1998). “Economic Effects of Rules of Origin”. WA; V.134-#2, pp. 209-229.

 

-J. Ju and K. Krishna (1998). “Firm Behavior and Market Access in a Free Trade Area with Rules of Origin”. NBER Working Paper, #6857.

 

-J. Rosellon(2000). “ The Economics of Rules of Origin”. Journal of International Trade and Economic Development; V.9-#4, pp. 397-425.

 

-W.C. Sawyer (2001). “NAFTA as a Means of Raising Rivals' Costs: A Comment”. Review of Industrial Organization; V.18-#1, pp. 127-131.

 

-P. Rodriguez (2001). “Rules of Origin with Multistage Production”. World Economy; V.24-#2, pp. 201-220.

 

-R. Falvey and G. Reed (2002). “Rules of Origin as Commercial Policy Instruments”. IER; V.43-#2, pp. 393-408.

 

5. Customs Valuation

 

-H.G. Johnson (1966). “A Note on Tariff Valuation Bases, Economic Efficiency and the Effects of Preferences”. JPE; V.74-#4, pp. 401-402.

 

-H. Grubel and H.G. Johnson (1967). “Nominal Tariff Rates and US Valuation Practices: Two Case Studies”. REStat; V.49-#2, pp. 138-142.

 

-P. Diamond and F. Mitchell (1971). “Customs Valuation and Transport Choice”. JIE; V.1-#1, pp. 119-126.

 

6. Internal Taxes and Border Tax Adjustments

 

-R. Baldwin (1970). “Border Tax Adjustments for Internal Taxes”. Chapter 4 in R. Baldwin, Nontariff Distortion of International Trade. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 84-109.

 

-M. Krauss and H.G. Johnson (1970). “Border Taxes, Border Tax Adjustments, Comparative Advantage and the Balance of Payments”. CJE; V.3-#4, pp. 595-602.

 

-J. Meade (1974). “A Note on Border-Tax Adjustments”. JPE; V.82-#5, pp. 1013-1015.

 

-E. Berglas (1974). “Devaluation, Monetary Policy, and Border Tax Adjustments”. CJE; V.7-#1, pp. 1-11.

 

-T. Georgakopoulos (1974). “Tax Rebating of Exports and the Balance of Payments”. EER; V.5-#?, pp. 197-205.

 

-R. Ruffin (1979). “Border Tax Adjustments and Countervailing Duties”. WA; V.115-#?, pp. 351-355.

 

-G. Grossman (1978). “Alternative Border Tax Policies”. Journal of World Trade Law; V.12-#?, pp. 452-460.

 

-G. Grossman (1980). “Border Tax Adjustments: Do They Distort Trade?”. JIE; V.10-#?, pp. 117-128.

 

-B. Hamilton and J. Whalley (1986). “Border Tax Adjustments and US Trade”. JIE; V.20-#?, pp. 377-383.

 

-M. Feldstein and P. Krugman (1991). “International Trade Effects of Value-Added Taxation”. in A. Razin and J. Slemrod, eds. Taxation in the Global Economy. Chicago: University of Chicago/NBER, pp. 263-278. (Comment/extension by Dixit, pp. 279-282.

 

7. Administered Protection: The Escape Clause

 

-W. Adams and J. Dirlam (1977). “Import Competition and the Trade Act of 1974: A Case Study of Section 201 and its Interpretation by the International Trade Commission”. Indiana Law Journal; V.52-#?, pp.

 

-R. Lawrence and R. Litan (1986). Saving free trade: A pragmatic approach. Washington, DC: Brookings.

 

-J. Jackson (1989). “Safeguards and Adjustment Policies”. Chapter 7 of The World Trading System: Law and Policy in International Economic Relations. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 149-187.

 

-P. Merciai (1981). “Safeguard Measures in the GATT”. Journal of World Trade Law; V.15-#1, pp. 41-66.

 

-P. Stern and A. Wechsler (1986). “Escape Clause Relief and Recessions: An Economic and Legal Look at Section 201". In G. Saxonhouse, and K. Yamamura, ed. Law and trade issues of the Japanese economy: American and Japanese perspectives. Seattle: University of Washington Press, pp. 195-217.

 

-J. Hartigan, P. Perry, and S. Kamma (1986). “The Value of Administered Protection: A Capital Market Approach”. Review of Economics and Statistics; V.68-#4, pp. 610-617.

 

-K. Rehbein, and S. Lenway (1993). “Industry Structure or Managerial Discretion: The Determinants of Industry Political Success in the U.S. International Trade Commission's Escape Clause Investigations”. In J. Post, ed. Research in corporate social performance and policy. Volume 14. Greenwich, Conn. and London: JAI Press, pp. 3-18.

 

-C. Coughlin, J. Terza, and N. Khalifah (1989). “The Determinants of Escape Clause Petitions”. Review of Economics and Statistics; V.71-#2, pp. 341-347.

 

-B. Blonigen and R. Feenstra (1997). “Protectionist Threats and Foreign Direct Investment”. In R. Feenstra, ed. The effects of U.S. trade protection and promotion policies. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 55-80.

 

-R. Staiger and G. Tabellini (1991). “Rules versus Discretion in Trade Policy: An Empirical Analysis”. In Baldwin, Robert E., ed. Empirical studies of commercial policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press?NBER, pp. 11-40.

 

-R. Staiger and G. Tabellini (1999). “Do GATT Rules Help Governments Make Domestic Commitments?”. Economics and Politics; V.11-#2, pp. 109-144.

 

8. Administered Protection: Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy

 

a. Law and Economics of Administered Protection: Overview

 

-R. Dale (1980). Antidumping Law in a Liberal Trade Order. New York: St. Martins.

 

-J. Brandt and W. Zeitler (1980). “Unfair Trade Practice Jurisdiction: The Applicability of Section 337 and the Countervailing Duty and Antidumping Laws”. Law and Policy in International Business; V.12-#1, pp. 95-116.

 

-J. Bello and A. Holmer, eds. (1987). The Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty Laws: Key Legal and Policy Issues. Washington, DC: American Bar Association.

 

-J. Jackson (1989). “Unfair Trade and the Rules on Dumping”. Chapter 10 of The World Trading System: Law and Policy in International Economic Relations. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 217-247.

 

-J. Jackson and E. Vermlust, eds. (1989). Anti-Dumping Law and Practice: A Comparative Study. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

 

-P. Tharakan, ed. (1991). Policy Implications of Antidumping Measures. Amsterdam: North-Holland.

 

-J. Jackson (1989). “The Perplexities of Subsidies in International Trade”. Chapter 11 of The World Trading System: Law and Policy in International Economic Relations. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 249-273.

 

-B. Balassa (1989). “Subsidies and Countervailing Measures: Economic Considerations”. PPR Working Paper, #WPS152.

 

-R. Cass (1990). “Trade Subsidy Law: Can Foolish Inconsistency Be Good Enough for Government Work?” Law and Policy in International Business; V.21-#?, pp. 609-661.

 

-C. Barshefsky and N. Zucker (1988). “Ammendments to the Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws under the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988". North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation;

 

-G. Horlick and G. Oliver (1989). “Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Law Provisions of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988". Journal of World Trade; V23-#3, pp. 5-49.

 

-J.M. Finger, ed. (1993). Antidumping: How it Works and Who Gets Hurt. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

 

-B. Hindley and P. Messerlin (1996). Antidumping Industrial Policy: Legalized Protection in the WTO and What to do About It. Washington, DC: AEI.

 

-R. Clarida (1996). “Dumping: In Theory, in Policy, and in Practice”. in J. Bhagwati and R. Hudec, eds. Fair Trade and Harmonization. V.1: Economic Analysis. Cambridge: MIT, pp. 357-389.

 

-E. Salonen (1997). “‘One Tomato, Two Tomato, ...’: Selection of Trade Remedy Laws in the Florida-Mexico Tomato Conflict”. Florida Journal of International Law; V.11-#?, pp. 371-397.

 

b. Analysis of Trade at Less than Fair Value

 

-A. Holmer, S. Haggerty and W. Hunter (1984). “Identifying and Measuring Subsidies under Countervailing Duty Law: An Attempt at Synthesis”. The Commerce Department Speaks on Import Administration and Export Administration, 1984. Washington, DC: Practicing Law Institute, pp. 301-460.

 

-C. Goetz, L. Granet and W. Schwartz (1986). “The Meaning of ‘Subsidy’ and ‘Injury’ in Countervailing Duty Law”. International Review of Law and Economics; V.6-#?, pp. 17-32.

 

-R. Diamond (1989). “Economic Foundations of Countervailing Duty Law”. Virginia Journal of International Law; V.29-#?, pp. 767-812.

 

-R. Diamond (1990). “A Search for Economic and Financial Principles in the Administration of US Countervailing Duty Law”. Law and Policy in International Business. V.21-#?, pp. 507-607.

 

-N.D. Palmeter (1986). “Torquemada and the Tariff Act: The Inquisitor Rides Again”. International Lawyer; V.20-#?, pp. 641-657.

 

-N.D. Palmeter (1988). “Exchange Rates and Anti-Dumping Determinations”. Journal of World Trade Law; V.22-#?, pp. 73-80.

 

-M. Coursey and D. Binder (1989). “Hypothetical Calculations under the US Antidumping Law: Foreign Market Value, US Price and Weighted-Average Dumping Margins”. American University Journal of International Law and Policy; V.4-#?, pp. 537-553.

 

-W. Bollom and D. Simons (1990). “The Use of Accounting Data in Antidumping Cases: A Public Policy Perspective”. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy; V.9-#1, pp. 1-18.

 

-R. Boltuck and R. Litan, eds. (1992). Down in the Dumps: Administration of the Unfair Trade Laws. Washington, DC: Brookings.

 

-W. Hansen and Kee Ok Park (1995). “Nation-State and Pluralistic Decision Making in Trade Policy: The Case of the International Trade Administration”. International Studies Quarterly; V.39-#2, pp. 181-211

 

c. Analysis of Injury

 

-W. Perry (1985). “Administration of Import Trade Laws by the US ITC”. Boston University International Law Journal;

 

-P. Jameson (1986). “Recent ITC Practice Regarding the Material Injury Standard: A Critique”. Law and Policy in International Business; V.18-#?, pp. 517-577.

 

-G. Grossman (1986). “Imports as a Cause of Injury: The Case of the US Steel Industry”. JIE; V.20-#?, pp. 201-223.

 

-R. Pindyck and J. Rotemberg (1987). “Are Imports to Blame? Attribution of Injury Under the 1974 Act”. Journal of Law and Economics; V.30-#?, pp 101-122.

 

-K. Kelly (1988). “The Analysis of Causality in Escape Clause Cases”. Journal of Industrial Economics; V.37-#2, pp. 187-207.

 

-M. Morkre and H. Kruth (1989). “Determining Whether Dumped Or Subsidized Imports Injure Domestic Industries: The ITC Approach”. Contemporary Policy Issues; V.7-#3, pp. 78-95.

 

-M. Knoll (1989). “Legal and Economic Framework for Analysis of Injury by the US ITC”. Journal of World Trade; V.23-#3, pp. 95-107.

 

-M. Knoll (1989). “An Economic Approach to the Determination of Injury under US Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Law”. NYU Journal of International Law and Policy; V.22-#?, pp. 37-116.

 

-N.D. Palmeter (1987). “Injury Determinations in Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty Cases--A Commentary on US Practice”. Journal of World Trade Law; V.21-#1, pp. 7-45.

 

-N.D. Palmeter (1987). “Dumping Margins and Material Injury: The USITC is Free to Choose”. Journal of World Trade Law; V.21-#?, pp. 173-175.

 

-D. Rousslang (1988). “Import Injury in US Trade Law: An Economic View”. International Review of Law and Ecnomics; V.8-#1, pp. 117-122.

 

-T. Murray and D. Rousslang (1989). “A Method for Estimating Injury Caused by Unfair Trade Practices”. International Review of Law and Economics; V.9-#2, pp. 149-164.

 

-A. Sykes (1989). “Countervailing Duty Law: An Economic Perspective”. Columbia Law Review; V.89-#?, pp. 199-263.

 

-R. Cass and W. Schwartz (1990). “Causality, Coherence and Transparency in the Implementation of International Trade Laws”. in M. Trebilcock and R. York, eds. Fair Exchange: Reforming Trade Remedy Laws. Toronto: C.D. Howe, pp. 24-90.

 

-S. Kaplan (1991). “Injury and Causation in USITC Antidumping Determinations: Five Recent Approaches”. in Tharakan, ed.

 

-R. Boltuck (1991). “Assessing the Effects on the Domestic Industry of Price Dumping”. in Tharakan, ed.

 

-A. Sykes (1996). “The Economics of Injury in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Cases”. International Review of Law and Economics; V.16-#?, pp. 5-26.

 

-A. Sykes (1997). “The Economics of Injury in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Cases”. In J. Bhandari and A. Sykes, eds. Economic Dimensions in International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 83-125. [comment by R. Cass and M. Knoll, pp. 126-165.]

 

-R. Boltuck (1997). “Innovations in Support of the Unitary Injury Test in U.S. Unfair Trade Cases”. In J. Bhandari and A. Sykes, eds. Economic Dimensions in International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 166-185.

 

-M. Morkre (1993). “The Effect of Subsidized Imports on Domestic Industry: A Comparison of Market Structures”. Journal of Policy Modeling; V.15-#1, pp. 49-61.

 

-W. Mock, jr. (1986). “Cumulation of Import Statistics in Injury Investigations Before the ITC”. Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business;

 

-W. Hansen and T. Prusa (1996). “Cumulation and ITC Decision-making: The Sum of the Parts is Greater than the Whole”. EcInq; V.34-#?, pp. 746-769.

 

-T. Prusa (1998). “Cumulation and Anti-dumping: A Challenge to Competition”. World Economy; V.21-#8, pp. 1021-1033.

 

-P.K.M. Tharakan, D. Greenaway, and J. Tharakan (1998). “Cumulation and Injury Determination of the European Community in Antidumping Cases”. WA; V.134-#2, pp. 320-339.

 

-B. Steen (1987). “Economically Meaningful Markets: An Alternative to Defining `Like Product` and `Domestic Industry` under the Trade Agreements Act of 1979". Virginia Law Review;

 

-R. Boltuck and S. Kaplan (1998). “An Economic Approach to ITC Sunset Reviews”. in R. Lawrence ed. Brookings Trade Forum 1998. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 219-239.

 

-T. Prusa and D. Sharp (2001). “Simultaneous Equations in Antidumping Investigations”. Journal of Forensic Economics; V.14-#1, pp. 63-78.

 

d. Economic Consequences of Administered Protection

 

(1) Basic Economic Analysis of ADD/CVD

 

-K. Stegemann (1985). “Antidumping Policy and the Consumer”. Journal of World Trade Law; V.19-#5, pp. 466-484.

 

-M. Webb (1987). “Anti-Dumping Laws, Production Location and Prices”. JIE; V.22-#?, pp.

 

-G. Yarrow (1987). “Economic Aspects of Antidumping Policies”. Oxford Review of Economic Policy; V.3-#?, pp.

 

-B. Hoekman and M. Leidy (1989). “Dumping, Anti-dumping, and Emergency Protection”. Journal of World Trade; V.23-#1, pp. 27-44.

 

-M. Leidy and B. Hoekman (1990). “Production Effects of Price- and Cost- Based Anti-dumping Laws Under Flexible Exchange Rates”. CJE; V.23-#4, pp. 873-895.

 

-R. Staiger and F. Wolak (1992). “The Effect of Domestic Antidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopoly”. JIE; V.32-#3/4, pp. 265-287.

 

-B. Hoekman and M. Leidy (1992). “Cascading Contingent Protection”. EER; V.36-#?, pp. 883-892.

 

-R. Feinberg and S. Kaplan (1993). “Fishing Downstream: The Political Economy of Effective Administered Protection”. CJE; V.26-#1, pp. 150-158.

 

-J. Francois (1992). “Countervailing the Effects of Subsidies: An Economic Analysis”. Journal of World Trade; V.26-#1, pp. 5-13.

 

-R. Willig (1998). “Economic Effects of Antidumping Policy”. in R. Lawrence ed. Brookings Trade Forum 1998. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 57-79.

 

(2) ADD/CVD Under Oligopoly

 

-A. Dixit (1988). “Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties Under Oligopoly”. EER; V.32-#?, pp. 55-68.

 

-B. Spencer (1988). “Countervailing Duty Laws and Subsidies to Imperfectly Competitive Industries”. in Baldwin, et al., eds. Issues in US-EC Trade Relations. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER; pp. 313-334.

 

-B. Spencer (1988). “Capital Subsidies and Countervailing Duties in Oligopolistic Industries”. JIE; V.25-#?, pp. 45-69.

 

-D. Collie (1991). “Export Subsidies and Countervailing Tariffs”. JIE; V.31-#3/4, pp. 309-324.

 

-D. Collie (1992). “Export Subsidies, Entry Deterrence and Countervailing Tariffs”. MS; V.60-#2, pp. 136-151.

 

-M. Webb (1992). “The Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Laws”. EcInq; V.30-#?, pp. 437-448.

 

-R. Staiger and F. Wolak (1991). “Strategic Use of Antidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusion”. ms: Stanford University.

 

-J. Reitzes (1993). “Antidumping Policy”. IER; V.34-#4, pp. 745-763.

 

-J. Cassing (1994). “Strategic Responses to Antidumping Laws and Legal Interpretations: Producing for Export Markets using Lawyers and Other Factors of Production”. JEI; V.9-#2, pp. 156-171.

 

-T. Prusa (1994). “Pricing Behavior in the Presence of Antidumping Laws”. JEI; V.9-#2, pp. 260-289.

 

-J. Hartigan (1994). “Dumping and Signaling”. JEBO; V.23-#?, pp. 69-81.

 

-J. Hartigan (1995). “Collusive Aspects of Cost Revelation Through Antidumping Complaints”. JITE; V.151-#3, pp. 478-489.

 

-J. Hartigan (1996). “Predatory Dumping”. CJE; V.29-#1, pp. 228-239.

 

-S. Anderson, N. Schmitt, and J.-J. Thisse (1995). “Who Benefits from Antidumping Legislation?”. JIE; V.38-$3/4, pp. 321-337.

 

-D. Baron (1997). “Integrated Strategy and International Trade Disputes: The Kodak-Fujifilm Case”. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy; V.6-#2, pp. 291-346.

 

-A. Panagariya and P. Gupta (1998). “Anti-Dumping versus Price Negotiation”. World Economy; V.21-#8, pp. 1003-1019.

 

-P. Barros and X. Martinez-Giralt (1999). “On the Effects of Antidumping Legislation”. RSUE; V.29-#1, pp. 53-72.

 

-Reinhilde Veugelers and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999). “European anti-dumping policy and the profitability of national and international collusion”. EER; V.43-#1, pp. 1-28

 

(3) Empirical Research on Scope and Consequences of ADD/CVD

 

(a) Scope

 

-L. Gard and J. Riedel (1980). “Safeguard Protection of Industry in Developed Countries: Assessment of Implications for Developing Countries”. WA; V.116-#3, pp. 471-492.

 

-J.M. Finger (1981). “The Industry-Country Incidence of Less-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Trade”. Quarterly Review of Economics and Business; V.21-#?, pp. 260-279.

 

-W. Hansen and T. Prusa (1995). “The Road Most Taken: The Rise of Title VII Protection”. World Economy; V.18-#2, pp. 295-313.

 

-J. Miranda, R. Torres, and M. Ruiz (1998). “The International Use of Antidumping, 1987-1997”. Journal of World Trade; V.32-#1, pp. 5-71.

 

-T. Prusa (2001). “On the Spread and Impact of Antidumping”. CJE; V.34-#3, pp. 591-611.

 

(b) Consequences

 

-M. Herander and J.B. Schwartz (1984). “An Empirical Test of the Impact of the Threat of US Trade Policy: The Case of Antidumping Duties”. SEJ; V.51-#1, pp. 59-79.

 

-J.M. Finger and T. Murray (1990). “Policing Unfair Imports: The US Example”. Journal of World Trade; V.24-#4, pp. 39-53.

 

-J. Devault (1990). “The Administration of US Antidumping Duties: Some Empirical Observations”. World Ecoomy; V.13-#1, pp. 75-88.

 

-R. Staiger and F. Wolak (1994). “The Trade Effects of Antidumping Law: Theory and Evidence”. in A. Deardorff and R. Stern, eds. Analytical and Negotiating Issues in the Global Trading System. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 231-261.

 

-R. Staiger and F. Wolak (1994). “Measuring Industry-specific Protection: Antidumping in the US”. BPEA; 1994: Microeconomics, pp. 51-118.

 

-R. Staiger and F. Wolak (1996). “Differences in Uses and Effects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sources”. in A. Krueger, ed. The Political Economy of American Trade Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 385-415.

 

-T. Prusa (1997). “The Trade Effects of U.S. Antidumping Actions”. In R. Feenstra, ed. The Effects of US Trade Protection and Promotion Policies. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 191-213.

 

-H.J. Shin (1998). “Possible Instances of Predatory Pricing in Recent U.S. Antidumping Cases”. in R. Lawrence ed. Brookings Trade Forum 1998. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 81-97.

 

-M. Gallaway, B. Blonigen, and J. Flynn (1999). “Welfare Cost of the US Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Law”. JIE; V.49-#2, pp. 211-244. [erratum in V.52-#1.]

 

-P. Conway and S. Dhar (1994). “The Economic Effects of Widespread Application of Anti-dumping Duties to Import Pricing”. JEI; V.9-#2, pp. 172-197.

 

-J.M. Finger and K.C. Fung (1994). “Will GATT Enforcement Control Antidumping”. JEI; V.9-#2, pp. 198-213.

 

-P. Messerlin and G. Reed (1995). “Antidumping Policies in the US and the EC”. EJ; V.105-#433, pp. 1565-1575.

 

-H. Marvel and E. Ray (1995). “Countervailing Duties”. EJ; V.105-#433, pp. 1576-1593.

 

-C. Krupp and P. Pollard (1996). “Market Responses to Antidumping Laws: Some Evidence from the US Chemical Industry”. CJE; V.29-#1, pp. 199-227.

 

-D. Bernhofen (1995). “Vertical Integration and Anticompetitive Behavior: Evidence from Dumping Complaints”. ms: Clark University.

 

-T. Lloyd, O. Morrissey, and G. Reed (1998). “Estimating the Impact of Anti-Dumping and Anti-Cartel Actions using Intervention Analysis”. EJ; V.108-#448, pp. 458-476.

 

-J. Hartigan, P. Perry and S. Kamma (1986). “The Value of Administered Protection: A Capital Market Approach”. REStat; V.68-#4, pp. 610-617.

 

-J. Hartigan, S. Kamma and P. Perry (1989). “The Injury Determination Category and the Value of Relief from Dumping”. REStat; V.?-#1, pp. 183-186.

 

-J. Hartigan, S. Kamma and P. Perry (1990). “Bifurcated vs. Single Injury Determination in USITC Antidumping Investigations”. JIEI; V.5-#1, pp. 47-63.

 

-S. Lenway, K. Rehbein and L. Starks (1990). “The Impact of Protectionism on Firm Wealth: The Experience of the Steel Industry”. SEJ; V.?-#?, pp. 1079-1093.

 

-K. Rehbein and L. Starks (1995). “Changes in US Trade Policies: The Wealth Effects on Japanese Steel Firms”. Japan and the World Economy; v.7-#3, pp. 309-327.

 

-M. Melvin and Q. Sun (1997) “U.S. protectionist policy and stock prices of U.S. import-competing and Korean and Taiwanese export-oriented firms”. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, V.5-#1, pp. 1-23.

 

-J. Rayburn and S. Lenway (1991). “An Investigation of the Behavior of Accruals in the Semiconductor Industry: 1985". ms: University of Minnesota.

 

-P. Messerlin and Y. Noguchi (1998). “Antidumping Policies in Electronic Products”. in R. Lawrence ed. Brookings Trade Forum 1998. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 147-171.

 

-D. Irwin (1998). “The Semiconductor Industry”. in R. Lawrence ed. Brookings Trade Forum 1998. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 173-200.

 

-P. Messerlin (1990). “The EC Antidumping Regulations: A First Economic Appraisal”. WA; V.126-#?, pp. 562-587.

 

-J. Bourgeois and P. Messerlin (1998). “The European Community’s Experience”. in R. Lawrence ed. Brookings Trade Forum 1998. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 127-145.

 

-M. Dutz (1998). “Economic Impact of Canadian Antidumping Law”. in R. Lawrence ed. Brookings Trade Forum 1998. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 99-125.

 

9. Competition Policy and International Trade

 

a. Some Basic Law and Economics of Antitrust

 

-R. Posner (1976). Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

 

-P. Areeda and D. Turner (1978). Antitrust Law. Boston: Little-Brown.

 

-R. Bork (1978). The Antitrust Paradox. New York: Basic Books.

 

-E. Gellhorn and W. Kovacic (1994). Antitrust Law and Economics. St. Paul: West.

 

-P. Areeda and D. Turner (1975). “Predatory Pricing and Related Practices under Section 2 of the Sherman Act”. Harvard Law Review; V.88-#4, pp. 697-733.

 

-P. Joskow and A. Klevorick (1979). “A Framework for Analysing Predatory Pricing Policy”. Yale Law Journal; V.89-#?, pp. 213-270.

 

-J. Ordover and R. Willing (1981). “An Economic Definition of Predation: Pricing and Product Innovation”. Yale Law Journal; V.91-#?, pp. 8-53.

 

-J. Brodley and G. Hay (1981). “Predatory Pricing: Competing Economic Theories and the Evolution of Legal Standards”. Cornell Law Review; V.66-#?, pp. 738-800.

 

-S. Salop, ed. (1981). Strategy, Predation, and Antitrust Analysis. Washington, DC: Federal Trade Commission.

 

-S. Salop and D. Scheffman (1987). “Cost Raising Strategies”. Journal of Industrial Economics; V.36-#1, pp. 19-34.

 

-J. Ordover and G. Saloner (1989). “Predation, Monopolization, and Antitrust”. in R. Schmalensee and R. Willing, eds. Handbook of International Organization–Vol.I.. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 537-596.

 

-A. Jacquemin and M. Slade (1989). “Cartels, Collusion, and Horizontal Merger”. in R. Schmalensee and R. Willing, eds. Handbook of International Organization–Vol.I.. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 415-473.

 

-M. Schwartz (1989). “Investments in Oligopoly: Welfare Effects and Tests for Predation”. Oxford Economic Papers; V.41-#?, pp. 698-719.

 

-P. Milgrom and J. Roberts (1990). “New Theories of Predatory Pricing”. in G. Bonanno and D. Brandolini, eds. Industrial Structure and the New Industrial Economics. Oxford: OUP, pp. 112-137.

 

-L. Phlips (1995). Competition Policy: A Game Theoretic Perspective. Cambridge: CUP.

 

-P. Areeda and H. Hovenkamp (1996). Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application. New York: Little Brown.

 

b. Legal/Institutional Analysis of International Trade and Competition Policy

 

-H. Applebaum and D. Grace (1987). “US Antitrust Law and Antidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979”. Antitrust Law Journal; V.56-#2, pp. 497-518.

 

-K. Elzinga (1987). “Antitrust Policy and Trade Policy: An Economist's Perspective”. Antitrust Law Journal;

 

-J. Davidow (1980). “Competition, Trade and the Antitrust Division”. Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business; V.?-#?, pp.

 

-J. Davidow (1982/83). “Cartels, Competition Law and the Regulation of International Trade”. New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, V.15-#2, pp. 351-376.

 

-A. Paul Victor (1982/3). “Antidumping and Antitrust: Can the Inconsistencies be Removed”. New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, V.15-#2, pp. 339-350.

 

-D. Wood (1989). “‘Unfair’ Trade Injury: A Competition-Based Approach”. Stanford Law Review; V.41-#?, pp. 1153-

 

-K. Meessen (1989). “Competition of Competition Laws”. Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business; V.10

 

-J. Davidow (1991). “The Relationship between Anti-Trust Laws and Trade Laws in the US”. World Economy; V.14-#1, pp. 37-52.

 

-R. Feinberg (1991). “Antitrust Policy and International Trade Liberalization”. World Competition; V.14-#4, pp. 13-19.

 

-R. Cass (1993). “Price Discrimination and Predation Analysis in Antitrust and International Trade: A Comment”. University of Cincinnati Law Review; V.61-#3, pp. 877-888.

 

-K. Kelly (1993). “Empirical Analysis for Antitrust and International Trade Law”. University of Cincinnati Law Review; V.61-#3, pp. 889-902.

 

-R. Boltuck and S. Kaplan (1993). “Conflicting Entitlements: Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation be Reconociled”. University of Cincinnati Law Review; V.61-#3, pp. 903-917.

 

-M. Morkre and K. Kelly (1993). “Perspectives on the Effects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industries”. University of Cincinnati Law Review; V.61-#3, pp. 919-944.

 

-F.M. Scherer (1994). Competition Policies for an Integrated World Economy. Washington, DC: Brookings.

 

-P. Messerlin (1994). “Should Antidumping Rules Be Replaced by National or International Competition Rules?”. Aussenwirtschaft; V.49-#?, pp. 351-374.

 

-P. Lloyd and G. Sampson (1995). “Competition and Trade Policy: Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Round”. World Economy; V.18-#?, pp. 681-705.

 

-A. Jacquemin (1995). “Towards an Internationalisation of Competition Policy?”. World Economy, V.18-#?, pp. 781-789.

 

-P. Buigues, A. Jacquemin, and A. Sapir, eds. (1995). European policies on competition, trade and industry: Conflict and complementarities. Brookfield, Vt.: Elgar.

 

-B. Hoekman and P. Mavroidis (1994). “Competition, Competition Policy and the GATT”. World Economy; V.17-#?, pp. 121-150.

 

-B. Hoekman and P. Mavroidis (1996). “Dumping, Antidumping and Antitrust”. Journal of World Trade; V.30-#?, pp. 27-52.

 

-M. Trebilcock (1996). “Competition Policy and Trade Policy–Mediating the Interface”. Journal of World Trade; V.30-#4, pp. 71-105.

 

-E. M. Graham (1996). Global Corporations and National Governments. Washington, DC: Brookings.

 

-American Bar Association (1996). “Symposium: The Role of Foreign Competition in U.S. Merger Enforcement”. Antitrust Law Journal; V.65-#1.

 

-B. Hoekman (1997). “Competition Policy and the Global Trading System”. World Economy; V.20-#4, pp. 383-406.

 

-J.D. Richardson and E.M. Graham (1997). Global Competition Policies: An Agenda. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.

 

-J.D. Richardson and E.M. Graham, eds. (1997). Global Competition Policies. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.

 

-D. Wood (1997). “The Trade Effects of Domestic Antitrust Enforcement”. In J. Bhandari and A. Sykes, eds. Economic Dimensions of International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 513-529.

 

-A. Swan (1997). “The Hartford Insurance Case: Antitrust in the Global Economy–Welfare Effects and Sovereignty”. In J. Bhandari and A. Sykes, eds. Economic Dimensions of International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 530-591.

 

-F. Scherer (1998). “International Trade and Competition Policy”. in E. Hope and P. Maeleng, eds. Competition and Trade Policies: Coherence or Conflict? London: Routledge, pp. 13-30.

 

-A. Sykes (1998). “Antidumping and Antitrust: What Problems Does Each Address?”. in R. Lawrence ed. Brookings Trade Forum 1998. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 1-43.

 

-A. Sykes (1999). “Regulatory Protectionism and the Law of International Trade”. University of Chicago Law Review; Winter 1999, pp.

 

-M. Janow (1998). “Unilateral and Bilateral Approaches to Competition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experience”. in R. Lawrence ed. Brookings Trade Forum 1998. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 253-285.

 

-J.D. Richardson (1998). “Multilateralizing Conventions”. in R. Lawrence ed. Brookings Trade Forum 1998. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 335-374.

 

-I.M. Destler (1998). “U.S. Approach to International Competition Policy”. in R. Lawrence ed. Brookings Trade Forum 1998. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 395-418.

 

-P.J. Lloyd and K. Vautier (2001). “Regional Approaches to Cross-border Competition Policies”. In S. Lahiri, ed. Regionalism and Globalization: Theory and Practice. London: Routledge, pp. 283-304.

 

c. Economic Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

 

(1) Theoretical Analysis

 

-A.A. Auquier and R. Caves (1979), “Monopolistic Export Industries, Trade Taxes, and Optimal Competition Policy”, EJ. V.89-#?; pp. 559-581.

 

-H. Katrak (1980). “Multinational Monopolies and Monopoly Regulation”. OEP; V.32-#3, pp. 453-466.

 

-S. Donnenfeld (1982). “Domestic Regulation and the Preservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Markets”. SEJ; V.49-#4, pp. 954-965.

 

-I. Dierckx, C. Matutes and D. Neven (1991). “Cost Differences and Survival in Declining Industries: A Case for ‘Picking Winners’?”. EER; V.35-#?, pp. 1507-1528.

 

-S. Lahiri and Y. Ono (1994). “Industrial Policy and National Welfare in the Presence of Monopoly”. Japan and the World Economy; v.6-#1, pp. 61-73.

 

-J. Ordover, A. Sykes and R. Willig (1983). “Unfair International Trade Practices”. International Law and Politics; V.15-#? , pp. 323-337.

 

-P. Barros and L. Cabral (1994). “Merger Policy in Open Economies”. EER; V.38-#?, pp. 1041-1055.

 

-S. Cowan (1989). “Trade and Competition Policies for Oligopolies”. WA; V.125-#?, pp. 464-483.

 

-N.V. Long and N. Vousden (1995). “The Effects of Trade Liberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergers”. RIE; V.3-#2, pp. 141-155.

 

-C. Bliss (1996). “Trade and Competition Control”. in J. Bhagwati and R. Hudec, eds. Fair Trade and Harmonization. V.1: Economic Analysis. Cambridge: MIT, pp. 313-328.

 

-J. Levinsohn (1996). “Competition Policy and International Trade”. in J. Bhagwati and R. Hudec, eds. Fair Trade and Harmonization. V.1: Economic Analysis. Cambridge: MIT, pp. 329-356.

 

-M. Motta and F. Onida (1996). “Trade Policy and Competition Policy”. Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia; V.56-#1/2, pp. 67-97.

 

-P. Jensen and K. Krishna (1996). “Entry Policy in an Open Economy”. Indian Economic Review; V.31-#1, pp. 41-56.

 

-K. Head and J. Ries (1997). “International Mergers and Welfare under Decentralized Competition Policy”. CJE; V.30-#4B, pp. 1104-1123.

 

-D. Neven and P. Seabright (1997). “Trade Liberalization and the Coordination of Competition Policy”. in L. Waverman, W. Comanor, and A. Goto, eds. Competition Policy in the Global Economy: Modalities for Cooperation. London: Routledge, pp. 381-406.

 

-H. Horn and J. Levionsohn (2001). “Merger Policies and Trade Liberalization”. Economic Journal, V.111-#?, pp. 244-276.

 

-P.J. Lloyd (1998). “Globalisation and Competition Policies”. WA; V.134-#2, pp. 161-185.

 

-R. Falvey (1998). “Mergers in Open Economies”. World Economy; V.21-#8, pp. 1061-1076.

 

-P.K.M. Tharakan and P.J. Lloyd, eds. (1998). “Special Issue on Competition Policy in a Global Economy”. World Economy; V.21-#8.

 

-M. Richardson (1998). “Foreign Entry and Domestic Welfare”. WA; V.134-#2, pp. 250-262.

 

-M. Richardson (1999). “Trade and Competition Policies: concordia discors?”. OEP; V.51-#4, pp. 649-664.

 

-T. Ross (1998). “On the Price Effects of Mergers with Freer Trade”. IJIO; V.6-#?, pp. 233-246.

 

-M. Ohyama (1999). “Market, Trade, and Welfare in General Equilibrium”. Japanese Econonomic Review; V.50-#1, pp. 1-24.

 

-T. Greaney (1999). “Strategic Trade and Competition Policies to Assist Distressed Industries”. CJE; V.32-#3, pp. 767-784.

 

-J. Reitzes and O. Grawe (1999). “Entry Policy and Entry Subsidies”. RIE; V.7-#4, pp. 732-743.

 

-T. Kabiraj and M. Chaudhuri (1999). “On the Welfare Analysis of a Cross-border Merger”. Journal of International Trade and Economic Development; V.8-#?, pp. 195-207.

 

-M. Yano (2001). “Trade Imbalance and Domestic Market Competition Policy”. IER; V.42-#3, pp. 729-750.

 

-Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001). “External effects of domestic regulations: comparing internal and international barriers to trade”. International Review of Law and Economics; V.21-#2, pp. 135-155.

 

-D. Collie (2002). “Mergers and Trade Policy under Oligopoly”. RIE; forth.

 

-G. Gaudet and R. Kanouni (2002). “Trade Liberalization and the Profitability of Domestic Mergers”. Centre de Recherche et Développement en Économique, Chaier 28-2001.

 

(2) Empirical Analysis

 

-A. Mattoo and P. Mavroidis (1995). “The EC-Japan Consensus on Cars: Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy”. World Economy; V.18-#?, pp. 345-365.

 

-P.K.M. Tharakan and P.J. Lloyd, eds. (1998). “Special Issue on Competition Policy in a Global Economy”. World Economy; V.21-#8.

 

-K. Elzinga (1989). “Collusive Predation: Matsushita v. Zenith”. in J. Kwoka and L. White, eds. The Antitrust Revolution. Glenville: Scott Foresman, pp. 241-262.

 

-R. Blair, J. Fesmire and R. Romano (1991). “An Economic Analysis of Matsushita”. Antitrust Bulletin; pp. 355-381.

 

-R. Belderbos and P. Holmes (1995). “An Economics Analysis of Matsushita Revisited”. Antitrust Bulletin; V.40, pp. 825-857.

 

-D. Schwartzman (1993). The Japanese Television Cartel: A Study Based on Matsushita v. Zenith. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

 

-Komuro, Norio (1998). “Kodak-Fuji Film Dispute and the WTO Panel Ruling”. Journal of World Trade; V.32-#5, pp. 161-217 .

 

-Y. Kim and Gl Horlick (1997). “Private Remedies for Private Anti-competitive Barriers to Trade: The Kodak-Fuji Example”. Empirica; V.24-#1/2, pp. 75-81.

 

10. Market Access/Export Expansion

 

a. Voluntary Import Expansion/Aggressive Unilateralism

 

-J. Bhagwati (1988). “VERs, Quid Pro Quo DFI, and VIEs: Political Economy Theoretic Analysis”. International Economic Journal; V.1-#1, pp. 1-14.

 

-E. Dinopoulos and M. Kreinin (1988). “An Analysis of Import Expansion Policies”. EcInq; V.28-#?, pp. 99-108.

 

-N. Bjorksten (1994). “Voluntary Import Expansions and Voluntary Export Restraints in an Oligopoly Model with Capacity Constraints”. CJE; V.27-#?, pp. 446-457.

 

-K. Spier and D. Weinstein (1993). “Retaliatory Mechanisms for Eliminating Trade Barriers: Aggressive Unilateralism v. GATT Cooperation”. in W. Chang and S. Katayama, eds. Imperfect Competition in International Trade. Boston: Kluwer, pp. 231-248.

 

-J. Reitzes and O. Grawe (1994). “Market-share Quotas”. JIE; V.36-#3/4, pp. 431-447.

 

-M. Cronshaw and J. Markusen (1995). “The Theory and Consequences of Results-Oriented Trade Policy”. In J. Levinsohn, A. Deardorff, and R. Stern, eds. New Directions in Trade Theory. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 295-326.

 

-W. Ethier and H. Horn (1996). “Restults-Oriented Trade Policy”. RIE; V.4-#1, pp. 17-39.

 

-T. Greaney (1996). “Import Now! An Analysis of Market Share Voluntary Import Expansions (VIEs)”. JIE; V.40-#3/4, pp. 149-163.

 

-S. Nagoka (1997). “Economics Consequences of VIE When Consumers are Constrained”. Japan and whe World Economy; V.9-#4, pp. 557-565.

 

-T. Verdier (1998). “Results-Oriented versus Rules-Oriented Trade Policies: A Theoretical Survey”. EER; V.42-#?, 733-744.

 

-K. Krishna, M. Thursby and S. Roy (1997). “Pro-competitive Market Access”. Business and Economics for the 21st Century, Vol. 1. Worcester, MA: Business and Economics Society International Press, pp. 333-342.

 

-K. Krishna, S. Roy and M. Thursby (1998). “Implementing Market Access”. RIE; V.6-#4, pp. 529-544.

 

-K. Krishna and J. Morgan (1998). “Implementing Results-Oriented Trade Polcies: The Case of the US-Japanese Auto Parts Dispute”. EER; V42-#7, pp. 1443-1467.

 

-J. Ju and K. Krishna (2000). “Welfare and Market Access Effects of Piecemeal Tariff Reforms”. JIE; V.51-#2, pp. 305-316.

 

-K. Krishna, S. Roy, and M. Thursby (2001). “Can Subsidies for MARs Be Procompetitive”. CJE; V.34-#1, pp. 212-224.

 

-T. Greaney (1999). “Manipulating Market Shares: The Indirect Effects of Voluntary Import Expansions (VIEs)”. Japan and the World Economy; V.11-#1, pp. 95-113.

 

-J. Ishikawa (1999). “Expanding the Purchase of a Foreign Intermediate Good: An Analysis of VIEs and Content Protection under Oligopoly”. In R. Sato, R. Ramachandran, and K. Mino, eds. Global Competition and Integration. Boston: Kluwer.

 

-D. Irwin (1995). Managed Trade: The Case Against Export Targets. Washington, DC: AEI

 

b. Law and Economics of 301

 

-J.H. Bello and A. Holmer (1986). “Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Requirements, Procedures and Developments”. Northwest Journal of International Law and Business; V.7-#?, pp. 645-653.

 

-J.H. Bello and A. Holmer (1987). “Significant Recent Developments in Section 301 Unfair Trade Cases”. in US Trade Law and Policy. New York: Practising Law Institute, pp. 297-349.

 

-J.H. Bello and A. Holmer (1988). “The Heart of the 1988 Trade Act: A Legislative History of the Ammendments to Section 301". Stanford Journal of International Law. V.25-#1, pp. 1-44.

 

-J.H. Bello and A. Holmer (1988). “Unilateral Action to Open Foreign Markets: The Mechanics of Retaliation Exercises”. The International Lawyer; V.32-#4, pp.

 

-A. Holmer and J. Bello (1989). “The Promise and Peril of Unilateralism”. in H. Applebaum and J. Bello, eds. Trade Law and Policy Institute. New York: Practicing Law Institute, pp. 185-195.

 

-J. Bradley (1989). “The Super 301 Process”. in H. Applebaum and J. Bello, eds. Trade Law and Policy Institute. New York: Practicing Law Institute, pp. 87-89.

 

-J.C. Bliss (1989). “The Amendments to Section 301: An Overview and Suggested Strategies for Foreign Response”. Law and Policy in International Business; V.20-#?, pp. 501-528.

 

-J. McMillan (1990). “Strategic Bargaining and Section 301". E&P; V.2-#1, pp. 45-58.

 

-A. Sykes (1990). “`Mandatory` Retaliation for Breach of Trade Agreements: Some Thoughts on the Strategic Design of Section 301". Boston University International Law Journal; V.8-#2, pp. 301-324.

 

-M.P. Ryan (1991). “Strategy and Compliance with Bilateral Trade Dispute Settlement Agreements: USTR's Section 301 Experience in the Pacific Basin”. Michigan Journal of International Law; V.12-#4, pp. 799-827.

 

-J. Bhagwati and H. Patrick, eds. (1990). Aggressive Unilateralism: America's 301 Policy and the World Trading System. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

 

-E. Grinols (1989). “Procedural Protectionism: The American Trade Bill and the New Interventionist Mode”. WA; V.125-#3, pp. 501-521.

 

-G. Saxonhouse (1991). “Japan, SII and the International Harmonization of Domestic Economic Practices”. Michigan Journal of International Law; V.12-#?, pp. 450-469.

 

-T. Bayard and K. Elliott (1992). “‘Aggressive Unilateralism’ and Section 301: Market Opening or Market Closing?”. World Economy; V.15-#6, pp. 685-706.

 

-M. Mastanduno (1992). “Setting Market Access Priorities: The Use of Super 301 in US Trade with Japan”. World Economy; V.15-#6, pp. 729-753.

 

-J. Odell (1992). “International Threats and Internal Politics: Brazil, the EC and the US, 1985-1987". in P. Evans, H. Jacobson and R. Putnam, eds. International Bargaining and Domestic Politics. Berkeley: University of California Press.

 

-A. Sykes (1992). “Constructive Unilateral Threats in International Commercial Relations: The Limited Case for Section 301". Law and Policy in International Business; V.23-#?, pp. 263-330.

 

-J. Grier (1992). “The Use of Section 301 to Open Japanese Markets to Foreign Firms”. North Carolina Journal of International Law; V.17-#?, pp. 1-44.

 

-J. Bello and A. Holmer (1992). “GATT Dispute Settlement Agreement: Internationalization or Elimination of Section 301". International Lawyer; V.26-#, pp. 795-802.

 

-J. Bello and A. Holmer (1994). “The Post Uruguay Round Future of Section 301". Law and Policy in International Business; V.24-#4, pp. 1297-1308.

 

-T. Bayard and K. Elliott (1994). Reciprocity and Retaliation in US Trade Policy. Washington, DC: IIE.

 

-T. McDorman, Ted (1994). “Unilateralism (Section 301) to Multilateralism (GATT): Settlement of International Intellectual Property Disputes after the Uruguay Round”. In G. Stewart, M. Tawfik, and M. Irish, Maureen, eds. International trade and intellectual property: The search for a balanced system. Boulder: Westview, pp. 119-139.

 

-M. Ryan (1995). “STR's Implementation of 301 Policy in the Pacific”. International Studies Quarterly; V.39-#3, pp. 333-350.

 

-G. Saxonhouse (1996). “A Short Summary of the Long History of Unfair Trade Allegations against Japan”. in J. Bhagwati and R. Hudec, eds. Fair Trade and Harmonization. V.1: Economic Analysis. Cambridge: MIT, pp. 471-513.

 

-J. McMillan (1996). “Why Does Japan Resist Foreign Market-Opening Pressure?”. in J. Bhagwati and R. Hudec, eds. Fair Trade and Harmonization. V.1: Economic Analysis. Cambridge: MIT, pp. 515-541.

 

-K. Abbott (1996). “Defensive Unfairness: The Normative Structure of Section 301". In J. Bhagwati and R. Hudec, eds. Fair trade and harmonization: Prerequisites for free trade? Volume 2. Legal analysis. Cambridg: MIT Press, 415-471.

 

-M. Noland (1997). “Chasing Phantoms: The Political Economy of USTR”. International Organization; V.51-#?, pp. 365-387.

 

-M. Schaefer (1998). “Section 301 and the World Trade Organization: A Largely Peaceful Coexistence to Date”. Journal of International Economic Law; V.1-#1, pp. 156-160.

 

-T. Greaney (2001). “Assessing the Impacts of US-Japan Bilateral Trade Agreements, 1980-1995". World Economy; V.24-#2, pp. 127-157.

 

11. Export Subsidies

 

a. Institutional and Empirical Analyses

 

-J. Pearce (1980). Subsidized Export Credit. London: RIIA.

 

-Midland Bank (1980). “Export Credit Facilities: An International Comparison”. Midland Bank Review; pp. 20-29.

 

-OECD (1982). The Export Credit Financing Systems in OECD Member Countries. Paris: OECD.

 

-R. Feinberg (1982). Subsidizing Success: The Export-Import Bank in the US Economy. Cambridge: CUP.

 

-H. Flesig and C. Hill (1984). “The Benefits and Costs of Official Export Credit Programs”. in R. Baldwin and A. Krueger, eds. The Structure and Evolution of Recent US Trade Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 321-355.

 

-G. Hufbauer and J. Erb (1984). Subsidies in International Trade. Washington, DC: IIE.

 

-C. Hamilton (1983). “Public Subsidies to Industry: The Case of Sweden and its Shipbuilding Industry”. World Bank Staff Working Paper, #566.

 

-J. Eaton (1986). “Credit Policy and International Competition”. in P. Krugman, ed. Strategic Trade Policy and the New International Economic. Cambridge: MIT, pp. 115-145.

 

-J. Melitz and P. Messerlin (1987). “Export Credit Subsidies”. Economic Policy; V.4, pp. 150-175.

 

-R. Falvey and N. Gemmel (1990). “Compensatory Financial and Fiscal Incentives to Export”. in C. Milner, ed. Export Promotion Strategies: Theory and Evidence. Brighton: Harvester-Wheatsheaf, pp. 109-129.

 

-R. Falvey and N. Gemmel (1990). “Trade Taxes and Welfare: The Case of Export Incentives in Southeast Asian Countries”. Australian Economic Review; V.?-#?, pp. 61-73.

 

-A. Seitzinger and P. Paarlberg (1990). “A Simulation Model of the US Export Enhancement Program for Wheat”. American Journal of Agricultural Economics; V.?-#?, pp. 98-103.

 

-G. Anania, M. Bohman and C. Carter (1992). “US Export Subsidies in Wheat: Strategic Trade Policy or Expensive Beggar-thy-Neighbor Policy”. American Journal of Agricultural Economics; V.?-#?, pp. 534-545.

 

-A. Hoffmaister (1992). “The Cost of Export Subsidies: Evidence from Costa Rica”. IMFSP; V.39-#1, pp. 148-174.

 

-D. Rousslang and S. Tokarick (1994). “The Trade and Welfare Consequences of US Export-Enhancing Tax Provisions”. IMFSP; V.41-#4, pp. 675-683.

 

b. Theoretical Analyses

 

-Y.-H. Yeh (1971). “On Subsidies vs. Tariffs”. SEJ; V.?-#?, pp. 89-92.

 

-Y.-H. Yeh (1986). “Export Subsidies vs. Production Subsidies”. AEJ; V.14-#2, pp. 71-75.

 

-Y.-H. Yeh (1985). “Export Subsidies, Factor Inflows, and Income Distribution”. AEJ; V.13-#2, pp. 73-75.

 

-Y.-H. Yeh (1987). “The Effect of Consumption Taxes and Production Subsidies”. AEJ; V.15-#2, pp. 57-61.

 

-E. Kleiman and J. Pincus (1981). “The Cyclical Effects of Incremental Export Subsidies”. EcRec; V.57-#?, pp. 140-149.

 

-E. Kleiman and J. Pincus (1982). “The Australian Export Expansion Grants Scheme”. Australian Economic Papers; V.21-#?, pp. 85-105.

 

-M. Richardson and S. Wilkie (1986). “Incremental Export Subsidies”. EcRec; V.62-#?, pp. 88-92.

 

-D. Rodrik (1995). “Taking Trade Policy Seriously: Export Subsidization as a Case Study in Policy Effectiveness”. In J. Levinsohn, A. Deardorff, and R. Stern, eds. New Directions in Trade Theory. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 347-384.

 

-R. Harris and N. Schmitt (1999). “Do Two Wrongs Make a Right? Export Incentives and Bias in Trade Policy”. in J. Piggott and A. Woodland, eds. International Trade Policy and the Pacific Rim. London: Macmillan, pp. 191-212.

 

-M. Petersen and R. Rajan (1996). “Trade Credit: Theories and Evidence”. NBER Working Paper, #5602.

 

12. Adjustment Assistance

 

a. Theoretical Analysis of Adjustment Costs and Adjustment Assistance

 

-W.M. Corden (1974). Trade Policy and Economic Welfare. Oxford: OUP. pp. 104-112.

 

-A. Deardorff (1987). “Safeguards Policy and the Conservative Social Welfare Function”. in H. Kierzkowski, ed. Protection and Competition in International Trade. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 22-40.

 

-P. Neary (1982). “Intersectoral Capital Mobility, Wage Stickiness, and the Case for Trade Adjustment Assistance”. in J. Bhagwati, ed. Import Competition and Response. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 39-64.

 

-M. Mussa (1982). “Government Policy and the Adjustment Process”. in J. Bhagwati, ed. Import Competition and Response. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 13-122.

 

-P. Diamond (1982). “Protection, Trade Adjustment Assistance, and Income Distribution”. J. Bhagwati, ed. Import Competition and Response. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 123-145.

 

-H. Flam, T. Persson and L.E.O. Svensson (1983). “Optimal Subsidies to Declining Industries”. JPubE; V.22-#?, pp. 327-345.

 

-R. Boadway and D. Wildasin (1990). “Optimal Tax-Subsidy Policies for Industrial Adjustment to Uncertain Shocks”. OEP; V.42-#?, pp. 105-134.

 

-M. Gavin (1990). “Structural Adjustment to a Terms of Trade Disturbance”: The Role of Relative Prices”. JIE; V.28-#?, pp. 217-243.

 

-M. Riordan and R. Staiger (1993). “Sectoral Shocks and Structural Unemployment”. IER; V.34-#?, pp. 611-629.

 

-R. Feenstra and T. Lewis (1994). “Trade Adjustment Assistance and Pareto Gains from Trade”. JIE; V.36-#3/4, pp. 201-222.

 

-J. Brander and B. Spencer (1994). “Trade Adjustment Assistance: Welfare and Incentive Effects of Payments to Displaced Workers”. JIE; V.36-#3/4, pp. 239-261.

 

-A. Dixit and R. Rob (1994). “Risk-Sharing, Adjustment and Trade”. JIE; V.36-#3/4, pp. 263-287.

 

-W. Mayer (1994). “Optimal Pursuit of Safeguard Actions over Time”. in A. Deardorff and R. Stern, eds. Analytical and Negotiating Issues in the Global Trading System. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 315-355.

 

-K.C. Fung and R. Staiger (1996). “Trade Liberalization and Trade Adjustment Assistance”. in M. Canzoneri, W. Ethier and V. Grilli, eds. The New Transatlantic Economy. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 265-286.

 

b. Uncertainty and Tariffs as Insurance

 

-S. Turnovsky (1978). “The Distribution of Welfare Gains from Price Stabilization: A Survey of Some Theoretical Issues”. in F. Adams and S. Klein, eds. Stabilizing World Commodity Markets. Lexington: D.C. Heath, pp. 119-148,

 

-D. Newberry and J. Stiglitz (1981). The Theory of Commodity Price Stabilization. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

 

-D. Newberry (1984). “Commodity Price Stabilization in Imperfectly Competitive Markets”. in G. Storey, A. Schmitz and A. Sarris, eds. International Agricultural Trade. Boulder: Westview Press.

 

-C. Gilbert (1985). “Futures Trading and the Welfare Evaluation of Commodity Price Stabilisation”. EJ; V.?-#?, pp. 637-661.

 

-S. Turnovsky, H. Shalit and A. Schmitz (1980). “Consumer's Surplus, Price Instability, and Consumer Welfare”. Etrica; V.48-#1, pp. 135-152.

 

-E.K. Choi and S. Johnson (1987). “Consumers' Surplus and Price Uncertainty”. IER; V.?-#?, pp. 407-411.

 

-E.K. Choi and S. Johnson (1991). “Uncertainty, Price Stabilization and Welfare”. SEJ; V.57-#3, pp. 789-797.

 

-D. Newberry and J. Stiglitz (1984). “Pareto Inferior Trade”. REStud. V.51-#1, pp. 1-12.

 

-J. Eaton and G. Grossman (1985). “Tariffs as Insurance: Optimal Commercial Policy When Domestic Markets are Incomplete”. CJE. V.18-#2, pp. 258-272.

 

-J. Cassing, A.L. Hillman and N.V.Long (1986). “Risk Aversion, Terms of Trade Uncertainty and Social Consensus Trade Policy”. OEP. V.38-#?, pp. 234-242.

 

-D. DeMeza (1987). “The Optimal Tariff and Quota when Terms of Trade are Random”. OEP; V39-#?, pp. 412-417.

 

-R. Fernandez and D. Rodrik (1991). “Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty”. AER; V.81-#5, pp. 1146-1155.

 

-S. Lahiri and J. Sheen (1990). “Terms of Trade Vulnerability and National Welfare in a Small Open Economy”. OEP; V.42-#?, pp. 526-543.

 

-O. Shy (1988). “A General Equilibrium Model of Pareto Inferior Trade”. JIE; V.25-#?, pp. 143-154.

 

-A.L. Hillman, E. Katz and J. Rosenberg (1987). “Workers as Insurance: Anticipated Government Assistance and Factor Demand”. OEP; V.39-#?, 813-820.

 

-A. Dixit (1987). “Trade and Insurance with Moral Hazard”. JIE; V.23-#?, pp. 201-220.

 

-A. Dixit (1989). “Trade and Insurance with Adverse Selection”. REStud; V.56-#?, pp. 235-248.

 

-A.Dixit (1989). “Trade and Insurance with Imperfectly Observed Outcomes”. QJE; V.104-#1, pp. 195-203.

 

-R.H. Bates, P. Brock and J. Tiefenthaler (1991). “Risk and Trade Regimes: Another Look”. IO; V.45-#1, pp. 1-18.

 

-D. Rodrik (1998). “Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments?”. JPE; V.106-#5, pp. 997-1032.

 

-R. Staiger and G. Tabellini (1987). “Distortionary Trade Policy and Excessive Protection”. AER; V.77-#5, pp.

 

-H. Lapan (1988). “The Optimal Tariff, Production Lags, and Time Consistency”. AER. V.78-#3, pp. 395-401.

 

-H. Lapan (1991). “The Optimal Tariff, Time Consistency and Immiserizing Growth in a Large Country”. JIEI; V.6-#1, pp. 27-39.

 

-P. Srivastava (1994). “Nationalizing to Liberalize: Credibility in Trade Liberalization”. JIE; V.36-#3/4, pp. 449-465.

 

-R. Staiger and G. Tabellini (1989). “Rules and Discretion in Trade Policy”. EER; V.33-#?, pp. 1265-1277.

 

-R. Fischer and T. Prusa (1999). “Contingent Protection as Better Insurance”. NBER Working Paper, #6933.

 

c. Empirical Research on Trade-Displaced Workers and Adjustment Assistance

 

(1) Identifying Trade Sensitive Sectors and Trade-Displaced Workers

 

-C.M. Aho and J. Orr (1981). “Trade Sensitive Employment: Who are the Affected Workers?”. Monthly Labor Review; V.104-#2, pp. 29-35.

 

-C. K. Schoepfle (1982). “Imports and Domestic Employment: Identifying Affected Industries”. Monthly Labor Review; V.105-#8, pp. 13-26.

 

- R. Bednarzik (1993). “An Analysis of US Industries Sensitive to Trade”. Monthly Labor Review; V.116-#2, pp. 15-31.

 

-R. Shelburne and R. Bednarzik (1993). “Geographic Concentration of Trade-Sensitive Employemnt”. Monthly Labor Review; V.116-#6, pp. 3-13.

 

(2) Labour Market Experience of Trade-Displaced Workers

 

(a) Economic Effects of Worker Displacement in General

 

-D. Hamermesh (1989). “What Do We Know About Worker Displacement in the US?”. Industrial Relations; V.28-#1, pp. 51-59.

 

-B. Fallick (1996). “A Review of Recent Empirical Literature on Displaced Workers”. ILR Review; V.50-#1, pp. 5-16.

 

-L. Kletzer (1998). “Job Displacement”. Journal of Economic Perspectives; V.12-#1, pp. 115-136.

 

-L. Jacobson (1978). “Earnings Losses of Workers Displaced from Manufacturing Industries”. in U.S. Department of Labor, The Impact of International Trade and Investment on Employment. Washington, DC: USGPO, pp. 87-98.

 

-M. Podgursky and P. Swaim (1987). “Job Displacement and Earnings Loss: Evidence from the Displaced Worker Survey”. ILRR; V.41-#1, pp. 17-29.

 

-K. Shaw (1987). “Occupational Change, Employer Change, and the Transferability of Skills”. SEJ; V.53-#?, pp. 702-719.

 

-L. Kletzer (1989). “Returns to Seniority after Permanent Job Loss”. AER; V.79-#3, pp. 536-543.

 

-J. Addison and P. Portugal (1989). “Job Displacement, Relative Wage Changes, and Duration of Unemployment”. Journal of Labor Economics; V.7-#?, pp. 281-302.

 

-R. Topel (1990). “Specific Capital and Unemployment: Measuring the Costs and Consequences of Job Loss”. Carnegie-Rocester Conference Series on Public Policy; #33, pp. 145-176.

 

-R. Topel (1991). “Specific Capital, Mobility, and Wages: Wages Rise with Job Seniority”. JPE; V.99-#1, pp. 145-176.

 

-C. Ruhm (1991). “Are Workers Permanently Scarred by Job Displacements?”. AER; V.81-#1, pp. 319-324.

 

-K. Shaw (1991). “The Influence of Human Capital Investment on Migration and Industry Change”. Journal of Regional Science; V.31-#4, pp. 397-416.

 

-L. Kletzer (1991). “Earnings After Job Displacement: Job Tenure, Industry, and Occupation”. In J. Addison, ed. Job Displacement: Consequences and Implications for Policy. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, pp. 107-135.

 

-D. Kruse (1991). “Displaced versus Disadvantaged Workers”. in J. Addison, ed. Job Displacement: Consequences and Implications for Policy. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, pp. 279-296.

 

-S. Jacobson, R. LaLonde, and D. Sullivan (1993). “Earnings Losses of Displaced Workers”. AER; V.83-#4, pp. 685-709.

 

-S. Jacobson, R. LaLonde, and D. Sullivan (1993). The Costs of Worker Dislocation. Kalamazoo: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.

 

-B. Fallick (1993). “The Industrial Mobility of Displaced Workers”. Journal of Labor Economics; V.11-#2, pp. 302-323.

 

-W. Carrington (1993). “Wage Losses for Displaced Workers: Is It Really the Firm that Matters?”. Journal of Human Resources; V.28-#3, pp. 453-462.

 

-W. Carrington and A. Zaman (1994). “Interindustry Variation in Costs of Job Displacement”. Journal of Labor Economics; V.12-#2, pp. 243-276.

 

-H. Farber (1993). “The Incidence and Cost of Job Loss: 1982-1991". BPEA; Microeconomics, 1; pp. 73-119.

 

-D. Neal (1995). “Industry-Specific Human Capital: Evidence from Displaced Workers”. Journal of Labor Economics; V.13-#4, pp. 653-677.

 

-L. Kletzer (1996). “The Role of Sector-Specific Skills in Post-Displacement Earnings”. Industrial Relations; V.35-#4, pp. 473-490.

 

-D. Parent (2000). “Industry-Specific Capital and the Wage Profile: Evidence from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics”. Journal of Labor Economics; V.18-#2, pp. 306-323.

 

-D. Greenaway, R. Upward, and P. Wright (2000). “Labour Market Flows and the Adjustment Process”. Oxford Review of Economic Policy; V.16-#?, pp.

 

-M. Haynes, R. Upward, and P. Wright (2000). “Smooth and Sticky Adjustment: A Comparative Analysis of the US and UK”. Review of International Economics V.8-#?, pp.517-532.

 

-M. Haynes, R. Upward, and P. Wright (2002). “Estimating the Wage Costs of Inter- and Intra-Sectoral Adjustment”. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, V.138-#2, pp. 229-253.

 

-Richard Rogerson and Martin Schindler (2002). “The Welfare Costs of Worker Displacement”. Journal of Monetary Economics; V.49-#6, pp. 1213-1234.

 

-Dae Il Kim (1998). “Reinterpreting Industry Premiums: Match-Specific Productivity”. Journal of Labor Economics; V.16-#3, pp. 479-504.

 

-R. Schoeni and M. Dardia (1996). “Wage Losses of Displaced Workers in the 1990's”. RAND Corporation Report: DRU/1474/RC.

 

-J. Heckman (1979). Sample Selection Bias as Specification Error”. Econometrica; V.47-#1, pp. 153-162. [comment by W. Greene, Greene, V.49-#3, pp. 795-798].

 

-C. Manski (1989). “Anatomy of the Selection Problem”. Journal of Human Resources; V.24-#3, pp. 343-360.

 

-F. Vella (1998). “Estimating Models with Sample Selection Bias: A Survey”. Journal of Human Resources; V.33-#1, pp. 127-169.

 

(b) Trade Displacement

 

-D. Kruse (1988). “International Trade and the Labor Market Experience of Displaced Workers”. Industrial and Labor Relations Review; V.41-#3, pp. 402-417.

 

-T. Hungerford (1995). “International Trade, Comparative Advantage, and the Incidence of Layoff Employment Spells”. REStat; V.77-#3, pp. 511-521.

 

-J. Addison, D. Fox, and C. Ruhm (1995). “Trade and Displacement in Manufacturing”. Monthly Labor Review; V.118-#4, pp. 58-67.

 

-D. Clark, H. Herzog, and A. Schlottmann (1998). “Import Competition, Employment Risk, and the Job-Search Outcomes of Trade-Displaced Manufacturing Workers”. Industrial Relations; V.37-#2, pp. 182-206.

 

-J. Haveman (1998). “The Influence of Changing Trade Patterns on Displacements of Labor”. International Trade Journal; V.12-#2, pp. 259-292.

 

-L. Kletzer (1998). “International Trade and Job Displacement in U.S. Manufacturing, 1979-1991". in S. Collins, ed. Imports, Exports, and the American Worker. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 422-472.

 

-L. Kletzer (1998). “Increasing Foreign Competition and Increased Job Insecurity: Are They Related?”. in Paula Voos, ed. Proceedings of the Fiftieth Annual Meeting. Madison: Industrial Relations Research Association, pp. 99-106.

 

-L. Kletzer (2000). “Trade and Job Loss in U.S. Manufacturing, 1979-1994". in R. Feenstra, ed. The Impact of International Trade on Wages. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 349-393.

 

-J. Addison, D. Fox, and C. Ruhm (2000). “Technology, Trade Sensitivity, and Labor Displacement”. SEJ; V.66-#3, pp. 682-699.

 

(3) Evaluating Trade Adjustment Assistance

 

-R. Baldwin (1970). “Government Aids to Domestic Groups”. Chapter 5 of R. Baldwin, Nontariff Distortion of International Trade. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 110-132.

 

-R. Baldwin and J. Mutti (1973). “Policy Issues in Adjustment Assistance: The US”. in H. Hughes, ed. Prospects for Partnership: Industrialization and Trade Policies in the 1970s. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins/World Bank, pp. 148-177.

 

-OECD (1975). Adjustment for Trade: Studies in Industrial Adjustment Problems and Policies. Paris: OECD.

 

-C. Frank and S. Levinson (1977). Foreign Trade and Domestic Aid. Washington, DC: Brookings.

 

-W. Dewald, ed. (1978). The Impact of International Trade and Investment on Employment. Washington, DC: US Department of Labor.

 

-C.M. Aho and T. Bayard (1980). “American Trade Adjustment Assistance after 5 Years”. World Economy; V.3-#3, pp.

 

-J.D. Richardson (1982). “Trade Adjustment Assistance Under the Trade Act of 1974: An Analytical Examination and Worker Survey”. in J. Bhagwati, ed. Import Competition and Response. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 321-368.

 

-C.M. Aho and T. Bayard (1984). “Costs and Benefits of Trade Adjustment Assistance”. In R. Baldwin and A. Krueger, eds. The Structure and Evolution of Recent U.S. Trade Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 153-192.

 

-R. Lawrence and R. Litan (1986). Saving Free Trade: A Pragmatic Approach. Washington, DC: Brookings.

 

-P. Decker and W. Corson (1995). International Trade and Worker Displacement: Evaluation of the Trade Adjustment Assistance Program”. Industrial and Labor Relations Review; V.48-#4, pp. 758-774.

 

-L. Jacobson (1998). “Compensation Programs”. in S. Collins, ed. Imports, Exports, and the American Worker. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 473-537.

 

-G. Schoepfle (2000). “U.S. Trade Adjustment Assistance Policies for Workers”. in A. Deardorff and R. Stern, eds. Social Dimensions of U.S. Trade Policy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 95-122.

 

-L. Marcal (2001). “Does Trade Adjustment Assistance Help Trade-Displaced Workers?”. Contemporary Economic Policy; V.19-#1, pp. 59-72.

 

-E. Kapstein (1998). “Trade Liberalization and the Politics of Trade Adjustment Assistance”. International Labour Review; v.137-#4, pp. 501-516.

 

d. Empirical Research on the Labor Market Effects of Trade

 

(1) The Effect of Trade on Wages and Employment

 

(a) Mostly Employment Effects

 

i) Overviews

 

-J. Martin (1979). “Measuring the Effects of Changes in Trade Flows: A Survey of Recent Research”. In The Impact of the Newly Industrialized Countries on Production and Trade in Manufactures. Paris: OECD.

 

-L. D’A. Tyson and J. Zysman (1988). “Trade and Employment: An Overview of the Issues and Evidence”. In L. D’A. Tyson, W. Dickens and J. Zysman, eds. The Dynamics of Trade and Employment. Cambridge: Ballinger, pp. 1-40.

 

-W. Dickens (1988). “The Effects of Trade on Employment: Techniques and Evidence”. In L. D’A. Tyson, W. Dickens and J. Zysman, eds. The Dynamics of Trade and Employment. Cambridge: Ballinger, pp. 41-85.

 

-J. Abowd and R. Freeman (1991). “Introduction and Summary”. in J. Abowd and R. Freeman, eds. Immigration, Trade and Labor Markets. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 1-25.

 

-R. Baldwin (1995). “The Effect of Trade and Foreign Direct Investment on Employment and Relative Wages”. OECD Economic Studies, #23, pp. 7-54.

 

ii) Accounting Decompositions

 

-J. Martin and J. Evans (1981). “Notes on Measuring the Employment Displacement Effects of Trade by the Accounting Procedure”. OEP; V.33-#1, pp. 154-164.

 

-G. Grossman (1982). “Comment”. In J. Bhagwati, ed. Import Competition and Response. Chicago: Univeristy of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 396-399.

 

-L. Krause (1971). “How Much of Current Unemployment Did We Import”. BPEA; #2, pp. 417-428.

 

-C. Frank with S. Levinson (1977). “Import Competition and American Jobs”. In Frank with Levinson, Foreign Trade and Domestic Aid. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 23-38.

 

-A. Krueger (1979). “The Impact of Foreign Trade on Employment in US Industry”. in B. Hindley, ed. Current Issues in Commercial Policy and Diplomacy. London: Macmillan, pp. 73-98.

 

-A. Krueger (1980). “Protectionist Pressures, Imports and Employment in the US”. ScanJE; V.82-#2, pp. 133-146.

 

-A. Krueger (1980). “Restructruing for Import Competition from Developing Countries, I: Labor Displacements and Economic Redeployment in the US”. Journal of Policy Modeling; V.2-#?, pp. 165-184.

 

-R. Lawrence (1984). Can America Compete? Washington, DC: Brookings. (chapters 3 and 4).

 

-B. Eichengreen (1988). “International Competition in the Products of U.S. Basic Industries”. in M. Feldstein, ed. The United States in the World Economy. Chicago: Univeristy of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 279-353.

 

-B. Su and C. Chentrens (1994). “Foreign Trade Alternatives for Employment and Occupations, 2005". Monthly Labor Review; V.117-#11, pp. 37-45.

 

-V. Cable (1977). “British Protectionsism and LDC Imports”. ODI Review; V.2-#?, pp. 29-48.

 

-J. Borkakoti (1997). “The Impact of Import Penetration on Unemployment in UK Manufacturing”. in J. Borkakoti and C. Milner, eds. International Trade and Labour Markets. London: Macmillan, pp. 90-117.

 

-R. Hine and P. Wright (1997). “Trade and Manufacturing Employment in the UK”. in J. Borkakoti and C. Milner, eds. International Trade and Labour Markets. London: Macmillan, pp. 118-139.

 

-F. Wolter (1979). “Adjusting to Imports from Developing Countries”. in H. Giersch, ed. Reshaping the World Economic Order. Tubingen: Mohr.

 

iii) Factor Content Method

 

-Mitchell, D. (1975). “Recent Changes in the Labor Content of US International Trade”. Industrial and Labor Relations Review; V.28-#3, pp. 355-375.

 

-P. De Grauwe, W. Kennes, T. Peeters, and R. van Straelen (1979). “Trade Expansion with Less Developed Countries and Employment: A Case Study of Belgium”. WA; V.115-#1, pp. 99-115.

 

-D. Schumacher (1984). “North-South Trade and Shifts in Employment: A Comparative Analyis of Six European Community Countries”. International Labor Review; V.123-#3, pp. 333-347.

 

-A. Sapir and D. Schumacher (1985). “The Employment Impact of Shifts in the Composition of Commodity and Services Trade”. Employment Growth and Structural Change. Paris: OECD, pp. 115-127.

 

-C. Driver, A. Kilpatrick and B. Naisbitt (1985). “The UK Employment Effects of Trade Expansion with the EEC and the NICs”. EER; V.30-#2, pp. 427-38.

 

-C. Driver, A. Kilpatrick and B. Naisbitt (1985). “The Employment Effects of Changes in the Structure of UK Trade”. Journal of Economic Studies; V.12-#5, pp. 19-38.

 

-C. Driver, A. Kilpatrick and B. Naisbitt (1988). “The Sensitivity of Estimated Employment Effects in Input-Output Studies: An Example of the Use of Marginal versus Average Coefficients”. Economic Modelling; V.5-#2, pp. 145-150.

 

-A. Wood (1991). “The Factor Content of North-South Trade in Manufactures Reconsidered”. WA; V.127-#4, pp. 719-743.

 

-A. Wood (1991). “How Much Does Trade with the South Affect Workers in the North?”. WBRO; V.6-#3, pp. 19-35.

 

-N. Sakurai (1995). “Structural Change and Employment: Empirical Evidence for 8 OECD Countries”. OECD Science, Technology and Industry Review; #15, pp. 133-175.

 

-P. Messerlin (1995). “The Impact of Trade and Capital Movements on Labour: Evidence on The French Case”. OECD Economic Studies, #24, pp. 89-124.

 

-M. Gregory and C. Greenhalgh (1997). “International Trade, Deindustrialization and Labour Demand: An Input-Output Study for the UK (1979-1990)”. in Jitendral Borkakoti and Chris Milner, eds. International Trade and Labour Markets. London: Macmillan, pp. 62-89.

 

iv) Regression Analyses

 

a) US

 

-G. Grossman (1986). “Imports as a Cause of Injury: the Case of the US Steel Industry”. JIE; V.20-#3/4, pp. 201-223.

 

-G. Grossman (1987). “The Employment and Wage Effects of Import Competition in the US”. JIEI; V.2-#1, pp. 1-23.

 

-C. Mann (1988). “The Effect of Foreign Competition in Prices and Quanitites on the Employment in Import Sensitive U.S. Industries”. International Trade Journal; V.2-#4, pp. 409-444.

 

-R. Freeman and L. Katz (1991). “Industrial Wage and Employment Determination in an Open Economy”. in J. Abowd and R. Freeman, eds. Immigration, Trade, and Labor Markets. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 235-259.

 

-A. Revenga (1992). “Exporting Jobs? The Impact of Import Competition on Employment and Wages in US Manufacturing”. QJE; V.107-#1, pp. 255-284.

 

b) Europe

 

-R. Freeman and A. Revenga (1999). “How Much Has LDC Trade Affected Western Job Markets?”. in Mathias Dewatripont, André Sapir, and Khalid Sekkat, eds. Trade and Jobs in Europe: Much Ado About Nothing? Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 8-32.

 

-D. Neven and C. Wyplosz (1999). “Relative Prices, Trade and Restructuring in European Industry”. in Mathias Dewatripont, André Sapir, and Khalid Sekkat, eds. Trade and Jobs in Europe: Much Ado About Nothing? Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 33-59.

 

-M. Dewatripont, A. Sapir, and K. Sekkat (1999). “Labour Market Effects of Trade with LDCs in Europe”. in Mathias Dewatripont, André Sapir, and Khalid Sekkat, eds. Trade and Jobs in Europe: Much Ado About Nothing? Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 60-78.

 

-O. Cortes, S. Jean, and J. Pisani-Ferry (1999). “Trade with Emerging Countries and the Labour Market: The French Case”. in Mathias Dewatripont, André Sapir, and Khalid Sekkat, eds. Trade and Jobs in Europe: Much Ado About Nothing? Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 113-138.

 

-K. Aiginger, R. Winter-Ebmer, and J. Zweimüller (1996). “Eastern European Trade and the Austrian Labor Market”. WA; V.132-#3, pp. 476-500.

 

c) UK

 

-K. Denny and S. Machin (1991). “The Effects of Import Competition on Wages and Employment”. Institute of Fiscal Studies working paper, #

 

-J. Konings and H. Vandenbussche (1995). “The Effect of Foreign Competition on UK Employment and Wages: Evidence from Firm-level Panel Data”. WA; V.131-#4, pp. 655-671.

 

-J. Borkakoti (1997). “The Impact of Import Penetration on Unemployment in UK Manufacturing”. in J. Borkakoti and C. Milner, eds. International Trade and Labour Markets. London: Macmillan, pp. 90-117.

 

-A. Courakis, K. Maskus, and A. Webster (1997). “Occupational Employment and Wage Changes in the UK: Trade and Technology Effects”. in J. Borkakoti and C. Milner, eds. International Trade and Labour Markets. London: Macmillan, pp. 169-202.

 

-R. Hine and P. Wright (1997). “Trade and Manufacturing Employment in the UK”. in J. Borkakoti and C. Milner, eds. International Trade and Labour Markets. London: Macmillan, pp. 118-139.

 

-D. Greenaway, R. Hine, and P. Wright (1999). “An Empirical Assessment of the Impact of Trade on Employment in the United Kingdom”. EJPE; V.15-#4, pp. 485-500.

 

-P. Oslington (1999). “Trade and Labour Rents: An Analysis of Recent OECD Wage Inequality and Unemployment Experience”. Centre for Research on Globalisation and Labour Markets Discussion Paper, #99/13.

 

d) Other

 

-N. Gaston and D. Trefler (1997). “The Labour Market Consequences of the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement”. CJE; V.30-#1, pp. 18-42.

 

-E. Beaulieu (2000). “The Canada-US Free Trade Agreement and Labour Market Adjustment in Canada”. CJE; V.33-#2, pp. 540-563.

 

-N. Gaston (1998). “The Impact of International Trade and Protection on Australian Manufacturing Employment”. Australian Economic Papers; V.37-#2, pp. 119-136.

 

Karunaratne, Neil Dias (1999). “Globalisation and Labour Immiserisation in Australia”. Journal of Economic Studies; V.26-#2/3, pp. 82-105.

 

-K. Lang (1998). “The Effect of Trade Liberalization on Wages and Employment: The Case of New Zealand”. Journal of Labor Economics; V.16-#4, pp. 792-814.

 

-B. Balassa (1986). “The Employment Effects of Trade in Manufactured Products Between Developed and Developing Countries”. JPolMod; V8-#3, pp. 371-390.

 

v) CGE Methods

 

-A. Deardorff and R. Stern (1986). “Changes in Trade and Employment in the Major Industrialized Countries”. Chapter 9 in The Michigan Model of World Trade and Production. Cambridge: MIT, pp. 199-218.

 

-R. Staiger, A. Deardorff, and R. Stern (1987). “Employment Effects of Japanese and American Protectionism”. In D. Salvatore, ed. The New Protectionist Threat to World Welfare. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 164-180.

 

-H. Lee and D. Roland-Holst (1994). “Shifting Comparative Advantage and the Employment Effects of US-Japan Trade”. World Economy; V.17-#3, pp. 323-363.

 

(b) Mostly Wage Effects

 

i) Overviews

 

-A. Wood (1991). “How Much Does Trade with the South Affect Workers in the North”. WBER; V.6-#?, pp. 19-36.

 

-A. Wood (1994). North-South Trade, Employment and Inequality: Changing Fortunes in a Skill-Driven World. New York: Oxford University Press.

 

-D. Bloom and A. Brender (1993). “Labor and the Emerging World Economy”. Population Bulletin; V.48-#2, pp. 2-39.

 

-P. Krugman and R. Lawrence (1994). “Trade, Jobs and Wages”. Scientific American; April, pp. 44-49.

 

-E. Leamer (1994). “Trade, Wages, and Revolving Door Ideas”. NBER Working Paper, #4716.

 

-J. Bhagwati and V. Dehejia (1994). “International Trade Theory and Wages of the Unskilled”. In J. Bhagwati and M. Kosters, eds. Trade and Wages: Leveling Wages Down? Washington, DC: AEI, pp. 36-75.

 

-A. Deardorff and D. Hakura (1994). “Trade and Wages: What are the Questions?”. In J. Bhagwati and M. Kosters, eds. Trade and Wages: Leveling Wages Down? Washington, DC: AEI, pp. 76-107.

 

-R. Cooper (1994). “Foreign Trade, Wages and Unemployment”. In H. Giersch, ed. Fighting Europe’s Unemployment in the 1990's. Berlin: Springer, pp. 93-117.

 

-P. Krugman (1995). “Growing World Trade: Causes and Consequences”. BPEA, #1, pp. 327-362.

 

-G. Burtless (1995). “International Trade and the Rise in Earnings Inequality”. JEL; V.33-#2, pp. 800-816.

 

-R. Freeman (1995). “Are Your Wages Being Set in Beijing”. Journal of Economic Perspectives; V.9-#3, pp. 15-32.

 

-J.D. Richardson (1995). “Income Inequality and Trade: How to Think, What to Conclude”. Journal of Economic Perspectives, V.9-#3, pp. 33-55.

 

-A. Wood (1995). “How Trade Hurts Unskilled Workers”. Journal of Economic Perspectives; V.9-#3, pp. 57-80.

 

-R. Cooper (1996). “Is Growth in Developing Countries Beneficial to Industrial Countries?”. Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics 1995. Washington, DC: World Bank, pp. 249-275.

 

-P. Krugman (1995). “Technology, Trade, and Factor Prices”. NBER Working Paper, #5355.

 

-P. Krugman (1996). “Domestic Distortions and the Deindustrialization Hypothesis”. in R. Feenstra, G. Grossman and D. Irwin, eds. The Political Economy of Trade Policy. Cambridge: MIT, pp. 33-49.

 

-G. Hanson and A. Harrison (1995). “Trade, Technology, and Wage Inequality”. NBER Working Paper, #5110.

 

-P. Brenton (1997). “Rising Trade and Falling Wages: A Review of the Theory and Empirics”. in P. Brenton and J. Pelkmans, eds. Global Trade and European Workers. London: Macmillan, pp. 18-38.

 

-F.L. Pryor (1999). “The Impact of Foreign Trade on the Employment of Unskilled U.S. Workers: Some New Evidence”. SEJ; V.65-#3, pp. 472-472.

 

-S. Collins, ed. (1998). Imports, Exports and the American Worker. Washington, DC: Brookings.

 

-R. Lawrence (1996) Single World, Divided Nations? Globalization and OECD Labor Markets. Washington, DC: Brookings\OECD.

 

-M. Slaughter (1998). “International Trade and Per Capita Income Convergence: A Difference-in-Differences Analysis”. NBER Working Paper; #6557.

 

-G. Johnson and F. Stafford (1999). “The Labor Market Implications of International Trade”. Chapter 34 in O. Ashenfelter and D. Card, eds. Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. 3B. Amsterdam: North Holland, pp.

 

ii) US

 

-I. Kravis (1956). “Wages and Foreign Trade”. REStat; V.38-#1, pp. 14-30.

 

-D. Brauer (1991). “The Effect of Imports on US Manufacturing Wages”. FRBNY Quarterly Review; Spring, pp. 14-26.

 

-K. Murphy and F. Welch (1991). “The Role of International Trade in Wage Differentials”. In M. Kosters, ed. Workers and Their Wages: Changing Patterns in the US. Washington, DC: AEI, pp. 39-69.

 

-R. Freeman and L. Katz (1991). “Industrial Wage and Employment Determination in an Open Economy”. in J. Abowd and R. Freeman, eds. Immigration, Trade, and Labor Market. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 235-259.

 

-G. Borjas, R. Freeman and L. Katz (1992). “On the Labor Market Effects of Immigration and Trade”. In G. Borjas and L. Katz, eds. Immigration and the Workforce: Economic Consequences for the US and Source Areas. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 213-244.

 

-R. Batra (1992). “The Fallacy of Free Trade”. RIE; V.1-#1, pp. 19-31.

 

-R. Batra and D. Slottje (1992). “Trade Policy and Poverty in the US: Theory and Evidence, 1947-1990". RIE; V.1-#?, pp. 189-208.

 

-C. Arndt and T. Hertel (1997). “Revisiting ‘The Fallacy of Free Trade’”. RIE; V.5-#2, pp. 221-229.

 

-G. Johnson and F. Stafford (1993). “International Competition and Real Wages”. AER; V.83-#2, pp. 127-131.

 

-E. Leamer (1993). “Wage Effects of a US-Mexican Free Trade Agreement”. In P. Garber, ed. The Mexico-US Free Trade Agreement. Cambridge: MIT, pp. 57-125

 

-R. Lawrence and M. Slaughter (1993). “Trade and US Wages: Giant Sucking Sound or Small Hiccup?”. BPEA; V.1993-#2, pp. 161-210.

 

-G. Borjas and V. Ramey (1994). “Time Series Evidence on the Sources of Trends in Wage Inequality”. AER; V.84-#2, pp. 10-16.

 

-G. Borjas and V. Ramey (1994). “The Relationship between Wage Inequality and Trade”. In J. Bergstrand, et al. Eds. The Changing Distribution of Income in an Open US Economy. New York: Elsevier, pp. 217-241.

 

-G. Borjas and V. Ramey (1995). “Foreign Competition, Market Power, and Wage Inequality”. QJE; V.110-#4, pp. 1075-1110.

 

-J. Sachs and H. Shatz (1994). “Trade and Jobs in US Manufacturing”. BPEA; V.1994-#1, pp. 1-84.

 

-N. Fielke (1994). “Is Global Competition Making the Poor Even Poorer?”. New England Economic Review; Nov/Dec, pp. 3-16.

 

-A. Bernard and J.B. Jensen (1995). “Exporters, Jobs and Wages in US Manufacturing: 1976-1987". BPEA: Microeconomics, pp. 67-119.

 

-A. Bernard and J.B. Jensen (1997). “Exporters, Skill Upgrading and the Wage Gap”. JIE; V.42-#1/2, pp. 3-31.

 

-A. Bernard and J.B. Jensen (2000). “Understanding Increasing and Decreasing Wage Inequality”. in R. Feenstra, ed. The Impact of International Trade on Wages. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp.227-261.

 

-R. Baldwin and G. Cain (2000). “Shifts in Relative US Wages: The Role of Trade, Technology and Factor Endowments”. REStat; V.82-#4, pp. 580-595.

 

-R. Feenstra and G. Hanson (1999). “The Impact of Outsourcing and High Technology Capital on Wages: Estimates for the US, 1979-1990". QJE; V.114-#3, pp. 907-940.

 

-W. Cline (1997). Trade and Income Distribution. Washington, DC: IIE.

 

-J. Harrigan (2000). “International Trade and American Wages in General Equilibrium, 1967-1995. in R. Feenstra, ed. The Impact of International Trade on Wages. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 171-193.

 

-M. Lovely and J.D. Richardson (2000). “Trade Flows and Wage Premiums: Does Who or What Matter?”. in R. Feenstra, ed. The Impact of International Trade on Wages. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 309-343.

 

-P. Krugman (2000). “And Now for Something Completely Different: An Alternative Model of Trade, Education, and Inequality”. in R. Feenstra, ed. The Impact of International Trade on Wages. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 15-28.

 

-E. Leamer (1999). “Effort, Wages, and the International Division of Labor”. JPE; V.107-#6, pp. 1127-1163.

 

-E. Leamer and C. Thornberg (2000). “Effort and Wages: A New Look at the Interindustry Wage Differentials”. in R. Feenstra, ed. The Impact of International Trade on Wages. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 36-80.

 

iii) Europe

 

-J. Oliviera-Martins (1994). “Market Structure, Trade and Wages”. OECD Economic Observer; #.22, pp. 131-154.

 

-D. Greenaway, R. Hine and P. Wright (1997). “Does Trade Affect Wages? An Empirical Analysis of the UK”. CREDIT Research Paper, #97/11.

 

-J. Haskel and M. Slaughter (1999). “Trade, Technology and UK Wage Inequality”. GLM Working Paper; #99/2.

 

-T. Desjonqueres, S. Machin, and J. Van Reenen (1999). “Another Nail in the Coffin? Or Can the Trade Based Explanation of Changing Skill Structures be Resurrected?”. ScanJE; V.101-#4, pp. 533-554.

 

-B. Anderton and P. Brenton (1999). “Trade with NICs and Wage Inequality: Evidence from the UK and Germany”. in P. Brenton and J. Pelkmans, eds. Global Trade and European Workers. London: Macmillan, pp. 39-68.

 

-M. Lücke (1999). “Trade with Low-income Countries and the Relatives Wages and Employment Opportunities of the Unskilled: An Exploratory Analysis for West Germany and the UK”. in P. Brenton and J. Pelkmans, eds. Global Trade and European Workers. London: Macmillan, pp. 69-95.

 

-D. Greenaway, R. Hine and P. Wright (2000). “Further Evidence on the Effect of Foreign Competition on Industry Level Wages”. WA; V.136-#3, pp. 522-538.

 

iv) Japan

 

-M. Rebick (1999). “Trade and the Wage Structure in the Presence of Price Differentials in the Product Market: The Japanese Labor Market 1965-1990". Journal of the Japanese and International Economies; V.13-#1, pp. 22-43.

 

v) LDCs

 

-A.C. Edwards and Z. Tzannatos (1995). “National and International Wage Differentials: Effects of Trade, Growth and Education”. Ms: World Bank.

 

-M. Cragg and M. Epelbaum (1996). “Why Has Wage Dispersion Grown in Mexico? Is it the Incidence of Reforms or the Growing Demand for Skills?”. JDevE; V.51-#?, pp. 99-116.

 

-G. Hanson (1997). “Increasing Returns, Trade and the Regional Structure of Wages”. EJ; v.107-#440, pp. 113-133.

 

-R. Feenstra and G. Hanson (1997). “Foreign Direct Investment and Relative Wages: Evidence from Mexico’s Maquiladora”. JIE; V.42-#3/4, pp. 371-393.

 

-A. Harrison and E. Leamer (1997). “Labor Markets in Developing Countries: An Agenda for Research”. Journal of Labor Economics; V.15-#3/Part II, pp. S1-S19.

 

-A. Revenga (1997). “Employment and Wage Effects of Trade Liberalization: The Case of Mexican Manufacturing”. Journal of Labor Economics; V.15-#3/Part II, pp. S20-43.

 

-J. Currie and A. Harrison (1997). “Sharing the Costs: The Impact of Trade Reform on Capital and Labor in Morocco”. Journal of Labor Economics; V.15-#3/Part II, pp. S44-S71.

 

-D. Robbins (1996). “HOS Hits Facts: Facts Win; Evidence on Trade and Wages in the Developing World.” HIID Working Paper # 557.

 

-D. Robbins (1997). “Trade and Wages in Colombia”. Estudios de Economia; V.24-#1, pp. 47-83.

 

-D. Robbins (1999). “Wage Dispersion and Trade in Colombia: An Analysis of Greater Bogota, 1976-1989". In C. Callahan and F. Gunter, eds. Colombia: An opening economy? Stamford, Conn.: JAI Press, pp. 97-129.

 

-D. Robbins and T.H. Gindling (1999). “Trade Liberalization and the Relative Wages for More-Skilled Workers in Costa Rica”. Review of Development Economics; V.3-#2, pp. 140-154.

 

-U. Kambhampati, P. Krishna, and D. Mitra (1997). “The Effects of Trade Policy Reforms on Labour Markets: Evidence from India”. Journal of International Trade and Economic Development; V.6-#2, pp. 287-297.

 

-C. Milner and P. Wright (1998). “Modelling Labour Market Adjustment to Trade Liberalisation in an Industrialising Economy”. Economic Journal; V.108-#447, pp. 509-528.

 

-G. Hanson (1998). “Regional Adjustment to Trade Liberalization”. RSUE; V.28-#4, pp. 419-444.

 

-A. Revenga and C. Montenegro (1998). “North American Integration and Factor-Price Equalization: Is there Evidence of Wage Convergence between Mexico and the United States”. in S. Collins, ed. (1998). Imports, Exports and the American Worker. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 305-347.

 

-A. Savvides (1998). “Trade Policy and Income Inequality: New Evidence”. EcLets; V.61-#?, pp. 365-372.

 

-G. Hanson and A. Harrison (1999). “Trade Liberalization and Wage Inequality in Mexico”. Industrial and Labor Relations Review; V.52-#2, pp. 271-288.

 

-E. Leamer, H. Maul, S. Rodriguez, and P. Schott (1999). “Does Natural Resource Abundance Increase Latin American Income Inequality?”. Journal of Development Economics; V.59-#1, pp. 3-42.

 

-A. Spilimbergo, J.L. Londoño, and M. Székely (1999). “Income Distribution, Factor Endowments, and Trade Openness”. Journal Of Development Economics V.59-#1, pp. 77-101

 

-H. Beyer, P. Rojas, and R. Vergara (1999). “Trade Liberalization and Wage Inequality”. Journal Of Development Economics V.59-#1, pp. 103-123.

 

-A. Harrison and G. Hanson (1999). “Who Gains from Trade Reform? Some Remaining Puzzles”. Journal Of Development Economics V.59-#1, pp. 125-154.

 

-A. Wood (1999). “Openness and Wage Inequality in Developing Countries: The Latin American Challenge to East Asian Conventional Wisdom”. in R. Baldwin, D. Cohen, A. Sapir, and A. Venables, eds. Market Integration, Regionalism and the Global Economy. Cambridge: CUP/CEPR, pp. 153-181.

 

-J. Levinsohn (1999). “Employment Responses to International Liberalization in Chile”. Journal of International Economics; V.47-#?, pp. 321-344.

 

-M. Moreira and S. Najberg (2000). “Trade Liberalisation in Brazil: Creating or Exporting Jobs?”. Journal of Development Studies; V.36-#3, pp. 78-99.

 

-E.J. Amadeo and V. Pero (2000). “Adjustment, Stabilisation and the Structure of Employment in Brazil”. Journal of Development Studies; V.36-#4, pp. 120-148.

 

-R. Robertson (2000). “Wage Shocks and North American Labor-Market Integration”. AER; v.90-#4, pp. 742-764.

 

-R. Robertson (2000). “Trade Liberalisation and Wage Inequality: Lessons from the Mexican Experience”. World Economy; V.23-#6, pp. 827-849.

 

-R. Robertson and D. Dutkowsky (2002). “Labor Adjustment Costs in a Destination Country: The Case of Mexico”. Journal of Development Economics; V.67-#1, pp. 29-54.

 

-Z. Feliciano (2001). “Workers and Trade Liberalization: The Impact of Trade Reforms in Mexico on Wages and Employment”. ILR Review; V.55-#1, pp. 95-115.

 

-Sajjid Chinoy, Pravin Krishna, and Devashish Mitra (2001). “Trade Liberalization and Labor Demand Elasticities: Evidence from Turkey”. Journal of International Economics, V.55-#2, pp. 391-409.

 

-Pinelopi K. Goldberg and Nina Pavcnik (2001). “Trade Protection and Wages: Evidence from the Colombian Trade Reforms”. NBER Working Paper, #8575.

 

-Shang-Jin Wei and Yi Wu (2001). “Globalization and Inequality: Evidence from Within China”. NBER Working Paper; #8611.

 

-A. Ghose (2000). “Trade Liberalization, Employment and Global Inequality”. International Labor Review; V.139-#3, pp. 281-305.

 

-S. Edwards (1997). “Trade Policy, Growth, and Income Distribution”. AER; V.87-#2, pp. 205-210.

 

-A.C. Edwards and S. Edwards (1997). “Trade Liberalization and Unemployment: Policy Issues and Evidence from Chile”. in J. Borkakoti and C. Milner, eds. International Trade and Labour Markets. London: Macmillan, pp. 8-43.

 

-A.C. Edwards and S. Edwards (2000). “Economic Reforms and Labor Markets: Policy Issues and Lessons from Chile”. Economic Policy; V.15-#30, pp. 181-230.

 

-A. Revenga, M. Riboud, and H. Tan (1994). “The Impact of Mexico's Retraining Program on Employment and Wages”. World Bank Economic Review; V.8-#2, pp 247-277.

 

-T. H. Gindling and d. Robbins (2001). “Patterns and Sources of Changing Wage Inequality in Chile and Costa Rica during Structural Adjustment”. World Development; V.29-#4, pp. 725-745.

 

-S. Galiani and P. Sanguinetti (2003). “The Impact of Trade Liberalization on Wage Inequality: Evidence from Argentina”. Journal of Development Economics; V.72-#2, pp. 497-513.

 

-G. Esquivel and J. Rodriguez-Lopez (2003). “Technology, Trade and Wage Inequality in Mexico Before and After NAFTA”. Journal of Development Economics; V.72-#2, pp. 543-565.

 

(c) Exchange Rates and Wages/Employment

 

-W. Branson and J. Love (1987). “U.S. Manufacturing and the Real Exchange Rate”. in R. Marston, ed. Misalignment of Exchange Rates: Effects on Trade and Industry. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 241-270.

 

-R. Dornbusch and J. Frankel (1987). “Macroeconomics and Protection”. in R. Stern, ed. US Trade Policies in a Changing World Economy. Cambridge: MIT. pp. 77-130.

 

-B. Eichengreen (1988). “International Competition in the Products of U.S. Basic Industries”. in M. Feldstein, ed. The United States in the World Economy. Chicago: Univeristy of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 279-353.

 

-L. Goldberg and J. Tracy (2000). “Exchange Rates and Local Labor Markets”. in R. Feenstra, ed. The Impact of International Trade on Wages. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 269-304.

 

-R. Dornbusch and S. Fischer (1986). “The Open Economy: Implications for Monetary and Fiscal Policy”. In R. Gordon, ed. The American Business Cycle: Continuity and Change. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp.

 

-W. Vroman and J. Abowd (1988). “Disaggregated Wage Developments”. BPEA; 1988-#1, pp. 313-338.

 

-D. Himarios (1993). “The Exchange Rate and the US Wage Process: An Intensive Empirical Investigation”. JMCB; V.25-#?, pp. 96-108.

 

-B. Cha and D. Himarios (1995). “The Internationalization of the US Wage Process”. RIE; V.3-#2, pp. 209-223.

 

(d) Globalization and Deindustrialization

 

B. Bluestone and B. Harrison (1982). The Deindustrialization of America. New York: Basic Books.

 

S. Chaikin (1982). “Trade, Investment and Deindustrialization: Myth and Reality”. Foreign Affairs; V.60-#4, pp. 836-851.

 

R. Lawrence (1983). “Is Trade Deindustrializing America? A Medium-Term Perspective”. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity; #1, pp. 129-161.

 

-R. Lawrence (1987). “Trade Performance as a Constraint on European Growth”. Barriers to European Growth: A Transatlantic View. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 303-374.

 

-R. Rowthorn and J. Wells (1987). De-Industrialization and Foreign Trade. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

 

-S. Cohen and J. Zysman (1987). Manufacturing Matters. New York: Basic Books.

 

-L. Mishel (1989). “The Late Great Debate on Deindustrialization”. Challenge; V.32-#1, pp. 35-43.

 

-D. Dollar and E. Wolff (1993). Competitiveness, Convergence, and International Specialization. Cambridge: MIT Press. [Chapter 2.]

 

-P. Gottschalk and M. Joyce (1995). “The Impact of Technological Change, Deindustrialization, and Internationalization of Trade on Earnings Inequality: An International Perspective”. in K. McFate, R. Lawson, and W.J. Wilson, eds. Poverty, Inequality, and the Future of Social Policy: Western States in the New World Order. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, pp.

 

-S. Saeger (1997). “Globalization and Deindustrialization: Myth and Reality in the OECD”. WA; V.133-#4, pp. 549-608.

 

-R. Rowthorn and R. Ramaswamy (1997). “Deindustrialization: Causes and Implications”. IMF Working Paper, WP/97/42.

 

-R. Rowthorn and R. Ramaswamy (1999). “Growth, Trade, and Deindustrialization”. IMF Staff Papers; V.46-#1, pp. 18-41.

 

-A. Burgstaller (1987). “Industrialization, Deindustrialization, and North-South Trade”. AER; V.77-#5, pp. 1017-1018.

 

-P. Krugman (1996). “Domestic Distortions and the Deindustrialization Hypothesis”. in R. Feenstra, G. Grossman, and D. Irwin, eds. The political economy of trade policy: Papers in honor of Jagdish Bhagwati. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 33-49.

 

-A. Spilimbergo (1998). “Deindustrialization and Trade”. RIE; V.6-#3, pp. 450-460.

 

(2) The Effect of Protection on Wages and Employment

 

-B. Vaccara (1960). Employment and Output in Protected Manufacturing Industries. Washington, DC: Brookings.

 

W. Salant and B. Vaccara (1961). Import Liberalization and Employment. Washington, DC: Brookings.

 

-G. Basevi (1966). “The U.S. Tariff Structure: Estimates of Effective Rates of Protection of U.S. Industries and Industrial Labor”. REStat; V.48-#2, pp. 147-160.

 

-D.S. Ball (1967). “US Effective Tariffs and Labor's Share”. JPE; V.75-#2, pp. 183-187.

 

-W.P. Travis (1968). “The Effective Rate of Protection and the Question of Labor Protection in the United States”. JPE; V.76-#3, pp. 443-461.

 

-B. Balassa, S. Guisinger, and D. Schydlowsky (1970). “The Effective Rate of Protection and the Question of Labor Protection: A Comment”. JPE; V.78-#5, pp. 1150-1162.

 

-J. Cheh (1976). “A Note on Tariffs, Nontariff Barriers, and Labor Protection in US Manufacturing Industries”. JPE; V.84-#2, pp. 389-384.

 

-J. Stone (1978). “A Comment on Cheh”. JPE; V.86-#5, pp. 959-962.

 

-D. Clark (1980). “A Comment on Cheh”. JPE; V.88-#6, pp. 1249-1254.

 

-G. Zandano (1969). “The Heckscher-Ohlin Model and the Tariff Structures of the Industrial Countries”. Banca Nazionale De Lavoro Quarterly Review; V.88-#1, pp. 46-65.

 

-M. Constantopoulos (1974). “Labor Protection in Western Europe”. EER; V.5-#4, pp. 313-328.

 

-G.C. Hufbauer and H.O. Balkhy (1974). “The Cost of Redistributing Income Through Trade Policy”. WA. V.110-#1, pp. 38-52.

 

-D. Burgess (1976). “Tariffs and Income Distribution: Some Empirical Evidence for the US”. JPE; V.84-#1, pp. 17-45.

 

-J. Hartigan and E. Tower (1976). “Trade Policy and the American Income Distribution”. RESTat; V.64-#?, pp. 261-270.

 

-R. Baldwin and W. Lewis (1978). “US Tariff Effects on Trade and Employment in Detailed SIC Industries”. in W. Dewald, ed. The Impact of International Trade and Investment on Employment. Washington, DC: Department of Labor, pp. 241-259.

 

-R. Baldwin (1985). “Trade Policy and Employment”. In Employment Growth and Structural Chcnge. Paris: OECD, pp. 90-114.

 

-N. Gaston and D. Trefler (1992). “Nontariff Barriers to Trade and Workers’ Wages”. in E. Bairam, ed. Studies in Labor Economics. London: Ashgate Publishing, pp. 72-110.

 

-N. Gaston and D. Trefler (1994). “The Role of International Trade and Trade Policy in Labour Markets of Canada and the US”. World Economy; V.17-#1, pp. 45-62.

 

-N. Gaston and D. Trefler (1994). “Protection, Trade and Wages: Evidence for US Manufacturing”. Industrial and Labor Relations Review; V.47-#4, pp. 574-593.

 

-J. Cheh (1974). “United States Concessions in the Kennedy Round and Short-run Labor Adjustment Costs”. JIE; V.4-#4, pp. 323-340.

 

-M. Bale (1977). “United States Concessions in the Kennedy Round and Short-run Labor Adjustment Costs: Further Evidence”. JIE; V.7-#?, pp. 145-148.

 

-R. Baldwin (1976). “Trade and Employment Effects in the US of Multilateral Tariff Reductions”. AER; V.66-#2, pp. 142-148.

 

-J. Riedel (1977). “Tarff Concessions in the Kennedy Round and the Structure of Protection in West Germany: An Econometric Assessment”. JIE; V.7-#?, pp. 133-143.

 

(3) Some Useful Research on Labor Markets

 

(a) Trends in Wages and Employment

 

-K. Murphy and R. Topel (1987). “The Evolution of Unemployment in the US: 1968-1985". NBER Macroeconomics Annual; V.2, pp.

 

-B. Harrison and B. Bluestone (1988). The Great U-Turn: Corporate Restructuring and the Polarization of America. New York: Basic Books.

 

-B. Harrison and B. Bluestone (1990). “Wage Polarization in the US and the ‘Flexibility’ Debate”. Cambridge Journal of Economics; V.14-#3, pp. 351-373.

 

-B. Bluestone (1990). “The Great U-turn Revisted: Economic Restructuring, Jobs and the Redistribution of Earnings”. In J. Kasarda, ed. Jobs, Earnings and Employment in the US. Boston: Kluwer.

 

-L. Katz and A. Revenga (1989). “Changes in the Structure of Wages: The US and Japan”. Journal of Japanese and International Economies; V.3-#?, pp. 522-553.

 

-G. Burtless, ed. (1990). A Future of Lousy Jobs?: The Changing Structure of US Wages. Washington, DC: Brookings.

 

-C. Juhn, K. Murphy, and R. Topel (2002). “Why Has the Natural Rate of Unemployment Increased Over Time”. BPEA; #1, pp. 75-126.

 

-K. Murphy and F. Welch (1992). “The Structure of Wages”. QJE; V.107-#1, pp. 285-326.

 

-L. Katz and K. Murphy (1992). “Changes in Relative Wages, 1963-1987: Supply and Demand Factors”. QJE; V.107-#1, pp. 35-78.

 

-J. Bound and G. Johnson (1992). “Changes in the Structure of Wages in the 1980's: An Evaluation of Alternative Explanations”. AER; V.82-#3, pp. 371-392.

 

-F. Levy and R. Murnane (1992). “US Earnings Levels and Earnings Inequality: A Review of Recent Trends and Proposed Explanations”. JEL; V.30-#3, pp. 1333-1381.

 

-S. Davis (1992). “Cross-Country Patterns of Change in Relative Wages”. In O. Blanchard and S. Fisher, eds. NBER Macroeconomic Annual--1992. Cambridge: MIT.

 

-D. Hamermesh (1993). Labor Demand. Princeton: PUP.

 

-C. Juhn, K. Murphy and B. Pierce (1993). “Wage Inequality and the Rise in Returns to Skill”. JPE; V.101-#?, pp. 410-442.

 

-E. Berman, J. Bound and Z. Grilliches (1994). “Changes in the Demand for Skilled Labor within US Manufacturing: Evidence from the Annual Survey of Manufactures”. QJE; V.109-#2, pp. 367-397.

 

-M. Kosters (1994). “An Overview of Changing Wage Patterns in the Labor Market”. In J. Bhagwati and M. Kosters, eds. Trade and Wages: Leveling Wages Down? Washington, DC: AEI, pp. 1-35.

 

- J. Bergstrand, T. Cosimano, J. Houck and R. Sheehan, Eds. (1994). The Changing Distribution of Income in an Open US Economy. New York: Elsevier.

 

-Blackburn, McKinley L. and David Bloom (1995). “Changes in the Structure of Family Income Inequality in the United States and Other Industrial Nations during the 1980s”. in S. Polachek,ed. Research in labor economics. V.14, pp. 141-170.

 

-J. Bound and G. Johnson (1995). “What are the Causes of Rising Wage Inequality in the US”. FRBNY Economic Policy Review; V.1-#1, pp. 9-17.

 

-C. Juhn and K. Murphy (1995). “Inequality in Labor Market Outcomes: Conntrasting the 1980s and Earlier Decades”. FRBNY Economic Policy Review; V.1-#1, pp. 26-32.

 

-D. Brauer and S. Hickok (1995). “Explaining the Growing Inequality in Wages across Skill Levels”. FRBNY Economic Policy Review; V.1-#1, pp. 61-75.

 

-J. DiNardo, N. Fortin, and T. Lemieux (1996). “Labor Market Institutions and the Distribution of Wages”. Etrica; V.64-#5, pp. 1001-1044.

 

-T. Lemieux (2002). “Decomposing Changes in Wage Distributions: A Unified Approach”. CJE, V.35-#4, pp. 646-688.

 

-J. Bishop, J. Formby, and P. Thistle (1997). “Changing American Earnings Distributions: One-half Century of Experience”. Empirical Economics; V.22-#4, pp. 501-514.

 

-R. Topel (1997). “Factor Proportions and Relative Wages: The Supply-Side Determinants of Wage Inequality”. Journal of Economic Perspectives; V.11-#2,pp. 55-74.

 

D. Lee (1999). “Wage Inequality in the United States during the 1980s: Rising or Falling Minimum Wage?”. QJE; V.114-#3, pp. 977-1023

 

-C. Juhn (1999). “Wage Inequality and Demand for Skill: Evidence from Five Decades”. ILR Review; V.52-#3, pp. 424-443.

 

-C. Juhn, K. Murphy, and R. Topel (2002). “Current Unemployment, Historically Contemplated”. BPEA; #1, pp. 79-136.

 

(b) On Skill-Biased Technical Change and Wages

 

i) Theory–Technology Change in Open Economies, GE

 

-R. Findlay and H. Grubert (1959). “Factor Intensities, Technological Progress, and the Terms of Trade”. OEP; V.11-#?, pp. 111-121.

 

-P. Doeringer (1967). “Factor Prices and Technological Change”. EcInq; V.?-#?, pp. 111-121.

 

-J. Borkakoti (1980). “Generalized Findlay-Grubert Theorems”. QJE; V.95-#4, pp. 587-611.

 

-J.P. Neary (1981). “On the Short-Run Effects of Technological Progress”. OEP; V.33-#2, pp. 224-233.

 

-R. Jones (1965). “The Structure of Simple General Equilibrium Models”. JPE; V.73-#6, pp. 557-572.

 

-R. Jones (1965). “‘Neutral’ Technological Change and the Isoquant Map”. AER; V.55-#4, pp. 848-855.

 

-R. Jones (1966). “Comments on Technical Progress”. Philippine Economic Journal; V.5-#2, pp. 313-332.

 

-R. Jones (1970). “The Role of Technology in the Theory of International Trade”. in R. Vernon, ed. The Technology Factor in International Trade. New York: Columbia/NBER, pp. 72-92.

 

-W.E. Diewert (1987). “The Effects of an Innovation: A Trade Theory Approach”. CJE; V.20-#4, pp. 694-714.

 

-R. Jones (1996). “International Trade, Real Wages, and Technical Progress: The Specific Factors Model”. International Review of Economics and Finance; V.5-#2, pp. 113-124.

 

-R. Jones (1997). “Trade, Technology, and Income Distribution”. Indian Economic Review; V.32-#2, pp. 129-140.

 

-R. Findlay and R. Jones (2000). “Factor Bias and Technical Progress”. EcLets; V.68-#3, pp. 303-308.

 

-R. Jones (2000). “Technical Progress, Price Adjustments and Wages”. RIE; V.8-#3, pp. 497-503.

 

-J. Haskel and M. Slaughter (1999). “Technological Change as a Driving Force of Rising Income Inequality”. in H. Siebert, ed. Globalization and Labor. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck/Institut für Weltwirtschaft, pp. 157-175.

 

-J. Haskel (2000), “The Trade and Labour Approaches to Wage Inequality”. RIE; V.8-#3, pp.

 

-B. Xu (2001). “Factor Bias, Sector Bias and the Effects of Technical Progress on Relative Factor Prices”. JIE; V.54-#1, pp. 5-25.

 

-J.P. Neary (2000). “Competition, Trade and Wages”. ms: University College Dublin.

 

-T. Verdier (2000). “Trade Induced Technical Bias And Wage Inequalities: A Theory Of Defensive Innovations”. CEPR Discussion Paper, #2401.

 

ii) Empirical Research

 

-L.M. Blackburn and D. Bloom (1987). “Earnings and Income Inequality in the US”. Population and Development Review; V.13-#?, pp. 575-609.

 

-A. Bartel and F. Lichetnberg (1987). “The Comparative Advantage of Educated Workers in Implementing New Technology”. REStat; V.69-#1, pp. 1-11.

 

-A. Krueger (1993). “How Computers Have Changed the Wage Structure: Evidence from Microdata, 1984-1989". QJE; V.108-#1, pp. 33-60.

 

-K. Murphy and F. Welch (1993). “Industrial Change and the Rising Importance of Skills”. in S. Danziger and P. Gottschalk, eds. Uneven Tides: Rising Inequality in America. New York: Russell Sage, pp. 101-132.

 

-E. Berman, J. Bound, and Z. Griliches (1994). “Changes in the Demand for Skilled Labor within U.S. Manufacturing: Evidence from the Annual Survey of Manufactures”. Quarterly Journal of Economics; V.109-#2, pp. 367-397.

 

-M. Doms, T. Dunne, and K. Troske (1997). “Workers, Wages, and Technology”. QJE; V.112-#1, pp. 253-290.

 

-T. Dunne, H. Haltiwanger, and K. Troske (1997). “Technology and Jobs: Secular Changes and Cyclical Dynamics”. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy; #46, pp. 107-178.

 

-J. DiNardo and J.-S. Pischke (1997). “The Returns to Computer Use Revisited: Have Pencils Changed the Wage Structure Too?”. QJE; V.112-#1, pp. 291-303.

 

-P. Gregg and A. Manning (1997). “Skill-Biased Technical Change, Unemployment and Wage Inequality”. EER; V.41-#6, pp. 1173-1200.

 

-C. Goldin and L. Katz (1998). “The Origins of Technology-Skill Complementarity”. QJE; V.113-#3, pp. 693-732,

 

-D. Acemoglu (1998). “Why Do New Technologies Complement Skills? Directed Technology Change and Wage Inequality”. QJE; V.113-#4, pp. 1055-1089.

 

-D. Autor, L. Katz, and A. Krueger (1998). “Computing Inequality: Have Computers Changed the Market?”. QJE; V.113-#4, pp. 1169-1213 .

 

-Stephen Machin and John Van Reenen (1998). “Technology and Changes in Skill Structure: Evidence from Seven OECD Countries”. QJE; V.113-#4, pp. 1215-1244 .

 

-E. Berman, J. Bound and S. Machin (1998). “Implications of Skill-Biased Technological Change: International Evidence”. QJE; V.113-#4, pp. 1245-1279.

 

-L. Mishel and J. Bernstein (1998). “Technology and the Wage Structure: Has Technology’s Impact Accelerated Since the 1970s?”. Research in Labor Economics; V.17, pp. 305-355.

 

-H. Lloyd-Ellis (1999). “Endogenous Technological Change and Wage Inequality”. AER; V.89-#1, pp. 47-77.

 

-F. Caselli (1999). “Technological Revolutions”. AER; V.89-#1, pp. 78-102.

 

-D. Acemoglu (1999). “Changes in Unemployment and Wage Inequality: An Alternative Theory and Some Evidence”. AER; V.89-#5, pp. 1259-1278.

 

-Per Krusell, Lee E. Ohanian, Jose-Victor Rios-Rull, and Giovanni Violante (2000). “Capital-Skill Complementarity and Inequality: A Macroeconomic Analysis”. Econometrica; V.68-#5, pp. 1029-1053.

 

-R. Lawrence (2000). “Does a Kick in the Pants Get You Going or Does It Just Hurt? The Impact of International Competition on Change in U.S. Manufacturing”. in R. Feenstra, ed. The Impact of International Trade on Wages. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 197-219.

 

-J. Haskel and M. Slaughter (2002). “Does the Sector Bias of Skill-biased Technical Change Explain Changing Skill Premia?”. EER; V.46-#?, pp. 1757-1783.

 

(c) Microfoundations of Aggregate Employment Dynamics

 

-D. Lilien (1982). “Sectoral Shifts and Cyclical Unemployment”. JPE; V.90-#4, pp. 779-793.

 

-K. Abraham and L. Katz (1986). “Cyclical Unemployment: Sectoral Shifts or Aggregate Disturbances”. JPE; V.94-#3, pp. 507-522.

 

-O. Blanchard and P. Diamond (1989). “The Beveridge Curve”. BPEA; #1, pp. 1-60.

 

-O. Blanchard and P. Diamond (1990). “The Cyclical Behavior of the Gross Flows of Workers in the US”. BPEA; #2, pp. 85-155.

 

-S. Davis and J. Haltiwanger (1990). “Gross Job Creation and Destruction: Microeconomic Evidence and Macroeconomic Implications”. NBER Macroeconomics Annual. Cambridge: MIT Press/NBER, pp. 123-168.

 

-S. Davis and J. Haltiwanger (1992). “Gross Job Creation, Gross Job Destruction, and Employment Reallocation”. QJE; V.107-#3, pp. 819-863.

 

-R. Hall (1991). “Labor Demand, Labor Supply and Employment Volatility”. NBER Macroeconomic Annual. Cambridge: MIT Press/NBER, pp. 17-47.

 

-G. Neumann and R. Topel (1984). “Employment Risk, Sectoral Shifts and the Geographic Distribution of Unemployment”. ERC/NORC Working Papers: 84-3.

 

-G. Neumann and R. Topel (1991). “Employment Risk, Diversification, and Unemployment”. QJE; V.106-#4, pp. 1341-1365.

 

-S.L. Brainard and D. Cutler (1993). “Sectoral Shifts and Cyclical Unemployment Reconsidered”. QJE; V.108-#1, pp. 219-243.

 

-T. Mills, G. Pelloni, and A. Zervoyainni (1995). “Unemployment Fluctuations in the U.S.: Further Tests of the Sectoral Shifts Hypothesis”. REStat; V.77-#2, pp. 294-304.

 

-S. Davis, J. Haltiwanger, and S. Schuh (1996). Job Creation and Job Destruction. Cambridge: MIT Press.

 

-K. Shin (1997). “Sectoral Shocks and Movement Costs: Effects on Employment and Welfare”. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control; V.21-#2/3, pp. 449-471.

 

-K. Shin (1997). “Inter- and Intrasectoral Shocks: Effects on the Unemployment Rate”. Journal of Labor Economcs; V.15-#2, pp. 376-401.

 

-R. Caballero, E. Engel, and J. Haltiwanger (1997). “Aggregate Employment Dynamics: Building from Microeconomic Evidence”. AER; V.87-#1, pp. 115-137.

 

-S. Davis and J. Haltiwanger (1999). “On the Driving Forces Behind Cyclical Movements in Employment and Job Reallocation”. AER; V.89-#5, pp. 1234-1258.

 

13. Government Procurement

 

a. Institutional and Empirical

 

-OECD (1976). Government Purchasing in Europe, North America and Japan. Paris: OECD.

 

-W.C. Graham (1983). “Government Procurement Policies: GATT, the EEC and the US”. in M.J. Trebilcock, et al. eds. Federalism and the Canadian Economic Union. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, pp. 355-393.

 

-S. Joson (1985). “The Gatt Agreement on Government Procurement: Canada and Australia”. Australian Economic Papers; V.?-#?, pp. 76-94.

 

-B. Hoekman and P. Mavroidis, eds. (1997). Law and Policy in Public Purchasing: The WTO Agreement on Government Procurement. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

 

-N. Fielke (1969). “The Buy-American Policy of the US Government: Its Balance of Payments and Welfare Effects”. New England Economic Review; pp. 2-18.

 

-J.D. Richardson (1972). “The Subsidy Aspect of a Buy American Policy in Government Procurement”. in The Economics of Federal Subsidy Programs. Washington: USGPO, pp. 220-243.

 

-R. Baldwin and J.D. Richardson (1972). “Government Purchasing Policies, Other NTBs, and the International Monetary Crisis”. in. H. English and K. Hay, eds. Obstacles to Trade in the Pacific Area. Ottawa: Carleton School of International Affairs, pp. ?

 

-T. Lowinger (1976). “Discrimination in in Government Procurement of Foreign Goods in the US and Western Europe”. SEJ; V.42-#?, pp. 451-460.

 

b. Mostly Theoretical, Full Information

 

-R. Baldwin (1970). “Restrictions on Governmental Expenditures”. Chapter 3 in, R. Baldwin, Nontariff Distortions of International Trade. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 58-83.

 

-B. Hindley (1978). “The Economics of an Accord on Public Procurement Policies”. World Economy; V.1-#?, pp. 279-288.

 

-S. Joson (1979). “Implications of the Government Procurement Policy for Structureal Change”. in C. Aislabie and C. Tisdell, eds. the Economics of Structural Change and Adjustment. Newcastle: University of Newcastle Press, pp. 377-397.

 

-M. Herander (1982). “The Impact of Government Price Discrimination and Its Equivalence with the Tariff”. WA; V.118-#3, pp. 525-544.

 

-M. Herander (1986). “Discriminatory Government Procurement with a Content Requirement: Its Protective Effects and Welfare Costs”. AEJ; V.14-#1, pp. 20

 

-S. Joson (1986). “Substitutability of `Buy local` Policies for Tariff Protection in Small Economies”. Journal of Policy Modeling; V.8-#2, pp. 223-239.

 

-P.G. Warr and B. Parmenter (1986). “Protection Through Government Procurement”. in R. Snape, ed. Issues in World Trade Policy: GATT at the Crossroads. London: Macmillan, pp. 175-190.

 

-J. Finsinger (1988). “Non-Competitive and Protectionist Government Purchasing Behavior”. EER; V.32-#?, pp. 69-80.

 

-K. Miyagiwa (1991). “Oligopoly and Discriminatory Government Procurement Policy”. AER; V.81-#5, pp. 1319-1328.

 

c. Mostly Theoretical, Asymmetric Information

 

-R.P. McAfee and J. McMillan (1989). “Government Procurement and International Trade”. JIE; V.26-#?, pp. 291-308.

 

-I.G. Kim (1994). “Price-preference vs. Tariff Policies in Government Procurement Auctions”. EcLets; V.45-#?, pp. 217-222.f

 

-F. Branco (1994). “Favoring Domestic Firms in Procurement Contracts”. JIE; V.37-#1/2, pp. 65-80.

 

-R. Myerson (1981). “Optimal Auction Design”. Mathematics of Operations Research; V.6-#1, pp. 619-632.

 

-J. Riley and W. Samuelson (1981). “Optimal Auctions”. AER; V.71-#?, pp. 381-392.

 

-R.P. McAfee and J. McMillan (1987). “Auctions and Bidding”. JEL; V.35-#?, pp. 699-738.

 

-P. Milgrom (1985). “The Economics of Competitive Bidding: A Selective Survey”. in L. Hurwicz, et al., eds. Social Goals and Social Organization. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 261-289.

 

-P. Milgrom (1987). “Auctions”. in T. Bewley, ed. Advances in Economic Theory. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 1-32

 

14. State Trading and Marketing Boards

 

-J. Viner (1944). “International Relations Between State-Controlled National Economies”. AER; V.34-#?, pp. 315-329.

 

-M. Kostecki (1982). “State Trading in Foreign Trade of the Mixed Economies: Review”. Economia Internazionale; V.35-#2, pp. 211-226.

 

-P.J. Lloyd (1982). “State Trading and the Theory of International Trade”. In M. Kostecki, ed. (1982). State Trading in International Markets. New York: St. Martins

 

-J. Markusen (1984). “The Welfare and Allocative Effects of Export Taxes versus Marketing Boards”. JDevE; V.14-#1, pp. 19-36.

 

-C.D. Kolstad and A.E. Burris (1986). “Imperfectly Competitive Equilibria in International Commodity Markets”. American Journal of Agricultural Economics; V.68-#1, pp. 27-36.

 

-M. Thursby (1988). “Strategic Models, Market Structure, and State Trading: An Application to Agriculture”. in R. Baldwin ed. Trade Policy Issues and Empirical Analysis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 79-107.

 

-K. Krishna and M. Thursby (1992). “Optimal Policies and Marketing Board Objectives”. JDevE; V.38-#1, pp. 1-15.

 

-M. Fulton, B. Larue, M. Veeman (1999). “The Impact of Export State Trading Enterprises under Imperfect Competition: The Small Country Case”. Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics; V.47-#4, pp. 363-73.

 

-D. Skully (1992). “Price Discrimination and State Trading: The Case of U.S. Wheat”. European Review of Agricultural Economics; V.19-#3, pp. 313-329.

 

-J.S. Clark (1995). “Single Desk Selling by the Canadian Wheat Board: Does It Have an Impact?”. Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics; V.43-#2, pp. 225-236.

 

-C. Carter, R. Loyns, and D. Berwald (1998). “The Domestic Costs of Statutory Marketing Authorities: The Case of the Canadian Wheat Board”. American Journal of Agricultural Economics; V.80-#2, pp. 313-324.

 

-J. Alston and R. Gray (1998). “Export Subsidies and State Trading: Theory and Application to Canadian Wheat”. In T. Yildirim, A. Schmitz, W.H. Furtan, eds. World agricultural trade (1998). Boulder: Westview Press, pp. 281-298.

 

-W. Furtan, D. Kraft, and E. Tyrchniewicz (1999). “Can the Canadian Wheat Board Extract Monopoly Rents? The Case of the Spring Wheat Market”. International Journal of the Economics of Business; V.6-#3, pp. 417-437.

 

-T. Schmitz and R. Gray (2000). “State Trading Enterprises and Revenue Gains from Market Power: The Case of Barley Marketing and the Canadian Wheat Board”. Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics; V.25-#2, pp. 596-615.

 

-J. Alston and R. Gray (2000). “State Trading versus Export Subsidies: The Case of Canadian Wheat”. Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics; V.25-#1, pp. 51-67.

 

-C.P. Timmer and W. Falcon (1975). “The Political Economy of Rice Production and Trade in Asia”. in L.G. Reynolds, ed. Agriculture in Development Theory. New Haven: Yale University Press.

 

-S. Hoos, ed. (1979). Agricultural Marketing Boards: An International Perspective. Cambridge: Ballinger.

 

-M. Kostecki, ed. (1982). State Trading in International Markets. New York: St. Martins.

 

-J. Abbott (1987). Agricultural Marketing Enterprises. Cambridge: CUP.

 

-T. Cottier and P. Mavroidis, eds. (1998). State Trading in the 21st Century. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

 

-L. Young (1999). “Prevalence and Reform of State Trading Importers in World Grain Markets”. Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics; V.47-#4, pp. 351-362.

 

-P. McKenzie (1990). “China's Application to the GATT: State Trading and the Problem of Market Access”. Journal of World Trade; V.24-#5, pp. 133-158.

 

-M. Annand and D. Buckingham (1998). “State Trading Exporters and the World Trade Organization: What Are the Rules?”. In T. Yildirim, A. Schmitz, W.H. Furtan, eds. World agricultural trade (1998). Boulder: Westview Press, pp. 327-341.

 

-A. Schmitz and H. Furtan (1998). “State Trading, Trade Distortions and GATT”. In T. Yildirim, A. Schmitz, W.H. Furtan, eds. World agricultural trade (1998). Boulder: Westview Press, pp. 255-279.

 

-S. McCorriston and D. MacLaren (2002). “State Trading, the WTO, and GATT Article XVII”. World Economy; V.25-#1, pp. 107135.

 

15. Offshore Assembly Provision

 

-J.M. Finger (1975). “Tariff Provisions for Offshore Assembly and the Exports of Developing Countries”. EJ; V.85-#?, pp. 365-371.

 

-J.M. Finger (1976). “Trade and Domestic Effects of the Offshore Assembly Provision in the US Tariff”. AER; V.66-#?, pp. 598-611.

 

-J.M. Finger (1977). “Offshore Assembly Provisions in the West German and Netherlands Tariffs: Trade and Domestic Effects”. WA; V.113-#2, pp. 238-249.

 

-G. Grossman (1982). “Offshore Assembly Provisions and the Structure of Protection”. JIE; V.12-#?, pp. 301-312.

 

-D. Appleyard and A.J. Field (1981). “Input Aggregation and the US Tariff Structure”. WA; V.117-#4, pp. 717-726.

 

-D. Appleyard and A.J. Field (1982). “The Effects of the Offshore Assembly Provisions on the US Tariff Structure”. Journal of Economic Studies; V.9-#1, pp. 3-18.

 

-D. Appleyard, A.J. Field and E. Tower (1985). “Further Analysis of the Effects of Offshore Assembly Provisions on the US Tariff Structure”. Journal of Economic Studies; V.12-#4, pp. 62-65.

 

-R. Boltuck, J. Méndez, T. Murray and D. Rousslang (1990). “The Trade Effects of Repealing the US Offshore Assembly Provision”. WA; V.126-#?, pp. 709-721.

 

-J. Méndez, T. Murray and D. Rousslang (1991). “US-Mexico Employment Effects of Repealing the US Offshore Assembly Provision”. Applied Economics; V.23-#?, pp. 533-566.

 

-J. Mendez (1993). “The Welfare Effects of Repealing the US Offshore Assembly Provision”. JIE; V.34-#1/2, pp. 1-22.

 

E. Evaluating the Costs of Protection

 

1. Patterns of Protection

 

-B. Balassa and C. Balassa (1984). “Industrial Protection in Developed Countries”. World Economy; V.7-#2, pp. 197-196.

 

-A. Deardorff and R. Stern (1985). “The Structure of Tariff Protection: Effects of Foreign Tariffs and Existing NTBs”. REStat; V.47-#4, pp. 539-548.

 

-J. Nogués, A. Olechowski and L.A. Winters (1986). “The Extent of Nontariff Barriers to Industrial Country Imports”. WBER; V.1-#1, pp. 181-199.

 

-S. Laird and A. Yeats (1990). “Trends in Nontariff Barriers of Developed Countries, 1966-1986". WA; V.126-#2, pp. 299-326.

 

-M. Honma and Y. Hayami (1986). “Structure of Agricultural Protection in Industrial Countries”. JIE; V.20-#?, pp. 115-129.

 

-M. Daly, E. Lizano, and A. Silvy (2000). “Recent Trends in Tariff and Nontariff Barriers to Trade in the United States”. WA; V.136-#4, pp. 724-752.

 

2. Partial Equilibrium Welfare Analysis

 

a. Consumer and Producer Surplus in Welfare Analysis

 

-A. Harberger (1971). “Three Basic Postulates for Applied Welfare Analysis: An Interpretive Essay”. JEL; V.9-#?, pp. 785-797.

 

-J. Currie, J. Murphy and A. Schmitz (1971). “The Concept of Economic Surplus and Its Use in Economic Analysis”. EJ; V.81-#324, pp. 741-799.

 

-E. Silberberg (1972). “Duality and the Many Consumer's Surpluses”. AER; V.62-#5, pp. 942-952.

 

-M. Burns (1973). “A Note on the Concept and Measure of Consumer's Surplus”. AER; V.63-#3, pp. 335-344.

 

-R. Willig (1976). “Consumer's Surplus without Apology”. AER; V.66-#4, pp. 589-597.

 

-A. Dixit and P. Weller (1979). “The Three Consumer's Surpluses”. Eca; V.46-#?, pp. 125-135.

 

-J. Hausman (1981). “Exact Consumer's Surplus and Deadweight Loss”. AER; V.71-#4, pp. 662-676. [Correction by Haveman/Gabay/Andreoni, V.77-#3, pp. 494-495]

 

-J. Chipman and J. Moore (1976). “The Scope of Consumer's Surplus Arguments”. in A. Tang, et al. eds. Evolution, Welfare and Time in Economics. Lexington: DC Heath, pp. 69-123.

 

-J. Chipman and J. Moore (1980). “Compensating Variation, Consumer's Surplus and Welfare”. AER; V.70-#?, pp. 933-949.

 

-J. Chipman and J. Moore (1990). “Acceptable Indicators of Welfare Change, Consumer's Surplus Analysis and the Gorman Polar Form”. in J. Chipman, et al. eds. Preferences, Uncertainty and Optimality. Boulder: Westview, pp. 68-120.

 

-J. Chipman and J. Moore (1992). “Compensating Variation as a Measure of Welfare Change”. in W. Neuefeind and R. Riezman, eds. Economic Theory and International Trade. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, pp. 93-128.

 

-R. Boadway (1974). “The Welfare Foundations of Cost-Benefit Analysis”. EJ; V.84-#?, pp. 926-939.

 

-B. Smith and F. Stephen (1975). “The Welfare Foundations of Cost-Benefit Analysis”. EJ; V.85-#?, pp. 902-905.

 

-E. Foster (1976). “The Welfare Foundations of Cost-Benefit Analysis--Comment”. EJ; V.86-#?, pp. 353-358.

 

-J. Ruiz-Castillo (1987). “Potential Welfare and the Sum of Individual Compensating or Equivalent Variations”. JET; V.41-#1, pp. 34-35.

 

-C. Blackorby and D. Donaldson (1985). “Consumers’ Surpluses and Consistent Cost-Benefit Tests”. Social Choice and Welfare; V.1-#?, pp. 251-262.

 

-Giovanni Facchini, Peter J. Hammond, Hiroyuki Nakata (2001). “Spurious deadweight gains”. Economics Letters; V.72-#1, pp. 33-37.

 

b. Welfare Analysis of Intermediate Goods

 

-R. Schmalensee (1971). “Consumer's Surplus and Producer's Goods”. AER; V.61-#4, pp. 682-687.

 

-D. Wisecarver (1974). “The Social Costs of Input-Market Distortions”. AER; V.64-#3, pp. 359-372.

 

-J. Anderson (1976). “The Social Cost of Input Distortions: A Comment and a Generalization”. AER; V.66-#1, pp. 235-238.

 

-R. Schmalensee (1976). “Another Look at the Social Valuation of Input Price Changes”. AER; V.66-#1, pp. 239-243.

 

-S. Jacobsen (1979). “On the Equivalence of Input and Output Market Marshallian Surplus Measures”. AER; V.69-#3, pp. 423-428.

 

-D. Carlton (1979). “Valuing Market Benefits and Costs in Related Output and Input Markets”. AER; V.69-#4, pp. 688-696.

 

-R. Just and D. Hueth (1979). “Welfare Measures in a Multimarket Framework”. AER; V.69-#5, pp. 947-954.

 

-H. Quirmbach (1984). “Input Market Surplus: The Case of Imperfect Competition”. EcLets; V.16-#?, pp. 357-362.

 

3. Partial-Equilibrium Methodology for Cost of Protection

 

a. General Approaches

 

-B.N. Jeon and G. von Furstenberg (1986). “Techniques for Measuring the Welfare Effects of Protection: Appraising the Choices”. Journal of Policy Modeling; V.8-#2, pp. 273-303.

 

-W.M. Corden (1957). “The Calculation of the Cost of Protection”. EcRec; V.33-#?, pp. 29-51.

 

-H.G. Johnson (1960). “The Cost of Protection and the Scientific Tariff”. JPE; V.68-#4, pp. 327-345.

 

-E. Mishan (1968). “Appended Note” to “What is Producers' Surplus”. AER; V.58-#5, pp. 1280-1282.

 

-M. Krauss and D. Winch (1971). “Mishan on the Gains from Trade: Comment”. AER; V.61-#1, pp. 199-200. [Reply pp. 202-207.]

 

-J. Anderson (1974). “A Note on Welfare Surpluses and Gains from Trade in General Equilibrium”. AER; V.64-#4, pp. 758-762.

 

-E. Helpman (1978). “The Exact Measurement of Welfare Losses Which Result from Trade Taxes”. IER; V.19-#, pp. 157-163.

 

-G.W. McKenzie (1985). “A Problem in Measuring the Cost of Protection”. MS; V.53-#1, pp. 45-54.

 

-R. Just and D. Hueth (1979). “Welfare Measures in an Multimarket Framework”. AER; V.69-#5, pp. 947-954.

 

-D. Rousslang and J. Suomela (1985). Calculating the Consumer and Net Welfare Costs to the US of Import Relief. Washington, D.C.: US-ITC.

 

-D. Rousslang and P. Young (1984). “Calculating the Short-Run Welfare Effects of a Tariff Reduction When Wages are Rigid”. CJE; V.17-#1, pp. 39-47.

 

-D. Rousslang (1987). “The Opportunity Cost of Import Tariffs”. Kyklos; V.40-#1, pp. 88-102.

 

-D. Rousslang and J. Suomela (1988). “Calculating the Welfare Costs of Import Restrictions in the Imperfect Substitutes Model”. Applied Economics; V.20-#?, pp. 691-700.

 

-M. Jones (1993). “The Geometry of Protectionism in the Imperfect Substitutes Model: A Reminder”. SEJ; V.60-#?, pp. 235-238.

 

-D. Rousslang (1991). “Welfare Cost of Import Restraints in the Presence of Domestic Taxes”. Journal of Policy Modeling; V.13-#3, pp. 459-465.

 

b. Applications

 

-W.M. Corden (1975). “The Costs and Consequences of Protection: A Survey of Empirical Work”. in P. Kenen, ed. International Trade and Finance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 51-91.

 

-G. Basevi (1968). “The Restrictive Effect of the US Tariff and its Welfare Value”. AER; V.58-#?, pp. 841-852.

 

-F. Walker (19??). “The Restrictive Effect of the US Tariff: Comment”. AER; V.?-#?, pp. 963-966.

 

-S.P. Magee (1971). “The Welfare Effects of Restrictions on US Trade”. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity; V.3-#?, pp. 65-108.

 

-M. Morkre and D. Tarr (1980). Effects of Restrictions on US Imports: Five Case Studies and Theory. Washington, D.C.: FTC.

 

-D. Tarr and M. Morkre (1984). Aggregate Costs to the US of Tariffs and Quotas on Imports. Washington, D.C.: FTC.

 

-W. Dobson (1985). “The Consumer Cost of US Trade Restraints”. FRBNY Quarterly Review; Summer, pp. 1-12.

 

-A. Denzau (1987). “How Import Restraints Reduce Employment”. St. Louis: Center for the Study of American Business.

 

-OECD (1985). Costs and Benefits of Protection. Paris: OECD.

 

-G. Sampson and R. Snape (1980). “Effects of the EEC's Variable Import Levies”. JPE; V.88-#5, pp. 1026-1040.

 

-C. Hamilton (1981). “A New Approach to Estimation of the Effects of Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade: An Application to the Swedish Textile and Clothing Industry”. WA; V.117-#2, pp. 298-324.

 

-D. Tarr (1987). “Effects of Restraining Steel Exports from the Republic of Korea and Other Countries to the United States and the European Economic Community”. WBER; V.1-#3, pp. 397-418.

 

4. General Equilibrium Measures of Cost of Protection

 

-J. Anderson (1994). “The Theory of Protection”. in D. Greenaway and L.A. Winters, eds. Surveys in International Trade. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 107-138..

 

-W.E. Diewert (1983). “The Measurement of Waste within the Production Sector of an Open Economy”. ScanJE; V.85-#2, pp. 159-179.

 

-W.E. Diewert (1984). “The Measurement of Deadweight Loss in an Open Economy”. Eca; V.51-#1, pp. 23-42.

 

-W.E. Diewert (1985). “A Dynamic Approach to the Measurement of Waste in an Open Economy”. JIE; V.19-#?, pp. 213-240.

 

-A. Turunen-Red (1990). “A Note on the Measurement of Production Gain Due to a Tariff Reform in a Small Open Economy”. SEJ; V.57-#2, pp. 528-532.

 

-R. Clarete and J. Whalley (1987). “Comparing the Marginal Welfare Costs of Commodity and Trade Taxes”. JPubE; V33-#?, pp. 357-362.

 

-P.J. Lloyd and A. Schweinberger (1988). “Distortions, True Trade Price and Quantity Indices, and Welfare”. ScanJE; V.92-#4, pp. 541-557.

 

-E. Grinols and K.Y. Wong (1991). “An Exact Measure of Welfare Change”. CJE; V.24-#2, pp. 428-449.

 

-J. Anderson and J.P. Neary (1990). “The Coefficient of Trade Utilitzation: Back to the Baldwin Envelope”. in R. Jones and A. Krueger, eds. The Political Economy of International Trade. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 48-72.

 

-J. Anderson (1991). “The Coefficient of Trade Utilization: The Cheese Case”. in R. Baldwin, ed. Empirical Studies of Commerical Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 221-241.

 

-J. Anderson and J.P. Neary (1994). “Measuring the Restrictiveness of Trade Policy”. WBER, V.8-#2, pp. 151-169.

 

-J. Anderson and J.P. Neary (1994). “The Trade Restrictiveness of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement”. WBER; V.8-#2, pp. 171-189.

 

-J. Anderson, G. Bannister and J.P. Neary (1995). “Domestic Distortions and International Trade”. IER; V.36-#1, pp. 139-157.

 

-J. Anderson (1995). “Tariff Index Theory”. RIE; V.3-#2, pp. 156-173.

 

-J. Anderson and J.P. Neary (1996). “A New Approach to Evaluating Trade Policy”. REStud; V.63-#1, pp. 107-125.

 

-K. O’Rourke (1997). “Measuring Protection: A Cautionary Tale”. JDevE; V.53-#?, pp. 169-183.

 

-J. Anderson (1998). “Trade Restrictiveness Benchmarks”. EJ; V.108-#449, pp. 1111-1125.

 

-J. Anderson (1998). “The Uruguay Round and Welfare in Some Distorted Agricultural Economies”. JDevE; V.56-#?, pp. 393-410.

 

-C. Bach and W. Martin (2001). “Would the Right Tariff Aggregator for Policy Analysis Please Stand Up?”. Journal of Policy Modeling; V.23-#6, pp. 621-635.

 

-J. Anderson and J.P. Neary (2003). “The Mercantilist Index of Trade Policy”. IER; V.44-#2, pp. 627-649.

 

-C.H. Chau, R. Färe, and S. Grosskopf (2003). “Trade Restrictiveness and Efficiency”. IER; V.44-#3, pp. 1079-1095.

 

5. Econometric Approaches to Evaluation of the Magnitude and Cost of Protection

 

a. Openness, Protection and Trade Flows in General

 

(1) HOV Based Analyses

 

-E. Leamer (1987). “Cross Section Estimation of the Effects of Trade Barriers”. in R. Feenstra, ed. Empirical Methods for International Trade. Cambridge: MIT Press. pp. 52-82.

 

-E. Leamer (1988). “Measures of Openness”. in R. Baldwin, ed. Trade Policy Issues and Empirical Analysis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 147-204.

 

-E. Leamer (1990). “The Structure and Effects of Tariff and Nontariff Barriers in 1983". in R. Jones and A. Krueger, eds. The Political Economy of International Trade. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 224-260.

 

-E. Leamer (1990). “Latin America as a Target of Trade Barriers Erected By the Major Developed Countries in 1983". JDevE; V.32-#?, pp. 337-368.

 

-S. Edwards (1992). “Trade Orientation, Distortions and Growth in Developing Countries”. JDevE; V.39-#1, pp. 31-57.

 

-H. Wolff (1993). “Trade Orientation: Measurement and Consequences”. Estudios de Economía; V.20-#3, pp. 51-86.

 

-L. Pritchett (1996). “Measuring Outward Orientation in LDCs: Can It Be Done?”. JDevE; V.49-#?, pp. 307-335.

 

-R. López (1995). “Synergy and Investment Efficiency Effects of Trade and Labor Market Distortions”. EER; V.39-#7, pp. 1321-1344.

 

(2) Monopolistic Competition and Gravity Models

 

-J. Brocker and H. Rohweder (1990). “Barriers to International Trade: Methods of Measurement and Empirical Evidence”. Annals of Regional Science; V.24-#4, pp. 289-305.

 

-H. Wall (1999). “Using the Gravity Model to Estimate the Costs of Protection”. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Review; January/February, pp. 33-40.

 

-J. Harrigan (1993). “OECD Imports and Trade Barriers in 1983". JIE; V.35-#1/2, pp. 91-111.

 

-J. Harrigan (1996). “Openness to trade in Manufactures in the OECD”. JIE; V.40-#1/2, pp. 23-39.

 

-V. Oguledo and C. MacPhee (1994). “Gravity Model: A Reformulation and an Application to Discriminatory Trade Arrangements”. Applied Economics; V.26-#2, pp. 107-120.

 

-R. Shelburne (1987). “A Ratio Test of Trade Intensity and Per-capita-Income Similarity”. WA; V.123-#3, pp. 474-487.

 

-J. Frankel (1993). “Is Japan Creating a Yen Bloc in East Asia and the Pacific?”. In J. Frankel and M. Kahler, eds. Regionalism and Rivalry: Japan and the US in Pacific Asia. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 53-85.

 

-J. Frankel, E. Stein, and S. Wei (1995). “Trading Blocs and the Americas: The Natural, the Unnatural, and the Super-Natural”. JDevE; V.47-#?, pp. 61-95.

 

-J. Frankel, E. Stein, and S. Wei (1996). “Continental Trading Blocs: Are they Natural or Supernatural?”. in J. Frankel, ed. The Regionalization of the World Economy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 91-113.

 

-J.J. Polak (1996). “Is APEC a Natural Regional Trading Bloc? A Critique of the ‘Gravity Model’ of International Trade”. World Economy; V.19-#5, pp. 533-543.

 

-G. Biessen (1991). “Is the Impact of Central Planning on the Level of Foreign Trade Really Negative?”. Journal of Comparative Economics; V.15-#1, pp. 22-44.

 

-C. Montenegro and R. Soto (1996). “How Distorted Is Cuba's Trade? Evidence and Predictions from a Gravity Model”. Journal of International Trade and Economic Development; V.5-#1, pp. 45-70.

 

-T. Bayoumi and B. Eichengreen (1997). “Is Regionalism Simply a Diversion? Evidence from the Evolution of the EC and EFTA”. in T. Ito and A.O. Krueger, eds. Regionalism versus Multilateral Trade Arrangements. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 141-164.

 

-S. Dhar and A. Panagariya (1999). “Is East Asia Less Open than North America and the EEC? No”. in J. Piggott and A. Woodland, eds. International Trade Policy and the Pacific Rim. London: Macmillan, pp. 105-123

 

-D. Coe and A. Hoffmaister (1999). “North-South Trade: Is Africa Unusual?”. Journal of African Economies; V.8-#2, pp. 228-256.

 

-N. Tamirisa (1999). “Exchange and Capital Controls as Barriers to Trade”. IMFSP; V.46-#1, pp. 69-88.

 

-H. Wolf (2000). “Intranational Home Bias in Trade”. REStat; V.82-#4, pp. 555-563.

 

b. Is Japan an Outlier?

 

-G. Saxonhouse and R. Stern (1988). “An Analytical Survey of Formal and Informal Barriers to International Trade and Investment in the US, Canada, and Japan”. in R. Stern, ed. US-Canadian Trade and Investment Relations with Japan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp.

 

-G. Saxonhouse (1983). “The Micro- and Macroeconomics of Foreign Sales to Japan”. in W. Cline, ed. Trade Policy for the 1980s. Washington, DC: IIE, pp. 259-304.

 

-G. Saxonhouse (1986). “What’s Wrong with Japanese Trade Structure?”. Pacific Economic Papers; V.137, pp. 1-36.

 

-R. Lawrence (1987). “Imports in Japan: Closed Markets or Minds?”. BPEA; V.1987-#2, pp. 517-554.

 

-G. Saxonhouse (1989). “Product Differentiation, Economies of Scale and Access to the Japanese Market”. in R. Feenstra, ed. Trade Policies for International Competitiveness. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 145-174.

 

-K. Takeuchi (1989). “Does Japan Import Less than It Should? A Review of the Econometric Literature”. Asian Economic Journal; V.3-#2, pp. 138-170.

 

-G. Saxonhouse (1993). “Japanese Economic Growth and Trade Relations: Japanese Performance in Long-term Perspective”. in T. Ito and A. Krueger, eds. Trade and Protectionism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 149-179.

 

-G. Saxonhouse (1993). “What DoesJapanese Trade Structure Tell Us About Japanese Trade Policy”. JEcPersective; V.7-#3, pp. 21-43.

 

-R. Lawrence (1993). “Japan’s Different Trade Regime: An Analysis with Particular Reference to Keiretsu”. JEcPersective; V.7-#3, pp. 3-19.

 

-M. Noland (1993). “Protectionism in Japan”. Open Economies Review, V.4-#?, pp. 67-81.

 

-M. Noland (1993). “The Impact of Industrial Policy on Japan’s Trade Specialization”. REStat; V.75-#2, pp. 48.

 

-M. Noland (1997). “Public Policy, Private Preferences, and the Japanese Trade Pattern”. REStat; V.79-#2, pp. 259-266.

 

-M. Noland (1988). “The Determinants of International Specialization in Manufactured Goods, 1965-1980". Economic Studies Quarterly; V.39-#3, pp. 216-32.

 

c.

Capital Market Event Study Methods

 

-J. Hartigan, P. Perry and S. Kamma (1986). “The Value of Administered Protection: A Capital Market Approach”. REStat; V.68-#4, pp. 610-617.

 

-J. Hartigan, S. Kamma and P. Perry (1989). “The Injury Determination Category and the Value of Relief from Dumping”. REStat; V.?-#1, pp. 183-186.

 

-J. Hartigan, S. Kamma and P. Perry (1990). “Bifurcated vs. Single Injury Determination in USITC Antidumping Investigations”. JIEI; V.5-#1, pp. 47-63.

 

-S. Lenway and K. Rehbein (1989). “Rent Seekers in the U.S. International Trade Commission Escape Clause Investigations”. International Trade Journal; V.4-#2, pp. 119-142.

 

-Lenway, Stafanie, Kathleen Rehbein, and Laura Starks (1990). “The Impact of Protectionism on Firm Wealth: The Experience of the Steel Industry”. Southern Economic Journal; V.56-#4, pp. 1079-1093.

 

-S. Lenway and D. Schuler (1991) “The Determinants of Corporate Political Involvement in Trade Protection: The Case of the Steel Industry”. In R. Baldwin, ed. Empirical Studies of Commercial Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 75-105.

 

-K. Rehbein and S. Lenway (1993). “Industry Structure or Managerial Discretion: The Determinants of Industry Political Success in the U.S. International Trade Commission’s Escape Clause Investigations”. In J. Post, ed. Research in corporate social performance and policy. Volume 14. Greenwich, Conn: JAI press, pp. 3-18.

 

-K. Rehbein and L. Starks (1995). “Changes in US Trade Policies: The Wealth Effecs on Japanese Steel Firms”. Japan and the World Economy; v.7-#3, pp. 309-327.

 

-John Hughes, Stefanie Lenway, and Judy Rayburn (1997). “Stock Price Effects of U.S. Trade Policy Responses to Japanese Trading Practices in Semi-conductors”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.30-#4, pp. 922-942.

 

-Stefanie Lenway, Randall Morck, and Bernard Yeung (1998). “The Effect of Protectionism in the American Steel Industry: An Empirical Analysis”. In Joanne Oxley and Bernard Yeung, eds. Structural change, industrial location and competitiveness. Globalization of the World Economy, vol. 3. Northampton, Mass.: Elgar, pp. 513-42.

 

-M. Melvin and Q. Sun (1997) “U.S. protectionist policy and stock prices of U.S. import-competing and Korean and Taiwanese export-oriented firms”. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, V.5-#1, pp. 1-23.

 

-Thompson, Aileen (1994). “Trade Liberalization, Comparative Advantage, and Scale Economies: Stock Market Evidence from Canada”. Journal of International Economics; V.37-#1/2, pp. 1-27.

 

-Abraham, Filip and Aileen Thompson (1997). “Stock Market Evaluations of a European Monetary Union”. Keith Maskus, et al., eds. Quiet pioneering: Robert M. Stern and his international economic legacy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 283-312.

 

-Mutti, John, Rachelle Sampson, and Bernard Yeung (2000). “The Effects of the Uruguay Round: Empirical Evidence from U.S. Industry”. Contemporary Economic Policy; V.18-#1, pp. 59-69.

 

6. Applied GE (AGE) Analysis of Trade and Protection

 

a. Basic Techniques and Issues in AGE Trade Modeling

 

-P. Kehoe and T. Kehoe (1994). “A Primer on Static Applied General Equilibrium Models”. Federal Reserve Bank of Minnesota Quarterly Review; V.18-#2, pp. 2-16.

 

-K. Dervis, J. deMelo and S. Robinson (1982). General Equilibrium Models for Development Policy. Cambridge: CUP.

 

-J. Shoven and J. Whalley (1984). “Applied General-Equilibrium Models of Taxation and International Trade”. Journal of Economic Literature; V.22-#3, pp. 1007-1051.

 

-J. Shoven and J. Whalley (1992). Applying General Equilibrium. Cambridge: CUP.

 

-J. Francois and K. Reinert, eds. (1997). Applied Models for Trade Policy Analysis: A Handbook. Cambridge: CUP.

 

-V. Ginsburgh and M. Keyzer (1997). The Structure of Applied General Equilibrium Models. Cambridge: MIT.

 

-J. Shoven and J. Whalley (1974). “On the Computation of Competitive Equilibrium on International Markets with Tariffs”. JIE; V.4-#?, pp. 341-354.

 

-A. Mansur and J. Whalley (1982). “A Decomposition Algorithm for General Equilibrium Computation with Application to International Trade”. Etrica; V.50-#?, pp. 1547-1557.

 

-P. Petri (1984). Modeling Japanese-American Trade. Boston: Harvard University Press.

 

-H. Scarf and J. Shoven, eds. (1984) Applied General Equilibrium Analysis. Cambridge: CUP.

 

-J. Piggott and J. Whalley, eds. (1986). New Developments in Applied General Equilibrium Analysis. Cambridge: CUP.

 

-A. Deardorff and R. Stern (1986). The Michigan Model of World Production and Trade. Cambridge: MIT Press.

 

b. Macro Closure Rules in AGE Modeling

 

-J. Rattso (1982). “Different Macroclosures of the Original Johansen Model and Their Impact on Policy Evaluation”. Journal of Policy Modeling; V.4-#1, pp. 85-97.

 

-L. Taylor and F. Lysy (1979). “Vanishing Income Redistributions: Keynesian Clues About Model Surprises in the Short-run”. JDevE; V.6-#1, pp. 11-29.

 

-C. Lluch (1979). “Models of Employment and Income Distribution”. JDevE; V.6-#1, pp. 31-45.

 

-C. Bell (1979). “The Behavior of a Dual Economy under Different Closing Rules”. JDevE; V.6-#1, pp. 47-72.

 

-F. Bourgignon, G. Michel and D. Miqueu (1983). “Short-run Rigidities and Long-run Adjustments in a General Equilibrium Model of Income Distribution and Development”. JDevE; V.13-#1, pp. 21-43.

 

-J. Whalley and B. Yeung (1984). “External Sector ‘Closing Rules’ in AGE Models”. JIE; V.16-#?, pp. 123-138.

 

-M. Dewatripont and G. Michel (1987). “On Closure Rules, Homogeneity and Dynamics in AGE Models”. JDevE; V.26-#1, pp. 65-76.

 

-M. Kilkenny and S. Robinson (1990). “CGE Analysis of Agricultural Liberalization: Factor Mobility and Macro Closure”. Journal of Policy Modelling, V.12-#?, pp. 527-576.

 

c. Market Structure Issues in AGE Analysis

 

(1) Factor-Market Distortions

 

-J. DeMelo (1977). “Distoritions in the Factor Market: Some General Equilibrium Estimates”. REStat; V.59-#?, pp. 398-405.

 

-J.K. Kwon and H. Paik (1995). “Factor Price Distortions, Resource Allocation, and Growth: A CGE Analysis”. REStat; V.?-#4, pp. 664-676

 

(2) Product Differentiation and the Armington Assumption

 

-P. Armington (1969). “A Theory of Demand for Products Differentiated by Place of Production”. IMFSP; V.16-#?, pp. 159-178.

 

-J. DeMelo and S. Robinson (1981). “Trade Policy and Resource Allocation in the Presence of Product Differentiation”. REStat; V.63-#?, pp. 169-177.

 

-J. DeMelo and S. Robinson (1985). “Product Differentiation and Trade Dependence of the Domestic Price System in Computable General Equilibrium Trade Models”. In T. Peeters, et al. Eds. International Trade and Exchange Rates in the Late Eighties. Amsterdam: Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, pp. 93-107.

 

-D. Brown (1987). “Tariffs, Terms of Trade, and National Product Differentiation”. Journal of Policy Modeling; V.9-#3, pp. 503-526.

 

-C. Shiells and K. Reinert (1993). “Armington Models and Terms of Trade Effects: Some Econometric Evidence for North America”. CJE; V.26-#2, pp. 299-316.

 

(3) Imperfect Competition in AGE Models

 

-T. Hazeldine (1980). “Testing Two Models of Pricing and Protection with Canads/US Data”. Journal of Industrial Economics; V.?-#?, pp. 145-154.

 

-R. Harris (1984). “AGE Analysis of Small Open Economies with Scale Economies and Imperfect Competition”. AER; V.74-#5, pp. 1016-1032.

 

-D. Cox and R. Harris (1985). “Trade Liberalization and Industrial Organization: Some Estimates for Canada”. JPE; V.93-#?, pp. 115-145.

 

-D. Brown (1989). “Market Structure, The Exchange Rate, and Pricing Behavior By Firms: Some Evidence from CGE Trade Models”. WA; V.125-#3, pp. 441-462.

 

-T. Hazeldine (1990). “Why do the Free Trade Gain Numbers Differ So Much? The Role of Industrial Organization in General Equilibrium”. CJE; V.23-#4, pp. 791-806.

 

-V. Norman (1990). “Assessing Trade and Welfare Effects of Trade Liberalization: A Comparison of Alternative Approaches to CGE Modelling with Imperfect Competition”. EER; V.34-#?, pp. 725-751.

 

-T. Nguyen and R. Wigle (1991). “Three Variants of the the Whalley Model of Global Trade”. Empirical Economics; V.16-#1, pp. 121-137.

 

-T. Nguyen and R. Wigle (1992). “Trade Liberalization with Imperfect Competition: The Large and the Small of It”. EER; V.36-#1, pp. 17-35.

 

-J. Mercenier (1995). “Nonuniqueness of Solutions in AGE Models with Scale Economies and Imperfect Competition”. Economic Theory; V.6-#?, pp. 161-177.

 

-D. Rodrik (1988). “Imperfect Competition, Scale Economies and Trade Policy in Developing Countries”. in R. Baldwin, ed. Trade Policy Issues and Empirical Analysis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 109-137.

 

-S. Devarajan and D. Rodrik (1989). “Trade Liberalization in Developing Countries: Do Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies Matter?”. AER; V.79-#2, pp. 283-287.

 

-J. DeMelo and D. Roland-Holst (1990). “An Evaluation of Neutral Trade Policy Incentives under Increasing Returns to Scale”. In J. de Melo and A. Sapir, eds. Trade Theory and Economic Reform: North, South and East. Oxford: Blackwell.

 

-J. deMelo and D. Roland-Holst (1991). “Industrial Organization and Trade Liberalization: Evidence From Korea”. in R. Baldwin, ed. Empirical Studies of Commercial Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 287-306.

 

-T. Condon and J. deMelo (1991). “Industrial Organization Implications of QR Trade Regimes: Evidence and Welfare Costs”. Empirical Economics; V.16-#1, pp. 139-153.

 

-H. Gunsakera and R. Tyers (1991). “Imperfect Competition and Returns to Scale in a Newly Industrializing Economy: A General Equilibrium Analysis of Korean Trade Policy”. JDevE; V.?-#?, pp.

 

-T. Hertel (1994). “The `Procompetitive` Effects of Trade Policy Reform in a Small, Open Economy”. JIE; V.36-#3/4, pp. 391-411.

 

-F. Lopez-de-Silanes, J. Markusen, and T. Rutherford (1994). “Complementarity and Increasing Returns in Intermediate Inputs”. JDevE; V.45-#?, pp. 101-119.

 

-F. Lopez-de-Silanes, J. Markusen and T. Rutherford (1994). “The Auto Industry and the North American Free Trade Agreement”. In J. Francois and C. Shiells, eds. Modeling Trade Policy: AGE Assessments of North American Free Trade. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 223-255

 

-J. Markusen, T. Rutherford and L. Hunter (1995). “Trade Liberalization in a Multinational Dominated Industry”. JIE; V.38-#1/2, pp. 95-117.

 

-J. Markusen and T. Rutherford (1994). “Discrete Plant-Location Decisions in an AGE Model of Trade Liberalization”. WA; V.?-#?, pp. 133-150.

 

d. AGE Analysis of Protection

 

-J. Hartigan (1981). “The US Tariff and Comparative Advantage: A Survey of Method”. WA; V.117-#1, pp. 65-108.

 

-J. De Melo (1988). “Computable General Equilibrium Models for Trade Policy Analysis in Developing Countries: A Survey”. Journal of Policy Modeling; V.10-#4, pp. 469-503.

 

-S. Devarajan, J. Lewis and S. Robinson (1990). “Policy Lessons from Trade-focused, Two-Sector Models”. Journal of Policy Modeling; V.12-#4, pp. 625-657.

 

-R. Boadway and J. Treddenick (1978). “A General Equilibrium Computation of the Effects of the Canadian Tariff Structure”. CJE; V.11-#3, pp. 424-446.

 

-R. Harris and D. Cox (1984). Trade, Industrial Policy and Canadian Manufacturing. Toronto: Ontario Economic Council.

 

-B. Hamilton and J. Whalley (1983). “Optimal Tariff Calculations in Alternative Trade Models and Some Possible Implications for Current World Trading Arrangements”. JIE; V.15-#?, pp. 323-348.

 

-J. Markusen and R. Wigle (1989). “Nash Equilibrium Tariffs for the US and Canada: The Roles of Country Size, Scale Economies, and Capital Mobility”. JPE; V.368-386.

 

-G. Harrison, E. Ruström and R. Wigle (1989). “The Costs of Agricultural Trade Wars”. In A. Stoeckel, D. Vincent and S. Cuthbertson, eds. Macroeconomic Consequences of Farm Price Support Policies. Durham: Duke University Press.

 

-R. Jones, T. Nguyen, and J. Whalley (1990). “Computation of World General Equilibrium under Bilateral Quotas and an Application to the Analysis of Textile Trade Restrictions”. Journal of Policy Modeling; V.12-#3, pp. 511-526.

 

-H. Arce and K. Reinert (1994). “Aggregation and the Welfare Analysis of US Tariffs”. Journal of Economic Studies; V.21-#6, pp. 26-30.

 

-J. Francois, H. Arce, K. Reinert, and J. Flynn (1996). “Commercial Policy and the Domestic Carrying Trade”. CJE; V.29-#1, pp. 181-197.

 

-D. Tarr (1989). A General Equilibrium Analysis of the Welfare and Employment Effects of US Quotas in Textiles, Autos and Steel. Washington, D.C.: Federal Trade Commission.

 

-J. De Melo and D. Tarr (1993). A General Equilibrium Analysis of US Foreign Trade Policy. Cambridge: MIT.

 

e. AGE Analysis of Liberalization

 

(1) Multilateral Liberalization

 

-W. Cline, et al. (1978). Trade Negotiations in the Tokyo Round: A Quantitative Assessment. Washington, DC: Brookings.

 

-J. Whalley (1985). Trade Liberalization Among Major World Trading Areas. Cambridge:MIT.

 

-T.N. Srinivasan and J. Whalley, eds. (1986). General Equilibrium Trade Policy Modelling. Cambridge: MIT.

 

-A. Deardorff and R. Stern (1990). Computational Analysis of Global Trading Arrangements. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

 

-T. Nguyen, C. Perroni and R. Wigle (1991). “The Value of a Uruguay Round Success”. World Economy; V.14-#?, pp. 359-374.

 

-G. Harrison, T. Rutherford, and D. Tarr (1997). “Quantifying the Uruguay Round”. EJ; V.107-#444, pp. 1405-1430.

 

-J. Francois, B. McDonald, and H. Nordstrom (1997). “The Uruguay Round: A Global General Equilibrium Assessment”. in D. Robertson, ed., East Asian Trade After the Uruguay Round. Cambridge: CUP, pp.

 

(2) International Integration--Free Trade Areas, etc.

 

(a) NAFTA

 

-B. Hamilton and J. Whalley (1985). “Geographically Discriminatory Trade Arrangements”. REStat; V.67-#3, pp. 446-455.

 

-D. Cox and R. Harris (1986). “A Quantitative Assessment of the Economic Impact on Canada of Sectoral Free Trade with the US”. CJE; V.19-#?, pp. 377-394.

 

-D. Cox and R. Harris (1992). “North American Free Trade and Its Implications for Canada: Results from and CGE Model of North American Trade”. World Economy; V.15-#1, pp. 31-44.

 

-D. Cox (1994). “Some AGE Estimates of the Impact of a NAFTA on Canada”. In Francois and Shiells, eds, pp. 100-123.

 

-D. Brown and R. Stern (1987). “A Modeling Perspective”. In R. Stern, P. Tresize and J. Whalley, eds. Perspectives on the US-Candada Free Trade Agreement. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 155-182.

 

-D. Brown and R. Stern (1989). “Computational Analysis of the US-Canada Free Trade Agreement: The Role of Product Differentiation and Market Structure”. In R. Feenstra, ed. Trade Policies for International Competitiveness. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 217-245.

 

-D. Brown and R. Stern (1989). “CGE Estimates of Gains from US-Canadian Trade Liberalisation”. In D. Greenaway, T. Hyclak and R. Thornton, eds. Economic Aspects of Regional Trading Arrangements. New York: NYU Press, pp. 69-108.

 

-R. Wigle (1988). “General Equilibrium Evaluation of Canada-US Trade Liberalization in a Global Context”. CJE; V.20-#3, pp. 539-564.

 

-D. Brown (1992). “The Impact of a North American Free Trade Area: AGE Models”. In N. Lustig, B. Bosworth, and R. Lawrence, eds. North American Free Trade: Assessing the Impact. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 26-68.

 

-D. Brown, A. Deardorff and R. Stern (1992). “A North American Free Trade Agreement: Analytical Assessment and Computational Issues”. World Economy; V.15-#1, pp. 11-30.

 

-D. Brown, A. Deardorff and R. Stern (1992). “North American Integration”. EJ; V.102-#?, pp. 1507-1518.

 

-I. Trela and J. Whalley (1994). “Differences between Explicit and Ad Valorem Barrier Representations in Analyses of the Effects of North American Integration”. World Economy; V.?-#?, pp. 31-44.

 

-H. Sobarzo (1992). “A GE Analysis of the Gains from Trade for the Mexican Economy from a NAFTA”. World Economy; V.15-#1, pp. 83-100.

 

-H. Sobarzo (1994). “The Gains for Mexico from a NAFTA--An AGE Assessment”. In Francois and Shiells, eds., pp. 83-99.

 

-R. Boyd, K. Krutilla, and J. McKinney (1993). “The Impact of Tariff Liberalization between the US and Mexico”. Applied Economics; V.

 

-D. Roland-Holst, K. Reinert, and C. Shiells (1994). “A GE Analysis of North American Economic Integration”. In Francois and Shiells, eds., pp. 47-82.

 

-P. Kehoe and T. Kehoe (1994). “Capturing NAFTA’s Impact with Applied General Equilibrium Models”. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review; V.18-#1, pp. 17-34.

 

-C. Shiells, D. Roland-Holst and K. Reinert (1993). “Modeling and North American Free Trade Area: Estimation of Flexible Functional Forms”. WA; V.129-#1, pp. 55-76.

 

-J. Francois and C. Shiells, eds. (1994). Modelling Trade Policy: Applied General Equilibrium Assessments of North American Free Trade. Cambridge: CUP.

 

-A. Panagariya and R. Duttagupta (2001). “The ‘Gains’ from Preferential Trade Liberalization in the CGE Models: Where Do They Come From?”. In S. Lahiri, ed. Regionalism and Globalization: Theory and Practice. London: Routledge, pp. 39-60.

 

(b) The European Community

 

-M. Miller and J. Spencer (1977). “The Static Economic Efficts of the UK Joining the EEC: A General Equilibrium Approach”. REStud; V.44-#1, pp. 71-93.

 

-J. Spencer (1985). “The EEC: GE Computations and the Economic Implications of Membership”. In J. Piggott and J. Whalley, eds. New Developments in AGE Analysis. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 119-142.

 

-J. Spencer (1986). “Trade Liberalization through Tariff Cuts and the EEC: A General Equilibirum Evaluation”. In T.N. Srinivasan and J. Whalley, eds. (1986). General Equilibrium Trade Policy Modelling. Cambridge: MIT, pp. 125-144.

 

-G. Harrison, T. Rutherford, and I. Wooton (1989). “The Economic Impact of the European Community”. AER; V.79-2, pp. 288-294.

 

-G. Harrison, T. Rutherford, and I. Wooton (1991). “An Empirical Database for a General Equilibrium Model of the European Communities”. Empirical Economics; V.16-#1, pp. 95-120.

 

-M. Gasiorek, A. Smith and A. Venables (1991). “Completing the Internal Market in the EC: Factor Demands and Comparative Advantage”. in L.A. Winters and A. Venables, eds. European Integration: Trade and Industry. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 9-33.

 

-M. Gasiorek, A. Smith and A. Venables (1992). “`1992`: Trade and Welfare--A General Equilibrium Model”. in L.A. Winters, ed. Trade Flows and Trade Policy after `1992`. Cambridge: CUP/CEPR, pp. 35-66.

 

-V. Norman (1989). “EFTA and the Internal European Market”. Economic Policy, #9, pp. 424-465.

 

-J. Haaland and V. Norman (1992). “Global Production Effects of European Integration”. in L.A. Winters, ed. Trade Flows and Trade Policy after `1992`. Cambridge: CUP/CEPR, pp. 67-91.

 

-T. Hertel, M. Gehlhar and R. McDougall (1994). “Reforming the European Community’s Common Agricultural Policy: Who Stands to Gain?”. in A. Deardorff and R. Stern, eds. Analytical and Negotiating Issues in the Global Trading System. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 139-184.

 

-G. Harrison, T. Rutherford, and I. Wooton (1995). “Liberalizing Agriculture in the Eurpean Union”. Journal of Policy Modeling; V.17-#3, pp. 223-255.

 

-R. Baldwin, J. Francois, and R. Portes (1997). “The Costs and Benefits of Eastern Enlargement: The Impact on the EU and Central Europe”. Economic Policy; #24, pp. 127-176.

 

-Emmanuel Petit (1997). “Market Integration, Scale Economies and Labor Market Imperfection in an Applied General Equilibrium Model” . Annales d'Economie et de Statistique; #47, pp.

 

f. Trade and Migration in AGE Models

 

-B. Hamilton and J. Whalley (1984). “Efficiency and Distributional Implications of Global Restrictions on Labour Mobility: Calculations and Policy Implications”. JDevE; V.14-#?, pp. 61-76.

 

-J. Hill and J. Méndez (1984). “The Effect of Commercial Policy on International Migration Flows: The Case of the US and Mexico”. JIE, V.17-#1/2, pp. 41-53.

 

-F. Rivera-Batiz (1986). “Modeling the Short-run Economic Effects of Immigration: Some General Equilibrium Simulations”. Modeling and Simulation; V.17-Part 1, pp. 215-222.

 

-R. Hinojosa-Ojeda and S. Robinson (1992). “Labor Issues in a North-American Free Trade Area”. In N. Lustig, B. Bosworth, and R. Lawrence, eds. Assessing the Impact of North American Free Trade. Pp. 69-108.

 

-S. Robinson, M. Burfisher, R. Hinojosa-Ojeda and K. Thierfelder (1993). “Agricultural Policies and Migration in a US Mexico Free Trade Area”. Journal of Policy Modelling; V.15-#5/6, pp. 673-701.

 

-M. Burfisher, S. Robinson and K. Thierfelder (1995). “Wage Changes in a US-Mexico Free Trade Area: Migration versus Stolper-Samuelson Effects”. In J. Francois and C. Shiells, eds. Pp. 195-222.

 

-S. Levy and S. van Wijnbergen (1994). “Labor Markets, Migration and Welfare: Agriculture in the North-American Free Trade Agreement”. JDevE; V.43-#?, pp. 263-278.

 

-Robert McCleery (1992). “An Intertemporal, Linked, Macroeconomic CGE Model of the US and Mexico, Focusing on Demographic Change and Factor Flows”. In USITC, Economy-wide Modeling of the Economic Implications of a FTA With Mexico and a NAFTA with Canada and Mexico. Washington, DC: USITC, pp. 373-441.

 

-R. Hinojosa Ojeda and R. McCleery (1993). “US-Mexico Interdependence, Social Pacts and Policy Perspectives: A CGE Approach”. In J. Bustamante, C. Reynolds, and R. Hinojosa-Ojeda, eds. US-Mexico Relations: Labor Market Interdependence. Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp. 113-154.

 

-S. Weyerbrock (1995). “Can the European Community Absorb More Immigrants? A General Equilibrium Analysis of the Labor Market and Macroeconomic Effects of East-West Migration in Europe”. Journal of Policy Modeling; V.17-#2, pp. 85-120.

 

-J. Francois and D. Nelson (1999). “Trade Policy and North-South Migration”. in R. Baldwin and J. Francois, eds. Dynamic Issues in Applied Commercial Policy Analysis. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 323-344.

 

-D. Roland-Holst (1999). “Labour Markets and Dynamic Comparative Advantage”. in R. Baldwin and J. Francois, eds. Dynamic Issues in Applied Commercial Policy Analysis. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 367-378.

 

g. Dynamic AGE Models

 

-L. Goulder and B. Eichengreen (1989). “Savings Promotion, Investment Promotion and International Competitiveness”. In R. Feenstra, ed. Trade Policies for International Competitivenss. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 5-44.

 

-L. Goulder and B. Eichengreen (1992). “Trade Liberalization in General Equilibrium: Intertemporal and Inter-Industry Effects”. CJE; V.25-#2, pp. 253-280.

 

-L. Bovenberg and L. Goulder (1992). “Introducing Intertemporal and Open Economy Features in Applied General Equilibrium Models”. In D. Henk, T. Van der Klundert, J. Van Sindern, eds. Applied General Equilibrium Modeling. Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 47-64.

 

-C. Keuschnigg and W. Kohler (1994). “Modeling Intertemporal General Equilibrium: An Application to Austrial Commercial Policy”. Empirical Economics; V.19-#?, pp. 131-164.

 

-C. Keuschnigg and W. Kohler (1995). “Dynamic Effects of Trade Liberalization: An Intertemporal CGE Approach”. RIE; V.3-#1, pp. 20-35.

 

-C. Ryan (1992). “The Integration of Financial Services and Economic Welfare”. in L.A. Winters, ed. Trade Flows and Trade Policy after `1992`. Cambridge: CUP/CEPR, pp. 92-118.

 

-L. Young and J. Romero (1994). “A Dynamic Dual Model of the North American Free Trade Agreement”. In J. Francois and C. Shiells, eds. (1994). Modelling Trade Policy: Applied General Equilibrium Assessments of North American Free Trade. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 301-327.

 

-T. Kehoe (1993). “Toward a Dynamic General Equilibirum Model of North American Trade”. In J. Francois and C. Shiells, eds. (1994). Modelling Trade Policy: Applied General Equilibrium Assessments of North American Free Trade. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 328-347.

 

-S. Levy and S. van Wijnbergen (1993). “Agriculture in the Mexico-US Free Trade Agreement: A General Equilibrium Analysis”. In J. Francois and C. Shiells, eds. (1994). Modelling Trade Policy: Applied General Equilibrium Assessments of North American Free Trade. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 151-194.

 

-S. Levy and S. van Wijnbergen (1995). “Transition Problems in Economic Reform: Agriculture in the NAFTA”. AER; V.85-#4, pp. 738-754.

 

-J. Francois, H. Nordström, and C. Shiells (1999). “Transition Dynamics and Trade Policy Reform in Developing Countries”. in R. Baldwin and J. Francois, eds. Dynamic Issues in Applied Commercial Policy Analysis. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 14-41.

 

-R. Baldwin and R. Forslid (1999). “Putting Growth Effects in Computable Equilibrium Trade Models”. in R. Baldwin and J. Francois, eds. Dynamic Issues in Applied Commercial Policy Analysis. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 44-84.

 

-C. Keuschnigg and W. Kohler (1999). “Innovation, Capital Accumulation, and Economic Transitition”. in R. Baldwin and J. Francois, eds. Dynamic Issues in Applied Commercial Policy Analysis. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 89-137.

 

-J. Francois, B. McDonald, and H. Nordström (1999). “Trade Liberalization and Investment in a Multilateral Framework”. in R. Baldwin and J. Francois, eds. Dynamic Issues in Applied Commercial Policy Analysis. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 202-223.

 

-R. Baldwin, R. Forslid, and J. Haaland (1999). “Investment Creation and Investment Diversion: Simulation Analysis of the Single Market Programme”. in R. Baldwin and J. Francois, eds. Dynamic Issues in Applied Commercial Policy Analysis. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 228-265.

 

-T. Rutherford and D. Tarr (1999). “Blueprings, Spillovers, and the Dynamic Gains from Trade Liberalization in a Small Open Economy”. in R. Baldwin and J. Francois, eds. Dynamic Issues in Applied Commercial Policy Analysis. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 269-316.

 

-A. Auerbach and L. Kotlikoff (1986). Dynamic Fiscal Policy. Cambridge: CUP.

 

-L. Goulder and L. Summers (1989). “Tax Policy, Assett Prices and Growth: A General Equilibrium Analysis”. JPubE; V.38-#?, pp. 265-296.

 

-T. Kehoe and D. Levine (1990). “Indeterminacy in Applied Intertemporal General Equilibrium Models”. In L. Bergman, D. Jorgenson, and E. Zalai, eds. General Equilibrium Modeling and Economic Policy Analysis. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 111-148.

 

-K. Judd (1992). “Projection Methods for Solving Aggregate Growth Models”. JET; V.58-#?, pp. 410-452.

 

h. Linking CGE and Econometric Methods: Evaluation and Estimation

 

(1) Overviews

 

-A. Gregory and G. Smith (1992). “Statistical Aspects of Calibration in Macroeconomics”. In G.S. Madala, C.R. Rao, and H.D. Vinod ed. Handbook of Statistics, V.10. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 703-719.

 

-A. Marcet (1994). “Simulation Analysis of Dynamic Stochastic Models: Applications to Theory and Estimation”. In C. Sims, ed. Advances in Econometrics. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 81-118.

 

-A. Pagan (1994). “Calibration and Econometric Research: An Overview”. Journal of Applied Econometrics; V.9-Special Issue, pp. S1-s10.

 

-K. Kim and A. Pagan (1995). “The Econometrics of Calibrated Models”. In H. Pesaran and M. Wickens, eds. Handbook of Applied Econometrics; V.1. London: Blackwell, pp. 356-390.

 

-R. King (1995). “Quantitative Theory and Econometrics”. Economic Quarterly - Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond; V.81-#3, pp. 53-105.

 

-L. Hansen and J. Heckman (1996). “The Empirical Foundations of Calibration”. Journal of Economic Perspectives; V.10-#1, pp. 87-104.

 

-R. McKitrick (1998). “The Econometric Critique of Computable General Equilibrium Modeling: The Role of Parameter Estimation”. Economic Modelling; V.15-#4, pp. 543-573.

 

-A. Pagan (1998). “Calibration”. In D. Giles and A. Ullah (Eds.), Handbook of Applied Economic Statistics. New York: Marcel Dekker, pp. 605-618.

 

-J. Geweke (1999). “Computational Experiments and Reality”. Ms: University of Minnesota/Fed of Minneapolis.

 

(2) Methods

 

(a) Simulation Based Econometrics

 

-C. Gouriéroux and A. Monfort (1996). Simulation-Based Econometric Methods. (CORE Lectures). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

 

-C. Gouriéroux and A. Monfort (1991). “Simulation Base Econometrics in Models with Heterogeneity”. Annales d’Economie et de Statistique, #20-21, pp. 69-107.

 

-C. Gouriéroux, A. Monfort, and E. Renault (1993). “Indirect Inference”. Journal of Applied Econometrics; V.35-special supplement, pp. s85-s118.

 

-A. Monfort (1996). “A Reappraisal of Misspecified Econometric Models”. Econometric Theory; V.12-#?, pp. 597-619.

 

-A.R. Gallant and G. Tauchen (1996). “Which Moments to Match?”. Econometric Theory; V.12-#?, pp. 657-681.

 

-Y.K. Kwan (1998). “Asymptotic Bayesian Analysis Based on a Limited Information Estimator”. Journal of Econometrics; V.88-#1, pp. 99-121.

 

-M. El-Gamal (1993). “The Extraction of Information From Multiple Point Estimates”. Journal of Nonparametric Statistics; V.2-#4, pp. 369-378.

 

(b) Maximum Entropy Methods in Econometrics

 

-A. Zellner (1990). “Bayesian Methods and Entropy in Economics and Econometrics”. In W.T. Grandy and L.H. Shick, eds. Maximum Entropy and Bayesian Methods. Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 17-31.

 

-J. Sengupta (1991). “Maximum Entropy in Applied Econometric Research”. International Journal of Systems Science; V.22-#?, pp. 1941-1951.

 

-E. Soofi (1996). “Information Theory and Bayesian Statistics”. In D.A. Berry, K.M. Chaloner, and J.K. Geweke, eds. Bayesian Analysis in Statistics and Econometrics. New York: Wiley, pp. 179-189.

 

-A. Golan, G. Judge, and D. Miller (1996). Maximum Entropy Econometrics: Robust Estimation with Limited Data. Chichester: Wiley.

 

-T. C. Lee and G. Judge (1996). “Entropy and Cross-Entropy Procedures for Estimating Transition Probabilities from Aggregate Data”. In D. A. Barry et al. (Ed.), Bayesian Analysis in Statistics and Econometrics. New York: John Wiley and Sons.

 

-A. Golan and G. Judge (1996). “Recovering Information in the Case of Underdetermined Problems and Incomplete Economic Data”. Journal of Statistical Planning and Inference; V.49-#1, pp. 127–136.

 

-A. Golan, G. Judge, and D. Miller, (1997). “The Maximum Entropy Approach to Estimation and Inference: An Overview”. In T. Fomby and R.C. Hill, eds. Applying Maximum Entropy to Econometric Problems. (Advances in Econometrics, vol. 12). Greenwich: JAI Press, pp. 3-24.

 

-A. Golan and G. Judge (1998). “Information Recovery in Simultaneous Equations' Models”. In D. Giles and A. Ullah (Eds.), Handbook of Applied Economic Statistics. New York: Marcel Dekker, pp. 365-381.

 

-A. Golan (1999). “Maximum Entropy Approach for Estimating Nonlinear Dynamic Models”. In W.V.D. Linden and V. Dose, eds., Maximum Entropy and Bayesian Methods. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

 

-A. Golan (forth.). “Notes on Why Maximum Entropy Econometrics”. In A. Bera and R. Koenker, eds., Volume in Honor of George Judge. New York: Wiley.

 

-J. Sengupta (1992). “The Maximum Entropy Approach in Production Frontier Estimation”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.25-#1, pp. 41-57.

 

-H. Ruy (1993). “Maximum Entropy Estimation of Density and Regression Functions”. Journal of Econometrics; V.56-#3, pp. 397-440.

 

-Q. Paris and R. Howitt (1998). “An Analysis of Ill-Posed Production Problems Using Maximum Entropy”. American Journal of Agricultural Economics; V.80-#1, pp. 124-138.

 

-S. Lence and D. Miller (1998). “Estimation of Multi-output Production Functions with Incomplete Data: A Generalised Maximum Entropy Approach”. European Review of Agricultural Economics; V.25-#2, pp. 188-209.

 

-S. Lence and D. Miller (1998). “Recovering Output-Specific Inputs from Aggregate Input Data: A Generalized Cross-Entropy Approach”. American Journal of Agricultural Economics; V.80-#4, pp. 852-867.

 

-N. Agmon, Y. Alhassid, and R.D. Levine (1979). “An Algorithm for Finding the Distribution of Maximal Entropy”. Journal of Computational Physics; V.30-#?, pp. 250-259.

 

-A. Zellner and R. Highfield (1988). “Calculation of Maximum Entropy Distributions and Approximation of Marginal Posterior Distributions”. Journal of Econometrics; V.37-#2, pp. 195-209.

 

-A. Denzau, P. Gibbons, and E. Greenberg (1989). “Bayesian Estimation of Proportions with a Cross-Entropy Prior”. Communications in Statistics–Theory and Methods, V.18-#5, pp. 1843-1861.

 

-H. Theil (1967). Economics and Information Theory. Amsterdam: North-Holland.

 

(3) Applications

 

(a) Static CGE Models

 

-A. Mansur and J. Whalley (1984). “Numerical Specification of AGE Models: Estimation, Calibration and Data”. In H. Scarf and J. Shoven, eds. Applied General Equilibrium Analysis. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 69-127.

 

-D. Jorgenson (1983). “Modeling Production for General Equilibrium Analysis”. Scandinavian Journal of Economics; V.85-#2, pp. 101-112.

 

-D. Jorgenson (1984). “Econometric Methods for Applied General Equilibrium Analysis”. In H. Scarf and J. Shoven, eds. Applied General Equilibrium Analysis. New York: CUP, pp.139-203.

 

-D. Jorgenson (1998). Econometric General Equilibrium Modeling. Cambridge: MIT Press.

 

-A. Pagan and J. Shannon (1985). “Sensitivity Analysis for Linearized CGE Models”. In J. Piggott and J. Whalley, eds. New Developments in AGE Analysis. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 104-118

 

-G. Harrison and H. Vinod (1992). “The Sensitivity Analysis of AGE Models: Completely Randomized Factorial Sampling Designs”. REStat; V.74-#2, pp. 357-362.

 

-A. Golan, G. Judge, and S. Robinson (1994). “Recovering Information from Incomplete or Partial Multisectoral Economic Data”. REStat; V.76-#3, pp. 541-549.

 

-Amos Golan and Steve Vogel (2000). “Estimation of Non-Stationary Social Accounting Matrix Coefficients With Supply-Side Information”. Economic Systems Research; V.12-#4, pp. 447-471.

 

-Robinson, Sherman, Andrea Cattaneo, and Moataz El-Said (2001). “Updating and Estimating a Social Accounting Matrix Using Cross Entropy Methods”. Economic Systems Research; V.13-#1, pp. 47-64.

 

-C. Arndt, S. Robinson, and F. Tarp (2002). “Parameter Estimation for A Computable General Equilibrium Model: A Maximum Entropy Approach”. Journal of Economic Modelling; V.19-#3, pp. 375-398.

 

(b) Dynamic, Stochastic CGE Models

 

-L. Christiano and M. Eichenbaum (1992). “Current Real Business Cycle Theories and Aggregate Labor Market Fluctuations”. AER; V.82-#3, pp. 430-450.

 

-A. Gregory and G. Smith (1990). “Calibration as Estimation”. Econometric Reviews; V.9-#1, pp. 57-89.

 

-A. Gregory and G. Smith (1991). “Calibration as Testing: Inference in Simulated Macro Models”. Journal of Business and Economic Statistics; V.9-#3, pp. 293-303.

 

-A. Smith (1993). “Estimating Non-linear Time-Series Models Using Simulated Vector Autoregression”. Journal of Applied Econometrics; V.35-special supplement, pp. s63-s84.

 

-R. Fair (1993). “Estimating Event Probabilities from Macroeconomic Models using Stochastic Simulation”. In J. Stock and M. Watson, eds., Business Cycles, Indicators, and Forecasting. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER.

 

-M. Watson (1993). “Measures of Fit for Calibrated Models”. JPE; V.101-#6, pp. 1011-1041.

 

-G. Chow and Y.K. Kwan (1997). “Rational Expectations Is Not Generally Valid for Econometric Models: Evidence from Stock Market Data”. Pacific Economic Review; V.2-#3, pp. 149-163.

 

-G. Chow and Y.K. Kwan (1997). “How the Basic RBC Model Fails to Explain US Time Series”. Journal of Monetary Economics; V.41-#2, pp. 301-318.

 

-F.X. Diebold, L. Ohanian, and J. Berkowitz (1998). “Dynamic Equilibrium Economies: A Framework for Comparing Models and Data”. Review of Economic Studies; V.65-#3, pp. 433-451.

 

-F. Canova (1994). “Statistical Inference in Calibrated Models”. Journal of Applied Econometrics; V.9-Special Issue, pp. S123-s144.

 

-F. Canova, M. Finn, and A. Pagan (1994). “Evaluating a Real Business Cycle Model”. In C. Hargreaves, ed. Nonstationary Time Series Analysis and Cointegration. Oxford: OUP, pp. 225-255.

 

-F. Canova (1995). “Sensitivity Analysis and Model Evaluation in Simulated Dynamic General Equilibrium Economies”. IER; V.36-#?, pp. 477-501.

 

-D.N. DeJong, B.F. Ingram, and C.H. Whiteman (1996). “A Bayesian Approach to Calibration”. Journal of Business and Economic Statistics; V.14-#1, pp. 1-10.

 

-D.N. DeJong, B.F. Ingram, and C.H. Whiteman (2000). “A Bayesian Approach to Dynamic Macroeconomics”. Journal of Econometrics; V.98-#?, pp. 203-233.

 

7. Effective Rates of Protection

 

-W.M. Corden (1971). The Theory of Protection. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

 

-W.M. Corden (1985). “Effective Protection Revisited”. in Corden, Protection, Growth and Trade. Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 141-153.

 

a. The Theory of ERP

 

(1) Partial Equilibrium Basics

 

-W.M. Corden (1966). “The Structure of a Tariff System and the Effective Protective Rate”. JPE, V.74-#?, pp. 221-237.

 

-J.C. Leith (1968). “Substitution and Supply Elasticities in Calculating the Effective Protective Rate”. QJE; V.82-#4, pp. 588-601.

 

-J. Anderson and S. Naya (1969). “Substitution and Two Concepts of Effective Rate of Protection”. AER; V.59-#4, pp. 607-612.

 

-J.M. Finger (1969). “Substitution and the Effective Rate of Protection”. JPE; V.77-#6, pp. 972-975.

 

-J. Dutton and A. Stoeckel (1982). “Effective Protection with Substitution: A Geometric Approach”. SEJ; V.48-#?, pp. 909-916.

 

-C. Milner (1992). “Second Best Rates of Effective Protection with Imperfect Substitution”. Journal of Economic Studies; V.19-#?, pp. 3-13.

 

-D. Greenaway, G Reed and R. Hassan (1994). “By-products and Effective Protection”. Journal of Economic Studies; V.21-#6, pp. 31-36.

 

-E. Londero (2001). “Effective Protection in the Presence of Joint Production”. Journal of Economic Studies; V.28-#1, pp. 34-42.

 

(2) General Equilibrium Analysis

 

-R. Ruffin (1969). “Tariffs, Intermediate Goods and Domestic Protection”. AER; V.59-#?, pp. 261-261-269. [Comment by Balassa and response, AER, V.?-#?, pp. 959-969.]

 

-A.H.H. Tan (1970). “Differential Tariffs, Negative Value Added and the Theory of Effective Protection”. AER; V.60-#1, pp. 107-116.

 

-V.K. Ramaswami and T.N. Srinivasan (1971). “Tariff Structures and Resource Allocation in the Presence of Factor Substitution”. in J. Bhagwati, et al. eds. Trade, Balance of Payments and Growth. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 291-299.

 

-R. Jones (1971). “Substitution and Effective Protection”. JIE; V.1-#1, pp. 59-81.

 

-W. Mayer (1971). “Effective Tariff Protection in a Simple General Equilibrium Model”. Eca; V.?-#?, pp. 253-268.

 

-H.G. Johnson (1971). “Effective Protection and General Equilibrium Theory”. in Johnson, Aspects of the Theory of Protection. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, pp. 367-391.

 

-W. Ethier (1972). “Input Substitution and the Concept of the Effective Rate of Protection”. JPE; V.80-#?, pp. 34-47.

 

-J. Bhagwati and T.N. Srinivasan (1973). “The General Equilibrium Theory of Effective Protection and Resource Allocation”. JIE; V.3-#3, pp. 259-282. (Comment by Sendo (1974), JIE V.4-#2, pp. 213-215)

 

-M. Bruno (1973). “Protection and Tariff Change Under General Equilibrium”. JIE; V.3-#3, pp. 205-225.

 

-C. Khang (1973). “Factor Substitution in the Theory of Effective Protection”. JIE; V.3-#3, pp. 227-244.

 

-K. Tanaka, Y. Sendo and S. Kakimoto (1977). “The Theory of Effective Protection in General Equilibrium with Interindustrial Flows”. JIE; V. 7-#?, pp. 343-348.

 

-Y. Uekawa (1979). “The Theory of Effective Protection, Resource Allocation and the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem: The Many Industry Case”. JIE; V.9-#2, pp. 151-171.

 

-L. Wegge (1979). “Conjugate Small Country Production Equilibrium Concepts”. JIE; V.9-#?, pp. 173-196.

 

-A. Ray (1973). “Non-Traded Inputs and Effective Protection: A General Equilibrium Analysis”. JIE; V.3-#3, pp. 245-258.

 

-K. Suzuki (1979). “Nontraded Inputs, The Effective Rate of Protection and Gross Output Changes”. JIE; V.9-#?, pp. 411-415.

 

-M. Ohyama and K. Suzuki (1980). “Interindustry Flows, Non-Traded Goods and the Theory of Effective Protection: A General Equilibrium Analysis”. JIE; V.10-#?, pp. 567-578.

 

-Y. Uekawa (1980). “A Non-Traded Input, Substitution and Effective Protection”. JIE; V.10-#?, pp. 579-592.

 

-S. Yabuuchi and K. Tanaka (1981). “Non-Traded Inputs, Interindustry Flows, Resource Allocation and ERP Theory”. JIE; V.11-#?, pp. 99-111.

 

-G. Davis (1998). “The Substitution Problem in the Theory of Effective Protection”. RIE; V.6-#2, pp.

 

(3) Nominal Rates, Effective Rates and Welfare

 

-J. Vanek (1971). “Interindustry Flows and Meade's Second-Best Index”. JPE; V.79-#?, pp. 345-350.

 

-T. Bertrand (1972). “Welfare Indexes with Interindustry Flows: Comment”. JPE; V.90-#?, pp. 796-800.

 

-W. Ethier (1977). “The Theory of Effective Protection in General Equilibrium: Effective Rate Analogues of Nominal Rates”. CJE; V.10-#2, pp. 233-245.

 

-A. Ray (1980). “Welfare Significance of Nominal and Effective Rates of Protection”. Australian Economic Papers, V.19-#?, pp. 182-192.

 

-E. Ray (1976) “Imperfect Competition and the Resource Allocative Effects of Effective Protection”. REStud; V.?-#?, pp. 363-368. (Comment by Dutton and Tower).

 

b. Estimating ERPs

 

-B. Balassa (1965). “Tariff Protection in Industrial Countries: An Evaluation”. JPE; V.73-#6, pp. 573-594. also in Caves and Johnson.

 

-B. Balassa (1971). The Structure of Protection in Developing Countries. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

 

-H.G. Grubel and H.G. Johnson, eds. (1971). Effective Tariff Protection. Geneva: Institute of International Studies.

 

-J. Anderson (1972). “Effective Protection in the U.S.: A Historical Comparison”. JIE; V.2-#1, pp. 57-76.

 

-A. Yeats (1974). “Effective Tariff Protection in the US, the EC and Japan”. Quarterly Review of Economics and Business; V.14-#?, pp. 41-50.

 

-B. Balassa, et al. (1982). Development Strategies in Semi-industrial Countries. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

 

-B. Cohen (197?). “The Use of Effective Tariffs”. JPE; V.?-#?, pp. 128-141.

 

-T. Hitiris (1978). “Effective Protection and Economic Performance in UK Manufacturing Industry, 1963 and 1968". EJ; V.88-#?, pp. 107-120.

 

-D. Greenaway (1988). “Effective Tariff Protection in the UK”. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics; V.50-#?, pp. 313-324.

 

-C. Ennew, D. Greenaway, and G. Reed (1990). “Further Evidence on Effective Tariffs and Effective Protection in the UK”. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics; V.52-#1, pp. 69-78.

 

-R. Hassan, D. Greenaway, and G. Reed (1992). “Nominal and Effective Protection in the Egyptian Agricultural Sector: A Multicommodity Analysis”. Applied Economics; V.24-#?, pp. 483-492.

 

8. Project Evaluation, Domestic Resource Cost and Protection

 

-E. Tower (1984). “Effective Protection, Domestic Resource Costs, and Shadow Prices”. World Bank Staff Working Papers, #664.

 

a. Shadow Prices, Benefit-Cost Analysis and Project Evaluation

 

-E. Bacha and L. Taylor (1971). “Foreign Exchange Shadow Prices: A Critical Review of Current Theories”. QJE; V.85-#2, pp. 197-224.

 

-I.M.D. Little and J. Mirlees (1974). Project Appraisal and Planning for Developing Countries. New York: Basic Books.

 

-A. Rudra (1972). “Use of Shadow Prices in Project Evaluation”. Indian Economic Review; V.7-#1, pp. 1-15.

 

-R. Weckstein (1972). “Shadow Prices and Project Evaluation in Less-developed Countries”. EDCC; V.20-#?, pp. 474-494.

 

-V. Joshi (1972). “The Rationale and Relevance of the Little-Mirlees Criterion”. Bulletin of the Oxford Institute of Economics and Statistics; V.34-#?, pp. 3-33.

 

-D. Lal (1974). Methods of Project Appraisal. Washington, DC.: World Bank.

 

-J. Dreze and N. Stern (1987). “The Theory of Cost-Benefit Analysis”. In A. Auerbach and M. Feldstein, eds. Handbook of Public Economics--V.2. Amsterdam: North-Holland.

 

-T. Hatta (1991). “Project Evaluation and Compensation Tests”. In J. de Melo and A. Sapir, eds. Trade Theory and Economic Reform--North, South, and East. Cambridge: Blackwell, pp. 53-81.

 

-B. Balassa (1974). “Estimating the Shadow Price of Foreign Exchange in Project Appraisal”. OEP; V.26-#?, pp. 147-168.

 

-T. Bertrand (1974). “The Shadow Exchange Rate in an Economy with Trade Restrictions”. OEP; V.26-#?, pp. 185-191.

 

-P. Dasgupta and J. Stiglitz (1974). “Benfit-Cost Analysis and Trade Policies”. JPE; V.82-#1, pp. 1-33.

 

-R. Boadway (1975). “Benefit-Cost Shadow Pricing in Open Economies: An Alternative Approach”. JPE; V.83-#2, pp. 419-430.

 

-P. Warr (1977). “On the Shadow Pricing of Traded Commodities”. JPE; V.85-#4, pp. 865-872.

 

-P. Diamond and J. Mirlees (1976). “Private Constant Returns and Public Shadow Prices”. REStud; V.22-#?, pp. 41-48.

 

-R. Findlay and S. Wellisz (1976). “Project Evaluation, Shadow Prices and Trade Policy”. JPE; V.84-#3, pp. 543-552.

 

-P. Hammond (1978). “Cost-Benefit Analysis as a Planning Procedure”. in J. Artis and A. Nobay, eds. Contemporary Economic Analysis, vol. 2. London: Croom Helm, pp. 221-250.

 

-T. Bertrand (1979). “Shadow Pricing in Distorted Economies”. AER; V.69-#?, pp. 902-914.

 

-J. Bhagwati and H. Wan (1979). “The `Stationarity` of Shadow Prices of Factors in Project Evaluation, with and Without Distortions”. AER; V.69-#3, pp. 261-273.

 

-J. Bhagwati, T.N. Srinivasan and H. Wan (1979). “Value Subtracted, Negative Shadow Prices of Factors in Project Evaluation, and Immiserizing Growth: Three Paradoxes in the Presence of Trade Distortions”. EJ; V.88-#?, pp. 121-125.

 

-J. Bhagwati and T.N. Srinivasan (1981). “The Evaluation of Projects at World Prices Under Trade Distortions: Quantitative Restrictions, Monopoly Power in Traded and Non-Traded Goods”. IER; V.22-#2, pp. 385-399.

 

-C. Blitzer, P. Dasgupta and J. Stiglitz (1981). “Project Appraisal and Foreign Exchange Constraints”. EJ; V.91-#361, pp. 58-74.

 

-N. Bruce and R. Harris (1982). “Cost-Benefit Criteria and the Compensation Principle in Evaluating Small Projects”. JPE; V. 90-#?, pp. 755-776.

 

-W.E. Diewert (1983). “Cost-Benefit Analysis and Project Evaluation: A Comparison of Alternative Approaches”. JPubE; V.22-#?, pp. 265-302.

 

-C. Bell and S. Devarajan (1983). Shadow Prices for Project Evaluation under Alternative Macroeconomic Specifications”. QJE; V.97-?, pp. 457-477.

 

-A. Maneschi (1986). “The Shadow Pricing of Factors in a Multicommodity Specific-Factors Model”. CJE; V.19-#?, pp. 843-853. [Comment, Tower, et al. (1977), CJE; V.20-#?, pp. 399-402.]

 

-E. Buffie (1987). “Shadow Prices and Substitution in Trade Distorted Economies”. JPubE; V.34-#?, pp. 211-242.

 

-A. Smith (1987). “Factor Shadow Prices in Distorted Economies”. in H. Kierzkowski, ed. Protection and Competition in International Trade. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 54-67.

 

-A. Smith (1987). “Shadow Price Calculations in Distorted Economies”. ScanJE; V.89-#2, pp. 287-302.

 

-E. Tower and G. Pursell (1987). “On Shadow Pricing Foreign Exchange, Non-Traded Goods and Labor in a Simple General Equilibrium Model”. OEP; V.?-#?, pp.

 

-A. Maneschi (1990). “Income Distribution and Shadow Pricing in Open Economies”. EcRec; V.66-#?, pp. 23-31.

 

-G. Fane (1991). “The Social Opportunity Cost of Foreign Exchange: A Partial Defence of Harberger et al.” EcRec; V.67-#?, pp. 307-316.

 

-J.P. Neary (1988). “Tariffs, Quotas, and VERs with and Without Internationally Mobile Capital”. CJE; V.21-#?, pp. 714-735.

 

-H. Beladi, B. Biswas and G. Tribedy (1991). “Shadow Prices with Variable Factor Supply and Distortion”. SEJ; V.57-#3, pp. 649-655.

 

-N. Naqvi and K. Wiener (1991). “External Increasing Returns and the Shadow Price of Foreign Exchange”. JIE; V.30-#?, pp. 177-184.

 

-C.-C. Chao and E.S.H. Yu (1995). “The Shadow Price of Foreign Exchange in a Dual Economy”. JdevE; V.46-#?, pp. 195-202.

 

b. Domestic Resource Cost, Project Selection and Trade Policy

 

-M. Bruno (1967). “The Optimal Selection of Export-Promoting and Import Substituting Projects”. in Planning the Public Sector; New York: United Nations, pp. 88-135.

 

-B. Balassa and D. Schydlowsky (1968). “Effective Tariffs, Domestic Cost of Foreign Exchange, and the Equilibrium Exchange Rate”. JPE; V.76-#3, pp. 348-360.

 

-R. Findlay (1971). “Comparative Advantage, Effective Protection and the Domestic Resource Cost of Foreign Exchange”. JIE; V.1-#2, pp. 189-204.

 

-M. Bruno (1972). “Domestic Resource Costs and Effective Protection: Clarification and Synthesis”. JPE; V.80-#1, pp. 16-33.

 

-A. Krueger (1972). “Evaluating Restrictionist Trade Regimes: Theory and Measurement”. JPE; V.80-#1, pp. 48-62.

 

-B. Balassa and D. Schydlowsky (1972). “Domestic Resource Costs and Effective Protection Once Again”. JPE; V.80-#1, pp. 63-69.

 

-T.N. Srinivasan and J. Bhagwati (1978). “Shadow Prices for Project Selection in the Presence of Distortions: Effective Rates of Protection and Domestic Resource Costs”. JPE; V.86-#1, pp. 97-116.

 

-J. Bhagwati and T.N. Srinivasan (1979). “On Inferring Resource-Allocational Implications from DRC Calculations in Trade-Distorted Small Open Economies”. Indian Economic Review; V.14-#1, pp. 1-16.

 

-J. Bhagwati and T.N. Srinivasan (1980). “Domestic Resource Costs, Effective Rates of Protection and Project Analysis in Tariff-Distorted Economies”. QJE; V.94-#1, pp. 205-209.

 

-P.G. Warr (1983). “Domestic Resource Cost as an Investment Criterion”. OEP; V.35-#?, pp. 302-306.

 

-M. Nishimuzu and J. Page (1986). “Productivity Change and Dynamic Comparative Advantage”. REStat; V.68-#2, pp. 241-247.

 

-E. Tower (1992). “Domestic Resource Cost”. JIEI; V.7-#2, pp. 20-44.

 

9. “True” Protection and Trade Regime Bias

 

-L. Sjaastad (1980). “Commercial Policy, 'True' Tariffs and Relative Prices”. in J. Black and B. Hindley, eds. Current Issues in Commercial Policy and Diplomacy. NY: St. Martins; pp. 26-51.

 

-L. Sjaastad and K. Clements (1981). “The Incidence of Protection: Theory and Measurement”. ms: University of chicago.

 

-D. Greenaway and C. Milner (1987). “True Protection Concepts and their Use in Evaluating Commercial Policy in LDCs”. Journal of Development Studies. V.23-#?, pp. 200-219.

 

-D. Greenaway and C. Milner (1988). “Intra-Industry Trade and the Shifting of Protection Across Sectors”. EER; V.32-#?, pp. 927-945.

 

-D. Greenaway (1989). “Commercial Policy and Policy Conflict: An Evaluation of the Incidence of Protection in a Non-Industrialized Economy”. MS; V.57-#2, pp. 124-141.

 

-F. Sell (1989). “'True Exposure': The Analysis of Trade Liberalization in a General Equilibrium Framework”. WA; V.124-#?, pp. 635-652.

 

-H.D. Smeets (1989). “The ‘True Protection’ Concept--A Comment”. Journal of Development Studies; V.25-#3, pp. 401-407.

 

-C. Clague and D. Greenaway (1994). “Incidence Theory, Specific Factors and the Augmented Heckscher-Ohlin Model”. EcRec; V.70-#208, pp. 36-43.

 

-C. Milner (1994). “Trade Strategy and Revealed Trade Bias: An Evaluation for a Small Industrializing Economy”. World Development; V.22-#4, pp. 587-599.

 

-A. McKay and C. Milner (1997). “Measuring Trade Strategy in the Presence of Non-Tradeables”. Journal of Development Studies; V.33-#5, pp. 658-674.

 

-C. Milner (1997). “On Natural and Policy-induced Sources of Protection and Trade Regime Bias”. WA; V.132-#?, pp. 740-752.

 

-C. Milner (1998). “Trade Regime Bias and the Response to Trade Liberalisation in Sub-Saharan Africa”. KYKLOS; V.51-#2, pp. 219-236.

 

-C. Milner and O. Morrissey (1998). “Measuring Trade Liberalisation in Africa”. in O. Morrissey and M. McGillvray, eds. Evaluating Economic Liberalisation. London: Macmillan.

 

10. DUP Activities and the Cost of Protection

 

a. DUP Activities in General

 

(1) Surveys

 

-R. Tollison (1984). “Rent Seeking: A Survey”. KYKLOS; V.35-#4, pp. 575-602.

 

-M. Brooks and B. Heijdra (1989). “An exploration of Rent-Seeking”. EcRec; V.65-#1, pp. 32-50.

 

-S. Nitzan (1994). “Modelling Rent-Seeking Contests”. EJPE; V.10-#1, pp. 41-60.

 

-J. Buchanan, R. Tollison and G. Tullock, eds. (1980). Toward a Theory of Rent-Seeking Society; College Station: Texas A&M Press.

 

-C. Rowley, R. Tollison and G. Tullock, eds. (1988). The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking. Boston: Kluwer.

 

(2) General Discussion

 

-G. Tullock (1967). “The Welfare Cost of Tariffs, Monopolies and Theft”. Western Economic Journal; V.5-#2, pp. 224-232.

 

-J. Bhagwati and T.N. Srinivasan (1980). “Revenue Seeking: A Generalization of the Theory of Tariffs”. JPE; V.88-#6, pp. 1069-1087.

 

-E. Foster (1981). “The Treatment of Rents in Cost Benefit Analysis”. AER; V.71-#1, pp. 171-178. [Comment by Ng and Response, AER (1983), V.83-#5, pp. 1163-1172]

 

-M. Anam (1982). “Distortion Triggered Lobbying and Welfare”. JIE; V.13-#1/2, pp. 15-32.

 

-J. Bhagwati (1982). “Directly Unproductive, Profit-seeking (DUP) Activities”. JPE; V.90-#5, pp. 988-1002.

 

-J. Bhagwati and T.N. Srinivasan (1982). “The Welfare Consequences of DUP Lobbying Activities: Price versus Quantity Distortions”; JIE; V.13-#?, pp. 33-44.

 

-J. Bhagwati, R. Brecher and T.N. Srinivasan (1984). “DUP Activities and Economic Theory”. EER; V.24-#?, pp. 291-307.

 

-L.-S. Fan and C.-M. Fan (1990). “On the Welfare Effects of Rent-Seeking”. Indian Economic Journal; V.35-#1, pp. 136-139.

 

-M. Anam and E. Katz (1988). “Rent-Seeking and Second-Best Economics”. PC; V.59-#?, pp. 215-224.

 

-H. Varian (1989). “Measuring the Deadweight Costs of DUP and Rent-Seeking Activities”. E&P; V.1-#1, pp. 81-95.

 

-H. Monissen (1991). “Rent-seeking in General Equilibrium: A Didactic Illustration”. PC; V.72-#?, pp. 111-129.

 

-S. Mitchell (1993). “The Welfare Effects of Rent-Saving and Rent-Seeking”. CJE; V.26-#3, pp. 660-669.

 

-W. Baumol (1989). “Entrepreneurship: Productive, Unproductive and Destructive”. JPE; V.98-#5, pp. 893-921.

 

-M. Baye, D. Kovenock and C. DeVries (1993). “Rigging the Lobbying Process: An Application of the All Pay Auction”. AER; V.83-#?, pp. 289-294.

 

-W. Leninger (1993). “More Efficient Rent Seeking: A Munchausen Solution”. Public Choice; V.75-#?, pp. 43-62.

 

-W. Leninger and C.-L. Yang (1994). “Dynamic Rent-Seeking Games”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.7-#3, pp. 406-427.

 

-C.-L. Yang (1994). “A Simple Extension of the Dasgupta-Maskin Existence Theorem for Discontinuous Games with an Application to the Theory of Rent-Seeking”. EcLets; V.45-#2, pp. 181-183.

 

-M. Baye, D. Kovenock and C. DeVries (1996). “The All-Pay Auction with Complete Information”. Economic Theory; V.8-#?, pp. 291-305

 

-S. Skaperdas (1996). “Contest Success Functions”. Economic Theory; V.7-#2, pp. 283-390.

 

-T.-Y. Chung (1996). “Rent Seeking Contests when the Prize Increases with Aggregate Effort”. Public Choice; V.87-#?, pp. 55-66.

 

-F. Szidarovsky and K. Okuguchi (1997). “On the Existence and Uniqueness of Pure Nash Equilibrium in Rent-seeking Games”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.18-#1, pp. 135-140.

 

-M. Baye and H. Hoppe (2003). “The Strategic Equivalence of Rent Seeking, Innovation and Patent Race Games”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.44-#2, pp. 217-226.

 

(3) Degree of Rent-Dissipation

 

-G. Tullock (1980). “Efficient Rent-Seeking”. in J. Buchanan, R. Tollison and G. Tullock, eds. (1980). Toward a Theory of Rent-Seeking Society; College Station: Texas A&M Press. pp. 97-112,

 

-W. Corcoran (1984). “Long-run Equilibrium and Total Expenditures in Rent-Seeking”. PC; V.43-#?, pp. 89-94.

 

-W. Corcoran and G.V. Carels (1985). “Rent Seeking Behavior in the Long Run”. PC; V.46-#?, pp. 227-246.

 

-R. Higgins, W. Shughart and R. Tollison (1985). “Free Entry and Efficient Rent Seeking”. PC; V.46-#?, pp. 247-258.

 

-E. Applebaum and E. Katz (1986). “Rent-Seeking and Entry”. EcLets; V.20-#?, pp. 207-212.

 

-E. Applebaum and E. Katz (1986). “Transfer Seeking and Avoidance: On the Full Social Costs of Rent Seeking”. PC; V.48-#2, pp. 175-181.

 

-J. Wenders (1987). “On Perfect Rent Dissipation”. AER; V.77-#3, pp. 456-459.

 

-W. Dougan (1991). “The Cost of Rent-Seeking: Is GNP Negative?” JPE; V.99-#3, pp. 660-664.

 

-F. Nitzan (1991). “Collective Rent Dissipation”. EJ; V.101-#?, pp. 1522-1534.

 

-J.D. Perez-Castrillo (1992). “A General Analysis of Rent-Seeking Games”. PC; V.73-#?, pp. 335-350.

 

-J. Coggins (1995). “Rent Dissipation and the Social Cost of Price Policy”. E&P; V.7-#2, pp. 147-166.

 

-M. Baye, D. Kovenock and C. DeVries (1994). “The Solution to the Tullock Rent-Seeking Game when R > 2: Mixed-strategy Equilibria and Mean Dissipation Rates”. PC; V.81-#?, pp. 363-380. [Comment by Tullock, 1995, PC; V.85-#?, pp. 189-192.]

 

-M. Baye, D. Kovenock and C. DeVries (1999). “The Incidence of Overdissipation in Rent-seeking Gontests”. PC; V.99-#3/4, pp. 439-454.

 

(4) Extensions: Risk Aversion, Political Structure, etc

 

-A.L. Hillman and E. Katz (1984). “Risk-Averse Rent Seekers and the Social Cost of Monopoly Power”. EJ, V.94-#?, pp. 104-110.

 

-A.L. Hillman and D. Samet (1987). “Dissipation of Rents and Revenues in Small-Numbers Contests”. PC; V.54-#1, pp. 63-82.

 

-N.V. Long and N. Vousden (1987). “Risk Averse Rent Seeking with Shared Rents”. EJ; V.97-#?, pp. 971-985.

 

-A.L. Hillman (1984). “Preemptive Rent-seeking and the Social Cost of Monopoly Power”. IJIO; V.2-#?, pp. 277-281.

 

-E. Applebaum and E. Katz (1987). “Seeking Rents by Setting Rents: The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking”. EJ; V.97-#?, pp. 685-699.

 

-A.L. Hillman and E. Katz (1987). “Hierarchical Structure and the Social Costs of Bribes and Transfers”. JPubE; V.34-#?, pp. 129-142.

 

-R.D. Congleton (1991). “Ideological Conviction and Persuasion in the Rent-Seeking Society”. JPubE; V.44-#1, pp. 65-86.

 

-A.L. Hillman and J. Riley (1989). “Politically Contestable Rents and Transfers”. E&P; V.1-#1, pp. 17-39.

 

-W. Suen (1989). “Rationing and Rent-Dissipation in the Presence of Heterogeneous Individuals”. JPE; V.97-#?, pp. 1384-1394.

 

-T. Ellingsen (1991). “Strategic Buyers and the Social Cost of Monopoly”. AER; V.81-#3, pp. 648-657.

 

-H.W. Ursprung (1990). “Public Goods, Rent Dissipation, and Candidate Competition”. E&P; V.2-#2, pp. 115-132.

 

-T. Schmidt (1992). “Rent-Seeking Firms and Consumers: An Equilibrium Analysis”. E&P; V.4-#2, pp. 137-149.

 

-A. Yates and J. Heckelman (2001). “Rent-Setting in Multiple Winner Rent-seeking Contests”. European Journal of Political Economy; V.17-#4, pp. 835-852.

 

(5) Social Cost of Monopoly and Regulation

 

-R. Posner (1975). “The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation”. JPE; V.83-#?, pp. 807-827.

 

-K. Cowling and D. Mueller (1978). “The Social Costs of Monopoly Power”. EJ; V.88-#?, pp. 348-363.

 

-S.C. Littlechild (1981). “Misleading Calculations of the Social Costs of Monopoly Power”. EJ; V.91-#?, pp. 348-363.

 

-F. Fisher (1985). “The Social Cost of Monopoly and Regulation: Posner Revisited”. JPE; V.93-#2, pp. 410-416.

 

-W. Rogerson (1982). “The Social Cost of Monopoly and Regulation: A Game Theoretic Analysis”. Bell Journal of Economics; V.13-#?, pp. 391-401.

 

-D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole (1987). “Understanding Rent Dissipation: On the Use of Game Theory in Industrial Organization”. AER, V.77-#2, pp. 176-183.

 

-Laband, D. and J. Sophocleus (1988). “The Social Cost of Rent-Seeking: First Estimates”. PC; V.58-#?, pp. 269-275.

 

-T. Ellingsen (1991). “Strategic Buyers and the Social Cost of Monopoly”. AER; V.81-#?, pp. 648-657.

 

-W. Leninger (1991). “Patent Competition, Rent Dissipation and the Persistence of Monopoly”. JET; V.53-#?, pp. 146-172.

 

b. Rent-Seeking and the Cost of Protection

 

-A. Krueger (1974). “The Political-Economy of Rent-Seeking Society”. AER; V.69-#3, pp. 291-303.

 

-M. Morkre (1979). “Rent-Seeking and Hong-Kong's Textile Quota System”. The Developing Economies; V.?-#?, pp. 110-118.

 

-S. Mohammad and J. Whalley (1984). “Rent Seeking in India: Its Cost and Policy Significance”. KYKLOS; V.37-#3, pp. 387-413.

 

-W. Grais, J. de Melo and S. Urata (1986). “A General Equilibrium Estimation of the Effects of Reductions in Tariffs and Quantitative Restrictions in Turkey in 1978". in T.N. Srinivasan and J. Whalley, eds. General Equilibrium Trade Modelling. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 61-88.

 

-A.E. Yeldan and T. Roe (199?). “Political Economy of Rent-Seeking Under Alternative Trade Regimes”. WA; V.?-#?, pp. 563-582.

 

-E. Ampofo-Tuffuor, C. DeLorme jr., and D. Kamerschen (1991). “The Nature, Significance and Cost of Rent-Seeking in Ghana”. KYKLOS; V.44-#4, pp. 537-559.

 

-D. Tarr (1994). “The Welfare Costs of Price Controls for Cars and Color Televisions in Poland: Contrasting Estimates of Rent-Seeking from Recent Experience”. WBER; V.8-#3, pp. 415-443.

 

-J. Jackson (1984). “Perspectives on the Jurisprudence of International Trade”. AER; V.74-#2, pp. 277-281.

 

-W. Mayer (1991). “The Political Economy of Trade Policy Formation”. ms: University of Cincinnati.

 

-R. Feenstra and J. Bhagwati (1982). “Tariff-Seeking and the Efficient Tariff”. in J. Bhagwati, ed. Import Competition and Response. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 245-258.

 

-A.L. Hillman (1988). “Tariff-revenue Transfers to Protectionist Interests: Compensation to Reduced Protection or Supplementary Reward for Successful Lobbying?” PC; V.58-#?, pp. 169-172.

 

-E. Dinopoulos (1984). “Optimal Tariff with Revenue-Seeking: A Contribution to the Theory of DUP Activities”. in D. Colander ed. Neoclassical Political Economy. Cambridge: Ballinger, pp. 129-138.

 

-R. Baldwin (1990). “Optimal Tariff Retaliation Rules”. in R. Jones and A. Krueger, eds. The Political Economy of International Trade. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 108-121.

 

-M. Lundahl (1988). “Self-Defeating and Welfare-Improving DUP Redistribution of Capital Assets”. EcLets; V.26-#?, pp. 179-182.

 

-S. Yabuuchi (1989). “Revenue Seeking and Metzler Paradoxes”. E&P; V.1-#3, pp. 181-185.

 

-D. Rodrik (1986). “Tariffs, Subsidies and Welfare with Endogenous Policy”. JIE; V.21-#?, pp. 285-299.

 

-D. Rodrik (1987). “Policy Targeting with Endogenous Distortions: Theory of the Optimum Subsidy Revisisted”. QJE; V.102-#4, pp. 903-911.

 

-A. Panagariya and D. Rodrik (1993). “Political-Economy Arguments for a Uniform Tariff”. IER; V.34-#3, pp. 685-703.

 

-C. Rowley and R. Tollison (1986). “Rent Seeking and Trade Protection”. Aussenwirtschaft; V.41-#2/3, pp. 303-328.

 

-R. McKenzie (1988). “The Relative Restrictiveness of Tariffs and Quotas: A Reinterpretation from a Rent-Seeking Perspective”. PC; V.58-#?, pp. 85-90.

 

-W. Kaempfer and T. Willett (1989). “Combining Rent-Seeking and Public Choice Theory in the Analysis of Tariffs versus Quotas”. PC; V.63-#?, pp. 79-86.

 

-A.L. Hillman (1990). “Protectionist Policies as the Regulation of International Industry”. PC; V.67-#?, pp. 101-110.

 

-G. Anderson, C. Rowley and R. Tollison (1988). “Rent-Seeking and the Restriction of Human Exchange”. Journal of Legal Studies; V.17-#1, pp. 83-100.

 

c. Protection Avoidance and the Cost of Protection

 

(1) Empirical Analysis

 

-J. Bhagwati (1981). “Alternative Theories of Illegal Trade: Economic Consequences and Statistical Detection”. WA; V.117-#3, pp. 409-426.

 

-J. Bhagwati (1964). “On the Underinvoicing of Imports”. Bulletin of the Oxford University Institute of Economics and Statistics; V.26-#?, pp. 389-397.

 

-J. Bhagwati (1967). “Fisacal Policy, the Faking of Foreign Trade Declarations, and the Balance of Payments”. Bulletin of the Oxford University Institute of Economics and Statistics; V.29-#?, pp. 61-77.

 

-G. Winston (1970). “Overinvoicing, Underutilization and Distorted Industrial Growth”. Pakistan Development Review; V.10-#?, pp. 405-421.

 

-J. Bhagwati, A. Krueger and C. Wibulswasdi (1974). “Capital Flight from LDCs: A Statistical Analysis”. in J. Bhagwati, ed. Illegal Transactions in International Trade. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp.148-154.

 

-L. deWulf (1981). “Statistical Analysis of Under- and Over-invoicing of Imports”. JDevEc; V.8-#?, pp. 303-323.

 

-D. McDonald (1985). “Trade Discrepancies and the Incentive to Smuggle: An Emprical Analysis”. IMFSP; V.32-#4, pp. 668-692.

 

(2) Smuggling of Goods

 

-C. Beccaria (1764). “An Attempt at an Analysis of Smuggling”. reproduced in W. Baumol and S. Goldfeld, eds. Precursors in Mathematical Economics. London: LSE, pp. 118-119.

 

-J. Bhagwati and B. Hansen (1973). “A Theoretical Analysis of Smuggling”. QJE; V.81-#?, pp. 172-187.

 

-J. Bhagwati and T.N. Srinivasan (1974). “An Alternative Proof of the Bhagwati-Hansen Results on Smuggling and Welfare”. in J. Bhagwati, ed. Illegal Transactions in International Trade. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 23-26.

 

-H.G. Johnson (1972). “Notes on the Economic Theory of Smuggling”. Malayan Economic Review; V.17-#1, pp. 1-7.

 

-J. Bhagwati and T.N. Srinivasan (1973). “Smuggling and Trade Policy”. JPubE; V.2-#?, pp. 377-389.

 

-R. Falvey (1978). “A Note on Preferential and Illegal Trade Under Quantitative Restrictions”. QJE; V.92-#1, pp. 175-178.

 

-A. Ray (1978). “Smuggling, Import Objectives, and Optimum Tax Structure”. QJE; V.92-#3, pp. 509-514.

 

-M. Sheikh (1974). “Smuggling, Production and Welfare”. JIE; V.4-#4, pp. 355-364.

 

-M. Kemp (1976). “Smuggling and Optimal Commercial Policy”. JPubE; V.5-#?, pp. 381-384.

 

-M. Pitt (1981). “Smuggling and Price Disparity”. JIE; V.11-#4, pp. 447-458.

 

-L. Martin and A. Panagariya (1984). “Smuggling, Trade and Price Disparity: A Crime-Theoretic Approach”. JIE; V.17-#?, pp. 201-217.

 

-T. Nguyen and J. Whalley (1986). “Equilibrium Under Price Controls with Endogenous Transactions Costs”. JET; V.39-#?, pp. 290-300.

 

-D.A.G. Norton (1988). “On the Economic Theory of Smuggling”. Eca; V.55-#?, pp. 107-118.

 

-A. Deardorff and W. Stolper (1990). “Effects of Smuggling Under African Conditions: A Factual, Institutional and Analytic Discussion”. WA; V.126-#1, pp. 116-141.

 

-M. Thursby, R. Jensen, and J. Thursby (1991). “Smuggling, Camouflaging, and Market Structure”. QJE; V.106-#3, pp. 789-814.

 

-M. Richardson (1992). “Trade Policy and the Legalization of Drugs”. SEJ; V.58-#3, pp. 655-670.

 

(3) Risk Preferences of Smugglers and Equilibrium

 

-K. Scholler (1989). “Risk and Illegal Trade”. Metroeconomica; V.40-#?, pp. 87-97.

 

-S. Devarajan, C. Jones and M. Roemer (1989). “Markets under Price Controls in Partial and General Equilibrium”. World Development; V.17-#12, pp. 1881-1893.

 

-M. Sheikh (1989). “A Theory of Risk, Smuggling and Welfare”. World Development; V.17-#12, pp. 1931-1944.

 

-S. Fausti (1992). “Smuggling and Parallel Markets for Exports”. International Trade Journal; V.6-#4, pp. 443-470

 

(4) Black Markets for Foreign Exchange

 

-M. Sheikh (1976). “Black Market for Foreign Exchange, Capital Flows and Smuggling”. JDevE; V.3-#1, pp. 9-26.

 

-O.E.G. Johnson (1987). “Trade Tax and Exchange Rate Coordination in the Context of Border Trading: A Theoretical Analysis”. IMFSP; V.34-#3, pp. 548-564.

 

-J.B. de Macedo (1987). “Currency Inconvertibility, Trade Taxes and Smuggling”. JDevE; V.27-#?, pp. 109-125.

 

-W. Branson and J.B. deMacedo (1989). “Currency Inconvertibility, Trade Taxes and Smuggling”. in G. Calvo, et al. eds. Debt, Stabilization and Development. Oxford: Blackwell.