I. THE ECONOMICS OF TARIFF AND NON-TARIFF BARRIERS TO TRADE

A. International Trade and Welfare: The Gains from Trade

1. General Analysis of Economic Welfare
   
a. Overviews


   b. Compensation and the Kaldor-Hicks Criterion


c. Evaluation of Real National Income

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d. Bergson-Samuelson Social Welfare Functions


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a. Consumption Sets, Utility Possibility Sets, and Social Welfare Functions


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b. Trade and Welfare with Lump-Sum Compensation


c. Duality, Trade Utility Functions and Gains from Trade


d. Gains from Trade without Lump-Sum Compensation


(1) On International Justice


(2) General Analyses of International Distributive Justice


(3) Ethical Analysis of Nationality/Citizenship


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B. The Tariff and the Terms of Trade

1. The Optimum Tariff

   a. Theory

   -Corden, Chapter 7

   -B&S, Chapter 17


b. Empirical Research


2. The Welfare Optimal and Maximum Revenue Tariffs
a. Theory

-Corden, Chapter 4


b. Taxation, Development and Public Production


3. **Lerner Symmetry and The Lerner and Metzler Tariff Paradoxes**


c. **Empirical Research on Trade Taxes and Government Revenue**


4. Extending the General Structure

-Corden, Chapter 4


C. Economic Distortions and the Theory of Economic Policy

1. The General Theory of Distortions and Welfare

   a. Distortions, Optimal Intervention and National Welfare

   - Corden, chapters 2 and 3
   - B&S, chapters 13-17


  b. Existence of Equilibrium with Distortions


2. **Factor Market Distortions and Trade Policy**

  a. **Overviews**

- Corden, Chapter 6


b. **Factor Immobility and Adjustment Costs** (see Ricardo-Viner Model)

c. **Economy-wide Minimum Wage**

-B&S, Chapter 22


d. **Wage Differentials in an HOS Economy**

-B&S, Chapter 21


e. Wage Differentials, Specific-Factors and Unemployment

(1) The Specific-K Harris-Todaro Model: Comparative Static Analysis
-B&S, Chapter 23


(2) Dynamics and Stability of the Specific-K Harris-Todaro Model


(3) The Mobile Capital H-T Model: Comparative Static Analysis


(4) The Mobile Capital H-T Analysis: Dynamics and Stability


f. Unions, Unemployment and Trade
(1) Overviews


(2) General Equilibrium with Unions: Closed Economy


(3) General Equilibrium with Unions: Open Economy


(4) Strategic Unions and Trade


(5) Empirical Research on Unions and Trade


**g. Implicit Contracts, Efficiency Wages and Job Search**

(1) Overviews


(2) Implicit Contracts


(3) Efficiency Wages


(4) Job Search


(5) X-Efficiency and Trade


(6) Interindustry Wage Differences and Trade Policy: Empirical Research


  h. Variable Factor Supply

3. Temporary Equilibrium Models

a. Basic Structure of Temporary Equilibrium Models


b. Open Economy Temporary Equilibrium Analysis: Small Country


c. Open Economy Temporary Equilibrium Analysis: Large Country


4. Public Goods, Pollution and International Trade

   a. Optimal Policy with Externalities and Public Goods


   b. General Equilibrium Models of Trade and Pollution


(1) Trade and Comparative Advantage with Pollution/Public Goods


(2) Environmental Regulation and Comparative Advantage
(a) Theory


(b) Empirics


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5. **Noneconomic Objectives**

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b. **The Tariff and the Income Distribution**

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c. Foreign Dependence and Trade Policy for a Risky World


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**D. The Economics of Non-Tariff Barriers**

1. **Quantitative Restrictions**

   a. Basic Economic Analysis of Quotas


   b. Economic Analysis of Auction Quotas


   c. Tariffs v. Quotas Under Uncertainty

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c. VERs and Expectations


  d. Empirical Evaluations

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(2) Footwear


(3) Steel


(4) Autos


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e. Political Economy of VERs


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(2) Economic Analysis of ROOs


5. **Customs Valuation**


6. **Internal Taxes and Border Tax Adjustments**


7. **Administered Protection: The Escape Clause**

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b. Analysis of Trade at Less than Fair Value


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d. Economic Consequences of Administered Protection

(1) Basic Economic Analysis of ADD/CVD


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   a. Some Basic Law and Economics of Antitrust


b. Legal/Institutional Analysis of International Trade and Competition Policy


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c. Economic Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

(1) Theoretical Analysis


(2) Empirical Analysis


10. Market Access/Export Expansion

   a. Voluntary Import Expansion/Aggressive Unilateralism


b. Law and Economics of 301


11. Export Subsidies

   a. Institutional and Empirical Analyses


b. Theoretical Analyses


12. Adjustment Assistance

   a. Theoretical Analysis of Adjustment Costs and Adjustment Assistance


b. Uncertainty and Tariffs as Insurance


c. Empirical Research on Trade-Displaced Workers and Adjustment Assistance

(1) Identifying Trade Sensitive Sectors and Trade-Displaced Workers


(2) Labour Market Experience of Trade-Displaced Workers

(a) Economic Effects of Worker Displacement in General


(b) Trade Displacement


(3) Evaluating Trade Adjustment Assistance


d. Empirical Research on the Labor Market Effects of Trade

(1) The Effect of Trade on Wages and Employment

(a) Mostly Employment Effects

i) Overviews


ii) Accounting Decompositions


iii) Factor Content Method


iv) Regression Analyses

a) US


b) Europe


c) UK


d) Other


v) CGE Methods


(b) Mostly Wage Effects

i) Overviews


ii) US


iii) Europe


   iv) Japan


   v) LDCs


(c) Exchange Rates and Wages/Employment


(d) Globalization and Deindustrialization


(2) The Effect of Protection on Wages and Employment


(3) Some Useful Research on Labor Markets

(a) Trends in Wages and Employment


(b) On Skill-Biased Technical Change and Wages

i) Theory–Technology Change in Open Economies, GE


ii) Empirical Research


(c) Microfoundations of Aggregate Employment Dynamics


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a. Openness, Protection and Trade Flows in General

   (1) HOV Based Analyses


- (2) Monopolistic Competition and Gravity Models


b. Is Japan an Outlier?


c. Capital Market Event Study Methods


6. Applied GE (AGE) Analysis of Trade and Protection
a. Basic Techniques and Issues in AGE Trade Modeling


b. Macro Closure Rules in AGE Modeling


c. Market Structure Issues in AGE Analysis

(1) Factor-Market Distortions


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(3) Imperfect Competition in AGE Models


d. AGE Analysis of Protection


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(b) The European Community


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g. Dynamic AGE Models


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(1) Overviews


(2) Methods

(a) Simulation Based Econometrics


(b) Maximum Entropy Methods in Econometrics


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(2) Smuggling of Goods


(3) Risk Preferences of Smugglers and Equilibrium


(4) Black Markets for Foreign Exchange


