Bibliography on Learning in Economic and Game Theory


I. Models of Individual Learning

 

A. Statistical Decision Theory

 

1. General Exposition


Wald, Abraham (1950). Statistical Decision Functions. New York: John Wiley.


Blackwell, David, and M.A. Girshick (1954). Theory of Games and Statistical Decisions. New York: John Wiley and Sons.


Savage, L.J. (1954). The Foundations of Statistics. New York: Wiley.


Raiffa, Howard and Robert Schlaiffer (1961). Applied Statistical Decision Theory. Boston: Division of Research, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University.


DeGroot, Morris H. (1970). Optimal Statistical Decisions. New York: McGraw Hill.


Edwards, A.W.F. (1972/92). Likelihood. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.


Berger, James (1980/85). Statistical Decision Theory and Bayesian Analysis. New York: Springer.


Radner, Roy (1972). “Normative Theory of Individual Decision: An Introduction”. in C.B. McGuire and Roy Radner, eds. Decision and Organization. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 1-18.


Marschak, Jacob and Roy Radner (1972). Economic Theory of Teams. New Haven: Yale University Press. [especially “Part I. Prologue: Single Person Decision Problems”, pp. 9-119.]


Hirschleifer, Jack and John Riley (1992). “Information and Informational Decisions”. Chapter 5 of The Analytics of Uncertainty and Information. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 167-223.

 

2. Information Structures and Value of Information


McGuire, C.B. (1972). “Comparisons of Information Structures”. in C.B. McGuire and Roy Radner, eds. Decision and Organization. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 101-130.


LeCam, L. (1996). “Comparison of Experiments – A Short Survey”.. in T.S. Ferguson, Lloyd Shapley, and J.B. MacQueen, eds. Statistics, Probability and Game Theory: Papers in Honor of David Blackwell. Hayward, Cal.: Institute of Mathematical Statistics, pp. 127-138.


Blackwell, David (1951). “Comparison of Experiments”. in Proceedings, Second Berkeley Symposium on Mathematical Statistics and Probability. Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 93-102.


Blackwell, David (1953). “Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments”. Annals of Mathematical Statistics; V.24-#?, pp. 265-272.


Le Cam, L. (1964). “Sufficiency and Approximate Sufficiency”. Annals of Mathematical Statistics; V.35-#4, pp. 1419-1455.


Ponssard, Jean-Pierre (1975). “A Note on Information Value Theory for Experiments Defined in Extensive Form”. Management Science; V.22-#4, pp. 449-454.


Crémer, Jacques (1983). “A Simple Proof of Blackwell’s ‘Comparison of Experiments’ Theorem”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.27-#?, pp. 439-443.


Kihlstrom, Richard (1984). “A ‘Bayesian’ Exposition of Blackwell’s Theorem on the Comparison of Experiments”. in Boyer, M. and R. Kihlstrom, eds. (1984). Bayesian Models of Economic Theory. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 13-31.


Radner, Roy and Joseph Stiglitz (1984). “A Nonconcavity in the Value of Information”. in Marcel Boyer and Richard Kihlstrom, eds. Bayesian Models in Economic Theory. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 33-52.


Kihlstrom, Richard (1984). “A Simple Example of the Radner-Stiglitz Nonconcavity in the Value of Information”. in Marcel Boyer and Richard Kihlstrom, eds. Bayesian Models in Economic Theory. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 53-61.


Moscarini, Giuseppe and Lones Smith (2002). “The Law of Large Demand for Information”. Econometrica; V.70-#6, pp. 2351-2366.


Chade, Hector and Edward Schlee (2002). “Another Look at the Radner-Stiglitz Nonconcavity in the Value of Information”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.107-#?, pp. 421-452.


Agnieszka Bielinska-Kwapisz (2003). “Sufficiency in Blackwell’s Theorem”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.46-#1, pp. 21-25.


Neyman, Abraham (1991). “The Positive Value of Information”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.3-#3, pp. 350-355.


Sulganik, Eyal (1995). “On the Structure of Blackwell’s Equivalence Classes of Information Systems”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.29-#3, pp. 213-223.


Bassan, Bruno and Marco Scarsini (1995). “On the Value of Information in Multi-Agent Decision Theory”. Journal of Mathematical Economics; V.24-#6, pp. 557-576.


Bassan, Bruno and Marco Scarsini (1996). “The Social Value of Withholding Information”. Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Economiche e Commerciali; V.43-#2, pp. 267-277.


Gossner, Olivier (2000). “Comparison of Information Structures”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.30-#1, pp. 44-63.


Gilboa, Itzhak and Ehud Lehrer (1991). “The Value of Information–An Axiomatic Approach”. Journal of Mathematical Economics; V.20-#?, pp. 443-459.


Nyarko, Yaw (1994). “On the Convexity of the Value Function in Bayesian Optimal Control Problems”. Economic Theory; V.4-#2, pp. 303-09.


Safra, Zvi and Eyal Sulganik (1995). “On the Nonexistence of Blackwell’s Theorem-Type Results with General Preference Relations”. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty; V.10-#?, pp. 187-201.


Sulganik, Eyal and Itzhak Zilcha (1997). “The Value of Information: The Case of Signal-Dependent Opportunity Sets”. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control; V.21-#10, pp. 1615-1625.


Datta, Manjira, Leonard Mirman, and Edward Schlee (2000). “Learning with Noisless Information and Payoff-Relevant Signals”. Economic Theory; V.16-#1, pp. 63-75.


Datta, Manjira, Leonard Mirman, and Edward Schlee (2002). “Optimal Experimentation in Signal Dependent Decision Problems”. International Economic Review; V.43-#2, pp. 577-608.


Dubra, Juan and Federico Echenique (2004). “Information is Not About Measurability”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.47-#2, pp. 177-185.


Morris, Stephen and Hyun Song Shin (1997). “The Rationality and Efficacy of Decisions under Uncertainty and the Value of an Experiment”. Economic Theory; V.9-#2, pp. 309-324.


Arrow, Kenneth (1992). “Informational Equivalence of Signals”. in Partha Dasgupta, et al. eds. Economic Analysis of Markets and Games. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 169-183.


Marschak, Jacob and Koichi Miyasawa (1968). “Economic Comparability of Information Systems”. Econometrica; V.9-#2, pp. 137-174.


LaValle, Irving (1968). “On Cash Equivalents and Information Evaluation under Uncertainty. Part I: Basic Theory”. Journal of the American Statistical Association; V.63-#?, pp. 252-276.


LaValle, Irving (1968). “On Cash Equivalents and Information Evaluation under Uncertainty. Part II: Incremental Information Decisions”. Journal of the American Statistical Association; V.63-#?, pp. 277-284.


LaValle, Irving (1968). “On Cash Equivalents and Information Evaluation under Uncertainty. Part III: Exchanging Partion-J for Partion-K Information”. Journal of the American Statistical Association; V.63-#?, pp. 285-290.


Marschak, Jacob (1971). “The Economics of Information Systems”. in M. Intrilligator, ed. Frontiers of Quantitative Economics. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 43-107.


Arrow, Kenneth (1972). “The Value of and Demand for Information”. in C.B. McGuire and Roy Radner, eds. Decision and Organization. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 131-159.

 

3. Dynamic Programming and Sequential Experiments

 

a. Dynamic Programming


Bather, John (2000). Decision Theory: An Introduction to Dynamic Programming and Sequential Decisions. New York: Wiley.


Kamien, Morton and Nancy Schwartz (1981). Dynamic Optimization: The Calculus of Variations and Optimal Control in Economic and Management. Amsterdam: Elsevier.


Seierstad, Atle and Knut Sydsæter (1987). Optimal Control Theory with Economic Applications. Amsterdam: North-Holland.


Harris, Milton (1987). Dynamic Economic Analysis. New York: Oxford University Press.


Whittle, Peter (1982). Optimization Over Time: Dynamic Programming and Optimal Control-Vol. 1. New York: Wiley.


Ross, Sheldon (1983). Introduction to Stochastic Dynamic Programming. New York: Academic Press.


Stokey, Nancy and Robert Lucas, jr., with Edward Prescott (1989). Recursive Methods in Economic Dynamics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.


Ljungqvist, Lars and Thomas Sargent (2000). Recursive Macroeconomic Theory. Cambridge: MIT Press.


Blackwell, David (1962). “Discrete Dynamic Programming”. Annals of Mathematical Statistics; V.33-#?, pp. 719-726.


Blackwell, David (1965). “Discounted Dynamic Programming”. Annals of Mathematical Statistics; V.36-#?, pp. 226-235.


Denardo, Eric (1967). “Contraction Mappings Underlying the Theory of Dynamic Programming”. SIAM Review; V.9-#2, pp. 165-177.


Maitra, Ashok (1968). “Discounted Dynamic Programming in Compact Metric Spaces”. Sankhya A; V.30-#?, pp. 211-216.


Benveniste, L.M. and J.A. Scheinkman (1979). “On the Differentiablility of the Value Function in Dynamic Models of Economics”. Econometrica; V.47-#3, pp. 727-732.


Lehrer, Ehud and Dov Monderer (1994). “Discounting versus Averaging in Dynamic Programming”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.6-#?, pp. 97-113.


Rust, John (1997). “Using Randomization to Break the Curse of Dimensionality”. Econometrica; V.65-#3, pp. 487-516.

 

b. Sequential Experimentation


DeGroot, Morris (1962). “Uncertainty, Information, and Sequential Experiments”. Annals of Mathematical Statistics; V.33-#?, pp. 404-419.


Wald, Abraham (1947). Sequential Analysis. New York: Wiley.


Arrow, Kenneth, David Blackwell and Meyer Girshick (1949). “Bayes and Minimax Solutions of Sequential Decision Problems”. Econometrica; V.17-#?, pp. 213-244.


Moscarini, Giuseppe and Lones Smith (2001). “The Optimal Level of Experimentation”. Econometrica; V.69-#6, pp. 1629-1644.

 

c. Bandit Problems

 

(1) Overviews


Berry, Donald and Bert Fristedt (1985). Bandit Problems: Sequential Allocation of Experiments. London: Chapman and Hall.


Gittins, John (1989). Multi-armed Bandit Allocation Indices. New York: Wiley.


Presman, E.L.and I.N. Sonin (1990). Sequential Control With Incomplete Information: The Bayesian Approach to Multi-Armed Bandit Problems (translated by , E.A. Medova-Dempster, M.A Dempster). San Diego: Academic Press.


Basu, Arup, Arup Bose, and Jayanta Ghosh (1991). “Sequential Design and Allocation Rules”. in P.K. Sen and B.K Ghosh, eds. Handbook of Sequential Analysis. New York: Dekker, pp. 475-501.

 

(2) Characterization and Optimal Adaptive Strategies


Robbins, H. (1952). “Some Aspects of the Sequential Design of Experiments”. Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society; V.58-#5, pp. 527-535.


Bellman, Richard (1956). “A Problem in the Sequential Design of Experiments”. Sankhyā A; V.16-#?, pp. 221-229.


Bradt, R., S. Johnson, and S. Karlin (1956). “On Sequential Designs for Maximizing the Sum of n Observations”. Annals of Mathematical Statistics; V.27-#?, pp. 1060-1074.


Feldman, Dorian (1962). “Contributions to the ‘Two-Armed Bandit’ Problem”. Annals of Mathematical Statistics; V.33-#?, pp. 847-856.


Fabius, J. and W.R. van Zwet (1970). “Some Remarks on the Two-Armed Bandit”. Annals of Mathematical Statistics; V.41-#6, pp. 1906-1916.


Berry, Donald (1972). “A Bernoulli Two-Armed Bandit”. Annals of Mathematical Statistics; V.43-#3, pp. 871-897.


Keener, Robert (1985). “Further Contributions to the ‘Two-Armed Bandit’ Problem”. Annals of Statistics; V.13-#1, pp. 418-422.


Wahrenberger, David, Charles Antle, and Lawrence Klimko (1977). “Bayesian Rules for Two-Armed Bandits”. Biometrika; V.64-#1, pp. 172-174.


Clayton, Murray and Donald Berry (1985). “Bayesian Nonparametric Bandits”. Annals of Statistics; V.13-#4, pp. 1523-1534.


Lai, Tze-Leung and H. Robbins (1985). “Asympotically Efficient Adaptive Allocation Rules”. Advances in Applied Mathematics; V.6-#1, pp. 4-22.


Lai, Tze-Leung and H. Robbins (1985). “Asympotically Optimal Allocation of Treatments in Sequential Experiments”. In T.J. Santner and A.C. Tamhane, eds. Design of Experiments: Ranking and Selection. New York: Marcel Dekker, pp. 127-142.


Lai, Tze-Leung (1987). “Adaptive Treatment Allocation and the Multi-Armed Bandit Problem”. Annals of Statistics; V.15-#3, pp. 1091-1114.


Anantharam, Venkatachalam, Pravin Varaiya and Jean Walrand (1987). “Asymptotically Efficient Allocation Rules for Multi-Armed Bandit Problems with Multiple Plays. Part I: IID Rewards”. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control; V.32-#11, pp. 968-976.


Anantharam, Venkatachalam, Pravin Varaiya and Jean Walrand (1987). “Asymptotically Efficient Allocation Rules for Multi-Armed Bandit Problems with Multiple Plays. Part II: Markovian Rewards”. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control; V.32-#11, pp. 977-982.


Yakowitz, Sid and Wing Lowe (1991). “Nonparametric Bandit Methods”. Annals of Operations Research; V.28, pp. 297-312.


Li, Zhaohai and Cun-Hui Zhang (1992). “Asymptotically Efficient Allocation Rules for Two Bernoulli Populations”. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, B; V.54-#2, pp. 609-616.


Burnetas, Apostolos and Michael Katehakis (1996). “Optimal Adaptive Policies for Sequential Allocation Problems”. Advances in Applied Mathematics; V.17-#2, pp. 122-142.


Burnetas, Apostolos and Michael Katehakis (1997). “Optimal Adaptive Policies for Markov Decision Processes”. Mathematics of Operations Research; V.22-#1, pp. 222-255.

 

(3) Gittins Index Strategies


Gittins, John and D. Jones (1974). “A Dynamic Allocation Index for the Sequential Allocation of Experiments”. in J. Gani, et al. eds. Progress in Statistics. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 241-266.


Gittins, John (1975). “The Two-Armed Bandit Problem: Variations on a Conjecture By Chernoff”. Sankhyā A; V.37-#?, pp. 287-291.


Gittins, John (1979). “Bandit Processes and Dynamical Allocation Indices”. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series B; V.41-#2, pp. 148-177.


Whittle, Peter (1980). “Multi-Armed Bandits and the Gittins Index”. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series B; V.42-#?, pp. 143-149.


Variya, Pravin, Jean Walrand and Cagatay Buyukkoc (1985). “Extensions of the Multiarmed Bandit Problem: The Discounted Case”. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control; V.30-#?, pp. 426-439.


Mandelbaum, Avi (1987). “Discrete Multi-Armed Bandits and Multi-Parameter Processes”. Probability Theory and Related Fields; V.71-#1, pp. 129-147.


Katheakis, Michael and Arthur Veinott, jr. (1987). “The Multi-Armed Bandit Problem: Decomposition and Computation”. Mathematics of Operations Research; V.12-#2, pp. 262-268.


Chang, Fu and Tze-Leung Lai (1987). “Optimal Stopping and Dynamic Allocation”. Advances in Applied Probability; V.19-#4, pp. 829-853.


Whittle, Peter (1988). “Restless Bandits: Activity Allocation in a Changing World”. Journal of Applied Probability; V.25A (special volume), pp. 287-298.


Glazebrook, K.D. (1991). “Competing Markov Decision Processes”. Annals of Operations Research; V.29, pp. 537-564.


Gittins, John and You-Gan Wang (1992). “The Learning Component of Dynamic Allocation Indices”. Annals of Statistics; V.20-#3, pp.1625-1636.


Banks, Jeffrey and Rangarajan Sundaram (1992). “A Class of Bandit Problems Yielding Myopic Optimal Strategies”. Journal of Applied Probability; V.29-#3, pp. 625-632.


Banks, Jeffrey and Rangarajan Sundaram (1992). “Denumerable Armed Bandits”. Econometrica; V.60-#5, pp. 1071-1096.


Weber, Richard (1992). “On the Gittins Index for Multiarmed Bandits”. Annals of Applied Probability; V.2-#4, pp. 1024-1033.


Ishikida, T. and P. Varaiya (1994). “Multi-Armed Bandit Problem Revisited”. Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications; V.83-#1, pp. 113-154.


Kaspi, Haya and Avishai Mandelbaum (1998). “Multi-armed bandits in discrete and continuous time”. Annals of Applied Probability; V.8-#4, pp. 1270-1290.


Katehakis, Michael and Uriel Rothblum (1996). “Finite State Multi-Armed Bandit Problems: Sensitive Discount, Average Reward and Average-Overtaking Optimality”. Annals of Applied Probability; V.6-#3, pp. 1024-1034.


Bertsimas, Dimitris and José Niño-Mora (1996). “Conservation Laws, Extended Polymatroids and Multiarmed Bandit Problems; A Polyhedral Approach to Indexable Systems”. Mathematics of Operations Research; V.21-#2, pp. 257-306.


Pandelis, Dimitrios and Demosthenis Teneketzis (1999). “On the Optimality of the Gittins Index Rule for Multi-Armed Bandits with Multiple Plays”. Mathematics of Operations Research; V.50-#3, pp. 449-461.


Magnac, Thierry and Jean-Marc Robin (1999). “Dynamic Stochastic Dominance in Bandit Problems”. Theory and Decision; V.47-#3, pp. 267-295.


Brezzi, Monica and Tze Leung Lai (2000). “Incomplete Learning from Endogenous Data in Dynamic Allocation”. Econometrica; V.68-#6, pp. 1511-1516.


Keller, Godfrey and Alison Oldale (2003). “Branching Bandits: A Sequential Search Process with Correlated Payoffs”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.113-#2, pp. 302-315.

 

(4) Switching Costs


Kolonko, Michael and Harald Benzing (1985). “The Sequential Design of Bernoulli Experiments Including Switching Costs”. Operations Research; V.33-#2, pp. 412-426.


Benzing, Harald, Dieter Kalin, and Radu Theodorescu (1987). “Optimal Policies for Sequential Bernoulli Experiments with Switching Costs”. Journal of Information Processing and Cybernetics; V.23-#12, pp. 599-607.


Hamada, Toshio (1987). “A Two-armed Bandit Problem with One Arm Known Including Switching Costs and Terminal Rewards”. Journal of the Japan Statistical Society; V.17-#1, pp. 21-30.


Agrawal, Rajeev, Manjunath Hegde, and Demosthenis Teneketzis (1988). “Asymptotically Efficient Adaptive Allocation Rules for the Multiarmed Bandit Problem with Switching Cost”. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control; V.33-#10, pp. 899-906.


Agrawal, Rajeev, Manjunath Hegde, and Demosthenis Teneketzis (1990). “Multi-armed Bandit Problems with Multiple Plays and Switching Cost”. Stochastics and Stochastics Reports; V.29-#4, pp. 437-459.


Banks, Jeffrey and Rangarajan Sundaram (1994). “Switching Costs and the Gittins Index”. Econometrica; V.62-#3, pp. 687-694.


Bergemann, Dirk and Juuso Välimäki (2001). “Stationary Multi Choice Bandit Problems”. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control; V.25-#10, pp.1585-1594.


Brezzi, Monica and Tze Leung Lai (2002). “Optimal Learning and Experimentation in Bandit Problems”. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control; V.27-#1, pp. 87-108.

 

B. Bayesian Learning

 

1. Bayesian Rationality

 

a. Under Preferences with the Expected Utility (EU) Property

 

(1) Surveys/Overviews


Kreps, David (1988). Notes on the Theory of Choice. Boulder: Westveiw Press.


Arrow, Kenneth (1951). “Alternative Approaches to the Theory of Choice in Risk-Taking Situations”. Econometrica; V.19-#?, pp. 404-437.


Ellsberg, Daniel (1954). “Classic and Current Notions of ‘Measurable Utility’”. Economic Journal; V.64-#?, pp. 528-556.


Arrow, Kenneth (1971). “Exposition of the Theory of Choice under Uncertainty”. in C. McGuire and R. Radner, eds. Decision and Organization. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 19-55.


Krantz, D., R. Duncan Luce, Patrick Suppes, and Amos Tversky (1971). Foundations of Measurement-Vol. 1. New York: Academic Press.


Fishburn, Peter (1970). Utility Theory for Decision Making. New York: Wiley.


Blackorby, Charles, Russell Davidson and David Donaldson (1977). “A Homiletic Exposition of the Expected Utility Hypothesis”. Economica; V.44-#?, pp. 351-358.


Schoemaker, P. (1982). “The Expected Utility Model: Its Variants, Purposes, Evidence, and Limitations”. Journal of Economic Literature; V.20-#2, pp. 529-563.


Gärdenfors, Peter and Nils-Eric Sahlin (1984). “Introduction: Bayesian Decision Theory-Foundations and Problems”. in P. Gärdenfors and N.-E. Sahlin, eds. Decision, Probability, and Utility: Selected Readings. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 1-15.


Karni, Edi and David Schmeidler (1991). “Utility Theory with Uncertainty”. in W. Hildenbrand and H. Sonnenschein, eds. Handbook of Mathematical Economics, V.IV. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 1763-1831.


Barberà, Salvador, Peter Hammond, and Christian Seidel, eds. (1999). Handbook of Utility Theory, Vol. I. Dordrecht: Kluwer.


Ghirardato, Paolo and Massimo Marinacci (2000). “The Impossibility of Compromise: Some Uniqueness Properties of Expected Utility Preferences”. Economic Theory; V.16-#?, pp. 245-258.

 

(2) Objective Risk and von Neumann-Morgenstern/EU Preferences


Jensen, Niels Erik (1967). “An Introduction to Bernoullian Utility Theory, I: Utility Functions”. Swedish Journal of Economics; V.69-#3, pp. 163-183.


Jensen, Niels Erik (1967). “An Introduction to Bernoullian Utility Theory, II: Interpretation, Evaluation and Application; A Critical Survey”. Swedish Journal of Economics; V.69-#4, pp. 229-247.


Fishburn, Peter (1989). “Retrospective on the Utility Theory of von Neumann and Morgenstern”. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty; V.127-#2, pp. 127-158.


Hammond, Peter (1999). “Objective Expected Utility: A Consequentialist Perspective”. in S. Barberà, P. Hammond, and C. Seidel, eds. Handbook of Utility Theory, Vol. I. Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 143-211.


von Neumann, John and Oskar Morgenstern (1953). “The Notion of Utility” and “Appendix. The Axiomatic Treatment of Utility”. in Games and Economic Behavior (3rd ed.). Princeton: PUP, pp. 15-31 and 617-632.


Vickery, William (1945). “Measuring Marginal Utility by Reactions to Risk”. Econometrica; V.13-#4, pp. 319-333.


Friedman, Milton and L.J. Savage (1948). “The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk”. Journal of Political Economy; V.56-#4, pp. 279-304.


Marschak, Jacob (1950). “Rational Behavior, Uncertain Prospects and Measurable Utility”. Econometrica; V.18-#2, pp. 111-141.


Baumol, William (1951). “The Neumann-Morgenstern Utility Index–An Oridnalist View”. Journal of Political Economy; V.59-#1, pp. 61-66.


Samuelson, Paul (1952). “Probability, Utility, and the Independence Axiom”. Econometrica; V.20-#4, pp. 670-678.


Malinvaud, Edmond (1952). “Note on von Neumann-Morgenstern’s Strong Independence Axiom”. Econometrica; V.20-#4, pp. 679.


Fishburn, Peter and P. Wakker (1995). “The Invention of the Independence Condition for Preferences”. Management Science; V.41-#7, pp. 1130-1144.


Herstein, I.N. and John Milnor (1953). “An Axiomatic Approach to Measurable Utility”. Econometrica; V.21-#?, pp. 291-297.


Alchian, Armen (1953). “The Meaning of Utility Measurement”. American Economic Review; V.43-#1, pp. 26-50.


Baumol, William (1958). “The Cardinal Utility which is Ordinal”. Economic Journal; V.68-#272, pp. 665-672.


Pfanzagl, Johann (1959). “A General Theory of Measurement–Applications to Utility”. Naval Research Logistics Quarterly; V.6-#?, pp. 283-294.


Fishburn, Peter (1975). “Separation Theorems and Expected Utilities”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.11-#1, pp. 16-34.


Vind, Karl (2000). “von Neumann Morgenstern Preferences”. Journal Of Mathematical Economics; V.33-#1, pp.109-122.


Hagen, Ole (1988). “Expected Utility Theory and Ordinalism, a Political Marriage”. in B. Munier, ed. Risk, Decision and Rationality. Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 209-220.

 

(3) Subjective Probability and Subjective EU (SEU) Preferences

 

(a) Overviews


Luce, R. Duncan and Patrick Suppes (1965). “Preference, Utility, and Subjective Probability”. in R.D. Luce, R.R. Bush, and E. Galanter, eds. Handbook of Mathematical Psychology, Vol. III. New York: Wiley, pp. 249-410.


Drèze, Jacques (1974). “Axiomatic Theories of Choice, Cardinal Utility and Subjective Probability: A Review”. in J. Drèze, ed. Allocation Under Uncertainty: Equilibrium and Optimality. London: Macmillan, pp. 3-23.


Fishburn, Peter (1981). “Subjective Expected Utility: A Review of Normative Theories”. Theory and Decision; V.13-#?, pp. 139-199.


Fishburn, Peter (1986). “The Axioms of Subjective Probability”. Statistical Science; V.1-#3, pp. 335-345. [Comment by I.J. Good, Patrick Suppes, James Berger, Terrence Fine, Teddy Seidenfeld, and Mervyn Stone, follow pp. 346-358.]


Wakker, Peter and Horst Zank (1999). “A Unified Derivation of Classical Subjective Expected Utility Models Through Cardinal Utility”. Journal of Mathematical Economics; V.32-#1, pp. 1-19.


Hammond, Peter (1999). “Subjective Expected Utility”. in S. Barberà, P. Hammond, and C. Seidel, eds. Handbook of Utility Theory, Vol. I. Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 213-271.

 

(b) The Ramsey-Savage Approach


Ramsey, Frank (1931). “Truth and Probability”. in Foundations of Mathematics. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp. 156-198. Also in Gärdenfors and Sahlin, pp. 19-47.


Savage, Leonard J. (1972). The Foundations of Statistics. New York: Dover. [Chapters 2-5 contain the material relevant to this section]


Shimony, Abner (1955). “Coherence and the Axioms of Confirmation”. Journal of Symbolic Logic; V.20-#1, pp. 1-28.


Davidson, Donald and Patrick Suppes (1956). “A Finitistic Axiomatization of Subjective Probability and Utility”. Econometica; V.24-#3, pp. 264-275.


Suppes, Patrick (1956). “The Role of Subjective Probability and Utility in Decision-Making”. in Proceedings of the Third Berkeley Symposium on Mathematical Statistics and Probability. pp. 61-73.


Debreu, Gerard (1959). “Cardinal Utility for Even Chance Mixtures of Pairs of Sure Prospects”. Review of Economic Studies; V.26-#?, pp. 174-177.


Luce, R. Duncan and Howard Raiffa (1957). “Individual Decision Making under Uncertainty”. Chapter 13 in Games and Decisions. New York: Wiley, pp. 275-306. Also in Gärdenfors and Sahlin, pp. 48-79.


Drèze, Jacques (1961/1987). “Logical Foundations of Cardinal Utility and Subjective Probability”. in J. Drèze, Essays on Economic Decisions under Uncertainty. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 90-104.


Marschak, Jacob and Roy Radner (1972). “Decision Under Uncertainty”. Chapter 1 of Theory of Teams. New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 9-44.


Vind, Karl (1991). “Independent Preferences”. Journal of Mathematical Economics; V.20-#?, pp. 119-135.


Gul, Faruk (1992). “Savage’s Theorem with a Finite Number of States”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.57-#1, pp. 99-110. [erratum in V.61-#1, pg. 184].


Hens, Thorsten (1992). “A Note on Savage’s Theorem with a Finite Number of States”. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty; V.5-#1, pp. 65-71.


Wakker, Peter (1993). “Unbounded Utility for Savage’s ‘Foundations of Statistics,’ and Other Models”. Mathematics of Operations Research; V.18-#2, pp. 446-484.


Wakker, Peter (1993). “Savage's Axioms Usually Imply Violation of Strict Stochastic Dominance”. Review of Economic Studies; V.60-#2, pp. 487-493.


Wakker, Peter (1993). “Clarification of Some Mathematical Misunderstandings about Savage's Foundations of Statistics, 1954”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.25-#2, pp. 199-202.


Stinchcombe, Maxwell (1997). “Countably Additive Subjective Probabilities”. Review of Economic Studies; V.64-#1, pp. 125-146.


Battigalli, Pierpaolo and Giacomo Bonanno (1997). “The Logic of Belief Persistence”. Economics and Philosophy; V.13-#1, pp. 39-59.


Bonanno, Giacomo (1997). “A Note on the Subtleties of Bayesian Inference”. Economic Notes; V.26-#3, pp. 477-486.

 

(c) Anscombe-Aumann Approach


Anscombe, Francis J. and Robert Aumann (1963). “A Defintion of Subjective Probability”. Annals of Mathematical Statistics; V.34-#1, pp. 199-205.


Fereira, P.E. (1972). “On Subjective Probability and Expected Utilities”. Annals of Mathematical Statistics; V.43-#?, pp. 928-933.


Pratt, John, Howard Raiffa, and Robert Schlaifer (1964). “The Foundations of Decision under Uncertainty: An Elementary Exposition”. Journal of the American Statistical Association; V.59-#?, pp. 353-375.


Fishburn, Peter (1967). “Prefernce-based Definitions of Subjective Probability”. Annals of Mathematical Statistics; V.38-#?, pp. 1605-1617.


Fishburn, Peter (1969). “A General Theory of Subjective Probabilities and Expected Utility”. Annals of Mathematical Statistics; V.40-#?, pp. 1419-1429.


Myerson, Roger (1979). “An Axiomatic Deivation of Subjective Probability, Utility, and Evaluation Functions”. Theory and Decision; V.11-#?, pp. 339-352.


Marschak, Thomas (1986). “Independence versus Dominance in Personal Probability Axioms”. in W. Heller, R. Starr, and D. Starrett, eds. Uncertainty, Information, and Communication. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 129-171.


Harsanyi, John (1993). “Normative Validity and Meaning of von Neumann-Morgenstern Utilities”. in K. Binmore, A. Kirman, and P. Tani, eds. Frontiers of Game Theory. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 307-320.


Battigalli, Pierpaolo and Pietro Veronesi (1996). “A Note on Stochastic Independence without Savage-Null Events”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.70-#?, pp. 235-248.


Sarin, Rakesh and Peter Wakker (1997). “A Single-Stage Approach to Anscombe and Aumann's Expected Utility”. Review of Economic Studies; V.64-#3, pp. 399-409.


Ghirardato, Paolo, Fabio Maccheroni, Massimo Marinacci, and Marciano Siniscalchi (2003). “A Subjective Spin on Roulette Wheels”. Econometrica; V.71-#6, pp. 1897-1908.

 

(d) Jeffrey-Bolker Approach


Jeffrey, Richard (1965/83). The Logic of Decision. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.


Jeffrey, Richard (1992). Probability and the Art of Judgement. Cambridge: CUP. [esp. cptrs. 13-16]


Jeffrey, Richard (1965). “New Foundations for Bayesian Decision Theory”. in Y. Bar-Hillel, ed. Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 289-300. [also chapter 13 in Jeffrey (1992)]


Bolker, Ethan (1966). “Functions Resembling Quotients of Measures”. Transactions of the American Mathematical Society; V.124-#?, pp. 292-312.


Bolker, Ethan (1967). “A Simultaneous Axiomatization of Utility and Subjective Probability”. Philosophy of Science; V.34-#?, pp. 333-340.


Jeffrey, Richard (1978). “Axiomatizing the Logic of Decision”. in A. Hooker, J. Leach, and E. McClennen, eds. Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory, Vol. 1. Dordrecht: Kluwer. [also Chapter 15 in Jeffrey (1992)]


Domotor, Zoltan (1978). “Axiomatization of Jeffrey Utilities”. Synthese; V.39-#2, pp. 165-210.


Bradley, Richard (1998). “A Representation Theorem for a Decision Theory with Conditionals”. Synthese; V.116-#?, pp. 187-229.

 

(e)Conditional SEU


Pfanzagl, Johann (1967). “Subjective Probability Derived from the Morgenstern-von Neumann Utility Concept”. in Martin Shubik, ed. Essays in Mathematical Economics in Honor of Oskar Morgenstern. Princeton: PUP, pp. 237-251.


Pfanzagl, Johann (1968). Theory of Measurement. New York: Wiley.


Luce, R. Duncan and D. Krantz (1971). “Conditional Expected Utility”. Econometrica; V.39-#2, pp. 253-272.


Fishburn, Peter (1972). “Subjective Expected Utility with Mixture Sets and Boolean Algebras”. Annals of Mathematical Statistics; V.43-#?, pp. 917-927.


Fishburn, Peter (1973). “A Mixture Set Axiomatization of Conditional Subjective Expected Utility”. Econometrica; V.41-#1, pp. 1-25.


Fishburn, Peter (1974). “On the Foundations of Decision Making under Uncertainty”. in M. Balch, D. McFadden, and S. Wu, eds. Essays on Economic Behavior under Uncertainty. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 25-44.


Balch, Michael and Peter Fishburn (1974). “Subjective Expected Utility for Conditional Primitives”. in M. Balch, D. McFadden, and S. Wu, eds. Essays on Economic Behavior under Uncertainty. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 57-69. [Comments by D. Krantz & R.D. Luce, R. Jeffrey, E. Bolker, and J. Pratt, follow, with response, pp. 70-96.]

 

(4) Multidimensional Uncertainty with Lexicographic Preferences


Fishburn, Peter (1974). “Lexicographic Orders, Utilities and Decision Rules: A Survey”. Management Science; V.20-#11, pp. 1442-1471.


Yilmaz, Mustafa (1978). “Multiattribute Utility Theory: A Survey”. Theory and Decision; V.9-#?, pp. 317-347.


Blume, Lawrence, Adam Brandenburger, and Eddie Dekel (1989). “An Overview of Lexicographic Choice under Uncertainty”. Annals of Operations Research; V.19, pp. 231-246.


Hausner, Melvin (1954). “Multidimensional Utilities”. in R. Thrall, C. Coombs, and R. Davis, eds. Decision Processes. New York: Wiley, pp. 167-180.


Thrall, Robert (1954). “Applications of Multidimensional Utility Theory”. in R. Thrall, C. Coombs, and R. Davis, eds. Decision Processes. New York: Wiley, pp. 181-186.


Chipman, John (1960). “The Foundations of Utility”. Econometrica; V.28-#?, pp. 193-224.


Chipman, John (1971). “On the Lexicographic Representation of Preference Orderings”. in J. Chipman, L. Hurwicz, M. Richter, and H. Sonnenschein, eds. Preferences, Utility and Demand. New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, pp. 276-288.


Chipman, John (1971). “Non-Archimedean Behavior under Risk: An Elementary Analysis–With Application to the Theory of Assets”. in J. Chipman, L. Hurwicz, M. Richter, and H. Sonnenschein, eds. Preferences, Utility and Demand. New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, pp. 289-318.


Fishburn, Peter (1971). “A Study of Lexicographic Expected Utility”. Management Science; V.17-#11, pp. 672-678.


Fishburn, Peter (1972). “On the Foundations of Game Theory: The Case of Non-Archimedean Utilities”. International Journal of Game Theory; V.1-#2, pp.65-71.


Plott, Charles, James Little, and Robert Parks (1975). “Individual Choice when Objects have ‘Ordinal’ Properties”. Review of Economic Studies; V.42-#?, pp. 403-413.


Fishburn, Peter (1975). “Axioms for Lexicographic Preferences”. Review of Economic Studies; V.42-#?, pp. 415-419.


Luce, R. Duncan (1978). “Lexicographic Tradeoff Structures”. Theory and Decision; V.187-193.


Fishburn, Peter (1980). “Lexicographic Additive Differences”. Journal of Mathematical Psychology; V.21-#?, pp. 191-218.


Nakamura, Yutaka (1997). “Lexicographic Additivity for Multi-Attribute Preferences on Finite Sets”. Theory and Decision; V.42-#1, pp. 1-19.


Gottinger, Hans (1982). “Foundations for Lexicographic Utility”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.3-#?, pp. 363-371.


Blume, Lawrence, Adam Brandenburger, and Eddie Dekel (1991). “Lexicographic Probabilities and Choice under Uncertainty”. Econometrica; V.59-#1, pp. 61-79.


LaValle, Irving and Peter Fishburn (1991). “Lexicographic State-Dependent Subjective Expected Utility”. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty; V.4-#?, pp. 251-269.


LaValle, Irving and Peter Fishburn (1992). “State-Independent Subjective Expected Lexicographic Utility”. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty; V.5-#?, pp. 217-240.


Fishburn, Peter and Irving LaValle (1992). “Multiattribute Expected Utility without the Archimedean Axiom”. Journal of Mathematical Psychology; V.36-#?, pp. 573-591.


Fishburn, Peter and Irving LaValle (1994). “On Matrix Probabilities in Nonarchimedean Decision Theory”. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty; V.8-#?, pp. 283-299.


LaValle, Irving and Peter Fishburn (1996). “On the Varieties of Matrix Probabilities in Nonarchimedean Decision Theory”. Journal of Mathematical Economics; V.25-#1, pp. 33-54.


Fishburn, Peter and Irving LaValle (1998). “Subjective Expected Lexicographic Utility: Axioms and Assessment”. Annals of Operations Research; #80, pp. 183-206.


Nakamura, Yutaka (2000). “Finite-Dimensional Utilites”. Economic Theory; V.16-#1, pp. 209-218.


Knoblauch, Vicki (2000). “Lexicographic Orders and Preference Representation”. Journal of Mathematical Economics; V.34-#?, pp. 255-267.

 

b. Knightian Risk and Non-Expected Utility (NEU) Preferences

 

(1) Surveys, Problems with EU and SEU, General Discussions


Machina, Mark (1987). “Choice Under Uncertainty: Problems Solved and Unsolved”. Journal of Economic Perspectives; V.1-#1, pp. 121-154.


Fishburn, Peter (1987). “Reconsiderations in the Foundations of Decision under Uncertainty”. Economic Journal; V.97-#388, pp. 825-941.


Luce, R. Duncan (1992). “Where Does Subjective Expected Utility Fail Descriptively?”. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty; V.5-#1, pp. 5-27.


Weber, Martin and Colin Camerer (1987). “Recent Developments in Modelling Preferences under Risk”. Spektrum; V.9-#?, pp. 129-151.


Seidenfeld, Teddy (1988). “Decision Theory without ‘Independence’ or without ‘Ordering’: What is the Difference?”. Economics and Philosophy; V.4-#?, pp. 267-290. [Comments by Peter Hammond and Edward McClennan, with response, follow, pp. 292-315.]


Fishburn, Peter (1988). “Expected Utility: An Anniversary and a New Era”. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty; V.1-#?, pp. 267-283.


Fishburn, Peter (1989). “Generalizations of Expected Utility Theories: A Survey of Recent Results”. Annals of Operations Research; V.19-#?, pp. 3-28.


Quiggin, John (1989). “Sure Things–Dominance and Independence Rules for Choice under Uncertainty”. Annals of Operations Research; V.19-#?, pp. 335-357.


Epstein, Larry (1992). “Behavior under Risk: Recent Developments in Theory and Applications”. in Jean-Jaccques Laffont, ed. Advances in Economic Theory (Sixth World Conference), V.II. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 1-63.


Camerer, Colin (1995). “Individual Decision Making”. in John Kagel and Alvin Roth, eds. The Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton: PUP, pp. 587-703.


Starmer, Chris (2000). “Developments in Non-Expected Utility Theory: The Hunt for a Descriptive Theory of Choice under Risk”. Journal of Economic Literature; V.38-#2, pp. 332-382.


Grant, Simon, Atsushi Kajii, and Ben Polak (2000). “Different Notions of Disappointment Aversion”. EcLets; V.70-#?, pp. 203-208.

 

(2) Dropping Independence: Smooth Preferences and Local EU


Machina, Mark (1982). “‘Expected Utility’ Analysis without the Independence Axiom”. Econometrica; V.50-#2, pp. 277-323.


Machina, Mark (1983). “Generalized Expected Utility Analysis and the Nature of Observed Violations of the Independence Axiom”. in B. Stigum and F. Wenstøp, eds. Foundatons of Utility and Risk Theory with Applications. Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 263-293.


Machina, Mark (1988). “Cardinal Properties of Local Utility Functions”. in B. Munier, ed. Risk, Decision and Rationality. Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 339-344.


Allais, Maurice (1988). “A New Neo-Bernoullian Theory: The Machina Theory, A Critical Analysis”. in B. Munier, ed. Risk, Decision and Rationality. Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 345-403.


Machina, Mark (1995). “Two Errors in the ‘Allais Impossibility Theorem’”. Theory and Decision; V.38 -#3, pp. 231-250.


Allais, Maurice (1995). “The Real Foundations of the Alleged Errors in Allais‘ Impossibility Theorem: Unceasingly Repeated Errors or Contradictions of Mark Machina”. Theory and Decision; V.38 -#3, pp. 251-299.


Machina, Mark (1995). “The Two Errors: A Summary”. Theory and Decision; V.38 -#3, pp. 301-307. [Rejoinder by Allais, pp. 309-311].


Machina, Mark and David Schmeidler (1992). “A More Robust Definition of Subjective Probability”. Econometrica; V.60-#?, pp. 745-780.


Grant, Simon (1995). “Subjective Probability without Monotonicity: Or How Machina's Mom May Also Be Probabilistically Sophisticated”. Econometrica; V.63-#1, pp. 159-89.


Quiggin, John (1995). “Economic Choice in Generalized Expected Utility”. Theory and Decision; V.38-#2, pp. 153-171.


Sarin, Rakesh and Peter Wakker (2000). “Cumulative Dominance and Probabilistic Sophistication”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.40-#?, pp. 191-196.


Allen, Beth (1987). “Smooth Preferences and the Approximate Expected Utility Hypothesis”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.2-#2, pp. 340-355.


Chew, Soo Hong, Larry Epstein, and Itzhak Zilcha (1988). “A Correspondence Theorem between Expected Utility and Smooth Utility”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.46-#1, pp. 186-193.


Skiadas, Costis (1997). “Conditioning and Aggregation of Preferences”. Econometrica; V.65-#2, pp. 347-367.


Skiadas, Costis (1997). “Subjective Probability under Additive Aggregation of Conditional Preferences”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.76-#2, pp. 242-271.

 

(3) Weakening Independence

 

(a) Betweeness Property and NEU Preferences


Chew, Soo Hong (1983). “A Generalization of the Quasilinear Mean with Applications to the Measurement of Inequality and Decision Theory Resolving the Allais Paradox”. Econometrica; V.51-#?, pp. 1065-1092.


Dekel, Eddie (1986). “An Axiomatic Characterization of Preferences under Uncertainty: Weakening the Independence Axiom”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.40-#?, pp. 304-318.


Fishburn, Peter (1988). Nonlinear Preference and Utility Theory. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.


Chew, Soo Hong (1989). “Axiomatic Utility Theories with the Betweeness Property”. Annals of Operations Research; V.19-#?, pp. 273-298.


Chew, Soo Hong and Larry Epstein (1989). “The Structure of Preferences and Attitudes Towards the Timing of the Resolution of Uncertainty”. International Economic Review; V.30-#1, pp. 103-117.


Gul, Faruk and Outi Lantto (1990). “Betweenness Satisfying Preferences and Dynamic Choice”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.52-#1, pp. 162-177.


Chew, Soo Hong and Larry Epstein (1989). “A Unifying Approach to Axiomatic Non-expected Utility Theories”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.49-#2, pp. 207-240.


Chew, Soo Hong; Larry Epstein, and Peter Wakker (1993). “A Unifying Approach to Axiomatic Non-expected Utility Theories: Correction and Comment”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.59-#1, pp. 183-88.


Safra, Zvi and Uzi Segal (1995). “How Complicated Are Betweenness Preferences?”. Journal of Mathematical Economics; V.24-#4, pp. 371-381.


Conlon, John (1995). “A Simple Proof of a Basic Result in Nonexpected Utility”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.65-#?, pp. 635-639.


Grant, Simon, Atsushi Kajii, and Ben Polak (2000). “Decomposable Choice under Uncertainty”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.92-#2, pp. 169-197.


Gul, Faruk (1991). “A Theory of Disappointment Aversion”. Econometrica; V.59-#3, pp. 667-686.


Segal, Uzi and Avia Spivak (1997). “First-Order Risk Aversion and Non-Differentiability”. Economic Theory; V.9-#?, pp. 179-183.


Safra, Zvi and Uzi Segal (1998). “Constant Risk Aversion”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.83-#1, pp. 19-42.

 

(b) Quadratic Utility


Chew, Soo Hong; Larry Epstein, and Uzi Segal (1991). “Mixture Symmetry and Quadratic Utility”. Econometrica; V.59-#1, pp. 139-164.


Chew, Soo Hong; Larry Epstein, and Uzi Segal (1994). “The Projective Independence Axiom”. Economic Theory; V.4-#2, pp. 189-215.


Eichberger, Jürgen and Simon Grant (1997). “Dynamically Consistent Preferences with Quadratic Beliefs”. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty; V.14-#2, pp. 189-207.


Epstein, Larry and Uzi Segal (1992). “Quadratic Social Welfare Functions”. Journal of Political Economy; V.100-#4, pp. 691-712.

 

(c) Anticipated/Rank-Dependent Utility Theory


Quiggin, John (1982). “A Theory of Anticipated Utility”. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization; V.3-#?, pp. 323-343.


Segal, Uzi (1987). “Some Remarks on Quiggin's Anticipated Utility”. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization; V.8-#1, pp. 145-154.


Quiggin, John (1987). “Decision Weights in Anticipated Utility Theory: Response”. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization; V.8-#4, pp. 641-645.


Yaari, Menahem (1987). “The Dual Theory of Choice under Risk”. Econometrica; V.55-#1, pp. 95-115.


Yaari, Menahem (1986). “Univariate and Multivariate Comparisons of Risk Aversion: A New Approach”. in W. Heller, R. Starr, and D. Starrett, eds. Uncertainty, Information, and Communication. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 173-187.


Chew, Soo Hong, Edi Karni, and Zvi Safra (1987). “Risk Aversion in the Theory of Expected Utility with Rank Dependent Probabilities”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.42-#2, pp. 370-81.


Roell, A. (1987). “Risk Aversion in Quiggin and Yaari’s Rank-Order Model of Choice under Uncertainty”. Economic Journal; V.97-supplement, pp. 143-159.


Segal, Uzi (1987). “The Ellsberg Paradox and Risk Aversion: An Anticipated Utility Approach”. International Economic Review; V.28-#1, pp. 175-202.


Segal, Uzi (1989). “Anticipated Utility: A Measure Representation Approach”. Annals of Operations Research; V.19, pp. 359-373.


Wakker, Peter (1993). “Counterexamples to Segal's Measure Representation Theorem”. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty; V.6-#1, pp. 91-98.


Segal, Uzi (1993). “The Measure Representation: A Correction”. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty; V.6-#1, pp. 99-107.


Schlee, Edward (1990). “The Value of Information in Anticipated Utility Theory”. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty; V.3-#?, pp. 83-92.


Wakker, Peter (1990). “Characterizing Optimism and Pessimism Directly through Comonotonicity”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.52-#2, pp. 453-63.


Quiggin, John and Peter Wakker (1994). “The Axiomatic Basis of Anticipated Utility: A Clarification”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.64-#2, pp. 486-499.


Wakker, Peter (1994). “Separating Marginal Utility and Probabilistic Risk Aversion”. Theory and Decision; V.36-#1, pp. 1-44.


Luce, R. Duncan (1988). “Rank-Dependent, Subjective Expected Utility Representation”. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty; V.1-#?, pp. 305-332.


Luce, R. Duncan (1991). “Rank- and Sign-Dependent Linear Utility Models for Binary Gambles”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.53-#?, pp. 75-100.


Luce, R. Duncan and Peter Fishburn (1991). “Rank- and Sign-Dependent Linear Utility Models for Finite First-Order Gambles”. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty; V.4-#1, pp. 29-59.


LiCalzi, Marco (1998). “Variations on the Measure Representation Approach”. Journal Of Mathematical Economics; V.29-#3, 255-269.


Kahneman, Daniel and Amos Tversky (1979). “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk”. Econometrica; V.47-#?, pp. 263-291.


Tversky, Amost and Daniel Kahneman (1992). “Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty”. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty; V.5-#?, pp. 297-323.


Wakker, Peter and Amos Tversky (1993). “An Axiomatization of Cumulative Prospect Theory”. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty; V.7-#2, pp. 147-175.


Tversky, Amos and Peter Wakker (1995). “Risk Attitudes and Decision Weights”. Econometrica; V.63-#?, pp. 1255-1280.


Grant, Simon and Atushi Kajii (1998). “AUSI Expected Utility: An Anticipated Utility Theory of Relative Disappointment Aversion”. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization; V.37-#?, pp. 277-290.


Nakamura, Yutaka (1995). “Rank Dependent Utility for Arbitrary Consequence Spaces”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.29-#2, pp. 103-129.


Nakamura, Yutaka (1995). “Probabilistically Sophisticated Rank Dependent Utility”. Economics Letters; V.48-#3/4, pp. 441-447.


Wakker, Peter, Ido Erev, and Elke Weber (1994). “Comonotonic Independence: The Critical Test between Classical and Rank-Dependent Utility Theories”. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty; V.9-#3, pp. 195-230.


Wakker, Peter (1996). “The Sure-Thing Principle and the Comonotonic Sure-Thing Principle: An Axiomatic Analysis”. Journal of Mathematical Economics; V.25-#2, pp. 213-27.


Chateauneuf, Alain (1999). “Comonotonicity Axioms and Rank-Dependent Expected Utility for Arbitrary Consequences”. Journal of Mathematical Economics; V.32-#1, pp. 21-45.


Schmidt, Ulrich and Horst Zank (2001). “A new axiomatization of rank-dependent expected utility with tradeoff consistency for equally likely outcomes”. Journal of Mathematical Economics; V.35-#4, pp. 483-491.


Safra, Zvi and Uzi Segal (2001). “Rank-dependent preferences without ranking axioms”. Journal of Mathematical Economics; V.35-#4, pp. 547-562.


Abdellaoui, Mohammed (2002). “A genuine rank-dependent generalization of the Von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility theorem”. Econometrica; V.70-#2, pp. 717-736.


Abouda, Moez and Alain Chateauneuf (2002). “Characterization of Symmetrical Monotone Risk Aversion in the RDEU Model”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.44-#1, pp. 1-15.


Abouda, Moez and Alain Chateauneuf (2002). “Positivity of Bid-Ask Spreads and Symmetrical Monotone Risk Aversion”. Theory and Decision; V.52-#2, pp. 149-170.


Enrico Diecidue, Peter P. Wakker (2001). “On the Intuition of Rank-Dependent Utility”. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty; V.23-#3, pp. 281-298.


Wu, George and Richard Gonzalez (1996). “Curvature of the Probability Weighting Function”. Management Science; V.42-#?, pp. 1671-1690.


Wu, George and Richard Gonzalez (1999). “Nonlinear Decision Weights in Choice under Uncertainty”. Management Science; V.45-#1, pp. 74-85.


Prelec, Drazen (1998). “The Probability Weighting Function”. Econometrica; V.66-#3, pp. 497-527.

 

(d) On Comparative Statics


Machina, Mark (1989). “Comparative Statics and Non-Expected Utility Preferences”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.47-#?, pp. 393-405.


Chew, Soo Hong, Larry Epstein, and Itzhak Zilcha (1988). “A Correspondence Theorem between Expected Utility and Smooth Utility”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.46-#?, pp. 186-193.


Chew, Soo Hong and Naoko Nishimura (1992). “Differentiability, Comparative Statics, and Non-expected Utility Preferences”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.56-#2, pp. 294-312.


Schlee, Edward (1994). “The Preservation of Multivariate Comparative Statics in Non-Expected Utility Theory”. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty; V.9-#?, pp. 257-272.


Neilson, W. (1995). “Comparative Statics Derivatives with Non-Linear Preferences”. Journal of Mathematical Economics; V.24-#1, pp. 45-57.


Ormiston, Michael and Edward Schlee (1999). “Comparative Static Tests between Decision Models under Risk”. Journal of Mathematical Economics; V.32-#?, pp. 145-166.


Park, In-Uck (1998). “A Revealed-Preference Implication of Weighted Utility Decisions under Uncertainty”. Economic Theory; V.11-#2, pp. 413-426.

 

(4) Dynamic Consistency and NEU Preferences

 

(a) On Dutch Book Arguments


Shimony, Abner (1955). “Coherence and the Axioms of Confirmation”. Journal of Symbolic Logic; V.20-#3, pp. 1-28.


Lehman, R. Sherman (1955). “On Confirmation and Rational Betting”. Journal of Symbolic Logic; V.20-#3, pp. 251-262.


Kemeny, John G. (1955). “Fair Bets and Inductive Probabilities”. Journal of Symbolic Logic; V.20-#3, pp. 263-273.


Van Fraassen, Bas C. (1984). “Belief and the Will”. Journal of Philosophy; V.81-#5, pp. 235-256.


Schick, Frederick (1986). “Dutch Bookies and Money Pumps”. Journal of Philosophy; V.83-#2, pp. 112-119.


Green, Jerry (1987). “‘Making Book Against Oneself’, The Independence Axiom, and Nonlinear Utility Theory”. Quarterly Journal of Economics; V.98-#?, pp. 785-796.


Christensen, David (1991). “Clever Bookies and Coherent Beliefs”. Philosophical Review, V.100-#2, pp. 229-247.


Foley, Richard (1992). “Being Knowingly Incoherent”. Nous, V.26-#2, pp. 181-203.


Foley, Richard (1994). “How Should Future Opinion Affect Current Opinion?”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research; V.54-#4, pp. 747-766.


Border, Kim and Uzi Segal (1994). “Dutch Books and Conditional Probability”. Economic Journal; V.104-#422, pp. 71-75.


Kelsey David (1995) “Dutch Book Arguments and Learning in a Non-Expected Utility Framework”. International Economic Review; V.36-#?, pp. 187-206 .


Kelsey David and Frank Milne(1997) “Induced Preferences, Dynamic Consistency and Dutch Books”. Economica; V.64-#?, pp. 471-481.


Waidacher, C. (1997). “Hidden Assumptions in the Dutch Book Argument”. Theory and Decision; V.43-#3, pp. 293-312.


Yaari, Menahem (1998). “On the Role of ‘Dutch Books’ in the Theory of Choice under Risk”. in D. Jacobs, E. Kalai, and M. Kamien, eds. Frontiers of Research in Economic Theory. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 33-46.


Silber, Daniel (1999). “Dutch Books and Agent Rationality”. Theory and Decision; V.47-#3, pp. 247-266.


Cubitt, Robin and Robert Sugden (2001). “On Money Pumps”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.37-#1, pp. 121-160.


Diecidue, Enrico and Peter Wakker (2002). “Dutch books: avoiding strategic and dynamic complications, and a comonotonic extension”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.43-#2, pp. 135-149.

 

(b) Consistency, Consequentialism and Rationality


Machina, Mark (1989). “Dynamic Consistency and Non-Expected Utility Models of Choice Under Uncertainty”. Journal of Economic Literature; V.27-#?, pp. 1622-1668.


Hammond, Peter (1988). “Consequentialist Foundations for Expected Utility”. Theory and Decision; V.25-#1, pp. 25-78.


Hammond, Peter (1988). “Consequentialism and the Independence Axiom”. in B. Munier, ed. Risk, Decision and Rationality. Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 339-344.


Hammond, Peter (1989). “Consistent Plans, Consequentialism, and Expected Utility”. Econometrica; V.57-#6, pp. 1445-1449.


McLennan, Edward (1988). “Dynamic Choice and Rationality”. in B. Munier, ed. Risk, Decision and Rationality. Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 517-536.


Lavalle, Irving (1991). “Small Worlds and Sure Things: Consequentialism by the Back Door”. in W. Edwards, ed. Utility: Theories, Measurements and Applications. Boston: Kluwer.


Lavalle, Irving and Kenneth Wapman (1986). “Rolling Back Decision Trees Requires the Independence Axiom!”. Management Science; V.32-#?, pp. 382-385.


Sarin, Rakesh and Peter Wakker (1994). “Folding Back in Decision Tree Analysis”. Management Science; V.40-#?, pp. 625-628.


Machina, Mark (1991). “Dynamic Consistency and Non-Expected Utility”. in M.O.L. Bacharach and S. Hurley, eds. Foundations of Decision Theory. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 39-91.


Levi, Isaac (1991). “Consequentialism and Sequential Choice”. in M.O.L. Bacharach and S. Hurley, eds. Foundations of Decision Theory. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 91-122.


Cubitt, Robin (1996). “Rational Dynamic Choice and Expected Utility Theory”. Oxford Economic Papers; V.48-#1, pp. 1-19.


Bacharach, Michael (1992). “Backward Induction and Beliefs About Oneself”. Synthese; V.91-#3, pp. 247-284


Karni, Edi and Zvi Safra (1990). “Behaviorally Consistent Optimal Stopping Rules”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.51-#?, pp. 391-402.


Karni, Edi and Zvi Safra (1990). “Unbounded Behaviorally Consistent Stopping Rules”. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty; V.9-#?, pp. 231-238.


Karni, Edi and David Schmeidler (1991). “Atemporal Dynamic Consistency and Expected Utility Theory”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.54-#?, pp. 401-408.


Epstein, Larry G. and Michel Le Breton (1993). “Dynamically Consistent Beliefs Must Be Bayesian”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.61-#1,pp. 1-22.


Border, Kim and Uzi Segal (1994). “Dynamic Consistency Implies Approximately Expected Utility Preferences”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.63-#2, pp. 170-188.


Lo, Kin Chung (1996). “Weighted and Quadratic Models of Choice under Uncertainty”. Economics Letters; V.50-#3, pp. 381-386.


Segal, Uzi (1997). “Dynamic Consistency and Reference Points”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.72-#1, pp. 208-219.


Sarin, Rakesh and Peter Wakker (1998). “Dynamic Choice and NonExpected Utility”. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty; V.17-#2, pp. 87-119.


Grant, Simon, Atsushi Kaji, and Ben Polak (2000). “Temporal Resolution of Uncertainty and Recursive Non-Expected Utility Models”. Econometrica; V.68-#2, pp. 425-434.


Lo, Kin Chung (2000). “Rationalizability and the Savage Axioms”. Economic Theory; V.15-#3, pp. 727-733.


Halevy, Yoram (2004). “The Possibility of Speculative Trade Between Dynamically Consistent Agents”. Games & Economic Behavior; V.46-#1, pp. 189-198.


Schlee, Edward (1997). “The Sure Thing Principle and the Value of Information”. Theory and Decision; V.42-#1, pp. 21-36. [Corrigenda, T&D, 1998, V.45-#2, pp. 199-200.]

 

c. Knightian Uncertainty and Uncertainty Aversion

 

(1) Surveys and General Discussions


Bewley, Truman (1998). “Knightian Uncertainty”. in D. Jacobs, E. Kalai, and M. Kamien, eds. Frontiers of Research in Economic Theory: The Nancy L. Schwartz Memorial Lectures, 1983-1997. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 71-81.


Camerer, Colin and M. Weber (1992). “Recent Developments in Modeling Preference: Uncertainty and Ambiguity”. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty; V.5-#4, pp. 325-370.


Ghirardato, Paolo (1993). “Non-additive Measures of Uncertainty: A Survey of Some Recent Developments in Decision Theory”. Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Economiche e Commerciali; V.40-#3, pp. 253-276.


Dekel, Eddie, Barton Lipman, and Aldo Rustichini (1998). “Recent Developments in Modeling Unforseen Contingencies”. European Economic Review; V.42-#?, pp. 523-542.


Epstein, Larry (2001). “Subjective Probabilities on Subjectively Unambiguous Events”. Econometrica; V.69#2, pp. 265-306.


Knight, Frank (1921). Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit. Boston: Houghton-Miflin.


LeRoy, Stephen and Larry Singell, Jr. (1987). “Knight on Risk and Uncertainty”. Journal of Political Economy; V.5-#?, pp. 394-406.


Ellsberg, Daniel (1961). “Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms”. Quarterly Journal of Economics; V.75-#?, pp. 643-699. Also in Gärdenfors and Sahlin, pp. 245-269.


Edwards, Ward (1963). “Subjective Probabilities Inferred from Decisions”. Psychological Review; V.69-#?, pp. 109-135.


Levi, Isaac (1974). “On Indeterminate Probabilities”. Journal of Philosophy; V.71-#?, pp. 391-418. Also in Gärdenfors and Sahlin, pp. 287-312.


Levi, Isaac (1986). Hard Choices: Decision Making under Unresolved Conflict. New York: Cambridge University Press.


Schick, Frederic (1979). “Self-Knowledge, Uncertainty, and Choice”. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science; V.30-#?, pp. 235-252. Also in Gärdenfors and Sahlin, pp. 270-286.


Gärdenfors, Peter and Nils-Eric Sahlin (1982). “Unreliable Probabilities, Risk Taking, and Decision Making”. Synthese; V.53-#?, pp. 361-386. Also in Gärdenfors and Sahlin, pp. 313-334.


Epstein, Larry (2000). “Are Probabilities Used in Markets?”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.91-#1, pp. 86-90.

 

(2) Some Mathematical Background

 

(a) Non-Additive Measure and the Choquet Integral


Choquet, Gustave (1953/54). “Theory of Capacities”. Annales de l’Institut Fourier (Grenoble), V.5, pp. 131-295.


Denneberg, Dieter (1997). Lectures on Non-Additive Measure and Integral (2nd edition). Boston: Kluwer.


Schmeidler, David (1986). “Integral Representation without Additivity”. Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society; V.97-#2, pp. 255-261.


Gilboa, Itzhak (1989). “Additivizations of Nonadditive Measures”. Mathematics of Operations Research; V.4-#1, pp. 1-17.


Gilboa, Itzhak and David Schmeidler (1994). “Additive Representations of Non-Additive Measures and the Choquet Integral”. Annals of Operations Research; V.52, pp. 43-65.


Chateauneuf, Alain (1996). “Decomposable Capacities, Distorted Probabilities and Concave Capacities”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.31-#1, pp. 19-37.


Marinacci, Massimo (1996). “Decomposition and Representation of Coalitional Games”. Mathematics of Operations Research; V.21-#4, pp. 1000-1015.


Groes, Ebbe, Hans Jørgen Jacobsen, Brigitte Sloth and Torben Tranæs (1998). “Axiomatic Characterizations of the Choquet Integral”. Economic Theory; V.12-#2, pp. 441-448.


Zhou, Lin (1998). “Integral Representation of Continuous Comonotonically Additive Functionals”. Transactions of the American Mathematical Society; V.350-#5, pp. 1811-1822.


De Waegenaere, Anja and Peter Wakker (2001). “Nonmonotonic Choquet Integrals”. Journal of Mathematical Economics; V.36-#1, pp. 45-60.


Castaldo, Adriana and Massimo Marinacci (2002). “A Lusin Theorem for a Class of Choquet Capacities”.. Statistical Papers; V.43-#1, pp. 137-142.

 

(b) Upper and Lower Probabilities


Fine, Terrence (1994). “Upper and Lower Probability”. in Paul Humphreys, ed. Patrick Suppes: Scientific Philosopher, V. 1. Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 109-133.


Walley, Peter (1991). Statistical Reasoning with Imprecise Probabilities. London: Chapman and Hall.


Dempster, A.P. (1967). “Upper and Lower Probabilities Induced by a Multi-Valued Mapping”. Annals of Mathematical Statistics; V.38-#?, pp. 325-339.


Suppes, Patrick and Mario Zanotti (1977). “On Using Random Relations to Generate Upper and Lower Probabilities”. Synthese; V.36-#?, pp. 427-440.


Suppes, Patrick and Mario Zanotti (1989). “Conditions on Upper and Lower Probabilities to Imply Probabilities”. Erkenntnis; V.31-#?, pp. 323-345.


Walley, Peter and Terrence Fine (1979). “Varieties of Modal (Classificatory) and Comparative Probability”. Synthese; V.41-#?, pp. 321-374.


Walley, Peter and Terrence Fine (1982). “Towards a Frequentist Theory of Upper and Lower Probability”. Annals of Statistics; V.10-#?, pp. 742-761.


Chateauneuf, Alain and Jean-Yves Jaffray (1989). “Some Characterizations of Lower Probabilities and Other Monotone Capacities Through the Use of Möbius Inversion”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.17-#?, pp. 263-283.


Wasserman, Larry (1990). “Prior Envelopes Based on Belief Functions”. Annals of Statistics; V.18-#1, pp. 454-464.


Wasserman, Larry and Joseph Kadane (1992). “Symmetric Upper Probabilities”. Annals of Statistics; V.20-#?, pp. 1720-1736.


Kadane, Joseph B. and Larry Wasserman (1996). “Symmetric, Coherent, Choquet Capacities”. Annals of Statistics; V.24-#3, pp. 1250-1264.


Marinacci, Massimo (1999). “Limit Laws for Non-additive Probabilities and Their Frequentist Interpretation”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.84-#2, pp. 145-195.


Marinacci, Massimo (1999). “Coherent Choquet Capacities and Additivity”. ms: Università di Bologna.

 

(3) Conditioning: Probability Kinematics and Maximum Entropy

 

(a) Probability Kinematics and Jeffrey Conditionalization


Jeffrey, Richard (1965/1983). The Logic of Decision. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. [Chapters 11 and 12].


Jeffrey, Richard (1968). “Probable Knowledge”. in I. Lakatos, ed. The Problem of Inductive Logic. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 166-180. Also in Gärdenfors and Sahlin, pp. 86-96; and chapter 3 in Jeffrey 1992.


Levi, Isaac (1967). “Probability Kinematics”. Philosophy of Science; V.18-#?, pp. 197-209.


Levi, Isaac (1970). “Probability and Evidence”. in M. Swain, ed. Induction, Acceptance, and Rational Belief. Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 134-156.


Jeffrey, Richard (1970). “Dracula Meets Wolfman: Acceptance vs. Partial Belief”. in M. Swain, ed. Induction, Acceptance, and Rational Belief. Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 157-165.


Teller, Paul (1973). “Conditionalization and Observation”. Synthese; V.26-#?, pp. 218-258.


Teller, Paul (1976). “Conditionalization, Observation, and Change of Preference”. in W. Harper and C. Hooker, eds. Foundations in Probability Theory, Statistical Inference, and Statistical Theories of Science. Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 205-253.


May, Sherry (1976). “Probability Kinematics: A Constrained Optimization Problem”. Journal of Philosophical Logic; V.5-#?, pp. 395-398.


May, Sherry and William Harper (1976). “Toward an Optimization Procedure for Applying Minimum Change Principles in Probability Kinematics”. in W. Harper and C. Hooker, eds. Foundations in Probability Theory, Statistical Inference, and Statistical Theories of Science. Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 137-166.


Field, Hartry (1978). “A Note on Jeffrey Contitionalization”. Philosophy of Science; V.45-#?, pp. 361-367.


Garber, Daniel (1980). “Field and Jeffrey Conditionalization”. Philosophy of Science; V.47-#?, pp. 142-145.


Domotor, Zoltan, Mario Zanotti, and Henson Graves (1980). “Probability Kinematics”. Synthese; V.44-#?, pp. 421-442.


Williams, P.M. (1980). “Bayesian Conditionalization and the Principle of Minimum Information”. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science; V.31-#?, pp. 131-144.


van Fraassen, Bas (1980). “Rational Belief and Probability Kinematics”. Philosophy of Science; V.47-#2, pp. 165-187.


van Fraassen, Bas (1981). “A Problem for Relative Information Minimizers in Probability Kinematics”. British Journal of Philosophy of Science. V.32-#4, pp. 375-379.


Domotor, Zoltan (1980). “Probability Kinematics and Representation of Belief Change”. Philosophy of Science; V.47-#3, pp. 384-403.


Armendt, Brad (1980). “Is There a Dutch Book Argument for Probability Kinematics”. Philosophy of Science; V.47-#?, pp. 583-588.


Shafer, Glenn (1981). “Jeffrey’s Rule of Conditioning”. Philosophy of Science; V.48-#?, pp. 337-362.


Diaconis, Persi and Sandy Zabel (1982). “Updating Subjective Probability”. Journal of the American Statistical Association; V.77-#380, pp. 822-830.


Jeffrey, Richard (1983). “Bayesianism with a Human Face”. in J. Earman, ed. Testing Scientific Theories. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 133-156.


Van Fraassen, Bas and R.J.G. Hughes (1984). “Symmetry Arguments in Probability Kinematics”. In P. Kitcher and P. Asquith, eds. PSA-1984 (V.1). East Lansing: PSA, pp.


Van Fraassen, Bas (1986). “A Demonstration of the Jeffrey Conditionalization Rule”. Erkenntnis; V.24-#1, pp. 17-24.


Jeffrey, Richard (1987). “Alias Smith and Jones: The Testimony of the Senses”. Erkenntnis; V.26-#?, pp. 391-399.


Jeffrey, Richard (1988). “Conditioning, Kinematics, and Exchangeability”. in B. Skyrms and W. Harper, eds. Causation, Chance, and Credence. Boston: Kluwer, pp.


Skyrms, Brian (1987). “Dynamic Coherence and Probability Kinematics”. Philosophy of Science; V.54-#1, pp. 1-20.


Graves, Paul (1989). “Discussion: The Total Evidence Theorem for Probability Kinematics”. Philosophy of Science; V.56-#2, pp. 317-324.


Wagner, Carl G. (1992). “Generalized Probability Kinematics”. Erkenntnis; V.36-#2, pp. 245-257.


Howson, Colin and Allan Franklin (1994). “Bayesian Conditionalization and Probability Kinematics”. British Journal of Philosophy of Science; V.45-#2, pp. 451-466.


Jeffrey, Richard (1996). “Decision Kinematics”. in Kenneth Arrow, et al. eds., The Rational Foundations of Economic Behavior. London: Macmillan, pp. 3-19.

 

(b) Information Theory and Maximum Entropy

 

i) Information Theory and Statistical Inference

 

a) Overviews


Pierce, John (1980). An Introduction to Information Theory: Symbols, Signals and Noise. (Second, revised edition). New York: Dover.


Khinchin, Alexander I. (1957). Mathematical Foundations of Information Theory. New York: Dover.


Aczél, J. and Z. Daróczy (1973). On Measures of Information and Their Characterization. New York: Academic Press.


Cover, Thomas and Joy Thomas (1991). Elements of Information Theory. New York: John Wiley.


Rényi, Alfred (1961). “On Measures of Entropy and Information”. In Proceedings of Fourth Berkeley Symposium on Mathematics, Statistics and Probability. V.I. Berkeley: University of California Press, Pp. 547-561. [Also in Selected Papers of Alfred Renyi, Vol. 2. pp 565-580, 1976.]


Rényi, Alfred (1965). “On the Foundations of Information Theory”. Rev. Inst. Internat. Stat.; V.33-#1, pp. 1-14.


Kendall, M.G. (1973). “Entropy, Probability and Information”. International Statistical Review; V.59-68. HA11 .I505


Soofi, Ehsan S. (1994). “Capturing the Intangible Concept of Information”. Journal of the American Statistical Association; V.89-#428, pp. 1243-1254.


Ullah, Aman (1996). “Entropy, Divergence and Distance Measures, with Econometric Applications”. Journal of Statistical Planning and Inference; V.49-#1, pp. 137-162.


Shannon, Claude (1948). “A Mathematical Theory of Communication”. Bell System Technical Journal; V.27-#?, pp. 379-423, 623-656. [Reprinted in C. Shannon and W. Weaver, 1949, The Mathematical Theory of Communication. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.]

 

b) Jaynes (ME)


Skilling, John (1984). “The Maximum Entropy Method”. Nature; V.309-#?, pp. 748-749. (Discussion in V.312, pp. 381-2).


Jaynes, Edwin T. (1957). “Information Theory and Statistical Mechanics, I”. Physical Review; V. 106-#4, pp. 620-630.


Jaynes, Edwin T. (1957). “Information Theory and Statistical Mechanics, II”. Physical Review; V. 108-#2, pp. 171-190.


R.D. Levine (1980). “An Information Theoretical Approach to Inversion Problems”. Journal of Physics, A, V.13-#1, pp. 91-108. QC1 .J681


Van, Jan Campenhout and Thomas Cover (1981). “Maximum Entropy and Conditional Probability”. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory; V.27-#?, pp.483-489.


Csiszár, Imre (1985). “An Extended Maximum Entropy Principle and a Bayesian Justification”. Bayesian Statistics, 2. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 83-98 .


Skilling, John (1989). “Classic Maximum Entropy”. in J. Skilling, ed. Maximum Entropy and Bayesian Methods. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 45-52.


Gamboa, F. and E. Gassiat (1997). “Bayesian Methods and Maximum Entropy for Ill-Posed Inverse Problems”. Annals of Statistics; V.25-#1, pp. 328-350.


Skilling, John (1998) "Massive Inference and Maximum Entropy", in G.Erickson, J.T.Rychert & C.Ray.Smith, eds. Maximum Entropy and Bayesian Methods. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 1-14.


J. Kapur and H. Kesavan (1992). Entropy Optimization Principles with Applications. Academic Press: Boston.

 

c) Kullback-Liebler (MCE)


Kullback, Solomon and R.A. Leibler (1951). “On Information and Sufficiency”. Annals of Mathematical Statistics; V.22-#1, pp. 79-86.


Kullback, Solomon (1951). Information Theory and Statistics. New York: Wiley.


Hobson, Arthur and Bin-Kang Cheng (1973). “A Comparison of the Shannon and Kullback Information Measures”. Journal of Statistical Physics; 7-#4, pp. 301-310.


Tribus, Myron and Richard Rossi (1973). “On the Kullback Information Measure as a Basis for Information Theory: Comments on a Proposal of Hobson and Cheng”. Journal of Statistical Physics; V.9-#?, pp. 331-338.


Csiszár, Imre (1975). “I-Divergence Geometry of Probability Distributions and Minimization Problems”. Annals of Probability; V.3-#1, pp. 146-158.


Shore, John and Rodney Johnson (1981). “Properties of Cross-Entropy Minimization”. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory; V.27-#?, pp. 472-482.


Csiszár, Imre (1984). “Sanov Property, Generalized I-Projection and a Conditional Limit Theorem”. Annals of Probability; V.12-#3, pp. 768-793.


Loh, Wei-Yin (1985). “A Note on the Geometry of Kullback-Leibler Information Numbers”. Communications in Statistics, Part A-Theory and Methods; V.14-#4, pp. 895-904.

 

d) Lindley (Bayesian)


Lindley, D.V. (1956). “On a Measure of Information Provided by an Experiment”. Annals of Mathematical Statistics; V.27-#?, pp. 986-1005.


Bernardo, José (1979) “Expected Information as Expected Utility”. Annals of Statistics; V.7-#3, pp. 686-690.


Goel, Prem and Morris DeGroot (1979). “Comparison of Experiments and Information Measures”. Annals of Statistics; V.7-#5, pp. 1066-1077.


Goel, Prem (1983). “Information Measures and Bayesian Hierarchical Models”. Journal of the American Statistical Association; V.78-#382, pp. 408-410.

 

e) Model Selection


Akaike, Hirotugu (1973). “Information Theory and the Extension of the Maximum Likelihood Principle”. In B.N. Petrov and F. Csaki, eds. 2nd International Symposium on Information Theory. Budapest: Akailseoniai-Kiudo, pp. 267-281.


Akaike, Hirotugu (1974). “A New Look at the Statistical Identification Model”. IEEE Transactions on Automation and Control; V.19-#?, pp. 716-723.


Akaike, Hirotugu (1977). “On the Entropy Maximization Principle”. In P.R. Krishnaiah, ed. Applications of Statistics. Amsterdam: North Holland, pp. 27-41.


Schwarz, Gideon (1978). “Estimating the Dimension of a Model”. Annals of Statistics; V.6-#4, pp. 461-464.


Sawa, Takamitsu (1978). “Information Criteria for Discriminating Among Alternative Regression Models”. Econometrica; V.46-#6, pp. 1273-1291.


Leamer, Edward (1979). “Information Criteria for Choice of Regression Models: A Comment”. Econometrica; V.47-#2, pp. 507-510 .


Stone, M. (1979). “Comments on Model Selection Criteria of Akaike and Schwarz”. Journal of the Royal Statistical Association, Series B, V.41-#2, pp. 190-195.


Amemiya, Takeshi (1980). “Selection of Regressors”. International Economic Review; V.21-#?, pp. 331-354.


Akaike, Hirotugu (1981). “Likelihood of a Model and Information Criteria”. Journal of Econometrics; V.16-#1, pp. 3-14.


Atkinson, A.C. (1981). “Likelihood Ratios, Posterior Odds and Information Criteria”. Journal of Econometrics; V.16-#1, pp. 15-20.


Chow, Gregory (1981). “A Comparison of the Information and Posterior Probability Criteria for Model Selection”. Journal of Econometrics; V.16-#1, pp. 21-33.


Leamer, Edward (1983). “Model Choice and Specification Analysis”. In Z. Griliches and M.D. Intriligator, eds. Handbook of Econometrics, V.I. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 285-330.


Judge, George, W.E. Griffiths, R. Carter Hill, Helmut Lütkepohl, and Tsoung-Chao Lee (1985). “On Selecting the Set of Regressors”. Chapter 21 of The Theory and Practice of Econometrics. New York: Wiley, pp. 854-893.


Teräsvirta, T. and I. Mellin (1986). “Model Selection Criteria and Model Selection Tests in Regression Models”. Scandinavian Journal of Statistics; V.13-#?, pp. 159-171.


White, Halbert (1994). Estimation, Inference and Specification Analysis. Cambridge: CUP.


Van Casteren, Pieter and Jan De Gooijer (1997). “Model Selection by Maximum Entropy”. In T. Fomby and R.C. Hill, eds. Applying Maximum Entropy to Econometric Problems. (Advances in Econometrics, vol. 12). Greenwich: JAI Press, pp. 135-161.


Imbens, G., R. Spady, and P. Johnson (1998). “Information Theoretic Approaches to Inference in Moment Conditions Models”. Etrica; V.66-#?, pp. 333-357.

 

ii) Entropy and Bayesian Inference


Diaconis, Persi and Sandy Zabell (1982). “Updating Subjective Probability”. Journal of the American Statistical Association; V.77-#380, pp. 822-830.


Tribus, Myron (1988). “An Engineer Looks at Bayes”. In Gary J. Erickson and C. Ray Smith, ed. Maximum Entropy and Bayesian Methods in Science and Engineering, V.1. Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 31-52.


Gull, Stephen (1988). “Bayesian Inductive Inference and Maximum Entropy”. In Gary J. Erickson and C. Ray Smith, ed. Maximum Entropy and Bayesian Methods in Science and Engineering, V.1. Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 53-74.


Golan, Amos (1998). “Maximum Entropy, Likelihood and Uncertainty: A Comparison”. In G. Erickson, J. Rychert, C.R. Smith eds. Maximum Entropy and Bayesian Methods. Dordrecht: Kluwer.


Good, I.J. (1963). “Maximum Entropy for Hypothesis Formulation, Especially for Multidimensional Contingency Tables”. Annals of Mathematical Statistics; V.34-#3, pp. 911-934.


Jaynes, Edwin T. (1968). “Prior Probabilities”. IEEE Transactions on Systems Science and Cybernetics; V.4-#3, pp. 227-241.


Jaynes, Edwin T. (1973). “The Well-Posed Problem”. Foundations of Physics; V.3-#?, pp. 477-493.


Rowlinson, J. (1970). “Probability, Information, and Entropy”. Nature; V.255-#?, pp. 1196-1198.


Friedman, Kenneth and Abner Shimony (1971). “Jaynes Maximum Entropy Prescription and Probability Theory”. Journal of Statistical Physics; V.3-#?, pp.381-384.

 

Tribus, Myron and H. Motroni (1972). “Comments on the Paper ‘Jaynes Maximum Entropy Prescription and Probability Theory’”. Journal of Statistical Physics; V.4-#?, pp. 227-228.

 

Gage, Douglas W. and David Hestenes (1973). “Comments on the Paper ‘Jaynes Maximum Entropy Prescription and Probability Theory’”. Journal of Statistical Physics; V.7-#1, pp. 89-90.

 

Friedman, Kenneth (1973). “Replies to Tribus and Motroni and Gage and Hestenes”. Journal of Statistical Physics; V.9-#3, pp. 265-269.

 

Hobson, Arthur (1972). “The Interpretation of Inductive Probabilities”. Journal of Statistical Physics; V.6-#2/3, pp. 189-193.

 

Shimony, Abner (1973). “Comment on the Interpretation of Inductive Probabilities”. Journal of Statistical Physics; V.9-#2, pp. 187-191.


Macqueen, James and Jacob Marschak (1975). “Partial Knowledge, Entropy, and Estimation”. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA; V.72-#10, pp. 3819-3824. 506.1 N277p


Cyranski, John F. (1978). “Analysis of the Maximum Entropy Principle ‘Debate’”. Foundations of Physics; V.8-#5/6, pp. 493-506.


Jaynes, Edwin T. (1979). “Where Do We Stand on Maximum Entropy?”. in R. Levine and M. Tribus, eds. The Maximum Entropy Formalism. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 15-118.


Cyranski, John F. (1979). “Measurement, Theory, and Information”. Information and Control; V.41-#3, pp. 275-304.


Seidenfeld, Teddy (1979). “Why I Am Not an Objective Bayesian: Some Reflections Prompted by Rosenkrantz”. Theory and Decision; V.11-#4, pp. 413-440. [Reply by Rosenkrantz follows, pp. 441-451.]


Dias, Penha Maria Cardoso and Abner Shimony (1981). “A Critique of Jaynes’ Maximum Entropy Principle”. Advances in Applied Mathematics; V.2, pp. 172-211.


Williams, P.M. (1980). “Bayesian Conditionalization and the Principle of Minimum Information”. British Journal of Philosophy of Science; V.31-#?, 131-144.


van Fraassen, Bas (1980). “Rational Belief and Probability Kinematics”. Philosophy of Science; V.47-#2, pp. 165-187.


Van Fraassen, Bas (1981). “A Problem for Relative Information Minimizers in Probability Kinematics”. British Journal of Philosophy of Science; V.32-#?, pp. 375-379.


van Fraassen, Bas, R.I.G. Hughes and Gilbert Harman (1986). “A Problem for Relative Information Minimizers in Probability Kinematics, Continued”. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science; V.37-#?, pp. 453-475.


Frieden, B. Roy (1985). “Dice, Entropy, and Likelihood”. Proceedings of the IEEE; V.73-#12, pp. 1764-1770.

 

Fougere, P.F. (1988). “Maximum Entropy Calculations in a Discrete Probability Space”. In Gary J. Erickson and C. Ray Smith, ed. Maximum Entropy and Bayesian Methods in Science and Engineering, V.1. Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 205-234.


Skilling, John (1985). “Prior Probabilities”. Synthese; V.63-#1, pp. 1-34.


Shimony, Abner (1985). “The Status of the Principle of Maximum Entropy”. Synthese; V.63-#1, pp. 35-53.


Skyrms, Brian (1985). “Maximum Entropy Inference As A Special Case of Conditionalization”. Synthese; V.63-#1, pp. 55-74.


Domotor, Zoltan (1985)., “Probability Kinematics, Conditionals, and Entropy Principles”. Synthese; V.63-#1, pp. 75-114.


Jaynes, Edwin T. (1985). “Some Random Observations”. Synthese; V.63-#1, pp. 115-138.


Seidenfeld, Teddy (1986). “Entropy and Uncertainty”. Philosophy of Science; V.53-#?, pp. 479-491.


Zellner, Arnold (1988). “Optimal Information Processing and Bayes Theorem”. American Statistician; V.42-#?, pp. 278-284.


Jaynes, Edwin T. (1988). “The Relation of Bayesian and Maximum Entropy Methods”. In Gary J. Erickson and C. Ray Smith, ed. Maximum Entropy and Bayesian Methods in Science and Engineering, V.1. Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 25-29.


Paris, Jeff and Alena Vencovská (1992). “A Method for Updating Justifying Minimum Cross Etnropy”. International Journal of Approximate Reasoning; V.7-#1, pp. 1-18.


Grove, Adam and Joseph Halpern (1997). “Probability Update: Conditioning vs. Cross Entropy”. In Proceedings of the Thirteenth Annual Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, pp. 208-214.

 

iii) Axiomatic Derivation of PME


Shore, John and Rodney Johnson (1980). “Axiomatic Derivation of the Principle of Maximum Entropy”. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory; V.26-#1, pp. 26-37. [Corrections, V.29-#6, pp. 942-943.]


Tikochinsky, Y., N.Z. Thishby, and R.D. Levine (1984). “Consistent Inference of Probabilities for Reproducible Experiments”. Physical Review Letters, V.52-#?, pp. 1357-1360.


Skilling, John (1988). “The Axioms of Maximum Entropy”. In Gary J. Erickson and C. Ray Smith, ed. Maximum Entropy and Bayesian Methods in Science and Engineering, V.1. Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 173-187.


Csiszár, Imre (1991). “Why Least Squares and Maximum Entropy? An Axiomatic Approach to Inference for Linear Inverse Problems”. Annals of Statistics; V.19-#4, pp. 2032-2066.


Paris, Jeff and Alena Vencovská (1990). “A Note on the Inevitability of Maximum Entropy”. International Journal of Approximate Reasoning; V.4-#?, pp. 183-224.


Grove, Adam, Jospeph Halpern, and Daphne Koller (1994). “Random Worlds and Maximum Entropy”. Journal of AI Research; V.2-#?, pp. 33-88.


Halpern, Joseph and Daphne Koller (1995). “Representation Dependence in Probabilistic Inference”. Proceedings of the 14th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pp. 1853-1860.


Paris, Jeff and Alena Vencovská (1997). “In Defense of the Maximum Entropy Inference Process”. International Journal of Approximate Reasoning; V.17-#1, pp. 77-103.


Kern-Isberner, Gabriele (1998). “Characterizing the Principle of Minimum Cross-Entropy within a Conditional-Logical Framework”. Artificial Intelligence; V.98-#1/2, pp. 169-208 .


Paris, Jeff (1998/9). “Common Sense and Maximum Entropy”. Synthese; V.117-#1, pp. 75-93.

 

(4) Belief Functions

 

(a) Belief Functions and Generalized Bayesian Inference


Diaconis, Persi and Sandy Zabel (1986). “Some Alternatives to Bayes’s Rule”. in Bernard Grofman and Guillermo Owen, eds. Information Pooling and Group Decision Making. Greenwich: JAI Press, pp. 25-38.


Shafer, Glenn (1990). “Perspectives on the Theory of Belief Functions”. International Journal of Approximate Reasoning; V.4-#?, pp. 323-362.


Dempster, A.P. (1968). “A Generalization of Bayesian Inference”. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series B; V.30-#2, pp. 205-247.


Suppes, Patrick (1974). “The Measurement of Belief”. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series B; V.36-#2, pp. 160-191.


Shafer, Glenn (1976). A Mathematical Theory of Evidence. Princeton: PUP.


Wolfenson, Marco and Terrence Fine (1982). “Bayes-like Decision Making with Upper and Lower Probabilities”. Journal of the American Statistical Association; V.77-#1, pp. 80-88.


Walley, Peter (1987). “Belief Function Representations of Statistical Evidence”. Annals of Statistics; V.15-#4, pp. 1439-1465.


Kyburg, Henry (1987). “Bayesian and Non-Bayesian Evidential Updating”. Artificial Intellligence; V.31-#?, pp. 271-293.


Smets, Philippe (1988). “Belief Functions”. in P. Smets, A. Mamdani, D. Dubois, and H. Prade eds. Non-Standard Logics for Automated Reasoning. New York: Academic Press, pp. 253-277.


Pearl, Judea (1988). Probabilistic Reasoning in Intelligent Systems: Networks of Plausible Inference. San Mateo: Morgan Kaufmann.


Jaffray, Jean-Yves (1989). “Coherent Bets under Partially Resolving Uncertainty and Belief Functions”. Theory and Decision; V.26-#?, pp. 99-106.


Wong, S.K.M., Y.Y. Yao, P. Boltmann, and H.C. Bürger (1991). “Axiomatization of Qualitative Belief Structure”. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics; V.21-#4, pp. 726-734.


Voorbraak, Frans (1991). “On the Justification of Dempster's Rule of Combination”. Artificial Intelligence; V.48-#2, pp. 171-197.


Jaffray, Jean-Yves (1992). “Bayesian Updating and Belief Functions”. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics; V.22-#?, pp. 1144-1152.


Halpern, Joseph and Ronald Fagin (1992). “Two Views of Belief: Belief as Generalized Probability and Belief as Evidence”. Artificial Intelligence; V.54-#3, pp. 275-317.


Hendon, Ebbe, Hans Jørgen Jacobsen, Birgitte Sloth, and Torben Tranæs (1996). “The Product of Capacities and Belief Functions”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.32-#2, pp. 95-108.

 

(b) SEU Theory with Belief Functions


Walliser, B. (1991). “Belief Revision and Decision under Complex Uncertainty”. in B. Walliser and P. Bourgine, eds. Economics and Cognitive Science. New York: Pergammon Press.


Jaffray, Jean-Yves (1989). “Linear Utility Theory for Belief Functions”. Operations Research Letters; V.8-#?, pp. 107-112.


Jaffray, Jean-Yves (1991). “Belief Functions, Convex Capacities, and Decision Making”. in J. Doignon and J. Falmagne, eds. Mathematical Psychology: Current Developments. New York: Springer Verlag.


Jaffray, Jean-Yves and Peter Wakker (1994). “Decision Making with Belief Functions: Compatibility and Incompatibility with the Sure-Thing Principle”. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty; V.8-#3, pp. 255-271.


Nakamura, Yutaka (1993). “Subjective Utility with Upper and Lower Probabilities on Finite States”. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty; V.6-#1, pp. 33-48.


Hendon, Ebbe, Hans Jørgen Jacobsen, Birgitte Sloth, and Torben Tranæs (1994). “Expected Utility with Lower Probabilities”. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty; V.8-#2, pp. 197-216.


Gonzales, Christophe and Jean-Yves Jaffray (1998). “Imprecise Sampling and Direct Decision Making”. Annals of Operations Research; #80, 207-236 .

 

(5) Maximin Expected Utility


Bewley, Truman (1986/2002). “Knightian Decision Theory: Part I”. Decisions in Economics and Finance; V.25-#2, pp. 79-110.


Bewley, Truman (1986). “Knightian Decision Theory: Part II, Intertemporal Problems”. Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper, #835.


Gilboa, Itzhak (1988). “A Combination of Expected Utility Theory and Maximin Decision Criteria”. Journal of Mathematical Psychology; V.32-#?, pp. 405-420.


Gilboa, Itzhak and David Schmeidler (1989). “Maximin Expected Utility with a Non-Unique Prior”. Journal of Mathematical Economics; V.18-#?, pp. 141-153.


Jaffray, Jean-Yves (1988). “An Axiomatic Model of Choice under Risk Which is Compatible with the Certainty Effect”. in B. Munier, ed. Risk, Decision and Rationality. Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 313-325.


Kelsey, David (1994). “Maximin Expected Utility and the Weight of Evidence”. Oxford Economic Papers; V.46-#?, pp. 425-444.


Ghirardato, Paolo, Peter Klibanoff, and Massimo Marinacci (1998). “Additivity with Multiple Priors”. Journal of Mathematical Economics; V.30-#4, pp. 405-420.


Sarin, Rajiv and Farshid Vahid (1999). “Payoff Assessments without Probabilities: A Simple Dynamic Model of Choice”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.28-#2, pp. 294-309.


Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, Peter Klibanoff, and Emre Ozdenoren (2000). “Maxmin Expected Utility through Statewise Combinations”. Economics Letters; V.66-#1, pp. 49-54.


Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, Peter Klibanoff, and Emre Ozdenoren (2000). “Maxmin Expected Utility over Savage Acts with a Set of Priors”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.92-#1, pp. 35-65.


Billot, Antoine, Alain Chateauneuf, Itzhak Gilboa, and Jean-Marc Tallon (2000). “Sharing Beliefs: Between Agreeing and Disagreeing”. Econometrica; V.68-#3, pp. 685-694.


Klibanoff, Peter (2001). “Characterizing Uncertainty Aversion through Preference for Mixtures”. Social Choice and Welfare; V.18-#2, pp. 289-301.


Klibanoff, Peter (2001). “Stochastically Independent Randomization and Uncertainty Aversion”. Economic Theory; V.18-#3, pp. 605-620.


Nehring, Klaus (1999). “Capacities and Probabilistic Beliefs: A Precarious Coexistence”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.38-#2, pp. 197-213.


Maccheroni, Fabio (2002). “Maximin under Risk”. Economic Theory; V.19-#4, pp. 823-831.


Marinacci, Massimo (2002). “Probabilistic Sophistication and Multiple Priors”. Econometrica; V.70-#2, pp. 755-764.


Ozdenoren, Emre (2002). “Completing the State Space with Subjective States”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.105-#2, pp. 531-539.


Brüning, Martin and Dieter Denneberg (2003). “Max-min (s-)Additive Representation of Monotone Measures”. Statistical Papers; V.43-#1, pp. 23-35.

 

(6) Nonadditivity and Choquet Expected Utility (CEU) Theory

 

(a) Choquet Expected Utility (CEU) Theory


Chateauneuf, Alain (1994). “Modeling Attitudes towards Uncertainty and Risk Through the Use of Choquet Integral”. Annals of Operations Research; V.52, pp. 3-20.


Chateauneuf, Alain and Michele Cohen (1997). “Choquet Expected Utility Model: A New Approach to Individual Behavior under Uncertainty and Social Welfare”. In Michel Grabisch, Toshiaki Murofushi, and Michio Sugeno, eds. Fuzzy Measures and Integrals: Theory and Application. Heidelberg: Physica, pp. 289-313.


Schmeidler, David (1989). “Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity”. Econometrica; V.57-#?, pp. 571-587.


Gilboa, Itzhak (1987). “Expected Utility with Purely Subjective Non-Additive Priors”. Journal of Mathematical Economics; V.16-#1, pp. 65-78.


Gilboa, Itzhak (1989). “Duality in Non-Additive Expected Utility Theory”. Annals of Operations Research; V.19-#?, pp. 405-414.


Chateauneuf, Alain (1988). “Uncertainty Aversion and Risk Aversion in Models with Nonadditive Probabilities”. in B. Munier, ed. Risk, Decision and Rationality. Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 615-627.


Fishburn, Peter (1988). “Uncertainty Aversion and Separated Effects in Decision Making under Uncertainty”. in J. Kacprzyk and M. Fedrizzi, eds. Combining Fuzzy Imprecision with Probabilistic Uncertainty in Decisionmaking. New York: Springer-Verlag, pp. 10-25.


Wakker, Peter (1989). “Continuous Subjective Expected Utility with Non-additive Probabilities”. Journal of Mathematical Economics; V.18-#1, pp. 1-27.


Wakker, Peter (1990). “Under Stochastic Dominance Choquet-Expected Utility and Anticipated Utility are Identical”. Theory and Decision; V.29-#?, pp. 119-132.


Chateauneuf, Alain (1991). “On the Use of Capacities in Modeling Uncertainty Aversion and Risk Aversion”. Journal of Mathmetical Economics; V.20-#?, pp. 343-369.


Nehring, Klaus (1992). “Foundations for the Theory of Rational Choice with Vague Priors”. in J. Geweke, ed. Decison Making under Risk and Uncertainty. Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 231-242.


Sarin, Rakesh and Peter Wakker (1992). “A Simple Axiomatization of Non-Additive Expected Utility”. Econometrica; V.60-#6, pp. 1255-1272.


Nehring, Klaus (1994). “On the Interpretation of Sarin and Wakker’s ‘A Simple Axiomatization of Non-Additive Expected Utility,”. Econometrica; V.62-#4, pp. 935-938.


Eichberger, Jurgen and David Kelsey (1996). “Uncertainty Aversion and Preference for Randomisation”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.71-#1, pp. 31-43.


Montesano, Aldo and Francesco Giovannoni (1996). “Uncertainty Aversion and Aversion to Increasing Uncertainty”. Theory and Decision; V.41-#2, pp. 133-148.


Nakamura, Yutaka (1990). “Subjective Expected Utility with Non-additive Probabilities on Finite State Spaces”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.51-#2, pp. 346-66.


Nakamura, Yutaka (1992). “Multi-Symmetric Structures and Non-Expected Utility Theory”. Journal of Mathematical Psychology; V.36-#?, pp. 375-395.


CHEW Soo Hong and Edi Karni (1994). “Choquet Expected Utility with a Finite State Space: Commutativity and Act-Independence”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.62-#?, pp. 469-479.


Oginuma, Takashi (1994). “A Theory of Expected Utility with Nonadditive Probability”. Journal of Mathematical Economics; V.23-#5, pp. 451-473.


Chateauneuf, Alain (1995). “Ellsberg Paradox Intuition and Choquet Expected Utility. Mathematical Models for Handling Partial Knowledge in Artificial Intelligence. New York: Plenum, pp. 1-20.


Chew, Soo Hong and Peter Wakker (1996). “The Comonotonic Sure-Thing Principle”. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty; V.12-#1, pp. 5-27.


Ghirardato, Paolo (1997). “On Independence for Non-additive Measures, with a Fubini Theorem”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.73-#2, pp. 261-291.


Mukerji, Sujoy (1997). “Understanding the Nonadditive Probability Decision Model”. Economic Theory; V.9-#1, pp. 23-46.


Jaffray, Jean-Yves and Fabrice Philippe (1997). “On the Existence of Subjective Upper and Lower Probabilities”. Mathematics of Operations Research; V.22-#1, pp. 165-185.


Eichberger, Jürgen and David Kelsey (1999). “E-Capacities and the Ellsberg Paradox”. Theory and Decision; V.46-#2, pp. 107-140.


Epstein, Larry and Jiankang Zhang (1999). “Least Convex Capacities”. Economic Theory; V.13-#?, pp. 263-286.


Zhang, Jiankang (1999). “Qualitative Probabilities on λ- Systems”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.38-#1, pp. 11-20.


Zhou, Lin (1999). “Subjective Probability Theory with Continuous Acts”. Journal of Mathematical Economics; V.32-#1, pp. 121-130.


Ghirardato, Paolo and Michel Le Breton (2000). “Choquet Rationality”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.90-#2, pp. 277-285.


Castagnoli, Erio and Fabio Maccheroni (2000). “Restricting Independence to Convex Cones”. Journal of Mathematical Economics; V.34-#?, pp. 215-223.


Ghirardato, Paolo (2001). “Coping with Ignorance: Unforeseen Contingencies and Non-additive Uncertainty”. Economic Theory; V.17-#2, pp. 247-276.


Ghirardato, Paolo and Massimo Marinacci (2002). “Ambiguity Made Precise: A Comparative Foundation”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.102-#2, pp. 251-289.


Ghirardato, Paolo and Massimo Marinacci (2001). “Risk, Ambiguity, and the Separation of Utility and Beliefs”. Mathematics of Operations Research; V.26-#4, pp. 864-890.


Ghirardato, Paolo and Massimo Marinacci (2001). “Range Convexity and Ambiguity Averse Preference”. Economic Theory; V.17-#?, pp. 599-617.


Ghirardato, Paolo, Fabio Maccheroni, Massimo Marinacci, and Marciano Siniscalchi (2003). “A Subjective Spin on Roulette Wheels”. Econometrica; V.71-#6, pp. 1897-1908.


Ryan, Matthew J. (2002). “What do uncertainty-averse decision-makers believe?”. Economic Theory; V.20-#1, pp. 47-65.


Zhang, Jiankang (2002). “Subjective ambiguity, expected utility and Choquet expected utility”. Economic Theory; V.20-#1, 159-181.


Montesano, Aldo (2002). “Uncertainty with Partial Information on the Possibility of Events”. Theory and Decision; V.51-#2/4, pp. 197-216.


Augustin, Thomas (2002). “Expected Utility within a Generalized Concept of Probability–A Comprehensive Framework for Decision Making under Ambiguity”. Statistical Papers; V.43-#1, pp. 5-22.


Grabisch, Michel and Christophe Labreuche (2002). “The Symmetrical and Asymmetric Choquet Integrals on Finite Spaces for Decision Making”. Statistical Papers; V.43-#1, pp. 37-52.


Bosi, Gianni and Magali Zuanon (2003). “Choquet Utility for Noncomplete Preferences”. International Mathematical Journal; V.3-#7, pp. 681-687.


Chateauneuf, Alain, Jurgen Eichberger, and Simon Grant (2003). “A Simple Axiomatization and Constructive Representation Proof for Choquet Expected Utility”. Economic Theory; V.22-#4, pp. 907-915.


Lo, Kin Chung (2005). “More Likely than Unlikely”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.49-#1, pp. 39-54.

 

(b) Updating Ambiguous Beliefs and Dynamic Consistency


Wasserman, Larry and Joseph Kadane (1990). “Bayes’ Theorem for Choquet Capacities”. Annals of Statistics; V.18-#3, pp. 1328-1339.


Lavalle, Irving and Yongsheng Xu (1990). “Information Evaluation under Nonadditive Expected Utility”. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty; V.3-#3, pp. 261-75.


Gilboa, Itzhak and David Schmeidler (1992). “Updating Ambiguous Beliefs”. in Yoram Moses, ed. Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge–Proceedings of the Fourth Conference. Los Altos: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 143-162. [comment by James Dow and Sérgio R.d.C. Werlang follows].


Gilboa, Itzhak and David Schmeidler (1993). “Updating Ambiguous Beliefs”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.59-#1, pp. 33-49.


Denneberg, Dieter (1994). “Conditioning (Updating) Non-Additive Measures”. Annals of Operations Research; V.52, pp. 21-42.


Eichberger, Jurgen and David Kelsey (1996). “Uncertainty Aversion and Dynamic Consistency”. International Economic Review; V.37-#3, pp. 625-640.


Kelsey, David and Frank Milne (1997). “Induced Preferences, Dynamic Consistency and Dutch Books”. Economica; V.64-#255, pp. 471-81.


Siniscalchi, Marciano (1997). “Conditional Preferences, Ellsberg Paradoxes and the Sure Thing Principle”. in P. Battigalli, A. Montesano, and F. Panunzi, eds. Decisions, Games and Markets. Dordrecht: Kluwer/Studies in Risk and Uncertainty, pp. 31-53.


Sarin, Rakesh and Peter Wakker (1998). “Revealed Likelihood and Knightian Uncertainty”. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty; V.16-#?, pp. 233-250.


Ryan, Matthew (2001). “Capacity Updating Rules and Rational Belief Change”. Theory and Decision; V.51-#1, pp. 73-87.


Chateauneuf, Alain, Robert Kast, André Lapied (2001). “Conditioning Capacities and Choquet Integrals: The Role of Comonotony”. Theory and Decision; V.51-#2/4, pp. 367-386.


Ghirardato, Paolo (2002). “Revisiting Savage in a Conditional World”. Economic Theory; V.20-#1, pp. 83-92.


Denneberg, Dieter (2002). “Conditional Expectation for Monotone Measures, The Discrete Case”. Journal of Mathematical Economics; V.37-#2, 105-121.


Wang, Tan (2003). “Conditional Preferences and Updating”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.108-#2, pp. 286-321.


Pires, Cesaltina (2002). “A Rule for Updating Ambiguous Beliefs”. Theory and Decision; V.53-#2, pp. 137-152.


Vergnaud, Jean-Christophe (2002). “Information and Capacities”. Statistical Papers; V.43-#1, pp. 111-125.


Marinacci, Massimo (2002). “Learning from Ambiguous Urns”.. Statistical Papers; V.43-#1, pp. 143-151.

 

(c) Applications of CEU Theory

 

i) Overviews and General Analyses


Chateauneuf, Alain, Michele Cohen and Isaac Meilijson (1997). “New Tools to Better Model Behaviour under Risk and Uncertainty: An Overview”. Finance; V.18-#1, pp. 25-46.


Heilpern, Stanislaw (2002). “Using Choquet Integral in Economics”. Statistical Papers; V.43-#1, pp. 37-52.


Philippe, Fabrice (2002). “Tools for Decision Making under Imprecise Risk”.. Statistical Papers; V.43-#1, pp. 95-110.


Mukerji, Sujoy and Jean-Marc Tallon (2003). “An Overview of Economic Applications of David Schmeidler’s Models of Decision Making under Uncertainty”. Ms: Oxford University.

 

ii) Finance


Dhaene, J., M. Denuit, M. J. Goovaerts, R. Kaas and D. Vyncke (2002). “The Concept of Comonotonicity in Actuarial Science and Finance: Theory”. Insurance: Mathematics and Economics; V.31-#1, Pp. 3-33.


Dhaene, J., M. Denuit, M. J. Goovaerts, R. Kaas and D. Vyncke (2002). “The Concept of Comonotonicity in Actuarial Science and Finance: Applications”. Insurance: Mathematics and Economics; V.31-#1, Pp.133-161.


Dow, James and Sergio da C. Werlang (1992). “Uncertainty Aversion, Risk Aversion and the Optimal Choice of a Portfolio”. Econometrica; V.197-204.


Dow, James and Sergio da C. Werlang (1992). “Excess Volatility of Stock Prices and Knightian Uncertainty”. European Economic Review; V.36-#?, pp. 631-638.


Epstein, Larry and Tan Wang (1994). “Intertemporal Asset Pricing under Knightian Uncertainty”. Econmetrica; V.62-#?, pp. 283-322.


Epstein, Larry (2000). “Are Probabilities Used in Markets”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.91-#1, pp. 86-90.


Chen, Zengjing And Larry Epstein (2002). “Ambiguity, Risk, and Asset Returns in Continuous Time”. Econometrica; V.70-#4, pp. 1403-1443.


Epstein, Larry and Jianjun Miao (2003). “A Two-Person Dynamic Equilibrium under Ambiguity”. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control; V.27-#7, pp. 1253-1288.


Epstein, Larry and M. Schneider (2003). “Recursive Multiple Prior”. Journal of Economic Theory;


Chateauneuf, Alain, Robert Kast and Andre Lapied (1996). “Choquet Pricing in Financial Markets with Frictions”. Mathematical Finance; V.6-#3, pp. 323-330.


Wang, Shaun and Jan Dhaene (1998). “Comonotonicity, Correlation Order, and Premium Principles”. Insurance: Mathematics and Economics; V.22-#3, pp. 235-242.


Mukerji, Sujoy and Jean-Marc Tallon (2001). “Ambiguity Aversion and Incompleteness of Financial Markets”. Review of Economic Studies; V.68-#4, pp. 883-904.


Basili, Marcello (2001). “Knightian Uncertainty in Financial Markets: An Assessment”. Economic Notes; V.30-#1, pp. 1-26.


De Waegnaere, Anja, Robert Kast and Andre Lapied (2003). “Choquet Pricing and Equilibrium”. Insurance: Mathematics and Economics; V.32-#3, pp. 359-370.

 

iii) Incomplete Markets and Contracting


Morris, Stephen (1997). “Risk, Uncertainty and Hidden Information”. Theory and Decision; V.42-#?, pp. 235-269.


Cassese, Gianluca (1997). “Incompleteness of Markets and Vaguenss of Beliefs”. Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Economiche e Commerciali; V.44-#4, pp. 837-855.


Mukerji, Sujoy (1998). “Ambiguity Aversion and Incompleteness of Contractual Form”. American Economic Review; V.88-#5, pp. 1207-1231.


Tallon, Jean-Marc (1998). “Do Sunspots Matter When Agents are Choquet-expected-utility Maximizers?”. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control; V.22-#3, pp. 357-368.


Chateauneuf, Alain, Rose-Anne Dana, and Jean-Marc Tallon (2000). “Optimal Risk-sharing Rules and Equilibria with Choquet Expected Utility”. Journal of Mathematical Economics; V.34-#2, pp. 191-214.


Billot, Antoine, Alain Chateauneuf, Itzhak Gilboa and Jean-Marc Tallon (2000). “Sharing Beliefs: Between Agreeing and Disagreeing”. Econometrica; V.68-#3, pp. 685-694.


Chateauneuf, Alain and Jean-Marc Tallon (2002). “Diversification, convex preferences and non-empty core in the Choquet expected utility model”. Economic Theory; V.19-#3, pp. 509-523.


Ma, Chenghu (2001). “A No-Trade Theorem under Knightian Uncertainty with General Preferences”. Theory and Decision; V.51-#2/4, pp. 173-181.


Billot, Antoine, Alain Chateauneuf, Itzhak Gilboa and Jean-Marc Tallon (2002). “Sharing Beliefs and the Absence of Betting in the Choquet Expected Utility Model”.. Statistical Papers; V.43-#1, pp. 127-136.


Mangelsdorff, Lukas and Martin Weber (1994). “Testing Choquet Expected Utility”. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization; V.25-#3, pp. 437-457.


Nishimura, Kiyohiko and Hiroyuki Ozaki (2004). “Search and Knightian Uncertainty”. Journal of Economic Theory; V119-#2, pp. 299-233.

 

(7) Ignorance


Milnor, John (1954). “Games Against Nature”. in R. Thrall, C. Coombs, and R. Davis, eds. Decision Processes. New York: Wiley, pp. 49-59.


Chernoff, H. (1954). “Rational Selection of Decision Functions”. Econometrica; V.22-#4, pp. 422-443.


Arrow, Kenneth and Leonid Hurwicz (1972). “An Optimality Criterion for Decision-making under Ignorance”. in C. Carter and J. Ford, eds. Uncertainty and Expectation in Economics. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 1-11.


Luce, R. Duncan and Howard Raiffa (1957). Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey. New York: Wiley. [sections 13.2-13.5 of pp. 278-306.]


Maskin, Eric (1979). “Decision-making under Ignorance with Implications for Social Choice”. Theory and Decision; V.11-#?, pp. 319-337.


Cohen, Michèle and Jean-Yves Jaffray (1980). “Rational Behavior under Ignorance”. Econometrica; V.48-#5, pp. 1281-1299.


Cohen, Michèle and Jean-Yves Jaffray (1983). “Approximations of Rational Criteria under Complete Ignorance and the Independence Axiom”. Theory and Decision; V.15-#?, pp. 121-150.


Bossert, Walter, Prasanta Pattanaik, and Yongsheng Xu (2000). “Choice under Complete Uncertainty: Axiomatic Characterization of some Decision Rules”. Economic Theory; V.16-#?, pp. 295-312.


Rodriguez, C.C. (1988). “Understanding Ignorance”. In Gary J. Erickson and C. Ray Smith, ed. Maximum Entropy and Bayesian Methods in Science and Engineering, V.1. Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 189-204.

 

(8) Other


Aumann, Robert (1962). “Utility Theory without the Completeness Axiom”. Econometrica; V.30-#?, pp. 445-462. [correction, 1964, V.32-#?, pp. 210-212].


Kannai, Yakar (1963). “Existence of a Utility in Infinite Dimensional Partially Ordered Spaces”. Israel Journal of Mathematics; V.1-#?, pp. 229-234.


Fishburn, Peter (1986). “A New Model for Decisions under Uncertainty”. Economics Letters; V.21-#?, pp. 127-130.


Fishburn, Peter (1991). “On the Theory of Ambiguity”. International Journal of Information and Management Science; V.2-#1, pp. 1-16.


Fishburn, Peter (1993). “The Axioms and Algebra of Ambiguity”. Theory and Decision; V.34-#2, pp. 119-137.

 

2. General Theory of Bayesian Learning

 

a. Overviews


Kiefer, Nicholas M. (1988/9). “Optimal Collection of Information by Partially Informed Agents”. Econometric Reviews; V.7-#2 1988-89, pp. 113-48. [comments and response follow]


Kiefer, Nicholas and Yaw Nyarko (1995). “Savage-Bayesian Models of Economics”. in Alan Kirman and Mark Salmon, eds. Learning and Rationality in Economics. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 40-62.


Marimon, Ramon (1997). “Learning from Learning in Economics”. in David Kreps and Kenneth Wallis, eds. Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Application–V.I. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 278-315.

 

b. Calibration, Merging, and Bayesian Learning


Blackwell, David and Lester Dubins (1962). “Merging Opinions with Increasing Information”. Annals of Mathematical Statistics; V.38-#?, pp. 882-886.


Kalai, Ehud and Ehud Lehrer (1994). “Weak and Strong Merging of Opinion”. Journal of Mathematical Economics; V.23-#1, pp. 73-86.


Lehrer, Ehud and Ran Smorodinsky (1996). “Compatible Measures and Merging”. Mathematics of Operations Research; V.21-#3, pp. 697-706.


Lehrer, Ehud and Ran Smorodinsky (1996). “Learning and Merging”. in Thomas Ferguson, Lloyd Shapley, and James MacQueen, eds. Statistics, Probability and Game Theory: Papers in Honor of David Blackwell. Hayward, Cal.: Institute of Mathematical Statistics, pp. 147-168.


Miller, Ronald and Chris Sanchirico (1999). “The Role of Absolute Continuity in ‘Merging Opinions’ and ‘Rational Learning’”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.29-#1/2, pp. 170-190.


Miller, Ronald and Chris Sanchirico (1997). “Almost Everybody Disagrees Almost All the Time: The Genericity of Weakly-Merging Nowhere”. ms: Department of Economics, Columbia University.


Lehrer, Ehud and Ran Smorodinsky (2000). “Relative Entropy in Sequential Decision Problems”. Journal of Mathematical Economics; V.33-#4, pp. 425-439.


Dawid, A.P. (1982). “The Well-Calibrated Bayesian”. Journal of the American Statistical Association; V.77-#379, pp. 605-613. [Comment by D. Oakes and Response in JASA, V.80-#390, pp. 339-341.]


Foster, Dean and Rakesh Vohra (1998). “Asymptotic Calibration”. Biometrika; V.85-#2, pp. 379-390.


Foster, Dean (1999). “A Proof of Calibration via Blackwell’s Approachability Theorem”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.29-#1/2, pp. 73-78.


Fudenberg, Drew and David Levine (1999). “An Easier Way to Calibrate”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.29-#1/2, pp. 131-137.


Kalai, Ehud, Ehud Lehrer, and Rann Smorodinsky (1999). “Calibrated Forecasting and Merging”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.29-#1/2, pp. 151-169.

 

c. Bayesian Learning


Prescott, Edward (1972). “The Multiperiod Control Problem under Uncertainty”. Econometrica; V.40-#6, pp. 1043-1058.


Easley, David and Nicholas Kiefer (1988). “Controlling a Stochastic Process with Unknown Parameters”. Econometrica; V.56-#5, pp. 1045-1064.


Easley, David and Nicholas Kiefer (1989). “Optimal Learning with Endogenous Data”. International Economic Review; V.30-#4, pp. 963-978.


Kiefer, Nicholas and Yaw Nyarko (1988). “Control of a Linear Regression Process with Unknown Parameters”. in W. Barnett, E. Berndt and H. White, eds. Dynamic Econometric Modeling. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 105-120.


Kiefer, Nicholas and Yaw Nyarko (1989). “Optimal Control of an Unknown Linear Process with Learning”. International Economic Review; V.30-#3, pp. 571-586.


Kiefer, Nicholas (1990). “The Valuation of Economic Information”. in Richard Quandt and Dusan Triska, eds. Optimal Decisions in Markets and Planned Economies. Boulder: Westview Press, pp. 256-267.


Nyarko, Yaw (1991). “On the Convergence of Bayesian Posterior Processes in Linear Models: Counting Equations and Unknowns”. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control; V.15-#4, pp. 687-713.


Feldman, Mark (1991). “On the Generic Nonconvergence of Bayesian Actions and Beliefs”. Economic Theory; V.1-#4, pp. 301-322.


Aghion, Philippe, Patrick Bolton, Christopher Harris, and Bruno Jullien (1991). “Optimal Learning by Experimentation”. Review of Economic Studies; V.58-#4, pp. 621-654.


Feldman, Mark and Michael Spagat (1995). “Optimal Learning with Costly Adjustment”. Economic Theory; V.6-#3, pp. 439-451.


Bikhchandani, Sushil, Uzi Segal, and Sunil Sharma (1992). “Stochastic Dominance under Bayesian Learning”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.56-#2, pp. 352-77.


El-Gamal, Mahmoud A. Rangarajan Sundaram (1993). “Bayesian Economists . . . Bayesian Agents: An Alternative Approach to Optimal Learning”. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control; V.17-#3, pp. 355-83.


El-Gamal, Mahmoud A. and Thomas Palfrey (1996). “Economical Experiments: Bayesian Efficient Experimental Design”. International Journal of Game Theory; V.25-#4, pp. 495-517.


Jackson, Matthew, Ehud Kalai, and Rann Smorodinsky (1999). “Bayesian Representation of Stochastic Processes under Learning: DeFinetti Revisited”. Econometrica; V.67-#4, pp. 875-893.


Albert, Max (1999). “Bayesian Learning when Chaos Looms Large”. Economics Letters; V.65-#1, pp. 1-7.


Wieland, Volker (2000). “Learning by Doing and the Value of Optimal Experimentation”. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control; V.24-#?, pp. 501-534.


Balvers, Ronald and Thomas Cosimano (1993). “Periodic Learning about a Hidden State Variable”. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control; V.17-#5/6, pp. 805-827.

 

3. Economic Applications

 

a. Consumer learning with unknown product quality


Kihlstrom, Richard (1974). “A General Theory of Demand for Information About Product Quality”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.8-#4, pp. 413-439.


Kihlstrom, Richard (1974). “A Bayesian Model of Demand for Information About Prouct Quality”. International Economic Review; V.15-#1, pp. 99-118.


Grossman, Sanford, Richard Kihlstrom and Leonard Mirman (1977). “A Bayesian Approach to the Production of Information and Learning by Doing”. Review of Economic Studies; V.44-#3, pp. 533-547.


Kihlstrom, Richard, Leonard Mirman, and Andrew Postelwaite (1984). “Experimental Consumption and the ‘Rothschild Effect’”. in Boyer, M. and R. Kihlstrom, eds. (1984). Bayesian Models of Economic Theory. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 279-302.


Tonks, Ian (1984). “A Bayesian Approach to the Production of Information with a Linear Utility Function”. Review of Economic Studies; V.51-#3, pp. 521-527.


Fusselman, Jerry and Leonard Mirman (1993). “Experimental Consumption for a General Class of Disturbance Densities”. in Robert Becker, et al. eds. General Equilibrium, Growth and Trade, II. San Diego: Academic Press, pp. 367-392.


Boyer, Marcel and Richard Kihlstrom, eds. (1984). Bayesian Models of Economic Theory. Amsterdam: Elsevier.

 

b. Optimal Search with Learning


Rothschild, Michael (1974). “Searching for the Lowest Price when the Distribution of Prices in Unknown”. Journal of Political Economy; V.82-#?, pp. 689-711.


Axell, Bo (1974). “Price Dispersion and Information-An Adaptive Sequential Search Model”. Swedish Journal of Economics; V.76-#1, pp. 77-98.


Rosenfeld, Donald and Roy Shapiro (1981). “Optimal Adaptive Price Search”. Journal of EconomicTheory; V.25-#1, pp. 1-20.


Morgan, Peter (1985). “Distributions of the Duration and Value of Job Search with Learning”. Econometrica; V.53-#5, pp. 1199-1232.


Burdett, Kenneth and Tara Vishwanath (1988). “Declining Reservation Wages and Learning”. Review of Economic Studies; V.55-#4, pp. 655-666.


Benabou, Roland and Robert Gertner (1993). “Search with Learning from Prices: Does Increased Inflationary Uncertainty Lead to Higher Markups?”. Review of Economic Studies; V.60-#1, pp. 69-94.


Dana, James D., Jr. (1994). “Learning in an Equilibrium Search Model”. International Economic Review; V.35-#3, pp. 745-71.


Talmain, Gabriel (1992). “Search from an Unknown Distribution: An Explicit Solution”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.57-#?, pp. 141-157.


Bikhchandani, Sushil and Sunil Sharma (1996). “Optimal Search with Learning”. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control; V.20-#1/3, pp. 333-59.


Fishman, Arthur (1996). “Search with Learning and Price Adjustment Dynamics”. Quarterly Journal of Economics; V.111-#1, pp. 253-68.

 

c. Monopoly pricing with Unknown Demand


Rothschild, Michael (1974). “A Two-Armed Bandit Theory of Market Pricing”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.9-#?, pp. 185-202.


McLennan, Andrew (1984). “Price Dispersion and Incomplete Learning in the Long Run”. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control; V.7-#?, pp. 331-347.


Kiefer, Nicholas (1989). “A Value Function Arising the Economics of Information”. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control; V.13-#?, pp. 201-233.


Balvers, Ronald and Thomas Cosimano (1990). “Actively Learning about Demand and the Dynamics of Price Adjustments”. Economic Journal; V.100-#402, pp. 882-898.


Nyarko, Yaw (1991). “Learning in Mis-specified Models and the Possibility of Cycles”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.55-#?, pp. 416-427.


Mirman, Leonard, Larry Samuelson, and A. Urbano (1993). “Monopoly Experimentation”. International Economic Review; V.34-#3, pp. 549-564.


Trefler, Daniel (1993). “The Ignorant Monopolist: Optimal Learning with Endogenous Information”. International Economic Review; V.34-#3, pp. 565-581.


Rustichini, A. and A. Wolinsky (1995). “Learning about Variable Demand in the Long Run”. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control; V.19-#?, pp. 1283-1292.


Bala, Venkatesh and Sanjeev Goyal (1995). “A Theory of Learning with Heterogeneous Agents”. International Economic Review; V.36-#2, pp. 303-323.


Keller, Godfrey and Sven Rady (1999). “Optimal Experimentation in a Changing Environment”. Review of Economic Studies; V.66-#3, pp. 475-507.

 

d. Monopoly Investment with Unknown Demand


Cyert, Richard, Morris DeGroot, and Charles Holt (1978). “Sequential Investment Decisions with Bayesian Learning”. Management Science; V.24-#7, pp. 712-718


Cyert, Richard, Morris DeGroot, and Charles Holt (1979). “Capital Allocation within a Firm”. Behavioral Science; V.24-#?, pp.


Tonks, Ian (1986). “Bayesian Learning and the Optimal Investment Decision of the Firm”. Economic Journal, V.?-#conference supplement, pp. 87-98.


Zeira, Joseph (1987). “Investment as a Product of Search”. Journal of Political Economy; V.95-#1, pp. 204-210.


Jovanovic, Boyan and Yaw Nyarko (1995). “A Bayesian Learning Model Fitted to a Variety of Empirical Learning Curves”. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity; Microeconomics, pp. 247-99.

 

e. Optimal Growth with Learning


Freixas, X. (1981). “Optimal Growth with Experimentation”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.24-#?, pp. 296-309.


Bertocchi, Graziella and Michael Spagat (1997). “Structural Uncertainty and Subsidy Removal for Economies in Transitition”. European Economic Review; V.41-#9, pp. 1709-1734.


Flåm, Sjur and Leonard Mirman (1998). “Groping for Optimal Growth”. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control; V.23-#?, pp. 191-207.


Bertocchi, Graziella and Michael Spagat (1998). “Growth under Uncertainty with Experimentation”. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control; V.23-#?, pp. 209-231.

 

f. Other


Crawford, Robert (1973). “Implications of Learning for Economic Models of Uncertainty”. International Economic Review; V.14-#3, pp. 587-600.


Cyert, Richard and Morris DeGroot (1975). “Adaptive Utility”. in R.H. Day and T. Groves, eds. Adaptive Economic Models. San Diego: Academic Press, pp. 223-246.


Cyert, Richard and Morris DeGroot (1980). “Learning Applied to Utility Functions”. in A. Zellner, ed. Bayesian Analysis in Econometrics and Statistics. Amsterdam: North-Holland.

 

C. Bounded Rationality and Rules of Thumb (Bayesian rationality minus)

 

1. General Discussions


Simon, Herbert (1959). “Theories of Decision-Making in Economics and Behavioral Science”. American Economic Review; V.49-#3, pp. 253-283.


March, James (1978). “Bounded Rationality, Ambiguity, and the Engineering of Choice”. Bell Journal of Economics; V.9-#2, pp. 587-605.


Walliser, Bernard (1989). “Instrumental Rationality and Cognitive Rationality”. Theory and Decision; V.27-#1, pp. 7-36.


Lipman, Barton (1995). “Information Processing and Bounded Rationality: A Survey”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.28-#1, pp. 42-67.


Conlisk, John (1996). “Why Bounded Rationality?”. Journal of Economic Literature; V.34-#2, pp. 669-700.


Kahneman, Daniel, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky, eds. (1982). Judgement Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge: CUP.


Mongin, Philippe and Bernard Walliser (1988). “Infinite Regressions in the Optimizing Theory of Decisions”. in. B. Munier, ed. Risk, Decision and Rationality. Boston: Reidel, pp. 435-457.


Mongin, Philippe (2000). “Does Optimization Imply Rationality”. Synthese; V.124-#2, pp. 73-111.


Smith, Holly (1991). “Deciding How to Decide: Is There a Regress Problem?”. in Michael Bacharach and Susan Hurley, eds. Foundations of Decision Theory: Issues and Advances. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 194-219.


Lipman, Barton (1991). “How to Decide How to Decide How to ...: Modeling Limited Rationality”. Econometrica; V.59-#4, pp. 1105-1125.


de Palma, André, Gordon Myers and Yorgos Papageorgiou (1994). “Rational Choice under Imperfect Ability to Choose”. American Economic Review; V.84-#3, pp. 418-440.


Bendor, Jonathan (1995). “A Model of Muddling Through”. American Political Science Review; V.89-#4, pp. 819-840.


MacLeod, W. Bentley (1996). “Decision, Contract, and Emotion: Some Economics for a Complex and Confusing World”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.29-#4, pp. 788-810.


Rabin, Matthew (1998). “Psychology and Economics”. Journal of Economic Literature; V.36-#1, pp. 11-46.


Nehring, Klaus (1999). “Preference for Flexibility in a Savage Framework”. Econometrica; V.67-#?, pp. 101-120.


Easley, David and Aldo Rustichini (1999). “Choice Without Beliefs”. Econometrica; V.67-#5, pp. 1157-1184.


Rustichini, Aldo (1999). “Optimal Properties of Stimulus-Response Learning Models”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.29-#1/2, pp. 244-273.


Dekel. Eddie, Barton Lipman, and Aldo Rustichini (2001). Representing Preferences with a Unique Subjective State Space”. Econometrica; V.69-#?, pp. 894-934.


Ozdenoren, Emre (2002). “Completing the State Space with Subjective States”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.105-#?, pp. 531-539.


MacLeod, W. Bentley (2002). “Complexity, Bounded Rationality and Heuristic Search”. Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy; V.1-#1, Article 8, [http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/contributions/vol1/iss1/art8.]


Bowles, Samuel (1998). “Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and Other Economic Institutions“. Journal of Economic Literature; V.36-#1, pp. 75-111.

 

2. Adaptive Search and Satisficing


Simon, Herbert (1982). Models of Bounded Rationality, Vol. 2: Behavioral Economics and Business Organization. Cambridge: MIT Press. [especially sections VII and VIII]


Radner, Roy (1975). “Satisficing”. Journal of Mathematical Economics; V.2-#?, pp. 253-262.


Radner, Roy and Michael Rothschild (1975). “On the Allocation of Effort”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.10-#?, pp. 358-376.


Radner, Roy (1975). “A Behavioral Model of Cost Reduction”. Bell Journal of Economics; #1, pp. 196-215.


Rothschild, Michael (1975). “Further Notes on the Allocation of Effort”. in R. Day and T. Groves, eds. Adaptive Economic Models. New York: Academic Press, pp. 195-220.


Shipley, Frederic II (1975). “Convergence of Adaptive Decisions”. in R. Day and T. Groves, eds. Adaptive Economic Models. New York: Academic Press, pp. 247-272.


Radner, Roy (1986). “Behavioral Models of Stochastic Control”. in Stanley Reiter, ed. Studies in Mathematical Economics. Washington, DC: Mathematical Association of America, pp. 351-404.


Tamotsu Onozaki, Gernot Sieg, Masanori Yokoo (2000). “Complex Dynamics in a Cobweb Model with Adaptive Production Adjustment”. Journal of Economic Behavior And Organization; V.41-#2, pp. 101-115.

 

3. Finite Automata


Rubinstein, Ariel (1998). Modeling Bounded Rationality. Cambridge: MIT Press.


Fershtman, Chaim, and Ehud Kalai (1993). “Complexity Considerations and Market Behavior”. Rand Journal of Economics; V.24-#2, pp. 224-35.


Gilboa, Itzhak and David Schmeidler (1994). “Infinite Histories and Steady Orbits in Repeated Games”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.6-#?, pp. 370-399.


Anderlini, Luca (1998). “Forecasting Errors and Bounded Rationality”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.36-#2, pp. 71-90.


Anderlini, Luca and L. Felli (1994), “Incomplete Written Contracts: Undescribable States of Nature”. QJE; V.109-#?, pp. 1085-1124.


Anderlini, Luca and L. Felli (1999), “Incomplete Contracts and Complexity Costs”. Theory and Decision; V.46-#1, pp. 23-50.


Anderlini, Luca and H. Sabourian (1995). “Cooperation and Effective Computability”. Econometrica; V.63-#?, pp. 1337-1370.


Al-Najjar, Nabil, Raman Casadesus-Masanell, and Emre Ozdenoren (2003). “Probabilistic Representation of Complexity”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.111-#1, pp. 49-87.


Cutland, N.J. (1980). Computability: An Introduction to Recursive Function Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

 

4. Preference for Flexibility


Koopmans, Tjalling (1964). “On the Flexibility of Future Preferences”. in M. Shelly and G. Bryan, eds. Human Judgements and Optimality. New York: Wiley, pp. 243-254.


Kreps, David and E. Porteus (1978). “Temporal Resolution of Uncertainty and Dynamic Choice Theory”. Econometrica; V.46-#?, pp. 185-200.


Kreps, David M. (1979). “A Representation Theorem for ‘Preference for Flexibility’”. Econometrica; V.47-#3, pp. 565-577.


Modica, Salvatore (2002). “A note on preference for flexibility”. Decisions in Economics and Finance; V.25-#1, pp. 47-63.


Kreps, David (1992). “Static Choice in the Presence of Unforseen Contingencies”. in P. Dasgupta, D. Gale, O. Hart, and E. Maskin, eds. Economic Analysis of Markets and Games. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 258-281.


Jones, Robert and Joseph Ostroy (1984). “Flexibility and Uncertainty”. Review of Economic Studies; V.51-#1, pp. 13-32.


Chew, Soo Hong and Larry Epstein (1989). “The Structure of Preferences and Attitudes Towards the Timing of Resolution of Uncertainty”. International Economic Review; V.30-#?, pp. 103-117.


Grant, Simon, Atsushi Kaji, and Ben Polak (1998). “Intrinsic Preference for Information”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.83-#?, pp. 233-259.


Skiadas, Costas (1998). “Recursive Utility and Preferences for Information”. Economic Theory; V.12-#?, pp. 293-312.


Nehring, Klaus (1999). “Preference For Flexibility in a Savage Framework”. Econometrica; V.67-#1, pp. 101-119.


Dekel. Eddie, Barton Lipman, and Aldo Rustichini (2001). Representing Preferences with a Unique Subjective State Space”. Econometrica; V.69-#?, pp. 894-934.


Modica, Salvatore (2002). “A Note on Preference for Flexibility”. Decisions in Economics and Finance; V.25-#1, pp. 47-63.


Ozdenoren, Emre (2002). “Completing the State Space with Subjective States”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.105-#?, pp. 531-539.


Grant, Simon, Atsushi Kaji, and Ben Polak (2000). “Preference for Information and Dynamic Consistency”. Theory and Decision; V.48-#3, pp. 263-286.


Grant, Simon, Atsushi Kaji, and Ben Polak (2000). “Temporal Resolution of Uncertainty and Recursive Non-Expected Utility Models”. Econometrica, V.68-#2, pp. 425-434.


Arlegi, Ricardo and Jorge Nieto (2001). “Ranking Opportunity Sets: An Axiomatic Approach Based on the Preference for Flexibility”. Social Choice and Welfare; V.18-#1, pp. 23-36.


Arrow, Kenneth (1995). “A Note on Freedom and Flexibility”. in Basu, K., P. Pattanaik, and K. Suzumura, eds. Choice, welfare, and development. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 7-16.

 

5. Evolution of Social and Economic Structures


Wilson, Edward O. (1975). Sociobiology. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.


Wilson, Edward O. (1978). On Human Nature. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.


Lumsden, Charles and Edward O. Wilson (1981). Genes, Mind, and Culture: The Coevolutionary Process. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.


Wilson, Edward O. (1998). Consilience. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.


Dawkins, Richard (1976/1989). The Selfish Gene. Oxford: OUP.


Dawkins, Richard (1982). The Extended Phenotype: The Gene as the Unit of Selection. Oxford: OUP.


Boyd, Robert and Peter Richerson (1985). Culture and the Evolutionary Process. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.


Hayek, Friedrich (1988). The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.


Becker, Gary (1976). “Altruism, Egoism, and Genetic Fitness: Economics and Sociobiology”. Journal of Economic Literature; V.14-#2, pp. 817-826.


Rosenberg, Alexander (1980). Sociobiology and the Preemption of Social Science. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.


Montagu, Ashley, ed. (1980). Sociobiology Examined. New York: Oxford University Press.


Kitcher, Philip (1985). Vaulting Ambition: Sociobiology and the Quest for Human Nature. Cambridge: MIT Press.


Hausman, Daniel (1989). “Arbitrage Arguments”. Erkenntnis; V.30-#1/2, pp. 5-22.


Boulding, Kenneth (1981). Evolutionary Economics. Beverley Hills: Sage.


Boulding, Kenneth (1987). “The Epistemology of Complex Systems”. European Journal of Operations Research; V.30-#2, pp. 110-116.


Boulding, Kenneth (1991). “What is Evolutionary Economics?”. Journal of Evolutionary Economics; V.1-#1, pp. 9-17.


Boulding, Kenneth (1992). “Punctuationism in Societal Evolution”. in A. Somit, and S. Peterson eds.. The dynamics of evolution: The punctuated equilibrium debate in the natural and social sciences. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 171-86.


Hodgson, Geoffrey (1993). Economics and Evolution: Bringing Life Back Into Economics. Cambridge: Polity Press.


Witt, Ulrich, ed. (1992). Explaining Process and Change: Approaches to Evolutionary Economics. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.


Khalil, Elias and Kenneth Boulding, eds. (1996). Evolution, order and complexity. New York: Routledge.


Alchian, Armen (1950). “Uncertainty, Evolution and Economic Theory”. Journal of Political Economy; V.58-#?, pp. 211-221.


Enke, Stephen (1951). “On Maximizing Profits: A Distinction between Chamberlin and Robinson”. American Economic Review; V.41-#?, pp. 567-578.


Penrose, Edith (1952). “Biological Analogies in the Theory of the Firm”. American Economic Review; V.42-#?, pp. 804-819.


Friedman, Milton (1953). “The Methodology of Positive Economics”. Essays in Positive Economics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. [esp. pp. 19-23.]


Hamilton, W.D. (1964). “The Genetical Evolution of Social Behavior”. Journal of Theoretical Biology; V.7-#1, pp. 1-52.


Winter, Sidney (1964). “Economic Natural Selection and the Theory of the Firm”. Yale Economic Essays; V.4-#?, pp. 225-272.


Winter, Sidney (1971). “Satisficing, Selection and the Innovating Remnant”. Quarterly Journal of Economics; V.85-#?, pp. 237-261.


Farrell, M.J. (19?0). “Some Elementary Selection Processes in Economics”. Reveiw of Economic Studies; V.37-#?, pp. 305-319.


Day, Richard (1975). “Adaptive Processes and Economic Theory”. in R.H. Day and T. Groves, eds. Adaptive Economic Models. New York: Academic Press, pp. 1-37.


Winter, Sidney (1975). “Optimization and Evolution in the Theory of the Firm”. in R.H. Day and T. Groves, eds. Adaptive Economic Models. New York: Academic Press, pp. 73-118.


Nelson, Richard and Sidney Winter (1982). An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.


Hirshleifer, Jack (1982). “Evolutionary Models in Economics and Law: Cooperation versus Conflict Strategies”. Research in Law and Economics; V.4, pp. 1-60.


Jovanovic, Boyan (1982). “Selection and the Evolution of Industry”. Econometrica; V.50-#?, pp. 649-670.


Iwai, Katsuhito (1984). “Schumpeterian Dynamics: An Evolutionary Model of Innovation and Imitation”. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization; V.5-#?, pp. 159-190.


Iwai, Katsuhito (1984). “Schumpeterian Dynamics, Part II: Technological Progress, Firm Growth and ‘Economic Selection’”. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization; V.5-#?, pp. 321-351.


Matthews, R.C.O. (1984). “Darwinism and Economic Change”. Oxford Economic Papers; V.?-#?, pp. 91-117.


Hansson, Ingemar and Charles Stuart (1990). “Malthusian Selection of Preferences”. American Economic Review; V.80-#3, pp. 529-544.


Blume, Lawrence and David Easley (1992). “Evolution and Market Behavior”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.58-#1, pp. 9-40.


Blume, Lawrence and David Easley (1993). “Economic Natural Selection”. Economics Letters; V.42-#?, pp. 281-289.


Radner, Roy (1998). “Economic Survival”. In D. Jacobs, E. Kalai, and M. Kamien, eds. Frontiers of Economic Research. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 183-209.


Dutta, Prajit and Roy Radner (1999). “Profit Maximization and the Market Selection Hypothesis”. Review of Economic Studies; V.66-#4, pp. 769-798.


Dutta, Prajit and Rangarajan Sundaram (2001). “Survival and the Art of Profit Maximization”. Review of Economic Design; V.6-#3/4, pp. 429-446.


Sandroni, Alvaro (2000). “Do Markets Favor Agents Able to Make Accurate Predictions”. Econometrica; V.68-#?, pp. 1303-1342.


Biais, Bruno and Raphael Shadur (2000). “Darwinian Selection Does Not Eliminate Irrational Traders”. European Economic Review; V.44-#3, pp. 469-490.


Blume, Lawrence and David Easley (2002). “Optimality and Natural Selection in Markets”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.107-#1, pp. 95-135.


Blonski, Matthias (1999). “When is Rational Behavior Consistent with Rules of Thumb? A Link between Evolutionary Terminology and Neoclassical Methodology”. Journal of Mathematical Economics; V.32-#1, pp. 131-144.

 

D. Bounded Rationality with Practical Reason

 

1. Modal Epistemic and Doxastic Logic

 

a. Some Background on Modal Logic

 

(1) Basics of Modal Logic


E.J. Lemmon, in collaboration with Dana Scott (19777). An Introduction to Modal Logic. Oxford: Blackwell.


Bull, R.A. and Krister Segerberg (1984). “Basic Modal Logic”. in Dov Gabbay and F. Guenther, eds. Handbook of Philosophical Logic. Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 1-88.


Fitting, Melvin (1993). “Basic Modal Logic”. in Dov Gabbay, C.J. Hogger, and J.A. Robinson, eds. Handbook of Logic in Artificial Intelligence and Logic Programming. Volume 1: Logical Foundations. Oxford: Oxford Science Publications, pp. 365-448.


Chellas, B.F. (1980). Modal Logic: An Introduction. Cambridge: CUP.


Hughes, G.E. and M.J. Cresswell (1996). A New Introduction to Modal Logic. New York: Routledge.


Forbes, Graeme (2000). An Introduction to Modal Logic. ms: Department of Philosophy, Tulane University.


Linsky, Leonard ed. (1971). Reference and Modality. Oxford: OUP.


Kracht, Marcus, ed. (1998). Advances in Modal Logic. (Csli Lecture Notes , No 87).


Montague, Richard (1962). “Theories Incomparable with Respect to Relative Interpretability”. Journal of Symbolic Logic; V.27-#?, pp. 195-211.


Montague, Richard (1963). “Syntactical Treatment of Modality with Corollaries on Reflexion Principles and Finite Axiomatizability”. Acta Philosophica Fennica, V.16-#?, pp. 153-167.


Thomason, Richmond (1980). “A Note on Syntactic Treatments of Modality”. Synthese; V.44-#?, pp. 391-395.


Thomason, Richmond (1986). “Paradoxes and Semantic Representation”. in Joseph Halpern, ed. Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge: Proceedings of the 1986 Conference. Los Altos: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 225-239.


des Rivières, Jim and Hector Levesque (1986). “The Consistency of Syntactical Treatments of Knowledge”. in Joseph Halpern, ed. Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge: Proceedings of the 1986 Conference. Los Altos: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 115-130.

 

(2) Possible Worlds


Kripke, Saul (1963). “Semantical Considerations on Modal Logics”. Acta Philosophica Fennica; V.16-#?, pp. 83-94.


Kripke, Saul (1963). “Semantical Analysis of Modal Logic, I: Normal Modal Propositional Calculi”. Zeitschrift für Mathematische Logik unde Grundlagen der Mathematik; V.9-#?, pp. 67-96.


Kripke, Saul (1965). “Semantical Analysis of Modal Logic, II”. in J. Addison, L. Henkin, and A. Tarski, eds. Theory of Models. Amsterdam: North Holland, pp. 206-220.


Lambert, Karel and Bas van Fraassen (1970). “Meaning Relations, Possible Objects, and Possible Worlds”. in Karel Lambert, ed. Philosphical Problems in Logic: Some Recent Developments. Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 1-19.


Rescher, Nicholas (1975). A Theory of Possibility : A Constructivistic and Conceptualistic Account of Possible Individuals and Possible Worlds. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.


Loux, Michael, ed. (1979). The Possible and the Actual: Readings in the Metaphysics of Modality. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.


Stalnaker, Robert (1976). “Possible Worlds”. Noûs; V.10-#1, pp. 65-75.


Stalnaker, Robert (1991). “Possible Worlds and Situations”. Journal of Philosophical Logic; V.15-#?, pp. 109-123.


Lewis, David (1986). On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell.


Armstrong, D.M. (1989). A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility. Cambridge: CUP.

 

(3) Conditionals and Counterfactuals


Stalnaker, Robert (1968). “A Theory of Conditionals”. in N. Rescher, ed. Studies in Logical Theory. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 98-112.


Lewis, David (1973). Counterfactuals. Oxford: Blackwell.


Lewis, David (1976). “Probabilities of Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities”. Philosophical Review; V.85-#?, pp. 297-315.


Gibbard, Allan and William Harper (1978). “Counterfactuals and Two Kinds of Expected Utility”. Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory, Volume 1. Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 125-162.


Harper, William, Glenn Pearce, and Robert Stalnaker (1981). Ifs: Conditionals, Belief, Decision, Chance, and Time. Dordrecht: Reidel.


Lewis, David (1981). “Causal Decision Theory”. Austrasasian Journal of Philosophy; V.59-#?, pp. 5-30.


Jackson, Frank, ed. (1991). Conditionals. Oxford: OUP.


Eels, Ellery and Brian Skyrms, eds. (1994). Probability and Conditionals: Belief Revision and Rational Decision. Cambridge: CUP.


Friedman, Nir and Joseph Halpern (1994). “On the Complexity of Conditional Logics”. in. Jon Doyle, Erik Sandewall, and Pietro Torasso, eds. Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning: Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference. San Francisco: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 202-213.


Woodruff, Peter (1999). “Partitions and Conditionals”. Journal of Philosophical Logic; V.28-#2, pp. 113-128.


Stalker, Douglas, ed. (1994). Grue!: The New Riddle of Induction. Chicago: Open Court Publishing Company.

 

b. Knowledge and Belief in Kripke Structures

 

(1) Overviews


Hintikka, Jaakko (1986). “Reasoning About Knowledge in Philosophy: The Paradigm of Epistemic Logic”. in Joseph Halpern, ed. Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge–Proceedings of the 1986 Conference. Los Altos: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 63-80.


Halpern, Joseph (1986). “Reasoning about Knowledge: An Overview”. in Joseph Halpern, ed. Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge–Proceedings of the 1986 Conference. Los Altos: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 1-17.


Levesque, Hector (1986). “Knowledge Representation and Reasoning”. Annual Review of Computer Science, Vol. 1, pp. 255-287.


Parikh, Rohit (1990). “Recent Issues in Reasoning about Knowledge”. in Rohit Parikh, ed. Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge–Proceedings of the Third Conference. Los Altos: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 3-10.


Stalnaker, Robert (1994). “Modality and Possible Worlds”. Jaegwon Kim and Ernest Sosa, eds. Blackwell Companion to Metaphysics. Oxford: Blackwell.


Halpern, Joseph (1995). “Reasoning About Knowledge: A Survey”. in Dov Gabbay, C.J. Hogger, and J.A. Robinson, eds. Handbook of Logic in Artificial Intelligence and Logic Programming. Volume 4: Epistemic and Temporal Reasoning. Oxford: Oxford Science Publications, pp. 1-34.


Fagin, Ronald, Joseph Halpern, Yoram Moses, and Moshe Vardi (1995). Reasoning About Knowledge. Cambridge: MIT Press.

 

(2) Knowledge and Belief

 

(a) Philosophical Perspectives on Knowledge and Belief


Russell, Bertrand (1912). “Knowledge, Error, and Probable Opinion”. Chapter 13 of The Problems of Philosophy. Oxford: OUP.


Ayer, A.J. (1956). The Problem of Knowledge. London: Macmillan.


Gettier, Edmund (1963). “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”. Analysis; V.23-#6, pp. 121-123.


Clark, Michael (1963). “Knowledge and Grounds: A Comment on Mr. Gettier’s Paper”. Analysis; V.24-#2, pp. 46-48.


Sosa, Ernest (1964). “The Analysis of ‘Knowledge That P’”. Analysis; V.25-#1, pp. 1-8.


Saunders, John Turk and Narayan Champwat (1964). “Mr. Clark’s Definition of ‘Knowledge’”. Analysis; V.25-#1, pp. 8-9.


Lehrer, Keith (1965). “Knowledge, Truth and Evidence”. Analysis; V.25#5, pp. 168-168-175.


Harman, Gilbert (1966). “Lehrer on Knowledge”. Journal of Philosophy; V.63-#9, pp. 241-247.


Goldman, Alvin (1967). “A Causal Theory of Knowing”. Journal of Philosophy; V.64-#12, pp. 357-372.


Skyrms, Brian (1967). “The Explication of ‘X Knows That p’”. Journal of Philosophy; V.64-#2, pp. 373-389.


Lehrer, Keith and Thomas Paxson (1969). “Knowledge: Undefeated Justified True Belief”. Journal of Philosophy; V.66-#8, pp. 225-237.


Sartwell, Crispin (1990). “Knowledge is Merely True Belief”. American Philosophical Quarterly; V.28-#2, pp. 157-165.


Sartwell, Crispin (1992). “Why Knowledge is Merely True Belief”. Journal of Philosophy; V.89-#4, pp. 167-180.

 

(b) Modeling Knowledge and Belief via Modal Logic


Hintikka, Jaakko (1962). Knowledge and Belief: An Introduction to the Logic of the Two Notions. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.


Hintikka, Jaakko (1963). “The Modes of Modality”. Acta Philosophica Fennica; V.16-#?, pp. 65-81.


Hintikka, Jaakko (1968). “Epistemic Logic and the Methods of Philosophical Analysis”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy; V.46-#?, pp. 37-51.


Hintikka, Jaakko (1970). “Knowledge, Belief, and Logical Consequence”. Ajatus; V.32-#?, pp. 32-47. Also in Hintikka (1975), The Intentions of Intentionality. Dordrecht: Reidel.


Hintikka, Jaakko (1970). “Surface Information and Depth Information”. in Jaakko Hintikka and Patrick Suppes, eds. Information and Inference. Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 263-297.


Hintikka, Jaakko (1973). “Surface Semantics: Defintion and Motivation”. in Hughes Leblanc, ed. Truth, Syntax, and Modality. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 128-147.


Lenzen, Wolfgang (1978). “Recent Work In Epistemic Logic”. Acta Philosophica Fennica; V.30-#?, pp. 1-220.


Byrd, Michael (1973). “Knowledge and true belief in Hintikka's epistemic logic”. Journal of Philosophical Logic. V.2-#2, pp. 181-192.


Kraus, Sarit and Daniel Lehmann (1988). “Knowledge, Belief and Time”. Theoretical Computer Science; V.58-#?, pp. 155-174.


Halpern, Joseph and Moshe Y. Vardi. (1989). “The Complexity of Reasoning About Knowledge and Time. I. Lower bounds”. Journal of Computer and System Sciences; V.38-#1, pp. 195-237.


Voorbraak, Frans (1991). “A Theory of Objective Knowledge and Rational Belief”. in J. van Eijck, ed. Logics in AI. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, pp. 499-515.


Voorbraak, Frans (1992). “Generalized Kripke Models for Epistemic Logic”. in Yoram Moses, ed. Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge: Proceedings of the Fourth Conference. San Francisco: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 214-228.


van der Hoek, Wiebe (1993). “Systems for Knowledge and Belief”. Journal of Logic and Computation; V.3-#2, pp. 173-196.


Moses, Yoram and Yoav Shoham (1993). “Belief as Defeasible Knowledge”. Artificial Intelligence; V.64-#2, pp. 299-322.


Lamarre, P. and Yoav Shoham (1994). “Knowledge, Certainty, Belief, and Conditionalisation”. in. Jon Doyle, Erik Sandewall, and Pietro Torasso, eds. Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning: Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference. San Francisco: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 415-424.


van der Hoek, Wiebe, Jan Jaspars, and Elias Thijsse (1994). “Honesty in Partial Logic”. in. Jon Doyle, Erik Sandewall, and Pietro Torasso, eds. Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning: Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference. San Francisco: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 583-594.


Halpern, Joseph (1996). “Should Knowledge Entail Belief?”. Journal of Philosophical Logic; V.25-#5, pp. 483-494.


Ross, Lawrence and Rohit Parikh (1992). “Topological Reasoning and the Logic of Knowledge”. in Yoram Moses, ed. Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge–Proceedings of the Fourth Conference. Los Altos: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 95-105.


Georgatos, Konstantinos (1994). “Knowledge Theoretic Properties of Topological Spaces”. in Michael Masuch and László Pólos, eds. Knowledge Representation and Reasoning under Uncertainty. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, pp. 147-159.


Battigalli, Pierpaolo and Giacomo Bonanno (1997). “The Logic of Belief Persistence”. Economics and Philosophy; V.13-#?, pp. 39-59.


Bonanno, Giacomo (2002). “Information, Knowledge and Belief”. Bulletin of Economic Research; V.54-#1, pp. 47-67.

 

(3) Reasoning about Probability


Scott, Dana and Peter Krauss (1966). “Assigning Probabilities to Logical Formulas”. in Jaakko Hintikka and Patrick Suppes, eds. Aspects of Inductive Logic. Amsterdam: North-Holland.


Miller, D. (1966). “A Paradox of Information”. British Journal of Philosophy of Science; V.17-#?, pp. 59-61. [Comment by Karl Popper follows, pp. 61-69.]


Skyrms, Brian (1980). “Higher Order Degrees of Belief”. in D.H. Mellor, ed. Prospects for Pragmatism: Essays in Honor of F.P. Ramsey. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.


Domotor, Zoltan (1981) “Higher Order Probabilities”. Philosophical Studies; V.40-#1, pp. 31-46.


Gaifman, Haim (1986). “A Theory of Higher Order Probabilities”. in Joseph Halpern, ed. Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge: Proceedings of the 1986 Conference. San Francisco: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 275-292.


Haddawy, Peter and Alan Frisch (1990). “Modal Logics of Higher-Order Probability”. in Ross Shachter, Tod Levitt, Laveen Kanal and John Lemmer, eds. Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, 4. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 133-148.


Halpern, Joseph (1991). “The Relationship between Knowledge, Belief, and Certainty”. Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence; V.4-#?, pp. 301-322. [errata. (1999), V.26-#1/4, pp. 253-256.]


Fagin, Ronald, Joseph Halpern, and Nimrod Megiddo (1990). “A Logic for Reasoning About Probabilities”. Information and Computation; V.87-#1/2, pp. 78-128.


Fagin, Ronald and Joseph Halpern (1994). “Reasoning about Knowledge and Probability”. Journal of the Association for Computing Machinery; V.41-#2, pp. 340-367. [corregendum, 1998, V.45-#1, pg. 214]


Aumann, Robert (1999). “Interactive Epistemology, II: Probability”. International Journal of Game Theory; V.28-#?, pp. 301-314.


Billot, Antoine and Bernard Walliser (1999). “Epistemic Properties of Knowledge Hierarchies”. Journal of Mathematical Economics; V.32-#2, pp. 185-205.


Samet, Dov (1998). “Quantified Beliefs and Believed Quanitites”. in Itzhak Gilboa, ed. Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge: Proceedings of the Seventh Conference. San Francisco: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 263-272.


Samet, Dov (2000). “Quantified Beliefs and Believed Quantities”. Journal of Economic Theory; 95-#2, pp. 169-185.


Samet, Dov (1999). “Bayesianism Without Learning”. Research in Economics; V.53-#2, pp. 227-242 .


Samet, Dov (forth.). “On the Triviality of Higher-Order Beliefs”. Journal of Philosophical Logic; V.


Heifetz, Aviad and Philippe Mongin (2001). “Probability Logic for Type Spaces”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.35-#1, pp. 31-53.


Brandenburger, Adam (2002). “On the Existence of a ‘Complete’ Possibility Structure”. Ms: Harvard Business School.

 

c. The Logical Omniscience Problem and Non-Standard Modal Logics

 

(1) Impossible Possible Worlds


Rantala, Veikko (1975). “Urn Models: A New Kind of Non-Standard Model for First-Order Logic”. Journal of Philosophical Logic; V.4-#?, pp. 455-474.


Hintikka, Jaakko (1975). “Impossible Possible Worlds Vindicated”. Journal of Philosphical Logic; V.4-#?, pp. 475-484.


Rantala, Viekko (1979). “Possible Worlds and Formal Semantics”. in E. Saarinen, R. Hilpinen, I. Ninluoto, and M.P. Hintikka, ed. Essays in Honor of Jaakko Hintikka. Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 177-188.


Rantala, Veikko (1982). “Impossible Worlds Semantics and Logical Omniscience”. Acta Philosophica Fennica; V.35-#?, pp. 106-115.


Rantala, Veikko (1982). “Quantified Modal Logic: Non-Normal Worlds and Propositional Attitudes”. Studia Logica; V.41-#1, pp. 41-65.


H. Wansing (1990). “A General Possible World Framework for Reasoning about Knowledge and Belief”. Studia Logica; V.49-#4, pp. 523-539.


Fagin, Ronald, Joseph Halpern, and Moshe Vardi (1990). “A Nonstandard Approach to the Logical Omniscience Problem”. in Rohit Parikh, ed. Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge–Proceedings of the Third Conference. Los Altos: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 41-55.


Fagin, Ronald, Joseph Halpern, and Moshe Vardi (1995). “A Nonstandard Approach to the Logical Omniscience Problem”. Artificial Intelligence; V.79-#2, pp. 203-240.


Lipman, Barton (1994). “An Axiomatic Approach to the Logical Omniscience Problem”. in Ronald Fagin, ed. Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge–Proceedings of the Fifth Conference. Los Altos: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 182-196.


Lipman, Barton (1997). “Logics for Nonomniscient Agents: An Axiomatic Approach”. in M. Bacharach, L.-A. Gerard-Varet, P. Mongin, and H. Shin eds. Epistemic Logic and the Theory of Games and Decisions. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Pub, pp. 193-216.


Lipman, Barton (1999). “Decision Theory without Logical Omniscience: Toward an Axiomatic Framework fro Bounded Rationality”. Review of Economic Studies; V.66-#2, pp. 339-361.


Morris, Stephen (1997). “Alternative Definitions of Knowledge”. in M. Bacharach, L.-A. Gerard-Varet, P. Mongin, and H. Shin eds. Epistemic Logic and the Theory of Games and Decisions. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Pub, pp. 217-233.


Morris, Stephen (1994). “Revising Knowlege: A Hierarchical Approach”. in Ronald Fagin, ed. Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge–Proceedings of the Fifth Conference. Los Altos: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 160-174.


Morris, Stephen (1996). “The Logic of Belief and Belief Change: A Decision Theoretic Approach”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.69-#1, pp. 1-23.

 

(2) Montague-Scott Semantics, Unawareness and Local Reasoning


Thomason, Richmond, ed. (1974). Formal Philosophy: Selected Papers of Richard Montague. New Haven: Yale University Press.


Montague, Richard (1968). “Pragmatics”. in R. Klibansky. Contemporary Philosophy. Florence: La Nuova Italie Editrice, pp. 102-122. [also Chapter 3 of Thomason, ed., pp. 95-118.]


Montague, Richard (1970). “Universal Grammar”. Theoria; V.36-#?, pp. 373-398. [also Chapter 7 of Thomason, ed., pp. 222-246.]


Scott, Dana (1970). “Advice on Modal Logic”. in Karel Lambert, ed. Philosophical Problems in Logic. Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 143-173.


Lewis, David (1970). “General Semantics”. Synthese; V.22-#1, pp. 18-67.


Stalnaker, Robert (1972). “Pragmatics”. in Gilbert Harman and Donald Davidson, eds. Semantics of Natural Languages. Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 380-397.


Stalnaker, Robert (1985). Inquiry. Cambridge: MIT.


Stalnaker, Robert (1991). “The Problem of Logical Omniscience. I”. Synthese; V.89-#3, pp. 425-440.


Stalnaker, Robert (1999). Context and Content. Oxford: Clarednon Press. [Includes “The Problem of Logical Omniscience, II”, as Chapter 14.]


Clark, Herbert and Catherine Marshall (1981). “Definite Reference and Mutual Knowledge”. in Arvind Joshi, Bonnie Webber, and Ivan Sag, eds. Elements of Discourse Understanding. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 10-63.


Vardi, Moshe (1986). “On Epistemic Logic and Logical Omniscience”. in Joseph Halpern, ed. Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge–Proceedings of the 1986 Conference. Los Altos: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 293-305.


Vardi, Moshe (1989). “On the Complexity of Epistemic Reasoning”. Proceedings of the 4th IEEE Symposium on Logic in Computer Science, pp. 243-252.


Levesque, Hector (1984). “A Logic of Implicit and Explicit Belief”. in R. J. Brachman, ed. Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence. ?: William Kaufmann, pp. 198-202.


Lakemeyer, Gerhard (1986). “Steps Towards a First-Order Logic of Explicit and Implicit Belief”. in Joseph Halpern, ed. Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge: Proceedings of the 1986 Conference. Los Altos: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 325-340.


Lakemeyer, Gerhard (1991). “A Computationally Attractive First-Order Logic of Belief”. in J. van Eijck, ed. Logics in Artificial Intelligence. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, V.478. New York: Springer-Verlag, pp. 333-347.


Fagin, Ronald and Joseph Halpern (1988). “Belief, Awareness, and Limited Reasoning”. Artificial Intelligence; V.34-#1, pp. 39-76.


Konolige, Kurt (1986). “What Awareness Isn’t: A Sentential View of Implicit and Explicit Belief”. in Joseph Halpern, ed. Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge: Proceedings of the 1986 Conference. Los Altos: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 241-250.


Huang, Zhisheng and Karen Kwast (1991). “Awareness, Negation and Logical Omniscience”. in J. van Eijck, ed. Logics in Artificial Intelligence. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, V.478. New York: Springer-Verlag, pp. 282-300.


Modica, Salvatore and Aldo Rustichini (1994). “Awareness and Partitional Information Structures”. Theory and Decision; V.37-#2, pp. 107-124.


Modica, Salvatore and Aldo Rustichini (1999). “Unawareness and Partitional Information Structures”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.27-#2, pp. 265-298.


Dekel, Eddie, Barton Lipman, and Aldo Rustichini (1998). “Standard State-Space Models Preclude Unawareness”. Econometrica; V.66-#1, pp. 159-73.


Hintikka, Jaakko and Ilpo Halonen (1995). “Semantics and Pragmatics for Why-Questions”. Jouranl of Philosophy; V.92-#12, pp. 636-657.


Lenzen, Wolfgang (1995). “On the Semantics and Pragmatics of Epistemic Attitudes”. Knowledge and Belief in Philosophy and Artificial Intelligence. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, pp. 181-197.


R. Lavendhomme and T. Lucas (1997). “From Logical Omniscience to Logical Competence”. in M. Bacharach, L.-A. Gerard-Varet, P. Mongin, and H. Shin eds. Epistemic Logic and the Theory of Games and Decisions. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Pub, pp. 107-128.


E. Thijsse (1997). “Knowledge and Belief in a Partial Model”. in M. Bacharach, L.-A. Gerard-Varet, P. Mongin, and H. Shin eds. Epistemic Logic and the Theory of Games and Decisions. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Pub, pp. 129-150.


Shin, Hyun Song and Timothy Williamson (1994). “Representing the Knowledge of Turing Machines”. Theory and Decision; V.37-#?, pp. 125-146


Hviide, Hans (1999). “Bounds to Memory Loss”. Theory and Decision; V.46-#1, pp. 1-21.

 

(3) Infinitary Modal Logic


Radev, Slavian (1987). “Infinitary Propositional Normal Modal Logic”. Studia Logica; V.46-#4, pp. 291-309.


Blass, Andreas (1990). “Infinitary Combinatorics and Modal Logic”. Journal of Symbolic Logic; V.55-#2, pp. 761-778.


Segerberg, Krister (1994). “A Model Existence Theorem in Infinitary Propositional Modal Logic”. Journal of Philosophical Logic; V.23-#?, pp. 337-367.


Fagin, Ronald (1994). “A Quantitative Analysis of Modal Logic”. Journal of Symbolic Logic; V.59-#1, pp. 209-252.


Heifetz, Aviad (1997). “Infinitary S5 Epistemic Logic”. Mathematical Logic Quarterly; V.43-#3, pp. 333-342.


Tanaka, Yoshihito (1999). “Kripke completeness of infinitary predicate multimodal logics”. Notre Dame J. Formal Logic; V.40-#3, pp. 326-340.


Tanaka, Yoshihito (2001). “Cut Elimination Theorems for Some Infinitary Modal Logics”. MLQ, Mathematical Logic Quarterly; V.47-#3, pp. 327-339.


Tanaka, Yoshihito and Hiroakira Ono (2001). “Rasiowa-Sikorski Lemma and Kripke Completeness of Predicate and Infinitary Modal Logics”. Advances in modal logic, Vol. 2. (Uppsala, 1998), CSLI Lecture Notes, 119. Stanford: CSLI Publications, pp. 401-419.


Tanaka, Yoshihito (2001). “Model Existence in Non-compact Modal Logic”. Studia Logica; V.67-#1, pp. 61-71.

 

2. Models of Belief Revision

 

a. Overviews


Mackinson, David (1985). “How to Give it Up: A Survey of Some Formal Aspects of the Logic of Theory Change”. Synthese; V.62-#?, pp.347-363. [Errata: Synthese; 1986,V8-#1, pp. 185-186]


Harman, Gilbert (1986). Change in View: Principles of Reasoning. Cambridge: MIT Press.


Gärdenfors, Peter (1988). Knowledge in Flux: Modeling the Dynamics of Epistemic States. Cambridge: MIT Press.


Gärdenfors, Peter (1990). “The Dynamics of Belief Systems: Foundations vs. Coherence Theories”. Revue Internationale de Philosophie; V.44-#1, pp.24-46.


Doyle, Jon (1992). “Reason Maintenance and Belief Revision: Foundations vs. Coherence Theories”. in Peter Gärdenfors, ed. Belief Revision. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 29-51.


Gärdenfors, Peter (1992). “Belief Revision: An Introduction”. in Peter Gärdenfors, ed. Belief Revision. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 1-28.


Gärdenfors, Peter and Hans Rott (1995). “Belief Revision”. in Dov Gabbay, C.J. Hogger, and J.A. Robinson, eds. Handbook of Logic in Artificial Intelligence and Logic Programming. Volume 4: Epistemic and Temporal Reasoning. Oxford: Oxford Science Publications, pp. 35-132.

 

b. The Basic AGM Model: Revision and Contraction of Belief Sets


Alchourrón, Carlos and David Makinson (1982). “Hierarchies of Regulations and their Logic”. in R. Hilpinen, ed. New Studies in Deontic Logic. Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 125-148.


Alchourrón, Carlos and David Makinson (1985). “On the Logic of Theory Change: Contraction Functions and Their Associated Revision Functions”. Theoria; V.48-#1, pp. 14-37.


Alchourrón, Carlos, Peter Gärdenfors, and David Makinson (1985). “On the Logic of Theory Change: Partial Meet Contraction and Revision Functions”. Journal of Symbolic Logic; V.50-#2, pp. 510-530.


Alchourrón, Carlos and David Makinson (1985). “On the Logic of Theory Change: Safe Contraction”. Studia Logica; V.44-#?, pp. 405-422.


Alchourrón, Carlos and David Makinson (1986). “Maps between some Different Kinds of Contraction Functions: The Finite Case”. Studia Logica; V.45-#?, pp. 187-198.


Segerberg, Krister (1986). “On the Logic of Small Changes in Theories. II”. in D. Skordev, ed. Mathematical Logic and Its Applications. New York: Plenum, pp. 205-211.


Lindström, Sten and Wlodzimierz Rabinowicz (1989). “On Probabilistic Representation of Non-Probabilistic Belief Revision”. Journal of Philosophical Logic; V.18-#?, pp. 69-101.


Segerberg, Krister (1997). “Proposal for a Theory of Belief Revision Along the Lines of Lindström and Rabinowicz”. Fundamenta Informaticae; V.32-#2, pp. 183-191.


Asher, Nicholas (1991). “Discourse Representation Theory and Belief Dynamics”. in André Fuhrman and Michael Morreau, eds. The Logic of Theory Change. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, pp. 282-321.


Hansson, Sven Ove (1994). “Kernel Contraction”. Journal of Symbolic Logic; V.59-#3, pp. 845-859.


Weyerdt, Emil (1991). “Doxastic Preference Logic: A New Look at Belief Revision”. in J. van Eijck, ed. Logics in Artificial Intelligence. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, V.478. New York: Springer-Verlag, pp. 526-543.


Rott, Hans (1993). “Belief Contraction in the Context of the General Theory of Rational Choice”. Journal of Symbolic Logic; V.58-#4, pp. 1426-1450.


Segerberg, Krister (1995). “Belief Revision from the Point of View of Doxastic Logic”. Bulletin of the Interest Group in Pure and Applied Logics; V.3-#4, pp. 535-553.


Segerberg, Krister (1996). “A General Framework for the Logic of Theory Change”. University of Lódz. Department of Logic. Bulletin of the Section of Logic; V.25-#1, pp. 2-8.


Segerberg, Krister (1996). “Three Recipes for Revision”. Theoria; V.62#1/2, pp. 62-73.


Schlechta, Karl, Daniel Lehmann, and Menachem Magidor (1996). “Distance Semantics for Belief Revision”. in Yoav Shoham, ed. Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge– Proceedings of the Sixth Conference. Los Altos: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 137-145.


Lehmann, Daniel, Menachem Magidor, and Karl Schlechta (2001). “Distance Semantics for Belief Revision”. Journal of Symbolic Logic; V.66-#1, pp. 295-317.


Battigalli, Pierpaolo and Giacomo Bonanno (1997). “The Logic of Belief Persistence”. Economics and Philosophy; V.13-#1, pp. 39-59.


Martin, Eric and Daniel Osherson (1998). “Belief Revision in the Service of Scientific Inquiry”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.36-#1, pp. 57-68.


Martin, Eric and Daniel Osherson (1997). “Scientific Discovery Based on Belief Revision”. Journal of Symbolic Logic V.62-#4, pp. 1352-1370.


Martin, Eric and Daniel Osherson (1998). Elements of Scientific Inquiry. Cambridge: MIT.


Gärdenfors, Peter (1986). “Belief Revisions and the Ramsey Test for Conditionals”. Philosophical Review; V.95-#1, pp. 81-93.


Gärdenfors, Peter (1987). “Variations on the Ramsey Test: More Triviality Results”. Studia Logica; V.46-#?, pp. 321-327.


Levi, Isaac (1988). “Iteration of Conditionals and the Ramsey Test”. Synthese; V.76-#?, pp. 49-81.


Segerberg, Krister (1989). “A Note on an Impossibility Theorem of Gärdenfors”. Noûs; V.23-#?, pp. 351-354.


Rott, Hans (1989). “Conditionals and Theory Change: Revisions, Expansions, and Additions”. Synthese; V.81-#?, pp. 91-113.


Gärdenfors, Peter, Sten Lindström, Michael Morreau and Wlodzimierz Rabinowicz (1991). “The Negative Ramsey Test: Another Triviality Result”. in André Fuhrman and Michael Morreau, eds. The Logic of Theory Change. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, pp. 129-134.


Lindström, Sten and Wlodzimierz Rabinowicz (1992). “Belief Revision, Epistemic Conditionals and the Ramsey Test”. Synthese; V.91-#?, pp. 195-237.


Levi, Isaac (1997). For the Sake of Argument: Ramsey Test Conditionals, Inductive Inference, and Nonmonotonic Reasoning. Cambridge: CUP.


Schulte, Oliver (1999). “Minimal Belief Change and the Pareto Principle”. Synthese; V.118-#?, pp. 329-361.

 

c. Belief Revision by Epistemic Entrenchment


Gärdenfors, Peter and David Makinson (1988). “Revisions of Knowledge Systems using Epistemic Entrenchment”. in Moshe Vardi, ed. Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge–Proceedings of the Second Conference. Los Altos: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 83-95.


Harper, William (1975). “Rational Belief Change, Popper Functions, and Counterfactuals”. Synthese; V.30-#?, pp. 221-262.


Grove, Adam (1988). “Two Modellings for Theory Change”. Journal of Philosophical Logic; V.17-#?, pp. 157-170.


Lindström, Sten and Wlodzimierz Rabinowicz (1991). “Epistemic Entrenchment with Imcomparabilities and Relational Belief Revision”. in André Fuhrman and Michael Morreau, eds. The Logic of Theory Change. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, pp. 93-126.


Dubois, Didier and Henri Prade (1991). “Epistemic Entrenchment and Possibilistic Logic”. Artificial Intelligence; V.50-#?, pp. 223-239.


Katsuno, Hirofumi and Alberto Mendelzon (1991). “Propositional Knowledge Base Revision and Minimal Change”. Artificial Intelligence; V.52-#?, pp. 263-294.


Rott, Hans (1991). “Two Methods of Constructing Contractions and Revisions of Knowledge Systems”. Journal of Philosophical Logic; V.20-#?, pp. 149-173.


Rott, Hans (1992). “On the Logic of Theory Change: More Maps Between Different Kinds of Contraction Functions”. in Peter Gärdenfors, ed. Belief Revision. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 122-141.


Rott, Hans (1991). “A Nonmonotonic Conditional Logic for Belief Revision”. in André Fuhrman and Michael Morreau, eds. The Logic of Theory Change. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, pp. 135-181.


Rott, Hans (1992). “Preferential Belief Change using Generalized Epistemic Entrenchment”. Journal of Logic, Language and Information; V.1-#?, pp. 45-78.


Rott, Hans (1992). “Modellings for Belief Change: Prioritization and Entrenchment”. Theoria; V.58-#1, pp. 21-57.


Schlechta, Karl (1991). “Some Results on Theory Revision”. in André Fuhrman and Michael Morreau, eds. The Logic of Theory Change. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, pp. 72-92.


Schlechta, Karl (1991). “Theory Revision and Probability”. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic; V.32-#?, pp. 307-319.


Nayak, Abhaya, Paul Nelson, and Hanan Polansky (1996). “Belief Change as Change in Epistemic Entrenchment”. Synthese; V.109-#?, pp. 143-174.


Mongin, Philippe (1994). “The Logic of Belief Change and Non-Addititve Probability”. In D. Prawitz and D. Westerstahl, eds. Logic and Philosophy of Science in Uppsala. Boston: Kluwer; pp. 135-171.


Mongin, Philippe (1994). “Some Connections between Epistemic Logic and the Theory of Non-Addititve Probability”. In P. Humphreys, ed. Patrick Suppes: Scientific Philosopher–Vol 1. Boston: Kluwer; pp. 135-171.

 

d. Iterated Belief Revision, Ordinal Conditional Functions, etc.


Spohn, Wolfgang (1988). “Ordinal Conditional Functions: A Dynamic Theory of Epistemic States”. in William Harper and Brian Skyrms, eds., Causation in Decision, Belief Change, and Statistics–Vol. 2. Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 105-134.


Spohn, Wolfgang (1990). “A General Non-Probabilistic Theory of Inductive Reasoning”. in R. Schachter, T. Levitt, L. Kanal, and J. Lemmer, eds. Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, 4. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 149-158.


Shenoy, P.P. (1991). “On Spohn’s Rule for Revision of Beliefs”. International Journal of Approximate Reasoning; V.5-#?, pp. 149-181.


Dubois, Didier and Henri Prade (1992). “Belief Change and Possibility Theory”. in Peter Gärdenfors, ed. Belief Revision. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 142-182.


Williams, Mary-Anne (1994). “Transmutations of Knowledge Systems”. in J. Doyle and E. Sandewall, eds. Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning. San Mateo: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 619-629.


Nayak, Abhaya (1994). “Iterated Belief Change Based on Epistemic Retrenchment.” Erkenntnis; V.41-#?, pp. 353-390.


Glasiter, Stephen Murray (1998). “Symmetry and Belief Revision”. Erkenntnis; V.49-#1, pp. 21-56.


Darwiche, Adnan and Judea Pearl (1994). “On the Logic of Iterated Belief Revision”. in Ronald Fagin, ed. Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge–Proceedings of the Fifth Conference. Los Altos: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 5-23. Final version (1997), Artificial Intelligence; V.89-#1, pp. 1-29.


Nayak, Abhaya, Norman Foo, Maurice Pagnucco, and Abdul Sattar (1996). “Changing Conditional Beliefs Unconditionally”. in Yoav Shoham, ed. Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge– Proceedings of the Sixth Conference. Los Altos: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 119-135.


Fariñas del Cerro, Luis and Andreas Herzig (1996). “Belief Change and Dependence”. in Yoav Shoham, ed. Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge–Proceedings of the Sixth Conference. Los Altos: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 147-161.


Kelly, Kevin (1999). “Iterated Belief Revision, Reliability, and Inductive Amnesia”. Erkenntnis; V.50-#1, pp. 11-58.


Dubois, Didier and Henri Prade (1988). Possibility Theory: An Approach to Computerized Processing of Uncertainty. New York: Plenum Press.


van der Meyden, Ron (1994). “Mutual Belief Revision”. in. Jon Doyle, Erik Sandewall, and Pietro Torasso, eds. Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning: Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference. San Francisco: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 595-606.


Kfir-Dahav, Noa and Moshe Tennenholtz (1996). “Multi-Agent Belief Revision”. in Yoav Shoham, ed. Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge– Proceedings of the Sixth Conference. Los Altos: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 175-194.

 

e. Belief Base Revision


Hansson, Sven Ove (1999). A Textbook of Belief Dynamics: Theory Change and Database Updating (Applied Logic Series, 11). Boston: Kluwer.


Mackinson, David (1987). “On the Status of the Postulate of Recovery in the Logic of Theory Change”. Synthese; V.62-#?, pp. 383-394.


Hansson, Sven Ove (1989). “New Operators for Theory Change”. Theoria; V.55-#?, pp. 114-136.


Hansson, Sven Ove (1991). “Belief Contraction without Recovery”. Studia Logica; V.50-#?, pp. 251-260.


Fuhrmann, André (1991). “Theory Contraction Through Base Contraction”. Journal of Philosophical Logic; V.20-#?, pp. 175-203.


Nebel, Berhnard (1992). “Syntax-Based Approaches to Belief Revision”. in Peter Gärdenfors, ed. Belief Revision. Cambridge: CUP, 52-88.


Hansson, Sven Ove (1992). “A Dyadic Representation of Belief”. in Peter Gärdenfors, ed. Belief Revision. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 89-121.


Hansson, Sven Ove (1992). “In Defense of Base Contraction”. Synthese; V.91-#?, pp. 239-245.


Hansson, Sven Ove (1993). “Reversing the Levi Identity”. Journal of Philosophical Logic; V.22-#?, pp. 637-669.


Hansson, Sven Ove (1993). “Theory Contraction and Base Contraction Unified”. Journal of Symbolic Logic; V.58-#?, pp. 602-625.


Nayak, Abhaya (1994). “Foundational Belief Change”. Journal of Philosophical Logic; V.23-#5, pp. 495-533.

 

f. Knowledge/Belief Update


Katsuno, Hirofumi and Alberto Mendelzon (1992). “On the Difference between Updating a Knowledge Base and Revising It”. in Peter Gärdenfors ed. (1992). Belief Revision. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 183-203.


Katsuno, Hirofumi and Ken Satoh (1995). “A Unified View of Consequence Relation, Belief Revision, and Conditional Logic”. in G. Crocco, Luis Farinas Del Cerro, and A. Herzig, eds. Conditionals: From Philosophy to Computer Science. (Studies in Logic and Computation, #5). New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 33-65.


Fuhrman, André (1991). “On the Modal Logic of Theory Change”. in André Fuhrman and Michael Morreau, eds. The Logic of Theory Change. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, pp. 259-281.


Grahne, Gösta (1991). “Updates and Counterfactuals”. in Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning. San Francisco: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 269-276.


Grahne, Gösta, Alberto Mendelzon, and Ray Reiter (1992). “On the Semantics of Belief Revision Systems”. in Yoram Moses, ed. Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge– Proceedings of the Fourth Conference. Los Altos: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 132-142.


Del Val, Alvaro and Yoav Shoham (1992). “Deriving Properties of Belief Update from Theories of Action”. in Proceedings of the 10th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, (AAAI, ‘92). Menlo Park: AAAI Press, pp. 584-589.


Del Val, Alvaro and Yoav Shoham (1993). “Deriving Properties of Belief Update from Theories of Action, II”. in Proceedings of the 13th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, (IJCAI, ‘93). San Francisco: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 732-737.


Del Val, Alvaro and Yoav Shoham (1994). “A Unified View of Belief Revision and Update”. Journal of Logic and Computation; V.4-#5, pp. 797-810.


Del Val, Alvaro and Yoav Shoham (1994). “Deriving Properties of Belief Update from Theories of Action”. Journal of Logic, Language and Information; V.3-#2, pp. 81-119.


Boutilier, Craig (1996). “Abduction to Plausible Causes: An Event-Based Model of Belief Update”. Artificial Intelligence; V.83-#1, pp. 143-166.


Ryan, Mark, Pierre-Yves Schobbens, and Odinaldo Rodrigues (1996). “Counterfactuals and Updates as Inverse Modalities”. in Yoav Shoham, ed. Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge–Proceedings of the Sixth Conference. Los Altos: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 163-173.


Pearl, Judea (1990). “System Z: A Natural Ordering of Defauts with Tractable Applications to Nonmonotonic Reasoning”. in Rohit Parikh, ed. Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge: Proceedings of the Third Conference. San Mateo: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 121-135.


Goldszmidt, Moisés and Judea Pearl (1992). “Rank-Based Systems: A Simple Approach to Belief Revision, Belief Update, and Reasoning About Evidence and Actions”. in B. Nebel, C. Rich and W. Swartout, eds. Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning. San Mateo: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 661-672.


Pearl, Judea (1996). “Causation, Action, and Counterfactuals”. in Yoav Shoham, ed. Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge– Proceedings of the Sixth Conference. Los Altos: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 51-73.


Pearl, Judea and Moisés Goldszmidt (1996). “Probabilistic Foundations of Reasoning with Conditionals”. in Gerhard Brewka, ed. Principles of Knowledge Representation. Stanford: CSLI Publications, pp. 33-68.


Goldszmidt, Moisés and Judea Pearl (1996). “Qualitative Probabilities for Default Reasoning, Belief Revision, and Causal Modeling”. Artificial Intelligence; V.84-#1, pp. 57-112.


van der Meyden, Ron (1998). “Common Knowledge and Update in Finite Environments”. Information and Computation; V.140-#2, pp. 115-157.

 

g. Belief Revision in Knowledge-based Programs

 

(1) On Knowledge-based Programs


Moses, Yoram (1992). “Knowledge and Communication (A Tutorial)”. in Yoram Moses, ed. Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge– Proceedings of the Fourth Conference. Los Altos: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 1-14.


Fagin, Ronald, Joseph Y. Halpern, Yoram Moses, and Moshe Y. Vardi (1997). “Knowledge-based Programs”. Distributed Computing; V.10-# 4, 1997, pp. 199-225.


Halpern, Joseph and Ronald Fagin (1989). “Modelling Knowledge and Action in Distributed Systems”. Distributed Computing; V.3-#4, pp. 159-179.


Halpern, Joseph and Ronald Fagin (1990). “Knowledge and Common Knowledge in Distributed Systems”. Journal of the Association for Computing Machinery; V.37-#3, pp. 549-587.


Halpern, Joseph and Lenore Zuck (1992). “A Little Knowledge Goes a Long Way: Knowledge-Based Derivations and Correctness Proofs for a Family of Protocols”. Journal of the Association for Computing Machinery; V.39-#3, pp. 449-478.


Shands, Deborah and Chung-Kuo Chang (1992). “Characterizing Distributed Systems using Knowledge-Based Models”. in Yoram Moses, ed. Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge– Proceedings of the Fourth Conference. Los Altos: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 29-42..


Neiger, Gil and Rida Bazzi (1992). “Using Knowledge to Optimally Achieve Coordination in Distributed Systems”. in Yoram Moses, ed. Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge– Proceedings of the Fourth Conference. Los Altos: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 43-59.


Neiger, Gil and Mark Tuttle (1993). “Common Knowledge and Consistent Simultaneous Coordination”. Distributed Computing; V.6-#3, pp.181-192.


van der Meyden Ron (1994). “Axioms for Knowledge and Time in Distributed Systems with Perfect Recall”. Proceedings, Ninth Annual IEEE Symposium on Logic in Computer Science. IEEE Computer Society Press. pp. 448-457.

 

(2) Belief Change


Friedman, Nir and Joseph Halpern (1994). “A Knowledge-based Framework for Belief Change, Part I: Foundations”. in Ronald Fagin, ed. Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge– Proceedings of the Fifth Conference. Los Altos: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 44-63.


Friedman, Nir and Joseph Halpern (1994). “A Knowledge-based Framework for Belief Change, Part II: Revision and Update”. in I. Doyle and E. Sandewall, eds. Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning. San Mateo: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 87-98.


Friedman, Nir and Joseph Halpern (1995). “Plausibility Measures: A User's Guide”. in P. Besnard and S. Hanks, eds. Proceedings of the 11th Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence. San Francisco: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 175-184.


Friedman, Nir and Joseph Halpern (1996). “A Qualitative Markov Assumption and Its Implications for Belief Change”. in E. Horvitz and F. Jensen, eds. Proceedings of the 12th Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence. San Francisco: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 263--273.


Friedman, Nir and Joseph Halpern (1997). “Modeling Belief in Dynamic Systems, I. Foundations”. Artificial Intelligence; V.95-#2, pp. 257-316.


Friedman, Nir and Joseph Halpern (1999). “Modeling Belief in Dynamic Systems. Part II: Revision and Update”. Journal of AI Research. V.10, pp. 117-167.


Ramanujam, R. (1996). “Local Knowledge Assertions in a Changing World”. in Yoav Shoham, ed. Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge–Proceedings of the Sixth Conference. Los Altos: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 1-14.


Vardi, Moshe (1996). “Implementing Knowledge-Based Programs”. in Yoav Shoham, ed. Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge–Proceedings of the Sixth Conference. Los Altos: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 15-30.


van der Meyden, Ron (1996). “Knowledge Based Programs: On the Complexity of Perfect Recall in Finite Environments”. in Yoav Shoham, ed. Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge–Proceedings of the Sixth Conference. Los Altos: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 31-49.


Halpern, Joseph and Yoram Moses (1998). “Using Counterfactuals in Knowledge-based Programming”. Proceedings of the Seventh Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge. San Francisco: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 97-110.


Boutilier, Craig, Nir Friedman, and Joseph Halpern (1998). “Belief Revision with Unreliable Observations”. Proceedings of the Fifteenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence. pp. 127-134.


Friedman, Nir and Joseph Halpern (1999). “Belief Revision: A Critique”. Journal of Logic, Language, and Information; forthcoming.

 

h. Nonmonotonic Logics


Schlechta, Karl (1997). Nonmonotonic Logics. Basic Concepts, Results, and Techniques. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 1187. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.


McDermott, Drew and Jon Doyle (1980). “Non-Monotonic Logic I”. Artificial Intelligence; V.13-#1/2, pp. 41-72.


McDermott, Drew (1982). “Non-Monotonic Logic II: Non-Monotonic Modal Theories”. Journal of the ACM; V.29-#1, pp. 33-57.


Stalnaker, Robert (1993). “A Note on Non-Monotonic Modal Logic”. Artificial Intelligence; V.64-#?, pp. 183-196.


Halpern, Joseph and Yoram Moses (1985). “Towards a theory of knowledge and ignorance (preliminary report)”. Logics and models of concurrent systems. [NATO Adv. Sci. Inst. Ser. F Comput. Systems Sci., 13]. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, pp. 459-476.


Gabbay, Dov (1985). “Theoretical Foundations for Nonmonotonic Reasoning in Expert Systems”. in K. Apt, ed. Logic and Models of Concurrent Systems. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.


Shoham, Yoav (1988). Reasoning about Change. Cambridge: CUP.


Mackinson, David (1989). “General Theory of Cumulative Inference”. in M. Reinfrank, J. de Kleer, M. Ginsberg, and E. Sandewall, eds. Non-Monotonic Reasoning. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, pp. 1-18.


Kraus, Sarit, Daniel Lehmann, and Menachem Magidor (1990). “Nonmonotonic Reasoning, Preferential Models and Cumulative Logics”. Artificial Intelligence; V.44-#?, pp. 167-207.


Lehmann, Daniel and Menachem Magidor (1990). “Preferential Logics: the Predicate Calculus Case”. In Rohit Parikh, ed. Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge: Proceedings of the Third Conference. San Mateo: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 57-72.


Lin, Fangzhen and Yoav Shoham (1990). “Epistemic Semantics for Fixed-Point Non-Monotonic Logics”. In Rohit Parikh, ed. Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge: Proceedings of the Third Conference. San Mateo: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 111-120.


Schwarz, Grigori and Mirosław Trusczyński (1991). “Modal Logic S4F and the Minimal Knowledge Paradigm”. in Yoram Moses, ed. Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge: Prceedings of the Fourth Conference. San Mateo: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 184-198.


Mackinson, David (1994). “General Patterns in Nonmonotonic Reasoning”. Handbook of Logic in Artificial Intelligence and Logic Programming. V.3, Nonmonotonic Reasoning. Oxford: OUP, pp. 35-110.


Parikh, Rohit (1991). “Monotonic and Nonmonotonic Logics of Knowledge”. Fundamenta Informaticae; V.15-#3/4, pp. 255-274.


Makinson, David and Peter Gärdenfors (1991). “Relations between the Logic of Theory Change and Nonmonotonic Logic”. in André Fuhrman and Michael Morreau, eds. The Logic of Theory Change. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, pp. 185-205.


Gärdenfors, Peter and David Makinson (1994). “Nonmonotonic Inference Based on Expectations”. Artificial Intelligence; V.65-#2, pp. 197-245.


Gärdenfors, Peter (1994). “The Role of Expectations in Reasoning”. in Michael Masuch and László Pólos, eds. Knowledge Representation and Reasoning under Uncertainty. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, pp. 1-16.


Moore, Robert (1995). Logic and Representation. CSLI Lecture Notes, 39. Stanford: Center for the Study of Language and Information. [esp. Chapters 6-8]


Moore, Robert (1988). “Autoepistemic Logic”. in Philippe Smets, Abe Mamdani, Didier Dubois and Henri Prade, eds. Nonstandard logics for automated reasoning. London: Academic Press, pp. 105-136.


Levesque, Hector (1990). “All I Know: A Study in Autoepistemic Logic”. Artificial Intelligence; V.42-#2/3, pp. 263-309.


Lakemeyer, Gerhard (1992). “On Perfect Introspection with Quantifying-in”. in Yoram Moses, ed. Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge: Prceedings of the Fourth Conference. San Mateo: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 199-213.


Halpern, Joseph and Gerhard Lakemeyer (1995). “Levesque’s Axiomatization of Only Knowing is Incomplete”. Artificial Intelligence; V.74-#2, pp. 381-387.


Konolige, Kurt (1991). “Quantification in Autoepistemic Logic”. Fundamenta Informaticae; V.15-#3/4, pp. 275-300.


Vreeswijk, Gerard (1991). “A Complete Logic for Autoepistemic Membership”. in J. van Eijck, ed. Logics in Artificial Intelligence. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, V.478. New York: Springer-Verlag, pp. 516-525.


Boutilier, Craig (1992). “Epistemic Entrenchment in Autoepistemic Logic”. Fundamenta Informaticae; V.17-#1/2, pp. 5-29.


Yuan, Li Yan (1994) “Autoepistemic Logic of First Order and Its Expressive Power”. Journal of Automated Reasoning. V.13-#1, pp. 69-82.


Li, Li Wu (1994). “Possible World Semantics and Autoepistemic Reasoning”. Artificial Intelligence; V.71-#2, pp. 281-320.


Asher, Nicholas and Michael Morreau (1991). “Commonsense Entailment: A Modal Theory of Nonmonotonic Reasoning”. in J. van Eijck, ed. Logics in Artificial Intelligence. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, V.478. New York: Springer-Verlag, pp. 1-30.


Koons, Robert and Nicholas Asher (1994). “Belief Revision in a Changing World”. In Ronald Fagin, ed. Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge: Proceedings of the Fifth Conference. San Francisco: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 321-340.


Halpern, Joseph (1997). “A Critical Reexamination of Default Logic, Autoepistemic Logic, and Only Knowing”. Computational Intelligence; V.13-#1, pp. 144-163.


Przymusinski, Teodor (1997). “Autoepistemic Logic of Knowledge and Beliefs”. Artificial Intelligence; V.95-#1, pp. 115-154.


Witteveen, Cees and Wiebe van der Hoek (1998). “Recovery of (Non)Monotonic Theories”. Artificial Intelligence; V.106-#?, pp. 139-159.


Halpern, Joseph and Gerhard Lakemeyer (1996). “Multi-Agent Only Knowing”. in Yoav Shoham, ed. Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge: Proceedings of the Sixth Conference. San Francisco: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 251-265.


Halpern, Joseph (1997). “A Theory of Knowledge and Ignorance for Many Agents”. Journal of Logic and Computation; V.7-#1, pp. 79-108.


Halpern, Joseph and Gerhard Lakemeyer (1996). “Multi-Agent Only Knowing”. Journal of Logic and Computation; V.11-#1, pp. 41-70.

 

3. Genetic Algorithms, Classifier Systems, and Pattern Recognition

 

a. On Genetic Algorithms


Holland, John (1992). “Genetic Algorithms”. Scientific American; #267 (July), pp. 66-72.


Birchenhall, Chris; Kastrinos, Nikos; Metcalfe, Stan (1997). “Genetic Algorithms in Evolutionary Modelling”. Journal of Evolutionary Economics; V.7-#4, pp. 375-93.


Goldberg, D.E. (1989). Genetic Algorithms in Search, Optimization, and Machine Learning. New York: Addison Wesley.


Holland, John (1992). Adaptation in Natural and Artificial Systems: An Introductory Analysis with Applications to Biology, Control, and Artificial Intelligence. Cambridge: MIT Press.


Mitchell, Melanie (1996). An Introduction to Genetic Algorithms. Cambridge: MIT Press.


Holland, John (1995). Hidden Order: How Adaptation Builds Complexity. Reading: Addison-Wesley.


Arthur, W. Brian (1993). “On Designing Economic Agents that Behave Like Human Agents”. Journal of Evolutionary Economics; V.3-#1, pp. 1-22. Also in W.B. Arthur (1994), Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 133-158.


Bullard, James B. and John Duffy (1994). “Using Genetic Algorithms to Model the Evolution of Heterogeneous Beliefs”. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working Paper: 94-028A.


Arifovic, Jasmina and Curtis Eaton (1995). “Coordination via Genetic Learning”. Computational Economics; V.8-#3, pp. 181-203.


Dawid, Herbert (1996). Adaptive Learning by Genetic Algorithms: Analytical Results and Applications to Economical Models. Heidelberg: Springer.


Dawid, Herbert (1996). “Genetic Algorithms as a Model of Adaptive Learning in Economic Systems”. Central European Journal for Operations Research and Economics; V.4-#1, pp. 7-23.


Lettau, Martin (1997). “Explaining the Facts with Adaptive Agents: The Case of Mutual Fund Flows”. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control; V.21-#7, pp. 1117-47.


Reichman, Thomas (1999). “Learning and Behavioral Stability – An Economic Interpretation of Genetic Algorithms”. Journal of Evolutionary Economics; V.9-#?, pp. 225-242.


Lettau, Martin and Harald Uhlig (1999). “Rules of Thumb versus Dynamic Programming”. American Economic Review; V.89-#1, pp. 148-174.


Noe, Thomas H. and Lynn Pi (2000). “Learning Dynamics, Genetic Algorithms, and Corporate Takeovers”. Journal of Economic Dynamics And Control; V.24-#2, pp. 189-217.

 

b. Classifier Systems, Pattern Recognition and Case Based Reasoning


Holland, John (1996). “The Rationality of Adaptive Agents”. in Kenneth Arrow, et al. eds., The Rational Foundations of Economic Behavior. London: Macmillan, pp. 281-297.


Holland, John (1980). “Adaptive Algorithms for Discovering and Using General Patterns in a Growing Knowledge Base”. International Journal of Policy Analysis and Information Systems; V.4-#?, pp. 245-268.


Holland, John (1986). “A Mathematical Framework for Studying Learning in Classifier Systems”. in Doyne Farmer, Alan Lapedes, Norman Packard, and Burton Wendroff, eds. Evolution, Games and Learning: Models for Adaptation in Machine and Nature. Amsterdam: North-Holland.


Holland, John, Keith Holyoak, Richard Nisbet and P.R. Thagard (1987). Induction: Process of Inference, Learning and Discovery. Cambridge: MIT Press.


Mitchell, Melanie (1993). Analogy Making as Perception. Cambridge: MIT Press.


Rubinstein, Ariel (1988). “Similarity and Decision-Making under Risk (Is There a Utility Theory Resolution to Allais’ Paradox?)”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.46-#?, pp. 145-153.


Aizpurua, Joxemari; Jorge Nieto, and Jose Ramon Uriarte (1990). “Choice Procedure Consistent with Similarity Relations”. Theory and Decision; V.29-#?, pp. 235-254.


Aizpurua, Joxemari, Tatsuo Ichiishi, Jorge Nieto, and Jose Ramon Uriarte (1993). “Similarity in the Space of Simple Lotteries”. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty; V.6-#?, pp. 289-297.


Kolodner, Janet (1993). Case-Based Reasoning. San Mateo: Morgan Kaufmann.


Rötheli, Tobias (1998). “Pattern Recognition and Procedurally Rational Expectations”. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization; V.37-#?, pp. 71-90.


Gilboa, Itzhak and David Schmeidler (1994). “Case-Based Decision Theory and Knowledge Representation: An Outline”. in Ronald Fagin, ed. Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge–Proceedings of the Fifth Conference. Los Altos: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 175-181.


Gilboa, Itzhak and David Schmeidler (1995). “Case-Based Decision Theory”. Quarterly Journal of Economics; V.110-#?, pp. 605-639.


Gilboa, Itzhak and David Schmeidler (1996). “Case-Based Optimization”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.15-#1, pp. 1-26.


Gilboa, Itzhak and David Schmeidler (1997). “Act Similarity in Case-Based Decision Theory”. Economic Theory; V.9-#?, pp. 47-61.


Gilboa, Itzhak and David Schmeidler (1997). “Cumulative Utility and Consumer Theory”. International Economic Review; V.38-#?, pp. 737-761.


Matsui, Akihiko (2000). “Expected Utility and Case-Based Reasoning”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.39-#1, pp. 1-12.


Gilboa, Itzhak, David Schmeidler and Peter Wakker (2002). “Utility in Case-Based Decision Theory”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.105-#2, pp. 483-502.


II. Non-Strategic Social Learning

 

A. Learning and Convergence to Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE)

 

1. On Rational Expectations Equilibrium

 

a. Characterization, Existence and Optimality of REE

 

(1) Surveys/Overviews


Grossman, Sanford (1981). “An Introduction to the Theory of Rational Expectations under Asymmetric Information”. Review of Economic Studies; V.48-#?, pp. 541-559.


Radner, Roy (1982). “Equilibrium under Uncertainty”. in K. Arrow and M. Intriligator, eds. Handbook of Mathematical Economics–Vol. II. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 923-1006.


Jordan, James and Roy Radner (1982). “Rational Expectations in Microeconomic Models: An Overview”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.26-#?, pp. 201-223.


Bray, Margaret (1989). “Rational Expectations, Information, and Asset Markets”. in Frank Hahn, ed. The Economics of Missing Markets, Information, and Games. Oxford: OUP, pp. 243-277.


Bacharach, Michael (1989). “Expecting and Affecting”. Oxford Economic Papers; V.41-#?, pp. 339-355.


Allen, Beth and James Jordan (1998). “The Existence of Rational Expectations Equilibrium: A Retrospective”. in Mukul Majumdar, ed. Organizations with Incomplete Information: Essays in Economic Analysis. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 42-60.

 

(2) Existence


Radner, Roy (1968). “Competitive Equilibrium under Uncertainty”. Econometrica; V.36-#1, pp. 31-58.


Radner, Roy (1972). “Existence of Equilibrium of Plans, Prices, and Price Expectations in a Sequence of Markets”. Econometrica; V.40-#2, pp. 289-303.


Rubinstein, Mark (1975). “Security Market Efficiency in an Arrow-Debreu Economy”. American Economic Review; V.65-#?, pp. 812-824.


Kreps, David (1977). “A Note on ‘Fulfilled Expectations’ Equilibria”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.15-#1, pp. 32-43.


Jordan, James (1977). “Expectations Equilibrium and Informational Efficiency for Stochastic Environments”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.16-#?, pp. 354-372.


Green, Jerry (1977). “The Non-existence of Informational Equilibria”. Review of Economic Studies; V.44-#?, pp. 451-463.


Radner (1979). “Rational Expectations Equilibrium: Generic Existence and the Information Revealed by Prices”. Econometrica; V.47-#3, pp. 655-678.


Allen, Beth (1981). “Generic Existence of Completely Revealing Equilibria for Economies with Uncertainty when Prices Convey Information”. Econometrica; V.49-#?, pp. 1173-1199.


Anderson, Robert and Hugo Sonnenschein (1982). “On the Existence of Rational Expectations Equilibrium”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.26-#?, pp. 261-278.


Allen, Beth (1982). “Approximate Equilibria in Microeconomic Rational Expectations Models”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.26-#?, pp. 244-260.


Allen, Beth (1984). “Equilibria in Which Prices Convey Information: The Finite Case”. in M. Boyer and R. Kihlstrom, eds. Bayesian Models in Economic Theory. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 63-92.


Allen, Beth (1985). “The Existence of Fully Rational Expectations Approximate Equilibria with Noisy Price Observations”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.37-#?, pp. 213-253.


Allen, Beth (1985). “The Existence of Rational Expectations Equilibria in a Large Economy with Noisy Price Observations”. Journal of Mathematical Economics; V.14-#?, pp. 67-103.


Allen, Beth (1986). “General Equilibrium with Rational Expectations”. in W. Hildenbrand and A. Mas-Colell, eds. Contributions in Mathematical Economics. Amsterdam: North-Holland.


DeMarzo, Peter and Costis Skiadas (1998). “Aggregation, Determinacy, and Informational Efficiency for a Class of Economies with Asymmetric Information”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.80-#1, pp. 123-52.


Chen, Ping (2002). “Microfoundations of macroeconomic fluctuations and the laws of probability theory: the principle of large numbers versus rational expectations arbitrage”. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization; V.49-#3, pp. 327-344.

 

(3) Existence of Partially Revealing REE


Grossman. Sanford (1977). “The Existence of Futures Markes, Noisy Rational Expectations, and Informational Externalities”. Review of Economic Studies; V.44-#3, pp. 431-449.


Grossman, Sanford and Joseph Stiglitz (1980). “The Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets”. American Economic Review; V.70-#3, pp. 393-408.


Hellwig, Martin (1980). “On the Aggregation of Information in Competitive Markets”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.22-#?, pp. 477-498.


Allen, Beth (1981). “A Class of Monotone Economies in Which Rational Expectations Equilibria Exist, but Prices Do Not Reveal All Information”. Economics Letters; V.7-#?, pp. 227-232.


Jordan, James (1982). “The Generic Existence of Rational Expectations Equilibrium in the Higher Dimensional Case”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.26-#?, pp. 224-243.


Jordan, J.S. (1982). “Admissable Data Structures”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.28-#1, pp. 19-31.


Ausubel, Lawrence (1990). “Partially Revealing Rational Expectations Equilibrium in a Competitive Economy”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.50-#?, pp. 93-126.


Polemarchakis, Heraklis and Paolo Siconolfi (1993). “Asset Markets and the Information Revealed by Prices”. Economic Theory; V.3-#?, pp. 645-661.


Rahi, Rohit (1995). “Partially Revealing Rational Expectations Equilibria with Nominal Assets”. Journal of Mathematical Economics; V.24-#2 , pp. 137-46.


Dutta, Jayasri and Stephen Morris (1997). “The Revelation of Information and Self-Fulfilling Beliefs”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.73-#?, pp. 231-244.


Pietra, Tito and Paolo Siconolfi (1997). “Extrinsic Uncertainty and the Informational Role of Prices”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.77-#1, pp. 154-80.


Pietra, Tito and Paolo Siconolfi (1998). “Fully Revealing Equilibria in Sequential Economies with Asset Markets”. Journal of Mathematical Economics; V.29-#2, pp. 211-23.


DeMarzo, Peter and Costas Skiadas (1998). “Aggregation, Determinacy, and Informational Efficiency for a Class of Economies with Asymmetric Information”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.80-#1, pp. 123-152.


DeMarzo, Peter and Costas Skiadas (1999). “On the Uniqueness of Fully Informative Rational Expectations Equilibrium”. Economic Theory; V.13-#1, pp. 1-24.


Heifetz, Aviad and Heracles Polemarchakis (1998). “Partial Revelation with Rational Expectations”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.80-#1, pp. 171-181.


Polemarchakis, Heraklis and Paolo Siconolfi (1998). “Prices, Asset Markets and Indeterminacy”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.82-#1, pp. 46-64.

 

(4) Efficiency


Arrow, Kenneth (1963/4). “The Role of Securities in the Optimal Allocation of Risk Bearing”. Review of Economic Studies; V.31-#?, pp. 91-96.


Diamond, Peter (1967). “The Role of a Stock Market in a General Equilibrium Model with Technological Uncertainty”. American Economic Review; V.57-#?, pp. 759-776.


Green, Jerry and Eytan Sheshinski (1975). “Competitive Inefficiencies in the Presence of Constrained Transactions”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.10-#?, pp. 343-357.


Kihlstrom, Richard and Leonard Mirman (1975). “Information and Market Equilibrium”. Bell Journal of Economics; V.6-#?, pp. 357-376.


Hart, Oliver (1975). “On the Optimality of Equilibrium when the Market Structure is Incomplete”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.11-#?, pp. 418-443.


Grossman, Sanford (1976). “On the Efficiency of Competitive Stock Markets where Traders have Diverse Information”. Journal of Finance; V.31-#2, pp. 573-585.


Grossman, Sanford (1978). “Further Results on the Informational Efficiency of Competitive Stock Markets”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.18-#1, pp. 81-101.


Grossman, Sanford (1977). “A Characterization of the Optimality of Equilibrium in Incomplete Markets”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.15-#1, pp. 1-15.


Green, Jerry (1981). “Value of Information with Sequential Futures Markets”. Econometrica; V.49-#?, pp. 335-358.


Jordan, James (1983). “On the Efficient Markets Hypothesis”. Econometrica; V.51-#?, pp. 1325-1344.


Easley, David and Robert Jarrow (1983). “Consensus Beliefs Equilibrium and Market Efficiency”. Journal of Finance; V.38-#3, pp. 903-911.


Laffont, Jean-Jacques (1985). “On the Welfare Analysis of Rational Expections Equilibrium with Asymmetric Information”. Econometrica; V.53-#1, pp. 1-29.

 

(5) Transaction Costs and Incomplete Markets


Hahn, Frank (1973). “On Transaction Costs, Inessential Sequence Economies and Money”. Review of Economic Studies; V.40-#?, pp. 449-462.


Kurz, Mordecai (1974). “Equilibrium in a Finite Sequence of Markets with Transaction Cost”. Econometrica; V.42-#1, pp. 1-20.


Ulph, A.M. and D.T. Ulph (1975). “Transaction Costs in General Equilibrium Theory–A Survey”. Economica; V.?-#?, pp.355-372.


Geanakoplos, John and Heraklis Polemarchakis (1986). “Existence, Regularity and Constrained Sub-Optimality of Competitive Allocations when Markets are Incomplete”. in Walter Heller, Ross Starr, and David Starrett, eds. Uncertainty, Information and Communication: Essays in Honor of Kenneth Arrow, Vol. III. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 65-95.


Geanakoplos, John (1990). “An Introduction to General Equilbrium with Incomplete Asset Markets”. Journal of Mathematical Economics; V.19-#?, pp. 1-38.


Huang, Peter and Ho-Mou Wu (1994). “Competitive Equilibrium of Incomplete Markets for Securities with Smooth Payoffs”. Journal of Mathematical Economics; V.23-#3, pp. 219-234.


Kurz, Mordecai and Ho-Mou Wu (1996). “Endogenous Uncertainty in a General Equilibrium Model with Price Contingent Contracts”. Economic Theory; V.8-#3, pp. 461-488.


Citanna, Alessandro, Aatsushi Kajii, and Antonio Villanacci (1998). “Constrained Suboptimality in Incomplete Markets: A General Approach and Two Applications”. Economic Theory; V.11-#2, pp. 495-521.


Arrow, Kenneth and Frank Hahn (1999). “Notes on Sequence Economies, Transaction Costs, and Uncertainty”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.86-#2, pp. 203-218.


Citanna, Alessandro and Antonio Villanacci (2000). “Incomplete Markets, Allocative Efficiency, and the Information Revealed by Prices”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.90-#2, pp. 222-253.

 

b. Prices, Decentralization, and Markets with Rational Agents


Hayek, Friedrich (1945). “The Use of Knowledge in Society”. American Economic Review; V.35-#?, pp. 519-530.


Hurwicz, Leonid (1973). “The Design of Resource Allocation Mechanisms”. AER; V.63-#2, pp. 1-30.


Hurwicz, Leonid (1967). “Optimality and Informational Efficiency in Resource Allocation Processes”. in K. Arrow, S. Karlin, and P. Suppes, eds. Mathematical Methods in the Social Sciences. Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp. 27-46.


Hurwicz, Leonid (1972).. “On Informationally Decentralized Systems”. in C. McGuire and R. Radner, eds. Decision and Organization. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 297-336.


Hurwicz, Leonid (1977). “On the Dimensional Requirements of Informationally Decentralized Pareto Satisfactory Processes”. in K. Arrow and L. Hurwicz, eds. Studies in Resource Allocation Processes. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 413-424.


Mount, Kenneth and Stanley Reiter (1974). “The Informational Size of Message Spaces”. JET; V.8-#?, pp. 161-192.


Reiter, Stanley (1974). “The Knowledge Revealed by an Allocation Process and the Informational Size of the Mesage Space”. JET; V.8-#?, pp. 389-396.


Walker, Mark (1977). “On the Informational Size of Message Spaces”. JET; V.15-#?, pp. 366-375.


Osana, Hiroaki (1978). “On the Informational Size of Message Spaces for Resource Allocation Processes”. JET; V.17-#?, pp. 66-78.


Jordan, J.S. (1982). “The Competitive Allocation Process is Informationally Efficient Uniquely”. JET; V.28-#?, pp. 1-28.


Sato, Fumitaka (1981). “On the Informational Size of Message Spaces for Resource Allocation Processes in Economies with Public Goods”. JET; V.24-#?, pp. 48-69.


Hurwicz, Leonid (1986). “Incentive Aspects of Decentralization”. in K. Arrow and M. Intriligator, eds. Hanbook of Mathematical Economics--V.III. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 1441-1482.


Hurwicz, Leonid (1986). “On Informational Decentralization and Efficiency in Resource Allocation Mechanisms”. in S. Reiter ed., Studies in Mathematical Economics. Washington, DC: American Mathematical Association, pp. 238-350.


-P. Chen (1992). “A Lower Bound for the Dimension of the Message Space of the Decentralized Mechanisms Realizing a Given Goal”. JMathE; V.21-#?, pp. 249-270.


-D. Saari and C. Simon (1978). “Effective Price Mechanisms”. Etrica; V.47-#5, pp. 1097-1125.


-D. Saari (1986). “On the Local Convergence of Economic Mechanisms”. JET; V.40-#1, pp. 152-167.


-D. Saari and S. Williams (1987). “On the Local Convergence of Economic Mechanisms”. in J.-M. Grandmont, ed. On the Local Convergence of Economic Mechanisms. London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.


-D. Saari (1984). “A Method for Constructing Message Systems For Smooth Performance Functions”. JET; V.33-#?, pp. 249-274.


-D. Saari (1985). “The Representation Problem and the Efficiency of the Price Mechanism”. JMathE; V.14-#?, pp. 135-167.


-D. Saari (1985). “Iterative Price Mechanisms”. Econometrica; V.53-#5, pp. 1117-1131.


-D. Saari (1988). “On the Types of Information and On Mechanism Design”. Journal of Computational and Applied Mathematics; V.14-#?, pp. 231-242.


-D. Saari (1990). “On the Design of Complex Organizations and Distributive Algorithms”. Complexity Theory; V.6-#?, pp. 102-118.


-D. Saari (1990). “Susceptibility to Manipulation “. Public Choice; V.64-#1, pp. 21-41.


-J. Jordan (1986). “Instability in the Implementation of Walrasian Allocations”. JET; V.39-#?, pp. 301-328.


-K. Mount and S. Reiter (1986). “On the Existence of a Locally Stable Dynamic Process with a Statically Minimal Message Space”. in T. Groves, R. Radner, and S. Reiter, eds. Information, Incentives, and Economic Mechanisms. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp.


-J. Jordan (1995). “Information Flows Intrinsic to the Stability of Economic Equilibrium”. in J. Ledyard, ed.. The Economics of Informational Decentralization: Complexity, Efficiency,and Stability. Boston : Kluwer Academic, pp. 1-33.


-K. Mount (1995). “Mechanisms for the Realization of Equilibria”. in J. Ledyard, ed.. The Economics of Informational Decentralization: Complexity, Efficiency,and Stability. Boston : Kluwer Academic, pp. 35-52.


-H. Sonnenschein (1995). “An Axiomatic Characterization of the Price Mechanism”. in J. Ledyard, ed.. The Economics of Informational Decentralization: Complexity, Efficiency,and Stability. Boston : Kluwer Academic, pp. 119-130.


-D. Saari (1995). “Sufficient Statistics, Utility Theory, and Mechanism Design”. in J. Ledyard, ed.. The Economics of Informational Decentralization: Complexity, Efficiency,and Stability. Boston : Kluwer Academic, pp. 219-242.


Stiglitz, Joseph (1994). Whither Socialism? Cambridge: MIT.

 

2. Boundedly Rational (e.g. Least Squares) Learning

 

a. Surveys/Overviews


Blume, Lawrence, Margaret Bray, and David Easley (1982). “Introduction to the Stability of Rational Expectations Equilibrium”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.26-#?, pp. 313-317.


Frydman, Roman and Edmund Phelps (1983). “Introduction”. in R. Frydman and E. Phelps, eds. Individual Forecasting and Aggregate Outcomes: “Rational Expectations” Examined. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 1-30.


Hahn, Frank (1989). “Information Dynamics and Equilibrium”. in Frank Hahn, ed. The Economics of Missing Markets, Information, and Games. Oxford: OUP, pp. 106-126.


Bullard, James (1991). “Learning, Rational Expectations and Policy: A Summary of Recent Research”. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review; V.73-#1, pp. 50-60.


Sargent, Thomas (1993). Bounded Rationality and Macreconomics. Oxford: OUP.


Honkapohja, Seppo (1993). “Adaptive Learning and Bounded Rationality: An Introduction to Basic Concepts”. European Economic Review; V.37--2-3, pp. 587-94.


Evans, George and Seppo Honkapohja (1995). “Adaptive Learning and Expectational Stability”. in Alan Kirman and Mark Salmon, eds. Learning and Rationality in Economics. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 102-126.


Evans, George and Seppo Honkapohja (1998). “Learning Dynamics”. in John Taylor and Michael Woodford, eds. Handbook of Macroeconomics. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp.


Vega-Redondo, Fernando (1999). “Markets under Bounded Rationality: From Theory to Facts”. Investigaciones Economicas; V.23-#1, pp. 3-26.


Evans, George and Seppo Honkapohja (2001). Learning and Expectations in Macroeconomics. Princeton: PUP.

 

b. General Adaptive Models–Model Uncertainty, etc.


DeCanio, S.J. (1979). “Rational Expectations and Learning from Experience”. Quarterly Journal of Economics; V.93-#1, pp. 47-58.


Blume, Lawrence and David Easley (1982). “Learning to Be Rational”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.26-#?, pp. 340–351.


Foster, James and Michael Frierman (1990). “Learning Rational Expectations: Classical Conditions Ensure Uniqueness and Global Stability”. Economica; V.57-#?, pp. 439-453.


Frydman, Roman (1983). “A Distinction between the Unconditional Expectational Equilibrium and the Rational Expectations Equilibrium”. in R. Frydman and E. Phelps, eds. Individual Forecasting and Aggregate Outcomes: “Rational Expectations” Examined. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 139-146.


Jordan, J.S. (1985). “Learning Rational Expectations: The Finite State Case”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.36-#?, pp. 257-276.


Williams, Scott (1985). “Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for the Existence of a Locally Stable Message Process”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.35-#?, pp. 127-154.


Jordan, James S. (1992). “Convergence to Rational Expectations in a Stationary Linear Game”. Review of Economic Studies; V.59-#?, pp. 109-123.


Jordan, James S. (1995). “Information Flows Intrinsic to the Stability of Economic Equilibrium”. in John Ledyard, ed. The Economics of Informational Decentralization: Complexity, Efficiency, and Stability. Boston: Kluwer Academic, pp. 1-33.


Brock, William and Cars Hommes (1997). “A Rational Route to Randomness”. Econometrica; V.65-#5, pp. 1059-1095.


Brock, William and Cars Hommes (1998). “Heterogeneous Beliefs and Routes to Chaos in a Simple Asset Pricing Model”. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control; V.22-#8/9, pp. 1235-1274.


Koutsougeras, Leonidas and Nicholas Yannelis (1999). “Bounded Rational Learning in Differential Information Economies: Core and Value”. Journal of Mathematical Economics; V.31-#?, pp. 373-391.


Brock, William and Patrick de Fontnouvelle (2000). “Expectational diversity in monetary economies1”. Journal of Economic Dynamics And Control; V.24-#5/7, pp. 725-759.


Goeree, Jacob K. and Cars H. Hommes (2000). “Heterogeneous beliefs and the non-linear cobweb model”. Journal of Economic Dynamics And Control; V.24-#5/7, pp. 761-798.


Gaunersdorfer, Andrea (2000). “Endogenous fluctuations in a simple asset pricing model with heterogeneous agents”. Journal of Economic Dynamics And Control; V.24-#5/7, pp. 799-831.


Evans, George (1983). “The Stability of Rational Expectations in Macroeconomic Models”. in R. Frydman and E. Phelps, eds. Individual Forecasting and Aggregate Outcomes: “Rational Expectations” Examined. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 69-94.


Guesnerie, Roger (1992). “An Exploration of the Eductive Justifications of the Rational-Expectations Hypothesis”. American Economic Review; V.82-#5, pp. 1254-1278.


Evans, George and Roger Guesnerie (1993). “Rationalizability, Strong Rationality, and Expectational Stability”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.5-#?, pp. 632-646.


Evans, George and Garey Ramey (1998). “Calculation, Adaptation and Rational Expectations”. Macroeconomic Dynamics; V.2-#2, pp.156-182.


Guesnerie, Roger (2002). “Anchoring Economic Predictions in Common Knowledge”. Econometrica; V.70-#2, pp. 439-480.


Schönhofer, Martin (2001). “Can agents learn their way out of chaos?”. Journal of Economic Behavior And Organization; V.44-#1, pp. 71-83.


Wenzelburger, Jan (2002). “Global convergence of adaptive learning in models of pure exchange”. Economic Theory; V.19-#4, pp. 649-672.


Schinkel, Maarten, Jan Tuinstra and Dries Vermeulen (2002). “Convergence of Bayesian Learning to General Equilibrium in Mis-Specified Models”. Journal of Mathematical Economics;

 

c. Parameter Uncertainty and Least-Squares Learning

 

(1) Linear Economies


Bray, Margaret (1982). “Learning, Estimation, and the Stability of Rational Expectations”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.26-#?, pp. 318-339.


Bray, Margaret (1983). “Convergence to Rational Expectations Equilibrium”. in R. Frydman and E. Phelps, eds. Individual Forecasting and Aggregate Outcomes: “Rational Expectations” Examined. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 123-132.


Bray, Margaret and N.E. Savin (1986). “Rational Expectations Equilibria, Learning and Model Selection”. Econometrica; V.54-#?, pp. 1129-1160.


Fouregeaud, C., C. Gourieroux, and J. Pradel (1986). “Learning Procedures and Convergence to Rationality”. Econometrica; V.54-#4, pp. 845-868.


Marcet, Albert and Thomas Sargent (1988). “The Fate of Systems with ‘Adaptive’ Expectations”. American Economic Review; V.78-#2, pp. 168-172..


Marcet, Albert and Thomas Sargent (1989). “Convergence of Least Squares Learning Mechanisms in Self-Referential Linear Stochastic Models”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.48-#2, pp. 337-368.


Marcet, Albert and Thomas Sargent (1989). “Convergence of Least Squares Learning in Environments with Hidden State Variables and Private Information”. Journal of Political Economy; V.97-#6, pp. 1306-1322.


Marcet, Albert and Thomas Sargent (1989). “Least-Squares Learning and the Dynamics of Hyperinflation”. in William Barnett, John Geweke, and Karl Shell, eds. Economic Complexity: Chaos, Sunspots, Bubbles, and Nonlinearity. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 119-140.


Sargent, Thomas (1991). “Equilibrium with Signal Extraction from Endogenous Variables”. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control; V.15-#2, pp. 245-274.


Marcet, Albert and Thomas Sargent (1992). “The Convergence of Vector Autoregressions to Rational Expectations Equilibrium”. in Alessandro Vercelli and Nicola Dimitri, eds. Macroeconomics: A Survey of Research Strategies. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 139-164.


Marcet, Albert and Thomas Sargent (1995). “Speed of Convergence of Recursive Least Squares: Learning with Autoregressive Moving-Average Perceptions”. in Alan Kirman and Mark Salmon, eds. Learning and Rationality in Economics. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 179-215.


Sargent, Thomas and François Velde (1995). “Macroeconomic Features of the French Revolution”. Journal of Political Economy; V.103-#3, pp. 474-518.


Sargent, Thomas (1999). The Conquest of American Inflation. Princeton: PUP.


Chang, M.C., C.Y. Cyrus Chu and Kenneth Lin (1995). “A Note on Least-Squares Learning Mechanism”. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control; V.19-#?, pp. 1293-1296.


Cripps, Martin (1991). “Learning Rational Expectations in a Policy Game”. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control; V.15-#2, pp. 297-315.


Bullard, James (1992). “Time-Varying Parameters and Nonconvergence to Rational Expectations under Least Squares Learning”. Economics Letters; V.40-#2, pp. 159-166.


Evans, George and Seppo Honkapohja (1992). “On the Robustness of Bubbles in Linear RE Models”. International Economic Review; V.33-#1, pp. 1-14.


Evans, George and Seppo Honkapohja (1994). “Learning, Convergence, and Stability with Multiple Rational Expectations Equilibria”. European Economic Review; V.38-#?, pp. 1071-1098.


Moreno, Diego and Mark Walker (1994). “Two Problems with Applying Ljung’s ‘Projection Algorighms’ to the Analysis of Decentralized Learning”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.62-#2, pp. 420-427.


Moreno, Diego and Mark Walker (1995). “Convergence Theorems for a Class of Recursive Stochastic Algorithms”. in J. Ledyard, ed.. The Economics of Informational Decentralization: Complexity, Efficiency,and Stability. Boston : Kluwer Academic, pp. 53-78.


Duffy, John (1994). “On Learning and the Nonuniqueness of Equilibrium in an Overlapping Generations Model with Fiat Money”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.64-#?, pp. 541-553.


Barucci, Emilio and Leonardo Landi (1997). “Least Mean Squares Learning in Self-Referential Linear Stochastic Models”. Economics Letters; V.57-#3, pp. 313-17.


Evans, George and Seppo Honkapohja (1998). “Economic Dynamics with Learning: New Stability Results”. Review of Economic Studies; V.65-#1, pp. 23-44.


Böhm, Volker and Jan Wenzelburger (1999). “Expectations, Forecasting, and Perfect Foresight: A Dynamical Systems Approach”. Macroeconomic Dynamics; V.3-#2, pp. 167-186.


Chang, M.C., C.Y. Cyrus Chu and Kenneth Lin (2000). “Initial Beliefs and the Global Stability of Least Squares Learning”. International Review of Economics and Finance; V.9-#?, pp. 123-137.


Bullard, James and Kaushik Mitra (2002). “Learning about Monetary Policy Rules”. Journal of Monetary Economics; V.49-#6, pp. 1105-1129

 

(2) Non-Linear Economies


Evans, George W. and Seppo Honkapohja (1993). “Adaptive Forecasts, Hysteresis, and Endogenous Fluctuations”. Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Review; #1, pp. 3-13.


Guesnerie, Roger (1993). “Successes and Failures in Coordinating Expectations”. European Economic Review; V.37-#?, pp. 243-268.


Grandmont, Jean-Michel (1998). “Expectations Formation and Stability of Large Socioeconomic Systems”. Econometrica; V.66-#4, pp. 741-781.


Grandmont, Jean-Michel (1985). “On Endogenous Competitive Business Cycles”. Econometrica; V.53-#5, pp. 995-1045.


Grandmont, Jean-Michel and Guy Laroque (1986). “Stability of Cycles and Expectations”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.40-#?, pp. 138-151.


Benassy, J.P. and M. Blad (1989). “On Learning and Rational Expectations in an Overlapping Generations Model”. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control; V.13-#3, pp. 379-400.


Woodford, Michael (1990). “Learning to Believe in Sunspots”. Econometrica; V.58-#2, pp. 277-307.


Evans, George (1989). “The Fragility of Sunspots and Bubbles”. Journal of Monetary Economics; V.23-#?, pp. 297-317.


Grandmont, Jean-Michel and Guy Laroque (1991). “Economic Dynamics with Learning: Some Instability Examples”. in W. Barnett, et al. eds. Equilibrium Theory and Applications. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 247-273.


Guesnerie, Roger and Michael Woodford (1991). “Stability of Cycles with Adaptive Learning Rules”. in W. Barnett, et al. eds. Equilibrium Theory and Applications. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 111-134.


Howitt, Peter and R. Preston McAfee (1992). “Animal Spirits”. American Economic Review; V.82-#3, pp. 493-507.


Bullard, James (1994). “Learning Equilibria”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.64-#2, pp. 468-487.


Sorger, Gerhard (1998). “Imperfect Foresight and Chaos: An Example of a Self-Fulfilling Mistake”. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization; V.33-#3/4, pp. 333-362.


Hommes, Cars and Gerhard Sorger (1998). “Consistent Expectations Equilibria”. Macroeconomic Dynamics; V.2-#3, pp. 287-321.


Schönhofer Martin (1999). “Chaotic Learning Equilibria”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.89-#1, pp. 1-20.


Kuan, Chung-Ming and Halbert White (1994). “Adaptive Learning with Nonlinear Dynamics Driven by Dependent Processes”. Econometrica; V.62-#5, pp. 1087-1114.


Evans, George and Seppo Honkapohja (1994). “On the Local Stability of Sunspot Equilibria under Adaptive Learning Rules”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.64-#1, pp. 142-161.


Evans, George and Seppo Honkapohja (1995). “Local Convergence of Recursive Learning to Steady States and Cycles in Stochastic Nonlinear Models”. Econometrica; V.63-#1, pp. 195-206.


Evans, George and Seppo Honkapohja (1998). “Convergence of Learning Algorithms without a Projection Facility”. Journal of Mathematical Economics; V.30-#1, pp. 59-86.


Evans, George and Seppo Honkapohja (2000). “Convergence for Difference Equations with Vanishing Time-Dependence, with Applications to Adaptive Learning”. Economic Theory; V.15-#3, pp. 717-725.


Honkapohja, Seppo and Kaushik Mitra (2003). “Learning with Bounded Memory in Stochastic Models”. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control; V.27-#?, pp. 1437-1457.


Marcet, Albert and Juan Nicolini (2003). “Recurrent Hyperinflations and Learning”. American Economic Review; V.93-#5, pp. 1476-1498.


Balasko, Yves (1994). “The Expectational Stability of Walrasian Equilibrium”. Journal of Mathematical Economics; V.23-#?, pp. 179-203.


Balasko, Yves and Daniel Royer (1996). “Stability of Competitive Equilibrium with Respect to Recursive Learning Processes”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.68-#2, pp. 319-348.


Chen, Xiaochong and Halbert White (1998). “Nonparametric Learning with Feedback”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.82-#1, pp. 190-222.


Barucci, Emilio, Gian Italo Bischi and Laura Gardini (1999). “Endogenous Fluctuations in a Bounded Rationality Economy: Learning with Non-perfect Foresight Equilibria”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.87-#1, pp. 243-253.


Araujo, Aloisio and Wilfredo Maldonado (2000). “Ergodic Chaos, Learning and Sunspot Equilibrium”. Economic Theory; V.15-#?, pp. 163-184.


Chiarella, Carl and Xue-Zhong He (2003). “Dynamics of Beliefs and Learning under aL-Processes–The Heterogeneous Case”. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control; V.27-#?, pp. 503-531.

 

d. Limited Computational Capacity and Bounded Rationality


Conlisk, John (1996). “Bounded Rationality and Market Fluctuations”. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization; V.29-#2, pp. 233-50.


Spear, Stephen (1989). “Learning Rational Expectations under Computability Constraints”. Econometrica; V.57-#4, pp. 889-910.


Board, Raymond (1994). “Polynomially Bounded Rationality”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.63-#?, pp. 246-270.

 

e. Genetic Algorithms


Marimon, Ramon, Ellen McGratten, and Thomas Sargent (1990). “Money As a Medium of Exchange in an Economy with Artificially Adaptive Agents”. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control; V.47-#?, pp. 282-336.


Arifovic, Jasmina (1994). “Genetic Algorithm Learning and the Cobweb Model”. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control; V.18-#1, pp. 3-28.


Arifovic, Jasmina (1995). “Genetic Algorithms and Inflationary Economies”. Journal of Monetary Economics; V36-#1, pp. 219-43.


Arifovic, Jasmina (1996). “The Behavior of the Exchange Rate in the Genetic Algorithm and Experimental Economies”. Journal of Political Economy; V.104-#3, pp. 510-41.


Arifovic, Jasmina; Bullard, James; Duffy, John (1997). “The Transition from Stagnation to Growth: An Adaptive Learning Approach”. Journal of Economic Growth; V.2-#2, pp. 185-209.


Dawid, Herbert (1996). “Learning Cycles and Sunspot Equilibria”. Journal of Evolutionary Economics;V.6-#4, pp. 361-373.


Arifovic, Jasmina (1999). “Stability of Equilibria Under Genetic-Algortihm Adaptation: An Analysis”. Macroeconomic Dynamics; V.2-#1, pp.1-21.


Bullard, James and John Duffy (1999). “Learning and the Stability of Cycles”. Macroeconomic Dynamics; V.2-#1, pp. 22-48.


Bullard, James and John Duffy (1999). “Using Genetic Algorithms to Model the Evolution of Heterogeneous Beliefs”. Computational Economics; V.13-#?, pp. 41-60.


Arifovic, Jasmina and Ramazan Gençay (2000). “Statistical properties of genetic learning in a model of exchange rate”. Journal of Economic Dynamics And Control; V.24-#5/7, pp. 981-1005.


Heinemann, Maik (2000). “Adaptive learning of rational expectations using neural networks”. Journal of Economic Dynamics And Control; V.24-#5/7, pp.1007-1026

 

3. Bayesian Learning


Blume, Lawrence and David Easley (1998). “Rational Expectations and Rational Learning”. in Mukul Majumdar, ed. Organizations with Incomplete Information: Essays in Economic Analysis. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 61-109.


Turnovsky, Stephen (1969). “A Bayesian Approach to the Theory of Expectations”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.1-#?, pp. 220-227.


Cyert, Richard and Morris DeGroot (1974). “Rational Expectations and Bayesian Analysis”. Journal of Political Economy; V.82-#3, pp. 521-536.


Grossman, Sanford (1975). “Equilibrium under Uncertainty and Bayesian Adaptive Control”. in R.H. Day and T. Groves, eds. Adaptive Economic Models. San Diego: Academic Press, pp. 279-307.


Cyert, Richard and Morris DeGroot (1977). “Sequential Strategies in Dual Control Problems”. Theory and Decision; V.8-#?, pp.


Townsend, Robert (1978). “Market Anticipations, Rational Expectations, and Bayesian Analysis”. International Economic Review; V.19-#2, pp. 481-494.


Townsend, Robert (1983). “Forecasting the Forecasts of Others”. Journal of Political Economy; V.91-#4, pp. 546-587.


Townsend, Robert (1983). “Equilibrium Theory with Learning and Disparate Expectations”. in R. Frydman and E. Phelps, eds. Individual Forecasting and Aggregate Outcomes: “Rational Expectations” Examined. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 169-198.


Frydman, Roman (1982). “Towards an Understanding of Market Process: Individual Expectations and Convergence to a Rational Expectations Equilibrium”. American Economic Review; V.72-#4, pp. 652-668.


Frydman, Roman (1983). “Individual Rationality, Decentralization, and the Rational Expectations Hypothesis”. in R. Frydman and E. Phelps, eds. Individual Forecasting and Aggregate Outcomes: “Rational Expectations” Examined. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 97-122.


Blume, Lawrence and David Easley (1984). “Rational Expectations Equilibrium: An Alternative Approach”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.34-#?, pp. 116-129.


Feldman, Mark (1987). “An Example of Convergence of Rational Expectations with Heterogeneous Beliefs”. International Economic Review; V.28-#3, pp. 635-650.


Feldman, Mark (1987). “Bayesian Learning and Convergence to Rational Expectations”. Journal of Mathematical Economics; V.16-#3, pp. 297-313.


Bray, Margaret and David Kreps (1988). “Rational Learning and Rational Expectations”. in G. Feiwel, ed. Arrow and the Ascent of Modern Economic Theory. London: Macmillan, pp. 597-625.


Kurz, Mordecai (1992). “Understanding the Past in Order to Assess the Future: On Learning Equilibrium Price Processes”. in Partha Dasgupta, et al. eds. Economic Analysis of Markets and Games. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 291-315.


Vives, Xavier (1993). “How Fast Do Rational Agents Learn”. Review of Economic Studies; V.60-#2, pp. 329-347.


Shah, Sudhir (1995). “Bayesian Learning and the Stability of Equilibrium Forecasts”. Journal of Mathematical Economics; V.24-#?, pp. 461-495.


Jun, Byoung and Xavier Vives (1996). “Learning and Convergence to a Full-Information Equilibrium are not Equivalent”. Review of Economic Studies; V.63-#4, pp. 653-674.


Nyarko, Yaw (1997). “Convergence in Economic Models with Bayesian Hierarchies of Beliefs”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.74-#?, pp. 266-296.


Kreps, David (1998). “Anticipated Utility and Dynamic Choice”. in D. Jacobs, E. Kalai, and M. Kamien, eds. Frontiers of Research in Economic Theory. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 242-274.

 

B. Learning and Convergence to ‘Common Knowledge’

 

1. Surveys/Overviews


Tan, Tommy and Sergio R.D.C. Werlang (1988). “A Guide to Knowldge and Games”. in Moshe Vardi, ed. Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge–Proceedings of the Second Conference. Los Altos: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 163-177.


Barwise, Jon (1988). “Three Views of Common Knowledge”. in Moshe Vardi, ed. Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge–Proceedings of the Second Conference. Los Altos: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 365-379.


Brandenburger, Adam and Eddie Dekel (1989). “The Role of Common Knowledge Assumptions in Game Theory”. in Frank Hahn, ed. The Economics of Missing Markets, Information, and Games. Oxford: OUP, pp. 46-61.


Binmore, Ken and Adam Brandenburger (1990). “Common Knowledge and Game Theory”. in K. Binmore, Essays on the Foundations of Game Theory. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 105-150.


Geanakoplos, John (1994). “Common Knowledge”. in Robert Aumann and Sergiu Hart, eds. Handbook of Game Theory, Vol. 2. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 1438-1496.


Dekel, Eddie and Faruk Gul (1997). “Rationality and Knowledge in Game Theory”. in David Kreps and Kenneth Wallace, eds. Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, Vol. 1. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 87-172.


Board, Oliver (2002). “Knowledge, Beliefs, and Game-Theoretic Solution Concepts”. Oxford Review of Economic Policy; V.18-#4, pp. 418-432.


Samuelson, Larry (2004). “Modeling Knowledge in Economic Analysis”. Journal of Economic Literature; V.42-#2, pp. 367-403.


Bonanno, Giacomo and Klaus Nehring (1997). “Agreeing to Disagree: A Survey”. ms: UC Davis, Department of Economics.

 

2. The Idea of Common Knowledge


Lewis, David (1966). Convention: A Philosophical Study. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.


Clark, Herbert and Catherine Marshall (1981). “Definite Reference and Mutual Knowledge”. in Arvind Joshi, Bonnie Webber, and Ivan Sag, eds. Elements of Discourse Understanding. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 10-63.


Radford, Colin (1968). “Knowing and Telling”. Philosophical Review; V.78-#3, pp. 326-336.


Cargile, John (1969/70). “A Note on Iterated Knowledge”. Analysis; V.?-#?, pp. 151-155.


Schiffer, Stephen (1972). Meaning. Oxford: Oxford University Press.


Heal, Jane (1978). “Common Knowledge”. Philosophical Quarterly; V.28-#111, pp. 116-131.


Gilbert, Margaret (1987). “Modelling Collective Belief”. Synthese; V.73-#?, pp. 185-204.

 

3. Preliminaries: Bayesian Aggregation of Opinions

 

a. Non-Interactive


Blackwell, David and Lester Dubins (1962). “Merging Opinions with Increasing Information”. Annals of Mathematical Statistics; V.38-#?, pp. 882-886.


Dickey, James and Peter Freeman (1975). “Population-Distributed Personal Probabilities”. Journal of the American Statistical Association; V.70-#?, pp. 362-364.


Dawid, A.P. (1982). “Intersubjective Statistical Models”. In G. Koch and F. Spizzichino, eds. Exchangeability in Probability and Statistics. Amsterdam: North-Holland.


Weerahandi, Samaradasa and James Zidek (1981). “Multi-Bayesian Statistical Decision Theory”. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series A; V.144-#1, pp. 85-93.


Weerahandi, Samaradasa and James Zidek (1983). “Elements of Multi-Bayesian Decision Theory. Annals of Statistics; V.11-#4, pp. 1032-1046.


Genest, Christian, Samaradasa Weerahandi, and James Zidek (1990). “Conditionalization and Likelihood Dominance in Group Belief Formation”. Statistics and Decisions; V.8-#2, pp. 183-198.


Diaconis, Persi and David Freedman (1986). “On the Consistency of Bayes Estimates”. Annals of Statistics; V.14-#1, pp. 1-26.


Schervish, Mark and Teddy Seidenfeld (1990). “An Approach to Consensus and Certainty with Increasing Evidence”. Journal of Statistical Planning and Inference; V.25-#3, pp. 401-414.


Seidenfeld, Teddy and Mark Schervish (1990). “Two Perspectives on Consensus for (Bayesian) Inference and Decisions”. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics, V.20-#2, pp. 318-325.


Kadane, Joseph (1993). “Several Bayesians: A Review”. Test; V.2-#1/2, pp. 1-12. [comments by F.J. Girón, D. Peña, P. Fishburn, S. French, D.V. Lindley, G. Parmigiani, R.L. Winkler, with response by Kadane, pp. 13-25).


Bassan, Bruno and Marco Scarsini (1995). “On the value of information in multi-agent decision theory”. Journal of Mathematical Economics; V.24-#6, pp. 557-576.


Bassan, Bruno and Marco Scarsini (1998). “Sequential Decisions with Several Agents”. Economic Theory; V.12-#2, pp. 371-391.


Esteves, L.G., S. Wechsler, J.G. Leite, and V.A. González-López (2000). “Definettian Consensus”. Theory and Decision; V.49-#1, pp. 79-95.


Wallsten, Thomas and Adele Diederich (2001). “Understanding pooled subjective probability estimates”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.41-#1, pp. 1-18.


Lainé, Jean, Michel Le Breton and Alain Trannoy (1986). “Group Decision Making Under Uncertainty: A Note on the Aggregation of ‘Ordinal Probabilities’”. Theory and Decision; V.21-#2, pp. 155-161.


Weymark, John (1997). “Aggregating Ordinal Probabilities on Finite Sets”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.75-#2, pp. 407-432.

 

b. Interactive


DeGroot, Morris (1974). “Reaching a Consensus”. Journal of the American Statistical Association; V.69-#?, pp. 118-121.


Chatterjee, Samprit (1975). “Reaching a Consensus: Some Limit Theorems”. Bulletin de l'Institut International de Statistique; V.46-#3, pp. 156-160.


Chatterjee, Samprit and Eugene Seneta (1977). “Towards Consensus: Some Convergence Theorems”. Journal of Applied Probability; V.14-#1, pp. 89-97.


Berger, Roger (1981). “A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Reaching a Consensus Using DeGroot’s Method”. Journal of the American Statistical Association; V.76-#374, pp. 415-418.


Cohen, Joel E., John Hajnal, and Charles Newman (1986). “Approaching Consensus Can Be Delicate when Positions Harden”. Stochastic Processes and their Applications. V.22 -#2, pp. 315-322.


Gilardoni, Gustavo and Murray Clayton (1993). “On Reaching a Consensus Using DeGroot's Iterative Pooling”. Annals of Statistics; V.21-#1, pp. 391-401.


Lehrer, Keith (1976). “When Rational Disagreement is Impossible”. Noûs; V.10-#3, pp. 327-332.


Bacharach, Michael (1979). “Normal Bayesian Dialogues”. Journal of the American Statistical Association; V.74-#368, pp. 837-846.

 

4. Decision-Theoretic Approaches

 

a. Partitional Information Structure


Aumann, Robert (1976). “Agreeing to Disagree”. Annals of Statistics; V.4-#6, pp. 1236-1239.


Nishihara, Ko (1991). “A Note on th Equivalence of the Two Definitions of Common Knowledge”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.21-#?, pp. 177-178.


Milgrom, Paul (1981). “An Axiomatic Characterization of Common Knowledge”. Econometrica; V.49-#1, pp. 219-222.


Geanakoplos, John and Heraklis Polemarchakis (1982). “We Can’t Disagree Forever”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.28-#1, pp. 192-200.


Newman, Peter (1992). “Common Knowledge and the Game of Red Hats”. Indian Economic Review; V.27-#Special Issue, pp. 451-457.


Minelli, E. and H.M. Polemarchakis (1996). “Knowledge at Equilibrium”. in Yoav Shoham, ed. Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge–Proceedings of the Sixth Conference. Los Altos: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 211-228.


Cave, Jonathan (1983). “Learning to Agree”. Economics Letters; V.12-#?, pp. 147-152.


Parikh, Rohit and Paul Krasucki (1990). “Communication, Consensus, and Knowledge”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.52-#?, pp. 178-189.


Krasucki, Paul (1990). “Reaching Consensus on Decisions”. in Rohit Parikh, ed. Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge: Proceedings of the Third Conference. San Mateo: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 141-150.


Krasucki, Paul (1996). “Protocols Forcing Consensus”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.70-#1, pp. 266-272.


Heifetz, Aviad (1996). “Comment on Consensus without Common Knowledge”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.70-#1, pp. 273-277


Hart, Sergiu, Aviad Heifetz and Dov Samet (1996). “‘Knowing Whether,’ ‘Knowing That,’ and the Cardinality of State Spaces”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.70-#1, pp. 249-56.


McKelvey, Richard and Talbot Page (1986). “Common Knowledge, Consensus, and Aggregate Information”. Econometrica; V.54-#1, pp. 109-127.


Bergin, James (2001). “Common Knowledge with Monotone Statistics”. Econometrica; V.69-#5, pp. 1315-1332.

 

b. Generalized Information Structures (σ-algebras)


Sebenius, James and John Geanakoplos (1983). “Don’t Bet On It: Contingent Agreements with Asymmetric Information”. Journal of the American Statistical Association; V.78-#382, pp. 424-426.


Sonsino, Doron (1998). “Geanakoplos and Sebenius Model with Noise”. International Journal of Game Theory; V.27-#1, pp. 111-130


Nielsen, Lars Tyge (1984). “Common Knowledge, Communication, and Convergence of Beliefs”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.8-#1, pp. 1-14.


Bergin, James (1989). “We Eventually Agree”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.17-#?, pp. 57-66.


Nielsen, Lars Tyge, Adam Brandenburger, John Geanakoplos, Richard McKelvey, and Talbot Page (1990). “Common Knowledge of Aggregate Expectations”. Econometrica; V.58-#5, pp. 1235-1239.


Nielsen, Lars Tyge (1995). “Common Knowledge of a Multivariate Aggregate Statistic”. International Economic Review; V.36-#1, pp. 207-216.


Nielsen, Lars Tyge (1996). “Common Knowledge: The Case of Linear Regression”. Journal of Mathematical Economics; V.26-#?, pp. 285-304.


Hanson, Robin D. (1998). “Consensus by Identifying Extremists”. Theory and Decision; V.44-#3, pp. 293-301.

 

c. Common p-Beliefs and Common Knowledge


Brandenburger, Adam and Eddie Dekel (1987). “Common Knowledge with Probability 1”. Journal of Mathematical Economics; V.16-#?, pp. 237-245.


Monderer, Dov and Dov Samet (1989). “Approximating Common Knowledge with Common Beliefs”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.1-#?, pp. 170-190.


Neeman, Zvika (1996). “Approximating Agreeing to Disagree Results with Common p-Beliefs”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.12-#?, pp. 162-164.


Monderer, Dov and Dov Samet (1995). “Stochastic Common Learning”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.9-#?, pp. 161-171.


Kajii, Atsushi and Stephen Morris (1997). “Common p-Belief: The General Case”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.18-#1, pp. 73-82.


Morris, Stephen (1999). “Approximate Common Knowledge Revisited”. International Journal of Game Theory; V.28-#3, pp. 385-408.


Vassilakis, Spyros and Shmuel Zamir (1993). “Common Belief and Common Knowledge”. Journal of Mathematical Economics; V.22-#?, pp. 495-505.


Biacino, L. and M.R. Simonelli (1995). “Fuzzy Common Knowledge”. Journal of Mathematical Economics; V.24-#?, pp. 73-82.

 

d. Common Knowledge and No Trade/No Speculation Theorems


Hirschleifer, Jack (1975). “Speculation and Equilibrium: Information, Risks and Markets”. Quarterly Journal of Economics; V.89-#4, pp. 519-542.


Hirschleifer, Jack (1977). “The Theory of Speculation under Alternative Regimes of Markets”. Journal of Finance; V.32-#?, pp. 975-100.


Harrison, J.M. and David Kreps (1978). “Speculative Investor Behavior in a Stock Market with Heterogeneous Expectations”. Quarterly Journal of Economics; V.92-#2, pp. 323-336.


Tirole, Jean (1982). “On the Possibility of Speculation under Rational Expectations”. Econometrica; V.50-#5, pp. 1163-1181.


Milgrom, Paul and Nancy Stokey (1982). “Information, Trade and Common Knowledge”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.26-#1, pp. 17-27.


Hakansson, N., J. Kunkel, and J. Ohlson (1982). “Sufficient and Necessary Conditions for Information to Have Social Value in Pure Exchange”. Journal of Finance; V.37-#?, pp. 1169-1181.


Sebenius, James and John Geanakoplos (1983). “Don’t Bet On It: Contingent Agreements with Asymmetric Information”. Journal of the American Statistical Association; V.78-#382, pp. 424-426.


Dubey, Pradeep, John Geanakoplos, and Martin Shubik (1987). “The Revelation of Information in Strategic Market Games: A Critique of Rational Expectations Equilibrium”. Journal of Mathematical Economics; V.16-#2, pp. 105-138.


Nau, Robert (1995). “The Incoherence of Agreeing to Disagree”. Theory and Decision; V.39-#?, pp. 219-239.


Morris, Stephen (1994). “Trade with Heterogeneous Prior Beliefs and Asymmetric Information”. Econometrica; V.62-#6, pp. 1327-1347.


Morris, Stephen (1996). “Speculative Investor Behavior and Learning”. Quarterly Journal of Economics; V.?-#?, pp. 1111-1133.


Minelli, E. and H.M. Polemarchakis (1996). “Knowledge at Equilibrium”. in Yoav Shoham, ed. Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge– Proceedings of the Sixth Conference. Los Altos: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 211-228.


Sonsino, Doron (1995). “Impossibility of Speculation Theorems with Noisy Information”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.8-#?, pp. 406-421.


Bhattacharyya, S. and Barton Lipman (1995). “Ex Ante versus Interim Rationality and the Existence of Bubbles”. Economic Theory; V.6-#?, pp. 469-494.


Neeman, Zvika (1996). “Approximating Agreeing to Disagree Results with Common p-Beliefs”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.12-#1, pp. 162-164.


Neeman, Zvika (1996). “Common Beliefs and the Existence of Speculative Trade”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.16-#1, pp. 77-96.


Biais, Bruno and Peter Bossaerts (1998). “Asset Prices and Trading Volumes in a Beauty Contest”. Review of Economic Studies; V.65-#2, pp. 307-340.


Sandroni, Alvaro (1998). “Learning, Rare Events, and Recurrent Market Crashes in Frictionless Economies without Intrinsic Uncertainty”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.82-#1, pp. 1-18.


Araujo, Aloisio and Alvaro Sandroni (1999). “On the Convergence to Homogeneous Expectations when Markets are Complete”. Econometrica; V.67-#3, pp. 663-672.


Morris, Stephen and Costis Skiadas (2000). “Rationalizable Trade”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.31-#2, pp. 311-323.


Billot, Antoine, Alain Chateuneuf, Itzhak Gilboa, and Jean-Marc Tallon (2000). “Sharing Beliefs: Between Agreeing and Disagreeing”. Econometrica; V.68-#3, pp. 685-694.


Ng, Ma-Chung (2003). “On the Duality between Prior Beliefs and Trading Demands”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.109-#1, pp. 39-51.


Kurz, Mordecai (1992). “Understanding the Past in order to Assess the Future: On Learning Equilibrium Price Processes”. in Partha Dasgupta, et al., eds. Economic Analysis of Markets and Games: Essays in honor of Frank Hahn. Cambridge: MIT Press 1992, pp. 291-315.


Kurz, Mordecai (1994). “On Rational Belief Equilibria”. Economic Theory; V.4-#6, pp. 859-876.


Kurz, Mordecai (1994). “On the Structure and Diversity of Rational Beliefs”. Economic Theory; V.4-#6, pp. 877-900.


Kurz, Mordecai (1996). “Rational Beliefs and Endogenous Uncertainty”. Economic Theory; V.8-#3, pp. 383-397.


Kurz, Mordecai and Ho-Mou Wu (1996). “Endogenous Uncertainty in a General Equilibrium Model with Price Contingent Contracts”. Economic Theory; V.8-#3, pp. 461-88.


Kurz, Mordecai, ed. (1997). Endogenous Economic Fluctuations: Studies in the Theory of Rational Beliefs. Berlin: Springer.


Chwe, Michael Suk-Young (1999). “The Reeded Edge and the Phillips Curve: Money Neutrality, Common Knowledge, and Subjective Beliefs”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.87-#1, pp. 49-71.

 

5. Epistemic Modal Logic Approaches

 

a. Proof Theoretic Analysis of Common Knowledge and Common Belief


Bacharach, Michael (1985). “Some Extensions of a Claim of Aumann in an Axiomatic Model of Knowledge”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.37-#?, pp. 167-190.


Moses, Yoram and Gal Nachum (1990). “Agreeing to Disagree After All”. in Rohit Parikh, ed. Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge: Proceedings of the Third Conference. San Mateo: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 151-168.


Bacharach, Michael (1992). “The Acquisition of Common Knowledge”. in Cristina Bicchieri and Maria Luisa Della Chiara, eds. Knowledge, Belief and Strategic Interaction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 285-315.


Gilboa, Itzhak (1988). “Information and Metainformation”. in Moshe Vardi, ed. Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge–Proceedings of the Second Conference. Los Altos: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 227-243.


Geanakoplos, John (1989). “Game theory without Partitions and Applications to Speculation and Consensus”. Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper; #914.


Samet, Dov (1990). “Ignoring Ignorance and Agreeing to Disagree”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.52-#?, pp. 190-207.


Rubinstein, Ariel and Asher Wolinsky (1990). “On the Logic of ‘Agreeing to Disagree’ Type Results”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.51-#?, pp. 184-193.


Shin, Hyun Song (1993). “Logical Structure of Common Knowledge”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.60-#1, pp. 1-13.


Bonanno, Giacomo and Klaus Nehring (1998). “On the Logic and Role of Negative Introspection of Common Belief”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.35-#1, pp. 17-36.


Bonanno, Giacomo and Klaus Nehring (1998). “Assessing the Truth Axiom under Incomplete Information”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.36-#1, pp. 3-29.


Bonanno, Giacomo and Klaus Nehring (1999). “Varieties of Interpersonal Compatibility of Beliefs”. in Jelle Gerbrandy, Maarten Marx, Maarten de Rijke and Yde Venema ed. JFAK. Essays dedicated to Johan van Benthem on the occassion of his 50th birthday. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press (cd-rom).


Dimitri, Nicola (1993). “Learning Partitions”. Economics Letters; V.42-#?, pp. 195-199.


Samet, Dov (1992). “Agreeing to Disagree in Infinite Information Structures”. International Journal of Game Theory; V.21-#?, pp. 213-218.


Matsuhisa, Takashi and Kazuyoshi Kamiyama (1997). “Lattice Structure of Knowledge and Agreeing to Disagree”. Journal of Mathematical Economics; V.27-#?, pp. 389-410.

 

b. Model Theoretic Analysis of Common Knowledge and Common Belief

 

(1) Overviews


Barwise, John (1989). “On the Model Theory of Common Knowledge”. in J. Barwise, The Situation in Logic. Csli Lecture Notes 17, pp. 201-220.


Lismont, Luc and Philippe Mongin (1994). “On the Logic of Common Belief and Common Knowledge”. Theory and Decision; V.37-#2, pp. 75-106.


Margalit, Avishai and Menahem Yaari (1996). “Rationality and Comprehension”. in Kenneth Arrow, et al., eds. The Rational Foundations of Economic Behavior. New York: St. Martins/IEA, pp. 89-100.


Kaneko, Mamoru, Takashi Nagashima, Nobu-Yuki Suzuki, and Yoshito Tanaka (2002). “A Map of Common Knowledge Logics”. Studia Logica; V.71-#1, pp. 57-86.

 

(2) Kripke Structures


Halpern, Joseph and Yoram Moses (1990). “Knowledge and Common Knowledge in a Distributed Environment”. Journal of the Association for Computing Machinery; V.37-#3, 549-587.


Fagin, Ronald, Joseph Halpern, and Moshe Vardi (1991). “A Model-Theoretic Analysis of Knowledge”. Journal of the Association for Computing Machinery; V.38-#2, pp. 382-428.


Halpern, Joseph and Yoram Moses (1992). “A Guide to Completeness and Complexity for Modal Logics of Knowledge and Beliefs”. Artificial Intelligence; V.54-#3, pp. 319-379.


Fagin, Ronald and Joseph Halpern (1994). “Reasoning about Knowledge and Probability”. Journal of the Association for Computing Machinery; V.41-#2, 340-367.


Fagin, Ronald, Joseph Halpern, Yoram Moses, and Moshe Vardi (1996). “Common Knowledge Revisited”. in Yoav Shoham, ed. Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge– Proceedings of the Sixth Conference. Los Altos: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 283-298.


Fagin, Ronald, Joseph Halpern, Yoram Moses, and Moshe Vardi (1999). “Common Knowledge Revisited”. Annals of Pure and Applied Logic; V.96-#1/3, pp. 89-105.


Simon, Robert Samuel (1999). “The Difference between Common Knowledge of Formulas and Sets”. International Journal of Game Theory; V.28-#3, pp. 367-384.


Van der Hoek, Wiebe and John-Jules Meyer (1997). “A Complete Epistemic Logic for Multiple Agents”. in M. Bacharach, L.-A. Gerard-Varet, P. Mongin, and H. Shin eds. Epistemic Logic and the Theory of Games and Decisions. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Pub, pp. 35-68.


Van der Hoek, Wiebe, Bernd van Linder, and John-Jules Meyer (1999). “Group Knowledge is Not Always Distributed (Neither is it Always Implicit)”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.38-#2, pp. 215-240.


Colombetti, M. (1993). “Formal Semantics for Mutual Beliefs”. Artificial Intelligence; V.82-#?, pp. 341-353.


Lismont, Luc and Philippe Mongin (1994). “A Non-Minimal but Very Weak Axiomatization of Common Belief”. Artificial Intelligence; V.70-#?, pp. 363-374.


Lismont, Luc and Philippe Mongin (1995). “Belief Closure: A Semantics of Common Knowledge for Modal Propositional Logic”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.30-#2, pp. 127-153.


Bonanno, Giacomo (1996). “On the Logic of Common Belief”. Mathematical Logic Quarterly; V.42-#?, pp.305-311.


Bonanno, Giacomo and Klaus Nehring (2000). “Common Belief with the Logic of Individual Belief”. Mathematical Logic Quarterly; V.46-#1, pp. 49-52.


Bonanno, Giacomo and Klaus Nehring (2000). “Intersubjective Consistency of Knowledge and Belief”. In Martina Faller, Stefan Kaufmann, and Marc Pauly, eds. Formalizing the Dynamics of Beliefs. Stanford: CSLI Publications, pp. 27-50.


Wolter, Frank (2000). “First Order Common Knowledge Logics”. Studia Logica; V.65-#?, pp. 249-271.

 

(3) Neighborhood Semantics


Lismont, Luc (1993). “La Connaissance Commune en Logique Modale”. Mathematical Logic Quarterly; V.39-#1, pp. 115-130.


Lismont, Luc (1995). Common Knowledge: Relating Anti-Founded Situation Semantics to Modal Logic Neighborhood Structures”. Journal of Logic, Language, and Information; V.3-#?, pp. 285-302.

 

(4) Infinitary Logics


Kaneko, Mamoru (1999). “Common Knowledge Logic and Game Logic”. Journal of Symbolic Logic; V.64-#2, pp. 685-700.


Kaneko, Mamoru and Takashi Nagashima (1997). “Axiomatic Indefinability of Common Knowledge in Finitary Logics”. in M. Bacharach, L.-A. Gerard-Varet, P. Mongin, and H. Shin eds. Epistemic Logic and the Theory of Games and Decisions. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Pub, pp. 69-93.


Heifetz, Aviad (1996). “Common Belief in Monotonic Epistemic Logic”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.32-#?, pp. 109-123.


Fagin, Ronald (1994). “A Quantitative Analysis of Modal Logic”. Journal of Symbolic Logic; V.59-#1, pp. 209-252.


Heifetz, Aviad (1994). “Infinitary Epistemic Logic”. in Ronald Fagin, ed. Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge–Proceedings of the Fifth Conference. Los Altos: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 95-107.


Heifetz, Aviad (1997). “Infinitary S5 Epistemic Logic”. Mathematical Logic Quarterly; V.43-#3, pp. 333-342.


Heifetz, Aviad (1999). “Iterative and Fixed Point Common Belief”. Journal of Philosophical Logic; V.28-#1, pp. 61-79.


Tanaka, Yoshihito (2001). “Model Existence in Non-compact Modal Logic”. Studia Logica; V.67-#1, pp. 61-71.


Lismont, Luc and Philippe Mongin (2003). “Strong Completeness Theorems for Weak Logics of Common Belief”. Journal of Philosophical Logic; V.32-#?, pp. 115-137.

 

6. On the Common Prior Assumption


Morris, Stephen (1995). “The Common Prior Assumption in Economic Theory”. Economics and Philosophy; V.11-#2, pp. 227-253.


Nyarko, Yaw (1991). “Learning and Agreeing to Disagree without Common Priors”. New York University Economic Research Report: 91-51.


Morris, Stephen (1994). “A Curious Property of Belief Operators”. University of Cambridge Economic Theory Discussion Paper: #198.


Feinberg, Yossi (2000). “Characterizing Common Priors in the Form of Posteriors”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.91-#2, pp. 127-179.


Samet, Dov (1998). “Common Priors and Separation of Convex Sets”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.24-#1, pp. 172-174.


Samet, Dov (1998). “Iterated Expectations and Common Priors”. Games and Economic Behavior; V24-#1/2, pp. 131-141.


Gul, Faruk (1998). “A Comment on Aumann’s Bayesian View”. Econometrica; V.66-#4, pp. 923-927.


Aumann, Robert (1998). “Common Priors: A Reply to Gul”. Econometrica; V.66-#4, pp. 929-938.


Lipman, Barton (2003). “Finite Order Implications of Common Priors”. Econometrica; V.71-#4, pp. 1255-1267.


Halpern, Joseph (1998). “Characterizing the Common Prior Assumption”. Proceedings of the Seventh Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge. San Francisco: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 133-146.


Halpern, Joseph (2002). “Characterizing the Common Prior Assumption”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.106-#2, pp. 316-355.


Bonanno, Giacomo and Klaus Nehring (1999). “How to Make Sense of the Common Prior Assumption under Incomplete Information”. International Journal of Game Theory; V.28-#3, pp. 409-434.


Nehring, Klaus (2001). “Common Priors under Incomplete Information: A Unification”. Economic Theory; V.18-#3, pp. 535-553.


Nyarko, Yaw (1998). “Bayesian Learning and Convergence to Nash Equilibria without Common Priors”. Economic Theory; V.11-#3, pp. 643-655.


Miller, Ronald and Chris Sanchirico (1997). “Almost Everybody Disagrees Almost All the Time: The Genericity of Weakly-Merging Nowhere”. ms: Department of Economics, Columbia University.


Varian, Hal (1989). “Difference of Opinion in Financial Markets”. In Courtney Stone, ed. Financial Risk: Theory, Evidence and Implications. Boston: Kluwer, pp.


Rubinstein, Ariel (1993). “On Price Recognition and Computational Complexity in a Monopolisitc Model”. Journal of Political Economy; V.101-#3, pp. 473-484.


Harris, Milton and Artur Raviv (1993). “Differences of Opinion Make a Horse Race”. Review of Financial Studies; V.6-#3, pp. 473-506.


Kandel, Eugene and Neil Pearson (1995). “Differential Interpretation of Public Signals and Trade in Speculative Markets”. Journal of Political Economy; V.103-#4, pp. 831-872.


Kyle, Albert S. and Albert Wang (1997). “Speculation Duopoly with Agreement to Disagree: Can Overconfidence Survive the Market Test?”. Journal of Finance; V.52-#5, pp. 2073-2090.


Haruvy, Ernan, Dale Stahl, and Paul Wilson (2001). “Modeling and Testing for Heterogeneity in Observed Strategic Behavior”. Review of Economics and Statistics; V.83-#1, pp. 146-157.


Ng, Ma-Chung (2003). “On the Duality between Prior Beliefs and Trading Demands”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.109-#1, pp. 39-51.


Nakata, Hiroyuki (2003). “Modelling Exchange of Probabilistic Information”. Economic Theory; V.21-#2/3, pp. 697-727.

 

C. Herd Behavior, Information Cascades, etc.

 

1. Overviews/Surveys


Hirshleifer, David (1995). “The Blind Leading the Blind: Social Influence, Fads, and Informational Cascades”. in Mariano Tommasi and Kathryn Ierulli, eds. The New Economics of Human Behavior. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 188-215.


Bikhchandani, Sushil, David Hirshleifer, and Ivo Welch (1998). “Learning from the Behavior of Others: Conformity, Fads, and Informational Cascades”. Journal of Economic Perspectives; V.12-#3, pp. 151-170.


Vives, Xavier (1996). “Social Learning and Rational Expectations”. European Economic Review; V.40-#?, pp. 589-601.


Devenow, Andrea and Ivo Welch (1996). “Rational Herding in Financial Economics”. European Economic Review; V.40-#3/5, pp. 603-615.


Gale, Douglas (1996). “What Have we Learned from Social Learning?”. European Economic Review; V.40-#?, pp. 617-628.


Grant, Simon, Stephen King, and Ben Polak (1996). “Information Externalities, Share-priced Based Incentives and Managerial Behavior”. Journal of Economic Surveys; V.10-#1, pp. 1-12


Moscarini, Giuseppe and Marco Ottaviani (1997). “Economic Models of Social Learning”. in Peirpaolo Battigalli, Aldo Montesano, and Fausto Panunzi, eds. Decisons, Games and Markets. Boston: Kluwer, pp.265-298.


Bikchandani, Sushil and Sunil Sharma (2001). “Herd Behavior in Financial Markets: A Review”. IMF Staff Papers; forth.


Hirshleifer, David and S. Hong Teoh (2003). “Herd Behavior and Cascading in Financial Markets: A Review and Synthesis”. European Financial Management; V.9-#1, pp. 25-66.


Chamley, Christophe (2004). Rational Herds: Economic Models of Social Learning. Cambridge: CUP.

 

2. Statistical Cascades


Banerjee, Abhijit (1992). “A Simple Model of Herd Behavior”. Quarterly Journal of Economics; V.107-#3, pp. 797-817.


Bikhchandani, Sushil, David Hirshleifer, and Ivo Welch (1992). “A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades”. Journal of Political Economy; V.100-#5, pp.992-1026.


Welch, Ivo (1992). “Sequential Sales, Learning, and Cascades”. Journal of Finance; V.47-#2, pp. 695-732.


Simons, Gerald and Gautam Bhattacharya (1996). “Informational Cascades in Informal Markets”. Journal of Economics (MVEA); V.22-#1, pp. 47-55.


Chamley, Christophe and Douglas Gale (1994). “Information Revelation and Strategic Delay in a Model of Investment”. Econometrica; V.62-#5, pp. 1065-1085.


Zhang, Jianbo (1997). “Strategic Delay and the Onset of Investment Cascades”. RAND Journal of Economics; V.28-#1, pp. 188-205.


Aoyagi, Masaki (1998). “Equilibrium Delay in a Simple Dynamic Model of Investment”. Economic Theory; V. 12-#1, pp. 123-146.


Lee, In Ho (1993). “On the Convergence of Informational Cascades”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.61-#?, pp. 395-411.


Gul, Faruk and Russell Lundholm (1995). “Endogenous Timing and the Clustering of Agents’ Decisions”. Journal of Political Economy; V.103-#5, pp. 1039-1066.


Vives, Xavier (1997). “Learning from Others: A Welfare Analysis”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.20-#?, pp. 177-200.


Caminal, Ramon and Xavier Vives (1999). “Price Dynamics and Consumer Learning”. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy; V.8-#1, pp. 95-131.


Burguet, Roberto and Xavier Vives (2000). “Social Learning and Costly Information Acquisition”. Economic Theory; V.15-#?, pp. 185-205.


Bru, Lluís and Xavier Vives (2002). “Informational Externalities, Herding, and Incentives”. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics; V.158-#1, pp. 91-105.


Huck, Stefan and Jörg Oechssler (1998). “Informational Cascades with Continuous Action Spaces”. Economics Letters; V.60-#?, pp. 163-166.


Smith, Lones and Peter Sørensen (2000). “Pathological Outcomes of Observational Learning”. Econometrica; V.68-#2, pp. 371-398.


Smith, Lones and Peter Sørensen (1997). “Informational Herding and Optimal Experimentation”. ms: MIT.


Moscarini, Giuseppe, Marco Ottaviani, and Lones Smith (1998). “Social Learning in a Changing World”. Economic Theory; V.11-#?, pp. 657-665.


Nöth, M. and M. Weber (2003). “Information Aggregation with Random Ordering: Cascades and Overconfidence”. The Economic Journal, V.113-#484, pp. 166-189.


Chamley, Christoph (2004). “Delays and Equilibria with Large and Small Information in Social Learning”. European Economic Review; V.48-#3, pp. 477-501.


Anderson, Lisa and Charles Holt (1997). “Information Cascades in the Laboratory”. American Economic Review; V.87-#5, pp


Hung, Angela and Charles Plott (2001). “Information Cascades: Replication and an Extension to Majority Rule and Conformity-Rewarding Institutions”. American Economic Review; V.91-#5, pp. 1508-1520.


Kübler, Dorothea and Georg Weizsäker (2004). “Limited Depth of Reasoning and Failure of Cascade Formation in the Laboratory”. Review of Economic Studies; V.71-#2, pp. 425-442.


Çelen, Bogaçhan and Shachar Kariv (2004). “Observational Learning under Imperfect Information”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.47-#1, pp. 72-86.


Çelen, Bogaçhan and Shachar Kariv (2004). “Distinguishing Informational Cascades from Herd Behavior in the Laboratory”. American Economic Review; V.94-#3, pp. 484-498.


Froot, Kenneth, David Scharfstein, Jeremy Stein (1992). “Herd on the Street: Informational Inefficiencies in a Market with Short-Term Speculation”. Journal of Finance; V.47-#4, pp. 1461-1484.


Trueman, Brett (1994). “Analyst Forecasts and Herding Behavior”. Review of Financial Studies; V.7-#?, pp. 97-124.


Choi, Jay Pil (1997). “Herd Behavior, the ‘Penguin Effect’, and Suppression of Informational Diffusion: An Analysis of Informational Externalities and Payoff Interdependency”. RAND Journal of Economics; V.28-#3, pp. 407-425.


Lee, In Ho (1998). “Market Crashes and Informational Avalanches”. Review of Economic Studies; V.65-#4, pp. 741-759.


Avery, Christopher and Peter Zemesky (1998). “Multidimensional Uncertainty and Herd Behavior in Financial Markets”. American Economic Review; V.88-#4, pp. 724-748.


Neeman, Zvika and Gerhard Orosel (1999). “Herding and Winner’s Curse in Markets with Sequential Bids”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.85-#1, pp. 91-121.


Patterson, Seymour (1998). “The Thrust to Free Trade: Conviction or Fashion”. International Advances in Economic Research; V.4-#2, pp. 115-127.


Calvo, Guillermo and Enrique Mendoza (2000). “Rational Contagion and the Globalization of Securities Markets”. Journal of International Economics; V.51-#1, pp. 79-113.


Chari, V.V. and Patrick Kehoe (2004). “Financial Crises as Herds”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.119-#1, pp. 128-150.


Choi, Chong Chu, Xeni Dassiou, and Stephen Gettings (2000). “Herding Behaviour and the Size of Customer Base as Commitment to Quality”. Economica; V.67-#267, pp. 375-398.


Jackson, Matthew and Ehud Kalai (1997). “Social Learning in Recurring Games”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.21-#?, pp. 102-134.


Jackson, Matthew and Ehud Kalai (1998). “Reputation versus Social Learning”. Economic Theory; V.88-#1, pp. 40-59.


Selten, Reinhard and Myrna Wooders (2001). “Cyclic Games: An Introduction and Some Examples”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.34-#1, pp. 138-152.


Minehart, Deborah and Suzanne Scotchmer (1999). “Ex Post Regret and the Decentralized Sharing of Information”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.27-#1, pp. 114-131.

 

3. Reputational Cascades


Scharfstein, David and Jeremy Stein (1990). “Herd Behavior and Investment”. American Economic Review; V.80-#3, pp. 465-479. [“Comment”, by M. Ottaviani and P. Sørensen (2000), V.90-#3, pp. 695-704; response 705-706.]


Brennan, Michael (1990). “Latent Assets”. Journal of Finance; V.45-#3, pp. 709-730.


Hirshleifer, David, Avanidhar Subrahmanyam, and Sheridan Titman (1994). “Security Analysis and Trading Patterns When Some Investors Receive Information before Others”. Journal of Finance; V.49-#5, pp. 1665-1698.


Zwiebel, Jeffrey (1995). “Corporate Conservatism and Relative Compensation”. Journal of Political Economy; V.103-#1, pp. 1-25.


Brandenburger, Adam and Ben Polak (1996). “When Managers Cover their Posteriors: Making the Decisions the Market Wants to See”. Rand Journal of Economics; V.27-#3, pp. 523-542.


Prendergast, Canice and Lars Stole (1996). “Impetuous Youngsters and Jaded Old-Timers: Acquiring a Reputation for Learning”. Journal of Political Economy V.104-#6, pp. 1105–1134


Cote, Jane, and Debra Sanders (1997). “Herding Behavior: Explanations and Implications”. Behavioral Research in Accounting; #9, pp. 20-45.


Jeon, Seonghoon (1998). “Reputational Concerns and Managerial Incentives in Investment Decisions”. European Economic Review; V. 42-#7, pp. 1203-1219.


Khanna, Naveen (1998). “Optimal Contracting with Moral Hazard and Cascading”. Review of Financial Studies; V.11-#3, pp. 557-594.


Avery, Christopher and Judith Chevalier (1999). “Herding Over the Career”. Economics Letters; V.63-#3, pp. 327-333.


Chevalier, Judith and Glenn Ellison (1999). “Career Concerns of Mutual Fund Managers”. Quarterly Journal of Economics; V.114-#2, pp. 389-432.


Graham, John (1999). “Herding Among Investment Newsletters: Theory and Evidence”. Journal of Finance; V.54-#1, pp. 231-268.


Nofsinger, John R. ; Sias, Richard W. (1999) “Herding and Feedback Trading by Institutional and Individual Investors”. Journal of Finance; V.54-#6, pp. 2263-2295.


Hong, Harrison, Jeffrey Kubik, and Amit Solomon (2000). “Security Analysts’ Career Concerns and Herding of Earnings Forecasts”. Rand Journal of Economics; V.31-#1, pp. 121-144.


Welch, Ivo (2000). “Herding Among Security Analysts”. Journal of Financial Economics; V.58-#3, pp. 369-396.


Ottaviani, Marco and Peter Sørensen (2000). “Information Aggregation in Debate: Who Should Speak First”. Journal of Public Economics; V.81-#3, pp. 393-421.


Calvo, Guillermo and Enrique Mendoza (2000). “Rational Contagion and the Globalization of Securities Markets”. Journal of International Economics; V.51-#1, pp. 79-113.


Effinger, Matthias and Mattias Polborn (2001). “Herding and Anti-herding: A Model of Reputational Differentiation”. European Economic Review; V.45-#3, pp. 385-403.


Levy, Gilat (2004). “Anti-herding and Strategic Consultation”. European Economic Review; V.48-#3, pp. 503-525.


Kuran, Timur (1998). “Ethnic Norms and Their Transformation through Reputational Cascades”. Journal of Legal Studies; V.27-#2/part 2, pp. 623-659.

 

4. Limited Sampling, Word-of-Mouth Learning, Rumors, etc.


Kirman, Alan (1993). “Ants, Rationality, and Recruitment”. Quarterly Journal of Economics; V.108-#1, pp. 137-156.


Kirman, Alan (1997). “The Economy as an Interactive System”. in W. Brian Arthur, Steven Durlauf, and David Lane, eds. The Economy as a Complex Evolving System, II. Reading, Mass.: Addison Wesley/Santa Fe Institute, pp. 491-531.


Kirman, Alan (1997). “The Economy as an Evolving Network”. Journal of Evolutionary Economics;V.7-#4, pp. 339-353.


Banerjee, Abhijit (1993). “The Economics of Rumors”. Review of Economic Studies; V.60-#?, pp. 309-337.


Banerjee, Abhijit and Drew Fudenberg (2004). “Word-of-Mouth Learning”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.46-#1, pp. 1-22.


Smith, Lones and Peter Sørensen (1996). “Rational Social Learning with Random Sampling”. ms: MIT.


Ellison, Glenn and Drew Fudenberg (1995). “Word-Of-Mouth Communication and Social Learning”. Quarterly Journal of Economics; V.111-#1, pp. 93-125.


Shiller, Robert J. (1995). “Conversation, Information, and Herd Behavior”. American Economic Review; V.85-#2, pp. 181-85.


Dawid, Herbert (1999). “On the Dynamics of Word of Mouth Learning With and Without Anticipations”. Annals of Operations Research; #89, pp. 273-295.


Arthur, W. Brian and David Lane (1993). “Information Contagion”. Structural Change and Economic Dynamics; V.4-#?, pp. 81-104. Also in W.B. Arthur (1994), Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 69-97.


Lane, David (1997). “Is What is Good for Each Best for All? Learning from Others in the Information Contagion Model”. in W. Brian Arthur, Steven Durlauf, and David Lane, eds. The Economy as a Complex Evolving System, II. Reading, Mass.: Addison Wesley/Santa Fe Institute, pp. 105-127.


Bala, Venkatesh and Sanjeev Goyal (1998). “Learning from Neighbors”. Review of Economic Studies; V.65-#3, pp. 595-621.


Bala, Venkatesh and Sanjeev Goyal (2001). “Conformism and Diversity under Social Learning”. Economic Theory; V.17-#?, pp. 101-120.


Blonski, Matthisa (1999). “Social Learning with Case-Based Decisions”. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization; V.38-#1, pp. 59-77.


Ellison, Glenn and Drew Fudenberg (1993). “Rules of Thumb for Social Learning”. Journal of Political Economy; V.101-#4, pp. 612-643.


Morris, Stephen (2000). “Contagion”. Review of Economic Studies; V.67-#1, pp. 57-78.


Kelly, Morgan and Cormac Ó Gráda (2000). “Market Contagion: Evidence from the Panics of 1854 and 1857”. American Economic Review; V.90-#5, pp. 1110-1124.


Gale, Douglas and Shachar Kariv (2003). “Bayesian Learning in Social Networks”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.45-#?, pp. 329-346.


Björnerstedt, Jonas and Jörgen Weibull (1996). “Nash Equilibrium and Evolution by Imitation”. in Kenneth Arrow, Enrico Colombatto, Mark Perlman, and Christian Schmidt, eds. The Rational Foundations of Economic Behavior. New York: St. Martins, pp. 155-171


Schlag, Karl (1998). “Why Imitate, and If So, How? A Boundedly Rational Approach to Multi-armed Bandits”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.78-#1, pp. 130-156.


Schlag, Karl (1998). “Which One Should I Imitate?”. Journal Of Mathematical Economics; V.31-#4, pp. 493-522.


Vega-Redondo, Fernando (1997). “The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior”. Econometrica; V.65-#2, pp. 375-384.


Schenk-Hoppé, Klaus Reiner (2000). “The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior in Oligopolies”. Journal of Mathematical Ecnomics; V.33-#1, pp. 335-55.


Alós-Ferrer, Carlos, Ana Ania and Klaus Renier Schenk-Hoppé (2000). “An Evolutionary Model of Bertrand Oligopoly”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.33-#1, pp. 1-19.


Alós-Ferrer, Carlos (2004). “Cournot versus Walras in Dynamic Oligopolies with Memory”. International Journal of Industrial Organization; V.22-#2, pp. 193-217.


Cubitt, Robin and Robert Sugden (1998). “The Selection of Preferences Through Imitation”. Review of Economic Studies; V.65-#4, pp. 761-771.


Alós-Ferrer, Carlos and Manfred Nermuth (2003). “A Comment on ‘The Selection of Preferences Through Imitation’”. Economic Bulletin; V.3-#7, pp. 1-9.


Bergin, James and Dan Bernhardt (2004). “Comparative Learning Dynamics”. International Economic Review; V.45-#2, pp. 431-465.

 

5. Information Externalities, Strategic Experimentation, and Herding


Leibenstein, Harvey (1950). “Bandwagon, Snob and Veblen Effects in the Theory of Consumer Demand”. Quarterly Journal of Economics; V.64-#2, pp. 183-207.


Schelling, Thomas (1978). Micromotives and Macrobehavior. New York: Norton.


Becker, Gary (1991). “A Note on Restaurant Pricing and Other Examples of Social Influence on Price”. Journal of Political Economy; V.99-#5, pp. 1109-1116.


Bolton, Patrick and Christopher Harris (1999). “Strategic Experimentation”. Econometrica; V.67-#2, pp. 349-374.


Bolton, Patrick and Christopher Harris (1999). “Strategic Experimentation: The Undiscounted Case”. In Peter Hammond and Gareth Myles, eds. Incentives, Organization and Public Economics. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 53-68.


Caplin, Andrew and John Leahy (2000). “Miracle on Sixth Avenue: Information Externalities and Search”. Economic Journal; V.108-#446, pp. 60-74.


Alexander-Cook, Kim, Dan Bernhardt, and Joanne Roberts (1998). “Riding Free on the Signals of Others”. Journal of Public Economics; V.67-#1, pp. 25-43.


Guzman, Rolando and Gustavo Ventura (1998). “A Model of Experimentation with Informational Externalities”. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control; V.23-#1, pp. 9-34.


Aoyagi, Masaki (1998). “Mutual Observability and the Convergence of Actions in a Multi-Person Two-Armed Bandit Model”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.82-#2, pp. 405-424.


Bassan, Bruno and Marco Scarsini (1998). “Sequential Decisions with Several Agents”. Economic Theory; V.12-#2, pp. 371-391.

 

6. Related Topics

 

a. Oligopoly learning with unknown demand


Cyert, Richard and Morris DeGroot (1970). “Bayesian Analysis and Duopoly Theory”. Journal of Political Economy; V.78-#?, pp.


Cyert, Richard and Morris DeGroot (1970). “Multiperiod Decision Models with Alternative Choice as a Solution to the Duopoly Problem”. Quarterly Journal of Economics; V.84-#?, pp.


Cyert, Richard and Morris DeGroot (1971). “Interfirm Learning and the Kinked Demand Curve”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.3-#3, pp. 272-287.


Cyert, Richard and Morris DeGroot (1973). “An Analysis of Cooperation and Learning in a Duopoly Context”. American Economic Review; V.63-#1, pp. 26-37.


Kirman, Alan (1975). “Learning by Firms about Demand Conditions”. in R.H. Day and T. Groves, eds. Adaptive Economic Models. San Diego: Academic Press, pp. 137-156.


Gates, D.J., J.A. Rickard, and D.J. Wilson (1977). “A Convergent Adjustment Process for Firms in Competition”. Econometrica; V.45-#?, pp. 1349-1364.


Kirman, Alan (1995). “Learning in Oligopoly: Theory, Simulation, and Experimental Evidence”. in Alan Kirman and Mark Salmon, eds. Learning and Rationality in Economics. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 127-178.


Cyert, Richard and Morris DeGroot (1987). Bayesian Analysis and Uncertainty in Economic Theory. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield.

 

b. Oligopoly Investment/Entry under Unknown Demand


Rob, Rafael (1991). “Learning and Capacity Expansion under Demand Uncertainty”. Review of Economic Studies; V.58-#4, pp. 655-675.


Caplin, Andrew and John Leahy (1993). “Sectoral Shocks, Learning and Aggregate Fluctuations”. Review of Economic Studies; V.60-#4, pp. 777-794.


Zeira, Joseph (1994). “Informational Cycles”. Review of Economic Studies; V.61-#1, pp. 31-44.

 

c. Costly Action, Endogenous Ordering, and Frenzies


Romer, David (1993). “Rational Asset Price Movement without News”. American Economic Review; V.83-#5, pp.1112-1130.


Bulow, Jeremy and Paul Klemperer (1994). “Rational Frenzies and Crashes”. Journal of Political Economy; V.102-#1, pp. 1-23.


Caplin, Andrew and John Leahy (1994). “Business as Usual, Market Crashes, and Wisdom After the Fact”. American Economic Review; V.84-#3, pp. 548-565.


Lohmann, Susanne (1993). “A Signaling Model of Informative and Manipulative Political Action”. American Political Science Review; V.87-#2, pp. 319-333.


Lohmann, Susanne (1995). “A Signaling Model of Competitive Political Pressures”. Economics and Politics; V.7-#3, pp. 181-206.


Lohmann, Susanne (1994). “The Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989-1991”. World Politics; V.47-#1, pp. 42-101.


Lohmann, Susanne (1994). “Information Aggregation Through Costly Political Action”. American Economic Review; V.84-#3, pp. 518-530.


Lohmann, Susanne (1993). “A Welfare Analysis of Political Action”. in William Barnett, Melvin Hinich, and Norman Schofield, eds. Political Economy: Institutions, Competition and Representation. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 437-461.

 

d. Noise Trading and Speculative Bubbles


Blachard, Olivier and Mark Watson (1982). “Bubbles, Rational Expectations, and Financial Markets”. in Paul Wachtel, ed. Crises in the Economic and Financial Structure. Lexington: Lexington Books.


Kyle, Albert (1985). “Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading”. Econometrica; V.53-#6; pp. 1315-1335.


Glosten, Lawrence and Paul Milgrom (1985). “Bid, Ask, and Transaction Prices in a Specialist Market with Heterogeneously Informed Traders”. Journal of Financial Economics; V.14-#1, pp. 71-100.


Black, Fischer (1986). “Noise”. Journal of Finance; V.41-#3, pp. 529-543.


Trueman, Brett (1988). “A Theory of Noise Trading in Securities Markets”. Journal of Finance; V.43-#1, pp. 83-95.


Kyle, Albert (1989). “Informed Speculation with Imperfect Competition”. Review of Economic Studies; V.56-#?, pp. 317-356.


Laffont, Jean-Jacques and Eric Maskin (1989). “The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Insider Trading in the Stock Market”. Journal of Political Economy; V.27-#1, pp. 70-93.


Varian, Hal (1989). “Difference of Opinion in Financial Markets”. In Courtney Stone, ed. Financial Risk: Theory, Evidence and Implications. Boston: Kluwer, pp.


Day, Richard H. and Weihong Huang (1990).”Bulls, Bears and Market Sheep”. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization; V.14-#3 , pp. 299-329.


Shiller, Robert (1991). Market Volatility. Cambridge: MIT Press.


Shleifer, Andrei and Lawrence Summers (1990). “The Noise Trader Approach to Finance”. Journal of Economic Perspectives; V.4-#2, pp. 19-33.


DeLong, J. Bradford, Andrei Shleifer, Lawrence Summers, and Robert Waldmann (1990). “Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets”. Journal of Political Economy; V.98-#4, pp. 703-738.


DeLong, J. Bradford, Andrei Shleifer, Lawrence Summers, and Robert Waldmann (1991). “The Survival of Noise Traders in Financial Markets”. Journal of Business; V.54-#1, pp. 1-19.


Kirman, Alan (1991). “Epidemics of Opinion and Speculative Bubbles in Financial Markets”. in M. Taylor, ed. Money and Financial Markets. London: Macmillan.


Kyle, Albert and Jean-Luc Vila (1991). “Noise Trading and Takeovers”. Rand Journal of Economics; V.22-#1, pp. 54-71.


Shin, Hyun Song (1992). “Prices of State Contingent Claims with Insider Traders, and the Favourite-Longshot Bias”. Economic Journal; V.102-#411, pp. 426-435.


Danthine, Jean-Pierre and Serge Moresi (1993). “Volatility, Information, and Noise Trading”. European Economic Review; V.37-#5, pp. 961-955.


Campbell, John and Albert Kyle (1993). “Smart Money, Noise Trading and Stock Price Behavior”. Journal of Economic Studies; V.60-#1, pp. 1-34.


Harris, Milton and Artur Raviv (1993). “Differences of Opinion Make a Horse Race”. Review of Financial Studies; V.6-#3, pp. 473-506.


Kandel, Eugene and Neil Pearson (1995). “Differential Interpretation of Public Signals and Trade in Speculative Markets”. Journal of Political Economy; V.103-#4, pp. 831-872.


Kyle, Albert S. and Albert Wang (1997). “Speculation Duopoly with Agreement to Disagree: Can Overconfidence Survive the Market Test?”. Journal of Finance; V.52-#5, pp. 2073-2090.


Dow, James and Gary Gorton (1997). Noise Trading, Delegated Portfolio Management, and Economic Welfare”. Journal of Political Economy; V.105-#5, pp. 1024-1050.


Barlevy, Gadi and Pietro Veronesi (2003). “Rational Panics and Stock Market Crashes”. Journal of Economic Theory; V110-#2, pp. 234-263.


Abreu, Dilip and Markus Brunnermeier (2003). “Bubbles and Crashes”. Econometrica; V.71-#1, pp. 173-204.


Conlon, John (2004). “Simple Finite Horizon Bubbles Robust to Higher Order Knowledge”. Econometrica; V.72-#3, pp. 927-936.


Frankel, Jeffrey and Kenneth Froot (1988). “Explaining the Demand for Dollars: International Rates of Return, and the Expectations of Chartists and Fundamentalists”. in R. Chambers and P. Paarlberg, eds. Agriculture, Macroeconomics, and the Exchange Rate. Boulder: Westview.


Frankel, Jeffrey and Kenneth Froot (1990). “Chartists, Fundamentalists, and the Demand for Dollars”. in A. Courakis and M. Taylor, eds. Private Behavior and Government Policy in Interdependent Economies. Oxford: Clarendon Press.


Frankel, Jeffrey and Kenneth Froot (1990). “Chartists, Fundamentalists, and the Demand for Dollars”. American Economic Review; V.80-#2, pp. 181-185.


Flood, Robert and Peter Garber (1994). Speculative Bubbles, Speculative Attacks, and Policy Switching. Cambridge: MIT Press. [Part I]


Menkhoff, L. (1998). The Noise Trading Approach--Questionnaire Evidence from Foreign Exchange”. Journal of International Money and Finance; V.17-#3, pp. 547-564.


Grinspun, Ricardo (1995). “Learning Rational Expectations in an Asset Market”. Journal of Economics (Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie); V.61-#3, pp. 215-243.


Zeira, Joseph (1999). “Informational Overshooting, Booms, and Crashes”. Journal of Monetary Economics; V.43-#1, pp. 237-257

 

e. Network Externalities and Herding


Dybvig, Philip and Chester Spatt (1983). “Adoption Externalities as Public Goods”. Journal of Public Economics; V.20-#?, pp. 231-247.


Farrell, Joseph and Garth Saloner (1985). “Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation”. Rand Journal of Economics; V.16-#1, pp. 70-83.


Katz, Michael and Carl Shapiro (1985). “Network Externalities, Competition and Compatibilty”. American Economic Review; V.75-#3, pp. 424-440.


David, Paul A. (1985). “Clio and the Economics of QWERTY”. American Economic Review; V.75-#2, pp. 332-37.


David, Paul A. (1986). “Understanding the Economics of QWERTY: The Necessity of History”. in William N. Parker, ed.. Economic history and the modern economist. Oxford and New York: Blackwell, pp. 30-49.


Liebowitz, S. J., and Stephen Margolis (1990). “The Fable of the Keys”. Journal of Law and Economics; V.33-#1, pp. 1-25.


David, Paul and Julie Ann Bunn (1988). “The Economics of Gateway Technologies and Network Evolution: Lessons from Electricity Supply History”. Information Economics and Policy; V.3-#?, pp. 165-202.


Arthur, W. Brian (1989). “Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by Small Events”. Economic Journal; V.99-#?, pp. 116-131.


David, Paul A. (1994). “Why Are Institutions the 'Carriers of History'?: Path Dependence and the Evolution of Conventions, Organizations and Institutions”. Structural Change and Economic Dynamics; V5-#2, pp. 205-20.


Katz, Michael and Carl Shapiro (1994). “Systems Competition and Network Effects”. Journal of Economic Perspectives; V.8-#2, pp. 93-115.


Farrell, Joseph and Carl Shapiro (1994). “The Dynamics of Bandwagons”.in James Friedman, ed. Problems of Coordination in Economic Activity. Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 149-184.


Liebowitz, S. J. and Stephen Margolis (1994). “Network Externality: An Uncommon Tragedy”. Journal of Economic Perspectives; V.8-#2, pp. 133-50.


Liebowitz, S. J. and Stephen Margolis (1995). “Path Dependence, Lock-in, and History”. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization; V.11-#1, pp. 205-26.


Liebowitz, S. J., and Stephen Margolis (1995). “Are Network Externalities a New Source of Market Failure?”. Research in Law and Economics; V.17, pp. 1-22.


Cowan, Robin (1990). “Nuclear Power Reactors: A Study in Technological Lock-in”. Journal of Economic History; V.50-#3, pp. 801-814.


Cowan, Robin (1991). “Tortoises and Hares: Choice Among Technologies of Unknown Merit”. Economic Journal; V.101-407, pp. 801-814.


Cowan, Robin and Philip Gunby (1996). “Sprayed to Death: Path Dependence, Lock-In and Pest Control Strategies”. Economic Journal; V.106-#436, pp. 521-42.


Ruttan, Vernon (1997). “Induced Innovation, Evolutionary Theory and Path Dependence: Sources of Technical Change”. Economic Journal; V.107-#444, pp. 1520-1547.


David, Paul (1998). “Communication Norms and the Collective Cognitive Performance of ‘Invisible Colleges’”. In G.B. Navaretti, P. Dasgupta, K.-G. Maier and D. Siniscalco, eds. Creation and Transfer of Technical Knowledge: Institutions and Incentives. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.


Woeckener, Bernd (2000). “The competition of user networks: ergodicity, lock-ins, and metastability”. Journal of Economic Behavior And Organization; V.41-#2, pp. 85-99.

 

f. Social Interactions and Neighborhood Effects


Durlauf, Stephen and H. Peyton Young (2001). “The New Social Economics”. In S. Durlauf and P. Young, eds. Social Dynamics. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 1-14.


Durlauf, Stephen (1996). “Neighborhood Feedbacks, Endogenous Stratification, and Income Inequality”. In W. Barnett, G. Gandolfo, and C. Hillinger, eds. Dynamic Disequilibrium Modeling. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 505-534.


Durlauf, Stephen (1997). “Statistical Mechanics Approaches to Socioeconomic Behavior”. In W.B. Arthur, S. Durlauf, and D. Lane, eds. The Economy as an Evolving Complex System, II. Menlo Park: Addison-Wesley, pp. 81-104.


Durlauf, Stephen (1999). “How Can Statistical Mechanics Contribute to Social Science”. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences; V.96-#?, pp. 10582-10584.


Durlauf, Steven (2001). “A Framework for the Study of Individual Behavior and Social Interactions”. Sociological Methodology; V.31-#1, pp. 47-87.


Brock, William and Stephen Durlauf (2001). “Interactions Based Models”. In Heckman and Edward Leamer, eds. Handbook of Econometrics–V.5. Amsterdam: North Holland, pp. 3297-3380.


Blume, Lawrence and Stephen Durlauf (2001). “The Interactions Based Approach to Socioeconomic Behavior”. In S. Durlauf and P. Young, eds. Social Dynamics. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 15-44.


Brock, William and Stephen Durlauf (2001). “Discrete Choice with Social Interactions”. Review of Economic Studies; V.68-#2, pp. 235-260.


Brock, William and Stephen Durlauf (2002). “A Multinomial Choice Model of Neighborhood Effects”. American Economic Review; V.92-#2, pp. 298-303.


Blume, Lawrence and Stephen Durlauf (2003). “Equilibrium Models for Social Interaction Models”. International Game Theory Review; V.5-#3, pp. 193-209.


III. Learning in Strategic Environments


Eichberger, Jürgen (1992). “Nash Equilibrium and Learning”. in J. Borland, J. Creedy, and J. Eichberger, eds. Recent Developments in Game Theory. Brookfield, Vt.: Gower.


Battigalli, Pierpaolo, Mario Gilli, and M. Cristina Molinari (1992). “Learning and Convergence to Equilibrium in Repeated Strategic Interactions: An Introductory Survey”. Richerche Economiche; V.46-#3/4, pp. 335-378.

 

A. Bayesian Rationality in Strategic Environments

 

1. Characterizing Information and Knowledge in Games

 

a. Characterization


Kuhn, Harold (1953). “Extensive Games and the Problem of Information”. in H. Kuhn and A. Tucker, eds. Contributions to the Theory of Games, Vol. 2. Princeton: PUP. pp. 192-216.


Okada, A. (1981). “On Stability of Perfect Equilibrium Points”. International Journal of Game Theory; V.10-#?, pp. 67-73.


Dubey, Pradeep and Mamoru Kaneko (1984). “Information Patterns and Nash Equilibria in Extensive Games: I”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.8-#2, pp. 111-139.


Dubey, Pradeep and Mamoru Kaneko (1985). “Information Patterns and Nash Equilibria in Extensive Games: II”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.10-#3, pp. 247-262.


Bonanno, Giacomo (1992). “Players’ Information in Extensive Games”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.24-#?, pp. 35-48.


Bonano, Giacomo and Pierpaolo Battigalli (1997). “Synchronic Information, Knowledge and Common Knowledge in Extensive Games”. in M. Bacharach, L.-A. Gerard-Varet, P. Mongin, and H. Shin eds. Epistemic Logic and the Theory of Games and Decisions. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Pub, pp. 235-263. [Also Research in Economics; V.53-#1, pp. 77-99.]


Kline, J. Jude (1997). “Information Structures and Decentralizability of Equilibria”. Economic Theory; V.9-#1, pp. 81-96.


van Ditmarsch, H. (2001). “Knowledge Games”. Bulletin of Economic Research; V.53-#4, pp. 249-273.

 

b. On Perfect and Imperfect Recall


Okada, A. (1987). “Complete Inflation and Perfect Recall in Extensive Games”. International Journal of Game Theory; V.16-#?, pp. 85-91.


Aumann, Robert and Sylvain Sorin (1989). “Cooperation and Bounded Recall”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.1-#1, pp. 5-39.


Kaneko, Mamoru and J. Jude Kline (1995). “Behavior Strategies, Mixed Strategies and Perfect Recall”. International Journal of Game Theory; V.24-#2, pp. 127-145.


Piccione, Michele and Ariel Rubinstein (1997). “On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.20-#1, pp. 3-24.


Gilboa, Itzhak (1997). “A Comment on the Absent-Minded Driver”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.20-#1, pp. 25-30.


Battigalli, Pierpaolo (1997). “Dynamic Consistency and Imperfect Recall”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.20-#1, pp. 31-50.


Grove, Adam and Joseph Halpern (1997). “On the Expected Value of Games with Absentmindedness”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.20-#1, pp. 51-65.


Halpern, Joseph (1997). “On Ambiguities in the Interpretation of Game Trees”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.20-#1, pp. 66-96.


Lipman, Barton (1997). “More Absentmindedness”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.20-#1, pp. 97-101.


Aumann, Robert, Sergiu Hart, and Motty Perry (1997). “The Absent-Minded Driver”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.20-#1, pp. 102-116.


Aumann, Robert, Sergiu Hart, and Motty Perry (1997). “The Forgetful Passenger”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.20-#1, pp. 117-120.


Piccione, Michele and Ariel Rubinstein (1997). “The Absent-Minded Driver’s Paradox: Synthesis and Responses”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.20-#1, pp. 121-130.


Segal, Uzi (2000). “Don’t Fool Yourself to Believe You Won’t Fool Yourself Again”. Economics Letters; V.67-#1, pp. 1-3.


Dulleck, Uwe and Jörg Oechssler (1997). “The Absent-Minded Centipede”. Economics Letters; V.55-#?, pp. 309-315.


Ritzberger, Klaus (1999). “Recall in Extensive Form Games”. International Journal of Game Theory; V.28-#1, pp. 69-87.


Board, Oliver (2003). “The Not-So-Absent-Minded Driver”. Research in Economics; V.57-#3, pp. 189-200.


Bonanno, Giacomo (2003). “A Syntactic Characterization of Perfect Recall in Extensive Games”. Research in Economics; V.57-#3, pp. 201-217.


Bonanno, Giacomo (2003). “Memory of Past Beliefs and Actions”. Studia Logica; V.75-#1, pp. 7-30.


Bonanno, Giacomo (2004). “Memory and Perfect Recall in Extensive Games”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.47-#2, pp. 237-256.


Bonanno, Giacomo (2004). “A Characterization of von Neumann Games in Terms of Memory”. Synthese; V.139-#2, pp. 237-256.

 

c. Equivalence of Strategic and Normal Form


Krentel, W.D., J.C.C. McKinsey, and W.V. Quine (1951). “A Simplification of Games in Extenstive Form”. Duke Mathematics Journal, V.18-#?, pp. 885-900.


Dalkey, N. (1953). “Equivalence of Information Patterns and Essentially Determinate Games”. in H. Kuhn and A. Tucker, eds. Contributions to the Theory of Games, Vol. 2. Princeton: PUP. pp. 217-245.


Thompson, F.B. (1952/1997). “Equivalence of Games in Extensive Form”. in H. Kuhn, ed. Classics in Game Theory. Princeton: PUP, pp. 36-45.


Elmes, Susan and Philip Reny (1994). “On the Strategic Equivalence of Extensive Form Games”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.62-#1, pp. 1-23.


Mailath, George, Larry Samueslon, and Jeroen Swinkels (1993). “Externsive form Reasoning in Normal Form Games”. Etrica; V.61-#2, pp. 273-302.


Mailath, George, Larry Samueslon, and Jeroen Swinkels (1994). “Normal Form Structures in Extensive Form Games”. JET; V.64-#?, pp. 325-371.


Glazer, Jacob and Ariel Rubinstein (1996). “An Extensive Game as a Guide for Solving a Normal Game”. JET; V.70-#1, pp. 32-42.


Bonanno, Giacomo (1992). “Set-theoretic Equivalence of Extensive Form Games”. International Journal of Game Theory; V.20-#?, pp. 429-447.


Peleg, Bezalel, J. Rosenmüller and P. Sudhölter (1999). “The Canonical Extensive Form of a Strategic Game”. In A. Alkan, C. Aliprantis, and N. Yannelis, eds. Current Trends in Economics: Theory and Applications. Springer, pp. 367-387.


Sudhölter, Peter, Joachim Rosenmüller, Bezalel Peleg (2000). “The Canonical Extensive Form of a Game Form, Part II. Representation”. Journal of Mathematical Economics; V.33-#3, pp. 299-338.


Quesada, Antonio (2001). “The Normal Form is Not Sufficient”. Economics and Philosophy; V.17-#2, pp. 235-243.


Casajus, Andre (2003). “Weak Isomorphism of Extensive Games”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.46-#3, pp. 267-290.

 

2. Knowledge, Common Knowledge and Bayesian Nash Equilibrium

 

a. Characterizing Bayesian Nash Equilibria


Eichberger, Jürgen (1993). “Games with Incomplete Information”. Chapter 5 of Game Theory for Economists. San Diego: Academic Press, pp. 123-151.


Harsanyi, John (1967). “Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part I. The Basic Model”. Management Science; V.14-#3, pp. 159-182.


Harsanyi, John (1968). “Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points”. Management Science; V.14-#5, pp. 320-334.


Harsanyi, John (1968). “Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game”. Management Science; V.14-#3, pp. 159-182.


Böge, W. and Th. Eisele (1979). “On Solutions of Bayesian Games”. International Journal of Game Theory; V.8-#4, pp. 193-215.


Armbruster, W. and W. Böge (1979). “Bayesian Game Theory”. in O. Moeschlin and D. Pallaschke, eds. Game Theory and Related Topics. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 17-28.


Mertens, Jean-François and Shmuel Zamir (1985). “Formulation of Bayesian Analysis for Games with Incomplete Information”. International Journal of Game Theory; V.14-#1, pp. 1-29.


Vassilakis, Spyros and Shmuel Zamir (1993). “Common Belief and Common Knowledge”. Journal of Mathematical Economics; V.22-#?, pp. 495-505.


Brandenburger, Adam and Eddie Dekel (1993). “Hierarchies of Beliefs and Common Knowledge”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.59-#?, pp. 189-198.


Morris, Stephen, Andrew Postelwaite, and Hyun Song Shin (1995). “Depth of Knowledge and the Effect of Higher Order Uncertainty”. Economic Theory; V.6-#?, pp. 453-467.


Heifetz, Aviad and Dov Samet (1998). “Knowledge Spaces with Arbitrarily High Rank”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.22-#?, pp. 260-273.


Heifetz, Aviad and Dov Samet (1999). “Hierarchies of Knowledge: An Unbounded Stairway”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.38-#2, pp. 157-170.


Fagin, Ronald, John Geanakoplos, Joseph Halpern, and Moshe Vardi (1992). “The Expressive Power of the Hierarchical Approach to Modeling Knowledge and Common Knowledge”. in Yoram Moses, ed. Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge–Proceedings of the Fourth Conference. Los Altos: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 229-244.


Fagin, Ronald, John Geanakoplos, Joseph Halpern, and Moshe Vardi (1999). “The Hierarchical Approach to Modeling Knowledge and Common Knowledge”. International Journal of Game Theory; V.28-#3, pp. 331-365.


Heifetz, Aviad (1993). “The Bayesian Formulation of Incomplete Information – The Non-Compact Case”. International Journal of Game Theory; V.21-#?, pp. 329-338.


Hart, Sergiu, Aviad Heifetz, and Dov Samet (1996). “Knowing Whether, Knowing That, and the Cardinality of State Spaces”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.70-#1, pp. 249-256.


Heifetz, Aviad (1997). “Eliminating Redundancies in Partition Spaces”. in M. Bacharach, L.-A. Gerard-Varet, P. Mongin, and H. Shin eds. (1997). Epistemic Logic and the Theory of Games and Decisions. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Pub, pp. 95-103.


Heifetz, Aviad and Dov Samet (1998). “Topology-Free Typology of Beliefs”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.82-#?, pp. 324-341.


Heifetz, Aviad and Dov Samet (1999). “Coherent Beliefs are Not Always Types”. Journal of Mathematical Economics; V.32-#?, pp. 475-488.


Battigalli, Pierpaolo and Marciano Siniscalchi (1999). “Hierarchies of Conditional Beliefs and Interactive Epistemology in Dynamic Games”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.88-#1, pp. 188-230.


Battigalli, Pierpaolo and Marciano Siniscalchi (2002). “Strong Belief and Forward Inductive Reasoning”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.106-#2, pp. 356-391.


Brandenburger, Adam (2003). “On the Existence of a ‘Complete’ Possibility Structure”. In Nicola Dimitri, Marcello Basili, and Itzhak Gilboa, eds. Cognitive Processes and Economic Behavior. London: Routledge, pp. 30-34.


Mariotti, Thomas (2003). “Hierarchies of Compact Beliefs and Rationalizable Behavior”. Economic Letters; V.79-#2, pp. 199-204.


Brandenburger, Adam and H. Jerome Keisler (2005). “An Impossibility Theorem on Beliefs in Games”. Studia Logica; forth.


Mariotti, Thomas, Martin Meier, and Michele Piccione (2005). “Hierarchies of Beliefs for Compact Possibility Models”. Journal of Mathematical Economics; V.


Tohmé, Fernanco (2005). “Existence and Definability of States of the World”. MathSocSci; V.49-#1, pp. 81-100.


Rajan, Uday (1998). “Trembles in the Bayesian Foundations of Solution Concepts of Games”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.82-#1, pp. 248-266.

 

b. Refining Bayesian Nash Equilibria

 

(1) The Refinement Programme: Subgame Perfection


Kreps, David (1989). “Out-of-equilibrium Beliefs and Out-of-equilibrium Behavior”. in Frank Hahn, ed. The Economics of Missing Markets, Information, and Games. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 7-45.


Kohlberg, Elon (1990). “Refinement of Nash Equilibrium: The Main Ideas”. in Tatsuro Ichiishi, Abraham Neyman, and Yair Tauman, eds. Game Theory and Applications. San Diego: Academic Press, pp. 3-45.


van Damme, Eric (1991). Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibrium. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.


van Damme, Eric (1992). “Refinements of Nash Equilibrium”. in Jean-Jacques Laffont, ed. Advances in Economic Theory: Sixth World Congress. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 32-75.


Eichberger, Jürgen (1993). “Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept: Backward Induction”. Chapter 6 of Game Theory for Economists. San Diego: Academic Press, pp. 123-180. [esp. sections 6.2 and 6.3]


Binmore, Ken (1985). “Equilibria in Extensive Games”. Economic Journal, V.95-Conference Supplement, pp. 51-59.


Fudenberg, Drew, David Kreps, and David Levine (1988). “On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.44-#?, pp. 354-380.


Selten, Reinhard (1975). “Re-examination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games”. International Journal of Game Theory; V.4-#1, pp. 25-55.


Myerson, Roger (1978). “Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept”. International Journal of Game Theory; V.7-#2, pp. 73-80.


van Damme, Eric (1984). “A Relation between Perfect Equilibria in Extensive Form Games and Proper Equilibria in Normal Form Games”. International Journal of Game Theory; V.13-#1, pp. 1-13.


Kalai, Ehud and Dov Samet (1984). “Persistent Equilibria in Strategic Games”. International Journal of Game Theory; V.13-#3, pp. 129-144.


Fudenberg, Drew and David Levine (1983). “Subgame-Perfect Equilibria of Finite- and Infinite-Horizon Games”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.31-#?, pp. 251-268.


Harris, Christopher (1985). “Existence and Characterization of Perfect Equilibrium in Games of Perfect Information”. Econometrica; V.55-#3, pp. 613-628.


Harris, Christopher, Philip Reny, and Arthur Robson (1995). “The Existence of Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium in Continuous Games with Almost Perfect Information: A Case for Public Randomization”. Econometrica; V.63-#3, pp. 507-544.


Aliprantis, Charalambos (1999). “On the Backward Induction Method”. Economics Letters; V.64-#?, pp. 125-131.

 

(2) Consistency and Equilibrium Selection


Peleg, Bezalel and Stef Tijs (1996). “The Consistency Principle for Games in Strategic Form”. International Journal of Game Theory; V.25-#1, pp. 13-34.


Peleg, Bezalel, Jos Potters and Stef Tijs (1996).”Minimality of Consistent Solutions for Strategic Games, In Particular for Potential Games”. Economic Theory; V.7-#1, pp. 81-93.


Norde, Henk, Jos Potters, Hans Reijnierse, and Dries Vermeulen (1996). “Equilibrium Selection and Consistency”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.12-#2, pp. 219-225.


Van Heumen, Robert, Bezalel Peleg, Stef Tijs, and Peter Borm (1996). “Axiomatic Characterizations of Solutions for Bayesian Games”. Theory & Decision; V.40-#?, pp. 103-129.


Peleg, Bezalel and Peter Sudholter (1997). “An Axiomatization of Nash Equilibria in Economic Situations”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.18-#2, pp. 277-285.


Patrone, Fioravante, Graziano Pieri, Stef Tijs and Anna Torre (1998). “On Consistent Solutions for Strategic Games”. International Journal of Game Theory; 27-#2, pp. 191-200.


Ray, Indrajit (2000). “Consistency, Dummy and Independence of Irrelevant Strategies for Strategic Games”. Social Choice & Welfare; V.17-#2, pp. 217-222.


Quesada, Antonio (2002). “A Conflict between Sequential Rationality and Consistency Principles”. International Journal of Game Theory; V.31-#1, pp. 13-18.


Güth, Werner (2002). “On the Inconsistency of Equilibrium Refinement”. Theory & Decision; V.53-#4, pp. 371-392.


Dufwenberg, Martin, Henk Norde, Hans Reijnierse and Stef Tijs (2001). “The Consistency Principle for Set-Valued Solutions and a New Direction for Normative Game Theory”. Mathematical Methods of Operations Research; V.54-#1, pp. 119-131.


Thomson, William (2001). “On the Axiomatic Method and Its Recent Applications to Game Theory and Resource Allocation”. Social Choice and Welfare; V.18-#?, pp. 327-386. [esp. pp. 370-377].


Peleg, Bezalel (1986). “On the Reduced Game Property and Its Converse”. International Journal of Game Theory; V.15-#?, pp. 187-200. [“Correction”, IJGT, V.16-#?, pg. 290.]


Peleg, Bezalel (1990). “Axiomatizations of the Core, the Nucleolus, and the Prekernel”. In Tatsuro Ichiishi, Abraham Neyman and Yair Tauman, eds. Game Theory and Applications. San Diego: Academic Press, pp. 176-182.


Maschler, Michael (1990). “Consistency”. In Tatsuro Ichiishi, Abraham Neyman and Yair Tauman, eds. Game Theory and Applications. San Diego: Academic Press, pp. 183-186.


Thomson, William (1990). “The Consistency Principle”. In Tatsuro Ichiishi, Abraham Neyman and Yair Tauman, eds. Game Theory and Applications. San Diego: Academic Press, pp. 187-215..


Driessen, Theo S.H. (1991). “A Survey of Consistency Properties in Cooperative Game Theory”. SIAM Review; V.33-#1, pp. 43-59.

 

(3) The Harsanyi-Selten Refinements: Tracing Procedure, etc.


Harsanyi, John (1975). “The Tracing Procedure: A Bayesian Approach to Defining a Solution for n-Person Noncooperative Games”. International Journal of Game Theory; V.4-#2, pp. 61-94.


Harsanyi, John (1976). “A Solution Concept for n-Person Noncooperative Games”. International Journal of Game Theory; V.5-#4, pp. 211-225.


Guth, Werner (1985). “A Remark on the Harsanyi-Selten Theory of Equilibrium Selection”. International Journal of Game Theory; V.14-#1, pp. 31-39.


Harsanyi, John and Reinhard Selten (1988). A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games. Cambridge: MIT Press.


Skyrms, Brian (1990). The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.


Schnauel, S.H., Leo Simon and William Zame (1991). “The Algebraic Geometry of Games and the Tracing Procedure”. in Reinhard Selten, ed. Game Equilibrium Models, Vol. 2L Methods, Morals and Markets. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, pp. 9-43.


Carlsson, Hans and Eric van Damme (1993). “Global Games and Equilibrium Selection”. Econometrica; V.61-#5, pp. 989-1018.


Carlsson, Hans and Eric van Damme (1993). “Equilibrium Selection in Stag Hunt Games”. in Ken Binmore and Alan Kirman, eds. Frontiers of Game Theory. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 237-254.


van Damme, Eric (1996). “Equilibrium Selection in Team Games”. in W. Albers, W. Guth, P. Hammerstein, B. Moldovanu, and E. van Damme, eds. Understanding Strategic Behavior: Essays in Honor of Reinhard Selten. Berlin: Springer, pp. 100-111.


van Damme, Eric and Sjaak Hurkens (1997). “Games with Imperfectly Observable Commitment”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.21-#?, pp. 282-308.


van Damme, Eric and Sjaak Hurkens (1999). “Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.28-#1, pp. 105-129.


van den Elzen, Antoon and Dolf Talman (1999). “An Algorithmic Approach toward the Tracing Procedure for Bi-matrix Games”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.28-#1, pp. 130-145.


Herings, P. Jean-Jacques (2000). “Two Simple Proofs of the Feasibility of the Linear Tracing Procedure”. Economic Theory; V.15-#?, pp. 485-490.


Harsanyi, John (1995). “A New Theory of Equilibrium Selection for Games with Complete Information”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.8-#?, pp. 91-122.


Harsanyi, John (1995). “A New Theory of Equilibrium Selection for Games with Incomplete Information”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.10-#?, pp. 318-322.

 

(4) Sequential Equilibrium


Kreps, David and Robert Wilson (1982). “Sequential Equilibria”. Econometrica; V.50-#4, pp. 863-894.


McLennan, Andrew (1985). “Justifiable Beliefs in Sequential Equilibrium”. Econometrica; V.53-#4, pp. 889-904.


Kreps, David and Garey Ramey (1987). “Structural Consistency, Consistency, and Sequential Rationality”. Econometria; V.55-#6, pp. 1331-1348.


Hillas, John (1994). “Sequential Equilibria and Stable Sets of Beliefs”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.64-#1, pp. 78-102.


Hendon, Ebbe, Han Jørgen Jacobsen, and Brigitte Sloth (1996). “The One-Shot-Deviation Principle for Sequential Rationality”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.12-#?, pp. 274-282.


Madrigal, Vincente, Tommy Tan, and Sérgio R.d.C. Werlang (1987). “Support Restrictions and Sequential Equilibria”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.43-#?, pp. 329-334.


Fudenberg, Drew and Jean Tirole (1991). “Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and Sequential Equilibrium”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.53-#2, pp. 236-260.


Bonanno, Giacomo (1992). “Rational Beliefs in Extensive Games”. Theory and Decision, V.33-#?, pp. 153-176.


Weibull, Jörgen (1992). “On Self-Enforcement in Extensive-form Games”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.4-#?, pp. 450-462.


Reny, Philip (1992). “Backward Induction, Normal Form Perfection and Explicable Equilibria”. Econometrica; V.60-#3, pp. 637-649.


van Heumen, Robert, Bezalel Peleg, Stef Tijs and Peter Borm (1996). “Axiomatic Characterizations of Solutions for Bayesian Games”. Theory and Decisions, V.40-#2, pp. 103-129.

 

(5) Forward Induction and Strategic Stability


Mertens, Jean-François (1991). “Equilibrium and Rationality: Context and History-Dependence”. in Kenneth Arrow, ed. Issues in Contemporary Economics, Volume 1. Markets and Welfare. New York: NYU Press, pp. 198-211.


Kohlberg, Elon and Jean-François Mertens (1986). “On the Strategic Stability of Equilibrium”. Econometrica; V.54-#5, pp. 1003-1037.


Mertens, Jean-François (1989). “Stable Equilibria–A Reformulation. Part I. Definitions and Basic Properties”. Mathematics of Operations Research; V.14-#4, pp. 575-625.


Mertens, Jean-François (1990). “Stable Equilibria–A Reformulation. Part II. Discussion of the Definition, and Further Results”. Mathematics of Operations Research; V.15-#4, pp. 694-753.


Mertens, Jean-François (1992). “The Small Worlds Axiom for Stable Equilibria”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.4-#?, pp. 553-564.


Al-Najjar, Nabil (1995). “Strategically Stable Equilibria in Games with Infinitely Many Pure Strategies”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.29-#?, pp. 151-164.


Govindan, Srihari (1996). “A Subgame Property of Stable Equilibria”. Mathematics of Operations Research; V.21-#4, pp. 991-999.


Vermeulen, A.J. and M.J.M. Jansen (2000). “Ordinality of Solutions of Noncooperative Games”. Journal of Mathematical Economics; V.33-#1, pp. 13-34.


Perea y Monsuwé, Andrés, Mathijs Jansen, and Dries Vermeulen (2000). “Player Splitting in Extensive Form Games”. International Journal of Game Theory; V.29-#3, pp. 433-450.


Hillas, John (1990). “On the Definition of Strategic Stability of Equilibria”. Econometrica; V.58-#6, pp. 1365-1390.


Govindan, Srihari (1995). “Every Stable Set Contains a Fully Stable Set”. Econometrica; V.63-#1, pp. 191-193.


Vermeulen, A.J. and M.J.M. Jansen (2001). “An Ordinal Selection of Stable Sets in the Sense of Hillas”. Journal of Mathematical Economics; V.36-#?, pp. 161-167.


Hillas, John, Mathijs Jansen, Jos Potters, Dries Vermeulen (2001) “On the Relation Among Some Definitions of Strategic Stability”. Mathematics of Operations Research; V.26-#3, pp. 611-635.


Wilson, Robert (1992). “Computing Simply Stable Equilibria”. Econometrica; V.60-#5, pp. 1039-1070.


Govindan, Srihari and Robert Wilson (1997). “Uniqueness of the Index for Nash Equilibria of Two-Player Games”. Economic Theory; V.10-#?, pp. 541-549.


Govindan, Srihari and Robert Wilson (1997). “Equivalence and Invariance of the Index and Degree of Nash Equilibria”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.21-#1, pp. 56-61.


van Damme, Eric (1989). “Stable Equilibria and Forward Induction”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.48-#?, pp. 476-496.


Mertens, Jean-François (1995). “Two Examples of Strategic Equilibrium”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.8-#?, pp. 378-388.


Osborne, Martin (1990). “Signaling, Forward Induction, and Stability in Finitely Repeated Games”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.50-#1, pp. 22-36.


Ponssard, Jean-Pierre (1990). “Self Enforceable Paths in Extensive Form Games”. Theory and Decision; V.29-#?, pp. 69-83.


Al-Najjar, Nabil (1995). “A Theory of Forward Induction in Finitely Repeated Games”. Theory and Decision; V.38-#?, pp. 173-195.


Ben-Porath, Elchanan and Eddie Dekel (1992). “Signaling Future Actions and the Potential for Sacrifice”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.57-#1, pp. 36-51.


Gul, Faruk and David Pearce (1996). “Forward Induction and Public Randomization”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.70-#1, pp. 43-64.


Govindan, Srihari and Arthur Robson (1998). “Forward Induction, Public Randomization, and Admissability”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.82-#2, pp. 451-457.


Hauk, Esther and Sjaak Hurkens (2002). “On Forward Induction and Evolutionary and Strategic Stability”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.106-#1, pp. 66-90.

 

(6) Refinements in Signalling Games


Grossman, Sanford and Motty Perry (1986). “Perfect Sequential Equilibrium”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.39-#1, pp. 97-119.


Banks, Jeffrey and Joel Sobel (1987). “Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games”. Econometrica; V.55-#3, pp. 647-661.


Cho, In-Koo and David Kreps (1987). “Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria”. Quarterly Journal of Economics; V.102-#?, pp. 179-221.


Cho, In-Koo (1987). “A Refinement of Sequential Equilibrium”. Econometrica; V.55-#6, pp. 1367-1389.


Cho, In-Koo and Joel Sobel (1990). “Strategic Stability and Uniqueness in Signaling Games”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.50-#?, pp. 381-413.


Cho, In-Koo (1993). “Strategic Stability in Repeated Signaling Games”. International Journal of Game Theory; V.22-#?, pp. 107-121.


Mailath, George, Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara, and Andrew Postelwaite (1993). “Belief-Based Refinements in Signalling Games”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.60-#?, pp. 241-276.


Perea y Monsuwé, Andres, Mathijs Jansen, and Hans Peters (1997). “Consistency of Assessments in Infinite Signaling Games”. Journal of Mathematical Economics; V.27-#?, pp. 425-449.


Nöldeke, Georg and Larry Samuelson (1997). “A Dynamic Model of Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Markets”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.73-#?, pp. 118-156.


Stamland, Tommy (1999). “Partially Informative Signaling”. JET; V.89-#1, pp. 148-161.

 

(7) On Conditional Probability Systems


McLennan, Andrew (1989). “The Space of Conditional Systems is a Ball”. International Journal of Game Theory; V.18-#?, pp. 125-139.


McLennan, Andrew (1989). “Consistent Conditional Systems in Non-Cooperative Game Theory”. International Journal of Game Theory; V.18-#?, pp. 140-174.


Blume, Lawrence, Adam Brandenburger, and Eddie Dekel (1991). “Lexicographic Probabilities and Equilibrium Refinements”. Econometrica; V.59-#1, pp. 81-98.


Blume, Lawrence and William Zame (1994). “The Algebraic Geometry of Perfect and Sequential Equilibrium”. Econometrica; V.62-#4, pp. 783-794.


Hammond, Peter (1994). “Elementary Non-Archimedean Representations of Probability for Decision Theory and Games”. in P. Humphreys, ed. Patrick Suppes: Scientific Philosopher, V.1, Probability and Probabilistic Causality. Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 25-59.


Hammond, Peter (1999). “Consequentialism, Non-Archimedean Probabilities, and Lexicographic Expected Utilities”. in C. Bicchieri, R. Jeffrey, and B. Skyrms, eds. The Logic of Strategy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.


Hammond, Peter (1999). “Non-Archimedean Subjective Probabilities in Decision Theory and Games”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.38-#2, pp. 139-156.


Vieille, Nicolas (1996). “Conditional Systems Revisited”. International Journal of Game Theory; V.25-#2, pp. 207-217.


Kohlberg, Elon and Philip Reny (1997). “Independence on Relative Probability Spaces and Consistent Assessments in Game Trees”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.75-#?, pp. 280-313.


Swinkels, Jeroen (1993). “Independence for Conditional Probability Systems”. ms: Kellog Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University.


Battigalli, Pierpaolo (1996). “Strategic Independence and Perfect Bayesian Equilibria”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.70-#1, pp. 201-234.


Battigalli, Pierpaolo (1997). “Games with Observable Deviators”. in in Pierpaolo Battigalli, Aldo Montesano, and Fausto Panunzi, eds. Decisions, Games and Markets. Boston: Kluwer, pp. 57-96.


Mailath, George, Larry Samuelson, and Jeroen Swinkels (1997). “How Proper is Sequential Equilibrium”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.18-#?, pp. 193-218.


Govindan, Srihari and Tilman Klumpp (2003). “Perfect Equilibrium and Lexicographic Beliefs”. International Journal of Game Theory; V.31-#2, pp. 229-243.

 

c. Non-Expected Utility Preferences, etc.

 

(1) NEU Preferences


Binmore, Ken (1993). “De-Bayesing Game Theory”. in K. Binmore, A. Kirman, and P. Tani, eds. Frontiers of Game Theory. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 321-339.


Crawford, Vincent (1990). “Equilibrium without Independence”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.50-#?, pp. 127-154.


Dekel, Eddie, Zvi Safra, and Uzi Segal (1991). “Existence and Dynamic Consistency of Nash Equilibrium with Non-expected Utility Preferences”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.55-#2, pp. 229-246.


Volij, Oscar (1996). “Epistemic Conditions for Equilibrium in Beliefs without Independence”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.70-#2, pp. 391-406.


Cheng, Leonard and Min Zhu (1995). “Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium Based upon Expected Utility and Quadratic Utility”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.9-#2, pp. 139-150.


Ritzberger, Klaus (1996). “On Games under Expected Utility with Rank Dependent Probabilities”. Theory and Decision; V.40-#1, pp. 1-27.


Chen, Ho-Chyuan and William Nielson (1999). “Pure Strategy Equilibria with Non-Expected Utility Players”. Theory and Decision; V.46-#2, pp. 199-209.


Grant, Simon, Atsushi Kajii, and Ben Polak (2001). “‘Third Down with a Yard to Go’: Recursive Expected Utility and the Dixit-Skeath Conundrum”. Economics Letters; V.73-#?, pp. 275-286.

 

(2) Non-Additive (Choquet) EU


Dow, James and Sérgio da Costa Werlang (1994). “Nash Equilibrium under Knightian Uncertainty: Breaking Down Backward Induction”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.64-#?, pp. 305-324.


Eichberger, Jürgen and David Kelsey (1996). “Uncertainty Aversion and Preference for Randomisation”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.71#1, pp. 31-43.


Epstein, Larry and Tan Wang (1996). “‘Beliefs about Beliefs’ without Probabilities”. Econometrica; V.64-#6, pp. 1343-1373.


Epstein, Larry (1997). “Preference, Rationalizability and Equilibrium”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.73-#1, pp. 1-29.


Mukerji, Sujoy (1995). “A Theory of Play for Games in Strategic Form when Rationality is not Common Knowledge”. University of Southampton, Discussion Paper in Economics and Econometrics, #9519.


Mukerji, Sujoy and Hyun Song Shin (1996). “Is Common Knowledge Possible in Games with Knightian Uncertainty?”. University of Southampton Discussion Paper in Economics and Econometrics, #9642.


Marinacci, Massimo (2000). “Ambiguous Games”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.31-#2, pp. 191-219.


Groes, Ebbe, Hans Jørgen Jacobsen, Brigitte Sloth and Torben Tranæs (1998). “Nash Equilibrium with Lower Probabilities”. Theory and Decision; V.44-#1, pp. 37-66.


Eichberger, Jürgen and David Kelsey (2000). “Non-Additive Beliefs and Strategic Equilibria”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.30-#2, pp. 183-215.


Haller, Hans (2000). “Non-Additive Beliefs in Solvable Games”. Theory and Decision; V.49-#4, pp. 313-338.


Marinacci, Massimo (1997). “Finitely Additive and Epsilon Nash Equilibria”. International Journal of Game Theory; V.26-#3, pp. 315-333.


Epstein, Larry (1997). “Preference, Rationalizability and Equilibrium”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.73-#1, pp. 1-29.


Ghirardato, Paolo and Michel LeBreton (2000). “Choquet Rationality”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.90-#2, pp. 277-285.


Greenberg, Joseph (2000). “The Right to Remain Silent”. Theory and Decision; V.48-#2, pp. 193-204.


Ryan, Matthew (2002). “Violations of Belief Persistence in Dempster-Shafer Equilibrium”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.39-#1, pp. 167-174.


Ryan, Matthew (2001). “Belief Persistence and Game Theory”. MS: Australian National University.


Mukerji, Sujoy and Hyun Song Shin(2002) “Equilibrium Departures from Common Knowledge in Games with Non-Additive Expected Utility”. Advances in Theoretical Economics: V.2-#1, Article 2.

 

(3) Multiple Priors/Maximin EU


Lo, Kin Chung (1996). “Equilibrium Beliefs under Uncertainty”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.71-#2, pp. 443-484.


Lo, Kin Chung (1999). “Nash Equilibrium Without Mutual Knowledge of Rationality”. Economic Theory; V.14-#3, pp. 621-633.


Lo, Kin Chung (1999). “Extensive Form Games with Uncertainty Averse Players”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.28-#2, pp. 256-270.


Lo, Kin Chung (2000). “Epistemic Conditions for Agreement and Stochastic Independence of ε-contaminated Beliefs”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.39-#?, pp. 207-234.


Klibanoff, Peter (1992/96). “Uncertainty, Decision, and Normal Form Games”. ms: Northwestern University/MEDS.


Ma, Chenghu (2000). “Uncertainty Aversion and Rationality in Games of Perfect Information.” Journal of Economic Dynamics And Control; V.24-#3, pp. 451-482.


Luo, Xiao and Chenghu Ma (2001). “Stable Equilibrium in Beliefs in Extensive Games with Perfect Information”. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control; V.25-#?, pp. 1801-1825.


Lo, Kin Chung (2002). “Correlated Equilibrium under Uncertainty”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.44-#2, pp. 183-209.


Lo, Kin Chung (2005). “More Likely than Unlikely”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.49-#1, pp. 39-54.

 

3. Correlated Equilibrium

 

a. Characterization and Existence of Correlated Equilibrium


Aumann, Robert (1974). “Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies”. Journal of Mathematical Economics; V.1-#1, pp. 67-96.


Aumann, Robert and Sergiu Hart (1986). “Biconvexity and Bimartingales”. Israel Journal of Mathematics; V.54-#?, pp. 159-180.


Hart, Sergiu and David Schmeidler (1989). “Existence of Correlated Equilibria”. Mathematics of Operations Research; V.14-#1, pp. 18-25.


Zemel, Itzhak and Eitan Zemel (1989). “Nash and Correlated Equilibria: Some Complexity Considerations”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.1-#1, pp. 80-93.


Yannelis, Nicholas and Aldo Rustichini (1991). “On the Existence of Correlated Equilibria”. in M.A. Khan and N. Yanelis, eds. Equilibrium Theory in Infinite Dimensional Spaces. Berlin: Springer, pp. 268-280.


Nowak, Andrzej (1991). “Existence of Correlated Weak Equilibria in Discontinuous Games”. in M. Ali Khan and Nicholas Yannelis, eds.. Equilibrium Theory in Infinite Dimensional Spaces. New York: Springer, pp. 281-287.


Vieille, Nicolas (1996). “On Equilibrium on the Square”. International Journal of Game Theory; V.25-#2, pp. 199-205.


Keiding, Hans and Bezalel Peleg (2000). “Correlated Equilibria of Games with Many Players”. International Journal of Game Theory; V.29-#3, pp. 375-389.

 

b. Interpretation and Extensions


Forges, Françoise (1993). “Five Legitimate Definitions of Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information”. Theory and Decision; V.35-#?, pp. 277-310.


Aumann, Robert (1987). “Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality”. Econometrica; V.55-#1, pp. 1-18.


Forges, Francoise (1990). “Correlated Equilibrium in Two-Person Zero-Sum Games”. Econometrica; V.58-#2, pp. 515.


Gul, Faruk (1998). “A Comment on Aumann’s Bayesian View”. Econometrica; V.66-#4, pp. 923-927. [response by Aumann follows, pp. 929-938].


Nau, Robert and Kevin McCardle (1990). “Coherent Behavior in Noncooperative Games”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.50-#?, pp. 424-444.


Nau, Robert (1992). “Joint Coherence in Games with Incomplete Information”. Management Science; V.38-#?, pp. 374-387.


Cotter, Kevin (1991). “Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Type-Dependent Strategies”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.54-#?, pp. 48-68.


Cotter, Kevin (1994). “Type Correlated Equilibria for Games with Payoff Uncertainty”. Economic Theory; V.4-#4, pp. 617-627.


Brandenburger, Adam, Eddie Dekel, and John Geanakoplos (1992). “Correlated Equilibrium with Generalized Information Structures”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.4-#?, pp. 182-201.


Lehrer, Ehud (1992). “Correlated Equilibria in Two-Player Repeated Games with Nonobervable Actions”. Mathematics of Operations Research; V.17-#1, pp. 175-199.


Vanderschraaf, Peter and Brian Skyrms (1993). “Deliberational Correlated Equilibria”. Philosophical Topics; V.21-#1, pp. 191-227.


Vanderschraaf, Peter (1995). “Endogenous Correlated Equilibria in Noncooperative Games”. Theory and Decision; V.38-#1, pp. 61-84.


Evangelista, Fe and T.E.S. Raghavan (1996). “A Note on Correlated Equilibrium”. International Journal of Game Theory; V.25-#1, pp. 35-41.


Myerson, Roger (1997). “Dual Reduction and Elementary Games”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.21-#1/2, pp. 183-202.


Neyman, Abraham (1997). “Correlated Equilibrium and Potential Games”. International Journal of Game Theory; V.26-#2, pp. 223-227.


Ray, Indrajit (1996). “Efficiency in Correlated Equilibrium”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.32-#3, pp. 157-178.


Ray, Indrajit (1998). “Correlated Equilibrium as a Stable Standard of Behavior”. Review of Economic Design; V.3-#3, pp. 257-269.

 

c. Sunspots and Correlated Equilibrium


Forges, Françoise (1991). “Sunspot Equilibrium as a Game-Theoretical Solution Concept”. in William Barnett, et al., eds. Equilibrium theory and applications: Proceedings of the Sixth International Symposium in Economic Theory and Econometrics. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 135-159.


Maskin, Eric and Jean Tirole (1987). “Correlated Equilibria and Sunspots”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.43-#2, pp. 364-373.


Forges, Francoise (1988). “Can Sunspots Replace a Mediator?”. Journal of Mathematical Economics; V.17-#4, pp. 347-368.


Peck, James and Karl Shell (1991). Market Uncertainty: Correlated and Sunspot Equilibria in Imperfectly Competitive Economies”. Review of Economic Studies; V.58-#5, pp. 1011-1029.


Peck, James (1994). “Notes on Correlated Equilibrium and Sunspot Equilibrium”. in Jean-Francois Mertens and Sylvain Sorin, eds. Game-Theoretic Methods in General Equilibrium Analysis. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic (NATO), pp. 249-260.


Forges, Francoise and James Peck (1995). “Correlated Equilibrium and Sunspot Equilibrium”. Economic Theory; V.5-#1, pp. pp. 33-50.

 

d. Communication and Correlation


Forges, Françoise (1985). “Correlated Equilibria in a Class of Repeated Games with Incomplete Information”. International Journal of Game Theory; V.14-#3, pp. 129-150.


Forges, Françoise (1986). “An Approach to Communication Equilibrium”. Econometrica; V.54-#6, pp. 1375-1385.


Myerson, Roger (1986). “Multistage Games with Communication”. Econometrica; V.54-#2, pp. 323-358.


Forges, Françoise (1988). “Communication Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information”. Mathematics of Operations Research; V.13-#2, pp. 191-231.


Forges, Françoise (1990). “Universal Mechanisms”. Econometrica; V.58-#6, pp. 1341-1364.


Forges, Françoise (1994). “Non-Zero Sum Repeated Games and Information Transmission”. in Nimrod Megiddo, ed. Essay in Game Theory in Honor of Michael Maschler. New York: Springer-Verlag, pp. 65-95.


Forges, Françoise and Enrico Minelli (1997). “Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms and Rational Expectations”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.75-#2, pp. 388-406.


Dhillon, Amrita and Jean François Mertens (1996). “Perfect Correlated Equilibrium”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.68-#?, pp. 279-302.


Bárány, Imre (1992). “Fair Distribution Protocols or How the Players Replace Fortune”. Mathematics of Operations Research; V.17-#2, pp. 327-340.


Lehrer, Ehud (1996). “Mediated Talk”. International Journal of Game Theory; V.25-#?, pp. 177-188.


Lehrer, Ehud and Sylvain Sorin (1997). “One-Shot Public Mediated Talk”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.20-#?, pp. 131-148.


Ben-Porath, Elchanan (1998). “Correlation without Mediation: Expanding the Set of Equilibrium Outcomes by “Cheap” Pre-play Procedures”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.80-#?, pp. 108-122.


Gossner, Olivier (1998). “Secure Protocols or How Communication Generates Correlation”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.83-#1, pp. 69-89.


Wärneryd, Karl (1998). “Communication, Complexity, and Evolutionary Stability”. International Journal of Game Theory; V.27-#4, pp. 599-609.


Urbano, Amparo and Jose Vila (2002). “Computational Complexity and Communication: Coordination in Two-player Games”. Econometrica; V.70-#5, pp. 1893-1927.

 

e. On Cheap Talk, Equilibrium and Refinements

 

(1) Overviews


Farrell, Joseph (1995). “Talk Is Cheap”. American Economic Review; V.85-#2, pp. 186-190.


Farrell, Joseph and Matthew Rabin (1996). “Cheap Talk”. Journal of Economic Perspectives; V.10-#3, pp. 103-118.


Crawford, Vincent (1998). “A Survey of Experiments on Communication via Cheap Talk”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.78-#2, pp. 286-298.

 

(2) Cheap talk in Sender-Receiver Games


Crawford, Vincent and Joel Sobel (1982). “Strategic Information Transmission”. Econometrica; V.50-#6, pp. 1431-1451.


Spector, David (2000). “Pure Communication between Agents with Close Preferences”. Economics Letters; V.66-#?, pp. 171-178.


Sobel, Joel (1985). “A Theory of Credibility”. Review of Economic Studies; V.52-#?, pp. 557-573.


Pitchik, Carolyn and Andrew Schotter (1987). “Honesty in a Model of Strategic Information Transmission”. American Economic Review; V.77-#5, pp. 1032-1036.


Farrell, Joseph (1993). “Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.5-#4, pp. 514-531.


Matthews, Steven (1989). “Veto Threats: Rhetoric in a Bargaining Game”. Quarterly Journal of Economics; V.104-#2, pp. 347-369.


Farrell, Joseph and Robert Gibbons (1989). “Cheap Talk with Two Audiences”. American Economic Review; V.79-#5, pp. 1214-1223.


Myerson, Roger (1989). “Credible Negotiation Statements and Coherent Plans”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.48-#?, pp. 264-303.


Rabin, Matthew (1990). “Communication Between Rational Agents”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.51-#?, pp. 144-170. [Corrigendum, (1992), V.58-#?, pp. 110-111.]


Seidmann, Daniel (1992). “Cheap Talk Games May Have Unique, Informative Equilibrium Outcomes”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.4-#3, pp. 422-425.


Zapater, Iñigo (1997). “Credible Proposals in Communication Games”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.72-#?, pp. 173-197.


Seidmann, Daniel (1990). “Effective Cheap Talk with Conflicting Interests”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.50-#?, pp. 445-458.


Watson, Joel (1991). “Communication and Superior Cooperation in Two-Player Normal Form Games”. Economics Letters; V.35-#?, pp. 267-271.


Matthews, Steven, Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara, and Andrew Postelwaite (1991). “Refining Cheap-Talk Equilibria”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.55-#?, pp. 247-273.


Conlon, John (1997). “Coordination and Weak Announcement Proofness: Two Comments on ‘Refining Cheap-Talk Equilibria’”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.72-#?, pp. 220-224.


Blume, Andres (1994). “Equilibrium Refinements in Sender-Receiver Games”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.64-#1, pp. 66-77.


Blume, Andres and Joel Sobel (1995). “Communication-Proof Equilibria in Cheap-Talk Games”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.65-#?, pp. 359-382.


Blume, Andres (1996). “Neighborhood Stability in Sender-Receiver Games”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.13-#1, pp. 2-25.


Manelli, Alejandro (1996). “Cheap Talk and Sequential Equilibria in Signaling Games”. Econometrica; V.64-#4, pp. 917-942.


Watson, Joel (1996). “Information Transmission when the Informed Party is Partly Confused”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.12-#?, pp. 143-161.


Rabin, Matthew and Joel Sobel (1996). “Deviations, Dynamics, and Equilibrium Refinements”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.68-#1, pp. 1-25.


Park, In-Uck (1997). “Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcome Distributions for Sender-Receiver Cheap-Talk Games”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.76-#?, pp. 431-448.


Baliga, Sandeep and Stephen Morris (2002). “Co-ordination, Spillovers, and Cheap Talk”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.105-#2, pp. 450-468.


Jackson, Matthew, Leo Simon, Jeroen Swinkels, and William Zame (2002). “Communication and Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games of Incomplete Information”. Econometrica; V.70-#5, pp. 1711-1740. [Corrigendum, 2004, V.72-#6, pp. 1927-1929.]


Aumann, Robert and Sergiu Hart (2003). “Long Cheap Talk”. Econometrica; V.71-#6, pp. 1619-1660.

 

(3) Applications of Cheap Talk in S-R Games


Stein, Jeremy (1989). “Cheap Talk and the Fed: A Theory of Imprecise Policy Announcements”. American Economic Review; V.79-#1, pp. 32-42.


Conlon, John (1993). “Can the Government Talk Cheap? Communication, Announcements, and Cheap Talk”. Southern Economic Journal; V.60-#2, pp. 418-429.


Garfinkel, Michelle R. and Seonghwan Oh (1995). “When and How Much to Talk: Credibility and Flexibility in Monetary Policy with Private Information”. Journal of Monetary Economics; V.35-#2, pp. 341-357.


Haubrich, Joseph (1995). “Vagueness, Credibility, and Government Policy”. Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Economic Review; V.31-#1, pp. 13-19.


Arce M., Daniel G. (1997). “Coherence and the Credibility of Convertibility Announcements”. Journal of International Money and Finance; V.16-#5, pp. 719-735.


Johnson, James (1993). “Is Talk Really Cheap? Prompting Conversation between Critical Theory and Rational Choice”. American Political Science Review; V.87-#1, pp. 74-86.


Warneryd, Karl (1994). “Partisanship as Information”. Public Choice; V.80-#3/4, pp. 371-380.


Benabou, Roland and Guy Laroque (1992). “Using Privileged Information to Manipulate Markets: Insiders, Gurus, and Credibility”. Quarterly Journal of Economics; V.107-#3, pp. 921-958.


Bagwell, Kyle and Garey Ramey (1993). “Advertising as Information: Matching Products to Buyers”. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy; V.2-#2, pp. 199-243


Farrell, Joseph and Robert Gibbons (1995). “Cheap Talk about Specific Investments”. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization; V.11-#2, pp. 313-334.


Morris, Stephen (2000). “Political Correctness”. Journal of Political Economy; forth.

 

(4) Costly talk in Sender-Receiver Games


Austen-Smith, David (1994). “Strategic Transmission of Costly Information”. Econometrica; V.62-#4, pp. 955-963.


Austen-Smith, David and Jeffrey Banks (2000). “Cheap Talk and Burned Money”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.91-#1, pp. 1-16.


Austen-Smith, David and Jeffrey Banks (2002). “Costly Signalling and Cheap Talk in Models of Political Influence”. European Journal of Political Economy; V.18-#2, pp. 263-280.


Wang, Gyu Ho (1998). “Cheap Talk and Signaling Games”. Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics; V.3-#2, pp. 13-31.


van Damme, Eric (1989). “Stable Equilibria and Forward Induction”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.48-#?, pp. 476-496. [section 4.]


Ben-Porath, Elchanan and Eddie Dekel (1992). “Signaling Future Actions and the Potential for Sacrifice”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.57-#1, pp. 36-51.


Hurkens, Sjaak (1996). “Multi-Sided Pre-play Communication by Burning Money”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.69-#?, pp. 186-197.


Shimoji, Makoto (2002). “On Forward Induction in Money-Burning Games”. Economic Theory; V.19-#3, pp. 637-648.

 

(5) Multi-Sided Cheap talk in Bargaining


Black, John and George Bulkley (1988). “The Role of Strategic Information Transmission in a Bargaining Model”. Economic Journal; V.98-#?, pp. 50-57.


Farrell, Joseph and Robert Gibbons (1989). “Cheap Talk Can Matter in Bargaining”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.48-#?, pp. 221-237.


Wärneryd, Karl (1992). “Communication, Correlation and Symmetry in Bargaining”. Economics Letters; V.39-#?, pp. 295-300.


Rabin, Matthew (1994). “A Model of Pre-game Communication”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.63-#?, pp. 370-391.


Arvan, Lanny, Luís Cabral, and Vasco Santos (1999). “Meaningful Cheap Talk Must Improve Equilibrium Payoffs”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.37-#?, pp. 97-106.


Chakraborty, Archishman and Rick Harbaugh (2003). “Cheap Talk Comparisons in Multi-issue Bargaining” Economics Letters; V.78-#3, pp. 357-363.

 

(6) Multi-Sided Pre-Play, Cheap Talk in Games


Farrell, Joseph (1987). “Cheap Talk, Coordination, and Entry”. Rand Journal of Economics; V.18-#1, pp. 34-39.


Farrell, Joseph (1988). “Communication, Coordination and Nash Equilibrium”. Economics Letters; V.27-#3, pp. 209-214.


Matthews, Steven and Andrew Postelwaite (1989). “Pre-Play Communication in Two-Person Sealed Bid Auctions”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.48-#?, pp. 238-263.


Palfrey, F. and S. Srivastava (1991). “Efficient Trading Mechanisms with Preplay Communication”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.55-#1, pp. 17-40.


Spagat, Michael (1992). “Validated Equilibrium and Sequential Spatial Competition Games”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.24-#1, pp. 49-57.


Chakravorti, Bhaskar, John Conley and Bart Taub (1996). “On Uniquely Implementing Cooperation in the One-Shot Prisoners’ Dilemma”. Economic Theory; V.8-#?, pp. 347-366. [corrigendum, 1997, V.9-#?, pp. 377-378.]


Chakravorti, Bhaskar, John Conley and Bart Taub (1999). “Economic Applications of Probabilistic Cheap Talk”. in M. Wooders, ed. Topics in Mathematical Economics and Game Theory. Providence: American Mathematical Society, pp. 153-169.


Arvan, Lanny, Luis Cabral and Vasco Santos (1999). “Meaningful Cheap Talk Must Improve Equilibrium Payoffs”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.37-#1, pp. 97-106.


Santos, Vasco (2000). “Alternating-Announcements Cheap Talk”. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization; V.42-#?, pp. 405-416.


Matthews, Steven and Andrew Postelwaite (1995). “On Modeling Cheap Talk in Bayesian Games”. in John Ledyard, ed. The Economics of Informational Decentralization: Complexity, Efficiency, and Stability. Boston: Kluwer, pp. 347-366.


Banerjee, Abhijit and Jorgen Weibull (2000). “Neutrally Stable Outcomes in Cheap-Talk Coordination Games”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.32-#1, pp. 1-24.


Battaglini, Marco (2002). “Multiple referrals and multidimensional cheap talk”. Econometrica; V.70-#4, pp. 1379-1401.


Baliga, Sandeep and Stephen Morris (2002). “Co-ordination, Spillovers, and Cheap Talk”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.105-#2, pp. 450-468.


Ben-Porath, Elchanan (1998). “Correlation without Mediation: Expanding the Set of Equilibrium Outcomes by ‘Cheap’ Pre-Play Procedures”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.80-#1, pp. 108-122.


Ben-Porath, Elchanan (2003). “Cheap Talk in Games with Incomplete Information”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.108-#1, pp. 45-71.

 

(7) Games of Persuasion


Grossman, Sanford (1981). “The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality”. Journal of Law and Economics; V.24-#3, pp. 461-483.


Milgrom, Paul (1981). “Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications”. Bell Journal of Economics; V.12-#2, pp. 350-391.


Milgrom, Paul and John Roberts (1986). “Relying on the Information of Interested Parties”. Rand Journal of Economics; V.17-#1, pp. 18-32.


Farrell, Joseph (1986). “Voluntary Disclosure: Robustness of the Unraveling Result, and Comments on Its Importance”. in R. Grieson, ed. Antitrust and Regulation. Lexington: Lexington Books, pp. 91-103.


Sobel, Joel (1985). “Disclosure of Evidence and Resolution of Disputes: Who Should Bear the Burden of Proof?”. in Alvin Roth, ed. Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining. Cambridge: CUP, pp.


Gibbons, Robert (1988). “Learning in Equilibrium Models of Arbitration”. American Economic Review; V.78-#5, pp. 896-912.


Fishman, Michael and Kathleen Hagerty (1990). “The Optimal Amount of Discretion to Allow in Disclosure”. Quarterly Journal of Economics; V.105-#2, pp. 427-444.


Shavell, Steven (1994). “Acquisition and Disclosure of Information Prior to Sale”. Rand Journal of Economics; V.25-#?, pp. 20-36.


Shin, Hyun Song (1994). “The Burden of Proof in a Game of Persuasion”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.64-#?, pp. 253-264.


Shin, Hyun Song (1998). “Adversarial and Inquisitorial Procedures in Arbitration”. Rand Journal of Economics; V.29-#2, pp. 378-405.


Sanchirico, Chris (1997). “The Burden of Proof in Civil Litigation: A Simple Model of Mechanism Design”. International Review of Law and Economics; V.16-#?, pp. 431-447.


Sanchirico, Chris (2000). “Games, Information and Evidence Production: With Application to English Legal History”. American Law and Economics Review, V.2-#2, pp. 342-


Sanchirico, Chris (2001). “Relying on the Information of Interested--and Potentially Dishonest--Parties”. American Law and Economics Review, V.3-#2, pp. 320-357.


Lipman, Barton and Duane Seppi (1995). “Robust Inference in Communication Games with Partial Provability”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.66-#2, pp. 370-405.


Seidmann, Daniel and Eyal Winter (1997). “Strategic Information Transmission with Verifiable Messages”. Econometrica; V.65-#1, pp. 163-169.


Dewatripont, Mathias and Jean Tirole (1999). “Advocates”. Journal of Political Economy; V.107-#1, pp. 1-39.


Morris, Stephen (2001). “Political Correctness”. Journal of Political Economy; V.109-#2, pp. 231-265.


Banerjee, Abhijit and Rohini Somanathan (2001). “A Simple Model of Voice”. Quarterly Journal of Economics; V.116-#1, pp. 189-227.


Krishna, Vijay and John Morgan (2001). “A Model of Expertise”. Quarterly Journal of Economics; V.116-#2, pp. 747-775.


Daughety, Andrew and Jennifer Reinganum (1999). “Stampede to Judgement: Persuasive Influence and Herding Behavior By Courts”. American Law and Economics Review, V.1-#1/2, pp. 158-189.


Wolinsky, Asher (1999). “Eliciting Information from Multiple Experts”. Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science Discussion Paper, #1277.


Green, Jerry and Jean-Jacques Laffont (1986). “Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design”. Review of Economic Studies; V.53-#3, pp. 447-456.


Glazer, Jacob and Ariel Rubinstein (2004). “On Optimal Rules of Persuasion”. Econometrica; V.72-#6, pp. 1715-1736.

 

(8) Public Debate


Gilligan, Thomas and Keith Krehbiel (1989). “Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules with a Heterogeneous Committee”. American Journal of Political Science; V.33-#2, pp. 459-490.


Austen-Smith, David (1990). “Information Transmission in Debate”. American Journal of Political Science; V.34-#1, pp. 124-152.


Austen-Smith, David (1990). “Credible Debate Equilibria”. Social Choice and Welfare; V.7-#?, pp. 75-93.


Austen-Smith, David (1993). “Information Acquisition and Orthogonal Argument”. in W. Barnett, et al., eds. Political Economy: Institutions, Information, Competition, and Representation. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 407-436.


Spector, David (2000). “Rational Debate and One-Dimensional Conflict”. Quarterly Journal of Economics; V.115-#1, pp. 181-200.


Ottaviani, Marco and Peter Sørensen (2000). “Information Aggregation in Debate: Who Should Speak First”. Journal of Public Economics; V.81-#3, pp. 393-421.


Vijay Krishna and John Morgan (2001). “Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules: Some Amendments”. American Political Science Review; V.95-#2, pp. 435-452.


Keith Krehbiel (2001). “Plausibility of Signals by a Heterogeneous Committee”. American Political Science Review; V.95-#2, pp. 453-457.


Battaglini, Marco (2002). “Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk”. Econometrica; V.70-#4, pp. 1379-1401.


Friedman, Ezra (1998). “Public Debate Among Experts”. Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science Discussion Paper, #1234.

 

4. Common Beliefs and Global Games

 

a. The Electronic Mail Game


Rubinstein, Ariel (1989). “The Electronic Mail Game: Strategic Behavior under Almost Common Knowledge”. American Economic Review; V.79-#?, pp. 385-391.


Binmore, Ken and Larry Samuelson (2001). “Coordinated Action in the Electronic Mail Game”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.35-#1/2, pp. 6-30.


Dulleck, Uwe (2001). “A Note on the E-Mail Game: Bounded-Rationality and Induction”. Sonderforschungsbereich 373 Discussion Paper, #47.


Dimitri, Nicola (2000). “Efficiency and Equilibrium in The Electronic Mail Game; The General Case”. Quaderni Università del Dipartimento di Economia Politica, degli Studi di Siena, # 295.


Dimitri, Nicola (2003). “Coordination in an Email Game without Mutual Knowledge”. Journal of Logic, Language and Information; V.12-#1, pp. 127-151.


Morris, Stephen (2001). “Faulty Communication: Some Variations on the Electronic Mail Game”. Advances in Theoretical Economics; V.1-#1, (article 5).


Morris, Stephen (2002). “Coordination, Communication, and Common Knowledge: A Retrospective on the Electronic-Mail Game”. Oxford Review of Economic Policy; V.18-#4, pp. 433-445.

 

b. Global Games and Equilibrium Selection


Morris, Stephen and Hyun Song Shin (1997). “Approximate Common Knowledge and Co-ordination: Recent Lessons from Game Theory”. Journal of Logic, Language and Information. V.6-#2, pp. 171-190.


Morris, Stephen and Hyun Song Shin (2003). “Global Games: Theory and Applications”. In M. Dewatripont, L. Hansen, and S. Turnovsky, eds. Advances in Economics and Econometrics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.


Carlsson, Hans and Eric van Damme (1993). “Global Games and Equilibrium Selection”. Econometrica; V.61-#5, pp. 989-1018.


Carlsson, Hans and Eric van Damme (1993). “Equilibrium Selection in Stag Hunt Games”. In K. Binmore, A. Kirman and A. Tani, eds. Frontiers of Game Theory. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp.


Börgers, Tilman (1994). “Weak Dominance and Approximate Common Knowledge”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.64-#?, pp. 265-276.


Engl, Greg (1995). “Lower Hemicontinuity of the Nash Equilibrium Correspondence”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.9-#?, pp. 151-160.


Morris, Stephen, Rafael Rob, and Hyun Song Shin (1995). “p-Dominance and Belief Potential”. Econometrica; V.63-#1, pp. 145-157.


Shin, Hyun Song and Timothy Williamson (1996). “How Much Belief is Necessary for a Convention”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.13-#?, pp. 252-268.


Kim, Youngse (1996). “Equilibrium Selection in n-person Coordination Games”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.15-#2, pp. 203-227.


Monderer, Dov and Dov Samet (1996). “Proximity of Information in Games with Incomplete Information”. Mathematics of Operations Research; V.21-#3, pp. 707-725.


Kajii, Atsushi and Stephen Morris (1997). “The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information”. Econometrica; V.65-#6, pp 1283-1309.


Kajii, Atsushi and Stephen Morris (1998). “Payoff Continuity in Incomplete Information Games”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.82-#1, pp. 267-276.


Neyman, Abraham (1999). “Cooperation in Repeated Games when the Number of Stages is Not Commonly Known”. Econometrica; V.67-#1, pp. 45-64.


Renault, Régis (2000). “Privately Observed Time Horizons in Repeated Games”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.33-#1, pp. 117-125.


Shin, Hyun Song (2000). “Approximate Common Knowledge in a Search Model”. In Peter Hammond and Gareth Myles, eds. Incentives, Organization and Public Economics. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 69-85.


Oyama, Daisuke (2002). “p-Dominance and Equilibrium Selection under Perfect Foresight Dynamics”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.107-#2, pp. 288-310.


Hellwig, Christian (2002). “Public Information, Private Information and the Multiplicity of Equilibrium in Coordination Games”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.107-#2, pp. 191-222.


Fukao, Kyoji (2003). “Coordination Failures under Incomplete Information and Global Games”. Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics; V.44-#1, pp. 59-73.


Frankel, David, Stephen Morris, and Ady Pauzner (2003). “Equilibrium Selection in Global Games with Strategic Complementarities”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.108-#1, pp. 1-44.


Epstein, Larry and Tan Wang (1995). “‘Beliefs about Beliefs’ without Probabilities”. Econometrica; V.64-#6, pp. 1343-1373.


Gilboa, Itzhak and David Schmeidler (1988). “Information Dependent Games: Can Common Sense be Common Knowledge?”. Economics Letters; V.27-#?, pp. 215-221.

 

5. Rationalizable Equilibrium


Bernheim, B. Douglas (1984). “Rationalizable Strategic Behavior”. Econometrica; V.52-#4, pp. 1007-1028.


Pearce, David G. (1984). “Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection”. Econometrica; V.52-#4, pp. 1029-1050.


Basu, Kaushik (1988). “Strategic Irrationality in Extensive Games”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.15-#?, pp. 247-260.


Tan, Tommy C.C and Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa Werlang (1988). “The Bayesian Foundations of Solution Concepts in Games”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.45-#?, pp. 370-390.


Brandenburger, Adam and Eddie Dekel (1987). “Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria”. Econometrica; V.55-#6, pp. 1391-1402.


Mariotti, Thomas (2003). “Hierarchies of Compact Beliefs and Rationalizable Behavior”. Economics Letters; V.79-#?, pp. 199-204.


Zambrano, Eduardo (2004). “Counterfactual Reasoning and Common Knowledge of Rationality in Normal Form Games”. Topics in Theoretical Economics; V.4-#1, article 8.


Sobel, Joel, Lars Stole and Iñigo Zapater (1990). “Fixed Equilibrium Rationalizability”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.52-#?, pp. 304-331.


Reny, Philip (1993). “Common Belief and the Theory of Games with Perfect Information”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.59-#?, pp. 257-274.


Börgers, Tilman (1993). “Pure Strategy Dominance”. Econometrica; V.61-#2, pp. 423-430.


Dekel, Eddie and Drew Fudenberg (1990). “Rational Behavior with Payoff Uncertainty”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.52-#?, pp. 243-267.


Hammond, Peter (1993). “Aspects of Rationalizable Behavior”. in Ken Binmore, Alan Kirman, and Piero Tani, eds. Frontiers of Game Theory. Cambridge: MIT, pp. 277-305.


Hammond, Peter (1996). “Consequentialism, Structural Rationality and Game Theory”. in Kenneth Arrow, et al. eds., The Rational Foundations of Economic Behavior. London: Macmillan, pp. 25-42.


Börgers, Tilman (1994). “Weak Dominance and Approximate Common Knowledge”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.64-#?, pp. 265-276.


Samuelson, Larry (1992). “Dominated Strategies and Common Knowledge”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.4-#?, pp. 284-313.


Börgers, Tilman and Larry Samuelson (1992). “‘Cautious’ Utility Maximization and Iterated Weak Dominance”. International Journal of Game Theory; V.21-#1, pp. 13-25.


Lipman, Barton (1994). “A Note on the Implications of Common Knowledge of Rationality”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.6-#?, pp. 114-129.


Blume, Lawrence, Adam Brandenburger, and Eddie Dekel (1991). “Lexicographic Probabilities and Equilibrium Refinements”. Econometrica; V.59-#1, pp. 81-98.


Brandenburger, Adam (1992). “Lexicographic Probabilities and Iterated Admissability”. in Partha Dasgupta, et al., eds. Economic Analysis of Markets and Games. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 282-290.


Stahl, Dale (1995). “Lexicographic Rationalizability and Iterated Admissability”. Economics Letters; V.47-#?, pp. 155-159.


Basu, Kaushik and Jorgen Weibull (1991). “Strategy Subsets Closed under Rational Behavior”. Economics Letters; V.36-#2, pp. 141-146.


Cho, In-Koo (1994). “Stationarity, Rationalizability and Bargaining”. Review of Economic Studies; V.61-#2, pp. 357-374.


Rabin, Matthew (1994). “Incorporating Behavioral Assumptions into Game Theory”. in James Friedman, ed. Problems of Coordination in Economic Activity. Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 69-87.


Gul, Faruk (1996). “Rationality and Coherent Theories of Strategic Behavior”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.70-#1, pp. 1-31.


Battigalli, Pierpaolo (1994). “A Comment on Strategic Rationality Orderings and Computation Trembles”. Economic Notes; V.23-#?, pp. 19-25.


Battigalli, Pierpaolo (1996). “Strategic Rationality Orderings and the Best Rationalization Principle”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.13-#?, pp. 178-200.


Veronesi, Pietro (1997). “Lexicographic Rationality Orderings and Iterative Weak Dominance”. in Pierpaolo Battigalli, Aldo Montesano, and Fausto Panunzi, eds. Decisions, Games and Markets. Boston: Kluwer, pp. 125-147.


Ben-Porath, Elchanan (1997). “Rationality, Nash Equilibrium and Backwards Induction in Perfect Information Games”. Review of Economic Studies; V.64-#?, pp. 23-46.


Shimoji, Makoto and Joel Watson (1998). “Conditional Dominance, Rationalizability, and Game Forms”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.83-#2, pp. 161-195.


Anthonisen, Niels (1999). “Strong Rationalizability for Two-Player Noncooperative Games”. Economic Theory; V.13-#1, pp. 143-169.


Schumacher, Frank (1999). “Proper Rationalizability and Backward Induction”. International Journal of Game Theory; V.28-#4, pp. 599-615.


Herings, P. Jean-Jacques and Vincent Vannetelbosch (1999). “Refinements of Rationalizability for Normal-Form Games”. International Journal of Game Theory; V.28-#1, pp. 53-68.


Herings, P. Jean-Jacques and Vincent Vannetelbosch (2000). “The Equivalence of the Dekel-Fudenberg Iterative Procedure and Weakly Perfect Rationalizability”. Economic Theory; V.15-#3, pp. 677-687.


Asheim, Geir (2002). “Proper Rationalizability in Lexicographic Beliefs”. International Journal of Game Theory; V.30-#4, pp. 453-478.


Battigalli, Pierpaolo and M. Siniscalchi (1999). “Interactive Beliefs, Epistemic Interdependence and Strong Rationalizability”. Research in Economics; V.53-#?, pp. 243-246.


Battigalli, Pierpaolo (2003). “Rationalizability in Infinite, Dynamic Games with Incomplete Information”. Research in Economics; V.57-#1, pp. 1-38.


Battigalli, Pierpaolo and M. Siniscalchi (2003). “Rationalization and Incomplete Information”. Advances in Theoretical Economics; V.3-#1, article 3, [46 pages] http://www.bepress.com/bejte/advances/vol3/iss1/art3


Asheim, Geir and Martin Dufwenberg (2003). “Admissibility and Common Belief”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.42-#2, pp. 208-234.


Asheim, Geir and Martin Dufwenberg (2003). “Deductive Reasoning in Extensive Games”. Economic Journal; V.113-#487, pp. 305-325.


Bicchieri, Cristina and Oliver Schulte (1996). “Common Reasoning About Admissibility”. Erkenntnis; V.45-#2/3, pp. 299-326.


Board, Oliver (2002). “Belief Revision and Rationalizability”. In I. Gilboa, ed. Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge (TARK VII).


Board, Oliver (2002). “Algorithmic Characterization of Rationalizability in Extensive Form Games”. Ms: Oxford University.


Epstein, Larry (1997). “Preference, Rationalizability and Equilibrium”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.73-#1, pp. 1-29.

 

6. Subjective, Self-Confirming, Conjectural, etc. Equilibrium


Hahn, Frank (1973). On the Notion of Equilibrium in Economics. Cambridge: CUP. Also reprinted in Hahn (1984), Equilibrium and Macroeconomics. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 43-71.


Hahn, Frank (1989). “Information, Dynamics and Equilibrium”. in F. Hahn, ed. The Economic Theory of Missing Markets, Information and Games. Oxford: OUP, pp. 106-126.


Battigalli, Pierpaolo (1988). “Implementable Strategies, Prior Information and the Problem of Credibility in Extensive Games”. Rivista Internazionale di Sceinze Economiche e Commerciali; V.35-#8, pp. 705-733.


Battigalli, Pierpaolo and Danilo Guaitoli (1997). “Conjectural Equilibria and Rationalizability in a Game with Incomplete Information”. in Pierpaolo Battigalli, Aldo Montesano, and Fausto Panunzi, eds. Decisions, Games and Markets. Boston: Kluwer, pp. 97-124.


Fudenberg, Drew and David Levine (1993). “Self-Confirming Equilibrium”. Econometrica; V.61-#3, pp. 523-545.


Kalai, Ehud and Ehud Lehrer (1993). “Subjective Equilibrium in Repeated Games”. Econometrica; V.61-#5, pp. 1231-1240.


Kalai, Ehud and Ehud Lehrer (1995). “Subjective Games and Equilibria”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.8-#?, pp. 123-163.


Rubinstein, Ariel and Asher Wolinsky (1994). “Rationalizable Conjectural Equilibrium: Between Nash and Rationalizability”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.6-#?, pp. 299-311.


Gilli, Mario (1999). “On Non-Nash Equilibria”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.27-#2, pp. 184-293.


Battigalli, Pierpaolo (1999). “A Comment on Non-Nash Equilibria”. ms: European University Institute.


Greenberg, Joseph (1996). “Towering over Babel: Worlds Apart–But Acting Together”. ms: McGill University.


Dekel, Eddie, Drew Fudenberg, and David Levine (1999). “Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.89-#2, pp. 165-185.


Hidetsugu, Oishi (2003). “Rationalized Subjective Equilibria in Repeated Games”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.36-#1, pp. 168-191.

 

B. Epistemic Logic and the Foundations of Game Theory

 

1. Analyses of Equilibrium Based on Epistemic Modal Logic: Overviews


Dekel, Eddie and Faruk Gul (1997). “Rationality and Knowledge in Game Theory”. in David Kreps and Kenneth Wallace, eds. Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, Vol. 1. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 87-172.


Battigalli, Pierpaolo and Giacomo Bonanno (1999). “Recent Results on Belief, Knowledge and the Epistemic Foundations of Game Theory”. Research in Economics, V.53-#2, pp. 149-225.


Aumann, Robert (1999). “Interactive Epistemology I: Knowledge”. International Journal of Game Theory; V.28-#3, pp. 263-300.


Aumann, Robert (1999). “Interactive Epistemology II: Probability”. International Journal of Game Theory; V.28-#3, pp. 301-314.


Heifetz, Aviad (1999). “How Canonical is the Canonical Model? A Comment on Aumann’s Interactive Epistemology”. International Journal of Game Theory; V.28-#3, pp. 435-442.


Kaneko, Mamoru (2002). “Epistemic Logics and Their Game Theoretic Applications: Introduction”. Economic Theory; V.19-#1, pp. 7-62.


Bonanno, Giacomo (2002). “Modal Logic and Game Theory: Two Alternative Approaches”. Risk, Decision and Policy; V.7-#?, pp. 309-324.


Board, Oliver (2002). “Knowledge, Beliefs, and Game-Theoretic Solution Concepts”. Oxford Review of Economic Policy; V.18-#4, pp. 418-432.


Brandenburger, Adam (2002). “The Power of Paradox: Some Recent Developments in Interactive Epistemology”. Ms: Stern School of Business.

 

2. Analyses of Equilibrium Based on Epistemic Modal Logic: Foundations


Selten, Reinhard and Ulrike Leopold (1982). “Subjunctive Conditionals in Decision and Game Theory”. in W. Stegemüller, W. Balzer, and W. Spohn, eds. Philosophy of Economics. Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, pp. 191-20.


Bacharach, Michael (1987). “A Theory of Rational Decision in Games”. Erkenntnis; V.27-#?, pp. 17-55.


Bacharach, Michael (1993). “Variable Universe Games”. in Ken Binmore, Alan Kirman, and Piero Tani, eds. Frontiers of Game Theory. Cambridge: MIT, pp. 255-275.


Bacharach, Michael (1994). “The Epistemic Structure of a Theory of a Game”. Theory and Decision; V.37-#2, pp. 7-48.


Walliser, Bernard (1992). “Epistemic Logic and Game Theory”. in Cristina Bicchieri and Maria Luisa Della Chiara, eds. Knowledge, Belief and Strategic Interaction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 197-225.


Stalnaker, Robert (1994). “On the Evaluation of Solution Concepts”. Theory and Decision; V.37-#2, pp. 49-73. [comment by Giacomo Bonanno and Klaus Nehring, with response, (1998), V.45-#3, pp. 291-295.]


Bicchieri, Cristina (1993). “Counterfactuals, Belief Changes, and Equilibrium Refinements”. Philosophical Topics; V.21-#1, pp. 21-52.


Antonelli, Gian Aldo and Cristina Bicchieri (1994). “Backwards Forward Induction”. in Ronald Fagin, ed. Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge–Proceedings of the Fifth Conference. Los Altos: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 24-43.


Bicchieri, Cristina and Gian Aldo Antonelli (1995). “Game Theoretic Axioms for Local Rationality and Bounded Knowledge”. Journal of Logic, Language, and Information; V.4-#2, pp. 145-167.


Bicchieri, Cristina (1995). “The Epistemic Foundations of Nash Equilibrium”. in D. Little, ed. On the Reliability of Economic Models: Essays in the Philosophy of Economics. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, pp. 91-137. [Comment by B. Lipman, pp. 138-146.]


Holt, Debra (1994). “Coherent Belief Revision in Games”. in Ronald Fagin, ed. Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge–Proceedings of the Fifth Conference. Los Altos: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 305-320.


Bonanno, Giacomo (1991). “The Logic of Rational Play in Games”. Economics and Philosophy; V.7-#1, pp. 37-65. [comment by Arnis Vilks and response (1994), E&P, V10: 107-117.


Bonanno, Giacomo (1992). “Rational Beliefs In Extensive Games”, Theory and Decision, V.33-#2, pp. 153-176.


Bonanno, Giacomo (1993). “The Logical Representation of Extensive Games”. International Journal of Game Theory; V.22-#?, pp. 153-169.


Vilks, Arnis (1997). “Analyzing Games by Sequences of Metatheories”. in M. Bacharach, L.-A. Gerard-Varet, P. Mongin, and H. Shin eds. Epistemic Logic and the Theory of Games and Decisions. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Pub, pp. 265-292.


Quesada, Antonio (2002). “Belief System Foundations for Backward Induction”. Theory & Decision; V.53-#4, pp. 393-403.


Stalnaker, Robert (1996). “Knowledge, Belief, and Counterfactual Reasoning in Games”. Economics and Philosophy; V.12-#2, pp. 133-163.


Stalnaker, Robert (1999). “Extensive and Strategic Forms: Games and Models for Games”. Research in Economics; V.53-#3, pp. 293-319.


Bacharach, Michael (1999). “Interactive Team Reasoning: A Contribution to the Theory of Co-operation”. Research in Economics; V.53-#2, pp. 117-147.


Bonanno, Giacomo (2001). “Branching Time, Perfect Information Games, and Backward Induction”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.36-#1, pp. 57-73.


van Benthem, Johan (2001). “Games in Dynamic-Epistemic Logic”. Bulletin of Economic Research; V.53-#4, pp. 219-248.


van Ditmarsch, Hans (2001). “Knowledge Games”. Bulletin of Economic Research; V.53-#4, pp. 249-273.


Baltag, Alexandru (2002). “A Logic for Suspicious Players: Epistemic Actions and Belief Updates in Games”. Bulletin of Economic Research; V.53-#4, pp. 1-45.


Kaneko, Mamoru (2002). “Epistemic Logics and Their Game Theoretic Applications: Introduction”. Economic Theory; V.19-#1, pp. 7-62.


Kaneko, Mamoru and Takashi Nagashima (1991). “Final Decisions, the Nash Equilibrium and Solvability in Games with Common Knowledge of Logical Abilities”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.22-#?, pp. 229-255.


Kaneko, Mamoru and Takashi Nagashima (1996). “Game Logic and Its Applications I”. Studia Logica V.57-#2/3, pp. 325-354.


Kaneko, Mamoru and Takashi Nagashima (1997). “Game Logic and Its Applications II”. Studia Logica V.58-#2, pp. 325-354.


Kaneko, Mamoru (1999). “Epistemic Considerations of Decision Making in Games”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.38-#2, pp. 105-137.


Kaneko, Mamoru (1999). “Common Knowledge Logic and Game Logic”. Journal of Symbolic Logic; V.64-#2, pp. 685-700.


Kaneko, Mamoru and Nobu-Yuki Suzuki (2002). “Bounded Interpersonal Inferences and Decision Making. Logic and Economics”. Economic Theory; V.19-#1, pp. 63-103.


Kaneko, Mamoru and Nobu-Yuki Suzuki (2003). “Epistemic Models of Shallow Depths and Decision-making in Games”. Journal of Symbolic Logic; V.68-#1, pp. 163-186.

 

3. Problems with Nash Equilibrium, and its Variants, from an Epistemic View


Bernheim, B. Douglas (1986). “Axiomatic Characterizations of Rational Choice in Strategic Enviornments”. Scandinavian Journal of Economics; V.88-#3, pp. 473-488.


De Wolf, Olivier and Françoise Forges (1998). “Rational Choice in Strategic Environments: Further Observations”. Scandinavian Journal of Economics; V.100-#2, pp. 529-535. [Response by Bernheim follows, pp. 537-541.


Binmore, Ken (1987). “Modeling Rational Players, Part I”. Economics and Philosophy, V.3-#2, pp. 179-214.


Abreu, Dilip and David Pearce (1984). “On the Inconsistency of Certain Axioms on Solution Concepts for Non-cooperative Games”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.34-#?, pp. 169-174.


Basu, Kaushik (1990). “On the Non-Existence of a Rationality Definition for Extensive Games”. International Journal of Game Theory; V.19-#1, pp. 33-44.


Basu, Kaushik (1994). “The Traveler’s Dilemma: Paradoxes of Rationality in Game Theory”. American Economic Review; V.84-#2, pp. 391-395.


Bicchieri, Cristina (1988). “Strategic Behavior and Counterfactuals”. Synthese; V.76-#?, pp. 135-169.


Bicchieri, Cristina (1988). “Common Knowledge and Backward Induction: A Solution to the Paradox”. in Moshe Vardi, ed. Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge–Proceedings of the Second Conference. Los Altos: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 381-393.


Bicchieri, Cristina (1989). “Self-Refuting Theories of Strategic Interaction: A Paradox of Common Knowledge”. Erkenntnis; V30-#?, pp. 69-85.


Bicchieri, Cristina (1989). “Counterfactuals and Backward Induction”. Philosophica; V.44-#2, pp. 101-118.


Petitt, Philip and Robert Sugden (1989). “The Backward Induction Paradox”. Journal of Philosophy; V.86-#4, pp. 169-182.


Sobel, J. Howard (1993). “Backward Induction Arguments in Finitely Iterated Prisoners’ Dilemmas: A Paradox Regained”. Philosophy of Science; V.60-#?, pp. 114-133.


Cubitt, Robin (1989). “Refinements of Nash Equilibrium: A Critique”. Theory and Decision; V.26-#?, pp. 107-131.


Reny, Philip (1989). “Common Knowledge and Games with Complete Information”. PSA; V.2, pp. 363-369. also in Cristina Bicchieri and Maria Luisa Della Chiara, eds. (1992). Knowledge, Belief and Strategic Interaction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.345-353.


Gilboa, Itzhak (1990). “A Note on the Consistency of Game Theory”. in Rohit Parikh, ed. Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge–Proceedings of the Third Conference. Los Altos: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 201-208.


Bicchieri, Cristina (1992). “Knowledge-dependent Games: Backward Induction”. in Cristina Bicchieri and Maria Luisa Della Chiara, eds. Knowledge, Belief and Strategic Interaction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 327-343


Rubinstein, Ariel (1991). “Comments on the Interpretation of Game Theory”. Econometrica; V.59-#4, pp. 909-924.


Reny, Philip (1992). “Rationality in Extensive Form Games”. Journal of Economic Perspectives; V.6-#4, pp. 103-118.


Reny, Philip (1995). “Rational Behavior in Extensive Form Games”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.28-#1, pp. 1-16.


Sugden, Robert (1992). “Inductive Reasoning in Repeated Games”. Reinhard Selten, ed. Rational Interaction: Essays in Honor of John C. Harsanyi. New York: Springer-Verlag, pp. 201-221.


Koons, Robert (1991). Paradoxes of Belief and Strategic Rationality. New York: Cambridge University Press.


Koons, Robert (1992). “Doxastic Paradox and Reputation Effects in Interated Games”. in Yoram Moses, ed. Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge–Proceedings of the Fourth Conference. Los Altos: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 60-72.


Varoufakis, Yanis (1993). “Modern and Postmodern Challenges to Game Theory”. Erkenntnis; V.38-#?, pp. 371-404.


Samuelson, Larry (1992). “Dominated Strategies and Common Knowledge”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.4-#?, pp. 284-313.


Cubitt, Robin and Robert Sugden (1994). “Rationally Justifiable Play and the Theory of Non-Cooperative Games”. Economic Journal; V.104-#425, pp. 798-803. also in M. Bacharach, L.-A. Gerard-Varet, P. Mongin, and H. Shin eds. (1997). Epistemic Logic and the Theory of Games and Decisions. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Pub, pp. 293-302.


Dufwenberg, Martin and Johan Lindén (1996). “Inconsistencies in Extensive Games: Common Knowledge is Not the Issue”. Erkenntnis; V.45-#1, pp. 103-114.


Squires, David (1998). “Impossibility Theorems for Normal Form Games”. Theory and Decision; V.44-#1, pp. 67-81.


Quesada, Antonio (2002). “Another impossibility result for normal form games”. Theory and Decision; V.52-#1, pp. 73-80.


Zambrano, Eduardo (2004). “Counterfactual Reasoning and Common Knowledge of Rationality in Normal Form Games”. Topics in Theoretical Economics; V.4-#1, article 8.


Lipman, Barton (1994). “A Note on the Implications of Common Knowledge of Rationality”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.6-#?, pp. 114-129.


Jacobsen, Hans Jørgen (1996). “On the Foundations of Nash Equilibrium”. Economics and Philosophy; V.12-#1, pp. 67-88.


Skyrms, Brian (1998). “Subjunctive Conditionals and Revealed Preference”. Philosophy of Science; V.65-#4, pp. 545-574.


Skyrms, Brian, Gary D. Bell and Peter Woodruff (1999). “Theories of Counter-factual and Subjunctive Conditionals in Contexts of Strategic Interaction”. Research in Economics; V.53-#3, pp. 275-291.

 

4. Robert Aumann’s Decision Theoretic Response


Brandenburger, Adam (1992). “Knowledge and Equilibrium in Games”. Economic Perspectives; V.6-#4, pp. 83-101.


Aumann, Robert and Adam Brandenburger (1995). “Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium”. Econometrica; V.63-#5, pp. 1161-1180.


Polak, Ben (1999). “Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium, and Common Knowledge of Rationality”. Econometrica; V.67-#3, pp. 673-676.


Aumann, Robert (1992). “Irrationality in Game Theory”. in Partha Dasgupta, et al. eds. Economic Analysis of Markets and Games. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 214-227.


Aumann, Robert (1995). “Backward Induction and Common Knowledge of Rationality”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.8-#1, pp. 6-19.


Binmore, Ken (1996). “A Note on Backward Induction”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.17-#?, pp. 135-137. [Aumann’s reply follows, pp. 138-146].


Binmore, Ken and Larry Samuelson (1996). “Rationalizing Backward Induction”. in Kenneth Arrow, et al., eds. The Rational Foundations of Economic Behavior. New York: St. Martins/IEA, pp. 111-124. [comments by Bernard Walliser and Robert Aumann follow, pp. 125-131.


Binmore, Ken (1994). “Rationality in the Centipede”. in Ronald Fagin, ed. Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge–Proceedings of the Fifth Conference. Los Altos: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 150-159.


Binmore, Ken (1997). “Rationality and Backward Induction”. Journal of Economic Methodology; V.4-#1, pp. pp. 23-41.


Aumann, Robert (1998). “On the Centipede Game”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.23-#?, pp. 97-105.


Gilboa, Itzhak (1998). “Counter-Counterfactuals”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.24-#?, pp. 175-180.


Rabinowicz, Wlokek (1998). “Grappling with the Centipede: Defense of Backward Induction for Bi-Terminating Games”. Economics and Philosophy; V.14-#1, pp. 95-126.


Samet, Dov (1996). “Hypothetical Knowledge and Games with Perfect Information”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.17-#?, pp. 230-251.


Halpern, Joseph (1999). “Hypothetical Knowledge and Counterfactual Reasoning”. International Journal of Game Theory; V.28-#3, pp. 315-330.


Margalit, Avishai and Menahem Yaari (1996). “Rationality and Comprehension”. in Kenneth Arrow, et al. eds., The Rational Foundations of Economic Behavior. London: Macmillan, pp. 89-100. [Comments by Sen and Aumann follow]


Mariotti, Marco (1996). “The Decision-Theoretic Foundations of Game Theory”. in Kenneth Arrow, et al., eds. The Rational Foundations of Economic Behavior. New York: St. Martins/IEA, pp. 133-148. [comment by Battigalli follows]


Mariotti, Marco (1995). “Is Bayesian Rationality Compatible with Strategic Rationality”. Economic Journal; V.105-#432, pp. 1099-1109.


Mariotti, Marco (1997). “Decisions in Games: Why There May Be a Special Exemption from Bayesian Rationality”. Journal of Economic Methodology, V.4-#1, pp. 43-60.


Ben-Porath, Elchanan (1997). “Rationality, Nash Equilibrium and Backwards Induction in Perfect Information Games”. Review of Economic Studies; V.64-#?, pp. 23-46.


Stalnaker, Robert (1998). “Belief Revision in Games: Forward and Backward Induction”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.36-#1, pp. 31-56.


Halpern, Joseph (2001). “Substantive Rationality and Backward Induction”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.37-#2, pp. 425-435


Stuart, Harborne, jr. (1997). “Common Belief of Rationality in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.19-#?, pp. 133-143.


Lo, Kin Chung (2000). “A Note on Mutually Absolutely Continuous Belief Systems”. Economics Letters; V.68-#?, pp. 149-156.


Balkenborg, Dieter and Eyal Winter (1997). “A Necessary and Sufficient Epistemic Condition for Playing Backward Induction”. Journal of Mathematical Economics; V.27-#?, pp. 325-345.


Hu, Hong and Harborne Stuart, jr. (2002). “An Epistemic Analysis of the Harsanyi Transformation”. International Journal of Game Theory; V.30-#4, pp. 517-525.


Battigalli, Pierpaolo and Marciano Siniscalchi (1999). “Hierarchies of Conditional Beliefs and Interactive Epistemology in Dynamic Games”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.88-#1, pp. 188-230.


Battigalli, Pierpaolo and Marciano Siniscalchi (1999). “Interactive Beliefs, Epistemic Independence and Strong Rationalizability”. Research in Economics; V.53-#3, pp. 247-273.


Battigalli, Pierpaolo and Marciano Siniscalchi (2002). “Strong Belief and Forward Inductive Reasoning”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.106-#2, pp. 356-391.


Battigalli, Pierpaolo (2003). “Rationalizability in Infinite, Dynamic Games with Incomplete Information”. Research in Economics; V.57-#1, pp. 1-38.


Brandenburger, Adam and H. Jerome Keisler (1999). “An Impossibility Theorem on Beliefs in Games”. Ms: Harvard Business School/University of Wisconsin.


Asheim, Geir (2002). “On the Epistemic Foundation for Backward Induction”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.44-#2, pp. 121-144.


Quesada, Antonio (2003). “From Common Knowledge of Rationality to Backward Induction”. International Game Theory Review; V.5-#2, pp. 127-137.


Board, Oliver (2003). “Dynamic Interactive Epistemology”. Games and Economic Behavior; forth.

 

C. Evolutionary Learning and Convergence to Equilibrium

 

1. General Surveys


Selten, Reinhard (1991). “Evolution, Learning, and Economic Behavior”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.3-#1, pp. 3-24. Also in D. Jacobs, E. Kalai, and M. Kamien, eds. Frontiers of Research in Economic Theory. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 82-103.


Mailath, George (1992). “Introduction: Symposium on Evolutionary Game Theory”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.57-#?, pp. 259-277.


van Damme, Eric (1994). “Evolutionary Game Theory”. European Economic Review; V.38-#?, pp. 847-858.


Weibull, Jörgen (1994). “The ‘As If’ Approach to Game Theory: Three Positive Results and Four Obstacles”. European Economic Review; V.38-#?, pp. 868-881.


Robson, Arthur (1995). “The Evolution of Strategic Behaviour”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.28-#1, pp. 17-41.


Börgers, Tilman (1996). “On the Relevance of Learning and Evolution to Economic Theory”. Economic Journal; V.106-#438, pp. 1374-1385.


Kandori Michihiro (1997). “Evolutionary Game Theory in Economics”. in David Kreps and Kenneth Wallis, eds. Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Application–V.I. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 243-277.


Walliser, Bernard (1998). “A Spectrum of Equilibration Processes in Game Theory”. Journal of Evolutionary Economics; V.8-#1, pp. 67-87.


Friedman, Daniel (1998). “On Economic Applications of Evolutionary Game Theory”. Journal of Evolutionary Economics; V.8-#1, pp. 15-43.


Mailath, George (1998). “Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons from Evolutionalry Game Theory”. Journal of Economic Literature; V.36-#3, pp. 1347-1374.


Vega-Redondo, Fernando (1996). Evolution, Games, and Economic Behaviour. Oxford: OUP.


Samuelson, Larry (1997). Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection. Cambridge: MIT.


Hofbauer, Josef and Karl Sigmund (1998). Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics. Cambridge: CUP.

 

2. Evolution and Learning with Deterministic Dynamics (ESS and Replicator)

 

a. Deterministic Evolutionary Dynamics


Maynard Smith, John (1982). Evolution and the Theory of Games. Cambridge: CUP.


Hines, W.G. (1987). “Evolutionary Stable Strategies: A Review of Basic Theory”. Theoretical Population Biology; V.31-#?, pp. 195-272.


van Damme, Eric (1991). “Evolutionary Game Theory”. Chapter 9 of Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibrium. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, pp. 214-258.


Weibull, Jörgen (1995). Evolutionary Games Theory. Cambridge: MIT.


Maynard Smith, John and G. Price (1973). “The Logic of Animal Conflicts”. Nature; V.246, pp. 15-18.


Maynard Smith, John (1974). “The Theory of Games and the Evolution of Animal Conflicts”. Journal of Theoretical Biology; V.47-#?, pp. 209-221.


Taylor, Peter and Leo Jonker (1978). “Evolutionarily Stable Strategies and Game Dynamics”. Mathematical Biosciences; V.40-#?, pp. 145-156.


Talyor, Peter (1979). “Evolutionarily Stable Strategies with Two Types of Players”. Journal of Applied Probability; V.16-#?, pp. 76-83.


Zeeman, E.C. (1980). “Population Dynamics from Game Theory”. in Z. Nitecki and C. Robinson, eds. Global Theory of Dynamical Systems (Lecture Notes in Mathematics, #819). Berlin: Springer, pp. 471-497.


Zeeman, E.C. (1981). “Dynamics of Evolution of Animal Conflicts”. Journal of Theoretical Biology; V.89-#?, pp. 249-270.


Hines, W.G.S. (1980). “Three Characterizations of Population Strategy Stability”. Journal of Applied Probability; V.17-#?, pp. 333-340.


Thomas, Bernhard (1984). “Evolutionary Stability: States and Strategies”. Theoretical Population Biology; V.26-#1, pp. 49-67.


Rowe, Glenn, Ian Harvey and Stephen Hubbard (1985). “The Essential Properties of Evolutionary Stability”. Journal of Theoretical Biology; V.115-#?, pp. 269-285.


Bomze, Immanuel (1986). “Non-cooperative 2-person Games in Biology: A Classification”. International Journal of Game Theory; V.15-#1, pp. 31-59.


Lessard, Sabin (1990). “Evolutionary Stability: One Concept, Several Meanings”. Theoretical Population Biology; V.37-#?, pp. 159-170.


Robson, Arthur (1990). “Efficiency in Evolutionary Games: Darwin, Nash and the Secret Handshake”. Journal of Theoretical Biology; V.144-#?, pp. 379-396.


Selten, Reinhard (1983). “Evolutionary Stability in Extensive Two-Person Games”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.5-#?, pp. 269-363.


Selten, Reinhard (1988). “Evolutionary Stability in Extensive Two-Person Games–Correction and Further Development”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.16-#?, pp. 221-266.


Cripps, Martin (1991). “Correlated Equilibria and Evolutionary Stability”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.55-#2, pp. 428-34.


Swinkels, Jeroen (1992). “Evolutionary Stability with Equilibrium Entrants”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.57-#?, pp. 306-332.


Swinkels, Jeroen (1992). “Evolution and Strategic Stability: From Maynard Smith to Kohlberg and Mertens”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.57-#?, pp. 333-342.


Boylan, Richard (1992). “Laws of Large Numbers for Dynamical Systems with Randomly Matched Individuals”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.57-#?, pp. 473-504.


Boylan, Richard (1995). “Continuous Approximation of Dynamical Systems with Randomly Matched Individuals”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.66-#?, pp. 615-625.


Boylan, Richard (1994). “Evolutionary Equilibria Resistant to Mutation”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.7-#?, pp. 10-34.


Alós-Ferrer, Carlos (1999). “Dynamical Systems with a Continuum of Randomly Matched Agents”. JET; V.86-#2, pp. 245-267.


Bhaskar, V. (1995). “On the Neutral Stability of Mixed Strategies in Asymmetric Contests”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.30-#3, pp. 273-284.


Ben-Porath, Elchanan, Eddie Dekel, and Aldo Rustichini (1993). “On the Relationship between Mutation Rates and Growth Rates in a Changing Environment”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.5-#?, pp. 576-603.


Cressman, Ross (1995). “Evolutionary Game Theory with Two Groups of Individuals”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.11-#2, pp. 237-253.


Cressman, Ross (1996). “Evolutionary Stability in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.68-#1, pp. 234-248.


Cressman, Ross (1997). “Local Stability of Smooth Selection Dynamics for Normal Form Games”. Mathematical Social Sciences. V.34-#1, pp. 1-19.


Cressman, Ross (1997). “Dynamic Stability in Symmetric Extensive Form Games”. International Journal of Game Theory; V.26-#4, pp. 525-47.


Cressman, Ross and Karl Schlag (1998). “The Dynamic (In)Stability of Backwards Induction”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.83-#?, pp. 260-285.


Chamberland, Marc and Ross Cressman (2000). “An Example of Dynamic (In)Consistency in Symmetric Extensive Fom Evolutionary Games”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.30-#2, pp. 319-326.


Cressman, Ross (2000). “Subgame Monotonicity in Extensive Form Evolutionary Games”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.32-#2, pp. 183-205.


Oechssler, Jörg and Frank Riedel (2001). “Evolutionary Dynamics on Infinite Strategy Spaces”. Economic Theory; V.17-#?, pp. 141-162.


Skyrms, Brian (1994). “Darwin Meets The Logic of Decision: Correlation in Evolutionary Game Theory”. Philosophy of Science; V.61-#?, pp. 503-528.

 

b. Evolutive Learning with Deterministic Dynamics


Harley, Calvin (1981). “Learning the Evolutionarily Stable Strategy”. Journal of Theoretical Biology; V.89-#?, pp. 611-633.


Samuelson, Larry (1988). “Evolutionary Foundations of Solution Concepts for Finite, Two-Player, Normal-Form Games”. in Moshe Vardi, ed. Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge–Proceedings of the Second Conference. Los Altos: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 211-225.


Crawford, Vincent (1985). “Learning Behavior and Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibria”. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization; V.6-#1, pp. 69-78.


Crawford, Vincent (1989). “Learning and Mixed-Strategy Equilibria in Evolutionary Games”. Journal of Theoretical Biology; V.140-#?, pp. 537-550.


Nachbar, John (1990). “‘Evolutionary’ Selection Dynamics in Games: Convergence and Limit Properties”. International Journal of Game Theory; V.19-#?, pp. 59-89.


Friedman, Daniel (1991). “Evolutionary Games in Economics”. Econometrica; V.59-#3, pp. 637-666.


Gilboa, Itzhak and Akhiko Matsui (1991). “Social Stability and Equilibrium”. Econometrica; V.59-#3, pp. 859-867.


Matsui, Akhiko (1992). “Best Response Dynamics and Socially Stable Strategies”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.57-#?, pp. 343-362.


Vega-Redondo, Fernando (1993). “Competition and Culture in an Evolutionary Process of Equilibrium Selection”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.5-#?, pp. 618-631.


Canning, David (1995). “Learning and Social Equilibrium in Large Populations”. in Alan Kirman and Mark Salmon, eds. Learning and Rationality in Economics. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 308-323.


Samuelson, Larry and Jianbo Zhang (1992). “Evolutionary Stability in Asymmetric Games”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.57-#?, pp. 363-391.


Dekel, Eddie and Suzanne Scotchmer (1992). “On the Evolution of Optimizing Behavior”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.57-#?, pp. 392-406.


Cabrales, Antonio and Joel Sobel (1992). “On the Limit Points of Discrete Selection Dynamics”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.57-#?, pp. 407-419.


Swinkels, Jeroen (1993). “Adjustment Dynamics and Rational Play in Games”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.5-#?, pp. 455-484.


Stahl, Dale (1993). “Evolution of Smartn Players”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.5-#?, pp. 604-617.


Lu, Xiaohua and Dale Stahl (1994). “Responsive and Strong Responsive Evolutionary Dynamics”. International Journal of Game Theory; V. 23-#?, pp. 101-117.


Banerjee, Abhijit and Jörgen Weibull (1995). “Evolutionary Selection and Rational Behavior”. in Alan Kirman and Mark Salmon, eds. Learning and Rationality in Economics. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 343-363.


Waldman, Michael (1994). “Systematic Errors and the Theory of Natural Selection”. American Economic Review; V.84-#3, pp. 482-497.


Ritzberger, Klaus and Jorgen Weibull (1995). “Evolutionary Selection in Normal-form Games”. Econometrica; V.63-#6, pp. 1371-1399.


Hofbauer, Josef and Jörgen Weibull (1996). “Evolutionary Selection against Dominated Strategies”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.71-#2, pp. 558-573.


Björnerstedt, Jonas and Jörgen Weibull (1996). “Nash Equilibrium and Evolution by Imitation”. in Kenneth Arrow, Enrico Colombatto, Mark Perlman, and Christian Schmidt, eds. The Rational Foundations of Economic Behavior. New York: St. Martins, pp. 155-171


Börgers, Tilman and Rajiv Sarin (1997). “Learning through Reinforcement and Replicator Dynamics”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.77-#1, pp. 1-14.


Crawford, Vincent (1997). “Learning and Mixed-Strategy Equilibria in Evolutionary Games”. in Cristina Bicchieri, Richard Jeffrey and Brian Skyrms, eds. The Dynamics of Norms. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 131-147.


Robson, Arthur (1998). “Naive Adaptive Behavior and the Observability of Gambles”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.24-#1, pp. 97-108.


Sethi, Rajiv (1998). “Strategy-Specific Barriers to Learning and Nonmonotonic Selection Dynamics”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.23-#2, pp. 284-304.


Cressman, Ross and Karl Schlag (1998). “The Dynamic (In)Stability of Backwards Induction”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.83-#2, pp. 260-285.


Dawid, Herbert (1999). “On the Stability of Monotone Discrete Selection Dynamics with Intertia”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.37-#3, pp. 265-280.


Hopkins, Ed (1999). “Learning, Matching, and Aggregation”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.26-#1, pp. 79-110.


Hopkins, Ed (1999). “A Note on Best Response Dynamics”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.29-#1/2, pp. 138-150.


Ponti, Giovanni (2000). “Cycles of Learning in the Centipede Game”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.30-#1, pp. 115-141.


Stennek, Johan (2000) “The Survival Value of Assuming Others to be Rational”. International Journal of Game Theory; V.29-#2, pp. 147-163.


Reichmann, Thomas (2001). “Genetic Algorithm Learning and Evolutionary Games”. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control; V.25-#6/7, pp. 1019-1037.


Brenner, Thomas and Ulrich Witt (2003). “Melioration Learning in Games with Constant and Frequency-dependent Payoffs”. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization; V.50-#4, pp. 429-448.


Huck, Steffen and Rajiv Sarin (2004). “Players with Limited Memory”. Contributions to Theoretical Economics; V.4-#1, article 6.

 

c. Cheap Talk and Evolutionary Stability


Matsui, Akihiko (1991). “Cheap-Talk and Cooperation in a Society”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.54-#?, pp. 245-258.


Wärneryd, Karl (1991). “Evolutionary Stability in Unanimity Games with Cheap Talk”. Economics Letters; V.36-#?, pp. 375-378.


Wärneryd, Karl (1993). “Cheap Talk, Coordination, and Evolutionary Stability”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.5-#4, pp. 532-546.


Blume, Andres, Yong-Gwan Kim, and Joel Sobel (1993). “Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.5-#4, pp. 547-575.


Sobel, Joel (1993). “Evolutionary Stability and Efficiency”. Economics Letters; V.42-#?, pp. 301-312.


Kim, Yong-Gwan and Joel Sobel (1995). “An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-Play Communication”. Econometrica; V.63-#5, pp. 1181-1193.


Blume, Andres (1998). “Communication, Risk, and Efficiency in Games”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.22-#?, pp. 171-202.


Bhaskar, V. (1998). “Noisy Communication and the Evolution of Cooperation”. Journal of Economic Theory; v.82-#1, pp. 110-131.


Arifovic, Jasmina and B. Curtis Eaton (1998). “The Evolution of Type Communication in a Sender/Receiver Game of Common Interest with Cheap Talk”. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control; V.22-#8/9, pp. 1187-1207.


Banerjee, Abhijit and Jörgen Weibull (2000). “Neutrally Stable Outcomes in Cheap Talk Coordination Games”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.32-#1, pp. 1-24.

 

d. Evolution of Cooperation in the Prisoners’ Dilemma: Axelrod, et al.


Axelrod, Robert (1984). The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books.


Axelrod, Robert (1981). “The Emergence of Cooperation among Egoists”. American Political Science Review; V.75-#?, pp. 306-318.


Axelrod, Robert and William Hamilton (1981). “The Evolution of Cooperation”. Science, #211, pp. 379-403.


Hofstadter, Douglas (1983). “Metamagical Themas: Computer Tournaments on the Prisoner’s Dilemma suggest How Cooperation Evolves”. Scientific American; V.248-#5, pp. 16-26.


May, Robert (1987). “More Evolution of Cooperation”. Nature; #327, pp. 15-17.


Boyd, Robert and J.P. Lorberbaum (1987). “No Pure Strategy is Evolutionarily Stable in the Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma Game”. Nature, #327, pp. 58-59.


Axelrod, Robert and Douglas Dion (1988). “The Further Evolution of Cooperation”. Science, #242, pp. 1385-1390.


To, Theodore (1988). “More Realism in the Prisoner’s Dilemma”. Journal of Conflict Resolution; V.32-#2, pp. 402-408.


Hirshleifer, Jack and Juan Carlos Martinez-Coll (1988). “What Strategies Can Support the Evolutionary Emergence of Cooperation”. Journal of Conflict Resolution; V.32-#2, pp. 367-398.


Martinez-Coll, Juan Carlos and Jack Hirshleifer (1991). “The Limits of Reciprocity”. Rationality and Society; V.3-#1, pp. 35-64.


Boyd, Robert (1989). “Mistakes Allow Evolutionary Stability in the Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma”. Journal of Theoretical Biology; V.136-#?, pp. 47-56.


Fudenberg, Drew and Eric Maskin (1990). “Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games”. American Economic Review; V.80-#2, pp. 274-279.


Linster, Bruce (1992). “Evolutionary Stability in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma Played by Two-state Moore Machines”. Southern Economic Journal; V.58-#4, pp. 880-903.


Binmore, Kenneth and Larry Samuelson (1992). “Evolutionary Stability in Repeated Games Played by Finite Automata”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.57-#?, pp. 278-305.


Sober, Elliott (1992). “Stable Cooperation in the Iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma”. Economics and Philosophy; V.8-#1, pp. 127-139.


Nowak, M. and K. Sigmund (1992). “Tit for Tat in Heterogeneous Populations”. Nature; #355, pp. 250-253.


Nowak, M. and K. Sigmund (1993). “A Strategy of Win-Stay, Lose-Shift That Outperforms Tit-for-tat in the Prisoners’ Dilemma Game”. Nature, #364, pp. 56-58.


Miller, John H. (1996). “The Coevolution of Automata in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma”. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization; V.29-#1, pp. 87-112.


Ho, Teck-Hua (1996). “Finite Automata Play Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Information Processing Costs”. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control; V.20-#1-3, pp. 173-207.


Cooper, David (1996). “Supergames Played by Finite Automata with Finite Costs of Complexity in an Evolutionary Setting”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.68-#?, pp. 266-275.


Karandikar, Rajeeva, Dilip Mookherjee, Debraj Ray, and Fernando Vega-Redondo (1998). “Evolving Aspirations and Cooperation”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.80-#2, pp. 292-331.


Neyman, Abraham (1999). “Finitely Repeated Games with Finite Automata”. Mathematics of Operations Research; V.23-#?, pp. 513-522.


Palomino, Fréderic and Fernando Vega-Redondo (1999). “Convergence of Aspirations and (Partial) Cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma”. International Journal of Game Theory; V.28-#4, pp. 465-488.


Volij, Oscar (2002). “In Defense of DEFECT”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.39-#2, pp. 309-321.


Bendor, Jonathan, R.M. Kramer and S. Stout (1991). “When in Doubt: Cooperation in a Noisy Prisoners’ Dilemma”. Journal of Conflict Resolution; V.35-#?, pp. 691-719.


Bendor, Jonathan (1993). “Uncertainty and the Evolution of Cooperation”. Journal of Conflict Resolution; V.37-#?, pp. 709-734.


Bendor, Jonathan and Piotr Swistak (1995). “Types of Evolutionary Stability and the Problem of Cooperation”. Proceedings of the National Academy of Science; V92-#?, pp. 3596-3600.


Bendor, Jonathan and Piotr Swistak (1997). “The Evolutionary Stability of Cooperation”. American Political Science Review; V.91-#?, pp. 290-307.


Bendor, Jonathan and Piotr Swistak (1998). “Evolutionary Equilibria: Characterization Theorems and Their Implications”. Theory and Decision; V.45-#2, pp. 99-159.


Bendor, Jonathan and Piotr Swistak (1998). “The Evolutionary Advantage of Conditional Cooperation”. Complexity; V.4-#2, pp. 15-18.


Guttman, J. (1996). “Rational Actors, Tit-for-Tat Types, and the Evolution of Cooperation”. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization; V.29-#1, pp. 27-56.


Lomberg, B. (1996). “Nucleus and Sheild: The Evolution of Social Structure in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma”. American Sociological Review; V.61-#2, pp. 278-307.

 

e. The War of Attrition

 

(1) Theory


Maynard Smith, John and G.R. Price (1973). “The Logic of Animal Conflicts”. Nature; V.246, pp. 15-18.


Maynard Smith, John (1974). “The Theory of Games and the Evolution of Animal Conflict”. Journal of Theoretical Biology; V.47-#?, pp. 209-221.


Hines, W.G.S. (1977). “Competition with an Evolutionary Stable Strategy”. Journal of Theoretical Biology; V.67-#?, pp. 141-153.


Bishop, D.T. and C. Cannings (1978). “A Generalized War of Attrition”. Journal of Theoretical Biology; V.70-#?, pp. 85-124.


Bishop, D.T., C. Cannings and J. Maynard Smith (1978). “The War of Attrition with Random Rewards”. Journal of Theoretical Biology; V.74-#?, pp. 377-388.


Parker, G.A. and E.A. Thompson (1980). “Dung Fly Struggles: A Test of the War of Attrition”. Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology; V.7-#1, pp. 37-44.


Riley, John (1979). “Evolutionary Equilibrium Strategies”. Journal of Theoretical Biology; V.76-#?, pp. 109-123.


Riley, John (1980). “Strong Evolutionary Equilibrium and the War of Attrition”. Journal of Theoretical Biology; V.82-#?, pp. 383-400.


Selten, Reinhard (1980). “A Note on Evolutionarily Stable Strategies in Asymmetric Animal Conflicts”. Journal of Theoretical Biology; V.84-#?, pp. 93-101.


Hammerstein, P. and G. Parker (1982). “The Asymmetric War of Attrition”. Journal of Theoretical Biology; V.96-#?, pp. 647-682.


Nalebuff, Barry and John Riley (1985). “Asymmetric Equilibria in the War of Attrition”. Journal of Theoretical Biology; V.113-#?, pp. 517-527.


Haigh, J. And C. Cannings (1988). “The n-person War of Attrition”. In A. Kurzhansky and K. Sigmund, ed. Evolution and Control in Biological Systems. Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 59-74.


Hendricks, Ken, Andrew Weiss, and Charles Wilson (1988). “The War of Attrition in Continuous Time with Complete Information”. International Economic Review; V.29-#4, pp. 663-80.


Kornhauser, Lewis, Ariel Rubinstein, and Charles Wilson (1989). “Reputation and Patience in the ‘War of Attrition’”. Economica; V.56-#221, pp. 15-24


Ponsati, Clara and Jozsef Sakovics, Jozsef (1995). “The War of Attrition with Incomplete Information”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.29-#3, pp. 239-54.


Kapur, Sandeep (1995). “Markov Perfect Equilibria in an N-Player War of Attrition”. Economics Letters; V.47-#2, pp. 149-54.


Cannings, C and J. Whittaker (1995). “The Finite Horizon War of Attrition”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.11-#2, pp. 193-236.


Baston, Victor and Andrej Garnaev (1997). “A Non-Zero-Sum War of Attrition”. Mathematical Methods of Operations Research; V.45-#2, pp. 197-211.


Bulow, Jeremy and Paul Klemperer (1999). “The Generalized War of Attrition”. American Economic Review; V.89-#1, pp. 175-89.


Goeree, Jacob, Simon Anderson, and Charles Holt (1998). “The War of Attrition with Noisy Players”. Advances in applied microeconomics. Volume 7. Contests. Stamford, Conn.: JAI Press, 1998 pp. 15-29.


Oechssler, Jorg and Frank Riedel (2001). “Evolutionary Dynamics on Infinite Strategy Space”. Economic Theory; V.17-#1, pp. 141-62.

 

(2) All-Pay Auction


Baye, Michael, Dan Kovenock and Casper Devries (1993). “Rigging the Lobbying Process: An Application of the All-Pay Auction”. American Economic Review; V.83-#1, pp. 289-294.


Baye, Michael, Dan Kovenock and Casper Devries (1994). “The Solution to the Tullock Rent-Seeking Game When R Is Greater Than 2: Mixed-Strategy Equilibria and Mean Dissipation Rates”. Public Choice; V.81-#3/4, pp. 363-380.


Baye, Michael, Dan Kovenock and Casper Devries (1996). “The All-Pay Auction with Complete Information”. Economic Theory; V.8-#2, pp. 291-305.


Baye, Michael, Dan Kovenock and Casper Devries (1999). “The Incidence of Overdissipation in Rent-Seeking Contests”. Public Choice; V.99-#3/4, pp. 439-454.


Baye, Michael and Onsong Shin (1999). “Strategic Behavior in Contests: Comment”. American Economic Review; V.89-#3, pp. 691-693.


Amann, Erwin and Wolfgang Leininger (1996). “Asymmetric All-Pay Auctions with Incomplete Information: The Two-Player Case”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.14-#1, pp. 1-18.


Krishna, Vijay and John Morgan (1997). “An Analysis of the War of Attrition and the All-Pay Auction”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.72-#2, pp. 343-62.


Anderson, Simon, Jacob Goeree, and Charles Holt (1998). “Rent Seeking with Bounded Rationality: An Analysis of the All-Pay Auction”. Journal of Political Economy; V.106-#4, pp. 828-853.


Barut, Yasar and Dan Kovenock (1998). “The Symmetric Multiple Prize All-Pay Auction with Complete Information”. European Journal of Political Economy; V.14-#4, pp. 627-644.


Che, Yeon-Koo and Ian Gale (2000). “Difference-Form Contests and the Robustness of All-Pay Auctions”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.30-#1, pp. 22-43.


Monteiro, Paulo Klinger (2000). “Optimal All-Pay Auction When Signals Are Correlated”. Revista Brasileira de Economia; V.54-#2, pp. 189-99.


Albano, Gian Luigi (2001). “A Class of All-Pay Auctions with Affiliated Information”. Recherches Economiques de Louvain; V.67-#1, pp. 31-38.


Amegashie, J. Atsu (2001). “An All-pay Auction with a Pure-Strategy Equilibrium”. Economics Letters; V.70-#1, pp. 79-82.


Kaplan, Todd, Israel Luski, Aner Sela and David Wettstein (2002). “All-Pay Auctions with Variable Rewards”. Journal of Industrial Economics; V.50-#4, pp. 417-30


Itaya, Jun-Ichi; Sano, Hiroyuki (2003). “Exit from Rent-Seeking Contests”. Japanese Economic Review; V.54-#2, pp. 218-28.


Arbatskaya, Maria (2003). “The Exclusion Principle for Symmetric Multi-prize All-Pay Auctions with Endogenous Valuations”. Economics Letters; V.80-#1, pp. 73-80.

 

(3) Applications


Alessina, Alberto and A. Drazen (1991). “Why are Stabilizations Delayed?”, AER; V.81-#5, pp. 1170-1188.


Drazen, Allan and V. Grilli (1993). “The Benefit of Crises for Economic Reforms”. AER; V.83-#3, pp. 598-607.


Carre, Martine (2000). “Debt Stabilization with a Deadline”. European Economic Review; V.44-#1, pp. 71-90.


Hsieh, Chang-Tai (2000). “Bargaining over Reform”. European Economic Review; V.44-#9, pp. 1659-76.


Nikitin, Maxim (2000). “An Arrears Crisis and Stabilization Failure in a Transition Economy”. Journal of Comparative Economics; V.28-#4, pp. 665-99.


Padovano, Fabio and Larissa Venturi (2001). “Wars of Attrition in Italian Government Coalitions and Fiscal Performance: 1948-1994”. Public Choice; V.109-#1/2, pp. 15-54.


Allsopp, Louise (2000). “A Model to Explain the Duration of a Currency Crisis”. International Journal of Finance and Economics; V.5-#4, pp.


Hanming, Fang (2002). “Lottery versus All-Pay Auction Models of Lobbying”. Public Choice; V.112-#3/4, pp. 351-371.

 

3. Evolution and Learning with Stochastic Dynamics

 

a. Stochastic Evolutionary Dynamics


Mailath, George (1993). “Perpetual Randomness in Evolutionary Economics”. Economics Letters; V.42-#?, pp. 291-299.


Blume, Lawrence (1997). “Population Games”. in W. Brian Arthur, Steven Durlauf, and David Lane, eds. The Economy as a Complex Evolving System, II. Reading, Mass.: Addison Wesley/Santa Fe Institute, pp. 425-460.


Foster, Dean and H. Peyton Young (1990). “Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics”. Theoretical Population Biology; V.38-#?, pp. 219-232.


Young, H. Peyton and Dean Foster (1991). “Cooperation in the Short and in the Long Run”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.3-#?, pp. 145-156.


Fudenberg, Drew and Christopher Harris (1992). “Evolutionary Dynamics with Aggregate Shocks”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.57-#?, pp. 420-441.


Blume, Lawrence (1993). “The Statistical Mechanics of Strategic Interaction”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.4-#?, pp. 387-424.


Amir, Madjid and Siegfried Berningaus (1998). “Scale Functions in Equilibrium Selection Games”. Journal of Evolutionary Economics; V.8-#1, pp. 1-13.


Benaïm, Michel and Jörgen Weibull (2003). “Deterministic Approximation of Stochastic Evolution in Games”. Econometrica; V.71-#3, pp. 873-903.


Freidlin, Mark and Alexander Wentzell (1984). Random Perturbations of Dynamical Systems. New York: Springer-Verlag.

 

b. Evolutive Learning with Stochastic Dynamics


Young, H. Peyton (1998). Individual Strategy and Social Structure: An Evolutionary Theory of Institutions. Princeton: PUP.


Canning, David (1992). “Average Behavior in Learning Models”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.57-#?, pp. 442-472.


Kandori, Michihiro, George Mailath, and Rafael Rob (1993). “Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games”. Econometrica; V.61-#1, pp. 29-56.


Rhode, Paul and Mark Stegeman (1996). “A Comment on ‘Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games”. Econometrica; V.64-#2, pp. 443-449.


Sandholm, William (1998). “Simple and Clever Decision Rules for a Model of Evolution”. Economics Letters; V.61-#?, pp. 165-170.


Kandori, Michihiro and Rafael Rob (1995). “Evolution of Equilibria in the Long Run: A General Theory with Applications”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.65-#?, pp. 383-414.


Kandori, Michihiro and Rafael Rob (1998). “Bandwagon Effects and Long Run Technology Choice”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.22-#1, pp. 30-60.


Young, H. Peyton (1993). “The Evolution of Conventions”. Econometrica; V.61-#1, pp. 57-84.


Young, H. Peyton (1995). “Equilibrium Selection Through Adaptation and Experiment”. in Alan Kirman and Mark Salmon, eds. Learning and Rationality in Economics. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 364-381.


Vanderschraaf, Peter (1994). “Inductive Learning, Knowledge Asymmetries and Convention”. in Ronald Fagin, ed. Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge–Proceedings of the Fifth Conference. Los Altos: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 284-304.


Sáez-Marti, Maria and Jörgen Weibull (1999). “Clever Agent’s in Young’s Evolutionary Bargaining Model”. JET; V.86-#2, pp. 268-279.


Jacobsen, Hans Jørgen, Morgens Jensen, and Birgitte Sloth (2001). “Evolutionary Learning in Signalling Games”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.34-#1, pp. 34-63.


Samuelson, Larry (1991). “How to Tremble if You Must”. ms: University of Wisconsin.


Samuelson, Larry (1993). “Does Evolution Eliminate Dominated Strategies”. in Ken Binmore, Alan Kirman, and Piero Tani, eds. Frontiers of Game Theory. Cambridge: MIT, pp. 213-235.


Nöldeke, Georg and Larry Samuelson (1993). “An Evolutionary Analysis of Backward and Forward Induction”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.5-#?, pp. 425-454.


Samuelson, Larry (1994). “Stochastic Stability in Games with Alternative Best Replies”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.64-#1, pp. 35-65.


Binmore, Ken and Larry Samuelson (1994). “Drift”. European Economic Review; V.38-#?, pp. 859-867.


Binmore, Ken, Larry Samuelson and Richard Vaughan (1995). “Musical Chairs: Modelling Nosiy Evolution”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.11-#1, pp. 1-35.


Binmore, Ken and Larry Samuelson (1997). “Muddling Through: Noisy Equilibrium Selection”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.74-#?, pp. 235-265.


Binmore, Ken and Larry Samuelson (1999). “Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection”. Review of Economic Studies; V.66-#2, pp. 363-393.


Vega-Redondo, Fernando (1995). “Expectations, Drift, and Volatility in Evolutionary Games”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.11-#?, pp. 391-412.


Robson, Arthur and Fernando Vega-Redondo (1996). “Efficient Equilibrium Selection in Evolutionary Games with Random Matching”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.70-#1, pp. 65-92.


Amir, Majid and Siegfried Berninghaus (1996). “Another Approach to Mutation and Learning in Games”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.14-#1, pp. 19-43.


Bergin, James and Barton Lipman (1996). “Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations”. Econometrica; V.64-#4, pp. 943-956.


Posch, Martin (1997). “Cycling in a Stochastic Learning Algorithm for Normal Form Games”. Journal of Evolutionary Economics; V.7-#2, pp. 193-207.


Maruta, Tohimasa (1997). “On the Relationship between Risk-Dominance and Stochastic Stability”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.19-#?, pp. 221-234.


Sandholm, William and Ady Pauzner (1998). “Evolution, Population Growth, and History Dependence”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.22-#1, pp. 84-120.


Robles, Jack (1998). “Evolution with Changing Mutation Rates”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.79-#2, pp. 207-223.


Beggs, Alan (2002). “Stochastic Evolution with Slow Learning”. Economic Theory; V.19-#2, pp. 379-405.


van Damme, Eric and Jörgen Weibull (2002). “Evolution in Games with Endogenous Mistake Probabilities”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.106-#2, pp, 296-315.


Hart, Sergiu (2002). “Evolutionary Dynamics and Backward Induction”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.41-#2, pp. 227-264.


Blume, Lawrence (2003). “How Noise Matters”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.44-#2, pp. 251-271.


Sandholm, William (2002). “Evolution and Equilibrium under Inexact Information”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.44-#2, pp. 343-378.

 

4. Learning from Neighbors (Local Learning)


Ellison, Glenn (1993). “Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination”. Econometrica; V.61-#5, pp. 1047-1071.


Blume, Lawrence (1993). “The Statistical Mechanics of Strategic Interaction”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.5-#?, pp. 387-424.


Blume, Lawrence (1995). “The Statistical Mechanics of Best-Response Strategy Revision”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.11-#?, pp. 111-145.


Mailath, George, Larry Samuelson, and Avner Shaked (1997). “Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions”. Economic Theory; V.9-#?, pp. 551-556.


An, M. and Nicholas Kiefer (1995). “Local Externalities and Societal Adoption of Technologies”. Journal of Evolutionary Economics; V.5-#2, pp. 103-117.


Anderlini, Luca and Antonella Ianni (1996). “Path Dependence and Learning from Neighbors”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.13-#?, pp. 141-177.


Anderlini, Luca and Antonella Ianni (1996). “Learning on a Torus”. in Cristina Bicchieri, Richard Jeffrey and Brian Skyrms, eds. The Dynamics of Norms. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 87-107.


Berninghaus, Siegfried and Ulrich Schwalbe (1996). “Evolution, Interaction, and Nash Equilibria”. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization; V.29-#1, pp. 57-85.


Berninghaus, Siegfried and Ulrich Schwalbe (1996). Conventions, Local Interaction, and Automata Networks”. Journal of Evolutionary Economics;V.6-#3, pp. 297-312.


Galesloot, B. and Sanjeev Goyal (1997). “Cost of Flexibility and Equilibrium Selection”. Journal of Mathematical Economics; V.28-#?, pp. 249-264.


Darley, V.M. and Stuart Kauffman (1997). “Natural Rationality”. in W. Brian Arthur, Steven Durlauf, and David Lane, eds. The Economy as a Complex Evolving System, II. Reading, Mass.: Addison Wesley/Santa Fe Institute, pp. 45-80.


Padgett, John (1997). “The Emergence of Simple Ecologies of Skill”. in W. Brian Arthur, Steven Durlauf, and David Lane, eds. The Economy as a Complex Evolving System, II. Reading, Mass.: Addison Wesley/Santa Fe Institute, pp. 199-221.


Eshel, Ilan, Larry Samuelson, and Avner Shaked (1998). “Altruists, Egoists, and Hooligans in a Local Interaction Model”. American Economic Review; V.88-#1, pp. 157-179.


Ellison, Glenn (2000). “Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution”. Review of Economic Studies; V.67-#1, pp. 17-45.


Morris, Stephen (2000). “Contagion”. Review of Economic Studies; V.67-#1, pp. 57-78.


Morris, Stephen (1997). “Interaction Games: A Unified Analysis of Incomplete Information”. Santa Fe Institute Working Paper; #97-08-072E.


Ely, Jeffrey C (2002) “Local Conventions”. Advances in Theoretical Economics; V.2-#1, Article 1.


Lee, In Ho and Ákos Valentinyi (2000). “Noisy Contagion without Mutation”. Review of Economic Studies; V.67-#1, pp. 47-56.


Lee, In Ho, Adam Szeidl and Ákos Valentinyi (2003). “Contagion and State Dependent Mutations”. Advances in Economic Theory; V.3-#1, article 2.


Durieu, Jacques and Philippe Solal (2003). “Adaptive Play with Spatial Sampling”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.43-#2, pp. 189-195.


Blume, Andreas and Ted Temzelides (2003). “On the Geography of Conventions”. Economic Theory; V.22-#4, pp. 863-873.


Cartwright, Edward (2004). “The Stability of Conventions: Random and Lattice Matching Networks Compared”. Economics Letters; V.85-#1, pp. 47-51.

 

D. Boundedly Rational Learning and Convergence to Equilibrium

 

1. Overviews


Kreps, David (1990). “Bounded Rationality and Retrospection”. Chapter 6 in Game Theory and Economic Modelling. Oxford: OUP.


Aumann, Robert (1992). “Perspectives on Bounded Rationality”. in Yoram Moses, ed. Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge–Proceedings of the Fourth Conference. Los Altos: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 108-117.


Aumann, Robert (1997). “Rationality and Bounded Rationality”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.21-#1/2, pp. 2-14. Also in D. Jacobs, E. Kalai, and M. Kamien, eds. Frontiers of Research in Economic Theory. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 47-60.


Axelrod, Robert (1997). The Complexity of Cooperation: Agent-Based Models of Competition and Collaboration. Princeton: PUP.


Fudenberg, Drew and David Levine (1998). The Theory of Learning in Games. Cambridge: MIT.

 

2. Finite Automata, Bounded Recall, Strategic Complexity Bounds, etc.


Rubinstein, Ariel (1987). “The Complexity of Strategies and the Resolution of Conflict: An Introduction”. in R. Bryant and R. Portes, eds. Global Macroeconomics: Policy Conflict and Cooperation. New York: St. Martins/CEPR, pp. 17-32.


Kalai, Ehud (1990). “Bounded Rationality and Strategic Complexity in Repeated Games”. in Tatsuro Ichiishi, Abraham Neyman and Yai Tauman, eds. Game Theory and Applications. San Diego: Academic Press, pp. 131-157.


Neyman, Abraham (1998). “Cooperation, Repetition, and Automata”. in S. Hart and A. Mas-Colell, eds. Cooperation: Game Theoretic Approaches. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, pp. 233-255.


Smale, Steve (1980). “The Prisoner’s Dilemma and Dynamical Systems Associated to Non-Cooperative Games”. Econometrica; V.48-#7, pp. 1617-1634.


Aumann, Robert (1981). “Survey of Repeated Games”. in Essays in Game Theory and Mathematical Economics in Honor of Oskar Morgenstern. Mannheim: Bibliographiches Institut, pp. 11-42.


Radner, Roy (1987). “Can Bounded Rationality Resolve the Prisoners’ Dilemma”. in Andreu Mas-Colell and Werner Hildenbrand, eds. Contributions to Mathematical Economics. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 387-399.


Binmore, Ken (1987). “Modeling Rational Players, Part I”. Economics and Philosophy, V.3-#2, pp. 179-214.


Binmore, Ken (1988). “Modeling Rational Players, Part II”. Economics and Philosophy, V.4-#1, pp. 9-55.


Rubinstein, Ariel (1986). “Finite Automata Play the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.39-#?, pp. 83-96.


Neyman, Abraham (1985). “Bounded Rationality Justifies Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma”. Economics Letters; V.19-#?, pp. 227-229.


Megiddo, Nimrod and Avi Wigderson (1986). “On Play by Means of Computing Machines”. in J. Halpern, ed. Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning about Knowledge. Los Altos: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 259-274.


Megiddo, Nimrod (1989). “On Computable Beliefs of Rational Machines”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.1-#2, pp. 144-169.


Megiddo, Nimrod (1994). “On Probabilistic Machines, Bounded Rationality and Average Case Complexity”. in N. Megiddo, ed. Essays in Game Theory: In Honor of Michael Maschler. New York: Springer-Verlag, pp. 123-128.


Zemel, Eitan (1989). “Small Talk and Cooperation: A Note on Bounded Rationality”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.49-#1, pp. 1-9.


Benoit, Jean-Pierre (1988). “A Non-Equilibrium Analysis of the Finitely-Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.16-#?, pp. 281-287.


Harrington, Joseph (1987). “Finite Rationalizability and Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma”. Economics Letters; V.23-#?, pp. 233-237.


Howard, J.V. (1988). “Cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma”. Theory and Decision; V.24-#?, pp. 203-213.


Anderlini, Luca (1990). “Some Notes on Church’s Thesis and the Theory of Games”. Theory and Decision; V.29-#1, pp. 19-52.


Canning, David (1992). “Rationality, Computability, and Nash Equilibrium”. Econometrica; V.60-#4, pp. 877-888.


Gilboa, Itzhak (1988). “The Complexity of Computing Best-Response Automata in Repeated Games”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.45-#?, pp. 342-353.


Gilboa, Itzhak and Dov Samet (1989). “Bounded versus Unbounded Rationality: The Tyranny of the Weak”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.1-#3, pp. 213-221.


Gilboa, Itzhak and Iitan Zemal (1989). “Nash and Correlated Equilibria: Some Complexity Considerations”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.1-#1, pp. 80-93.


Gilboa, Itzhak, Ehud Kalai, and Eitan Zemel (1990). “On the Order of Eliminating Dominated Strategies”. Operations Research Letters; V.9-#?, pp. 85-89.


Gilboa, Itzhak, Ehud Kalai, and Eitan Zemel (1993). “The Complexity of Eliminating Dominated Strategies”. Mathematics of Operations Research; V.18-#3, pp. 553-565.


Marx, Leslie and Jeroen Swinkels (1997). “Order Independence for Iterated Weak Dominance”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.18-#?, pp. 219-245.


Aumann, Robert and Sylvain Sorin (1989). “Cooperation and Bounded Recall”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.1-#1, pp. 5-39.


Ben-Porath, Elchanan (1993). “Repeated Games with Finite Automata”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.59-#1, pp. 17-32.


Lehrer, Ehud (1988). “Repeated Games with Stationary Bounded Recall Strategies”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.46-#?, pp. 130-144.


Lehrer, Ehud (1994). “Finitely Many Players with Bounded Recall in Infinitely Repeated Games”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.7-#?, pp. 390-405.


Kalai, Ehud and William Stanford (1988). “Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games”. Econometrica; V.56-#2, pp. 397-410.


Abreu, Dilip and Ariel Rubenstein (1988). “The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata”. Econometrica; V.56-#6, pp. 1259-1281.


Binmore, Ken and Larry Samuelson (1992). “Evolutionary Stability in Repeated Games Played by Finite Automata”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.57-#?, pp. 278-305.


Cooper, D.J. (1996). “Supergames Played by Finite Automata with Finite Costs of Complexity in an Evolutionary Setting”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.68-#1, pp. 266-275.


Volij, Oscar (2002). “In Defense of DEFECT”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.39-#2, pp. 309-321.


Samuelson, Larry and Jeroen Swinkels (2003). “Evolutionary Stability and Lexicographic Preferences”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.44-#2, pp. 332-342.


Neme, Alejandro and Luis Quintas (1992). “Equilibrium of Repeated Games with Cost of Implementation”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.58-#?, pp. 105-109.


Neme, Alejandro and Luis Quintas (1995). “Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of Repeated Games with Implementation Costs”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.66-#?, pp. 599-608.


Piccione, Michele (1992). “Finite Automata with Discounting”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.56-#?, pp. 180-193.


Piccione, Michele and Ariel Rubinstein (1993). “Finite Automata Play a Repeated Extensive Game”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.61-#?, pp. 160-168.


Banks, Jeffrey and Rangarajan Sundaram (1990). “Repeated Games, Finite Automata, and Complexity”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.2-#2, pp. 97-117.


Kalai, Ehud and Alejandro Neme (1992). “The Strength of a Little Perfection”. International Journal of Game Theory; V.20-#2, pp. 335-355.


Neme, Alejandro (1993). “Little Perfection and Complexity”. International Journal of Game Theory; V.22-#?, pp. 309-318.


Cho, In-Koo and Hao Li (1999). “How Complex are Networks Playing Repeated Games?”. Economic Theory; V.13-#1, pp. 93-123.


Lipman, Barton and Sanjay Srivastava (1990). “Informational Requirements and Strategic Complexity in Repeated Games”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.2-#?, pp. 273-290.


Friedman, James (199?). “Oligopoly with Price Intertia and Bounded Rationality”. in W. Neufeind and R. Riezman, eds. Economic Theory and International Trade. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, pp. 153-172.


Neyman, Abraham and Daijiro Okada (1999). “Strategic Entropy and Complexity in Repeated Games”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.29-#1/2, pp. 191-233.


Neyman, Abraham and Daijiro Okada (2000). “Repeated Games with Bounded Entropy”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.30-#2, pp. 228-247.


Neyman, Abraham and Daijiro Okada (2000). “Two-Person Repeated Games with Finite Automata”. International Journal of Game Theory; V.29-#3, pp. 309-325.

 

3. Adaptive Learning


Walliser, Bernard (1989). “Instrumental and Cognitive Rationality”. Theory and Decision; V.27-#1, pp. 7-36.


Marimon, Ramon (1993). “Adaptive Learning, Evolutionary Dynamics and Equilibrium Selelction in Games”. European Economic Review; V.37-#?, pp. 603-611.


Marimon, Ramon and Ellen McGratten (1995). “On Adaptive Learning in Strategic Games”. in Alan Kirman and Mark Salmon, eds. Learning and Rationality in Economics. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 63-101.


Matsushima, Hitoshi (1997). “Bounded Rationality in Economics: A Game Theorist’s View”. Japanese Economic Review; V.48-#3, pp. 293-306.


Crawford, Vincent (1985). “Learning Behavior and Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium”. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization; V.6-#1, pp. 69-78.


Rosenthal, Robert (1989). “A Bounded-Rationality Approach to the Study of Non-Cooperative Games”. International Journal of Game Theory; V.18-#3, pp. 273-292.


Brousseau, Vincent and Alan Kirman (1993). “The Dynamics of Learning in N-Person Game with the Wrong N”. in Ken Binmore, Alan Kirman, and Piero Tani, eds. Frontiers of Game Theory. Cambridge: MIT, pp. 71-93.


Crawford, Vincent (1995). “Adaptive Dynamics in Coordination Games”. Econometrica; V.63-#1, pp. 103-143.


Crawford, Vincent and Bruno Broseta (1998). “What Price Coordination? The Efficiency-Enhancing Effect of Auctioning the Right to Play”. American Economic Review; V.88-#1, pp. 198-225.


McKelvey, Richard and Thomas Palfrey (1995). “Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.10-#1, pp. 6-38.


Chen, Hsiao-Chi, James Friedman, and Jacques-François Thisse (1997). “Boundedly Rational Nash Equilibrium: A Probabilistic Choice Approach”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.18-#1, pp. 32-54.


Foster, Dean and Rakesh Vohra (1997). “Calibrated Learning and Correlated Equilibrium”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.21-#1, pp. 40-55.


Borgers, Tilman and Rajiv Sarin (1997). “Learning through Reinforcement with Replicator Dynamics”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.77-#1, pp. 1-14.


Vega-Redondo, Fernando (1997). “The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior”. Journal of Mathematical Economics; V.65-#?, pp. 375-384.


Osborne, Martin and Ariel Rubinstein (1998). “Games with Procedurally Rational Players”. American Economic Review; V.88-#4, pp. 834-847.


Sethi, Rajiv (2000). “Stability of Equilibria in Games with Procedurally Rational Players”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.32-#1, pp. 85-104.


Jéhiel, Philippe (1995). “Limited Forecast in Repeated Alternate Games”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.67-#?, pp. 497-519.


Jéhiel, Philippe (1998). “Learning to Play Limited Forecast Equilibria”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.22-#?, pp. 274-298.


Jéhiel, Philippe (1998). “Repeated Games and Limited Forecasting”. European Economic Review; V.42-#?, pp. 543-551.


Flåm, Sjur Didrik (1998). “Restricted attention, myopic play, and the learning of equilibrium”. Annals of Operations Research; #82, pp. 473-482 .


Schlag, Karl (1998). “Why Imitate, and If So, How? A Boundedly Rational Approach to Multi-armed Bandits”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.78-#1, pp. 130-156.


Gale, Douglas and Robert Rosenthal (1999). “Experimentation, Imitation, and Stochastic Stability”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.84-#1, pp. 1-40.


Groes, Ebber, Han Jorgen Jacobsen and Birgitte Sloth (1999). “Adaptive Learning in Extensive Form Games and Sequential Equilibrium”. Economic Theory; V.13-#1, pp. 125-142.


Kim, Taesung and Nicholas Yannelis (1999). “Learning in Bayesian Games By Bounded Rational Players I”. Macroeconomic Dynamics; V.1-#3, pp. 568-587.


Serfes, Konstantinos and Nicholas C. Yannelis (1999). “Learning in Bayesian Games By Bounded Rational Players, II: Nonmyopia”. Macroeconomic Dynamics; V.2-#2, pp. 141-155.


Foster, Dean and Rakesh Vohra (1999). “Regret in the On-Line Decision Problem”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.29-#1/2, pp. 7-35.


Freund, Yoav and Robert Schapire (1999). “Adaptive Game Playing Using Multiplicative Weights”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.29-#1/2, pp. 79-103.


Rustichini, Aldo (1999). “Minimizing Regret: The General Case”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.29-#1/2, pp. 224-243.


Hart, Sergiu and Andreu Mas-Colell (2000). “A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium”. Econometrica; V.68-#5, pp. 1127-1150.


Vriend, Nicolaas J. (2000). “An Illustration of the Essential Difference between Individual and Social Learning, and Its Consequences for Computational Analyses”. Journal Of Economic Dynamics And Control; V.24-#1, pp. 1-19.


Bacharach, Michael and Dale Stahl (2000). “Variable-Frame Level-n Theory”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.32-#2, pp. 230-246.


Bergin, James and Dan Bernhardt (2004). “Comparative Learning Dynamics”. International Economic Review; V.45-#2, pp. 431-465.

 

4. Fictitious Play

 

a. General Theory of Fictitious Play (including Potential Games)


Brown, George (1951). “Iterative Solutions of Games by Fictitious Play”. in Tjalling Koopmans, ed. Activity Analysis of Production and Allocation. New York: Wiley.


Robinson, Julia (1951). “An Iterative Method for Solving a Game”. Annals of Mathematics. V.54, pp. 296-301.


Shapley, Lloyd (1965). “Some Topics in Two-Person Games”. Advances in Game Theory: Annals of Mathematical Studies; V.5, pp. 1-28. [especially section 5, “Fictitious Play in Non-Zero-Sum Games”, pp. 24-27.]


Metrick, A. and B. Polak (1994). “Fictitious Play in 2×2 Games: A Geometric Proof of Convergence”. Economic Theory; V.4-#6, pp. 923-933.


Monderer, Dov and Lloyd Shapley (1996). “Fictitious Play Property for Games with Identical Interests”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.68-#?, pp. 258-265.


Monderer, Dov and Aner Sela (1996). “A 2 × 2 Game without the Fictitious Play Property”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.14-#?, pp. 144-148.


Foster, Dean and H. Peyton Young (1998). “On the Nonconvergence of Fictitious Play in Coordination Games”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.25-#1, pp. 79-96 .


Krishna, Vijay and Tomas Sjöström (1998). “On the Convergence of Fictitious Play”. Mathematics of Operations Research; V.23-#2, pp. 479-511.


Harris, Christopher (1998). “On the Rate of Convergence of Continuous-Time Fictitious Play”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.22-#?, pp. 238-259.


Sela, Aner (1999). “Fictitious Play In ‘One-Against-All’ Multi-player Games”. Economic Theory; V.14-#3, pp. 635-651.


Sela, Aner (2000). “Fictitious Play in 2 × 3 Games”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.31-#1, pp. 152-162.


Hofbauer, Josef and William Sandholm (2002). “On Global Convergence of Stochastic Fictitious Play”. Econometrica; V.70-#6, pp.


Gaunersdorfer, Andrea and Josef Hofbauer (1995). “Fictitious Play, Shapley Polygons, and the Replicator Equation”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.11-#?, pp. 279-303.


Hendon, Ebbe, Hans Jorgen Jacobsen, and Birgitte Sloth (1992). “Fictitious Play and the Interpretation of Mixed Strategy Equilibria”. Nationalokonomisk Tidsskrift; V.130-#2, pp. 298-308.


Hart, Sergiu and Andreu Mas-Colell (1989). “Potential, Value and Consistency”. Econometrica; V.57-#?, pp. 589-614.


Qin, Cheng-Zhong (1996). “Endogenous Formation of Cooperation Structures”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.69-#1, pp. 218-226.


Monderer, Dov and Lloyd Shapley (1996). “Potential Games”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.14-#?, pp. 124-143.


Ui, Takashi (2000). “A Shapley Value Representation of Potential Games”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.31-#1, pp. 121-135.


Voorneveld, Mark and Henk Norde (1997). “A Characterization of Ordinal Potential Games”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.19-#?, pp. 235-242.


Kukushkin, Nikolai (1999). “Potential Games: A Purely Ordinal Approach”. Economics Letters; V.64-#?, pp. 279-283.


Voorneveld, Mark (2000). “Best-Response Potential Games”. EcLets; V.66-#?, pp. 289-295.


Slikker, Marco, Bhaskar Dutta, Anne van den Nouweland, Stef Tijs (2000). “Potential Maximizers and Network Formation”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.39-#1, pp. 55-70.


Sandholm, William (2001). “Potential Games with Continuous Sets of Players”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.97-#1, pp. 81-108.


Kukushkin, Nikolai (2002). “Perfect Information and Potential Games”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.38-#2, pp. 306-317.

 

b. Fictitious Play and Learning


Eichberger, Jürgen, Hans Haller, and Frank Milne (1993). “Naive Bayesian Learning in 2 × 2 Matrix Games”. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization; V.21-#?, pp. 69-90.


Eichberger, Jürgen (1995). “Bayesian Learning in Repeated Normal Form Games”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.11-#?, pp. 254-278.


Bomze, Immanuel and Jürgen Eichberger (1997). “Evolutive vs. Naive Bayesian Learning”. in Cristina Bicchieri, Richard Jeffrey and Brian Skyrms, eds. The Dynamics of Norms. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 109-130.


Fudenberg, Drew and David Kreps (1993). “Learning Mixed Equilibria”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.5-#?, pp. 320-367.


Fudenberg, Drew and David Kreps (1995). “Learning in Extensive-Form Games. I. Self-Confirming Equilibria”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.8-#1, pp. 20-55.


Fudenberg, Drew and David Levine (1995). “Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play”. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control; V.19-#?, pp. 1065-1090.


Hendon, Ebbe, Hans Jorgen Jacobsen, Birgitte Sloth (1996). “Fictitious Play in Extensive Form Games”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.15-#2, pp. 177-202.


Krishna, Vijay and Tomas Sjöström (1997). “Learning in Games: Fictitious Play Dynamics”. in S. Hart and A. Mas-Colell, eds. Cooperation: Game Theoretic Approaches. New York: Springer Verlag, pp.


Richards, Diana (1997). “The Geometry of Inductive Reasoning in Games”. Economic Theory; V.10-#?, pp. 185-193.


Monderer, Dov, Dov Samet, and Aner Sela (1997). “Belief Affirming in Learning Processes”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.73-#?, pp. 438-452.


Sela, Aner and Dorothea Herreiner (1999). “Fictitious Play in Coordination Games”. International Journal of Game Theory; V.28-#2, pp. 189-197.


Canning, David (1995). “Learning and Social Equilibrium in Large Populations”. in Alan Kirman and Mark Salmon, eds. Learning and Rationality in Economics. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 308-323.


Kaniovski, Yuri and H. Peyton Young (1995). “Learning Dynamics in Games with Stochastic Perturbations”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.11-#?, pp. 330-363.


Ellison, Glenn (1997). “Learning from Personal Experience: One Rational Guy and the Justification of Myopia”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.19-#?, pp. 180-210.


Anthonisen, Niels (1997). “On the Convergence of Beliefs within Populations in Games with Learning”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.76-#1, pp. 169-184.


Marx, Leslie (1999). “Adaptive Learning and Iterated Weak Dominance”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.26-#2, pp. 253-278.


Benaïm, Michel and Morris Hirsch (1999). “Mixed Equilibria and Dynamical Systems Arising from Fictitious Play in Perturbed Games”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.29-#1/2, pp. 36-72.


Fudenberg, Drew and David Levine (1999). “Conditional Universal Consistency”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.29-#1/2, pp. 104-130.


Kaniovski, Yuri, Arkadii Kryazhimaskii, and H. Peyton Young (2000). “Adaptive Dynamics in Games Played by Heterogeneous Populations”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.31-#1, pp. 50-96.


Hopkins, Ed (2002). “Two Competing Models of How People Learn in Games”. Econometrica; V.70-#2, pp.


LiCalzi, Marco (1995). “Fictitious Play by Cases”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.11-#1, pp. 64-89.


Aoyagi, Masaki (1996). “Evolution of Beliefs and the Nash Equilibrium of Normal Form Games”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.70-#2, pp. 444-469.


Flåm, Sjur Didrik (1998). “Averaged Predictions and the Learning of Equilibrium Play”. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control; V.22-#?, pp. 833-848.

 

5. Bayesian Learning


Blume, Lawrence and David Easley (1995). “What has the Rational Learning Literature Taught Us?”. in Alan Kirman and Mark Salmon, eds. Learning and Rationality in Economics. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 12-39.


Skyrms, Brian (1990). The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.


Jordan, J.S. (1991). “Bayesian Learning in Normal Form Games”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.3-#1, pp. 60-81.


Jordan, J.S. (1992). “The Exponential Convergence of Bayesian Learning in Normal Form Games”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.4-#?, pp. 202-217.


Jordan, J.S. (1993). “Three Problems in Learning Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibria”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.5-#?, pp. 368-386.


Jordan, J.S. (1997). “Bayesian Learning in Games: A non-Bayesian Perspective”. in Cristina Bicchieri, Richard Jeffrey and Brian Skyrms, eds. The Dynamics of Norms. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 149-174.


Nyarko, Yaw (1994). “Bayesian Learning Leads to Correlated Equilibria in Normal Form Games”. Economic Theory; V.4-#6, pp. 821-842.


Koutsougeras, Leonidas and Nicholas Yannelis (1994). “Convergence and Approximation Results for Non-cooperative Bayesian Games: Learning Theorems”. Economic Theory; V.4-#6, pp. 843-857.


Nyarko, Yaw (1997). “Savage-Bayesian Agents Play a Repeated Game”. in Cristina Bicchieri, Richard Jeffrey and Brian Skyrms, eds. The Dynamics of Norms. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 175-197.


Nyarko, Yaw (1998). “Bayesian Learning and Convergence to Nash Equilibria without Common Priors”. Economic Theory; V.11-#?, pp. 643-655.


Milgrom, Paul and John Roberts (1990). “Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities”. Econometrica; V.58-#6, pp. 1255-1277.


Milgrom, Paul and John Roberts (1991). “Adaptive and Sophisticated Learning in Normal Form Games”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.3-#1, pp. 82-100.


Fudenberg, Drew and David Levine (1993). “Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium”. Econometrica; V.61-#3, pp. 547-573.


Gans, Joshua (1995). “Best Replies and Adaptive Learning”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.30-#3, pp. 221-234.


Gilli, Mario (1999). “Adaptive Learning in Imperfect Monitoring Games”. Review of Economic Dynamics; V.2-#?, pp. 472-485.


Kalai, Ehud and Ehud Lehrer (1993). “Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium”. Econometrica; V.61-#5, pp. 1019-1045.


Lehrer, Ehud, and Rann Smorodinsky (1997). “Repeated Large Games with Incomplete Information”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.18-#1, pp. 116-134.


Sandroni, Alvaro (1998). “Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Convergence to Nash Equilibrium: The Almost Absolute Continuity Hypothesis”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.22-#1, pp. 121-147.


Sandroni, Alvaro and Rann Smorodinsky (1999). “The Speed of Rational Learning”. International Journal of Game Theory; V.28-#2, pp. 199-210.


Miller, Ronald and Chris Sanchirico (1999). “The Role of Absolute Continuity in ‘Merging Opinions’ and ‘Rational Learning’”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.29-#1/2, pp. 170-190.


Sorin, Sylvain (1999). “Merging, Reputation and Repeated Games with Incomplete Information”. Games and Economic Behavior, V.29-#1/2, pp. 274-308.


Nachbar, John (1997). “Prediction, Optimization, and Rational Learning in Games”. Econometrica; V.65-#2, pp. 275-309.


Nachbar, John (1998). “Rational Bayesian Learning in Repeated Games”. Washington University Center in Political Economy Working Paper, #204.


Nachbar, John (2001). “Bayesian Learning in Repeated Games of Incomplete Information”. Social Choice and Welfare; V.18-#2, pp. 303-326.


Sandroni, Alvaro (1998). “Does Rational Learning Lead to Nash Equilibrium in Finitely Repeated Games?”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.78-#1, pp. 195-218.


Nyarko, Yaw (1998). “The Truth is in the Eye of the Beholder: or Equilibrium in Beliefs and Rational Learning in Games”. CV Starr Center for Applied Economics Working Paper, # 9812.


Hurkens, Sjaak (1995). “Learning by Forgetful Players”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.11-#?, pp. 304-329.


Sanchirico, Chris William (1996). “A Probabilistic Model of Learning in Games”. Econometrica; V.64-#6, pp. 1375-1393.


Miller, Ronald and Chris Sanchirico (1997). “Almost Everybody Disagrees Almost All the Time: The Genericity of Weakly-Merging Nowhere”. ms: Department of Economics, Columbia University.


Sonsino, Doron (1997). “Learning to Learn, Pattern Recognition, and Nash Equilibrium”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.18-#?, pp. 286-331.


Jackson, Matthew, Ehud Kalai, and Rann Smorodinsky (1997). “Patterns, Types, and Bayesian Learning”. Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Sciences Discussion Paper, # 1177.


Sorin, Sylvain (1998). “On the Impact of an Event”. International Journal of Game Theory; V.27-#3, pp. 315-330.


Kaneko, Mamoru and Akihiko Matsui (1999). “Inductive Game Theory: Discrimination and Prejudices”. Journal of Public Economic Theory; V.1-#1, pp, 101-137.


Goyal, S. and M. Janssen (1996). “Can We Rationally Learn to Coordinate”. Theory and Decision; V.40-#1, pp. 29-49.


Sandroni, Alvaro (2000). “Reciprocity and Cooperation in Repeated Coordination Games: The Principled-Player Approach”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.32-#2, pp. 157-182.


Gilli, Mario (2001). “A General Approach to Rational Learning in Games”. Bulletin of Economic Research; V.53-#4, pp. 275-303.

 

E. Experimental Research on Learning in Games


Suppes, Patrick and Richard Atkinson (1960). Markov Learning Models for Multiperson Interactions. Stanford: Stanford University Press.


Camerer, Colin and Keith Weigelt (1988). “Experimental Tests of a Sequential Reputation Model”. Econometrica; V.56-#1, pp. 1-36.


Van Huyck, John, Raymond Battalio, and Richard Beil (1990). “Tacit Coordination Games, Strategic Uncertainty, and Coordination Failure”. American Economic Review; V.80-#1, pp. 234- 248.


Van Huyck, John, Raymond Battalio, and Richard Beil (1991). “Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games”. Quarterly Journal of Economics; V.106-#3, pp. 885-910.


Van Huyck, John, Raymond Battalio, and Richard Beil (1993). “Asset Markets as an Equilibrium Selection Mechanism: Coordination Failure, Game Form Auctions, and Tacit Communication”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.5-#3, pp. 485-504.


Crawford, Vincent (1991). “An ‘Evolutionary’ Interpretation of Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil’s Experimental Results on Coordination”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.3-#1, pp. 25-59.


Carlsson, Hans and Mattias Ganslandt (1998). “Noisy Equilibrium Selection in Coordination Games”. Economics Letters; V.60-#1, pp. 23-34.


Broseta, Bruno (2000). “Adaptive Learning and Equilibrium Selection in Experimenatal Coordination Games: An ARCH(1) Approach”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.32-#1, pp. 25-50.


Hey, John (1994). “Expectations Formation: Rational or Adaptive or ...?”. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization; V.25-#3, pp. 329-349.


Garvin, Susan and John Kagel (1994). “Learning in Common Value Auctions: Some Initial Observations”. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization; V.25-#3, pp. 351-372.


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