I. Endogenous Policy in Static, General Equilibrium
A. Endogenous Determination of Tax Policy
1. Optimal Taxation and Policy Reform by a Benevolent Government
-A. Sandmo (1976). “Optimal Taxation: An Introduction to the Literature”. JPubE; V.6-#?, pp. 37-54.
-W. Baumol and D. Bradford (1970). “Optimal Departures from Marginal Cost Pricing”. AER; V.60-#3, pp. 265-283.
-A. Dixit (1970). “On the Optimum Structure of Commodity Taxes”. AER; V.60-#3, pp. 295-301.
-N. Stern (1976). “On the Specification of Models of Optimal Income Taxation”. JpubE; V.6-#?, pp. 123-162.
-J. Mirlees (1976). “Optimal Tax Theory: A Synthesis”. JPubE; V.6-#?, pp. 327-358.
-J. Mirlees (1976). “The Theory of Optimal Income Taxation”. in K. Arrow and M. Intrilligator, eds. Handbook of Mathematical Economics--V.III. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 1197-1249.
-R. Sah (1983). “How Much Redistribution is Possible Through Commodity Taxes?”. JPubE; V.20-#?, pp. 89-101.
-P. Hammond (1990). “Theoretical Progress in Public Economics: A Provocative Assessment”. OEP; V.42-#?, pp. 6-33.
-A. Dixit (1975). “Welfare Effects of Tax and Price Changes”. JPubE; V.4-#?, pp. 103-123.
-T. Hatta (1977). “A Theory of Piecemeal Policy Recommendations”. REStud; V.44-#1, pp. 1-21.
-R. Guesnerie (1977). “On the Direction of Tax Reform”. JPubE; V.7-#?, pp. 179-202.
-W.E. Diewert (1978). “Optimal Tax Perturbations”. JPubE; V.10-#?, pp. 139-177.
-J. Weymark (1979). “A Reconciliation of Recent Results in Optimal Taxation Theory”. JPubE; V.12-#?, pp. 171-189.
-K. Roberts (1980). “Price-Dependent Welfare Prescriptions”. JPubE; V.13-#?, pp. 277-297.
-J. Tirole and R. Guesnerie (1981). “Tax Reform from the Gradient Projection Viewpoint”. JPubE; V.15-#3, pp. 275-293.
-J. Weymark (1981). “Undominated Directions of Tax Reform”. JPubE; V.16-#?, pp. 343-369.
-A. Turunen-Red (1990). “On the Hatta Normality Condition: Policy Reforms and Shadow Pricing”. JPubE; V.43-#?, pp. 253-262.
-R. Roberts (1992). “When Does a Decrease in a Distortion Increase Welfare”. EcLets; V.39-#?, pp. 37-42.
c. Informational Limits on Welfare Optimal Redistribution
-D.J. Roberts and A. Postelwaite (1976). “The Incentives for Price-Taking Behavior in Large Exchange Economies”. Etrica; V.44-#1, pp. 115-127.
-J. Roberts (1976). “The Incentives for Correct Revelation of Preferences and the Number of Consumers”. JPubE; V.6-#?, pp. 359-374.
-A. Postelwaite (1979). “Manipulation via Endowments”. REStud; V.46-#2, pp. 255-262.
-P. Hammond (1979). “Straightforward Individual Incentive Compatibility in Large Economies”. REStud; V.46-#2, pp. 263-282.
-P. Hammond (1987). “Markets as Constraints: Multilateral Incentive Compatibility in a Continuum Economy”. REStud; V.54-#?, pp. 399-412.
-T. Palfrey and S. Srivastava (1986). “Private Information in Large Economies”. JET; V.39-#1, pp. 34-58.
-T. Gresik and M. Satterthwaite (1989). “The Rate at Which a Simple Market Converges to Efficiency as the Number of Traders Increase: An Asymptotic Result for Optimal Trading Mechanisms”. JET; V.48-#?, pp. 304-332.
-P. Champsaur (1989). “Information, Incentives, and General Equilibrium”. in B. Cornet and H. Tulkens, eds. Contributions to Operations Research and Economics. Cambridge: MIT, pp. 23-44.
-F. Gul and A. Postelwaite (1992). “Asymptotic Efficiency in Large Exchange Economies with Asymmetric Information”. Etrica; V.60-#6, pp. 1273-1292.
-P. Champsaur and G. Laroque (1981). “Fair Allocations in Large Economies”. JET; V.25-#2, pp. 269-282.
-P. Champsaur and G. Laroque (1982). “A Note on Incentives in Large Economies”. REStud; V.49-#?, pp. 627-635.
-E. Maskin (1980). “On First-best Taxation”. in D. Collard, R. Lecomber and M. Slater, eds. Inocme Distribution: The Limits to Redistribution. New York: Wiley, pp. 9-30.
-K. Roberts (1984). “The Theoretical Limits to Redistribution”. REStud; V.51-#2, pp. 177-195.
-T. Piketty (1993). “Implementation of First-Best Allocations via Generalized Tax Schedules”. JET; V.61-#1, pp. 23-41.
-A. Mas-Colell and X. Vives (1993). “Implementation in Economies with a Continuum of Agents”. REStud; V.60-#?, pp. 613-629.
-J. Cordoba and P. Hammond (1998). “Asymptotically Strategy-Proof Walrasian Exchange”, MathSocSci; V.36-#3, pp. 185-212.
-P. Hammond (1999). “Multilateral Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Random Aumann-Hildenbrand Macroeconomies”. in M. Wooders, ed. Topics in Mathematical Economics and Game Theory. Providence: American Mathematical Society, pp.171-187.
-M.-P. Donsimoni and H. Polemarchakis (1994). “Redistribution and Welfare”. JMathE; V.23-#?, pp. 235-242.
-L. Gevers and S. Wibaut (1995). “Private Information and the Shape of the Redistribution Frontier”. in K. Basu, P. Pattanaik and K. Suzumura, eds. Choice, Welfare, and Development. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 76-99.
-K. Nehring (1998). “Incentive-Compatibility in Large Games”. MathSocSci; V.35-#1, pp. 57-67.
2. Political Determination of Tax Policy
-Y. Itsumi (1974). “Distributional Effects of Linear Income Tax Schedules”. REStud; V.41-#?, pp. 371-381.
-T. Romer (1975). “Individual Welfare, Majority Voting and the Properties of a Linear Income Tax”. JPubE; V.4-#2, pp. 163-185.
-T. Romer (1977). “Majority Voting on Tax Parameters: Some Further Results”. JPubE; V.7-#?, pp. 127-133.
-K. Roberts (1977).”Voting Over Income Tax Schedules”. JPubE; V.8-#3, pp. 329-340.
-A. Denzau and R. Mackay (1976). “Benefit Shares and Majority Voting”. AER; V.66-#1, pp. 69-76. [comment by Staaf and West, and response, AER, 1980, V.70-#3, pp. 461-473]
-J. Weymark (1984). “Majority-Rule Directions of Income Tax Reform and Second-Best Optimality”. ScanJE; V.86-#2, pp. 194-213.
-J. Gans and M. Smart (1996). “Majority Voting with Single-Crossing Preferences”. JPubE; V.59-#?, pp. 219-237.
-J. Roemer (1998). “Why the Poor Do Not Expropriate the Rich”. JPubE; V.70-#?, pp.
-S. Kanbur and G. Myles (1992). “Policy Choice and Political Constraints”. EJPE; V.8-#1, pp. 1-29.
-D. Austen-Smith (2000). “Redistributing Income under Proportional Representation”. JPE; V.108-#6, pp.
-B. Milanovich (2000). “The Median Voter Hypothesis, Income Inequality, and Income Redistribution: An Empirical Test with the Required Data”. EJPE; V.16-#2, pp.
-T. Hansen and J. Jaskold-Gabszewicz (1972). “Collusion of Factor Owners and Distribution of Social Output”. JET; V.4-#1, pp. 1-18.
-A. Dixit (1996). “Special-Interest Lobbying and Endogenous Commodity Taxation”. Eastern Economic Journal; V.22-#4, pp. 375-388.
-A. Dixit, G. Grossman, and E. Helpman (1997). “Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Tax Policy”. JPE; V.105-#4, pp. 752-69.
-R. Aumann and M. Kurz (1977). “Power and Taxes”. Etrica; V.45-#5, pp. 1137-1161.
-R. Aumann and M. Kurz (1977). “Power and Taxes in a Multi-Commodity Economy”. Israel Journal of Mathematics; V.27-#1-4, pp. 185-234.
-R. Aumann and M. Kurz (1978). “Power and Taxes in a Multicommodity Economy (updated)”. JPubE; V.9-#?, pp. 139-161.
-Y. Tauman (1981). “Values of Markets with Majority Rule”. in O. Moeschlin, and D. Pallaschke, eds. Game Theory and Mathematical Economics. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 103-122.
-A. Neyman (1985). “Semivalues of Political Economic Games”. Mathematics of Operations Research; V.10-#3, pp. 390-402.
-M. Kurz (1977). “Distortion of Preferences, Income Distribution, and the Case for a Linear Income Tax”. JET; V.14-#?, pp. 291-298.
-M. Kurz (1980). “Income Distribution and Distortion of Preferences: The l Commodity Case”. JET; V.22-#?, pp. 99-106.
-R. Gardner (1981). “Wealth and Power in a Collegial Polity”. JET; V.25-#?, pp. 353-366.
-M. Osborne (1984). “Why Do Some Goods Bear Higher Taxes Than Others?”. JET; V.32-#?, pp. 301-316.
-R. Peck (1986). “Power and Linear Income Taxes: An Example”. Etrica; V.54-#1, pp. 87-94.
-R. Aumann, M. Kurz and A. Neymann (1987). “Power and Public Goods”. JET; V.42-#?, pp. 108-127.
B. Endogenous Determination of Trade Policy
1. Benevolent Governments and the Bhagwati-Johnson Theory of Economic Policy
-H.G. Johnson (1965). “Optimal Trade Intervention in the Presence of Domestic Distortion”. R. Caves, et al. Trade, Growth and the Balance of Payments. Chicago: Rand McNally, pp. 3-34. also in Bhagwati.
-J. Bhagwati (1971). “The Generalized Theory of Distortions and Welfare”. J. Bhagwati, et al. Trade, Balance of Payments and Growth. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 69-90. also in Bhagwati.
-A. Vandendorpe (1972). “Optimal Tax Structures in a Model with Traded and Non-Traded Goods”. JIE; V.2-#?, pp. 235-256.
-A. Takayama (1972). “On the Analytical Framework of Tariffs and Trade Policy”. in G. Horwich and P. Samuelson, Trade Stability and Macroeconomics. New York: Academic Press, pp. 153-178.
-M. Ohyama (1972). “Trade and Welfare in General Equilibrium”. KES. V.9-#2, pp. 37-73.
-S. Anand and V. Joshi (1979). “Domestic Distortions, Income Distribution and the Theory of the Optimum Subsidy”. EJ; V.89-#?, pp. 336-352.
-A. Smith (1980). “Optimal Tariffs, Optimal Taxes and Shadow Prices”. in J. Black and B. Hindley, eds. Current Issues in Commercial Policy. NY: St. Martins, pp. 10-25.
-A. Dixit (1985). “Tax Policy in Open Economies”. in A. Auerbach and M. Feldstein, Handbook of Public Economics (V.I). Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 313-374.
2. Political Determination of Trade Policy: Endogenous Trade Policy
-D. Nelson (1988). “Endogenous Tariff Theory: A Critical Survey”. AJPS; V.32-#3, pp. 796-837.
-A.L. Hillman (1988). The Political Economy of Protection. Chur: Harwood Academic Publishers.
-S. Magee, W. Brock and L. Young (1989). Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
-D. Austen-Smith (1991). “Rational Consumers and Irrational Voters: A Review Essay on Magee, Brock and Young”. E&P; V.3-#1, pp. 73-92.
-W. Mitchell and M. Munger (1991). “Economic Models of Interest Groups”. AJPS; V.35-#2, pp. 512-546.
-M. Leidy (1994). “Trade Policy and Indirect Rent-Seeking: A Synthesis of Recent Work”. E&P; V.6-#2, pp. 97-118.
-D. Rodrik (1995). “What Does the Political Economy Literature on Trade Policy (Not) Tell Us That We Ought to Know?”. In G. Grossman and K. Rogoff, eds. Handbook of International Economics--V.4. Amsterdam: North Holland, pp.
-R. Findlay and S. Wellisz (1982). “Endogenous Tariffs, the Political Economy of Trade Restrictions and Welfare”. in J. Bhagwati, ed. Import Competition and Response. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp.
-W. Mayer (1984). “Endogenous Tariff Formation”. AER; V.74-#5, pp. 970-985.
-H.K. Hall and D. Nelson (1992). “Institutional Structure in the Political Economy of Protection: Legislated versus Administered Protection”. E&P; V.4-#1, pp. 61-77.
-G. Grossman and E. Helpman (1994). “Protection For Sale”. AER; V.84-#4, pp. 833-850.
C. Planning the Economy and the Theory of Market Socialism
-F. von Hayek (1935). “The Present State of the Debate”. in F. von Hayek, ed. Collectivist Economic Planning. London: George Routledge and Sons, pp. 201-243.
-O. Lange (1936/7). “On the Economic Theory of Socialism: Part One/Part Two”. REStud; V.4-#1, pp. 53-71; and V.4-#2, pp. 123-142.
-F. von Hayek (1940). “Socialist Calculation: The Competitive Solution”. Eca; V.7-#26, pp. 125-149.
-A. Lerner (1944). The Economics of Control. New York: Macmillan.
-A. Bergson (1948). “Socialist Economics”. in H. Ellis, ed. A Survey of Contemporary Economics. Philadelphia: Blakiston, pp. 193-236.
-A. Bergson (1967). “Market Socialism Revisited”. JPE; V.75-#5, pp. 655-209.
-M. Dobb (1969). Welfare Economics and the Economics of Socialism: Towards a Commonsense Critique. Cambridge: CUP.
-P. Bardhan and J. Romer (1992). “Market Socialism: A Case for Rejuvenation”. EcPerspectives; V.6-#3, pp. 101-116.
-I. Ortuño-Ortin, J. Romer and J. Silvestre (1993). “Investment Planning in Market Socialism”. in S. Bowles, B. Gustaffson and H. Gintis, eds. Democracy and Markets: Problems of Participation and Efficiency. Cambrdige: CUP.
-P. Bardhan and J. Romer, eds. (1993). Market Socialism: The Current Debate. New York: OUP.
-J. Romer (1994). A Future for Socialism. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
2. The Informational Problems with Planning
-L. Hurwicz (1973). “The Design of Resource Allocation Mechanisms”. AER; V.63-#2, pp. 1-30.
-J.-J. Laffont and E. Maskin (1982). “The Theory of Incentives: An Overview”. in W. Hildenbrand, ed. Advances in Economic Theory. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 31-94.
-R. Radner (1987). “Decentralization and Incentives”. in T. Groves, R. Radner and S. Reiter, eds. Information, Incentives, and Economic Mechanisms. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 3-47.
-T. Groves and J. Ledyard (1987). “Incentive Compatibility Since 1972". in T. Groves, R. Radner and S. Reiter, eds. Information, Incentives, and Economic Mechanisms. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 48-111.
-F. von Hayek (1945). “The Use of Knowledge in Society”. AER; V.35-#4, pp. 519-530.
-L. Hurwicz (1960). “Optimality and Efficiency in Resource Allocation Processes”. in K. Arrow, S. Karlin, and P. Suppes, eds. Mathematical Models in the Social Sciences. Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp. 27-48.
-K. Mount and S. Reiter (1974). “The Informational Size of Message Spaces”. JET; V.8-#?, pp. 161-192.
-S. Reiter (1974). “The Knowledge Revealed by an Allocation Process and the Informational Size of the Mesage Space”. JET; V.8-#?, pp. 389-396.
-M. Walker (1977). “On the Informational Size of Message Spaces”. JET; V.15-#?, pp. 366-375.
-H. Osana (1978). “On the Informational Size of Message Spaces for Resource Allocation Processes”. JET; V.17-#?, pp. 66-78.
-J. Jordan (1982). “The Competitive Allocation Process is Informationally Efficient Uniquely”. JET; V.28-#?, pp. 1-28.
-F. Sato (1981). “On the Informational Size of Message Spaces for Resource Allocation Processes in Economies with Public Goods”. JET; V.24-#?, pp. 48-69.
-P. Chen (1992). “A Lower Bound for the Dimension of the Message Space of the Decentralized Mechanisms Realizing a Given Goal”. JMathE; V.21-#?, pp. 249-270.
-D. Saari and C. Simon (1978). “Effective Price Mechanisms”. Etrica; V.47-#5, pp. 1097-1125.
-D. Saari (1986). “On the Local Convergence of Economic Mechanisms”. JET; V.40-#1, pp. 152-167.
-D. Saari and S. Williams (1987). “On the Local Convergence of Economic Mechanisms”. in J.-M. Grandmont, ed. On the Local Convergence of Economic Mechanisms. London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
-D. Saari (1984). “A Method for Constructing Message Systems For Smooth Performance Functions”. JET; V.33-#?, pp. 249-274.
-D. Saari (1985). “The Representation Problem and the Efficiency of the Price Mechanism”. JMathE; V.14-#?, pp. 135-167.
-D. Saari (1985). “Iterative Price Mechanisms”. Econometrica; V.53-#5, pp. 1117-1131.
-D. Saari (1988). “On the Types of Information and On Mechanism Design”. Journal of Computational and Applied Mathematics; V.14-#?, pp. 231-242.
-D. Saari (1990). “On the Design of Complex Organizations and Distributive Algorithms”. Complexity Theory; V.6-#?, pp. 102-118.
-D. Saari (1990). “Susceptibility to Manipulation “. Public Choice; V.64-#1, pp. 21-41.
-J. Jordan (1986). “Instability in the Implementation of Walrasian Allocations”. JET; V.39-#?, pp. 301-328.
-K. Mount and S. Reiter (1986). “On the Existence of aLocally Stable Dynamic Process with a Statically Minimal Message Space”. in T. Groves, R. Radner, and S. Reiter, eds. Information, Incentives, and Economic Mechanisms. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp.
-L. Hurwicz (1986). “Incentive Aspects of Decentralization”. in K. Arrow and M. Intriligator, eds. Hanbook of Mathematical Economics--V.III. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 1441-1482.
-L. Hurwicz (1986). “On Informational Decentralization and Efficiency in Resource Allocation Mechanisms”. in S. Reiter ed., Studies in Mathematical Economics. Washington, DC: American Mathematical Association, pp. 238-350.
-J. Jordan (1995). “Information Flows Intrinsic to the Stability of Economic Equilibrium”. in J. Ledyard, ed.. The Economics of Informational Decentralization: Complexity, Efficiency,and Stability. Boston : Kluwer Academic, pp. 1-33.
-K. Mount (1995). “Mechanisms for the Realization of Equilibria”. in J. Ledyard, ed.. The Economics of Informational Decentralization: Complexity, Efficiency,and Stability. Boston : Kluwer Academic, pp. 35-52.
-H. Sonnenschein (1995). “An Axiomatic Characterization of the Price Mechanism”. in J. Ledyard, ed.. The Economics of Informational Decentralization: Complexity, Efficiency,and Stability. Boston : Kluwer Academic, pp. 119-130.
-D. Saari (1995). “Sufficient Statistics, Utility Theory, and Mechanism Design”. in J. Ledyard, ed.. The Economics of Informational Decentralization: Complexity, Efficiency,and Stability. Boston : Kluwer Academic, pp. 219-242.
-J. Stiglitz (1994). Whither Socialism? Cambridge: MIT.
-I. Ortuño-Ortin and J. Romer (1993). “Politically Realistic Implementation with Inspection: The Equity-Honesty-Welfare Tradeoff”. E&P; V.5-#3, pp. 255-270.
3. The Political Problems with Planning
-K. Shepsle and B. Weingast (1984). “Political Solutions to Market Problems”. APSR; V.78-#?, pp. 417-434.
-C. Wolf, jr. (1987). Markets or Governments. Cambridge: MIT.
-D. Wittman (1989). “Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results”. JPE; V.97-#6, pp. 1395-1424.
-D. Usher (1994). “The Significance of the Probabilistic Voting Theorem”. CJE; V.27-#2, pp. 433-445.
-A. Shleifer and R. Vishny (1994). “The Politics of Market Socialism”. EcPerspectives; V.8-#2, pp. 165-176.
II. Endogenous Policy in Intertemporal, General Equilibrium
A. Intergenerational Politics and the Political Economy of Social Security
-E. Browning (1975). “Why the Social Insurance Budget is Too Large in a Democracy”. EcInq; V.13-#?, pp. 373-387. [comment by Bridges and response, 1978, V.16-#1, pp. 133-142]
-P. Townley (1981). “Public Choice and the Social Insurance Paradox: A Note”. CJE; V.14-#4, pp. 712-717
-S.C. Hu (1978). “On the Dynamic Behaviour of the Consumer and the Optimal Provision of Social Security”. REStud; V.45-#?, pp. 437-445.
-S.C. Hu (1982). “Social Security, Majority-Voting Equilibrium and Dynamic Efficiency”. IER; V.23-#2, pp. 269-287.
-K. Sjoblom (1985). “Voting for Social Security”. PC; V.45-#?, pp. 225-240.
-H. Verbon (1986). “Altruism, Political Power and Public Pensions”. KYKLOS; V.39-#3, pp. 343-358.
-H. Verbon and F. van Winden (1985). “Public Pensions and Political Decision-making”. De Economist; V.133-#?, pp. 527-544.
-H. Verbon (1987). “The Rise and Evolution of Public Pension Systems”. PC; V.52-#?, pp. 75-100.
-R. Wright (1986). “The Redistributive Role of Unemployment Insurance and the Dynamics of Voting”. JPubE; V.31-#?, pp. 377-399.
-M. Loewy (1988). “Equilibrium Policy in an Overlapping Generations Economy”. JMonE; V.22-#3, pp. 485-499.
-R. Boadway and D. Wildasin (1989). “A Median Voter Model o f Social Security”. IER; V.30-#2, pp. 307-328.
-R. Boadway and D. Wildasin (1989). “Voting Models of Social Security Determination”. in B. Gustafsson and N.A. Klevmarken, eds. The Political Economy of Social Security. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
-G. Tabellini (1990). “A Positive Theory of Social Security”. NBER Working Paper, # 3272.
-G. Tabellini (1991). “The Politics of Intergenerational Redistribution”. JPE; V.99-#2, pp. 335-357.
-H. Verbon and M.J.M. Verhoven (1992). “Decision Making on Pension Schemes under Rational Expectations”. ZfN; V.56-#?, pp. 71-97.
-L. Kotlikoff and R. Rosenthal (1993). “Some Inefficiency Implications of Generational Politics and Exchange”. E&P; V.5-#1, pp. 27-42.
-F. Breyer (1994). “The Political Economy of Intergenerational Redistribution”. EJPE; V.10-#1, pp.
-F. Breyer (1994). “Voting on Social Security when Labor Supply is Endogenous”. E&P; V.6-#2, pp. 119-130.
-X. Sala-i-Martin (1996). “A Positive Theory of Social Security”. Journal of Economic Growth; V.1-#2, pp. 277-304.
-G. Grossman and E. Helpman (1998). “Intergenerational Redistribution with Short-Lived Governments”. Economic Journal; V.108-#450, pp. 1299-1329.
-G. Casamatta, H. Cremer, and P. Helmuth (2000). “Political Sustainability and the Design of Social Insurance”. Journal of Public Economics; V.75-#3, pp. 341-364.
-G. Casamatta, H. Cremer, and P. Helmuth (2000). “The Political Economy of Social Security”. Scandinavian Journal of Economics; V.102-#3, pp. 503-522.
-G. Casamatta, H. Cremer, and P. Helmuth (2001). “Demographic Shock and Social Security: A Political Economy Perspective”. International Tax and Public Finance; V.8-#4, pp. 417-431.
B. Political Economy of Growth and Income Distribution
1. Surveys/Overviews
-R. Perotti (1992). “Income Distribution, Politics and Growth”. AER; V.82-#2, pp. 311-316.
-T. Verdier (1994). “Models of Political Economy of Growth: A Short Survey”. EER; V.38-#?, pp. 757-763.
-A. Alesina and R. Perotti (1994). “The Political Economy of Growth: A Critical Survey of Recent Literature”. World Bank Economic Review; V.8-#?, pp. 351-371.
2. Income Distribution and Growth
(1) Incomplete Financial Markets
-G. Loury (1981). “Intergenerational Transfers and the Distribution of Earnings”. Etrica; V.49-#?, pp. 843-867.
-J. Sheinkman and L. Weiss (1986). “Borrowing Constraints and Aggregate Economic Activity”. Etrica; V.54-#1, pp. 23-45.
-G. Becker and N. Tomes (1986). “Human Capital and the Rise and Fall of Families”. Journal of Labor Economics; V.4-#3, pp. S1-S39.
-J. Davies and P. Kuhn (1991). “A Dynamic Model of Redistribution, Inheritance and Inequality”. CJE; V.24-#?, pp. 324-344.
-K. Murphy, A. Shleifer and R. Vishny (1989). “Income Distribution, Market Size, and Industrialization”. QJE; V.104-#3, pp. 537-564.
-J. Greenwood and B. Jovoanovic (1990). “Financial Development, Growth and the Distribution of Income”. JPE; V.98-#5, pp. 1076-1107.
-P. Aghion and P. Bolton (1992). “Distribution and Growth in Models of Imperfect Capital Markets”. EER; V.36-#2/3, pp. 603-611.
-G. Saint-Paul (1992). “Fiscal Policy in an Endogenous Growth Model”. QJE; V.107-#?, pp. 1243-1259.
-D. Tsiddon (1992). “A Moral Hazard Trap to Growth”. IER; V.33-#?, pp. 299-321.
-O. Galor and J. Zeira (1993). “Income Distribution and Macroeconomics”. REStud; V.60-#1, pp. 35-52.
-G. Bertola (1993). “Factor Shares and Savings in Endogenous Growth”. AER; V.83-#5, pp. 1184-1198.
-G. Bertola (1996). “Factor Shares in OLG Models of Growth”. EER; V.40-#6, pp. 1541-1560.
-A. Banerjee and A. Newman (1991). “Risk Bearing and the Theory of Income Distribution”. REStud;V.58-#?, pp. 211-235.
-A. Banerjee and A. Newman (1993). “Occupational Choice and the Process of Development”. JPE; V.101-#2, pp. 274-298.
-J. Agell and K.E. Lommerud (1993). “Egalitarianism and Growth”. In T. Andersen and K.O. Moene, eds. Endogenous Growth. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 169-189.
-R. Torvik (1993). “Talent, Growth and Income Distribution”. In T. Andersen and K.O. Moene, eds. Endogenous Growth. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 191-206.
-T. van den Klundert and L. Meijdam (1993). “Endogenous Growth and Income Distribution”. ZfN; V.58-#1, pp. 53-75.
-S. Chatterjee (1994). “Transitional Dynamics and the Distribution of Wealth in a Neoclassical Growth Model”. JPubE; V.54-#1, pp. 97-119.
-R. Perotti (1994). “Income Distribution and Investment”. EER; V.38-#?, pp. 837-835.
-A. Alesina and R. Perotti (1995). “Taxation and Redistribution in an Open Economy”. EER; V.39-#?, pp. 961-979.
-V. Barham, R. Boadway, M. Marchand and P. Pestieau (1995). “Education and the Poverty Trap”. EER; V.39-#7, pp. 1257-1275.
-H. Uhlig and N. Yanagawa (1996). “Increasing the Capital Income Tax May Lead to Faster Growth”. EER; V.40-#6, pp. 1521-1540.
-C.F. Chou and G. Talmain (1996). “Redistribution and Growth: Pareto Improvements”. Journal of Economic Growth; V.1-#4, pp. 505-523.
-P. Aghion and P. Bolton (1997). “A Theory of Trickle-Down Growth and Development”. REStud; V.64-#2, pp.151-172.
-T. Piketty (1997). “The Dynamics of the Wealth Distribution and the Interest Rate with Credit Rationing”. REStud; V.64-#2, pp. 173-189.
-O. Galor and H. Zang (1997). “Fertility, Income Distribution, and Economic Growth: Theory and Cross-Country Evidence”. Japan and the World Economy; V.9-#2, pp. 197-229.
-W.H. Chiu (1998). “Income Inequality, Human Capital Accumulation and Economic Performance”. EJ; V.108-#446, pp. 44-59.
-S. Murray, W. Evans, and R. Schwab (1998). “Education-Finance Reform and the Distribution of Education Resources”. AER; V.88-#4, pp. 789-812.
-R. Fernández and R. Rogerson (1998). “Public Education and Income Distribution: A Dynamic Quantitative Evaluation of Education-Finance Reform”. AER; V.88-#4, pp. 813-833.
-K. Matsuyama (2000). “Endogenous Inequality”. REStud; V.67-#4, pp. 743-759.
(a) Theory
-C. deBartolome (1990). “Equilibrium Inefficiency in a Community Model with Peer Group Effects”. JPE; V.98-#1, pp. 110-133.
-H. Cole, G. Mailath and A. Postelwaite (1992). “Social Norms, Savings Behavior, and Growth”. JPE; V.100-#?, pp. 1092-1125.
-R. Bénabou (1994). “Human Capital, Inequality, and Growth: A Local Perspective”. EER; V.38-#?, pp. 817-826.
-R. Bénabou (1996). “Heterogeneity, Stratification and Growth: Macroeconomic Implications of Community Structure and School Finance”. AER; V.86-#3, pp. 584-609.
-R. Bénabou (1996). “Equity and Efficiency in Human Capital Investment: The Local Connection”. REStud; V.63-#2, pp. 237-264.
-R. Bénabou (1996). “Inequality and Growth”. in B. Bernanke and J. Rotemberg, eds., NBER Macroeconomics Annual. V.11, pp. 11-74.
-S. Durlauf (1996). “A Theory of Persistent Income Inequality”. Journal of Economic Growth; V.1-#1, pp. 75-93.
-S. Durlauf (1996). “Neighborhood Feedbacks, Endogenous Stratification, and Income Inequality”. in W. Barnett, G. Gandolfo, and C. Hillinger, eds. Dynamic Disequilibrium Modeling. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 505-534.
-R. Fernandez and R. Rogerson (1997). “Keeping People Out: Income Distribution, Zoning, and the Quality of Public Education”. IER; V.38-#1, pp. 23-42.
-R. Fernandez and R. Rogerson (2001). “Sorting and Long-Run Inequality”. QJE; V.116-#4, pp. 1305-1341.
-G. Akerlof (1997). “Social Distance and Social Decisions”. Etrica; V.65-#5, pp. 1005-1027.
-O. Galor and D. Tsiddon (1997). “Technological Progress, Mobility and Economic Growth”. AER; V.87-#3, pp. 363-382.
-O. Galor and O. Moav (2000). “Ability-Biased Technological Transition, Wage Inequality, and Economic Growth”. QJE; V.115-#2, pp. 469-497.
-J. Hassler and J.V. Rodríguez Mora (2000). “Intelligence, Social Mobility, and Growth”. AER; V.90-#4, pp. 888-908.
(b) Empirical
-C. Jencks and S. Meyer (1990). “The Social Consequences of Growing Up in a Poor Neighborhood: A Review”. in L. Lynn and M. McGeary, eds. Inner City Poverty in the United States. Washington, DC: National Academy Press, pp. 111-186.
-N. Denton and D. Massey (1989). “Hypersegregation in the United States Metropolitan Areas–Black and Hispanic Segregation Along Five Dimensions”. Demography; V.26-#3, pp. 373-391.
-D. Massey and N. Denton (1993). American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
-M. Hughes and J. Madden (1991). “Residential Segregation and the Economic Status of Black Workers: New Evidence for an Old Debate”. Journal of Labor Economics; V.29-#1, pp. 28-49.
-M. Corcoran, R. Gordon, D. Laren, and G. Solon (1992). “The Association between Men’s Economic Status and Their Family and Community of Origin”. Journal of Human Resources; V.27-#4, pp. 575-601.
-J. Rauch (1993). “Productivity Gains from Geographic Concentration of Human Capital: Evidence from the Cities”. Journal of Urban Economics; V.34-#3, pp. 380-400.
-G. Borjas (1995). “Ethnicity, Neighborhoods, and Human Capital Externalities”. AER; V.85-#3, pp. 365-390.
-M. Kremer (1997). “How Much does Sorting Increase Inequality”. QJE; V.?-#1, pp. 115-139.
-D. Quah (1997). “Empirics for Growth and Distribution: Stratification, Polarization, and Convergence Clubs”. Journal of Economic Growth; V.2-#1, pp. 27-59
-R. Fernandez and R. Rogerson (1998). “Public Education and the Dynamics of Income Distribution: A Quantitative Evaluation of Education Finance Reform”. AER; V.88-#4, pp. 813-833.
-C. Tilly (1998). Durable Inequality. Berkeley: University of California Press.
b. Mostly Empirical: Is There a Kuznets Curve?
-P. Lindert and J. Williamson (1985). “Growth, Equality, and History”. Explorations in Economic History; V.22-#4, pp. 341-377.
-I. Adelman and S. Robinson (1988). “Income Distribution and Development”. in H. Chenery and T.N. Srinivasan, eds. Handbook of Development Economics. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 949-1003.
-S. Kuznets (1955). “Economic Growth and Income Inequality”. AER; V.45-#1, pp. 1-28.
-F. Paukert (1973). “Income Distribution at Different Levels of Development”. International Labour Review; V.108-#2/3, pp. 97-125.
-H. Chenery, M. Ahluwalia, C. Bell, J. Duloy, and R. Jolly (1974). Redistribution with Growth. New York: Oxford University Press.
-S. Robinson (1976). “A Note on the U Hypothesis Relating Income Inequality to Economic Development”. AER; V.66-3, pp. 437-460.
-M. Ahluwalia (1976). “Inequality, Poverty and Development”. JDevE; V.3-#4, pp. 307-342.
-M. Ahluwalia (1976). “Income Distribution and Development: Some Stylized Facts”. AER; V.66-#2, pp. 128-135.
-M. Ahluwalia, N. Carter, and H. Chenery (1979). “Growth and Poverty in Developing Countries”. JDevE; V.6-#3, pp. 299-341.
-N. Hicks (1979). “Growth vs. Basic Needs: Is there a Trade-Off?”. World Development; V.7-#?, pp. 985-994.
-A. Saith (1983). “Development and Distribution: A Critique of the Cross-Country U-Hypothesis”. JDevE; V.23-#1, pp. 367-382.
-J. Nugent (1983). “An Alternative Source of Measurement Error as an Explanation for the Inverted U Hypothesis”. EDCC; V.31-#2, pp.
-G. Papanek and O. Kyn (1986). “the Effect on Income Distribution of Development, the Growth Rate and Economic Strategy”. JDevE; V.23-#1, pp. 55-65.
-F. Campano and D. Salvatore (1988). “Economic Development, Income Distribution and the Kuznets Hypothesis”. Journal of Policy Modelling; V.10-#2, pp. 265-280.
-R. Ram (1988). “Economic Development and Income Inequality: Further Evidence on the U-curve Hypothesis”. World Development; V.16-#?, pp. 1371-1375.
-F. Bourguignon and C. Morrisson (1990). “Income Distribution, Development and Foreign Trade: A Cross-Sectional Analysis”. EER; V.34-#6, pp. 1113-1132.
-S. Anand and R. Kanbur (1993). “The Kuznets Process and the Inequality-Development Relationship”. JDevE; V.40-#1, pp. 25-52.
-S. Anand and R. Kanbur (1993). “Inequality and Development: A Critique”. JDevE; V.41-#1, pp. 19-43.
-R. Ram (1995). “Economic Development and Income Inequality: An Overlooked Regression Constraint”. Economic Development and Cultural Change; V.43-#2, pp. 425-34.
-N. Birdsall, D. Ross, and R. Sabot (1995). “Inequality and Growth Reconsidered: Lessons from East Asia”. WBER; V.9-#3, pp. 477-508.
-G. Clarke (1995). “More Evidence on Income Distribution and Growth”. JDevE; V.47-#2, pp. 403-427.
-A. Fishlow (1996). “Inequality, Poverty and Growth: Where Do We Stand?”. Annual World Bank Conference on Economic Development--1995. pp. 25-39.
-P. VanHoudt (1997). “Do Labor market Policies and Growth Fundamentals Matter for Income Inequality in OECD Countries”. IMFSP; V.44-#3, pp. 356-373.
-B. Chiswick (1971). “Earnings Inequality and Economic Development”. QJE; V.85-#1, pp. 21-39.
-J. Mincer (1996). “Economic Development, Growth of Human Capital, and the Dynamics of the Wage Structure”. Journal of Economic Growth; V.1-#3, pp. 29-48.
-R. Bénabou (1996). “Inequality and Growth”. NBER Macroeconomics Annual. Cambridge: MIT, pp. 11-74.
-H. Li, L. Squire, and H.F. Zhou (1998). “Explaining International and Intertemporal Variations in Income Inequality”. EJ; V.108-#446, pp. 26-43.
-K. Deininger and L. Squire (1998). “New Ways of Looking At Old Issues: Inequality and Growth”. JDevE; V.57-#2, pp. 259-287.
-K. Forbes (2000). “A Reassessment of the Relationship between Inequality and Growth”. AER; V.90-#4, pp. 869-887.
3. Income Distribution and Growth with Endogenous Policy
-R. Perotti (1992). “Income Distribution, Politics, and Growth”. AER; V.82-#2, pp. 311-315.
-T. Verdier (1994). “Models of Political Economy of Growth: A Short Survey”. EER; V.38-#?, pp. 757-763.
(1) Models of Taxation, Redistribution, and Investment
-N. Beck (1978). “Social Choice and Economic Growth”. Public Choice; V.33-#2, pp. 33-48.
-R. Boylan and R. McKelvey (1995). “Voting over Economic Plans”. AER; V.85-#4, pp. 860-871.
-R. Boylan (1996). “Voting over Investment”. JMathE; V.26-#2, pp. 187-208.
-R. Boylan, J. Ledyard and R. McKelvey (1996). “Political Competition in a Model of Economic Growth”. Economic Theory; V.7-#?, pp. 191-205.
-A. Alesina and D. Rodrik (1992). “Distribution, Political Conflict, and Economic Growth: A Simple Theory and Some Empirical Evidence”. in A. Cukierman, Z. Hercowitz and L. Leiderman, eds. Political Economy, Growth and Business Cycles. Cambridge: MIT, pp. 23-50.
-A. Alesina and D. Rodrik (1994.). “Distributive Politics and Economic Growth”. QJE; V.109-#2, pp. 465-490.
-G. Bertola (1993). “Market Structure and Income Distribution in Endogenous Growth Models”. AER; V.83-##5, pp. 1184-1199.
-T. Persson and G. Tabellini (1992). “Growth, Distribution and Politics”. in A. Cukierman, Z. Hercowitz and L. Leiderman, eds. Political Economy, Growth and Business Cycles. Cambridge: MIT, pp. 3-22.
-T. Persson and G. Tabellini (1994). “Is Inequality Harmful for Growth”. AER; V.84-#3, pp. 600-621.
-S. Knack and P. Keefer (1997). “Does Inequality Harm Growth Only in Democracies? A Replication and Extension”. AJPS; V.41-#1, pp.323-332.
-G. Glomm and B. Ravikumar (1994). “Growh-Inequality Trade-offs in a Model with Public Sector R&D”. CJE; V.27-#2, pp. 484-493.
-G. Saint-Paul and T. Verdier (1996). “Inequality, Redistribution and Growth: A Challenge to the Conventional Political Economy Approach”. EER; V.40-#3-5, pp. 719-728.
-G. Saint-Paul and T. Verdier (1997). “Power, Distributive Conflicts, and Multiple Growth Paths”. Journal of Economic Growth; V.2-#2, pp. 155-168
-P. Krusell and J.-V. Ríos-Rull (1996). “Vested Interests in a Positive Theory of Stagnation and Growth”. REStud; V.63-#2, pp. 201-329.
-P. Krusell, V. Quadrini and J.-V. Rios-Rull (1997). “Politico-Economic Equilibrium and Economic Growth”. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control; V.21-#1, pp. 243-272.
-P. Krusell and J.-V. Ríos-Rull (1999). “On the Size of U.S. Government: Political Economy in the Neoclassical Growth Model”. AER; V.89-#5, pp. 1156-1181.
-F. Rodríguez C. (1999). “Does Distributional Skewness Lead to Redistribution? Evidence from the United States”. Economics and Politics; V.11-#2, pp. 171-199.
-William Bassett, John Burkett, and Louis Putterman (1999). “Income distribution, government transfers, and the problem of unequal influence”. European Journal of Political Economy; V.15-#2, pp. 207-228.
(2) Models with Constrained Accumulation of Human Capital
-G. Saint-Paul and T. Verdier (1992). “Historical Accidents and the Persistence of Distributional Conflicts”. Journal of Japanese and International Economics; V.6-#?, pp. 406-422.
-G. Saint-Paul and T. Verdier (1993). “Education, Democracy and Growth”. JDevE; V.42-#2, pp. 399-407.
-G. Glomm and B. Ravikumar (1992). “Public versus Private Investment in Human Capital: Endogenous Growth and Income Inequality”. JPE; V.100-#4, pp. 818-834.
-H.P. Grüner (1995). “Redistributive Policy, Inequality and Growth”. ZfN; V.62-#1, pp. 1-23.
-R. Perotti (1993). “Political Equilibrium, Income Distribution and Growth”. REStud; V.60-#4, pp. 755-776.
-R. Perotti (1996). “Growth, Income Distribution, and Democracy: What the Data Say”. Journal of Economic Growth; V.1-#2, pp. 149-187.
-A. Ades (1995). “Economic Development with Endogenous Political Participation”. E&P; V.7-#2, pp. 93-117.
-R. Bénabou (2000). “Unequal Societies: Income Distribution and the Social Contract; AER; V.90-#1, pp. 96-129.
b. Models of Distributional Struggle
-A. Alesina and G. Tabellini (1989). “External Debt, Capital Flight and Political Risk”. JIE; V.27-#3/4, pp. 465-490.
-A. Velasco and A. Tornell (1991). “Wages, Profits and Capital Flight”. E&P; V.3-#3, pp. 219-237.
-A. Tornell and A. Velasco (1992). “The Tragedy of the Commons and Economic Growth: Why Does Capital Flow from Poor to Rich Countries?”. JPE; V.100-#6, pp. 1208-1231.
-J. Benhabib and R. Radner (1992). “The Joint Exploitation of a Productive Asset: A Game Theoretic Approach”. ET; V.2-#2, pp. 155-190.
-S. Özler and D. Rodrik (1992). “External Shocks, Politics and Private Investment: Some Theory and Empirical Evidence”. JDevE; V.39-#?, pp. 141-162.
-K.A. Mork (1993). “Living with Lobbying: A Growth Policy Coopted by Lobbyists Can Be Better than No Growth Policy at All”. In T. Andersen and K.O. Moene, eds. Endogenous Growth. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 206-215.
-A. Ades (1995). “Economic Development with Endogenous Political Participation”. E&P; V.7-#2, pp. 93-117.
-J. Benhabib and A. Rustichini (1996). “Social Conflict, Growth and Income Distribution”. Journal of Economic Growth; V.1-#1, pp. 125-142.
-P. Lane and A. Tornell (1996). “Power, Growth and the Voracity Effect”. Journal of Economic Growth; V.1-#2, pp. 213-241.
-A. Tornell (1997). “Economic Growth and Decline with Endogenous Property Rights”. Journal of Economic Growth; V.2-#3, pp. 219-250.
-A. Tornell and P. Lane (1999). “The Voracity Effect”. AER; V.89-#1, pp. 22-46.
-R. Chang (1998). “Political party Negotiations, Income Distribution and Endogenous Growth”. JME; V.41-#2, pp. 227-255.
-L. Kristov, P. Lindert and R. McClelland (1992). “Pressure Groups and Redistribution”. JPubE; V.48-#2, pp. 135-163.
-S. Rose-Ackerman (1975). “The Economics of Corruption”. JpubE; V.4-#?, pp. 187-203.
-W. Brock and S. Magee (1984). “The Invisible Foot and the Waste of Nations”. in D. Colander, ed. Neoclassical Political Economy. Cambridge: Ballinger, pp. 177-185. [also in Magee, Brock, and Young Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory. Cambridge: CUP, Cptr.8]
-W. Baumol (1990). “Entrepreneurship: Productive, Unproductive, and Destructive”. JPE; V.98-#?, pp. 893-921.
-K. Murphy, A. Shleifer and R. Vishny (1991). “The Allocation of Talent: Implications for Growth”. QJE; V.106-#2, pp. 503-530.
-P. Pecorino (1992). “Rent Seeking and Growth: The Case of Growth through Human Capital Accumulation”. CJE; V.25-#4, pp. 944-956.
-M. Rama (1993). “Rent Seeking and Economic Growth: A Theoretical Model and Some Empirical Evidence”. JDevE; V.42-#1, pp. 35-50.
-F. Sturzenegger and M. Tommasi (1994). “The Distribution of Political Power, the Cost of Rent-Seeking and Economic Growth”. EcInq; V.32-#2, pp. 236-248.
-K. Murphy, A. Shleifer and R. Vishny (1993). “Why is Rent-seeking So Costly to Growth”. AER; V.83-#2, pp. 409-414.
-A. Shleifer and R. Vishny (1993). “Corruption”. QJE; V.109-#?, pp. 599-617.
-P. Maurro (1995). “Corruption and Growth”. QJE; V.110-#3, pp. 681-712.
-D. Acemoglu and T. Verdier (1998). “Property Rights, Corruption and the Allocation of Talent: A General Equilibrium Approach”. EJ; V.108-#450, pp. 1381-1403.
-D. Acemoglu (1998). “Reward Structures and the Allocation of Talent”. EER; V.?-#1, pp. 17-33.
-I. Ehrlich (1999). “Bureaucratic Corruption and Endogenous Economic Growth”. JPE; V.107-#6, pp. s270-s292.
-J.B. de Long and A. Schleifer (1993). “Princes and Merchants: European City Growth Before the Industrial Revolution”. JLawEc; V.36-#?, pp. 671-702.
4. Income Distribution, Political Instability, and Growth
-B. Russett (1964). “Inequality and Instability: the Relation of Land Tenure to Politics”. WP V.16-#?, pp. 442-454.
-D. Hibbs (1973). Mass Political Violence. New York: Wiley.
-J. Nagel (1974). “Inequality and Discontent: A Nonlinear Hypothesis”. WP; V.26-#?, pp. 453-472. [“Erratum”, (1976), V.28: 315].
-L. Sigelman and M. Simpson (1977). “A Cross-National Test of the Linkage between Economic Inequality and Political Violence”. Journal of Conflic Resolution; V.21-#?, pp. 105-128.
-M. Hardy (1979). “Economic Growth, Distributional Inequality, and Political Conflict in Industrial Societies”. Journal of Political and Military Sociology; V.5-#?, pp. 209-227.
-E. Weede (1981). “Income Inequality, Average Income, and Domestic Violence”. Journal of Conflict Resolution; V.25-#?, pp. 639-653.
-Y. Veneris and D. Gupta (1983). “Socio-Political Instability and Economic Dimesnions of Development: A Cross-sectional Model”. EDCC; V.31-#?, pp. 727-756.
-Y. Veneris and D. Gupta (1986). “Income Distribution and Socio-Political Instability as Determinants of Savings: A Cross-Sectional Model”. JPE; V.96-#?, pp. 873-883.
-E. Muller (1985). “Income Inequality, Regime Repressiveness, and Political Violence”. American Sociological Review; V.50-#1, pp. 47-61.
-E. Muller (1988). “Democracy, Economic Development and Income Inequality”. American Sociological Review; V.53-#1, pp. 50-68. [comment by Weede and response, 1989, V.54-#5, pp. 865-871. Comment by Bollen and Jackman, 1995, V.60-#6, pp. 983-996]
-A. Alesina and R. Perotti (1996). “Income Distribution, Political Instability, and Investment”. EER; V.40-#?, pp. 1203-1228.
-A. Alesina, S. Özler, N. Roubini, and P. Swagel (1996). “Political Instability and Economic Growth”. Journal of Economic Growth; V.1-#2, pp. 189-211.
-N. Campos and J. Nugent (2002). “Who Is Afraid of Political Instability?”. Journal Of Development Economics; V.67-#1, pp. 157-172.
-H. Bienen and N. van de Walle (1991). Of Time and Power: Leadership Duration in the Modern World. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
-J. Londregan and K. Poole (1990). “Poverty, the Coup Trap, and the Seizure of Economic Power”. WP; V.42-#?, pp. 151-183.
-J. Londregan and K. Poole (1992). “The Seizure of Executive Power and Economic Growth: Some Additional Evidence”. A. Cukierman, Z. Hercowitz, and L. Leiderman, eds. Political Economy., Growth, and Business Cycles. Cambridge: MIT Press, in pp. 50-79.
III. Endogenous Macroeconomic Policy for a Closed Economy
A. Politics of Macropolicy: Institutions and History
-A. Okun (1969). The Political Economy of Prosperity. New York: Norton.
-H. Stein (1968/1990). The Fiscal Revolution in America. Washington, DC: AEI.
-H. Stein (1984). Presidential Economics: The Making of Economic Policy from Roosevelt to Reagan, and Beyond. New York: Simon and Schuster.
-N. Spulber (1989). Managing the American Economy from Roosevelt to Reagan. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
-M. Reagan (1966). “The Political Structure of the Federal Reserve System”. APSR; V.55-#1, pp. 64-76.
-N. Beck (1982). “Presidential Influence on the Federal Reserve in the 1970s”. AJPS; V.26-#3, pp.
-E. Kane (1982). “External Pressure and the Operations of the Fed”. in R. Lombra and W. Witte, eds. Political Economy of International Domestic and Monetary Relations. Ames: Iowa State University Press, pp. 211-232.
-J. Woolley (1982). “Monetarists and the Politics of Monetary Policy”. Annals AAPSS, #459 (Government and Economic Performance), pp. 148-160.
-J. Woolley (1985). “Central Banks and Inflation”. in L. Lindberg and C. Maier, eds. The Politics of Inflation and Economic Stagnation. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 318-348.
-J. Woolley (1984). Monetary Politics: The Federal Reserve and the Politics of Monetary Policy. Cambridge: CUP.
-K. Grier (1987). “Presidential Elections and Federal Reserve Policy: An Empirical Test”. SEJ; V.?-#?, pp. 475-486.
-N. Beck (1987). “Elections and the Fed: Is Therre a Political Monetary Cycle?”. AJPS; V.31-#?, pp. 194-216.
-K.Grier (1989). “On the Existence of a Political Monetary Cycle”. AJPS; V.33-#?, pp. 376-389.
-W. Grieder (1987). Secrets of the Temple: How the Federal Reserve Runs the Country. New York: Simon and Schuster.
-R. Timberlake (1993). Monetary Policy in the US: An Intellectual and Institutional History. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
-C. Webber and A. Wildavsky (1986). A History of Taxation and Expenditure in the Western World. New York: Simon and Schuster.
-B.G. Peters (1991). The Politics of Taxation: A Comparative Perspective. Oxford: Blackwell.
-S. Ratner (1942). American Taxation: Its History as a Social Force in Democracy. New York: Norton.
-P. Peterson (1985). “The New Politics of Budgets”. in J. Chubb and P. Peterson, eds. The New Direction in American Politics. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 365-397
-J. Witte (1985). The Politics and Development of the Federal Income Tax. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
-J. Birnbaum and A. Murray (1987). Showdown at Gucci Gulch: Lawmakers, Lobbyists, and the Unlikely Triumph of Tax Reform. New York: Vintage.
-P. Peterson and M. Rom (1988). “Macroeconomic Policymaking: Who is In Control?”. in J. Chubb and P. Peterson, eds. Can Government Govern? Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 139-182.
-M. McCubbins (1991). “Party Politics, Divided Government, and Budget Deficits”. in S. Kernell, ed. Parallel Politics: Economic Policymaking in Japan and the US. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 83-118.
-A. Wildavsky (1988). The New Politics of the Budgetary Process. Glenview: Scott, Foresman.
-J. Savage (1988). Balanced Budgets and American Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
-C. Martin (1991). Shifting the Burden: The Struggle over Growth and Corporate Taxation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
-T. Persson, G. Roland, and G. Tabellini (2000). “Comparative Politics and Public Finance”. JPE; V.108-#6, pp. 1121-1161.
B. Time-Consistency and Sustainability of Macroeconomic Policy
1.Overviews
-K. Blackburn and M. Christensen (1989). “Monetary Policy and Policy Credibility”. JEL; V.27-#1, pp. 1-45.
-R. Flood and P. Isard (1989). “Monetary Policy Strategies”. IMFSP; V.36-#?, pp. 612-632. [comment by Lohmann, 1990, V.37: 440-445]
-T. Persson and G. Tabellini (1990). Macroeconomic Policy, Credibility and Politics. Chur: Harwood.
-A. Cukierman (1992). Central Bank Strategy, Credibility and Independence. Cambridge: MIT.
2. Time Inconsistency and the Case for Fixed Policy Rules under Full Information
-F. Kydland and E. Prescott (1977). “Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans”. JPE; V.85-#3, pp. 473-491.
-E. Prescott (1977). “Should Control Theory Be Used for Economic Stabilization?”. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy; V.7, pp. 13-38.
-G. Calvo (1978). “On the Time Consistency of Optimal Policy in a Monetary Economy”. Etrica; V.46-#6, pp. 1411-1428.
-F. Kydland and E. Prescott (1980). “Dynamic Optimal Taxation, Rational Expectations, and Control Theory”. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control; V.2-#1, pp. 79-92.
-S. Fischer (1980). “Dynamic Inconsistency, Cooperation, and the Benevolent Dissembling Government”. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control; V.2-#1, pp. 93-107.
-S. Turnovsky and W. Brock (1980). “Time Consistency and Optimal Government Policies in Perfect Foresight Equilibrium”. JpubE; V.13-#?, pp. 183-212.
-W. Buiter (1981). “The Superiority of Contingent Rules over Fixed Rules in Models with Rational Expectations”. EJ; V.91-#?, pp. 647-670. [comment by Borio, EJ; V.96: 1000-1010]
-B. Hillier and J. Malcomson (1984). “Dynamic Inconsistency, Rational Expectations and Optimal Government Policy”. Etrica; V.52-#?, pp. 14371451.
-A. Blinder (1987). “The Rules-versus-Discretion Debate in the Light of Recent Experience”. WA; V.123-#?, pp. 399-413.
-B. McCallum (1987). “The Case for Rules in the Conduct of Monetary Policy: A Concrete Example”. WA; V.123-#?, pp. 415-428. [Comment by Loef and response, WA; 1989, V.125-#?, pp. 169-182]
-J. Farrell (1987). “Rigidity vs. License”. AER; V.77-#1, pp.195-197.
-D. Cohen and P. Michel (1988). “How Should Control Theory be Used to Calculate a Time Consistent Government Policy?”. REStud; V.55-#?, pp. 263-274.
3. Commitment, Commitment Mechanisms and Optimal Sustainable Policy
-R. Lucas and N. Stokey (1983). “Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy in an Economy without Capital”. JMonetaryE; V.12-#1, pp. 55-93.
-T. Persson and L. Svensson (1984). “Time-Consistent Fiscal Policy and Government Cash-Flow”. JMonetaryE; V.14-#3, pp. 365-374.
-M. Persson, T. Persson and L. Svensson (1987). “Time Consistency of Fiscal and Monetary Policy”. Etrica; V.55-#6, pp. 1419-1431. [comment by Calvo\Obstfeld, 1990, V.58: 1245-1247]
-G. Calvo and M. Obstfeld (1988). “Optimal Time Consistent Fiscal Policy with Finite Lifetimes”. Etrica; V.56-#?, pp. 411-432.
-L. Kotlikoff, T. Persson and L. Svensson (1988). “Social Contracts as Assets: A Possible Solution to the Time Consistency Problem”. AER; V.78-#4, pp. 662-677.
-V. Chari and P. Kehoe (1990). “Sustainable Plans”. JPE; V.98-#?, pp. 783-802.
-N. Stokey (1991). “Credible Public Policy”. JEDC; V.15-#?, pp. 627-656.
-I.-K. Cho and A. Matsui (1995). “Induction and the Ramsey Policy”. JEDC; V.19-#5/7, pp. 1113-1140.
-V. Chari, P. Kehoe and E. Prescott (1989). “Time Consistency and Policy”. in R. Barro, ed. Modern Business Cycle Theory. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, pp. 265-305.
-W. Buiter (1983). “The Theory of Optimum Deficits and Debt”. in The Economics of Large Government Deficits. Boston: Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, pp. 4-69.
-R. Barro (1979). “On the Determination of the Public Debt”. JPE; V.87-#5, pt. 1, pp. 940-971.
-P. Masson (1985). “The Sustainability of Fiscal Deficits”. IMFSP; V.32-#4, pp. 577-605.
-H. Zee (198?). “The Sustainability and Optimality of Government Debt”. IMFSP; V.?-#?, pp. 658-685.
-H. Bohn (1988). “Why Do We Have Nominal Government Debt?”. Journal of Monetary Economics; V.21-#?, pp. 127-140.
-G. Calvo (1988). “Servicing the Public Debt: The Role of Expectations”. AER; V.78-#?, pp. 647-661.
-G. Calvo (1989). “Controlling Inflation: The Problem of Non-Indexed Debt”. in S. Edwards and F. Larraín, eds. Debt, Adjustment and Recovery: Latin America's Prospect for Growth and Development. New York: Blackwell, pp. 156-175.
-G. Calvo and P. Guidotti (1990). “Indexation and Maturity of Government Bonds: An Exploratory Model”. in R. Dornbusch and M. Draghi, eds. Public Debt Management: Theory and History. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 52-82.
-F. Giavazzi and M. Pagano (1990). “Confidence Crises and Public Debt Management”. in R. Dornbusch and M. Draghi, eds. Public Debt Management: Theory and History. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 125-143.
-A. Alesina, A. Prati and G. Tabellini (1990). “Public Confidence and Debt Management: A Model and A Case Study of Italy”. in R. Dornbusch and M. Draghi, eds. Public Debt Management: Theory and History. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 94-118.
-G. Calvo and P. Guidotti (1992). “Optimal Maturity of Nominal Government Debt: An Infinite Horizon Model”. IER; V.33-#?, pp. 895-920.
-V. Chari and P. Kehoe (1993). “Sustainable Plans and Mutual Default”. REStud; V.60-#?, pp. 175-195.
-R. Barro (1986). “US Deficits since World War I”. ScanJE; V.88-#?, pp. 195-222.
-R. Barro (1986). “The Behavior of the US Deficit”. in R. Gordon, ed. The American Business Cycle: Cotinuity and Change. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp.
-C. Sahasakul (1986). “The US Evidence on Optimal Taxation over Time”. JmonE; V.15-#?, pp. 251-275.
-B. Trehan and C. Walsh (1988). “Common Trends, Intertemporal Budget Balance, and Revenue Smoothing”. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control; V.12-#?, pp. 425-444.
-B. Trehan and C. Walsh (1990). “Seignorage and Tax Smoothing in the US, 1914-1986". JMonE; V.25-#1, pp. 97-112.
-B. Trehan and C. Walsh (1991). “Testing Intertemporal Budget Constraints: Theory and Application to US Federal Budget and Current Account Deficits”. JMCB; V.23-#?, pp. 206-223.
-C.-H. Huang and K. Lin (1993). “Deficits, Government Expenditures, and Tax Smoothing in the US: 1929-1988". JMonE; V.31-#?, pp. 317-339.
-D. Aschauer (1988). “The Equilibrium Approach to Fiscal Policy”. JMCB; V.20-#1, pp. 41-62.
-E. Phelps (1973). “Inflation in the Theory of Public Finance”. SwedJE; V.75-#?, pp. 67-82.
-L. Aurenheimer (1974). “The Honest Government's Guide to the Revenue from Money Creation”. JPE; V.82-#?, pp. 598-606.
-A. Drazen (1979). “The Optimal Rate of Inflation Revisited”. JMonE; V.5-#?, pp. 231-248.
-E. Helpman and E. Sadka (1979). “Optimal Financing of the Government's Budget: Taxes, Bonds or Money?”. AER; V.69-#?, pp. 152-160.
-S. Fischer (1982). “Seignorage and the Case for a National Money”. JPE; V.90-#2, pp. 295-313.
-K. Kimbrough (1986). “Inflation, Employment, and Welfare in the Presence of Transactions Costs”. JMCB; V.18-#2, pp. 127-140.
-K. Kimbrough (1986). “The Optimum Quantity of Money Rule in the Theory of Public Finance”. JMonetaryE; V.18-#?, pp. 277-284.
-J. Aizenman (1987). “Inflation, Tariffs and Tax Enforcement Costs”. JIEI; V.2-#1, pp. 12-28.
-C. Végh (1989). “Government Spending and Inflationary Finance: A Public Finance Approach”. IMFSP; V.36-#3, pp. 657-677.
-A. Dixit (1991). “The Optimal Mix of Inflationary Finance and Commodity Taxation with Collection Lags”. IMFSP; V.38-#3, pp. 643-654.
-G. Calvo and P. Guidotti (1993). “On the Flexibility of Monetary Policy: The Case of the Optimal Inflation Tax”. REStud; V.60-#204, pp.
-M.G. Mankiw (1987). “The Optimal Collection of Seignorage: Theory and Evidence”. JMonetaryE; V.20-#?, pp. 327-341.
-J. Poterba and J. Rotemberg (1990). “Inflation Taxation with Optimizing Governments”. JMCB; V.22-#1, pp. 1-18.
-G. Calvo and L. Leiderman (1992). “Optimal Inflation Tax Under Precommitment”. AER; V.82-#1, pp. 179-194
-J. Aizenman (1992). “Competitive Externalities and the Optimal Seignorage”. JMCB; V.24-#1, pp. 63-656.
4. Reputation and Optimal Sustainable Policy
-K. Rogoff (1989). “Reputation, Coordination, and Monetary Policy”. in R. Barro, ed. Modern Business Cycle Theory. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, pp. 236-264.
-R. Barro and D. Gordon (1983). “Rules, Discretion, and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy”. JMonetaryE; V.12-#1, pp. 101-121.
-M. Canzoneri (1985). “Monetary Policy Games and the Role of Private Information”. AER; V.75-#5, pp. 1056-1070.
-K. Rogoff (1985). “The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target”. QJE; V.100-#?, pp. 1169-1189.
-G. Tabellini (1985). “Accomodative Monetary Policy and Central Bank Reputation”. Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia; V.44-#?, pp. 389-425.
-D. Backus and J. Driffill (1985). “Inflation and Reputation”. AER; V.75-#3, pp. 530-538.
-D. Backus and J. Driffill (1985). “Rational Expectations and Policy Credibility Following a Change in Regime”. REStud; V.52-#?, pp. 211-221.
-R. Barro (1986). “Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy with Incomplete Information”. JMonetaryE; V.17-#1, pp. 3-20.
-J. Vickers (1986). “Signalling in a Model of Monetary Policy with Incomplete Information”. OEP; V.38-#3, pp. 443-455.
-K. Rogoff (1987). “Reputational Constraints on Monetary Policy”. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy; V.26, pp. 141-182.
-J. Drifill (1989). “Macroeconomic Policy Games with Incomplete Information: Some Extensions”. in F. van der Ploeg and A. de Zeeuw, eds. Dynamic Policy Games in Economics. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 289-322.
-C. Carraro (1988). “A Folk Theorem of Monetary Policy”. in D. Laussel, et al., eds. Monetary Theory and Policy. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, pp. 173-206.
-N. Stokey (1989). “Reputation and Time Consistency”. AER; V.79-#2, pp. 134-139.
-S. Lohmann (1992). “The Optimal Degree of Commitment: Credibility and Flexibility”. AER; V.82-#1, pp. 273-286.
-R. Cubitt (1992). “Monetary Policy Games and Private Sector Precommitment”. OEP; V.44-#?, pp. 513-530.
-A. al-Nowaihi and P. Levine (1994). “Can Reputation Resolve the Monetary Policy Problem?”. JME; V.33-#?, pp. 355-380.
-C. Walsh (1995). “Optimal Contracts for Independent Central Bankers”. AER; V.85-#1, pp. 150-167.
-B. McCallum (1995). “Two Fallacies Concerning Central Bank Independence”. AER; V.85-#2, pp. 207-211.
-B. Lockwood (1997). “State-Contingent Inflation Contracts and Unemployment Persistence”. JMCB; V.29-#3, pp. 286-299.
-B. Herrendorf and B. Lockwood (1997). “Rogoff’s ‘Conservative’ Central Banker Restored”. JMCB; V.29-#4, pp. 476-495.
-L. Svensson (1997). “Optimal Inflation Targets, ‘Conservative’ Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts”. AER; V.87-#1, pp. 98-114.
-R. Beetsma and A.L. Bovenberg (1997). “Central Bank Independence and Public Debt Policy”. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control; V.21-#?, pp. 873-894.
-H. Jensen (1997). “Credibility of Optimal Monetary Delegation”. AER; V.87-#?, pp. 911-920.
-R. Beetsma and H. Jensen (1998). “Inflation Targets and Contracts with Uncertain Central Banker Preferences”. JMCB; V.30-#?, pp. 384-403.
-R. Beetsma and H. Jensen (1999). “Optimal Inflation Targets, ‘Conservative’ Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts: Comment”. AER; V.89-#1, pp. 342-347.
-A. Alesina and G. Tabellini (1987). “Relates and Discretion with Noncoordinated Monetary and Fiscal Policies”. Economic Inquiry; V.25-#4, pp. 619-630.
-G. Banerjee (2001). “Rules and Discretion with Common Central Bank and Separate Fiscal Authorities”. Journal of Economics and Business; V.53-#1, pp. 45-68.
-A. Dixit and L. Lambertini (2003). “Interactions of Commitment and Discretion in Monetary and Fiscal Policies”. AER V.93-#5, pp. 1522-1542.
5. Politics, Reputation and Sustainability
-A. Cukierman (1992). Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence. Cambridge: MIT.
-A. Cukierman and A. Meltzer (1986). “A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information”. Etrica; V.54-#?, pp. 1099-1128.
-A. Cukierman and A. Meltzer (1986). “The Credibility of Monetary Announcements”. in M. Neumann, ed. Monetary Policy and Uncertainty. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft.
-T. Basar and M. Salmon (1988). “On the Convergence of Beliefs and Policy to a Rational Expectations Equilibrium in a Dual Policy Problem”. in D. Laussel, et al. eds. Monetary Theory and Policy. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, pp. 207-223.
-N. Balke and J. Haslag (1992). “A Theory of Fed Watching in a Macroeconomic Policy Game”. IER; V.33-#3, pp. 619-628.
-T. Persson and L. Svensson (1989). “Why a Stubborn Conservative would Run a Budget Deficit: Policy with Time-Inconsistent Preferences”. QJE; V.104-#2, pp. 325-345.
-C. Waller (1989). “Monetary Policy Games and Central Bank Politics”. JMCB; V.21-#4, pp. 422-432.
-G. Tabellini and A. Alesina (1990). “Voting on the Budget Deficit”. AER; V.80-#1, pp. 37-49.
-C. Waller (1992). “The Choice of a Conservative Central Banker in a Multisector Economy”. AER; V.82-#4, pp. 1006-1012.
-C. Waller (1992). “A Bargaining Model of Partisan Appointments to the Central Bank”. JME; V.29-#3, pp. 411-428.
S. Lohmann (1992). “Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus Flexibility”. AER; V.82-#1, pp. 273-286.
Posen, Adam (1993). “Why Central Bank Independence Does Not Cause Low Inflation: There is No Institutional Fix for Politics”. In Richard O’Brien, ed. Finance and the International Economy: 7. Oxford: OUP, pp. 41-65.
Posen, Adam (1995). “Declarations Are Not Enough: Financial Sector Sources of Central Bank Independence”. NBER macroeconomics annual 1995. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 253-274.
-T. Persson and G. Tabellini (1993). “Designing Institutions for Monetary Stability”. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy; #39, pp.
-P. Minford (1995). “Time-Inconsistency, Democracy, and Optimal Contingent Rules”. OEP; V.47-#2, pp. 195-210.
-A. Alesina and R. Gatti (1995). “Independent Central Banks: Low Inflation at No Cost?”. AER; V.85-#2, pp. 196-200.
-B. McCallum (1995). “Two Fallacies concerning Central Bank Independence”. AER; v.85-#2, pp. 207-211.
-C. Waller and C. Walsh (1996). “Central Bank Independence, Economic Behavior, and Optimal Term Lengths”. AER; V.86-#5, pp. 1139-1153.
Lohmann, Suzanne (1997). “Partisan Control of the Money Supply and Decentralized Appointment Powers”. EJPE; V.13-#?, pp. 225-246.
Lohmann, Suzanne (1998). “Institutional Checks and Balances and the Political Control of the Money Supply”. OEP; V.50-#3, pp. 360-377.
Lohmann, Suzanne (1994). “Designing a Central Bank in a Federal System: The Deutsche Bundesbank, 1957-1992". in P. Siklos, ed.. Varieties of monetary reforms: Lessons and experiences on the road to monetary union. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, pp. 247-277.
Lohmann, Suzanne (1998). “Federalism and Central Bank Independence: The Politics of German Monetary Policy”. WP; V.50-#3, pp.
Iverson, Torben (1998). “Wage Bargaining, Central Bank Independence, and the Real Effects of Money”. IO; V.52-#3, pp. 469-504.
Posen, Adam (1998). “Central Bank Independence and Disinflationary Credibility: A Missing Link?”. Oxford Economic Papers; V.50-#3 (July 1998): pp. 335-599.
Hall Peter and Robert Franzese, jr. (1998). “Mixed Signals: Central Bank Independence, Coordinated Wage Bargaining, and European Monetary Union”. IO; V.52-#3, pp. 505-535.
Franzese, Robert (1999). “Partially Independent Central Banks, Politically Responsive Governments, and Inflation”. American Journal of Political Science; V.43-#3, pp. 681-706.
Broz, J. Lawrence (2002). “Political System Transparency and Monetary Commitment Regimes”. International Organization; V.56-#4, pp. 863-889.
-K. Banaian, L. Laney and T. Willett (1986). “Central Bank Independence: An International Comparison”. in E. Toma and M. Toma, eds. Central Bankers, Bureaucratic Incentives, and Monetary Policy. Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, pp. 199-217.
-N. Roubini and J. Sachs (1989). “Political and Economic Determinants of Budget Deficits in the Industrial Democracies”. EER; V.33-#?, pp. 903-938.
-N. Roubini and J. Sachs (1989). “Government Spending and Budget Deficits in the Industrialized Countries”. Economic Policy; #4, pp. 100-132.
-D. Masciandaro and G. Tabellini (1988). “Monetary Regimes and Fiscal Deficits: A Comparative Analysis”. in H.S. Cheng, ed. Monetary Policy in the Pacific Basin. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
-V. Grilli, D. Masciandaro and G. Tabellini (1991). “Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries”. Economic Policy; #13, pp. 341-392.
-B. Bernanke and F. Mishkin (1992). “Central Bank Behavior and and the Strategy of Monetary Policy: Observations from Six Industrialized Countries”. NBER Macroeconomics Annual--1992. Cambridge: MIT Press/NBER.
-A. Cukierman, S. Webb and B. Neyapti (1992). “Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and its Effects on Policy Outcomes”. WBER; V.6-#3, pp. 353-398.
-A. Cukierman, P. Kalatizidakis, L. Summers, and S. Webb (1993). “Central Bank Independence, Growth, Investment and Real Rates”. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, #39, pp. 95-150.
-A. Alesina and L. Summers (1993). “Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance”. JMCB; V.25-#2, pp. 151-162.
-G. Debelle and S. Fischer (1994). “How Independent should a Central Bank Be?”. in J. Fuhrer, ed. Goals, Guidelines and Constraints Facing Monetary Policymakers. Boston: Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, pp. 195-221.
C. Political Consequences of Macroeconomic Conditions
-M. Paldam (1981). “A Preliminary Survey of the Theories and Findings on Vote and Popularity Functions”. EJPE; V.9-#?, pp. 181-199.
-K. Monroe (1984). Presidential Popularity and the Economy. New York: Praeger.
-M. Lewis-Beck (1988). “Economics and the American Voter: Past, Present, Future”. Political Behavior; V.10-#1, pp. 5-21.
-M. Paldam (1994). “The VP Function: A Survey of the Literature on Vote and Popularity Functions after 25 Years”. PC; V.79-#3/4, pp. 213-245.
-J. Mueller (1970). “Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnson”. APSR; V.27-#1, pp. 18-34.
-C.A.E. Goodhart and R. Bhansali (1970). “Political Economy”. Political Studies; V.18-#?, pp. 43-106.
-S. Kernell (1978). “Explaining Presidential Popularity”. APSR; V.72-#?, pp. 506-522.
-K. Monroe (1978). “Economic Influences on Presidential Popularity”. Public Opinion Quarterly; V.42-#?, pp. 360-369.
-M. Lewis-Beck (1980). “Economic Conditions and Executive Popularity: The French Experience”. AJPS; V.24-#?, pp. 306-323.
-D.R. Kinder (1981). “Presidents, Prosperity and Public Opinion”. Public Opinion Quarterly; V.45-#?, pp. 1-21.
-S. Kernell and D. Hibbs (1981). “A Critical Threshold Model of Presidential Popularity”. in D. Hibbs and H Fassbender, eds. Contemporary Political Economy. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 49-71.
-D. Hibbs (1982). “The Dynamics of Political Support for American Presidents among Occupational and Partisan Groups”. AJPS; V.26-#?, pp. 312-332.
-D. Hibbs and N. Vasilatos (1981). “Macroeconomic Performance and Mass Political Support in the US and Great Britain”. in D. Hibbs and H Fassbender, eds. Contemporary Political Economy. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 31-47.
-D. Hibbs (1982). “On the Demand for Economic Outcomes: Macroeconomic Performance and Mass Political Support in the US, Great Britain, and Germany”. JoP; V.426-462.
-D. Hibbs (1985). “Inflation, Political Support, and Macroeconomic Policy”. in L. Lindberg and C. Maier, eds. The Politics of Inflation and Economic Stagnation. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 175-195.
-H. Chappell (1982). “Presidential Popularity and Macroeconomic Performance: Are Voters Really So Naive?”. REStat; V.?-#?, pp. 385-392
-S. Fischer and J. Huizinga (1982). “Inflation, Unemployment, and Public Opinion Polls”. JMCB; V.14-#1, pp. 1-19.
-M. MacKuen (1983). “Political Drama, Economic Conditions, and the Dynamics of Presidential Popularity”. AJPS; V.27-#1, pp. 165-192.
-H. Norpoth and T. Yantek (1983). “Macroeconomic Conditions and Fluctuations of Presidential Popularity: The Question of Lagged Effects”. AJPS; V.27-#?, pp. 785-807.
-H. Norpoth (1984). “Economics, Politics and the Cycle of Presidential Popularity”. Political Behavior; V.6-#?, pp. 253-273.
-A. Miller and M. Wattenberg (1985). “Throwing the Rascals Out: Policy Performance and Performance Evaluations of Presidential Candidates”. APSR; V.79-#?, pp. 359-373.
-H. Chappell and W. Keech (1985). “A New View of Political Accountability for Economic Performance”. APSR; V.79-#1, pp. 10-27.
-D.R. Kiewiet and D. Rivers (1985). “The Economic Basis of Reagan's Approval”. in J. Chubb and P. Peterson, eds. The New Direction in American Politics. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 69-90.
-S. Feldman and P. Conover (1986). “Emotional Reactions to the Economy: I'm as Mad as Hell and I'm Not Going to Take it Anymore”. AJPS; V.30-#?, pp. 50-78.
-P. Conover, S. Feldman, and K. Knight (1986). “Judging Inflation and Unemployment”. JoP; V.48-#?, pp. 565-588.
-T. Yantek (1988). “Politiy and Economy under Extreme Economic Conditions”. AJPS; V.32-#1, pp. 196-216.
-H. Clarke and E. Elliott (1989). “New Models of Presidential Approval”. EJPE; V.5-#4, pp. 551-569.
-N. Beck (1991). “The Economy and Presidential Approval: An Information-Theoretic Perspective”. in H. Norpoth, M. Lewis-Beck and J.-D. Lafay, Economics and Politics: The Calculus of Support. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 85-102.
-N. Beck (1992). “Comparing Dynamic Specifications: The Case of Presidential Approval”. Political Analysis, #3, pp. 51-87.
-C. Ostrom, jr. and R. Smith (1993). “Error Correction, Attitude Persistence, and Executive Rewards and Punishments: A Behavioral Theory of Presidential Approval”. Political Analysis; V.4, pp. 127-183.
-R. Durr (1993). “An Essay on Cointegration and Error Correction Models”. Political Analysis; V.4-#?, pp. 185-228.
-MacKuen, M., R. Erikson and J. Stimson (1992). “Peasants or Bankers: The American Electorate and the US Economy”. APSR; V.86-#?, pp. 597-611.
-P. Peretz (1983). The Political Economy of Inflation in the US. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
-D.R. Kiewiet (1983). Macroeconomics and Micropolitics: The Electoral Effects of Economic Issues. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
-P. Whitely (1986). Political Control of the Macroeconomy. Beverly Hills: Sage.
-M.S. Lewis-Beck (1990). Economics and Elections: The Major Western Democracies. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
-H. Eulau and M.S. Lewis-Beck, eds. (1985). Economic Conditions and Electoral Outcomes: The US and Western Europe. New York: Agathon Press.
a. Aggregate Economic Conditions and Political Performance
-G. Kramer (1971). “Short-Term Fluctuations in US Voting Behavior, 1896-1964". APSR; V.65-#1, pp. 131-143.
-G. Kramer and S. Lepper (1972). “Congressional Elections”. in W. Aydelotte, A. Bogue and R. Fogel, eds. The Dimensions of Quantitative Research in History. Princeton: PUP, pp.256-281.
-G. Stigler (1973). “General Economic Conditions and National Elections”. AER; V.63-#2, pp. 160-167.
-S. Lepper (1974). “Voting Behavior and Aggregate Policy Targets”. PC; V.18-#?, pp. 67-81.
-E. Tufte (1975). “Determinants of the Outcomes of Midtem Congressional Elections”. APSR; V.69-#?, pp. 812-826.
-F. Arcelus and A. Meltzer (1975). “The Effect of Aggregate Economic Variables on Congressional Elections”. APSR; V.69-#4, pp. 1232-1239.
-H. Bloom and H.D. Price (1975). “Voter Response to Short-Run Economic Conditions: the Asymmetric Effect of Prosperity and Recession”. APSR; V.69-#4, pp. 1240-1254.
-S. Goodman and G. Kramer (1975). Comment on Arcelus and Meltzer”. APSR; V.69-#5, pp. 1255-1265.
-F. Arcelus and A. Meltzer (1975). “Aggregate Economic Variables and Votes for Congress: A Rejoinder”. APSR; V.69-#4, pp. 1266-1269.
-A. Meltzer and M. Vellrath (1975). “The Effects of Economic Policies on Votes for the Presidency: Some Evidence from Recent Elections”. JLawEcon; V.18-#?, pp. 781-798.
-R.P.Y. Li (1976). “Public Policy and Short-term Fluctuations in US Voting Behavior: A Reformulation and Expansion”. Political Methodology; V.3-#?, pp. 49-70.
-K. Monroe (1979). “Econometric Analyses of Electoral Behavior: A Critical Review”. Political Behavior; V.1-#?, pp. 137-174.
-J. Owens and E. Olson (1980). “Economic Fluctuations and Congressional Elections”. AJPS; V.24-#?, pp. 469-493.
-H.S. Atesoglu and R. Congleton (1982). “Economic Conditions and National Elections: Post-Sample Forecasts of the Kramer Equations”. APSR; V.76-#?, pp. 873-875.
-G. Parker (1986). “Economic Partisan Advantages in Congressional Contests”. Public Opinion Quarterly; V.50-#?, pp. 387-401.
-R. Fair (1978). “The Effect of Economic Events on Votes for President”. REStat; V.60-#2, pp. 159-173.
-R. Fair (1982). “The Effect of Economic Events on Votes for President: 1980 Results”. REStat; V.64-#2, pp. 322-325.
-R. Fair (1988). “The Effect of Economic Events of Votes for President: 1984 Update”. Political Behavior; V.10-#2, pp. 168-179.
-R. Gleisner (1992). “Economic Determinants of Presidential Elections: The Fair Model”. Political Behavior; V.14-#4, pp. 383-394.
-H. Greene (1993). “Forewarned Before Forecast: Presidential Election Models and the 1992 Election”. Political Science and Politics; V.?-#?, pp. 17-21.
-S. Haynes and J. Stone (1994). “Why Did Economic Models Falsely Predict a Bush Landslide in 1992". Contemporary Economic Policy; V.12-#2, pp. 123130.
b. Economic Conditions and Self-Regarding Political Choice
-R. Klorman (1978). “Trend in Personal Finances and the Vote”. Public Opinion Quarterly; V.42-#?, pp. 31-48.
-M. Fiorina (1978). “Economic Retrospective Voting in American National Elections: A Micro-Analysis”. AJPS; V.22-#2, pp. 426-443.
-M. Fiorina (1981). “Short- and Long-term Effects of Economic Conditions on Individual Voting Decisions”. in D. Hibbs and H. Fassbender, eds. Contemporary Political Economy. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 73-100.
-J. Kuklinski and D. West (1981). “Economic Expectations and Voting Behavior in US Senate and House Elections”. APSR; V.75-#?, pp. 436-447.
-M.S. Weatherford (1978). “Economic Conditions and Electoral Outcomes: Class Differences in the Political Response to Recession”. AJPS; V.22-#4, pp. 917-938.
-M.S. Weatherford (1982). “Recessions and Social Classes: Economic Impacts and Political Opinions”. Political Behavior; V.4-#1, pp. 7-31.
-M.S. Weatherford (1983). “Parties and Classes in Political Response to Economic Conditions”. in K. Monroe, ed. The Political Process and Economic Change. New York: Agathon pp. 181-213.
-J. Hibbing and J. Alford (1981). “The Electoral Impact of Economic Conditions: Who is Held Responsible?”. AJPS; V.25-#3, pp. 423-439.
-M. Fiorina (1983). “Who is Held Responsible? Further Evidence for the Hibbing-Alford Thesis”. AJPS; V.27-#1, pp. 158-164.
-D. Sears, R. Lau, T. Tyler and H. Allen (1980). “Self-Interest vs. Symbilic Politics in Policy Attitudes and Presidential Voting”. APSR; V.74-#3, pp. 670-684.
-S. Feldman (1982). “Economic Self-Interest and Political Behavior”. AJPS; V.26-#3, pp. 446-466.
-S. Feldman (1984). “Economic Self-Interest and the Vote: Evidence and Meaning”. Political Behavior; V.6-#?, pp. 229-252.
-M. Peffley (1984). “The Voter as Juror: Attributing Responsibility for Economic Conditions”. Political Behavior; V.6-#?, pp. 275-294.
-M.S. Weatherford (1983). “Economic Voting and the `Symbolic Politics` Argument: A Reinterpretation and Synthesis”. APSR; V.77-#1, pp. 158-174.
-D.R. Kiewiet and D. Rivers (1985). “A Retrospective on Retrospective Voting”. in M. Lewis-Beck and H. Eulau, eds. Economic Conditions and Electoral Outcomes; New York: Agathon.
-R. Born (1986). “Strategic Politicians and Unresponsive Voters”. APSR; V.80-#2, pp. 599-612.
-G. Markus (1988). “The Impact of Personal and National Economic Conditions on the Presidential Vote: A Pooled Cross-sectional Analysis”. AJPS; V.32-#1, pp. 137-154.
-G. Quattrone and A. Tversky (1988). “Contrasting Rational and Psychological Analyses of Political Choice”. APSR; V.82-#?, pp. 719-736.
-R. Erikson (1989). “Economic Conditions and the Presidential Vote”. APSR; V.83-#2, pp. 567-573.
-R. Erikson (1990). “Economic Conditions and the Congressional Vote: A Review of the Macrolevel Evidence”. AJPS; V.34-#2, pp. 373-399. [comment by Jacobson and response follow]
-G. Jacobson (1989). “Strategic Politicians and the Dynamics of US House Elections, 1946-1986". APSR; V.83-#3, pp. 773-793.
-M. Suzuki (1991). “The Rationality of Economic Voting and the Macroeconomic Regime”. AJPS; V.35-#?, pp. 624-642.
-M. Suzuki (1992). “Political Business Cycles in the Public Mind”. APSR; V.86-#4, pp. 989-96.
-M. Suzuki (1994). “Evolutionary Voter Sophistication and Political Business Cycles”. PC; V.81-#3/4, pp. 241-61.
-M. MacKuen, R. Erikson, and J. Stimson (1992). “Peasants or Bankers: The American Electorate and the US Economy”. APSR; V.86-#?, pp. 597-611.
-G.B. Powell and G. Whitten (1993). “A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Account of the Political Context”. AJPS; V.37-#2, pp. 391-414.
-D. Kinder and D.R. Kiewiet (1979). “Economic Discontent and Political Behavior: The Role of Personal Grievances and Collective Economic Judgements in Congressional Voting”. AJPS; V.23-#3, pp. 495-527.
-D. Kinder and D.R. Kiewiet (1981). “Sociotropic Politics: The American Case”. British Journal of Politics; V.11-#?, pp. 129-161.
-D. Kinder (1981). “Presidents, Prosperity, and Public Opinion”. Public Opinion Quarterly; V.45-#1, pp. 1-21.
-G. Kramer (1983). “The Ecological Fallacy Revisited: Aggregate- versus Individual-Level Findings on Economics and Elections, and Sociotropic Voting”. APSR; V.77-#1, pp. 92-111.
-D. Kinder and W. Mebane (1983). “Politics and Economics in Everyday Life”. in K. Monroe, ed. The Political Process and Economic Change. New York: Agathon, pp. 141-180.
-D. Kinder, G. Adams and P. Gronke (1989). “Economics and Politics in the 1984 American Presidential Election”. AJPS; V.33-#2, pp. 491-515.
-G. Markus (1988). “The Impact of Personal and National Economic Conditions on the Presidential Vote: A Pooled Cross-Sectional Analysis”. AJPS; V.32-#1, pp. 137-154.
-H. Clarke and M. Stewart (1994). “Prospections, Retrospections, and Rationality: The “Bankers” Model of Presidential Approval Reconsidered”. AJPS; V.38-#4, pp. 1104-1123.
-Mutz, Diana (1992). “Mass Media and the Depoliticization of Personal Experience”. American Journal of Political Science; V.36-#2, pp. 483-508.
-Mutz, Diana and Jeffery Mondak (1997). “Dimensions of Sociotropic Behavior: Group-Based Judgements of Fairness and Well-Being”. American Journal of Political Science; V.41-#1, pp. 284-308.
-G. Krause (1997). “Voters, Information Heterogeneity, and the Dynamics of Aggregate Economic Expectations”. AJPS; V.41-#1, pp. 1170-1200.
-J. Alford and J. Legge (1984). “Economic Conditions and Individual Vote in the Federal Republic of Germany”. JoP; V.46-#4, pp. 1168-1181.
-P. McDonough, S. Barnes, and A.L. Pina (1986). “Economic Policy and Public Opinion in Spain”. AJPS; V.30-#2, pp. 446-479.
D. Macroeconomic Consequences of Political Competition
1. Democratic Constraint and the Size of Government
-J. Schumpeter (1918). “The Crisis of the Tax State”. translation in (1954). International Economic Papers, V.4, pp. 5-38.
-K. Brunner (1978). “Reflection on the Political Economy of Government: The Persistent Growth of Government”. Schweizerische Zeitschrift Volkwirtschft und Statistik; V.114-#?, pp. 649-680.
J. Fesmire and E. Beauvais (1979). “Budget Size in Democracy Revisited: The Public Supply of Private, Public and Semi-Public Goods”. SEJ; V.45-#?, pp. 477-493.
-A. Meltzer and S. Richard (1981). “A Rational Theory of the Size of Government”. JPE; V.89-#5, pp. 914-927.
-R. Musgrave (1985). “Excess Bias and the Nature of Budget Growth”. JPubE; V.28-#?, pp. 287-308.
-A. Lindbeck (1985). “Redistribution Policy and the Expansion of the Public Sector”. JPubE; V.28-#?, pp. 309-328.
-A. Wildavsky (1985). “A Cultural Theory of Expenditure Growth and (Un)Balanced Budgets”. JPubE; V.28-#?, pp. 349-357.
-W. Keech and C. Simon (1985). “Electoral and Welfare Consequences of Political Manipulation of the Economy”. JEBO; V.6-#?, pp. 177-202.
-A. Cuikerman and A. Meltzer (1986). “A Positive Theory of Discretionary Policy, The Cost of Democratic Government, and the Benefits of a Constitution”. EcInq; V.24-#?, pp. 367-388.
-D. Mueller (1987). “The Growth of Government: A Public Choice Perspective”. IMFSP; V.?-#1, pp. 115-149.
-P. Krusell and J.-V. Ríos-Rull (1999). “On the Size of U.S. Government: Political Economy in the Neoclassical Growth Model”. AER; V.89-#5, pp. 1156-1181.
-G. Stigler (1972). “Economic Competition and Political Competition”. PC; V.13-#?, pp. 91-106.
-N. Edelson (1974). “Economic Competition and Political Competition: Comments and Corrections”. PC; V.17-#?, pp. 103-106.
-R. Dinkel (1976). “Collusion in Spatial Models of Party Competition”. PC; V.27-#?, pp. 97-99.
-W.M. Crain (1977). “On the Structure and Stability of Political Markets”. JPE; V.85-#4, pp. 829-842.
-W. Brown and G. Santoni (1980). “Economic Competition and Political Competition: A Comment”. PC; V35-#?, pp. 27-36.
-R. Wintrobe (1987). “The Market for Corporate Control and the Market for Political Control”. JLEO; V.3-#2, pp. 435-448.
b. Evidence on the Growth of the State
-O. Davis, M. Dempster and A. Wildavsky (1974). “Toward a Predictive Theory of Government Expenditures: US Domestic Appropriations”. British Journal of Political Science; V.4-#?, pp. 1-34.
-D. Tarschys (1975). “The Growth of Public Expenditures: Nine Modes of Explanation”. Scandinavian Political Studies; V.10-#?, pp. 9-31.
-T. Borcherding (1977). “The Sources of Growth of Public Expenditures in the US, 1902-1970". in T. Borcherding, ed. Budgets and Bureaucrats: The Sources of Government Growth. Durham: Duke University Press, pp.
-T. Borcherding (1985). “The Causes of Government Expenditure Growth: A Survey of the US Evidence”. JPubE; V.28-#?, pp. 359-382.
-D. Cameron (1978). “The Expansion of the Public Economy: A Comparative Analysis”. APSR; V.72-#4, pp. 1243-1261.
-S. Peltzman (1980). “The Growth of Government”. JLawEcon; V.23-#?, pp. 209-287.
-J. Conybeare (1982). “The Rent-Seeking State and Revenue Diversification”. World Politics; V.?-#1, pp. 25-42.
-A. Hicks (1984). “Elections, Keynes, Bureaucracy and Class: Explaining US Budget Deficits, 1961-1978". American Sociological Review; V.49-#?, pp. 165-182.
-O. Kristensen (1984). “On the Futility of the `Demand Approach` to Public Sector Growth”. European Journal of Political Research; V.12-#3, pp. 309-324.
-D. North (1985). “The Growth of Government in the US: An Economic Historian's Perspective”. JPubE; V.28-#?, pp. 383-399.
-W. Oates (1985). “Searching for Leviathan: An Empirical Study”. AER; V.75-#4, pp.
-D. Swank (1988). “The Political Economy of Government Domestic Expenditure in Affluent Democracies”. AJPS; V.32-#?, pp. 1120-1150.
-D. Tarschys (1988). “Tributes, Tariffs, Taxes and Trade: The Changing Sources of Government Revenue”. British Journal of Political Science; V.18-#1, pp. 1-21.
-N. Roubini and J. Sachs (1989). “Government Spending and Budget Deficits in the Industrialized Countries”. Economic Policy; #8, pp. 100-132.
-N. Roubini and J. Sachs (1989). “Political and Economic Determinants of Budget Deficits in the Industrial Democracies”. EER; V.33-#?, pp. 903-933.
-D. Lindauer and A. Velenchik (1992). “Government Spending in Developing Countries: Trends, Causes, and Consequences”. WBRO; V.7-#1, pp. 59-78.
-A. Blais, D. Blake, and S. Dion (1993). “Do Parties Make a Difference?: Parties and the Size of Government in Liberal Decocracies”. AJPS; V.37-#1, pp. 40-62.
-T. Persson and G. Tabellini (1999). “The Size and Scope of Government: Comparative Politics with Rational Politicians”. EER; V.43-#4-6, pp. 699-735.
-G. Becker and C. Mulligan (1998). “Deadweight Costs and the Size of Government”. NBER Working Paper, #6789.
c. Consequences of the Growth of the State
-R. Rubinson (1977). “Dependency, Government Revenue, and Economic Growth”. Studies in Compararive International Development; V.12-#?, pp. 3-28.
-D. Hibbs and H. Madsen (1981). “Public Reactions to the Growth of Taxation and Government Expenditure”. World Politics; V.?-#?, pp. 413-435.
-R. Klein (1985). “Public Expenditure in an Inflationary World”. in L. Lindberg and C. Maier, eds. The Politics of Inflation and Economic Stagnation. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 196-223.
-D. Cameron (1982). “On the Limits of the Public Economy”. Annals AAPSS, #459 (Government and Economic Performance), pp. 46-62.
-D. Cameron (1985). “Does Government Spending Cause Inflation? Taxes, Spending and Deficits”. in L. Lindberg and C. Maier, eds. The Politics of Inflation and Economic Stagnation. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 224-279.
-B. Barry (1985). “Does Democracy Cause Inflation? Political Ideas of Some Economists”. in L. Lindberg and C. Maier, eds. The Politics of Inflation and Economic Stagnation. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 280-317.
-D. Landau (1983). “Government Expenditure and Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Study”. SEJ; V.49-#?, pp. 783-792.
-J. Devine (1983). “Fiscal Policy and Class Income Inequality: The Distributional Consequences of Governmental Revenues and Expenditures in the US, 1949-1976". American Sociological Review; V.48-#?, pp. 606-622.
-C. Katz, V. Mahler and M. Franz (1983). “The Impact of Taxes on Growth and Distribution in Developed Capitalist Countries: A Cross-National Study”. APSR; V.77-#?, pp. 871-886. [comment by Przeworski and Wallerstein, APSR, 1985, V.79-#?, pp. 508-510; and by King and Jackson, APSR, 1986, V.80-#1, pp. 251-257].
-E. Weede (1984). “Democracy, Creeping Socialism, and Ideological Socialism in Rent-Seeking Societies”. PC; V.44-#?, pp. 349-366.
-R. Ram (1986). “Government Size and Economic Growth: A New Framework and Some Evidence from Cross-Section and Time-Series Data”. AER; V.76-#1, pp. 191-203.
-D. Jorgenson and K. Yun (1990). “Tax Reform and US Economic Growth”. JPE, V.98-#?(supplement), pp. s151-s193.
-D. Aschauer (1990). “Is Government Spending Stimulative?”. Contemporary Policy Issues; V.8-#1, pp. 30-46.
-W. Niskanen (1993). “Fiscal Effects on US Economic Growth”. in B. Zycher and L. Solomon, eds. Economic Policy, Financial Markets, and Economic Growth. Boulder: Westview, pp. 235-246.
-M.S. Weatherford (1987). “The Interplay of Ideology and Advice in Economic Policy-Making: The Case of Political Business Cycles”. JoP; V.49-#?, pp. 925-952.
-M.S. Weatherford (1988). “An Agenda Paper: Political Business Cycles and the Process of Economic Policymaking”. American Politics Quarterly; V.16-#?, pp. 99-136.
-A. Alesina (1988). “Macroeconomics and Politics”. NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1988. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 13-61.
-W. Nordhaus (1989). “Alternative Approaches to the Political Business Cycle”. BPEA; 1989-2, pp. 1-49.
-M. Gäertner (1994). “Democracy, Elections, and Macroeconomic Policy: Two Decades of Progress”. EJPE; V.10-#1, pp.
-W. Keech (1995). Economic Politics: The Costs of Democracy. Cambridge: CUP.
b. Political Business Cycles with a Rational Government
-W. Nordhaus (1975). “The Political Business Cycle”. REStud; V.42-#2, pp. 169-190.
-D. MacRae (1977). “A Poliical Model of the Business Cycle”. JPE; V.85-#2, pp. 239-264.
-W. Rogoff and A. Sibert (1988). “Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles”. REStud; V.55-#1, pp. 1-16.
-K. Rogoff (1990). “Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles”. AER; V.80-#1, pp. 21-36.
-J. Harrington (1993). “Economic Policy, Economic Performance, and Elections”. AER; V.83-#1, pp. 27-42.
-S. Lohmann (1998). “Rationalizing the Political Business Cycle Model”. E&P; V.10-#1, pp. 1-17.
-E. Tufte (1978). Political Control of the Economy. Princeton: PUP.
-B. McCallum (1978). “The Political Business Cycle: An Empirical Test”. SEJ; V.44-#3, pp. 504-515.
-M. Paldam (1979). “Is There an Electoral Cycle”. ScanJE; V.81-#2, pp. 323-342.
-D. Golden and J. Poterba (1980). “The Price of Popularity: The Political Business Cycle Reexamined”. AJPS; V.24-#4, pp. 696-714.
-D. Macrae (1981). “On the Political Business Cycle”. in D. Hibbs and H. Fassbender, eds. Contemporary Political Economy. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 169-184.
-P. Mosley (1984). The Making of Economic Policy: Theory and Evidence from Britain and the US since 1945. New York: St. Martins.
-S. Allen, J. Sulock and W. Sabo (1986). “The Political Business Cycle: How Significant?”. Public Finance Quarterly; V.14-#1, pp. 107-112.
-B.H. Sih (1986). “Political Business Cycles in Industrialized Democratic Countries”. KYKLOS; V.39-#1, pp. 31-46.
-M. Keil (1988). “Is the Political Business Cycle Really Dead?”. SEJ; V.55-#1.
-S. Haynes and J. Stone (1989). “An Integrated Test for Electoral Cycles in the US Economy”. REStat; V.?-#?, pp. 426-434.
-S. Haynes and J. Stone (1990). “Political Models of the Business Cycle Should Be Revived”. EcInq; V.?-#?, pp. 442-465.
-J. Williams (1990). “The Political Manipulation of Macroeconomic Policy”. APSR; V.84-#3, pp. 767-795.
-L. Davidson, M. Fratianni and J. von Hagen (1990). “Testing for Political Business Cycles”. Journal of Policy Modeling; V.12-#1, pp. 25-59.
-D. Findlay (1990). “The Political Business Cycle and Republican Administrations: An Empirical Investigation”. Public Finance Quarterly; V.18-#3, pp. 328-338.
-T. Cargill and M. Hutchinson (1991). “Political Business Cycles with Endogenous Election Timing: Evidence from Japan”. REStat; V.73-#4, pp. 733-739.
-A. Alesina, G. Cohen and N. Roubini (1992). “Macroeconomic Policy and Elections in OECD Democracies”. in A. Cukierman, Z. Hercowitz and L. Leiderman, eds. Political Economy, Growth and Business Cycles. Cambridge: MIT, pp. 227-262.
-Goncalves Veiga, Linda and Henry Chappell, Jr. (2002). “Politics and Unemployment in Industrialized Democracies”. Public Choice; V.110-#3/4, pp. 261-282.
c. Political Business Cycles with Rational Competitive Parties
-D. Hibbs (1977). “Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy”. APSR; V.71-#?, pp. 1467-1487.
-J. Payne (1979). “Inflation, Unemployment and Left-wing Parties: A Reanalysis”. APSR; V.73-#?, pp. 181-185. (response by Hibbs, pp. 185-190)
-H.J. Madsen (1981). “Partisanship and Macroeconomic Outcomes: A Reconsideration”. in D. Hibbs and H. Fassbender, eds. Contemporary Political Economy. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 269-282.
-N. Beck (1982). “Parties, Administrations and American Macroeconomic Outcomes”. APSR; V.76-#1, pp. 83-93. [comment by Hibbs, 1983, V.77: 447-451; response, 1984, V.78: 499-502]
-J. Alt (1985). “Political Parties, World Demand, and Unemployment: Domestic and International Sources of Economic Activity”. APSR; V.79-#?, pp. 1016-1040.
-J. Alt (1985). “Party Strategies, World Demand, and Unemployment in Britain and the US, 1947-1983". Political Behavior; V.7-#1, pp. 7-36.
-D. Hibbs (1986). “Political Parties, Macroeconomic Policies and Outcomes in the US”. AER; 76-#2, pp. 66-70.
-D. Hibbs (1987). The American Political Economy: Macroeconomics and Electoral Politics in the US. Cambridge: Harvard University.
-T. Havrilesky (1987). “A Partisanship Theory of Fiscal and Monetary Regimes”. JMCB; V.19-#?, pp. 308-325.
-P. Minford and D. Peel (1982). “The Political Theory of the Business Cycle”. EER; V.
-V. Boorah and F. van der Ploeg (1983). Political Aspects of the Economy. Cambridge: CUP.
-A. Alesina (1987). “Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game”. QJE; V.102-#?, pp. 651-678.
-Chapell and W. Keech (1986). “Party Differences in Macroeconomic Policies and Outcomes”. AER; V.76-#2, pp. 71-74.
-A. Alesina and G. Tabellini (1988). “Credibility and Politics”. EER; V.32-#?, pp. 542-550
-A. Alesina and G. Tabellini (1990). “A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt”. REStud; V.57-#?, pp. 403-414.
-A. Alesina and A. Cukierman (1990). “The Politics of Ambiguity”. QJE; V.105-#4, pp.829-850.
-G. Hess (1991). “Voting and the Intertemporal Selection of Tax Rates in a Macro-Economy”. E&P; V.3-#1, pp. 41-62.
-P. Aghion and P. Bolton (1990). “Government Domestic Debt and the Risk of Default: A Political-Economic Model of the Strategic Role of Debt”. in R. Dornbusch and M. Draghi, eds. Public Debt Management: Theory and History. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 315-345.
-S. Fukuda (1992). “Why Does a Two-Party System Exist?: A New Economic Explanation”. E&P; V.4-#3, pp. 277-287.
-D. Hibbs (1992). “Partisan Theory after 15 Years”. EJPE; V.8-#?, pp. 361-373.
-M. Lossani, P. Natale, and P. Tirelli (2000). “Macroeconomics and Politics Revisited: Do Central Banks Matter?”. E&P; V.12-#1, pp. 53-67.
(3) Empirical Tests of the Partisan Theory
-Chapell and W. Keech (1988). “The Unemployment Consequences of Partisan Monetary Regimes”. SEJ; V.55-#?, pp. 107-122.
-D. Hibbs and C. Dennis (1988). “Income Distribution in the US”. APSR; V.82-#2, pp. 467-490.
-A. Alesina and J. Sachs (1988). “Political Parties and Business Cycles in the US, 1948-1984". JMCB; V.20-#1, pp. 63-82.
-A. Alesina (1989). “Politics and Business Cycles in Industrial Democracies”. Economic Policy; #8, pp. 57-98.
-S. Shefrin (1989). “Evaluating Rational Partisan Business Cycle Theory”. E&P; V.1-#3, pp. 239-259. [comment by Alesina, E&P, V3-#1, pp. 63-71]
-A. Alesina and H. Rosenthal (1989). “Partisan Cycles in Congressional Elections and the Macroeconomy”. APSR; V.83-#2, pp. 373-398.
-M. Suzuki (1991). “The Rationality of Economic Voting and the Macroeconomic Regime”. AJPS; V.35-#?, pp. 624-642.
-A. Alesina and N. Roubini (1992). “Political Cycles in OECD Economies”. REStud; V.59-#?, pp. 663-688.
-A. Alesina, J. Londregan and H. Rosenthal (1993). “A Model of the Political Economy of the United States”. APSR; V.87-#1, pp. 1-33.
-D. Hibbs (1994). “The Partisan Model of Macroeconomic Cycles: More Theory and Evidence for the US”. E&P; V.6-#1, pp. 1-23.
-S. Haynes and J. Stone (1994). “Political Parties and the Variable Duration of Business Cycles”. SEJ; V.?-#?, pp. 869-885.
-M. Garfinkel and A. Glazer (1994). “Does Electoral Uncertainty Cause Economic Fluctuations?”. AER; V.84-#2, pp. 169-173.
-F. Carlsen and E. Pedersen (1999). “Rational Partisan Theory: Evidence for Seven OECD Economies”. E&P; V.11-#1, pp. 13-32.
-W. Clark and U. Reichert (1998). “International and Domestic Constraints on Political Business Cycle Behavior”. IO; V.57-#1, pp. 87-120.
-T. Oatley (1999). “How Constraining is Mobile Capital? The Partisan Hypothesis in a Open Economy”. AJPS; V.
-W. Clark and M. Hallerberg (2000). “Strategic Interaction between Monetary and Fiscal Actors under Full Capital Mobility”. APSR; V.94-#2, pp. 323-346.
IV. Endogenous Policy for the Open Economy
A. Credibility of Policy in Open Economies
1. Credibility and Exchange Rate Policy
-F. Giavazzi and M. Pagano (1988). “The Advantage of Tying One's Hands: EMS Discipline and Central Bank Credibility”. EER; V.32-#?, pp. 1055-1082.
-T. Andersen and O. Risager (1991). “The Role of Credibility for the Effects of a Change in Exchange-Rate Policy”. OEP; V.41-#1, pp. 85-98.
-A. Weber (1991). “Reputation and Credibility in the EMS”. European Policy; V.12-#?, pp. 57-102.
-A. Weber (1992). “The Role of Polcymakers' Reputation in the EMS Disinflations: An Empirical Evaluation”. EER; V.36-#?, pp. 1473-1492.
-T. Lane and L. Rojas-Suarez (1992). “Credibility, Capital Controls, and the EMS”. JIE; V.32-#3/4, pp. 321-337.
-J. von Hagen (1992). “Policy-Delegation and Fixed Exchange Rates”. IER; V.33-#4, pp. 849-870.
-A. Drazen and P. Masson (1994). “Credibility of Policies versus Credibility of Policymakers”. QJE; V.?-#?, pp. 735-754.
2. The Speculative Attack Problem
a. Overviews
-P.-R. Agénor, J. Bhandari and R. Flood (1992). “Speculative Attack Models of Balance of Payments Crises”. V.39-#2, pp. 357-394.
-P.-R. Agénor and R. Flood (1994). “Macroeconomic Policy, Speculative Attacks, and Balance of Payments Crises”. in F. van der Ploeg, ed. The Handbook of International Macroeconomics. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 224-250.
-R. Flood and N. Marion (2001). “Perspectives on the Recent Currency Crisis Literature”. In G. Calvo, R. Dornbusch, and M. Obstfeld, eds. Money, Capital Mobility, and Trade: Essays in Honor of Robert Mundell. Cambridge: MIT, pp. 207-249.
b. Stochastic Optimal Control and Stochastic Process Switching
-A. Dixit (1991). “A Simplified Treatment of the Theory of Optimal Regulation of Brownian Motion”. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control; V.15-#?, pp. 657-673.
-B. Dumas (1991). “Super Contract and Related Optimality Conditions”. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control; V.15-#?, pp. 675-685.
-A. Dixit (1993). The Art of Smooth Pasting. Chur: Harwood.
-R. Flood and P. Garber (1983). “A Model of Stochastic Process Switching”. Etrica; V.51-#3, pp. 537-552.
-G. Smith (1991). “Solution to a Problem of Stochastic Process Switching”. Etrica; V.59-#1, pp. 237-239.
-K. Froot and M. Obstfeld (1991). “Stochastic Process Switching: Some Simple Solutions”. Etrica; V.59-#1, pp. 241-250. also in P. Krugman and M. Miller, eds. Exchange Rate Targets and Currency Bands. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 61-74.
-A. Sutherland (1995). “State- and Time-contingent Switches of Exchange Rate Regime”. JIE; V.38-#3/4, pp. 361-374.
-C. Rose (1993). “Bounded and Unbounded Stochastic Processes”. in H. Varian, ed. Economic and Financial Modelling with Mathematica. Santa Clara, pp. 239-265.
-S. Ikeda and A. Shibata (1995). “Fundamentals Uncertainty, Bubbles, and Exchange Rate Dynamics”. JIE; V.38-#3/4, pp. 199-222.
-S. Salant and D. Henderson (1978). “Market Anticipation of Government Policies and the Price of Gold”. JPE; V.86-#4, pp. 627-648.
-P. Krugman (1979). “A Model of Balance of Payments Crises”. JMCB; V.11-#?, pp. 311-325.
-S. Salant (1983). “The Vulnerability of Price Stabilization Schemes to Speculative Atack”. JPE; V.91-#1, pp. 1-38.
-R. Flood and P. Garber (1984). “Collapsing Exchange Rate Regimes: Some Linear Examplse”. JIE; V.17-#?, pp. 1-13.
-R. Flood and P. Garber (1984). “Gold Monetization and Gold Discipline”. JPE; V.92-#1, pp. 90-107.
-V. Grilli (1986). “Buying and Selling Attacks on Fixed Exchange Rate Systems”. JIE; V.20-#?, pp. 143-156.
-R. Dornbusch (1987). “Collapsing Exchange Rate Regimes”. Journal of Development Economics; V.27-#?, pp. 71-83.
-W. Buiter (1987). “Borrowing to Defend the Exchange Rate and the Timing and Magnitude of Speculative Attacks”. JIE; V.23-#?, pp. 221-239.
-K. Blackburn (1988). “Collapsing Exchange Rate Regimes and Exchange Rate Dynamics: Some Further Examples”. JIMF; V.7-#?, pp. 373-385.
-A. Wilman (1987). “Speculative Attack on the Currency with Uncertain Monetary Policy Reactions”. EcLets; V.25-#?, pp. 75-78.
-A. Wilman (1988). “The Collapse of the Fixed Exchange Rate Regime with Sticky Wages and Imperfect Substitutability between Domestic and Foreign Bonds”. EER; V.32-#?, pp. 1817-1838.
-A. Wilman (1989). “Devaluation Expectation and Speculative Attacks on the Currency”. ScanJE; V.91-#1, pp. 97-116.
-L. Goldberg (1991). “Collapsing Exchange Rate Regimes: Shocks and Biases”. JIMF; V.10-#?, pp. 252-263.
-D. Gros (1992). “Capital Controls and Foreign Exchange Market Crises in the EMS”. EER; V.36-#?, pp. 1533-1544.
-M. Connolly and D. Taylor (1984). “The Exact Timing of the Collapse of an Exchange Rate Regime and Its Impact on the Relative Price of Traded Goods”. JMCB; 16-#2, pp. 194-207.
-M. Savastano (1992). “Collapse of a Crawling Peg Regime in the Presence of a Government Budget Constraint”. IMFSP; V.39-#1, pp. 79-100.
-M. Obstfeld (1984). “Balance of Payments Crises and Devaluation”. JMCB; V.16-#2, pp. 208-217.
-M. Obstfeld (1986). “Speculative Attack and the External Constraint in a Maximizing Model of the Balance of Payments”. CJE; V.19-#1, pp. 1-22.
-M. Obstfeld (1986). “Rational and Self-fulfilling Balance of Payments Crises”. AER; V.76-#1, pp. 72-81.
-M. Obstfeld (1988). “Competitiveness, Realignment, and Speculation: The Role of Financial Markets”. in F. Giavazzi, S. Micossi and M. Miller, eds. The European Monetary System. Cambridge: CUP. pp. 232-247.
-G. Calvo (1987). “Balance of Payments Crises in a Cash in Advance Economy”. JMCB; V.19-#1, pp. 19-32.
-S. van Wijnbergen (1988). “Inflation, Balance of Payments Crises, and Inflation”. in E. Helpman, A. Razin and E. Sadka, eds. Economic Effects of the Government Budget. Cambridge: MIT.
-S. van Wijnbergen (1991). “Fiscal Deficits, Exchange Rate Crises, and Inflation”. REStud; V.58-#1, pp. 81-92.
-S. Claessens (1988). “Balance-of-Payments Crises in a Perfect Foresight Optimizing Model”. JIMF; V.7-#?, pp. 363-372.
-S. Claessens (1991). “Balance of Payments Crises in an Optimal Portfolio Model”. EER; V.35-#1, pp. 81-101.
-A. Penati and G. Pennachi (1989). “Optimal Portfolio Choice and the Collapse of a Fixed-Exchange Rate Regime”. JIE; V.27-#?, pp. 1-24.
-P. Bachetta (1990). “Temporary Capital Controls in a Balance-of-Payments Crisis”. JIMF; V.V.9-#?, pp. 373-385.
-B. Eichengreen and C. Wyplosz (1993). “The Unstable EMS”. BPEA; V.1, pp. 51-143.
-M. Obstfeld (1994). “The Logic of Currency Crises”. Banque de France Cahiers Économiques et Monétaires; V.43-#?, pp. 189-213.
-M. Obstfeld (1996). “Models of Currency Crises with Self-fulfilling Features”. EER; V.40-#3/5, pp. 1037-1047.
-P. Isard (1994). “Realignment Expectations, Forward Rate Bias and Intervention in an Optimizing Model of Exchange Rate Adjustment”. IMFSP; V.41-#?, pp. 435-459.
-E. Stansfield and A. Sutherland (1995). “Realignment Expectations and Government Credibility”. OEP; V.47-#?, pp. 211-228.
-F.G. Ozkan and A. Sutherland (1995). “Policy Measures to Avoid a Currency Crisis”. EJ; V.105-#?, pp. 510-519.
-R. Flood and N. Marion (1997). “Policy Implications of ‘Second Generation’ Crisis Models”. IMFSP; V.44-#3, pp. 383-390.
-F. G. Ozkan and A. Sutherland (1998). “A Currency Crisis Model with an Optimizing Policymaker”. JIE; V.44-#2, pp. 339-364.
-S. Morris and H.S. Shin (1998). “Unique Equilibria in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks”. AER; V.88-#3, pp. 587-597.
-S. Morris and H.S. Shin (1999). “A Theory of the Onset of Currency Attacks”. in Agenor, Miller, Vines, and Weber, eds. Asian Financial Crisis: Causes, Contagion, and Consequences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
-G. Corsetti, A. Dasgupta, S. Morris and H. S. Shin (1999). “Does One Soros Make a Difference? A Theory of Currency Crises with Large and Small Traders”. Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper, #1273.
-S. Morris and H.S. Shin (2001). “Rethinking Multiple Equilibria in Macroeconomic Modeling”. NBER Macroeconomics Annual–2000. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 139-161.
-H. Blanco and P. Garber (1986). “Recurrent Devaluation and Speculative Attack on the Mexican Peso”. JPE; V.94-#1, pp. 148-166.
-M. Connolly (1986). “The Speculative Attack on the Peso and the Real Exchange Rate: Argentina, 1979-1981". JIMF; V.s117-s130.
-R. Cumby and S. van Wijnbergen (1989). “Financial Policy and Speculative Runs with a Crawling Peg: Argentina, 1979-1981". JIE; V.27-#?, pp. 215-232.
-V. Grilli (1990). “Managing Exchange Rate Crises: Evidence from the 1890's”. JIMF; V.9-#?, pp. 135-182.
-L. Goldberg (1994). “Predicting Exchange Rate Crises: Mexico Revisited”. JIE; V.36-#3/4, pp. 413-430.
-M. Miller and A. Sutherland (1992). “Britain’s Return to Gold and Entry into the EMS: Expectations, Joining Conditions and Credibility”. In P. Krugman and M. Miller, eds. Exchange Rate Targets and Currency Bands. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 82-106.
-M. Miller and A. Sutherland (1994). “Speculative Anticipations of Sterling’s Return to Gold: Was Keynes Wrong?”. EJ; V.104-#?, pp. 804-812.
-G. Smith (1995). “Reading a Target Zone in Keynes’ Indian Currency and Finance”. EJ; V.105-#430, pp. 661-668.
3. Coordination by Target Zones
-L. Svensson (1992). “An Interpretation of Recent Research on Exchange Rate Target Zones”. JEP; V.6-#4, pp. 119-144.
-L. Svensson (1994). “Fixed Exchange Rates as a Means to Price Stability: What Have we Learned?”. EER; V.38-#
-J. Frenkel and M. Goldstein (1986). “A Guide to Target Zones”. IMFSP; V.33-#4, pp. 633-673.
-J. Williamson (1983/1985). The Exchange Rate System. Washington, DC: IIE.
-J. Williamson and M. Miller (1987). Targets and Indicators: A Blueprint for the International Coordination of Economic Policy. Washington, DC: IIE.
-P. Kofman, A. de Vaal and C. de Vries (1993). “Fixing Soft Margins”. JIE; V.34-#3/4, pp. 359-374.
-J. Frankel (1990). “Obstacles to Coordination, and a Consideration of Two Proposals to Overcome Them: International Nominal Targeting (INT) and the Hosmi Fund”. in W. Branson, J. Frenkel and M. Goldstein, eds. International Policy Coordination and Exchange Rate Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 109-145.
-P. Krugman (1991). “Target Zones and Exchange Rate Dynamics”. QJE; V.106-#3, pp. 669-682.
-P. Krugman and M. Miller (1992). “Why Have a Target Zone?”. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy; V.38, pp. 279-314.
-M. Klein (1990). “Playing with the Band: Dynamic Effects of Target Zones in an Open Economy”. IER; V.31-#4, pp. 757-772.
-A. Werner (1992). “Exchange Rates and Target Zone Width”. EcLets; V.40-#?, pp. 455-457.
-M. Miller and P. Weller (1991). “Currency Bands, Target Zones and Price Flexibility”. IMFSP; V.38-#1, pp. 184-215.
-M. Miller and P. Weller (1991). “Exchange Rate Bands with Price Inertia”. EJ; V.101-#?, pp. 1380-1399.
-A. Sutherland (1994). “Target Zone Models with Price Inertia: Solutions and Testable Implications”. EJ; V.104-#422, pp. 96-112.
-L. Svensson (1991). “The Simplest Test of Target Zone Credibility”. IMFSP; V.38-#3, pp. 655-665.
-L. Svensson (1991). “Target Zones and Interest Rate Variability”. JIE; V.31-1/2, pp. 27-54.
-L. Svensson (1991). “The Term Structure of Interest Rate Differentials in a Target Zone: Theory and Swedish Data”. JMonetaryE; V.28-#1, pp. 87-116.
-R. Flood, A. Rose and D. Mathieson (1991). “An Exploration of Exchange-Rate Target-Zones”. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy; V.35, pp. 7-66.
-Z. Chen and A. Giovannini (1992). “Target Zones and the Distribution of Exchange Rates: An Estimation Method”. EcLets; V.40-#?, pp. 83-99.
-G. Smith and M. Spencer (1992). “Estimation and Testing in Models of Exchange Rate Target Zones and Process Switching”. in P. Krugman and M. Miller, eds. Exchange Rate Targets and Currency Bands. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 211-239.
c. Target Zones with Realignment Risk
-M. Miller and P. Weller (1992). “Exchange Rate Bands and Realignments in a Stationary Stochastic Setting”. in M. Miller, B. Eichengreen, and R. Portes, eds. Blueprints for Exchange Rate Management. New York: Academic Press, pp. 161-173.
-G. Bertola and R. Caballero (1992). “Target Zones and Realignments”. AER; V.82-#3, pp. 520-536.
-L. Bartolini and G. Bodnar (1992). “Target Zones and Forward Rates in a Model with Repeated Realignments”. JMonetaryE; V.30-#?, pp. 373-408.
-O. Tristiani (1994). “Variable Probability of Realignment in a Target Zone”. ScanJE; V.96-#1, pp. 1-14.
-G. Bertola and L. Svensson (1993). “Stochastic Devaluation Risk and the Empirical Fit of Target-Zone Models”. REStud; V.60-#?, pp. 689-712.
-L. Svensson (1992). “The Foreign Exchange Risk Premium in a Target Zone with Devaluation Risk”. JIE; V.33-#1/2, pp. 21-40.
-L. Svensson (1993). “Assessing Target Zone Credibility: Mean Reversion and Devaluation Expectations in the ERM, 1979-1992". EER; V.37-#?, 763-802.
-H. Lindberg, P. Soderlind and L. Svensson (1993). “Devaluation Expectations: The Swedish Krona 1985-1992". EJ; V.103-#420, pp. 1170-1179.
-J. Frankel and S. Phillips (1992). “The EMS: Credible At Last?”. OEP; V.44-#?, pp.
-P.A. Edin and A. Vredin (1993). “Devaluation Risk in Target Zones: Evidence from the Nordic Countries”. EJ; V.103-#416, pp. 161-175.
-A. Rose and L. Svensson (1993). “European Exchange Rate Credibility Before the Fall”. EER; V.38-#?, pp. 1185-1216.
-A. Rose and L. Svensson (1995). “Expected and Predicted Realignments: The FF/DM Exchange Rate During the EMS”. ScanJE; V.97-#2, pp. 173-200.
-A. Werner (1995). “Exchange Rate Target Zones, Realignments and the Interest Rate Differential: Theory and Evidence”. JIE; V.39-#3/4, pp. 353-367.
-B. Dumas, L.P. Jennergren, and B. Näslund (1995). “Currency Option Pricing in Credible Target zones”. Review of Futures Markets; V.12-#?, pp. 323-340.
-B. Dumas, L.P. Jennergren, and B. Näslund (1995). “Realignment Risk and Currency Option Pricing in Target Zones”. EER; V.39-#?, pp. 1523-1544.
-G. Bekaert and S. Gray (1998). “Target Zones and Exchange Rates: An Empirical Investigation”. JIE; V.45-#1, pp. 1-35.
-K. Froot and M. Obstfeld (1991). “Exchange-rate Dynamics under Stochastic Regime Shifts: A Unified Approach”. JIE; V.31-#3/4.
-F. Delgado and B. Dumas (1992). “Target Zones: Broad and Narrow”. in P. Krugman and M. Miller, eds. Exchange Rate Targets and Currency Bands. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 35-56.
-M. Klein (1992). “Big Effects of Small Interventions: The Informational Role of Intervention in Exchange Rate Policy”. EER; V.36-#?, pp. 915-924.
-K. Dominguez and P. Kenen (1992). “Intramarginal Intervention in the EMS and the Target-Zone Model of Exchange-Rate Behavior”. EER; V.36-#?, pp. 1523-1532.
-M. Klein and K. Lewis (1993). “Learning About Intervention in Target Zones”. JIE; V.35-#?, pp. 275-295.
-K. Kiedijk and C. Kool (1994). “Tail Estimates and the EMS Target Zone”. RIE; V.2-#2, pp. 153-165.
-R. Beetsma and F. van der Ploeg (1994). “Intramarginal Interventions, Bands and the Pattern of EMS Exchange Rate Distributions”. IER; V.35-#3, pp. 583-602.
-K. Lewis (1995). “Occasional Interventions to Target Rates”. AER; V.85-#4, pp. 691-715.
-M. Flandreau (1998). “The Burden of intervention: Externalities in Multilateral Exchange Rate Arrangements”. JIE; V.45-#1, pp. 137-171.
e. Speculative Attack on the Target Zone
-R. Flood and P. Garber (1991). “The Linkage between Speculative Attack and Target Zone Models of Exchange Rates”. QJE; V.106-#4, pp. 1367-1372.
-R. Flood and P. Garber (1992). “The Linkage between Speculative Attack and Target Zone Models of Exchange Rates--Some Extended Results”. in P. Krugman and M. Miller, eds. Exchange Rate Targets and Currency Bands. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 17-34.
-P. Krugman and J. Rotemberg (1992). “Speculative Attacks on Target Zones”. in P. Krugman and M. Miller, eds. Exchange Rate Targets and Currency Bands. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 117-132.
-F. Delgado and B. Dumas (1993). “Monetary Contracting between Central Banks and the Design of Sustainable Exchange-rate Zones”. JIE; V.34-#3/4, pp. 201-224.
-W. Buiter and V. Grilli (1992). “Anomalous Speculative Attacks on Fixed Exchange Rate Regimes: Possible Resolutions of the `Gold Standard Paradox`”. in P. Krugman and M. Miller, eds. Exchange Rate Targets and Currency Bands. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 140-176.
-G. Bertola and R. Caballero (1992). “Sustainable Intervention Policies and Exchange Rate Dynamics”. in P. Krugman and M. Miller, eds. Exchange Rate Targets and Currency Bands. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 186206.
-M. Ichikawa, M. Miller and A. Sutherland (1992). “Entering a Preannounced Currency Band”. in P. Krugman and M. Miller, eds. Exchange Rate Targets and Currency Bands. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 75-81.
-M. Miller and A. Sutherland (1992). “Britains Return to Gold and Entry into the EMS: Joining Conditions and Credibility”. in P. Krugman and M. Miller, eds. Exchange Rate Targets and Currency Bands. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 82-106.
-B. Dumas and L. Svensson (1994). “How Long do Unilateral Target Zones Last?”. JIE; V.36-#3/4, pp. 467-481.
-R. Cooper (1969). The Economics of Interdependence. New York: McGraw-Hill.
-R. Bryant (1980). Money and Monetary Policy in Interdependent Nations. Washington, DC: Brookings.
-M. Feldstein (1988). “Rethinking International Economic Coordination”. OEP; V.40-#?, pp. 205-219.
-S. Fischer (1988). “Macroeconomic Policy”. in M. Feldstein, ed. International Economic Cooperation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER. [comments by W.M. Blumenthal, C. Schultz, A. Greenspan, and H. Schmidt]
-W. McKibbin (1988). “The Economics of International Policy Coordination”. EcRec; V.64-#?, pp. 241-253.
-J. Horne and P. Masson (1988). “Scope and Limits of International Economic Cooperation and Policy Coordination”. IMFSP; V.35-#?, pp. 259-296.
-P. Kenen (1990). “The Coordination of Macroeconomic Policies”. in W. Branson, J. Frenkel and M. Goldstein, eds. International Policy Coordination and Exchange Rate Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 63-102.
-W. McKibbin and J. Sachs (1991). Global Linkages: Macroeconomic Interdependence and Cooperation in the World Economy. Washington, DC: Brookings.
1. Non-Strategic Analysis of Monetary/Exchange Rate Policy
-J. Niehans (1968). “Monetary and Fiscal Policies in Open Economies under Fixed Exchange Rates: An Optimizing Approach”. JPE; V.68-#?, pp. 893-920.
-R. Cooper (1969). “Macroeconomic Policy Adjustment in Interdependent Economies”. QJE; V.83-#1, pp.1-24.
-K. Hamada and Sakurai (1978). “International Transmission of Stagflation under Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rates”. JPE; V.86-#5, pp. 877-895.
-M. Mussa (1979). “Macroeconomic Interdependence and the Exchange Rate Regime”. in R. Dornbusch and J. Frenkel, eds. International Economic Policy. Baltimore: Hopkins, pp. 160-204.
-W.M. Corden and S. Turnovsky (1983). “Negative International Transmission of Economic Expansion”. EER; V.20-#?, pp. 289-310.
-M. Schmid (1982). “Devaluation: Keynesian Trade Models and the Monetary Approach: The Role of Nominal and Real Wage Rigidity”. EER; V.17-#1, pp. 27-50.
2. Strategic Analysis of Monetary Policy
-M. Canzoneri and D. Henderson (1991). Monetary Policy in Interdependent Economies: A Game Theoretic Approach. Cambridge: MIT.
-K. Hamada (1976). “A Strategic Analysis of Monetary Interdependence”. JPE; V.84-#4, pp. 677-700.
-K. Hamada (1977). “On the Political Economy of Monetary Integration: A Public Economics Approach”. in R. Aliber, ed. The Political Economy of Monetary Reform. pp. 13-31.
-K. Hamada (1979). “Macroeconomic Strategy and Coordination under Alternative Exchange Rates”. in R. Dornbusch and J. Frenkel, eds. International Economic Policy. Baltimore: Hopkins, pp. 292-324.
-L. Johansen (1982). “A Note on the Possibility of an International Equilibrium with Low Levels of Activity”. JIE; V.13-#?, pp. 257-265.
-W.M. Corden (1983). “The Logic of the International Monetary Non-System”. in F. Machlup, et al., eds. Reflections on a Troubled World Economy. London: Macmillan, pp. 59-74.
-W.M. Corden (1985). “Macroeconomic Policy Interaction under Flexible Exchange Rates: A Two Country Model”. Eca; V.52-#?, pp. 9-23.
-W.M. Corden (1985). “On Transmission and Coordination under Flexible Exchange Rates”. in W. Buiter and R. Marston, eds. International Economic Policy Coordination. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 8-24.
-W.M. Corden (1986). “Fiscal Policies, Current Accounts and Real Exchange Rates: In Search of the Logic of International Policy Coordination”. WA; V.122-#?, pp. 423-438.
-C. Bliss and V. Joshi (1988). “Exchange Rate Protection and Exchange Rate Conflict”. OEP; V.40-#?, pp. 365-377.
-G. Oudiz and J. Sachs (1984). “Policy Coordination in Industrializaed Countries”. BPEA; #1, pp. 1-64.
-M. Canzoneri and J. Gray (1984). “Some Aspects of the Adjustment Problem in an Interdependent World”. in T. Agmon, R. Hawkins and R. Levich, eds. The Future of the International Monetary System. Lexington: DC Heath, pp. 195-220.
-M. Canzoneri and J. Gray (1985). “Monetary Policy Games and the Consequences of Non-Cooperative Behavior”. IER; V.26-#3, pp. 547-464.
-B. Eichengreen (1985). “International Policy Coordination in Historical Perspective: A View from the Interwar Years”. in W. Buiter and R. Marston, eds. International Economic Policy Coordination. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 139-183.
-S. Turnovsky and V. d'Orey (1986). “Monetary Policies in Interdependent Economies with Stochastic Disturbances: A Strategic Approach”. EJ; V.96-#?, pp. 696-721.
-J.C. Martinez Oliva and S. Sinn (1988). “The Game Theoretic Approach to International Policy Coordination: Assessing the Role of Targets”. WA; V.124-#2, pp. 252-267.
-J.C. Martinez Oliva (1991). “One Remark on Spillover Effects and the Gains from Coordination”. OEP; V.43-#?, pp. 172-176
-F. Vandenbroucke (1985). “Conflicts in International Economic Policy and the World Recession: A Theoretical Analyis”. Cambridge Journal of Economics; V.9-#1, pp. 15-42.
-M. Jones (1987). “IMF Surveillance, Policy Coordination, and Time Consistency”. IER; V.28-#1, pp. 135-
-G. Basevi, P. Kind and G. Poli (1988). “Economic Cooperation and Confrontation between Europe and the USA: A Game Theoretic Approach to the Analysis of International Monetary and Trade Policies”. in R. Baldwin, C. Hamilton and A. Sapir, eds. Issues in US-EC Trade Relations. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, p.
-G. Basevi, V. Denicolo and F. Delbono (1990). “International Monetary Cooperation under Tariff Threats”. JIE; V.28-#1/2, pp. 1-23.
-A. Brandsma and A. Hughes-Hallett (1983). “Optimal Policies for Interdependent Economies: Risk Aversion and the Problem of Information”. Dynamic Modelling and Control of National Economies. Washington, DC: IFAC, pp. 455-462.
-A. Brandsma and A. Hughes-Hallett (1984). “Economic Conflict and the Solution of Dynamic Games”. EER; V.26-#?, pp. 13-32.
-A. Hughes-Hallett (1984). “Noncooperative Strategies for Dynamic Games and the Problem of Time Consistency”. OEP; V.36-#?, pp. 381-399.
-A. Hughes-Hallett (1986). “Autonomy and Choice of Policy in Asymmetrically Dependent Economies”. OEP; V.38-#?, pp.
-A. Hughes-Hallett (1986). “Policy Design in Asymmetrically Dependent Economies”. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control; V.10-#?, pp. 51-57.
-A. Hughes-Hallett (1986). “International Policy Design and the Sustainability of Policy Bargains”. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control; V.10-#?, pp. 467-494.
-A. Hughes-Hallett (1987). “How Robust are the Gains to Policy Coordination to Variations in the Model and Objectives”. Richerche Economiche; V.51-#?, pp. 341-372.
-G. Fissel (1988). “International Economic Policy Coordination: Policy Analysis in a Staggered Wage Setting Model”. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control; V.12-#?, pp. 93-100.
-H. Jensen (1994). “Sustaining Policy Cooperation between Economies of Different Size”. JIE; V.36-#3/4, pp. 289-307.
-M. Miller and M. Salmon (1985). “Dynamic Games and the Time Consistency of Optimal Policy in Open Economies”. EJ; V.95-#?, pp. 124-137.
-M. Miller and M. Salmon (1985). “Policy Coordination and Dynamic Games”. in W. Buiter and R. Marston, eds. International Economic Policy Coordination. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 184-213.
-G. Oudiz and J. Sachs (1985). “International Policy Coordination in Dynamic Macroeconomic Models”.. in W. Buiter and R. Marston, eds. International Economic Policy Coordination. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 274-319.
-D. Currie and P. Levine (1985). “Macroeconomic Policy Design in an Interdependent World”.. in W. Buiter and R. Marston, eds. International Economic Policy Coordination. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 228-268.
-D. Currie and P. Levine (1985). “Simple Macropolicy Rules for the Open Economy”. EJ; V.95-#(supp); pp. 60-70.
-P. Levine and D. Currie (1987). “Does International Macroeconomic Policy Coordination Pay and Is It Sustainable: A Two Country Analysis”. OEP; V.39-#?, pp. 38-74.
-J. Taylor (1985). “International Co-ordination in the Design of Macroeconomic Policy Rules”. EER; V.28-#?, pp. 53-81.
-K. Rogoff (1985). “Can International Monetary Policy Cooperation be Counterproductive?”. JIE; V.18-#?, pp. 199-217.
-M. Canzoneri and D. Henderson (1988). “Is Sovereign Policymaking Bad?”. Carnegie-Rochester Policy Series on Public Policy, #28, pp. 93-140.
-M. Canzoneri and D. Henderson (1989). “Optimal Choice of Monetary Policy Instruments in a Simple Two-Country Game”. in F. van der Ploeg and A. de Zeeuw, eds. Dynamic Policy Games in Economics. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 223-240.
-S. Turnovsky, T. Basar and V. D'Orey (1988). “Dynamic Strategic Monetary Policies and Coordination in Interdependent Economies”. AER; V.78-3, pp. 341-361. [comment by deCombrugghe/Roubini/Sachs and reply, AER, 1991, V.81-#5, pp. 1439-1445]
-A. Hughes-Hallett (1992). “Target Zones and International Policy Coordination: The Contrast Between the Necessary and Sufficient Condtions for Success”. EER; V.36-#?, pp. 893-914.
-A. Hughes-Hallett (1993). “Exchange Rates and Asymmetric Policy Regimes: When Does Exchange Rate Targetting Pay”. OEP; V.45-#?, pp. 191-206.
-A. Hughes-Hallett (1994). “On the Imperfect Substitutability of Policy Regimes: Exchange Rate Targetting vs. Policy Coordination”. EcLets; V.44-#?, pp. 159-164.
-H. Jensen (2000). “Optimal Monetary Policy Cooperation through State-Indpendent Contracts with Targets”. EER; V.44-#3, pp. 517-539.
3. Effectiveness of Coordinated Exchange Rate Intervention
-R. Marston (1988). “Exchange Rate Coordination”. in M. Feldstein, ed. International Economic Cooperation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 79-136. [comments by G. Carli, J. Attali, J. Petty, and R. Solomon]
a. Single Country Sterilization
-V. Argy (1982). “Exchange Rate Management in Theory and Practice”. Princeton Studies in International Finance. #50.
-D. Henderson (1983). “Exchange Market Intervention Operations: Their Role in Financial Policy and Their Effects”. in J. Bilson and R. Marston, eds. Exchange Rate Theory and Practice. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp.357-406.
-D. Henderson and D. Sampson (1984). “Intervention in Foreign Exchange Markets: A Summary of Ten Staff Studies”. Federal Reserve Bulletin; V.69-#?, pp. 357-406.
-K. Rogoff (1984). “On the Effects of Sterilized Intervention: An Analysis of Weekly Data”. JMonE; V.14-#?, pp. 133-150.
-M. Obstfeld (1983). “Exchange Rates,Inflation, and the Sterilization Problem: Germany, 1975-1981". EER; V.21-#?, pp. 161-189.
-D. Taylor (1982). “Official Intervention in the Foreign Exchange Market, or, Bet Against the Central Bank”. JPE; V.90-#?, pp. 356-368.
-C. Corrado and D. Taylor (1986). “The Cost of a Central Bank Leaning Against a Random Walk”. JIMF; V.5-#?, pp. 303-314.
-J. Carlson and I. Kim (1994). “Leaning Against the Wind: Do Central Banks Necessarily Lose?”. RIE; V.2-#2, pp. 143-152.
-G. Almenkinders and S. Eijffinger (1991). “Empirical Evidence on Foreign Exchange Market Intervention: Where do We Stand?”. WA; V.127-#?, pp. 645-677.
-H. Edison (1994). “The Effectiveness of Central Bank Intervention: A survey of the Literature After 1982". Princeton Special Paper in International Finance, #18.
b. The Theory of Optimum Currency Areas
-Y. Ishiyama (1975). “The Theory of Optimum Currency Areas: A Survey”. IMFSP; V.22-#?, pp. 344-383.
-E. Tower and T. Willett (1976). “The Theory of Optimum Currency Areas and Exchange Rate Flexibility”. Princeton Special Papers in International Finance, #11.
-P. Masson and M. Taylor (1993). “Currency Unions: A Survey of the Issues”. In P. Masson and M. Taylor, eds. Posicy Issues in the Operation of Currency Unions. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 3-51.
-R. Mundell (1961). “A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas”. AER; V.51-#4, pp. 657-665.
-R. McKinnon (1963). “Optimum Currency Areas”. AER; V.53-#5, pp. 717-725
-P. Kenen (1969). “The Theory of Optimum Currency Areas: An Eclectic View”. In R. Mundell and A. Swoboda, eds. Monetary Problems of the International Economy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 41-60.
-T. Willett and E. Tower (1970). “The Concept of Optimum Currency Areas and the Choice Between Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rates”. In G. Halm, ed. Approaches to Greater Flexibility of Exchange Rates. Princeton: PUP, pp. 407-415.
-T. Willett and E. Tower (1970). “Currency Areas and Exchange Rate Flexibility”. WA; V.105-#1, pp. 48-65.
-W.M. Corden (1972). “Monetary Integration”. Princeton Essays in International Finance, #93.
-J. Ingram (1973). The Case for European Monetary Integration. Princeton Essays in International Finance, #98.
-H.G. Johnson and A. Swoboda, eds. (1973). The Economics of Common Currencies. London: Allen and Unwin.
-M. Kreinin and H.R. Heller (1974). “Adjustment Costs, Optimal Currency Areas and International Reserves”. In W. Sellekaerts, ed. International Trade and Finance. White Plains: International Arts and Sciences Press, Pp. 127-140.
-J. Frenkel and J. Aizenman (1983). “Aspects of the Optimal Management of Exchange Rates”. In E. Claassen and P. Salin, eds. Recent Issues in the Theory of Flexible Exchange Rates. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 201-230.
-G. Tavlas (1993). “The ‘New’ Theory of Optimum Currency Areas”. World Economy; V.16-#?, pp. 663-685.
-G. Tavlas (1994). “The Theory of Monetary Integration”. Open Economies Review; V.5-#?, pp. 211-230.
-T. Bayoumi (1994). “A Formal Model of Optimum Currency Areas”. IMFSP; V.41-#4, pp. 537-554.
-P. Minford (1995). “Other People’s Money: Cash-in-Advance Microfoundations for Optimal Currency Areas”. JIMF; V.14-#3, pp. 427-440.
-T. Bayoumi and B. Eichengreen (1997). “Optimum Currency Areas and Exchange Rate Volatility: Theory and Evidence Compared”. B. Cohen, ed. International Trade and Finance: New Frontiers for Research. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 184-215.
-T. Bayoumi and B. Eichengreen (1998). “Exchange Rate Volatility and Intervention: Implications of the Theory of Optimum Currency Areas”. JIE; V.45-#2, pp. 191-209.
-T. Bayoumi and B. Eichengreen (1999). “Operationalising the Theory of Optimum Currency Areas”. in R. Baldwin, D. Cohen, A. Sapir, and A. Venables, eds. Market Integration, Regionalism and the Global Economy. Cambridge: CUP/CEPR, pp. 187-216.
-J. Frankel and A. Rose (1998). “The Enodgeneity of the Optimum Currency Area Criteria”. EJ; V.108-#?, pp. 1009-1025.
c. Coordination with Political Integration: The EMS Experience
-B. Eichengreen (1993). “European Monetary Integration”. JEL; V.31-#?, pp. 1321-1357.
-S. Micossi (1985). “The Intervention and Financing Mechanism of the EMS and the Role of the ECU”. Banca Nationale del Lavoro Quarterly Review; pp. 327-345.
-C. Mastropasqua, S. Micossi and R. Rinaldi (1988). “Interventions, Sterization and Monetary Policy in EMS Countries (1979-1987)”. in F. Giavazzi, S. Micossi and M. Miller, eds. The European Monetary System. Cambridge: CUP.
-M. Canzoneri and C. Rogers (1990). “Is the EC and Optimal Currency Area?”. AER; V.80-#3, pp. 419-433.
-B. Eichengreen (1990). “One Money for Europe? Lessons from the US Currency and Customs Union”. Economic Policy; #10, pp. 117-187.
-B. Eichengreen (1992). “Is Europe and Optimum Currency Area?”. in S. Borner and H. Grubel, eds. The European Community After 1992: The View from Outside. London: Macmillan.
-C. Bean (1992). “Economic and Monetary Union in Europe”. JEcPers; V.6-#?, pp. 31-52.
-X. Sala-i-Martin and J. Sachs (1992). “Fiscal Federalism and Optimum Currency Areas: Evidence for Europe from the US”. in M. Canzoneri, V. Grilli, and. P. Masson, eds. Establishing a Central Bank: Issues in Europe and Lessons from the US. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 195-220.
-P. DeGrauwe and W. Vanhaverbeke (1993). “Is Europe and Optimum Currency Area? Evidence from Regional Data”. In P. Masson and M. Taylor, eds. Policy Issues in the Operation of Currency Areas. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 111-129.
-P. Krugman (1993). “Lessons of Massachusetts for EMU”. in F. Torres and F. Giavazzi, eds. Adjustment and Growth in the European Monetary Union. Cambridge: CUP/CEPR, pp. 241-260.
-T. Bayoumi and B. Eichengreen (1993). “Shocking Aspects of European Monetary Unification”. In F. Torres and F. Giavazzi, eds. Adjustment and Growth in the European Monetary Union. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 193-229.
-T. Bayoumi and B. Eichengreen (1994). “One Money or Many? Analyzing the Prospect for Monetary Unification in Europe and Other Parts of the World”. Princeton Studies in International Finance, #76.
-D. Begg and C. Wyploz (1987). “Why the EMS? Dynamic Games and the Equilibrium Policy Regime”. In R. Bryant and R. Portes, eds. Global Macroeconomics. New York: St. Martins, pp.
-F. Giavazzi and A. Giovannini (1987). “Models of the EMS: Is Europe a Greater Deutschmark Area”. in R. Bryant and R. Portes, eds. Global Macroeconomics: Policy Conflict and Cooperation. New York: St. Martins, pp. 237-272.
-F. Giavazzi and A. Giovannini (1988). Limiting Exchange Rate Flexibility: The EMS. Cambridge: MIT.
-F. Giavazzi and A. Giovannini (1990). “Can the EMS System Be Copied Outside Europe? Lessons from Ten Years of Monetary Policy Coordination in Europe”. in W. Branson, J. Frenkel and M. Goldstein, eds. International Policy Coordination and Exchange Rate Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 247-269.
-F. Giavazzi and M. Pagano (1989). “The Advantage of Tying One’s Hands: Ems Discipline and Exchange Rate Credibility”. EER; V.32-#5, pp. 1055-1075.
-A. Weber (1991). “Reputation and Credibility in the European Monetary System”. Economic Policy; #12, pp. 57-102.
-J. von Hagen (1992). “Policy-Delegation and Fixed Exchange Rates”. IER; V.33-#4, pp. 849-870.
-G.M. Milesi-Ferretti (1995). “The Disadvantage of Tying One’s Hands: On the Political Economy of Policy Commitments”. AER; V.105-#433, pp. 1381-1402.
-A. Casella and J. Feinstein (1989). “Management of a Common Currency”. in A. Giovannini and M. de Cecco, eds. A European Central Bank?. Cambridge: CUP. pp. 131-156.
-A. Alesina and V. Grilli (1992). “The European Central Bank: Reshaping Monetary Policy in Europe”. in M. Canzoneri, V. Grilli and P. Masson, eds. Establishing a Central Bank: Issues in Europe and Lessons from the US. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 49-77.
-A. Giovannini (1992). “Central Banking in a Monetary Union: Reflections on the Proposed Statutes of the European Central Bank”. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy; Forth,
-A. Alesina and V. Grilli (1993). “On the Feasibility of a One or Multi-Speed European Monetary Union”. E&P; V.5-#2, pp. 145-165.
-P. Martin (1995). “Free-riding, Convergence and Two-Speed Monetary Union”. EER; V.39-#7, pp. 1345-1364.
-M. Canzoneri and B. Diba (1993). “Currency Substitution and Exchange Rate Volatility in the EC”. JIE; V.35-#3/4, pp. 351-365.
-A. Sibert (1992). “Government Finance in a Common Currency Area”. JIMF; V.11-#?, pp. 567-578.
-A. Sibert (1994). “The Allocation of Seignorage in a Common Currency Area”. JIE; V.37-#1/2, pp. 111-122.
-P. Levine (1993). “Fiscal Policy Coordination under EMU and the Choice of Monetary Instrument”. MS; V.61-#?, pp.
-D. Cohen and C. Wyplosz (1995). “Price and Trade Effects of Exchange Rate Fluctuations and the Design of Policy Coordiantion”. JIMF; V.14-#3, pp. 331-347.
-B. Sørensen and O. Yosha (1998). “International Risk Sharing and European Monetary Unification”. JIE; V.45-#2, pp. 211-238.
-A. Casella (1992). “Participation in a Currency Union”. AER; V.82-#4, pp. 847-863.
-A. Casella (1992). “Voting on the Adoption of a Common Currency”. in M Canzoneri, V. Grilli and P. Masson, eds. Designing a Central Bank for Europe. Cambridge, CUP
-A. Casella (1992). “On Markets and Clubs: Economic and Political Integration of Regions with Unequal Productivity”. AER; V.82-#2, pp.115-121.
-J. Feinstein (1992). “Public-Good Provision and Political Stability in Europe”. AER; V.82-#2, pp. 323-329.
-A. Casella and J. Feinstein (1990). “Public Goods in Trade: On the Formation of Markets and Political Jurisdictions”. ms
-A. Casella and B. Frey (1992). “Federalism and Clubs: Towards an Economic Theory of Overlapping Political Jurisdictions”. EER; V.36-#?, pp. 639-646.
-R. Chang (1995). “Bargaining a Monetary Union”. JET; V.66-#1, pp. 89-112.
-S. Lohmann (1996). “Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes? Necessary Conditions for Price Stability in Europe”. in H. Siebert, ed.. Monetary Policy in an Integrated World Economy: Symposium 1995. Tubingen: Mohr (Siebeck), pp. 139-160.
-S. Lohmann (1997). “Political Accountability in an Economic and Monetary Union”. Aussenwirtschaft; V.52-#?, pp. 159-177.
R. Beetsma and A.L. Bovenberg (1998). “Monetary Union without Fiscal Coordination May Discipline Policymakers”. JIE; V.45-#2, pp. 219-258.
-F. Ghironi and F. Giavazzi (1998). “Currency Areas, International Monetary Regimes, and the Employment-Inflation Tradeoff”. JIE; V.45-#2, pp. 259-296.
-K. McNamara (1998). The Currency of Ideas: Monetary Politics in the European Union. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
d. Coordination among Independent States: The OECD Experience
-M. Mussa (1981). The Role of Official Intervention. Group of 30 Occasional Papers, #6.
-M. Obstfeld (1990). “The Effectiveness of Foreign Exchange Intervention: Recent Experience, 1985-1988". in W. Branson, J. Frenkel and M. Goldstein, eds. International Policy Coordination and Exchange Rate Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 197-237.
-K. Dominguez (1990). “Market Responses to Coordinated Central Bank Intervention”. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy; V.32, pp. 121-164.
-K. Dominguez and J. Frankel (1993). Does Foreign Exchange Intervention Work?. Washington, DC: IIE.
-K. Dominguez and J. Frankel (1993). “Does Foreign-Exchange Intervention Matter?”. AER; V.83-#5, pp. 1356-1369.
-K. Dominguez and J. Frankel (1993). “Foreign Exchange Intervention: An Empirical Assessment”. in J. Frankel, ed. On Exchange Rates. Cambridge: MIT, pp.
-H. Edison (1993). “The Effectiveness of Central Bank Intervention: A Survey of Post-1982 Literature”. Princeton Special Papers in International Economics, #18.
4. Coordination of Fiscal Policy
a. Non-Strategic Analysis of Interdependent Fiscal Policy
-J. Frenkel and A. Razin (1985). “Fiscal Expenditures and International Economic Interdependence”. in W. Buiter and R. Marston, eds. International Economic Policy Coordination. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 37-73.
-C. Vegh and P. Guidotti (1990). “Optimal Taxation Policies in the EMS: A Two-Country Model of Public Finance”. IMFSP; V.37-#2, pp. 311-337.
-J. Frenkel and A. Razin (1992). Fiscal Policy and the World Economy. Cambridge: MIT.
b. Strategic Analysis of Fiscal Policy
-H. Hamada (1986). “Strategic Aspects of International Fiscal Interdependence”. Economic Studies Quarterly; V.37-#2, pp. 165-180.
-M. Devereux (1987). “Public Investment and International Policy Coordination”. EcLets; V.22-#?, pp. 299-302.
-D. Backus, M. Devereux and D. Purvis (1988). “A Positive Theory of Fiscal Policy in an Open Economies”. in J. Frenkel, ed. International Aspects of Fiscal Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp.
-S. Turnovsky (1988). “The Gains from Fiscal Cooperation in the Two-Commodity Real Trade Model”. JIE; V.25-#111-127.
-P. Kehoe (1987). “Coordination of Fiscal Policies in a World Economy”. JMonetaryE; V.19-#?, pp. 349-376.
-P. Kehoe (1989). “Policy Cooperation Among Benevolent Governments May Be Undesirable”. REStud; V.56-#?, pp. 289-296.
-Chari and Kehoe (1990). “International Coordination of Fiscal Policies in Limiting Economies”, JPE; V.98-#3, pp.617-636.
-R. Chang (1990). “International Coordination of Fiscal Deficits”. JMonetaryE; V.25-#?, pp. 347-366.
-M. Devereux (1991). “Terms of Trade and the International Coordination of Fiscal Policy”. EcInq; V.29-#?, pp. 720-736.
-M. Espinosa-Vega and C. Yip (1994). “On the Sustainability of International Coordination”. IER; V.35-#2, pp. 383-396.
-J. Sheen (1992). “International Monetary and Fiscal Policy Cooperation in the Presence of Wage Rigidities: Are Both Counterproductive?”. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control; V.16-#?, pp. 359-387.
-M. Devereux and A. Mansoorian (1992). “International Fiscal Policy Coordination and Economic Growth”. IER; V.33-#2, pp. 249-268.
-K. Blackburn and M. Vavn (1993). “Growth, Human Capital Spillovers and International Policy Coordination”. ScanJE; V.95-#4, pp. 495-515.
-M. Canzoneri (1989). “Adverse Incentives in the Taxation of Foreigners”. JIE; V.27-#?, pp. 283-297.
-J. Aizenman (1993). “Soft Budget Constraint, Taxes, and the Incentive to Cooperate”. IER; V.34-#4, pp. 819-832.
5. Cooperation with Model Uncertainty or Disagreement on Models
-J. Frankel and K. Rockett (1988). “International Macroeconomic Policy Coordination when Policymakers do not Agree on the True Model”. AER; V.78-#3, pp. 318-340. [comment by Holtham and Hughes-Hallett and response, AER; V.82-#4, pp. 1043-1051; reply pp. 1052-1056]
-J. Frankel (1988). “Obstacles to International Macroeconomic Policy Coordination”. Princeton Studies in International Finance; #64.
-G. Holtham and A. Hughes-Hallett (1988). “International Policy Cooperation and Model Uncertainty”. in R. Bryant and R. Portes, eds. Global Macroeconomics: Policy Conflict and Cooperation. New York: St. Martins, pp. 259-296.
-A. Ghosh (1986). “International Policy Coordination in an Uncertain World”. EcLets; V.21-#3, pp. 271-276.
-A. Ghosh and P. Masson (1988). “International Policy Coordination in a World with Model Uncertainty”. IMFSP; V.35-#?, pp. 230-258.
-A. Hughes-Hallett (1989). “What are the Risks in Coordinating Economic Policy Internationally?”. in R. McDonald and M. Taylor, eds. Exchange Rates and Open Economy Macroeconomics. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 63-105.
-A. Ghosh and S. Ghosh (1991). “Does Model Uncertainty Really Preclude International Policy Coordination?”. JIE; V.31-#3/4, pp. 325-340.
-A. Ghosh and P. Masson (1991). “Model Uncertainty, Learning, and the Gains from Coordination”. AER; V.81-#3, pp. 465-479.
-P. Masson (1992). “Portfolio Preference Uncertainty and Gains from Policy Coordination”. IMFSP; V.39-#1, pp. 101-120.
-A. Hughes-Hallett (1995). “Policy Bargains and the Problem of Model Selection”. JEDC; V.19-#5/7, pp. 941-959
-K. Blackburn (1989). “Credibility and Reputation in International Macroeconomic Policy Games”. in P. Artus, Y. Barroux, and G. McKenzie, eds. The International Transmission Mechanism, Exchange Rates, and Policy Coordination. London: Macmillan.
-A. Ghosh and P. Masson (1994). Economic Cooperation in an Uncertain World. Oxford: Blackwell.
C. Domestic Politics and International Economic Policy
-A. Lindbeck (1976). “Business Cycles, Politics and International Economic Dependence”. Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken Quarterly Review; V.2, pp. 53-68.
-A. Lindbeck (1976). “Stabilization Policy in Open Economies with Endogenous Politicians”. AER; V.66-#2, pp. 1-19.
-S. Black (1979). “The Political Assignment Problem and the Design of Stabilization Policies in Open Economies”. in A. Lindbeck, ed. Inflation and Employment in Open Economies. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 249-267.
-S. Black (1982). “Strategic Aspects of the Political Assignment Problem in Open Economies”. in R. Lombra and W. Witte, eds. Political Economy of Domestic and International Monetary Policy. Ames: Iowa State University Press; pp.
-S. Black (1982). Politics versus Markets: International Differences in Macroeconomic Policies. Washington, DC: AEI.
-F. van der Ploeg (1983). “The Principle of Political-Economic Assignment: Analysis of Macroeconomic Model with Political Feedbacks”. IFAC Dynamic Modelling and Control of National Economies. Washington, DC: IFAC, pp. 309-314.
-F. van der Ploeg (1984). “Government Ideology and Re-Election Efforts”. OEP; V.36-#?, pp. 213-231.
-F. van der Ploeg (1989). “The Political Economy of Overvaluation”. EJ; V.99-#?, pp. 850-855.
-T. Ito (1991). “International Impacts on Domestic Political Economy: A Case of Japanese General Elections”. JIMF; V.10-supplement, pp. 73-89.
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-J. Stephan (1992). “Political Exchange Rate Cycles: Theory and Empirical Evidence”. in H. Vosgerau, ed. European Integration in the World Economy. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, pp. 775-801.
-L. Ruland and J.-M. Viaene (1993). “The Political Choice of the Exchange Rate Regime”. E&P; V.5-#3, pp. 271-284.
-G. Tabellini (1990). “Domestic Politics and the International Coordination of Fiscal Policies”. JIE; V.28-#3/4, pp.
-S. Lohmann (1993). “Electoral Cycles and International Policy Cooperation”. EER; V.37-#?, pp. 1373-1391.
-T. Persson and G. Tabellini (1992). “The Politics of 1992: Fiscal Policy and European Integration”. REStud; V.59-#?, pp. 689-701.
-C. Hefeker (1997). Interest Groups and Monetary Integration: The Political Economy of Exchange Rate Choice. Boulder: Westview Press.
-J. Frieden (1997). “Economic Liberalization and the Politics of European Monetary Integration”. In M. Kahler, ed. Liberalization and Foreign Policy. New York: Columbia University Press.
J. Frieden (2001). “Making Commitments: France and Italy in the European Monetary System, 1979-1985” in B. Eichengreen and J. Frieden, eds. The Political Economy of European Monetary Unification. Boulder: Westview Press, pp. 23-47.
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-W. Bernhard and D. Leblang (1999). “Democratic Institutions and Exchange Rate Commitments”. IO; V.53-#1, pp. 71-97.
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-G. Garrett (2001). “The Politics of Maastricht”. in B. Eichengreen and J. Frieden, eds. The Political Economy of European Monetary Unification. Boulder: Westview Press, pp. 111-130.
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-B. Barry, ed. (1976). Power and Political Theory: Some European Views. London: Wiley.
-S. Lukes, ed. (1986). Power. London: Blackwell.
-H. Simon (1953). “Notes on the Observation and Measurement of Political Power”. JoP; V.15-#?, pp. 500-516.
-J. March (1955). “An Introduction to the Theory and Measurement of Influence”. APSR; V.49-#?, pp. 431-451.
-J. March (1957). “Measurement Concepts in the Theory of Influence”. JoP; V.19-#?, pp. 202-226.
-J. March (1966). “The Power of Power”. in D. Easton, ed. Varieties of Political Theory. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
-R. Dahl (1957). “The Concept of Power”. Behavioral Science; V.2-#?, pp. 201-215.
-R. Dahl (1968). “Power”. International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. New York: Free Press.
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-T. Parsons (1963). “On the Concept of Political Power”. Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society; V.107-#?, pp. 232-262.
-J. Harsanyi (1962). “Measurement of Social Power, Opportunity Costs and the Theory of Two-Person Bargaining Games”. Behavioral Science; V.7-#?, pp. 67-80.
-J. Harsanyi (1962). “Measurement of Social Power in N-Person Reciprocal Power Situations”. Behavioral Science; V.7-#?, pp. 81-92.
-W. Riker (1964). “Some Ambiguities in the Notion of Power”. APSR; V.58-#?, pp. 341-349.
-P. Blau (1964). Exchange and Power in Social Life. New York: Wiley.
-J. Nagel (1975). The Descriptive Analysis of Power. New Haven: Yale.
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-D. Wrong (1979). Power: Its Forms, Bases, and Uses. Oxford: Blackwell.
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1. General Analysis of Political Structure
-D. Easton (1965). A Framework for Political Analysis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
-D. Easton (1965). A Systems Analysis of Political Life. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
-D. Easton (1990). The Analysis of Political Structure. New York: Routledge.
-P. Kress (1966). “Self, System, and Significance: Reflections on Professor Easton's Political Science”. Ethics; V.77-#1, pp. 1-13.
-T. Parsons (1969). Politics and Social Structure. New York: Free Press.
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-R. Burt (1980). “Models of Network Structure”. Annual Review of Sociology; V.6, pp. 79-141.
-E. Laumann and D. Knoke (19??). “Social Network Theory”. in S. Lindenberg, J. Coleman and S. Nowak, eds. Approaches to Social Theory. New York: Russell Sage, pp. 83-104.
-E. Laumann and F. Pappi (1976). Networks of Collective Action: A Perspective on Community Influence Systems. New York: Academic Press.
-P. Marsden and E. Laumann (1977). “Collective Action in a Community Elite: Exchange, Influence Resources, and Issue Resolution”. in R. Liebert and A. Imersheim, eds. Power, Paradigms, and Community Research. London: Sage.
-E. Laumann, P. Marsden and J. Galaskiewicz (1977). “Community-Elite Influence Structures: Extension of a Network Approach”. AJS; V.83-#?, pp. 594-631.
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-T. Yamagishi, M. Gillmore, and K. Cook (1988). “Network Connections and the Distribution of Power in Exchange Networks”. AJS; V.93-#4, pp. 833-851.
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-E. Laumann and D. Knoke (1987). The Organizational State: Social Choice in National Policy Domains. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
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-D. Knoke (1990). Political Networks: The Structural Perspective. Cambridge: CUP.
2. Party Competition and Structural Realignment
a. Theory of Critical Elections and Structural Realignment
-V.O. Key (1955). “A Theory of Critical Elections”. JoP; V.17-#?, pp. 3-18.
-V.O. Key (1959). “Secular Realignment and the Party System”. JoP; V.21-#?, pp. 198-210.
-W.D. Burnham (1967). “Party Systems and the Political Process”. in W.D. Burnahm and W. Chambers, eds. The American Party Systems. pp. 277-307.
-W.D. Burnham (1970). Critical Elections and the Mainspring of American Politics. New York: Norton.
-J. Sundquist (1973). Dynamics of the Party System. Washington, DC: Brookings.
-P. Beck (1974). “A Socialization Theory of Partisan Realignment”. in R. Niemi, ed. The Politics of Future Citizens. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, pp. 199-219.
-W.D. Burnham, J. Clubb and W. Flanigan (1978). “Partisan Realignment a Systemic Perspective”. in J. Silbey, A. Bogue and W. Flanigan, eds. The History of American Electoral Behavior. Princeton: PUP, pp.
-P. Beck (1979). “The Electoral Cycle and Patterns of American Politics”. BJPS; V.9-#?, pp. 129-156.
-J. Clubb, W. Flaningan and N. Zingale (1980). Partisan Realignment. Beverly Hills: Sage.
-P. Kleppner (1981). “Critical Realignments and Electoral Systems”. in P. Kleppner, et al. eds. The Evolution of American Electoral Systems. Westport: Greenwood Press, pp. 3-32.
-A. Lichtman (1982). “The End of realignment Theory? Toward a New Program for American Political History”. Historical Methods; V.15-#4, pp. 170-188.
b. Methodological and Measurement Issues
-C. Sellers (1965). “The Equilibrium Cycle in Two-Party Politics”. Public Opinion Quarerly; V.29-#?, pp. 16-38.
-A. Campbell (1966). “A Classification of Presidential Elections”. in A. Campbell, P. Converse, W. Miller, and D. Stokes, eds. Elections and the Political Order. New York: Wiley, pp. 63-77.
-G. Pomper (1967). “Classification of Presidential Elections”. JoP; V.29-#?, pp. 535-566.
-W. Flanigan and N. Zingale (1974). “The Measurement of Electoral Change”. Political Methodology; V.1-#3, pp. 49-81.
-W. Flanigan and N. Zingale (1974). “Measures of Electoral Competition”. Political Methodology; V.1-#4, pp. 31-60.
-A. Broh and M. Levine (1978). “Patterns of Party Competition”. American Politics Quarterly; V.6-#3, pp. 357384.
-R. Salisbury and M. MacKuen (1981). “On the Study of Party Realignment”. JoP; V.43-#?, pp. 523-530.
-D. Gans (1986). “Persistence and Party Success in American Presidential Elections”. Journal of Interdisciplinary History; V.16-#2, pp. 221-237.
-G. Rabinowitz, P. Gurian and S. Macdonald (1984). “The Structure of Presidential Elections and the Process of Realignment, 1944-1980". American Journal of Political Science, V.28-#?, pp. 611-635.
-S. Macdonald and G. Rabinowitz (1987). “The Dynamics of Structural Realignment”. APSR; V.81-#3, pp. 775-796.
-J. Greer (1991). “Critical Realignments and the Public Opinion Poll”. JoP; V.53-#2, pp. 434-453.
-P. Nardulli (1995). “The Concept of a Critical Realignment, Electoral Behavior, and Political Change”. APSR; V.89-#1, pp. 10-22.
-W.D. Burnham (1981). “The System of 1896: An Analysis”. in P. Kleppner, et al. eds. The Evolution of American Electoral Systems. Westport: Greenwood Press, pp. 147-202.
-R. McCormick (1986). “Walter Dean Burnham and the `System of 1896`”. Social Science History; V.10-#3, pp. 245-262.
-W.D. Burnham (1986). “Periodization Schemes and `Party Systems`: The `System of 1896` as a Case in Point”. Social Science History; V.10-#3, pp. 263314.
-W.P. Shively (1971-72). “A Reinterpretation of the New Deal Realignment”. Public Opinion Quarterly; V.34-#?, pp. 621-624.
-K. Andersen (1979). The Creation of a Democratic Majority, 1928-1936. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
-K. Andersen (1976). “Generation, Partisan Shift, and Realignment: A Glace Back at the New Deal”. in N. Nie, S. Verba and J. Petrocik, eds. The Changing American Voter. Cambridge: Harvard, pp. 74-95.
-R. Jensen (1981). “The Last Party System: Decay of Consensus, 1932-1980". in P. Kleppner, et al. eds. The Evolution of American Electoral Systems. Westport: Greenwood Press, pp. 203-241.
-A. Lichtman (1976). “Critical Election Theory and the Reality of American Presidential Politics, 1916-40". American Historical Review; V.81-#?, pp. 317-351.
-B. Sinclair (1977). “Party Realignment and the Transformation of the Political Agenda: The House of Representatives, 1925-1938". APSR; V.71-#?, pp. 940-953.
-B. Sinclair (1978). “The Policy Consequences of Party Realignment--Social Welfare Legislation in the House of Representatives, 1933-1954". AJPS; V.22-#1, pp. 83-105.
-B. Sinclair (1978). “From Party voting to Regional Fragmentation: The House of Representatives from 1933-1956". American Politics Quarterly; V.6-#?, pp. 125-146.
d. Impact of Structural Realignment on Policy Outcomes
-B. Ginsberg (1972). “Critical Elections and the Substance of Party Conflict: 1844-1968". Midwest Journal of Political Science; V.16-#4, pp. 603-625.
-B. Ginsberg (1976). “Elections and Public Policy”. APSR; V.70-#1, pp. 41-49. [comment by W.L. Neumann and A. Hicks, and response, 1977, APSR; V.71: 277-281]
-D. Brady and N. Lynn (1973). “Switched-Seat Congressional Districts: Their Effect on Party Voting and Public Policy”. AJPS; V.67-#?, pp. 528-543.
-M. King and L. Seligman (197?). “Critical Elections, Congressional Recruitment and Public Policy”. in H. Eulau and M. Czudnowski, eds. Elite Recruitment in Democratic Politics. New York: Halsted Press, pp. 263-299.
-L. Seligman and M. King (1980). “Political Realignments and Recruitment to the US Congress”. in A. Campbell and R. Trilling, eds. Realignment in American Politics. Austin: University of Texas Press, pp. 157-201
-J. Clubb and S. Traugott (1977). “Partisan Cleavage and Cohesion in the House of Representatives, 1861-1974". Journal of Interdisciplinary History; V.7-#3, pp. 375-401.
-D. Brady (1978). “Critical Elections, Congressional Parties and Clusters of Policy Changes”. BJPS; V.8-#?, pp. 79-99.
-J. Cooper, D. Brady and P. Hurley (1977). “The Electoral Basis of Party Voting: Patterns and Trends in the US House of Representatives, 1887-1969". in. L. Maisel and J. Cooper, eds. The Impact of Electoral Politics. Beverly Hills: Sage.
-D. Brady, J. Cooper and P. Hurley (1979). “The Decline of Party in the US House of Representatives, 1887-1968". LSQ; V.4-#3, pp. 381-407.
-D. Brady with J. Stewart (1982). “Congressional Party Realignment and Transformations of Public Policy in Three Realignment Eras”. AJPS; V.26-#2, pp. 333-360.
-D. Brady (1985). “A Reevaluation of Realignments in American Politics: Evidence from the House of Representatives”. APSR; V.79-#1, pp. 2849.
-D. Brady (1988). Critical Elections and Congressional Policy Making. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
-M. Collie (1989). “Electoral Patterns and Voting Alignments in the US House, 1886-1986". LSQ; V14-#1, pp. 107-127.
-P. Hurley and R. Wilson (1989). “Partisan Voting Patterns in the US Senate, 1877-1986". LSQ; V.14-#2, pp. 225-250.
-G. Esping-Andersen, R. Friedland, and E.O. Wright (1976). “Modes of Class Struggle and the Capitalist State”. KAPITALSTATE; #4/5, pp.186-220.
-G. Therborn (1978). What Does the Ruling Class Do When it Rules? London: New Left Books.
-D. Easton (1981). “The Political System Beseiged by the State”. Political Theory; V.9-#?, pp. 303-325.
-B. Jessop (1982). The Capitalist State: Marxist Theories and Methods. New York: NYU Press.
-M. Carnoy (1984). The State and Political Theory. Princeton: PUP.
-S. Krasner (1984). “Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics”. Comparative Politics; V.16-#2, pp. 223-246.
-R. Alford and R. Friedland (1985). Powers of Theory: Capitalism, the State and Democracy. Cambridge: CUP.
-D. Held (1987). Models of Democracy. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
-D. Held (1989). Political Theory and the Modern State. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
-P. Evans, D. Rueschmeyer, and T. Skocpol, eds. (1985). Bringing the State Back In. Cambridge: CUP.
-G. Almond (1988). “The Return to the State”. APSR; V.82-#3, pp. 853-874. [comments by E. Nordlinger, T. Lowi, and S. Fabbrini, 1988, APSR; V.82-#3, pp. 875-901]
-R. Bendix et al., ed. (1973). State and Society. Berkeley: University of California Press.
-KAPITALSTATE (1983). “The State and State Theory in Western Europe”. KAPITALSTATE; #10/11.
-R. Benjamin and S. Elkin, eds. (1985). The Democratic State. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
-G. Duncan, ed. (1989). Democracy and the Capitalist State. Cambridge: CUP.
b. Institutional/Functional Theories of the State
(1) Historical-Sociological Theories
-O. Hintze (1975). The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze. (F. Gilbert, ed.). New York: Oxford University Press.
-B. Moore (1966). Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World. Boston: Beacon Press.
-T. Skocpol (1973). “A Critical Review of Barrington Moore’s Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy”. Politics and Society; V.12-#2, pp.
-J.P. Nettl (1968). “The State As A Conceptual Variable”. WP; V.20-#?, pp. 559-592.
-L. Binder, et al., eds. (1971). Crises and Sequences in Political Development. Princeton: PUP.
-S. Finer (1974). “State-building, State Boundaries and Border Control: An Essay on Certain Aspects of the First Phase of State-building in Western Europe Considered in the Light of the Rokkan-Hirschman Model”. Social Science Information; V.13-#?, pp. 79-126,
-C. Tilly (1975). “Reflections on the History of European State-Building”. in C. Tilly, ed. The Formation of Nation States in Europe. Princeton: PUP.
-F. Lane, ed. (1979). Profits from Power: Readings in Protection-Rent and Violence-Controlling Enterprises. Albany: SUNY Albany Press.
-T. Skocpol (1979). States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China. Cambridge: CUP.
-E. Nordlinger (1981). On the Autonomy of the Democratic State. Cambridge: Harvard.
-M. Mann (1984). “The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results”. Archives Européennes de Sociologie; V.25-#?, pp. 185-213.
-M. Mann (1986). The Sources of Social Power, V.I: A History of Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1760. Cambridge, CUP.
-M. Mann (1993). The Sources of Social Power, V.II: The Rise of Classes and Nation States. Cambridge: CUP.
-C. Tilly (1990). Coercion, Capital and European States, A.D. 900-1990. Oxford: Blackwell.
-L. Snider (1987). “Identifying the Elements of State Power: Where do We Begin?”. Comparative Political Studies; V.20-#3, pp. 314-356.
-T.R. Gurr (1988). “War, Revolution, and the Growth of the Coercive State”. Comparative Political Studies; V.21-#1, pp. 45-65.
-S. Krasner (1988). “Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective”. Comparative Political Studies; V.21-#1, pp. 66-94.
-D. Nelson (1990). “The State as a Conceptual Variable: Another Look”. ms: Murphy Institute of Political Economy.
(2) Choice-Theoretic Approaches
-D. North (1979). “A Framework for Analyzing the State in Economic History”. Explorations in Economic History;
-T.N. Srinivasan (1985). “Neoclassical Political Economy, the State and Economic Development”. Asian Development Review; V.3-#2, pp.
-R. Findlay and J. Wilson (1987). “The Political Economy of Leviathan”. in A. Razin and E. Sadka, eds. Economic Policy in Theory and Practice. New York: St. Martins, pp. 289-306.
-M. Levi (1988). Of Rule and Revenue. Berkeley: University of California Press.
-D. North and B. Weingast (1989). “Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in 17th Century England”. Journal of Economic History; V.49-#?, pp. 803-832.
-H. Root (1989). “Tying the Kings Hands: Credible Commitments and Royal Fiscal Policy during the Old Regime”. Rationality and Society; V.1-#?, pp. 240-258.
-G. Miller (1989). “Confiscation, Credible Commitment, and Progressive Reform in the US”. JITE; V.145-#?, pp. 686-692.
c. More-or-Less Instrumentalist Theories
(1) Essentially Class-based Politics
-C.W. Mills (1956). The Power Elite. New York: Oxford University Press.
-G.W. Domhoff (1970). The Higher Circles. New York: Random House.
-G.W. Domhoff (1983). Who Rules America Now? Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.
-R. Miliband (1969). The State in Capitalist Society. New York: Basic Books.
-R. Miliband (1977). Marxism and Politics. Oxford: OUP.
-R. Miliband (1983). Class Power and State Power. London: New Left Books.
-F. Block (1987). Revising State Theory: Essays in Politics and Postindustrialism. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
(2) Essentially Sector-based Politics
-G. Stigler (1975). The Citizen and the State. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
-G. Stigler, ed. (1988). Chicago Studies in Political Economy. Chicago: Univeristy of Chicago Press.
-P. Gourevitch (1977). “Internaitonal Trade, Domestic Coalitions and Liberty: Comparative Responses to the Crisis of 1873-1896". Journal of Interdisciplinary History; V.8-#2 pp. 281-313.
-J. Kurth (1979). “Political Consequences of the Product Cycle”. IO; V.33-#1, pp. 1-34.
-T. Ferguson (198?). “Elites and Elections, Or What Have They Done for You Lately?”. in B. Ginsberg, ed. Do Elections Matter? Boston: Addison Wesley, pp. 164-188.
-T. Ferguson (1983). “Party Realignment and American Industrial Structure: The Investment Theory of Political Parties in Historical Perspective”. in P. Zarembka, ed. Research in Political Economy, V.6. ?: JAI Press, pp. 1-82.
-T. Ferguson (1984). “From Normalcy to New Deal: Industrial Structure, Party Competition, and American Public Policy in the Great Depression”. IO; V.38-#1, pp. 41-94.
-R. McKelvey and P. Ordeshook (1986). “Information, Electoral Equilibria, and the Democratic Ideal”. JoP; V.48-#?, pp. 909-937.
d. More-or-Less Structuralist Theories
-A. Gramsci (1971). Selections from the Prison Notebooks. New York: International Publishers.
-N. Poulantzas (1968). Political Power and Social Classes. London: New Left Books.
-N. Poulantzas (1978). State, Power, Socialism. London: New Left Books.
-J. Habermas (1973). Legitimation Crisis. Boston: Beacon Press.
-C. Offe (1984). Contradictions of the Welfare State. Cambridge: MIT.
-E. Laclau (1977). Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory. London: New Left Books.
-E. Laclau and C. Mouffe (1985). Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. London: New Left Books.
-S. deBrunhoff (1976). The State, Capital and Economic Policy. London: Pluto Press.
-A. Przeworski (1980). “Material Bases of Consent: Economics and Politics in a Hegemonic System”. Political Power and Social Theory. V.1, pp. 21-66.
-S. Bowles and S. Gintis (1986). Democracy and Capitalism: Property, Community, and the Contradictions of Modern Social Thought. New York: Basic Books.
-N. Bobio (1987). Which Socialism?. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
-N. Bobio (1987). The Future of Democracy: A Defence of the Rules of the Game. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
-J. Keane (1988). Democracy and Civil Society. London: New Left Books.
-J. Keane, ed. (1988). Civil Society and the State. London: New Left Books.
-F. van Winden (1983). On the Interaction between the State and Private Sector. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
-A. Przeworski and M. Wallerstein (1988). “Structural Dependence of the State on Capital”. APSR; V.82-#1, pp. 11-29.
-D. Swank (1992). “Politics and the Structural Dependence of the State in Democratic Capitalist Nations”. APSR; V.86-#1, pp. 38-54.
e. Capital-Theoretic Approaches to the State
-W. Müller and C. Neusüss (1975). “The Illusion of State Socialism and the Contradiction between Wage Labor and Capital”. Telos; V.25-#?, pp. 13-90. [comments by J. Habermas and C. Offe follow]
-E. Altvater (1973). “Notes on Some Problems of State Interventionism (I & II)”. KAPITALSTATE; V.1-#?, pp. 96-108; #2, pp. 76-83.
-J. Hirsch (197?). “Elements of a Materialist Theory of the State”. International Journal of Sociology; pp. 9-82.
-J. Holloway and S. Picciotto, eds. (1978). State and Capital: A Marxist Debate. Austin: University of Texas Press.
1. General Theories of Economic and Socio-Economic Structure
-M. Weber (1922/1968). Economy and Society. Berkeley: University of California Press.
-J. Schumpeter (1991). The Economics and Sociology of Capitalism. Princeton: PUP.
-T. Parsons and N. Smelser (1956). Economy and Society: A Study in the Integration of Economic and Social Theory. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
-N. Luhmann (1982). The Differentiation of Society. New York: Columbia University Press.
-J. Habermas (1981). The Theory of Communicative Action, V.1: Reason and Rationalization of Society. Boston: Beacon Press.
-J. Habermas (1981). The Theory of Communicative Action, V.2: Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason. Boston: Beacon Press.
-J. Coleman (1974). Power and the Structure of Society. New York: Norton.
-J. Coleman (1990). Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge: Belknap/Harvard.
-A. Schotter (1981). The Economic Theory of Social Institutions. Cambridge: CUP.
-O. Williamson (1985). The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York: Free Press.
-C. Lindblom (1977). Politics and Markets: The World's Political Economic Systems. New Haven: Yale.
-R. Burt (1982). Toward a Structural Theory of Action: Network Models of Social Structure. New York: Academic Press.
-P. Marsden and N. Lin, eds. (1982). Social Structure and Network Analysis. Beverly Hills: Sage.
-B. Wellman and S. Berkowitz, eds. (1988). Social Structures: A Network Approach. Cambridge: CUP.
-K. Cook and J. Whitmeyer (1992). “Two Approaches to Social Structure: Exchange Theory and Network Analysis”. Annual Review of Sociology; V.18, pp. 109-127.
-H. White (1992). Identity and Control: A Structural Theory of Social Action. Princeton: PUP.
-C. Tilly (1998). Durable Inequality. Berkeley: University of California Press.
2. Structural Analysis At the Level of the Firm
a. Structure and Performance of Individual Organizations
-K. Arrow (1964). “Control in Large Organizations”. Management Science; V.10-#5, pp. 397-408.
-K. Arrow (1974). The Limits of Organization. New York: Norton.
-H. White (1970). Chains of Opportunity: System Models of Mobility in Organizations. Boston: Harvard University Press.
-M. Hannan and J. Freeman (1989). Organizational Ecology. Cambridge: Harvard.
-M. Hannan and G. Carroll (1992). Dynamics of Organizational Populations: Density, Legitimation, and Competition. New York: OUP.
-R. Sah and J. Stiglitz (1986). “The Architecture of Economic Systems: Hierarchies and Polyarchies”. AER; V.76-#?, pp. 716-727.
-R. Sah and J. Stiglitz (1988). “Committees, Hierarchies and Polyarchies”. EJ; V.98-#?, pp. 451-470.
-G. Miller and T. Moe (1986). “The Positive Theory of Hierarchies”. in H. Weisberg, ed. Political Science: The Science of Politics. New York: Agathon Press, pp. 167-198.
-T. Hammond and P. Thomas (1989). “The Impossibility of a Neutral Hierarchy”. JLEO; V.5-#1, pp. 155-184.
-G. Miller and T. Hammond (1994). “Why Politics is More Fundamental than Economics: Incentive-Compatible Mechanisms are Not Credible”. Journal of Theoretical Politics; V.6-#1, pp. 5-26.
-G. Miller (1994). Managerial Dilemmas. Cambridge: CUP.
b. Incomplete Information, Teams, and Efficient Organization
-J. Marschak (1954). “Towards an Economic Theory of Organization and Information”. in R. Thrall, C. Coombs, and R. Davis, eds. Decision Processes. New York: Wiley, pp. 250-272.
-J. Marschak (1955). “Elements for a Theory of Teams”. V.1-#?, pp. 127-137.
-T. Marschak (1959). “Centralization and Decentralization in Economic Organizations”. Etrica; V.27-#?, pp. 399-430.
-R. Radner (1961). “The Evaluation of Information in Organizations”. J. Neyman, ed. Proceedings of the Fourth Berkeley Symposium on Math. Stat. and Prob--V.1. Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 491-533.
-R. Radner (1961). “Team Decision Problems”. Annals of Math. Stat.; V.33-#?, pp. 857-881.
-K. Miyasawa (1967). “A Bayesian Approach to Team Decision Problems”. in M. Shubik, ed. Essays in Mathematical Economics. Princeton: PUP, pp. 149-170.
-J. Marschak and R. Radner (1972). Economic Theory of Teams. New Haven: Yale.
-R. Radner (1972/1986). “Teams”. in C. McGuire and R. Radner, eds. Decision and Organization. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 189-215.
-R. Radner (1972/1986). “Allocation of Scarce Resources under Uncertainty: An Example of a Team”. in C. McGuire and R. Radner, eds. Decision and Organization. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 217-236.
-T. Marschak (1972/1986). “Computation in Organizations: Comparison of Price Mechanisms and Other Adjustment Processes”. in C. McGuire and R. Radner, eds. Decision and Organization. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 237-281.
-T. Groves and R. Radner (1972). “Allocation of Resources in a Team”. JET; V.4-#?, pp. 415-441.
-T. Groves (1973). “Incentives in Teams”. Etrica; V.41-#4, pp. 617-631.
-J. Jordan (1975). “Information and Shadow Prices for the Constrained Concave Team Problem”. JMathE; V.2-#?, pp. 371-393.
-K. Arrow and R. Radner (1979). “Allocation of Resources in a Large Team”. Etrica; V.47-#?, pp. 361-385.
-K. Kim and F. Roush (1987). Team Theory. New York: Halsted Press.
-A. Camacho and J. Persky (1988). “The Internal Organization of Complex Teams: Bounded Rationality and the Logic of Hierarchies”. JEBO; V.9-#?, pp. 367-380.
c. Asymmetric Information, Agency and the Theory of Contracts
(1) Texts and Surveys
-G. Macdonald (1984). “New Directions in the Theory of Agency”. CJE; V.17-#3, pp.415-440.
-O. Hart and B. Holmstrom (1987). “The Theory of Contracts”. In Truman Bewley, ed. Advances in Economic Theory (5th World Congress). Cambridge: CUP, pp. 71-155.
-R. Rees (1985). “The Theory of Principal and Agent: Part 1". Bulletin of Economic Research; V.37-#1, pp. 3-26.
-R. Rees (1985). “The Theory of Principal and Agent: Part 2". Bulletin of Economic Research; V.37-#2, pp. 75-95.
-R. Rees (1987). “The Theory of Principal and Agent”. In J. Hey and P. Lambert, eds. Surveys in the Economics of Uncertainty. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 46-90.
-M. Ricketts (1986). “The Geometry of Principal and Agent: Yet Another Use for the Edgeworth Box”. Scottish Journal of Political Economy; V.33-#3, pp. 228-248.
-E. Douglas (1989). “The Simple Analytics of the Principal-Agent Incentive Contract”. Journal of Economic Education; V.20-#1, pp. 39-51.
-D. Sappington (1991). “Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships”. Journal of Economic Perspectives; V.5-#2, pp. 45-66.
-R. Gibbons (1998). “Incentives in Organizations”. Journal of Economic Perspectives; V.12-#4, pp. 115-132.
-C. Prendergast (1999). “The Provision of Incentives in Firms”. JEL; V.37-#1, pp. 7-63.
-J. Hirshleifer and J. Riley (1992). The Analytics of Uncertainty and Information. Cambridge: CUP.
-D. Campbell (1995). Incentives: Motivation and the Economics of Information. New York: Cambridge University Press.
I. Molho (1997). The Economics of Information: Lying and Cheating in Markets and Organizations. Oxford: Blackwell.
-Inés Macho-Stadler and David Pérez-Castrillo (1997). An Introduction to the Economics of Information: Incentives & Contracts. New York: Oxford University Press.
-Bernard Salanié (1997). The Economics of Contracts: A Primer. Cambridge: MIT.
(a) The Basic Principal-Agent Model with Moral Hazard
-S. Ross (1973). “The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem”. AER; V.63-#2, pp. 134-139.
-S. Ross (1974). “On the Economic Theory of Agency and the Principal of Similarity”. in M. Balch, D. McFadden, and S. Wu, eds. Essays on Economic Behavior under Uncertainty. Amsterdam, North-Holland, pp. 215-237.
-J. Stiglitz (1975). “Incentives, Risk and Information: Notes Toward a Theory of Hierarchy”. BellJE; V.6-#2, pp. 552-579.
-J. Mirlees (1976). “The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority within an Organization”. BellJE; V.7-#1, pp. 105-131.
-J. Mirlees (1975/1999). “The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part I”. REStud; V.66-#1, pp. 3-21.
-M. Harris and A. Raviv (1978). “Some Results on Incentive Contracts with Applications to Education and Employment, Health Insurance, and Law Enforcement”. AER; V.68-#1, pp. 20-30.
-M. Harris and A. Raviv (1979). “Optimal Incentives with Imperfect Information”. JET; V.20-#?, pp. 231-259.
-S. Shavell (1979). “Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship”. BellJE; V.10-#1, pp. 55-73.
-B. Hosmström (1979). “Moral Hazard and Observability”. BellJE; V.10-#1, pp. 74-91.
-F. Gjesdal (1982). “Information and Incentives: The Agency Information Problem”. REStud; V.49-#?, pp. 373-390.
-S. Grossman and O. Hart (1983). “An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem”. Etrica; V.51-#1, pp. 7-45.
-W. Rogerson (1985). “The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems”. Etrica; V.53-#6, pp. 1357-1367.
-I. Jewitt (1988). “Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems”. Etrica; V.56-#5, pp. 1177-1190.
-B. Sinclair-Desgagné (1994). “The First-Order Approach to Multi-Signal Principal Agent Problems”. Etrica; V.62-#2, pp. 459-469.
-E. Alvi (1997). “First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems: A Generalization”. Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory; V.22-#1, pp. 59-65.
-D. Sappington (1983). “Limited Liability Contracts between Principal and Agent”. JET; V.29-#1, pp. 1-21.
-F. Page (1987). “The Existence of Optimal Contracts in the Principal-Agent Model”. Journal of Mathematical Economics; V.16-#2, pp. 157-167.
-E. Balder (1996). “On the Existence of Optimal Contract Mechanisms for Incomplete Information Principal-Agent Models”. JET; V.68-#1, pp. 133-148.
-I. Jewitt (1989). “An Information Inequality for Agency Problems”. Economics Letters; V.29-#4, pp. 295-298.
-E. Green (1990). “Classical Statistics as a Theory of Incentives”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.2-#1, pp. 13-28.
-R. Myerson (1983). “Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal”. Etrica; V.51-#6, pp. 1767-1797.
-E. Maskin and J. Tirole (1990). “The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values”. Etrica; V.58-#2, pp. 379-409.
-E. Maskin and J. Tirole (1992). “The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values”. Etrica; V.60-#1, pp. 1-42.
-G. Maggi and A. Rodriguez-Clare (1995). “Costly Distortion of Information in Agency Problems”. RandJE; V.26-#4, pp. 675-689.
-M. Rajan and B. Sarath (1997). “The Value of Correlated Signals in Agencies”. RandJE; V.28-#1, pp. 150-167.
-H. Thiele and A. Wambach (2000). “Wealth Effects in the Principal Agent Model”. JET; V.89-#2, pp. 247-260.
-M. Currie and I. Steedman (1993). “Taking Effort Seriously”. Metroeconomica; V.44-#2, pp. 134-145.
-M. Currie and I. Steedman (1997). “The Ordinality of Effort Revisited”. Metroeconomica; V.48-#3, pp. 306-309.
(b) Contract Renegotiation
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-D. Demougin (1989). “A Renegotiation-Proof Mechanism for a Principal-Agent Model with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection”. RandJE; V.20-#2, pp. 256-267.
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(c) Repeated/Dynamic Agency
-A. Rubinstein (1979). “An Optimal Conviction Policy for Offenses that May Have Been Committed by Accident”. in S. Brams, A. Schotter, and G. Schwödiauer, eds. Applied Game Theory. Wuerzberg: Physica-Verlag, pp. 406-413.
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-J. Malcomson and F. Spinnewyn (1988). “The Multiperiod Principal Agent Problem”. REStud; V.55-#?, pp. 391-408.
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(d) Multiple Agents
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-D. Mookerjee (1984). “Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents”. REStud; V.51-#?, pp. 433-446.
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-C.-T. Ma (1988). “Unique Implementation of Incentive Contracts with Many Agents”. REStud; V.55-#4, pp. 555-572.
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-J.-J. Laffont and D. Martimort (2000). “Mechanism Design with Collusion and Correlation”. Etrica; V.68-#2, pp. 309-342.
(e) Common Agency (i.e. Multiple Principals)
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-A. Zhang (1993). “An Analysis of Common Sales Agents”. CJE; V.26-#1, pp. 134-149.
-D. Martimort (1996). “Exclusive Dealing, Common Agency, and Multiprincipals Incentive Theory”. RandJE; V.27-#1, pp. 1-31.
-L. Stole (1995). “Nonlinear Pricing and Oligopoly”. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy; V.4-#?, pp. 529-562.
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-E. Gal-Or (1997). “Multiprincipal Agency Relationships as Implied by Product Market Competition”. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy; V.6-#2, pp. 235-256.
-C. Kahn and D. Mookherjee (1998). “Competition and Incentives with Nonexclusive Contracts”. RandJE; V.29-#3, pp. 443-465.
-J.-J. Laffont and J. Tirole (1991). “Privatization and Incentives”. JLEO; V.7-#?, pp. 84-105.
-T. Olson and G. Torsvik (1993). “The Ratchet Effect in Common Agency: Implications for Regulation and Privatization”. JLEO; V.9-#1, pp. 136-158.
-T. Olson and G. Torsvik (1995). “Intertemporal Common Agency and Organizational Design: How Much Decentralization”. EER; V.39-#?, pp. 1405-1428.
-D. Martimort (1996). “The Multiprincipal Nature of Government”. EER; v.40-#?, pp. 673-685.
-D. Martimort (1999). “Renegotiation Design with Multiple Regulators”. JET; V.88-#2, pp. 261-293.
-E. Bond and T. Gresik (1996). “Regulation of Multinational Firms with Two Active Governments: A Common Agency Approach”. JPubE; V.59-#1, pp. 33-53.
-E. Bond and T. Gresik (1997). “Competition between Asymmetrically Informed Principals”. Economic Theory; V.10-#?, pp. 227-240.
-A. Dixit, G. Grossman, and E. Helpman (1997). “Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making”. JPE; V.105-#4, pp. 752-769.
-D. Laussel and M. Le Breton (1998). “Efficient Private Production of Public Goods under Common Agency”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.25-#2, pp. 194-218.
-H. Konishi, M. Le Breton, and S. Weber (1999). “On Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria in Common Agency Games”. JET; V.85-#1, pp. 122-139.
-S. Gifford (1999). “Efficient Moral Hazard”. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization; V.40-#4, pp. 427-442.
-L. Epstein and M. Peters (1999). “A Revelation Principle for Competing Mechanisms”. JET; V.88-#1, pp. 119-160.
-M. Peters (1999). “Competition Among Mechanism Designers in a Common Value Environment”. Review of Economic Design; V.4-#3, pp. 273-292.
-M. Peters (2001). “Common Agency and the Revelation Principle”. Econometrica; V.69-#5, pp. 1349-1372.
-Martimort, David, and Lars Stole (2002). “The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games”. Econometrica; V.70-#4, pp. 1659-1673.
-M. Peters (2003). “Negotiation and Take It or Leave It In Common Agency”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.111-#1, pp. 88-109.
-G. Biglaiser and C. Mezzetti (2000). “Incentive Auctions and Information Revelation”. RAND Journal of Economics; V.31-#1, pp. 145-164.
-D. Laussel and M. Le Breton (2001). “Conflict and Cooperation: The Structure of Equilibrium Payoffs in Common Agency”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.100-#1, pp. 93-128.
-E. Billette de Villemeur and B. Versaevel (2003). “From Private to Public Common Agency”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.111-#2, pp. 305-309.
-D. Bergmann and J. Välimäki (2003). “Dynamic Common Agency”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.111-#1, pp. 23-48.
-J. Peck (1997). “A Note on Competing Mechanisms and the Revelation Principle”. Ms: Ohio State.
-D. Martimort and L. Stole (1997). “Communications Spaces, Equilibria Sets and the Revelation Principle under Common Agency”. Ms: University of Chicago.
-D. Martimort and L. Stole (1999). “The Revelation and Taxation Principles in Common Agency Games”. Ms: University of Chicago.
-D. Martimort and L. Stole (2001). “Contractual Externalities and Common Agency Equilibria”. Advances in Theoretical Economics; V.3-#1, article 4.
-D. Martimort and L. Stole (2001). “Common Agency Equilibria with Discrete Mechanisms and Discrete Types”. Ms: University of Chicago.
(f) Adverse Selection and Generalized PA Problems
-R. Guesnerie and J.-J. Laffont (1984). “A Complete Solution to a Class of Principal-Agent Problems with an Application to the Control of a Self-Managed Firm”. JPubE; V.25-#?, pp. 329-369.
-A. Arya, J. Glover, and U. Rajan (2000). “Implementation in Principal-Agent Models of Adverse Selection”. JET; V.93-#1, pp. 87-109.
-R. Myerson (1982). “Optimal Coordination Mechanisms in Generalized Principal-Agent Problems”. JMathE; V.10-#?, pp. 67-81.
-P. Picard (1987). “On the Design of Incentive Contracts Under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection”. JPubE; V.33-#?, pp. 305-332.
-N. Melamud and S. Reichelstein (1989). “Value of Communication in Agencies”. JET; V.47-#?, pp. 334-368.
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(3) Internal Structure of the Firm
(a) Transaction Costs, Incomplete Contracts, and the Nature of the Firm
-B. Holmström and J. Tirole (1989). “The Theory of the Firm”. in R. Schmalensee and R. Willig, eds. Handbook of Industrial Organization. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
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-J. Tirole (1999). “Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?”. Etrica; V.67-#4, pp. 741-781.
-R. Coase (1937). “The Nature of the Firm”. Eca; V.4-#?, pp. 386-405.
-A. Alchian and H. Demsetz (1972). “Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization”. AER; V.62-#5, pp. 777-795.
-O. Williamson (1967). “Hierarchical Control and Optimal Firm Size”. JPE; V.75-#2, pp. 123-138.
-O. Williamson (1971). “The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations”. AER; V.61-#2, pp. 112-123.
-O. Williamson (1975). Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. New York: Free Press.
-O. Williamson (1985). The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York: Free Press.
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-V. Goldberg (1980). “Relational Exchange: Economics and Complex Contracts”. American Behavioral Scientist; V.23-#5, pp. 337-352.
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-D. Evans and S. Grossman (1983). “Integration”. in D. Evans, ed. Breaking Up Bell, Essays in Industrial Organization and Regulation. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 95-126.
-M. Casson (1984). “The Theory of Vertical Integration: A Survey and Synthesis”. Journal of Economic Issues; V.11-#2, pp. 3-43.
-S. Rosen (1988). “Transaction costs and Internal Labor Markets”. JLEO; V.4-#1, pp. 49-64.
-O. Williamson (1988). “The Logic of Economic Organization”. JLEO; V.4-#1, pp. 65-93.
-H. Demsetz (1988). “The Theory of the Firm Revisited”. JLEO; V.4-#1, pp. 141-161.
-S. Winter (1988). “On Coase, Competence, and the Corporation”. JLEO; V.4-#1, pp. 163-180.
-S. Masten (1988). “A Legal Basis for the Firm”. JLEO; V.4-#1, pp. 181-198.
-L. Putterman (1988). “The Firm as Association versus the Firm as Commodity”. Economics and Philosophy; V.4-#?, pp. 243-266.
-B. Yarbrough and R. Yarbrough (1988). “The Transactional Structure of the Firm: A Comparative Survey”. JEBO; V.10-#1, pp. 1-28.
-R. Guesnerie and C. Oddou (1988). “Increasing Returns to Size and their Limits”. ScanJE; V.90-#3, pp. 259-273.
(b) Team Production with Moral Hazard
i) Tha Basic Analysis
-A. Alchian and H. Demsetz (1972). “Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization”. AER; V.62-#5, pp. 777-795.
-M. Harris, C. Kriebel, and A. Raviv (1982). “Asymmetric Information, Incentives, and Intrafirm Resource Allocation”. Management Science; V.28-#?, pp. 604-620.
-B. Holmström (1982). “Moral Hazard in Teams”. Bell JE; V.13-#2, pp. 324-340.
-M Eswaran and A. Kotwal (1984). “The Moral Hazard of Budget Breaking”. Rand JE; V.15-#4, pp. 578-581.
-E. Rasmusen (1987). “Moral Hazard in Risk Averse Teams”. Rand JE; V.18-#3, pp. 428-435.
-J. Vislie (1994). “Efficiency and Equilibria in Complementary Teams”. JEBO; V.23-#1, pp. 83-91.
-T. Sjostrom (1996). “Implementation and Information in Teams”. Economic Design; V.1-#4, pp. 327-341.
-D. Adnolfatto and E. Nosal (1997). “Optimal Team Contracts”. CJE; V.30-#2, pp. 385-396.
-Li, Shuhe and Weiying Zhang (2001). “Optimal Assignment of Principalship in Teams”. JEBO; v.44-#1, pp. 105-127.
-B. Hermalin (1998). “Toward an Economic Theory of Leadership: Leading by Example”. AER; V.88-#5, pp. 1188-1206.
-Beckman, Martin (1984). “Hierarchy vs. Partnership”. JEBO; V.5-#2, pp. 237-245.
-L. Putterman and G. Skillman (1988). “The Incentive Effects of Monitoring under Alterative Compensation Schemes”. IJIO; V.6-#1, pp. 109-119.
-M. Weitzman and D. Kruse (1990). “Profit Sharing and Productivity”. In A. Blinder, ed. Paying for Productivity. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 95-141.
-R.P. McAfee and J. McMillan (1991). “Optimal Contracts for Teams”. International Economic Review; V.32-#3, pp. 561-577.
-R. Gibbons (1998). “Incentives in Organizations”. Journal of Economic Perspectives; V.12-#4, pp. 115-132.
-R. Gibbons (1999). “Game Theory and Garbage Cans: An Introduction to the Economics of Internal Organization”. In J. Halpern and R. Stern, eds. Debating Rationality: Nonrational Aspects of Organizational Decision Making. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, Pp. 36-52.
-G. Palermo (2000). “Economic Power and the Firm in New Institutional Economics: Two Conflicting Problems”. Journal of Economic Issues; V.34-#3, pp. 573-601.
-H. Demsetz (1995). The Economics of the Business firm: Seven Critical Commentaries. New York: Cambrdige University Press.
-E. Lazear (1995). Personnel Economics. Cambridge: MIT Press.
-J. Haubrich (1994). “Risk Aversion, Performance Pay, and the Principal-Agent Problem”. JPE; V.102-#2, pp. 258-276.
ii) Partnerships
-R. Wilson (1968). “The Theory of Syndicates”. Etrica; V.36-#1, pp. 119-132.
-R. Radner (1986). “Repeated Partnership Games with Imperfect Monitoring and No Discounting”. REStud; V.53-#1, pp. 43-57.
-R.Radner, R. Myerson, and E. Maskin (1986). “An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria”. REStud; V.53-#1, pp. 59-69.
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-H. Matsushima (1989). “Efficiency in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring”. JET; V.48-#?, pp. 428-442.
-H. Matsushima (1990). “Long-term Partnership in a Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Random Matching”. EcLets; V.34-#3, pp. 245-248.
-D. Abreu, P. Milgrom, and D. Pearce (1991). “Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships”. Etrica; V.59-#6, pp. 1713-1733.
-M. Kandori (1992). “The Use of Information in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring”. REStud; V.59-#?, pp. 581-593.
-S. Li (1992). “Nash-Implementation of Pareto Correspondence in Cooperative Economies: Note”. Journal of Comparative Economics; V.16-#2, pp. 309-314.
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-P. Legros and H. Matsushima (1991). “Efficiency in Partnerships”. JET; V.55-#2, pp. 296-322.
-P. Legros and S. Matthews (1993). “Efficient and Nearly-Efficient Partnerships”. REStud; V.60-#3, pp. 599-611.
-D. Fudenberg and D. Levine (1994). “Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players”. JET; V.62-#1, pp. 103-135.
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P. Cramton, R. Gibbons, and P. Klemperer (1987). “Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently”. Etrica; V.55-#3, pp. 615-632.
-R.P. McAfee (1992). “Amicable Divorce: Dissolving a Partnership with Simple Mechanisms”. JET; V.56-#2, pp. 266-293.
-D. Roth (1996). “A Theory of Partnership Dynamics”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.12-#1, pp. 95-112.
-Y. Hirao (1993). “Learning and Incentive Problems in Repeated Partnerships”. IER; V.34-#1, pp. 101-119.
-M. Galanter and T. Palay (1991). Tournament of lawyers: The transformation of the big law firm. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
-C. Ferrall (1996). “Promotions and Incentives in Partnerships: Evidence from Major U.S. Law Firms”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.29-#4, pp. 811-827.
iii) Tournaments
-E. Lazear and S. Rosen (1981). “Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts”. JPE; V.89-#5, pp. 841-864.
-J. Green and N. Stokey (1983). “A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts”. JPE; V.91-#3, pp. 349-364.
-B. Nalebuff and J. Stiglitz (1983). “Prizes and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of Compensation and Competition”. BellJE; V.14-#1, pp. 21-43.
-R. Dye (1984). “The Trouble with Tournaments”. EcInq; V.22-#1, pp. 147-149.
-L. Carmichael (1983). “Firm-Specific Human Capital and Promotion Ladders”. Bell Journal of Economics; V.14-#?, pp. 251-258.
-J.M. Malcomson (1984). “Work Incentives, Hierarchy, and Internal Labor Markets”. JPE; V.92-#3, pp. 486-507.
-J.M. Malcomson (1986). “Rank Order Contracts for a Principal with Many Agents”. REStud; V.53-#?, pp. 807-817.
-S. Rosen (1986). “Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments”. AER; V.76-#4, pp. 701-715
-W.B. MacLeod (1987). “Behavior and the Organization of the Firm”. Journal of Comparative Economics; V.11-#2, pp. 207-220.
-S. Bhattacharya and J.L. Guasch (1988). “Heterogeneity, Tournaments, and Hierarchies”. JPE; V.96-#4.
-M. Leeds (1988). “Rank-Order Tournaments and Worker Incentives”. Atlantic Economic Journal; V.16-#2, pp. 74-77.
K. McLaughlin (1988). “Aspects of Tournament Models: A Survey”. In R. Ehrenberg, ed. Research in labor economics. V.9, 225-256.
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-R. Drago and G. Turnbull (1988). “Market Incentives and Work Incentives: The Question of Flexible Production”. IER; V.32-#1, pp. 77-83.
-R. Drago and G. Turnbull (1988). “Competition and Cooperation in the Workplace”. JEBO; V.15-#3, pp. 347-3.64
-W.T.H. Koh (1992). “A Note on Modelling Tournaments”. ZfN, V.55-#3, pp. 297-308.
-G. Garvey and P. Swan (1992). “Managerial Objectives, Capital Structure, and the Provision of Worker Incentives”. Journal of Labor Economics; V.10-#4, pp. 867-881.
G. Brunello (1994). “Incentives, Bargaining and the Wage Structure”. ScanJE; V.96-#4, pp. 481-497.
M. Berkowitz and Y. Kotowitz (1993). “Promotions as Work Incentives”. EcInq; V.31-#1, pp. 342-353.
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-T. Tsoulouhas (1999). “Do Tournaments Solve the Two-Sided Moral Hazard Problem?”. JEBO; V.40-#3, pp. 275-294.
-R. Fernandez and J. Gali (1999). “To Each According to . . . ? Markets, Tournaments, and the Matching Problem with Borrowing Constraints”. Review of Economic Studies; V.66-#4, pp. 799-824.
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iv) Career Concerns
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-R. Gibbons and K. Murphy (1992). “Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence”. JPE; V.100-#3, pp. 468-505.
-J. Borland (1992). “Career Concerns: Incentives and Endogenous Learning in Labour Markets”. Journal of Economic Surveys; V.6-#3, pp. 251-270.
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v) Why Capital Hires Labor
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(c) Incomplete Contracts and Holdup: The Problem
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-P. Joskow (1987). “Contract Duration and Relation-specific Investments: Empirical Evidence from Coal Markets”. AER; V.77-#?, pp. 168-175.
-P. Joskow (1988). “Asset Specificity and the Structure of Vertical Relationships”. JLEO; V.4-#1, pp. 95-117.
-H. Hansmann (1988). “Ownership of the Firm”. JLEO; V.4-#4, pp. 267-304.
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(d) The Firm as a Nexus of Contracts: Principal-Agent Analysis
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-B. Holmström and P. Milgrom (1991). “Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership and Job Design”. JLEO; V.7-#?, pp. 24-52.
-J. Cremer (1986). “Cooperation in Ongoing Organizations”. QJE; V.?-#1, pp. 33-49.
-J. Bendor and D. Mookherjee (1987). “Institutional Structure and the Logic of Ongoing Collective Action”. APSR; V.81-#1, pp. 129-154.
-J. Tirole (1986). “Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations”. JLEO; V.2-#2, pp. 181-214.
-R. Radner (1986). “The Internal Economy of Large Firms”. EJ; V.?-#?, pp. 1-22.
-J. Tirole (1988). “The Multicontract Organization”. CJE; V.21-#3, pp. 459-466.
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-J-J. Laffont and d. Martimort (1998). “Collusion and Delegation”. RandJE; V.29-#2, pp. 280-305.
-O. Hart and B. Holmström (1987). “The Theory of Contracts”. in T. Bewley, ed. Advances in Economic Theory (Fifth World Congress). Cambridge: CUP, pp. 71-155.
-D. Levinthal (1988). “A Survey of Agency Models of Organization”. JEBO; V.9-#?, pp. 155-185.
-J. Tirole (1991). “Collusion and the Theory of Organizations”. in J.-J. Laffont, ed. Advances in Economic Theory, Sixth World Congress–Vol. II. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 151-206.
-P. Milgrom and J. Roberts (1992). Economics, Organization and Management. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
-G. Miller (1993). Managerial Dilemmas. Cambridge: CUP.
(e) Incomplete Contracts, Property Rights and Renegotiation
-S. Grossman and O. Hart (1986). “The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration”. JPE; V.94-#4, pp. 691-719.
-S. Grossman and O. Hart (1987). “Vertical Integration and the Distribution of Property Rights”. in A. Razin and E. Sadka, eds. Economic Policy in Theory and Practice. New York: St. Martins, pp. 504-546.
-O. Hart (1988). “Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm”. JLEO; V.4-#1, pp. 119-139.
-O. Hart and J. Moore (1988). “Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation”. Etrica; V.56-#?, pp. 755-785.
-O. Hart and J. Moore (1990). “Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm”. JPE; V.98-#6, pp. 1119-1158.
-W. Rogerson (1992). “Contractual Solutions to the Holdup Problem”. REStud; V.59-#4, pp. 774-794.
-W.B. McLeod and J. Malcomson (1993). “Investments, Holdup, and the Form of Market Contracts”. AER; V.83-#4, pp. 811-837.
-P. Bolton and M. Whinston (1993). “Incomplete Contracts, Vertical Integration, and Supply Assurance”. REStud; V.60-#?, pp. 121-148.
-G. Nöldeke and K. Schmidt (1995). “Option Contracts and Renegotiation: A Solution to the Holdup Problem”. RandJE; V.26-#2, pp. 163-179.
-A. Edlin and S. Reichelstein (1996). “Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment”. AER; V.86-#3, pp. 478-501.
-N. Melamud, D. Mookherjee, and S. Reichelstein (1997). “Contract Complexity, Incentives, and the Value of Delegation”. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy; V.6-#2, pp. 257-289.
-B.D. Bernheim and M. Whinston (1998). “Incomplete Contracts and Strategic Ambiguity”. AER; V.88-#4, pp. 902-932.
-P. Ahgion and J. Tirole (1997). “Formal and Real Authority in Organizations”. JPE; V.105-#1, pp. 1-29.
-R. Rajan and L. Zingales (1998). “Power in a Theory of the Firm”. QJE; V.113-#2, pp. 387-432.
-B. Holmström (1999). “The Firm as a Subeconomy”. JLEO; V.15-#1, pp. 74-102.
-Y.-K. Che and D. Hausch (1999). “Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting”. AER; V.89-#1, pp. 125-147.
-I. Segal (1999). “Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts”. REStud; V.66-#1, pp. 57-82.
-E. Maskin and J. Tirole (1999). “Unforseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts”. REStud; V.66-#1, pp. 83-114.
-O. Hart and J. Moore (1999). “Foundations of Incomplete Contracts”. REStud; V.66-#1, pp. 115-138.
-E. Maskin and J. Tirole (1999). “Two Remarks on the Property-Rights Literature”. REStud; V.66-#1, pp. 139-149.
-Jean Tirole (1999). “Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?”. Etrica, V.67-#4, pp. 741-782.
-L. Anderlini and L. Felli (1994), “Incomplete Written Contracts: Undescribable States of Nature”. QJE; V.109-#?, pp. 1085-1124.
-L. Anderlini and L. Felli (1999), “Incomplete Contracts and Complexity Costs”. Theory and Decision; V.46-#1, pp. 23-50.
-Y.-K. Che and T.Y. Chung (1999). “Contract Damages and Cooperative Investments”. RandJE; V.30-#1, pp. 84-105.
-S. Holden (1999). “Renegotiation and the Efficiency of Investments”. RandJE; V.30-#1, pp. 106-119.
-F. Gul (2001). “Unobservable investment and the hold-up problem”. Econometrica; V.69-#2, pp. 343-376.
(f) Collusion and Renegotiation
-J. Tirole (1992). “Collusion and the Theory of Organizations”. In J.-J. Laffont, ed. Advances in economic theory: Sixth World Congress. (Volume 2). Cambridge: CUP, pp. 151-206.
-J. Tirole (1986). “Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations”. JLEO; V.2-#2, pp. 181-214.
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-T. Olsen and G. Torsvik (1998). “Collusion and Renegotiation in Hierarchies: A Case of Beneficial Corruption”. IER; V.39-#2, pp. 413-438.
-J.-J. Laffont and D. Martimort (1998). “Collusion and Delegation”. RandJE; V.29-#2, pp. 280-305.
-M. Frascatore (1998). “Collusion in a Three-Tier Hierarchy: Credible Beliefs and Pure Self-Interest”. JEBO; V.34-#3, pp. 459-475.
-A. Kessler (2000). “On Monitoring and Collusion in Hierarchies”. JET; V.91-#2, pp. 280-291.
(4) Transfer Pricing and Managerial Control
(a) Under Full Information
-J. Hirschleifer (1956). “On the Economics of Transfer Pricing”. Journal of Business; V.29-#?, pp. 172-184.
-J.R. Gould (1964). “Internal Pricing in Firms when there are Costs of Using an Outside Market”. Journal of Business; V.64-#?, pp. 61-67.
-W. Baumol and T. Fabian (1964). “Decomposition, Pricing for Decentralization and External Economies”. Management Science; V.11-#1, pp. 1-31.
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-J. Ronen and G. Mckinney (1970). “Transfer Pricing for Divisional Autonomy”. Journal of Accounting Research; V.?-#?, pp. 99-112.
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-A.R. Abdel-khalik and E. Lusk (1974). “Transfer Pricing--A Synthesis”. Accounting Review; V.49-#?, pp. 8-23.
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-E. Bond (1976). “Optimal Transfer Pricing When Tax Rates Differ”. SEJ; V.47: 191-200.
(b) Under Asymmetric Information
-T. Groves and M. Loeb (1979). “Incentives in a Divisionalized Firm”. Management Science; V.25-#3, pp. 221-230.
-M. Harris, C. Kriebel and A. Raviv (1982). “Asymmetric Information, Incentives and Intrafirm Resource Allocation”. Management Science; V.28-#6, pp. 609-620.
-S. Cohen and M. Loeb (1984). “The Groves Scheme, Profit Sharing and Moral Hazard”. Management Science; V.30-#1, pp. 20-24.
-J. Ronen and K.R. Balachandran (1988). “An Approach to Transfer Pricing under Uncertainty”. Journal of Accounting Research; V.26-#2, pp. 300-314.
-J.S. Jordan (1989). “Accounting-based Divisional Performance Measurement: Incentives for Profit Maximization”. Contemporary Accounting Research; V.6-#2, pp. 903-921.
-A. Amershi and P. Cheng (1990). “Transfer Pricing: The Economics of Dominant Strategy Mechanisms under Information Asymmetry and Moral Hazard”. Contemporary Accounting Research; V.7-#1, pp. 61-99.
-R.D. Banker and S.M. Datar (1991). “Optimal Transfer Pricing under Postcontract Information”. Contemporary Accounting Research; V.8-#2, pp. 329-352.
-J. Christensen and J. Demski (1990). “Transfer Pricing in a Limited Communication Setting”. ms.: Yale School of Organization and Management.
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-B. Holmström and J. Tirole (1991). “Transfer Pricing and Organizational Form”. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization; V. 7-#2, pp. 201-228.
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-R. Eccles and H. White (1988). “Price and Authority in Inter-Profit Center Transactions”. American Journal of Sociology; V.94-Supplement, pp. s17-s48,
(5) Financial Structure and Managerial Incentives
-M. Harris and A. Raviv (1991). “Financial Contracting Theory”. in J.-J. Laffont, ed. Advances in Economic Theory, Sixth World Congress–Vol. II. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 64-150.
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-A. Shleifer and R. Vishny (1997). “A Survey of Corporate Governance”. JFin; V.52-#2, pp. 737-783.
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-A. Berle and G. Means (1932). The Modern Corporation and Private Property. New York: Macmillan.
-H. Manne (1965). “Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control”. JPE; V.73-#?, pp. 110-120.
-M. Jensen and W. Meckling (1976). “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure”. JFE; V.3-#?, pp. 305-360.
-E. Fama (1980). “Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm”. JPE; V.88-#2, pp. 288-307.
-E. Fama and M. Jensen (1983). “Separation of Ownership and Control”. JlawEcon; V.26-#?, pp. 301-325.
-E. Fama and M. Jensen (1983). “Agency Problems and Residual Claims”. JlawEcon; V.26-#?, pp. 327-349.
-E. Fama and M. Jensen (1985). “Organizational Forms and Investment Decisions”. JFE; V.14-#?, pp. 101-119.
-M. Jensen and R. Ruback (1983). “The Market For Corporate Control”. JFE; V.11-#1, pp. 5-50.
-M. Jensen (1986). “The Takeover Controversy: Analysis and Evidence”. Midland Corporate Journal; V.4-#?, pp. 6-32.
-M. Jensen and C. Smith (1988). “Stockholder, Manager, and Creditor Interests: Applications of Agency Theory”. in Altman and Subrahmanyam, eds. Recent Advances in Corporate Finance. Homewood: Irwin, pp. 93-131.
-G. Baker, M. Jensen and K. Murphy (1988). “Compensation and Incentives: Practice v. Theory”. Journal of Finance; V.43-#3, pp. 593-616.
-S. Ross (1977). “The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive-Signalling Approach”. BJE; V.8-#1, pp. 23-40.
-H. Leland and D. Pyle (1977). “Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation”. JFin; V.32-#2, pp. 371-387.
-S. Ross (1978). “Some Notes on Financial Incentive-Signalling Models, Activity Choice and Risk Preferences”. JFin; V.33-#3, pp 777-792
-S. Grossman and O. Hart (1980). “Takeover Bids, The Free Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation”. BLE; V.11-#1, pp. 42-64.
-S. Grossman and O. Hart (1981). “The Allocational Role of Takeover Bids in Situations of Asymmetric Information”. JFin; V.36-#2, pp. 253-270.
-S. Grossman and O. Hart (1982). “Corporate Financial Structure and Managerial Incentives”. J. McCall, ed. Economics of Information. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 107-137.
-O. Hart (1983). “The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme”. BJE; V.14-#2, pp. 366-382.
-D. Diamond (1984). “Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring”. REStud; V.51-#?, pp. 393-414.
-J. Stiglitz (1985). “Credit Markets and the Control of Capital”. JMCB; V.17-#2, pp. 133-152.
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-P. Aghion, O. Hart, and J. Moore (1992). “The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform”. JLEO; V.8-#3, pp. 523-546.
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d. Asymmetric Information and Efficiency Wages
(1) Overviews
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-A. Weiss (1991). Efficiency Wages: Models of Unemployment, Layoffs, and Wage Dispersion. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
(2) Adverse Selection and Efficiency Wages
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-J. Malcomson (1981). “Unemployment and the Efficiency Wage Hypothesis”. EJ; V.91-#?, pp. 848-866.
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(3) Worker Moral Hazard and Efficiency Wages
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-G. Calvo (1979). “Quasi-Walrasian Theories of Unemployment”. AER; V.69-#2, pp. 102-107.
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(4) Fairness and Efficiency Wages
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e. Class Struggle at the Point of Production
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3. Institutional Structure of the Macroeconomy
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b. Coordination, Convention, and Cooperation
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Gilbert, Margaret (1990). “Rationality, Coordination, and Convention”. Synthese; V.84-#1, pp. 1-21.
Bianchi, Marina (1993). “How to Learn Sociality: True and False Solutions to Mandeville's Problem”. History of Political Economy; V.25-#2, pp. 209-240.
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Banks, Jeffrey and Randall Calvert (1992). “A Battle-of-the-Sexes Game with Incomplete Information”. Games and Economic Behavior; V4-#3, pp. 347-372.
Kaneko, Mamoru and Toshiyuki Kimura (1992). “Conventions, Social Prejudices and Discrimination: A Festival Game with Merrymakers”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.4-#4, pp. pp. 511-527.
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Crawford, Vincent and Bruno Broseta (1998). “What Price Coordination? The Efficiency-Enhancing Effect of Auctioning the Right to Play”. AER; V.88-#1, pp. 198-225.
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Karandikar, Rajeeva et al. (1998). “Evolving Aspirations and Cooperation”. JET; V80-#2, pp. 292-331.
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Sandroni, Alvaro (1997). “Reciprocity and Cooperation in Repeated Coordination Games: The Blurry Belief Approach”. Northwestern University Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science Discussion Paper: #1200.
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Binmore, Ken (1990). “Evolution and Utilitarianism: Social Contract III”. Constitutional Political Economy; V.1-#2, pp. 1-26.
Binmore, Ken and Larry Samuelson (1994). “An Economist's Perspective on the Evolution of Norms”. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics; V.150-#1, pp. 45-63.
Boyer, Robert and Andre Orlean (1992). “How Do Conventions Evolve?”. Journal of Evolutionary Economics; V.2-#3, pp. 165-177.
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Kandori, Michihiro, George Mailath, and Rafael Rob (1993). “Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games”. Econometrica; V.61-#1, pp. 29-56.
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Goyal, Sanjeev (1996). “Interaction Structure and Social Change”. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics; V.152-#?, pp. 472-495.
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Van Huyck, John, Raymond Battalio, and Richard Beil (1991). “Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games”. Quarterly Journal of Economics; V.106-#3, pp. 885-910.
Van Huyck, John, Raymond Battalio, and Richard Beil (1993). “Asset Markets as an Equilibrium Selection Mechanism: Coordination Failure, Game Form Auctions, and Tacit Communication”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.5-#3, pp. 485-504.
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c. Emergence and Evolution of Norms
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d. Culture, Norms and Performance
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e. Analysis of Concrete Institutional Structure and Economic Performance
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-A. Braverman and T.N. Srinivasan (1981). “Credit and Sharecropping in Agrarian Societies”. Journal of Development Economics; V.9-#3, pp. 289-312.
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-A. Braverman and J.L. Guasch (1984). “Capital Requirements, Screening and Interlinked Sharecropping and Credit Contracts”. Journal of Development Economics; V.14-#3, pp. 359-374.
-M. Quibria and S. Rashid (1984). “The Puzzle of Sharecropping: A Survey of Theories”. World Development; V.12-#2, pp. 103-114.
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-S. Subramanian (1995). “Wage Labor, Sharecropping, and Credit Transactions”. OEP; V.47-#2, pp. 329-356.
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-R. Herring (1983). Land to the Tiller: The Political Economy of Agrarian Reform in South Asia. Delhi: Oxford University Press.
-J. Andvig (1991). “The Economics of Corruption: A Survey”. Studi Economici; V.46-#?, pp. 57-94.
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-S. Rose-Ackerman (1978). Corruption: A Study in Political Economy. New York: Academic Press.
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-P. Beck and M. Maher (1986). “A Comparison of Bribery and Bidding in Thin Markets”. EcLets; V.20-#1, pp. 1-5.
-D. Lien (1986). “A Note on Competitive Bribery Games”. EcLets; V.22-#?, pp. 337-341.
-D. Lien (1987). “Asymmetric Information in Competitive Bribery Games”. EcLets; V.23-#?, pp. 153-156.
-O. Cadot (1987). “Corruption as a Gamble”. JPubE; V.33-#?, pp. 223-244.
-R. Sah (1987). “Persistence and Pervasiveness of Corruption”. Conference on Political Economy: Theory and Implications. Washington, DC: World Bank.
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-R. Klitgaard (1991). Tropical Gangsters: One Man's Experience With Development and Decadence in Deepest Africa. New York: Basic Books.
-R. Klitgaard (1991). Controlling Corruption. Berkeley: University of California Press.
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-P. Maurro (1995). “Corruption and Growth”. QJE; V.110-#3, pp. 681-712.
-Daron Acemoglu and Thierry Verdier (2000). “Property Rights, Corruption and the Allocation of Talent: A General Equilibrium Approach”. EJ; V.108-#450, pp. 1381-1403.
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-K.A. Elliott (1997). Corruption and the Global Economy. Washington, DC: IIE.
-S. Rose-Ackerman (1999). Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform. New York: Cambridge University Press.
-I. Ehrlich (1999). “Bureaucratic Corruption and Endogenous Economic Growth”. JPE; V.107-#6, pp. s270-s292.
-Jean Hindriks, Michael Keen, and Abhinay Muthoo (1999). “Corruption, extortion and evasion”. Journal of Public Economics; V.74-#3, pp. 395-430.
-Jean-Jacques Laffont and Tchétché N'Guessan (1999). “Competition and Corruption in an Agency Relationship”. Journal of Development Economics; V.60-#2, pp. 271-295.
(6) Intermediaries, Middlemen, etc.
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-D. Diamond (1984). “Financial Intermediation as Delegated Monitoring: A Simple Example”. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly; V.82-#3, pp. 51-66.
A. Rubinstein and A. Wolinsky (1987). “Middlemen”. QJE; V.102-#3, pp. 581-593.
-M.O. Yanelle (1989). “The Strategic Analysis of Intermediation”. EER; V.33-#2/3, pp. 294-301.
-T. Gehrig (1993). “Intermediation in Search Markets”. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy; V.2-#1, pp. 97-120.
-M. Arnold (1993). “Signalling by Middlemen”. EcLets; V.42-#2/3, pp. 189-194.
-G. Biglaiser (1993). “Middlemen as Experts”. Rand Journal of Economics; V.24-#2, pp. 212-223.
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-G. Biglaiser and J. Friedman (1999). “Adverse Selection with Competitive Inspection”. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy; V.8-#1, pp. 1-32.
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-A. Yavas (1994). “Middlemen in Bilateral Search Markets”. Journal of Labor Economics; V.12-#3, pp. 406-429.
-J.T. Landa (1994). Trust, ethnicity, and identity: Beyond the new institutional economics of ethnic trading networks, contract law, and gift-exchange. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
-J. Fingleton (1997). “Competition among Middlemen When Buyers and Sellers Can Trade Directly”. Journal of Industrial Economics; V.45-#4, pp. 405-427.
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-R. Grabowski (1999). “Market Evolution and Economic Development: The Evolution of Impersonal Markets”. American Journal of Economics and Sociology; V.58-#4, pp. 699-712.
N. Wang (1999). “Transaction Costs and the Structure of the Market: A Case Study”. American Journal of Economics and Sociology; V.58-#4, pp. 783-805.
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4. Structural Analysis At the Level of the Economy
a. The Division of Labor and the Social Structure of Production
-E. Durkheim (1893/1984). The Division of Labor in Society. New York: Free Press.
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-D. Rueschemeyer (1986). Power and the Division of Labor. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
-A. Abbott (1988). The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
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-M. Granovetter (1983). “The Strength of Weak Ties Revisited”. in R. Collins, ed. Sociological Theory--1983. pp. 201-233.
-H. White (1981). “Production Markets as Induced Role Structures”. in S. Leinhardt, ed. Sociological Methodology--1981. San Francisco: Jossey Bass, pp. 1-57.
-H. White (1981). “Where Do Markets Come From?”. AJS; V.87-#3, pp. 517-547.
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-E. Leifer (1985). “Markets as Mechanisms: Using a Role Structure”. Social Forces; V.64-#2, pp. 442-472.
-R. Burt (1988). “The Stability of American Markets”. AJS; V.94-#2, pp. 356-395.
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b. Structures of Corporate Control
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-J. Schumpeter (1927). “Social Classes in an Ethnically Homogeneous Environment”. translation in J. Schumpeter, Imperialism and Social Classes. Oxford: Blackwell.
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Burt, Ronald (1980). “Models of Network Structure”. in Alex Inkeles, Neil Smelser, and Ralph Turner, eds. Annual Review of Sociology; #6, pp. 79-141.
Burt, Ronald (1982). Toward a Structural Theory of Action: Network Models of Social Structure, Perception, and Action. New York: Academic Press.
Berkowitz, S.D. (1982). An Introduction to Structural Analysis: The Network Approach. Toronto: Butterworth.
Wasserman, S. and K. Faust (1994). Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications. Cambridge: CUP.
Scott, John (2000). Social Network Analysis: A Handbook (2nd Edition). Beverley Hills: Sage.
Brieger, Ronald, Scott Boorman, and Phipps Arabie (1975). “An Algorithm for Clustering Relational Data with Applications to Social Network Analysis and Comparison with Multidimensional Scaling”. Journal of Mathematical Psychology; V.12-#3, pp. 328-383.
White, Harrison, Scott Boorman, and Ronald Brieger (1976). “Social Structure from Multiple Networks. I. Blockmodels of Roles and Positions. American Journal of Sociology; V.81-#4, pp. 730-780.
Boorman, Scott and Harrison White (1976). “Social Structure from Multiple Networks. II. Role Structures”. American Journal of Sociology; V.81-#6, pp. 1384-1446.
White, Harrison (1977). “Probabilities of Homomorphic Mappings from Multiple Graphs”. Journal of Mathematical Psychology; V.16-#2, pp. 121-134.
Arabie, Phipps, Scott Boorman, and Paul Levitt (1978). “Constructing Blockmodels: How and Why”. Journal of Mathematical Psychology; V.17-#1, pp. 21-63.
Panning, William (1982). “Blockmodels: From Relations to Configurations”. American Journal of Political Science; V.26-#3, pp. 585-608.
Boorman, Scott and Paul Levitt (1983). “Blockmodeling Complex Statutes: Mapping Techniques Based on Combinatorial Optimization for Analyzing Economic Legislation and Its Stress Over Time”. Economics Letters; V.13-#1, pp. 1-9.
Carrington, Peter, Greg Heil, and Stephen, Berkowitz (1979/80). “A Goodness-of-Fit Index for Blockmodels”. Social Networks; V.2-#3, pp. 219-234.
Bonacich, Philip (1980). “The ‘Common Structure Semigroup’, An Alternative to the Boorman and White ‘Joint Reduction’”. American Journal of Sociology; V.86-#1, pp. 159-166.
Bonacich, Philip and Maureen McConaghy (1980). “The Algebra of Blockmodeling”. in K. Schuessler, ed. Sociological Methodology–1980. San Francisco: Josey Bass, pp. 489-532.
Wu, Lawrence (1983/4). “Local Blockmodel Algebras for Analyzing Social Networks”. in S. Leinhardt, ed. Sociological Methodology–1983/4. San Francisco: Josey Bass, pp. 272-313.
Winship, Christopher and Michael Mandel (1983/4). “Roles and Positions: A Critique and Extension of the Blockmodeling Technique”. in S. Leinhardt, ed. Sociological Methodology–1983/4. San Francisco: Josey Bass, pp. 314-344.
Mandel, Michael (1983). “Local Roles and Social Networks”. American Sociological Review; V.48-#3, pp. 376-386.
Holland, Paul, Kathryn Laskey, and Samuel Leinhardt (1983). “Stochastic Blockmodels: First Steps”. Social Networks; V.5-#2, pp. 109-137.
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R. Feenstra, D.-S. Huang, and G. Hamilton (1997). “Business Groups and Trade in East Asia, Part 2: Networked Equilibria”. NBER Working Paper, #5887.
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e. Microeconomic and Game Theoretic Analyses of Networks
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Bala, Venkatesh and Sanjeev Goyal (1999). “A Strategic Analysis of Network Reliability”. Review of Economic Design, V.5-#3, pp. 205-228.
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Goyal, Sanjeev and Fernando Vega-Redondo (1999). “Learning, Network Formation and Coordination”. ms: Erasmus University.
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D. Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy
1. The Theoretical Relationship between Capitalism and Democracy
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2. The Empirical Relationship Between Capitalism and Democracy
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(a) The Effect of Growth/Development on Democracy
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(b) The Effect of Democracy on Economic Performance
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-K. Bollen and R. Jackman (1985). “Political Democracy and the Size Distribution of Income”. American Sociological Review; V.50-#?, pp. 438-457.
-B. Moon and W. Dixon (1985). “Politics, the State, and Basic Human Needs: A Cross-national Study”. ISQ; V.29-#?, pp. 661-694.
-A. Kohli (1986). “Democracy and Development”. in J. Lewis and V. Kalab, ed. Development Strategies Reconsidered. New Brunswick: Transaction Books, pp. 153-182.
-E. Muller (1988). “Democracy, Economic Development, and Income Inequality”. American Sociologcal Review; V.53-#?, pp. [comment by E. Weede and response, ASR, 1989]
-K. Bollen and R. Jackman (1989). “Democracy, Stability, and Dichotomies”. American Sociological Review; V.54-#?, pp. 612-621.
-Z. Arat (1988). “Democracy and Economic Development: Modernization Theory Revisited”. Comparative Politics; V.21-#1, pp. 21-36.
-F. Vorhies and F. Glahe (1988). “Political Liberty and Social Development: An Empirical Investigation”. PC; V.58-#?, pp. 45-71.
-T. Ziesemer (1990). “Public Factors and Democracy in Poverty Analysis”. OEP; V.42-#?, pp. 268-280.
-L. Sirowy and A. Inkeles (1990). “The Effects of Democracy on Economic Growth and Inequality: A Review”. Studies in Comparative Internaitonal Development; V.25-#?, pp. 126-157.
-A. Hadenius (1991). Democracy and Development. Cambridge: CUP.
-K. Remmers (1990). “Democracy and Economic Crisis: The Latin American Experience”. WP; V.42-#3, pp. 315-335.
-J. Helliwell (1994). “Empirical Linkages Between Democracy and Economic Growth”. British Journal of Political Science, V.24-#?, pp. 225-248.
-J. De Haan and C. Siermann (1995). “A Sensitivity Analysis of the Impact of Democracy on Economic Growth”. Empirical Economics; V.20-#?, pp. 197-215.
-J. De Haan and C. Siermann (1996). “New Evidence on the Relationship between Democracy and Economic Growth”. PC; V.86-#?, pp. 175-198.
-E. Weede (1996). “Legitimacy, Democracy and Comparative Economic Growth Reconsidered”. European Journal of Sociology; V.12-#3, pp. 217-225.
-L. Feld and M. Savioz (1997). “Direct Democracy Matters for Economic Performance: An Empirical Investigation”. KYKLOS; V.50-#4, pp. 507-538.
-R. Barro (1996). “Democracy and Development”. Journal of Economic Growth; V.1-#1, pp. 1-27.
(c) The Relationship between “Economic Freedom” and Growth
-G. Scully and D. Slottje (1991). “Ranking Economic Liberty Across Countries”. PC; V.69-#?, pp. 121-152.
-X. de Vanssay and Z. Spindler (1994). “Freedom and Growth: Do Constitutions Matter?”. PC; V.78-#?, pp. 359-372.
-J. Torstenssow (1994). “Property Rights and Economic Growth”. KYKLOS; V.47-#?, pp. 231-247.
-C. Clague, P. Keefer, S. Knack, and M. Olson (1996). “Property and Contract Rights in Autocracies and Democracies”. Journal of Economic Growth; V.1-#2, pp. 243-276.
-J. De Haan and C. Siermann (1998). “Further Evidence on the Relationship between Economic Freedom and Economic Growth”. PC; V.95-#?, pp. 363-380.
-J. Dawson (1998). “Institutions, Investment, and Growth: New Cross-Country and Panel Data Evidence”. Economic Inquiry; V.36-#4, pp. 603-619.
b. Historical Analysis of the Relationship between Capitalism and Democracy
-G. Therborn (1977). “The Rule of Capital and the Rise of Democracy”. New Left Review; V.103-#?, pp.
-J. Kurth (1979). “Industrial Change and Political Change”. In D. Collier, ed. The New Authoritarianism in Latin America. Princeton: PUP.
-G. Luebbert (1991). Liberalism Fascism or Social Democracy: Social Classes and the Political Origins of Regimes in Interwar Europe. Oxford: OUP.
-D. Rueschmeyer, E.H. Stephens, and J. Stephens (1992). Capitalist Development and Democracy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
c. Non-Democratic Political Institutions and Economic Performance
-D. Laband (1984). “Is there a Relationship between Economic Conditions and Political Structure?”. PC; V.42-#1, pp. 25-37.
-Y. Cohen (1985). “The Impact of Bureaucratic Authoritarianism on Economic Growth”. Comparative Political Studies; V.18-#?, pp. 123-136.
-G. Scully (1988). “The Institutional Framework and Economic Growth”. JPE; V.96-#3, pp. 652-662.
-G. Scully (1992). Constitutional Environments and Economic Growth. Princeton: PUP.
-A. Przeworski and F. Limongi (1993). “Political Regimes and Economic Growth”. Economic Perspectives; V.7-#3, pp. 51-69.
-M. Olson (1991). “Autocracy, Democracy and Prosperity”. in R. Zeckhauser, ed. Strategy and Choice. Cambridge: MIT, pp. 131-157.
-M. Olson (1993). “Dictatorship, Democracy and Development”. APSR; V.87-#?, pp. 567-576.
-C. Clague (1993). “Rule Obedience, Organizational Loyalty, and Economic Development”. JITE; V.149-#?, pp. 393-414.
-S. Knack and P. Keefer (1995). “Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures”. E&P; V.7-#?, pp. 207-227.
-S. Knack (1996). “Institutions and the Convergence Hypothesis: The Cross-National Evidence”. PC; V.87-#?, pp. 207-228.
-P. Keefer and S. Knack (1997). “Why Don’t Poor Countries Catch Up? A Cross-national Test of an Institutional Explanation”. EcInq; V.35-#?, pp. 590-602.
-M. McGuire and M. Olson (1996). “The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule”. JEL; V.34-#1, pp. 72-96.
-J. Durham (1999). “Economic Growth and Political Regimes”. Journal of Economic Growth; V.4-#?, pp. 81-111.
-W. Henisz (2000). “The Institutional Environment for Economic Growth”. E&P; V.12-#1, pp. 1-31.
-A. Chong and C. Calderón (2000). “Causality and Feedback between Institutional Measures and Economic Growth”. E&P; V.12-#1, pp. 69-81.
-Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson (2001). “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation”. AER; V.91-#5, pp. 1369-1401.
-H. Grossman and S.J. Noh (1990). “A Theory of Kleptocracy with Probabilistic Survival and Reputation”. E&P; V.2-#?, pp. 157-171.
-H. Grossman (1991). “A General Theory of Insurrections”. AER; V.81-#?, pp. 912-921.
-H. Grossman and M. Kim (1996). “Predation and Accumulation”. Journal of Economic Growth; V.1-#3, pp. 333-350.
3. Managing the Transition to Capitalism and Democracy: Political Economy of Policy Reform
-A. Krueger (1986). “Problems of Liberalization”. in A. Choksi and D. Papageorgiou, eds. Economic Liberalization in Developing Countries. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 15-31.
-A. Krueger (1992). Economic Policy Reform in Developing Countries. Oxford: Blackwell.
-A. Krueger (1993). “Virtuous and Vicious Circles in Economic Development”. AER; V.83-#2, pp. 351-355.
-A. Krueger (1993). Political Economy of Policy Reform in Developing Countries. Cambridge: MIT.
-D. Rodrik (1989). “Credibility of Trade Policy Reform--A Policymaker's Guider”. World Economy; pp. 1-16.
-D. Rodrik (1992). “The Limits of Trade Policy Reform in Developing Countries”. JEP; V.6-#1, pp. 87-105.
-D. Rodrik (1993). “The Positive Economics of Policy Reform”. AER. V.83-#2, pp. 356-361.
-D. Rodrik (1996). “Understanding Economic Policy Reform”. JEL; v.34-#1, pp. 9-41.
-R. Falvey (1992). “Timing and Sequencing Issues in Trade Liberalisation”. EJ; V.102-#?, pp. 908-924.
a. Timing, Credibility and Sustainability of Policy Reform
(1) Intertemporal Economic Foundations of (In)Credibility
-M. Bruno (1981). “Short-term Policy Trade-offs under Different Phases of Economic Development”. in S. Grassman and E. Lundberg, eds. The World Economic Order: Past and Prspects. London: Macmillan, pp. 295-313.
-G. Calvo (1981). “Devaluation: Levels versus Rates”. JIE; V.11-#?, pp. 165-172.
-M. Mussa (1986). “The Adjustment Process and the Timing of Trade Liberalization”. in A. Choksi and D. Papageorgiou, eds. Economic Liberalization in Developing Countries. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 68-124.
-R. Feenstra (1985). Anticipated Devaluations, Currency Flight, and Direct Trade Controls in a Monetary Economy”. AER; V.75-#3, pp. 386-401.
-G. Calvo (1986). “Temporary Stabilization: Predetermined Exchange Rates”. JPE; V.94-#6, pp. 1319-1329.
-G. Calvo (1987). “Costly Trade Liberalizations: Durable Goods and Capital Mobility”. IMFSP; V.35-#?, pp. 461-473.
-G. Calvo (1989). “Incredible Reforms”. in G. Calvo, et al., eds. Debt, Stabilization and Development. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 217-234.
-G. Calvo (1987). “On the Cost of Temporary Policy”. JDevE; V.27-#?, pp. 245-261.
-G. Calvo (1988). “Costly Trade Liberalizations: Durable Goods and Capital Mobility”. IMFSP; V.35-#?, pp. 461--473.
-G. Calvo (1991). “Temporary Stabilization Policy: the Case of Flexible Prices and Exchange Rates”. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control; V.15-#?, pp. 197-213.
-K. Froot (1988). “Credibility, Real Interest Rates, and the Optimal Speed of Trade Liberalization”. JIE; V.25-#?, pp. 71-93.
-S. Edwards and J. Ostry (1990). “Anticipated Protectionist Policies, Real Exchange Rates and the Current Account”. JIMF; V.9-#?, pp. 206-209.
-R. Dornbusch (1991). “Credibility and Stabilization”. QJE; V.106-#?, pp. 837-850.
-G. Calvo and C. Végh (1994). “Credibility and the Dynamics of Stabilization: A Basic Framework”. In C. Sims, ed. Advances in Econometrics: Sixth World Congress--V.II. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 377-420.
-E. Buffie (1995). “Trade Liberalization, Credibility and Self-fulfilling Failures”. JIE; V.38-#1/2, pp. 51-73.
-S. van Wijnbergen (1985). “Trade Reform, Aggregate Investment and Capital Flight: On Credibility and the Value of Information”. EcLets; V.19-#?, pp. 369-372.
-D. Rodrik (1991). “Policy Uncertainty and Private Investment in Developing Countries”. JDevE; V.36-#?, pp. 229-242.
-R. Labán (1991). “Capital Repatriation and the Waiting Game”. EcLets; V.37-#?, pp. 249-253.
-J. Aizenman (1992). “Trade Reforms, Credibility, and Development”. JDevE; V.39-#?, pp. 163-187.
-S. van Wijnbergen (1992). “Trade Reform, Policy Uncertainty, and the Current Account: A Non-Expected Utility Approach”. AER; V.82-#3, pp. 626-633.
-P. Srivastava (1994). “Nationalizing to Liberalize: Credibility in Trade Liberalization”. JIE; V.36-#3/4, pp. 449-465.
-D. Rodrik (1989). “Promises, Promises: Credible Policy Reform via Signalling”. EJ; V.99-#?, pp. 756-772.
-C. Engel and K. Kletzer (1991). “Trade Policy under Endogenous Credibility”. JDevE; V.36-#?, pp. 213-228.
-T. Andersen and O. Risager (1988). “Stabilization Policies, Credibility and Interest Rate Determination in a Small Open Economy”. EER; V.32-#?, pp. 669-679.
-T. Persson and S. van Wijnbergen (1993). “Signalling, Wage Controls and Monetary Disinflation Policy”. EJ; V.103-#416, pp. 79-97.
-A. Cukierman and N. Liviatan (1992). “The Dynamics of Optimal Gradual Stabilization”. WBER; V.6-#3, pp. 439-458.
-P. Agénor and M. Taylor (1992). “Testing for Credibility Effects”. IMFSP; V.39-#3, pp. 545-571.
-L. Karp and T. Paul (1994). “Phasing-in and Phasing-our Protectionism with Costly Adjustment of Labor”. EJ; V.104-#427, pp. 1379-1393.
-L. Karp and T. Paul (1998). “Labor Adjustment and Gradual Reform: When is Commitment Important?”. JIE; V.46-#2, pp. 333-362.
-P.L. Sacco and C. Scarpa (2000). “Critical Mass Effect and Restructuring in the Transition Toward a Market Economy”. EER; V.44-#3, pp. 587-608.
-A. Atkinson and J. Mickelwright (1992). Economic Transformation in Eastern Europe and the Distribution of Income. Cambridge: CUP.
(2) Political Economic Foundations of (In)Credibility
(a) Referenda with Imperfect/Asymmetric Information
-R. Fernandez and D. Rodrik (1991). “Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty”. AER; V.81-#5, pp. 1146-1155.
-M. Dewatripont and G. Roland (1992). “The Virtues of Gradualism and Legitimacy in the Transition to a Market Economy”. EJ; V.102-#?, pp. 291-300.
-M. Dewatripont and G. Roland (1992). “Economic Reform and Dynamic Political Constraints”. REStud; V.59-#4, pp. 703-730.
-S. van Wijnbergen (1992). “Intertemporal Speculation, Shortages and the Political Economy of Price Reform”. EJ; V.102-#?, pp. 1395-1406.
-S. van Wijnbergen (1992). “Should Prices be Decontrolled Gradually or in a Big Bang”. in A. Cukierman, Z. Hercowitz and L. Leiderman, eds. Political Economy, Growth and Business Cycles. Cambridge: MIT, pp. 263-280.
-K. Murphy, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny (1992). “The Transition to a Market Economy: Pitfalls of a Partial Reform”. AJE; V.57-#?, pp. 889-906.
-C. Wyplosz (1993). “After the Honeymoon: On the Economics and Politics of Economic Transition”. EER; V.37-#?, pp. 379-386.
-J. DeGregorio (forth.). “Models of Policy Accommodation and Inflation Persistence”. JMCB; V.
-G.M. Milesi-Ferretti (1995). “A Simple Model of Disinflation and the Optimality of Doing Nothing”. EER; V.39-#7, pp. 1385-1404.
-S.-J. Wei (1997). “Gradualism versus Big Bang: Speed and Sustainability of Reform”. CJE; V.30-#4b, pp. 1234-1247.
-P. Lian and S.-J. Wei (forth.). “To Shock or Not to Shock?: Economics and Political Economy of Large-Scale Reform”. E&P, V.
-R. Labán and H. Wolf (1993). “Large-Scale Privatization in Transition Economies”. AER; V.83-#5, pp. 1199-1210.
G. Roland and T. Verdier (1994). “Privatization in Eastern Europe: Irreversibility and Critical Mass Effects”. JPubE; V.54-#2, pp. 161-183.
-D. Rodrik (1995). “The Dynamics of Political Support for Reform in Economies in Transition”. JJIE; V.9-#?, pp. 403-425.
(b) Lobbying Games
-A. Alessina and A. Drazen (1991). “Why are Stabilizations Delayed?”, AER; V.81-#5, pp. 1170-1188.
-A. Drazen and V. Grilli (1993). “The Benefit of Crises for Economic Reforms”. AER; V.83-#3, pp. 598-607.
-A. Velasco (1994). “The State and Economic Policy: Chile 1952-1992". in B. Bosworth, R. Dornbusch, and R. Laban, eds. The Chilean Economy: Policy Lessons and Challenges. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 379-429.
-A. Tornell (1995). “Are Economic Crises Necessary for Trade Liberalization and Economic Reform?: The Mexican Experience”. in R. Dornbusch and S. Edwards,eds. Reform, Recovery and Growth: Latin America and the Middle East. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 53-73.
-R. Labán and F. Sturzenegger (1994). “Distributional Conflict, Financial Adaptation and Delayed Stabilization”. E&P; V.6-#3, pp. 257-276.
-R. Labán and F. Sturzenegger (1994). “Fiscal Conservatism as a Response to the Debt Crisis”. JDevE; V.45-#2, pp. 305-324.
-R. Perotti (1996). “Redistribution and Non-Consumption Smoothing in an Open Economy”. REStud; V.63-#?, pp 411-433.
-Chang-Tai Hsieh (2000). “Bargaining over reform”. EER; V.44-#9, pp. 1659-1676.
-V. Dehejia (1994). “Income Distribution and the Limits to Policy Reform: Shock Therapy or Gradualism?”. ms: Columbia University.
-Dehejia, Vivek (1996). “Shock Therapy vs. Gradualism: A Neoclassical Perspective”. Eastern Economic Journal; V.22-#4, pp. 425-431.
-E. Dinopoulos and T. Lane (1992). “Market Liberalization Policies in a Reforming Socialist Economy”. IMFSP; V.39-#3, pp. 465-494.