I. Collective Action, Social Choice and the General Analysis Political Aggregation

 

A. Overviews

 

-N. Frolich and J. Oppenheimer (1978). Modern Political Economy. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.

 

-D. Mueller (1989). Public Choice, II. Cambridge: CUP.

 

-R. Cornes and T. Sandler (1986). The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods and Club Goods. Cambridge: CUP.

 

B. The Collective Action Problem: Public Good Provision and Pressure Group Formation

 

1. Public Goods: Characterization and Equilibrium

 

a. Formal Characterization of Public Goods

 

-W. Oakland (1985). “Theory of Public Goods”. in A. Auerbach and M. Feldstein, eds. Handbook of Public Economics--V.II. Amsterdam: North Holland.

 

-P. Samuelson (1954). “The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure”. REStat; V.36-#3, pp. 387-389.

 

-P. Samuelson (1955). “Diagrammatic Exposition of the Pure Theory of Public Expenditure”. REStat; V.37-#3, pp. 350-356.

 

-P. Samuelson (1958). “Aspects of Public Expenditure Theories”. REStat; V.40-#3, pp. 332-338.

 

-P. Samuelson (1969). “The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure and Taxation”. in Margolis and Guitton, eds. Public Economics. New York: St. Martins, pp. 98-123.

 

-J.G. Head (1962). “Public Goods and Public Policy”. Public Finance; #17, pp. 197-219.

 

-O. Davis and A. Whinston (1967). “On the Distinction between Public and Private Goods”. AER; V.57-#?, pp. 360-373.

 

-M. Kamien, N. Schwartz and D. Roberts (1973). “Exclusion, Externalities, and Public Goods”. JPubE; V.2-#?, pp. 217-230.

 

-T. Bergstrom and R. Cornes (1983). “Independence of Allocative Efficiency from Distribution in the Theory of Public Goods”. Etrica; V.51-#6, pp. 17531765.

 

-J.G. Head and C. Shoup (1969). “Public Goods, Private Goods and Ambiguous Goods”. EJ; V.79-#?, pp. 567-572.

 

-W. Oakland (1972). “Congestion, Public Goods and Welfare”. JPubE; V.1-#?, pp. 339-357.

 

-J.G. Head (1976). “Mixed Goods in Samuelson Geometry”. Public Finance; V.31-#3, pp. 313-339.

 

b. On the Lindahl Equilibrium

 

-K. Wicksell (1896/1958). “A New Principle of Just Taxation”. translation in R. Musgrave and A. Peacock, eds. Classics in the Theory of Public Finance. New York: MacMillan, pp. 72-118.

 

-E. Lindahl (1919/1958). “Just Taxation--A Positive Solution”. translation in R. Musgrave and A. Peacock, eds. Classics in the Theory of Public Finance. New York: MacMillan, pp. 168-176.

 

-L. Johansen (1963). “Some Notes on the Lindahl Theory of Public Expenditures”. IER; V.4-#?, pp. 346-358.

 

-G. Philpotts (1980). “A Note on the Representation of Preferences in the Lindahl-Johansen Diagram”. AER; V.70-#3, pp. 488-492.

 

-E. Malinvaud (1971). “A Planning Approach to Public Goods Problem”. SwedJE; V.11-#?, pp. 96-112.

 

-P. Champsaur (1976). “Symmetry and Continuity Properties of Lindahl Equilibria”. JMathE; V.3-#1, pp. 19-36.

 

c. General Equilibrium with Public Goods

 

-W. Thomson (1999). “Economies with Public Goods: An Elementary Geometric Exposition”. JPET; V.1-#1, pp. 139-176.

 

-D. Foley (1967). “Resource Allocation and the Public Sector”. Yale Economic Essays; V.7-#1, pp. 45-98.

 

-R. Dorfman (1969). “General Equilibrium with Public Goods”. In J. Margolis and H. Guitton, eds. Public Economics. New York: St. Martins, pp. 247-275.

 

-D. Foley (1970). “Lindahl's Solution and the Core of an Economy with Public Goods”. Etrica; V.38-#1, pp. 66-72.

 

-T. Muench (1972). “The Core and the Lindahl Equilibrium of an Economy with Public Goods: An Example”. JET; V.4-#?, pp. 241-255.

 

-B. Ellickson (1973). “A Generalization of the Pure Theory of Public Goods”. AER; V.63-#3, pp. 417-432.

 

-J. Roberts (1974). “The Lindahl Solution for Economies with Public Goods”. JPubE; V.3-#?, pp. 23-42.

 

-P. Champsaur, J. Roberts, and T. Rosenthal (1975). “Cores in Economies with Public Goods”. IER; V.16-#?, pp. 751-764.

 

-T. Bergstrom (1975). “The Core when Strategies are Restricted by Law”. REStud; V.?-#?, pp. 249-257.

 

-J.-C. Milleron (1972). “Theory of Value with Public Goods: A Survey Article”. JET; V.5-#?, pp. 419-477.

 

-R. Zeckhauser and M. Weinstein (1974). “The Topology of Pareto Optimal Regions with Public Goods”. JET; V.42-#4, pp. 643-666.

 

-A. Denzau and R. Parks (1977). “A Problem with Public Sector Preferences”. JET; V.14-#?, pp. 454-457.

 

-H. Tulkens (1978). “Dynamic Processes for Public Goods: An Institution-Oriented Survey”. JpubE; V.9-#?, pp. 163-201.

 

-A. Mas-Colell (1980). “Efficiency and Decentralization in the Pure Theory of Public Goods”. QJE; V.94-#4, pp. 625-641.

 

-D. Campbell and M. Truchon (1988). “Boundary Optima and the Theory of Public Goods Supply”. JPubE; V.35-#?, pp. 241-249.

 

-T. Saijo (1990). “Boundary Optima and the Theory of Public Goods Supply”. JPubE; V.42-#?, pp. 213-217.

 

-J. Conley and D. Diamantaras (1996). “Generalized Samuelson Conditions and Welfare Theorems for Non-Smooth Economies”. JPubE; V.59-#?, pp. 137-152.

 

-G. Tian (1988). “On the Constrained Walrasian and Lindahl Correspondences”. EcLets; V.26-#?, pp. 299-303.

 

-D. Diamantaras and S. Wilkie (1996). “On the Set of Pareto Efficient Allocations in Economies with Public Goods”. ET; V.7-#?, pp. 371-379.

 

-J. Conley and D. Diamantaras (1996). “Generalized Samuelson Conditions and Welfare Theorems for Nonsmooth Economies”. Journal of Public Economics; V.59-#1, pp. 137-152.

 

-P. Hammond and A. Villar (1998). “Efficiency with Non-Convexities: Extending the ‘Scandinavian Consensus’ Approaches”. ScanJE; V.100-#1, pp. 11-32.

 

-S. Snyder (1999). “Testable Restrictions on Pareto Optimal Public Good Provision”. JPubE; V.71-#1, pp. 97-119.

 

2. Optimal Policy and Mechanisms for Public Good Provision

 

a. Optimal Policy for Provision of Public Goods

 

-J. Stiglitz and P. Dasgupta (1971). “Differential Taxation, Public Goods, and Economic Efficiency”. REStud; V.38-#?, pp. 151-174.

 

-A. Atkinson and N. Stern (1974). “Pigou, Taxation, and Public Goods”. REStud; V.41-#1, pp. 119-128.

 

-D. Wildasin (1984). “On Public Good Provision with Distortionary Taxation”. EcInq; V.22-#?,pp. 227-243.

 

-M. King (1986). “A Pigovian Rule for the Optimum Provision of Public Goods”. JPubE; V.30-#?, pp. 273-291.

 

-J. Wilson (1991). “Limited Public Good Provision with Limited Lump Sum Taxation”. AER; V.81-#1, pp. 153-166.

 

b. Wicksell-Lindahl Equilibrium and Voluntary Exchange

 

-H. Shibata (1971). “A Bargaining Model of the Pure Theory of Public Expenditure”. JPE; V.81-#1, pp. 1-29.

 

-R. Cornes and T. Sandler (1985). “The Simple Analytics of Public Good Provision”. Eca; V.52-#?, pp. 103-116.

 

-H. Schlesinger (1989). “On the Analytics of Pure Public Good Provision”. Public Finance; V.44-#1, pp. 102-

 

-J. Buchanan (1967). “Cooperation and Conflict in Public-Goods Interaction”. Western Economic Journal; V.5-#?, pp. 109-121.

 

-W. Breit (1968). “Public-Goods Interaction in Stackelberg Geometry”. Western Economic Journal; V.6-#?, pp. 161-164.

 

-J. Silvestre (1984). “Voluntariness and Efficiency in the Provision of Public Goods”. JPubE; V.24-#?, pp. 249-256.

 

c. Voting Mechanisms

 

-H. Bowen (1943). “The Interpretation of Voting in the Allocation of Economic Resources”. QJE; V.58-#?, pp. 27-48.

 

-A. Klevorick and G. Kramer (1973). “Social Choice on Pollution Management: The Genossenschaften”. JPubE; V.2-#2, pp. 101-146.

 

-M. Kaneko (1977). “The Ratio Equilibrium and a Voting Game in a Public Goods Economy”. JET; V.16-#?, pp. 123-136.

 

-S. Slutsky (1977). “A Voting Model for the Allocation of Public Goods: Existence of an Equilibrium”. JET; V.14-#?, pp. 299-325.

 

-A. Denzau and R. Parks (1977). “A Problem with Public Sector Preferences”. JET; V.14-#?, pp. 454-457.

 

-T. Bergstrom (1979). “When Does Majority Rule Supply Public Goods Efficiently”. Scan JE; V.81-#?, pp. 216-226.

 

-A. Denzau and R. Parks (1979). “Deriving Public Sector Preferences”. JPubE; V.11-#?, pp. 335-352.

 

-P. Coughlin and M. Hinich (1984). “Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Single-Peakedness in Public Economics Models”. JPubE; V.25-#?, pp. 161-179.

 

-B. Diba and A. Feldman (1984). “Utility Functions for Public Outputs and Majority Voting”. JPubE; V.25-#?, pp. 235-243.

 

-J. Milyo (2000). “A Problem with Euclidean Preferences in Spatial Models of Politics”. EcLets; V.66-#?, pp. 179-182.

 

-J. Milyo (2000). “Logical Deficiencies in Spatial Models: A Constructive Critique”. PC; V.105-#3/4, pp. 273-289.

 

d. Strategic Interaction and Voluntary Provision of Public Goods

 

(1) Nash Models

 

-P. Warr (1983). “The Private Provision of a Public Good is Independent of the Distribution of Income”. EcLets; V.13-#?, pp. 207-211.

 

-T. Bergstrom, L. Blume and H. Varian (1986). “On the Private Provision of Public Goods”. JPubE; V.29-#?, pp. 25-49.

 

-B.D. Bernheim (1986). “On the Voluntary and Involuntary Provision of Public Goods”. AER; V.76-#4, pp. 789-793.

 

-J. Andreoni (1988). “Privately Provided Public Goods in a Large Economy: The Limits of Altruism”. JPubE; V.35-#?, pp. 57-73.

 

-C. Fraser (1992). “The Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium in the Private Provision of Public Goods: An Alternative Proof”. JPubE; V.49-#?, pp. 389-390.

 

-T. Bergstrom, L. Blume and H. Varian (1992). “Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium in Private Provision of Public Goods: An Improved Proof”. JPubE; V.49-#?, pp. 391-392.

 

-T. Fries, E. Golding and R. Romano (1991). “Private Provision of Public Goods and the Failure of the Neutrality Property in Large Finite Economies”. IER; V.32-#1, pp. 147-157.

 

-R. Cornes (1993). “Dyke Maintenance and Other Stories: Some Neglected Types of Public Goods”. QJE, V.108-#1, pp. 259-271.

 

-R. Cornes and A. Schweinberger (1996). “Free Riding and the Inefficiency of the Private Production of Pure Public Goods”. CJE; V.29-#1, pp. 70-91.

 

-R. Kerschbamer and C. Puppe (1998). “Voluntary Contributions when the Public Good is not Necessarily Normal”. ZfN; V.68-#2, pp. 175-192.

 

-S. Vicary (1997). “Joint Production and the Private Provision of Public Goods”. JpubE; V.63-#?, pp. 429-445.

 

-S. Vicary (2000). “Donations to Public Goods in a Large Economy”. European Economic Review; V.44-#3, pp. 609-618.

 

-R. Boadway, P. Pestieau and D. Wildasin (1989). “Tax-Transfer Policies and the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods”. JPubE; V.39-#?, pp. 157-176.

 

-R. Cornes and T. Sandler (1984). “Easy Riders, Joint Production, and Public Goods”. EJ; V.94-#?, pp. 580-598.

 

(2) “Non-Nash” Models

 

-R. Cornes and T. Sandler (1984). “The Theory of Public Goods: Non-Nash Behavior”. JPubE; V.23-#?, pp. 367-379.

 

-R. Sugden (1985). “Consistent Conjectures and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods: Why the Conventional Theory Does Not Work”. JPubE; V.27-#?, pp. 117-124.

 

-R. Cornes and T. Sandler (1985). “On the Consistency of Conjectures with Public Goods”. JPubE; V.27-#?, pp. 125-129.

 

-J. Guttman (1987). “A Non-Cournot Model of Voluntary Collective Action”. Eca; V.54-#1, pp. 1-19.

 

-D. Austen-Smith (1980). “Individual Contributions to Public Goods”. EcLets; V.5-#?, pp. 359-361.

 

-J. Shogren (1987). “Negative Conjectures and Increased Public Good Provision”. EcLets; V.23-#?, pp. 181-184.

 

-H. Varian (1994). “Sequential Contributions to Public Goods”. JPubE; V.53-#2, pp. 165-186.

 

3. Property Rights, Free Contracting and the Coase “Theorem”

 

a. Externalities and Pigovian Taxes

 

(1) Characterizing Externalities

 

-H. Ellis and W. Fellner (1943). “External Economies and Diseconomies”. AER; V.33-#?, pp. 493-511.

 

-J. Meade (1952). “External Economies and Diseconomies in a Competitive Situation”. EJ; V.62-245, pp. 54-67.

 

-F. Bator (1958). “The Anatomy of Market Failure”. QJE; V.72-#?, pp. 351-379.

 

-W. Heller and D. Starrett (19??). “On the Nature of Externalities”. in S. Lin, ed. Theory and Measurement of Economic Externalities. New York: Academic Press, pp. 9-22.

 

-D. Starrett (1971). “Fundamental Non-Convexities in the Theory of Externalities”. JET; V.4-#?, pp. 180-199.

 

-Y. Otani and J. Sicilian (1977). “Externalities and Problems of Nonconvexity and Overhead Costs in Welfare Economics”. JET; V.14-#?, pp. 239-251.

 

-R. Cornes (1980). “External Effects an Alternative Formulation”. EER; V.14-#?, pp. 307-321.

 

(2) Responding to Externalities with Pigovian Taxes

 

-A.C. Pigou (1932). The Economics of Welfare. London: Macmillan.

 

-J. Buchanan and W.C. Stubblebine (1962). “Externality”. Eca; V.29-#?, pp. 371-384.

 

-O. Davis and A. Whinston (1962). “Externalities, Welfare, and the Theory of Games”. JPE; V.60-#?, pp. 241-262.

 

-R. Turvey (1963). “On Divergences between Social Cost and Private Cost”. Eca; V.30-#?, pp. 309-313.

 

-E. Mishan (1965). “Reflections on Recent Developments in the Concept of External Economies”. CJE; V.31-#1, pp. 3-34.

 

-S. Wellisz (1964). “On External Diseconomies and the Government-Assisted Invisible Hand”. Eca; V.31-#?, pp. 345-362. [comment by Davis/Whinston, 1966, V.33: 303-318]

 

-C. Plott (1966). “Externalities and Corrective Taxes”. Eca; V.33-#?, pp. 84-87.

 

-W. Baumol (1972). “On Taxation and the Control of Externalities”. AER; V.62-#?, pp. 307-322.

 

-A. Sandmo (1975). “Optimal Taxation in the Presence of Externalities; SwedJE; V.?-#?, pp. 86-98.

 

-Y.K. Ng (1976). “Recent Developments in the Theory of Externality and the Pigovian Solution”. EcRec; V.?-#?, pp. 169-185.

 

b. The Coase “Theorem”

 

(1) Non-Strategic Analyses

 

-R. Coase (1960). “The Problem of Social Cost”. JLawEcon; V.3-#1, pp. 1-44.

 

-G. Calabresi (1968). “Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability Rules--A Comment”. JLawEcon; V.11-#1, pp. 67-73.

 

-G.W. Nutter (1968). “The Coase Theorem on Social Cost: A Footnote”. JlawEcon; V.11-#?, pp. 503-507.

 

-G. Mumey (1971). “The ‘Coase Theorem’: A Reexamination”. QJE; V.85-#?, pp. 718-723.

 

-D. Regan (1972). “The Problem of Social Cost Revisited”. JlawEcon; V.15-#?, pp. 427-437.

 

-J. Marchand and K. Russell (1973). “Externalities, Liability, Separability, and Resource Allocation”. V.73-#4, pp. 611-620.

 

-K. Inada and K. Kuga (1973). “Limitations of the ‘Coase Theorem’ on Liability Rules”. JET; V.6-#?, pp.

 

-W. Schulze and R. d'Arge (1974). “The Coase Proposition, Information Constraints, and Long-Run Equilibrium”. AER; V.64-#4, pp. 763-772.

 

-S.T. Lowry (1976). “Bargain and Contract Theory in Law and Economics”. Journal of Economic Issues; v.10-#1, pp. 1-22.

 

-V. Goldberg (1976). “Toward an Expanded Theory of Contract”. Journal of Economic Issues; v.10-#1, pp. 45-61.

 

-P. Greenwood and C. Ingene (1978). “Uncertain Externalities, Liability Rules, and Resource Allocation”. AER; V.68-#?, pp.

 

-G. Daly (197?). “The Coase Theorem: Assumptions, Applications and Ambiguities”. EcInq; V.?-#?, pp. 203-213.

 

-C. Veljanovski (1982). “The Coase Theorems and the Economic Theory of Markets and the Law”. KYKLOS; V.35-#?, pp. 55-74.

 

-R. Cooter (1982). “The Cost of Coase”. Journal of Legal Studies; V.11-#1, pp. 1-34.

 

-R. Ellickson (1991). “The Case for Coase and Against Coaseanism”. Yale Law Journal; V.99-#?, pp. 611-633.

 

-P. Samuelson (1995). “Some Uneasiness with the Coase Theorem”. Japan and the World Economy; v.7-#1, pp. 1-7.

 

-L. Hurwicz (1995). “What is the Coase Theorem?”. Japan and the World Economy; v.7-#1, pp. 49-74.

 

-T. Russell (1995). “Aggregation, Heterogeneity, and the Coase Invariance Theorem”. Japan and the World Economy; v.7-#1, pp. 105-111.

 

-Boyd, J.H. III and John Conley (1997). “Fundamental Nonconvexities in Arrovian Markets and a Coasian Solution to the Problem of Externalities”. JET; V.72-#?, pp. 388-407.

 

-D. Usher (1998). “The Coase Theorem is Tautological, Incoherent, or Wrong”. EcLets; V.61-#1, pp. 3-11.

 

-J. Conley and S. Smith (1998). “Coasian Equilibria”. Ms: Tulane University.

 

-L. Hurwicz (1999). “Revisiting Externalities”. Journal of Public Economics Theory; V.1-#2, pp. 225-245.

 

(2) Strategic Analyses

 

-V. Aivazian and J. Callen (1981). “The Coase Theorem and the Empty Core”. JLawEcon; V.24-#?, pp. 175-181. [response by Coase follows]

 

-V. Avaizian, J. Callen and I. Liponowski (1987). “The Coase Theorem and Coalitional Stability”. Eca; V.54-#?, pp. 517-520.

 

-P. Gangopadhyay (2000). “On the Coase Theorem and Coalitional Stability: The Principle of Equal Relative Concession”. Theory and Decision; V.48-#2, pp. 179-191.

 

-E. Green (1982). “Equilibrium and Efficiency under Pure Entitlement Systems”. PC; V.39-#?, pp. 185-212.

 

-W. Samuelson (1985). “A Comment on the Coase Theorem”. A. Roth, ed. Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 321-339.

 

-J. Farrell (1987). “Information and the Coase Theorem”. Journal of Economic Perspectives; V.1-#2, pp. 113-129.

 

-R. Myerson and M. Satterthwaite (1983). “Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading”. JET; V.29-#?, pp. 265-281.

 

-R. Rob (1989). “Pollution Claim Settlements under Private Information”. JET; V.47-#2, pp. 307-333.

 

-G. Mailath and A. Postelwaite (1990). “Asymmetric Bargaining Problems with Many Agents”. REStud; V.57-#?, pp. 351-368.

 

-T. Page (1986). “Responsibility, Liability, and Incentive Compatibility”. Ethics; V.97-#1, pp. 240-262.

 

-G. Illing (1992). “Private Information as Transaction Costs: The Coase Theorem Revisited”. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics; V.148-#?, pp. 558-576.

 

-E. Maskin (1994). “The Invisible Hand and Externalities”. AER; V.84-#2, pp. 333-337.

 

-P. Klibanoff and J. Morduch (1995). “Decentralization, Externalities, and Efficiency”. REStud; V.62-#2, pp. 223-247.

 

-H. Varian (1995). “Coase, Competition, and Compensation”. Japan and the World Economy; v.7-#1, pp. 13-17.

 

-J. Nelson (1995). “Fairness, Efficiency and Externalities”. Japan and the World Economy; v.7-#1, pp. 85-103.

 

-R. McKelvey and T. Page (1999). “Taking the Coase Theorem Seriously”. Economics and Philosophy; V.15-#?, pp.235-247.

 

-R. McKelvey and T. Page (2002). “Status Quo Bias in Bargaining: An Extension of the Myerson-Satterthwaite Theorem with an Application to the Coase Theorem”. JET; V.107-#?, pp. 336-355.

 

-R. McKelvey and T. Page (2000). “An Experimental Study of the Effect of Private Information in the Coase Theorem”. Experimental Economics; V.3-#3, pp. 187-213.

 

-T. Page (1999). “Responsibility, Liability, and Incentive Compatibility”. Ethics; V.97-#1, pp. 240-262.

 

-D. Hausman (1999). “Liability, Responsibility, and Harm”. Ethics; V.97-#1, pp. 263-269.

 

-A. Dixit and M. Olson (2000). “Does Voluntary Participation Undermine the Coase Theorem?”. JPubE; V.76-#?, pp. 309-335.

 

4. Public Goods, Collective Action and the Theory of Groups

 

a. Local Public Goods: Sorting and Voting

 

-J. Stiglitz (1983). “The Theory of Local Public Goods Twenty-five Years After Tiebout: A Perspective”. in G. Zodrow, ed. Local Provision of Public Services: The Tiebout Model after Twenty-five Years. New York: Academic Press, pp. 17-53.

 

-P. Pestieau (1983) “Fiscal Mobility and Local Public Goods: A Survey of the Empirical and Theoretical Studies of the Tiebout Model”. in J.F. Thisse and H. Zoller, eds. Locational Analysis of Public Facilities. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 11-41.

 

-D. Wildasin (1987). “Theoretical Analysis of Local Public Economics”. in E. Mills, ed. Handbook of Urban Economics--V.II. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 1131-1178.

 

(1) The Basic Tiebout Model: Pure Sorting

 

-C. Tiebout (1956). “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures”. JPE; V.64-#5, pp. 416-424.

 

-M. Pauly (1970). “Optimality, ‘Public’ Goods, and Local Governments: A General Theoretical Analysis”. JPE; V.78-#3, pp. 572-585.

 

-T. Sandler (1975). “Pareto Optimality, Pure Public Goods, Impure Public Goods and Multiregional Spillovers”. Scottish Journal of Political Economy; V.22-#1, pp. 25-38.

 

-T. Negishi (1972). “Public Expenditure Determined by Voting with One's Feet and Fiscal Profitability”. SwedJE; V.?-#?, pp. 452-458.

 

-J. Buchanan and R. Wagner (1970). “An Efficiency Basis for Fiscal Equalization”. in. J. Margolis, ed. The Analysis of Public Output. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 169-158. [comment by M. Feldstein follows]

 

-J. Buchanan and C. Goetz (1972). “Efficiency Limits of Fiscal Mobility: An Assessment of the Tiebout Model”. JPubE; V.1-#1, pp. 25-43.

 

-F. Flatters, V. Henderson and P. Mieszkowski (1974). “Public Goods, Efficiency, and Regional Fiscal Equalization”. JPubE; V.3-#?, pp. 99-112.

 

-J. Sonstelie and R. Portney (1978). “Profit Maximizing Communities and the Theory of Local Public Expenditure”. JUE; V.5-#?, pp. 263-277.

 

-D. Wildasin (1980). “Locational Efficiency in a Federal System”. RSUE; V.10-#?, pp. 453-471.

 

-R. Boadway and F. Flatters (1982). “Efficiency and Equalizaton Payments in a Federal System of Government: A Synthesis and Extension of Recent Results”. CJE; V.15-#4, pp. 613-633.

 

-K. Stahl and P. Varaiya (1983). “Local Collective Goods: A Critical Re-Examination of the Tiebout Model”. in J.F. Thisse and H. Zoller, eds. Locational Analysis of Public Facilities. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 43-53.

 

-J. Jehiel and S. Scotchmer (1997). “Free Mobility and the Optimal Number of Jurisdictions”. Annales d’Economie et de Statistique; V.45-#?, pp. 219-231.

 

-R. Fernandez (1997). “Odd versus Even: Comparative Statics in Multicommunity Models”. JPubE; V.65-#?, pp. 177-192.

 

-P. Rhode and K. Stumpf (2003). “Assessing the Importance of Tiebout Sorting: Local Heterogeneity from 1850-1990". American Economic Review; V.93-#5, pp. 1648-1677.

 

(2) Existence and Stability of Tiebout Equilibria

 

T. Negishi (1972). “Stability of Markets with Public Goods: A Case of Gross Substitutability”. in G. Horwich and P. Samuelson, eds. Trade, Stability, and Macroeconomics. New York: Academic Press, pp. 259-268.

 

-D. Richter (1975). “Existence of General Equilibrium in Multiregional Economies with Public Goods”. IER; V.16-#?, pp. 201-221.

 

-M. Wooders (1978). “Equilibria, the Core, and Jurisdiction Structures with a Local Public Good”. JET; V.18-#2, pp. 328-348. [correction, JET, 1981, V.25: pp. 144-151]

 

-B. Ellickson (1979). “Competitive Equilibrium with Local Public Goods”. JET; V.21-#1, pp. 46-61.

 

-M. Wooders (1980). “The Tiebout Hypothesis: Near Optimality in Local Public Good Economies”. Etrica; V.48-#6, pp. 1467-1485.

 

-T. Bewley (1981). “A Critique of Tiebout's Theory of Local Public Expenditures”. Etrica; V.49-#3, pp. 713-740.

 

-J. Greenberg (1983). “Local Public Goods with Mobility: Existence and Optimality of a General Equilibrium”. JET; V.46-#?, pp. 17-33.

 

-J. Greenberg and S. Weber (1986). “Strong Tiebout Equilibrium under Restricted Preference Domain”. JET; V.38-#?, pp. 101-117.

 

-A. Grimaud and J.J. Laffont (1989). “Existence of Spatial Equilibrium”. JUE; V.25-#?, pp. 213-218.

 

-M. Wooders (1989). “A Tiebout Theorem”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.18-#1, pp. 33-55.

 

-J.V. Henderson (1991). “Separating Tiebout Equilibria”. JUE; V.29-#?, pp. 128-152.

 

-D. Pines (1991). “Tiebout without Politics”. RSUE; V.21-#?, pp. 469-489.

 

(3) Sorting and Voting with LPGs

 

-S. Rose-Ackerman (1983). “Beyond Tiebout: Modeling the Political Economy of Local Government”. in G. Zodrow, ed. Local Provision of Public Services: The Tiebout Model After Twenty-five Years. New York: Academic Press, pp. 55-83.

 

-S. Ross and J. Yinger (1999). “Sorting and Voting: A Review of the Literature on Urban Public Finance”. In P. Cheshire and E. S. Mills, eds. Handbook of Urban and Regional Economics, V. 3 (Applied Urban Economics). Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 2001-2060.

 

-B. Ellickson (1971). “Jurisdictional Fragmentation and Residential Choice”. AER; V.61-#2, pp. 334-339.

 

-F. Westhoff (1977). “Existence of Equilibria in Economies with a Local Public Good”. JET; V.14-#?, pp. 84-112.

 

-F. Westhoff (1979). “Policy Inferences from Community Choice Models: A Caution”. JUE; V.6-#?, pp. 535-549.

 

-J. Brueckner (1979). “Equilibrium in a System of Communities with Local Public Goods”. EcLets; V.2-#?, pp. 387-393.

 

-S. Rose-Ackerman (1979). “Market Models of Local Government: Exit, Voting, and the Land Market”. JUE; V.6-#?, pp. 319-337.

 

-S. Rose-Ackerman (1981). “Does Federalism Matter? Political Choice in a Federal Republic”. JPE; V.89-#1, pp. 152-165.

 

-D. Richter (1982). “Weakly Democratic Regular Tax Equilibria in a Local Public Goods Economy with Perfect Consumer Mobility”. JET; V.27-#?, pp. 137-162.

 

-D. Epple and A. Zelenitz (1981). “The Implications of Competition Among Jurisdictions: Does Tiebout Need Politics?”. JPE; V.89-#?, pp. 1197-1217.

 

-S. Bucovetsky (1982). “Inequality in the Local Public Sector”. JPE; V.90-#1, pp. 128-145.

 

-J. Yinger (1982). “Capitalization and the Theory of Local Public Finance”. JPE; V.90-#5, pp. 917-943.

 

-D. Epple, R. Filimon and T. Romer (1983). “Housing, Voting, and Moving: Equilibrium in a Model of Local Public Goods with Multiple Jurisdictions”. Research in Urban Economics; V.3, pp. 59-90.

 

-D. Epple, R. Filimon and T. Romer (1984). “Equilibrium Among Local Jurisdictions: Toward an Integrated Treatment of Voting and Residential Choice”. JPubE; V.24-#?, pp. 281-308.

 

-J. Yinger (1985). “Inefficiency and the Median Voter: Property Taxes, Capitalization, Heterogeneity, and the Theory of the Second Best”. Perspectives on Local Public Finance and Public Policy. V.2, pp. 3-30.

 

-J.V. Henderson (1985). “The Tiebout Model: Bring Back the Entrepreneurs”. JPE; V.93-#2, pp. 248-264.

 

-J. Greenberg and B. Shivovitz (1988). “Consistent Voting Rules for Competitive Local Public Good Economies”. JET; V.46-#?, 223-236.

 

-K. Dunz (1989). “Some Comments on Majority Rule Equilibria in Local Public Good Economies”. JET; V.47-#?, pp. 228-234.

 

-D. Epple and T. Romer (1991). “Mobility and Redistribution”. JPE; V.99-#4, pp. 828-858.

 

-D. Epple, R. Filimon and T. Romer (1993). “Existence of Voting and Housing Equilibrium in a System of Communities with Property Tax”. RSUE; V.23-#?, pp. 585-610.

 

-P. Rothstein (1994). “Learning the Preferences of Governments and Voters from Proposed Spending and Voting in School Budget Referenda”. Journal of Public Economics; V.54-#?, pp. 361-389.

 

-H. Konishi (1996). “Voting with Ballots and Feet: Existence of Equilibrium in a Local Public Good Economy”. JET; V.68-#?, pp. 480-509.

 

-R. Fernandez and R. Rogerson (1996). Income Distribution, Communities, and the Quality of Public Education”. QJE; V.111-#?, pp. 135-164.

 

-T. Nechyba (1997). “Existence of Equilibrium and Stratification in Local and Hierarchical Tiebout Economies with Property Taxes and Voting”. EcTheory; V.10-#?, pp. 277-304.

 

-T. Goodspeed (1998). “On the Importance of Public Choice in Migration Models”. EcLets; V.59-#3, pp. 373-379.

 

-D. Epple and G. Platt (1998). “Equilibrium and Local Redistribution in an Urban Economy when Households Differ in both Preferences and Incomes”. Journal of Urban Economics; V.43-#1, pp. 23-51.

 

-D. Epple, T. Romer, and H. Sieg (2001). “Interjurisdictional Sorting and Majority Rule”. Etrica; V.69-#6, pp. 1437-1465.

 

-G. Miller (1981). Cities by Contract: The Politics of Municipal Incorporation. Cambridge: MIT.

 

(4) Commodity Trade Between LPG Economies

 

-E. Berglas (1976). “Distribution of Tastes and Skills and the Provision of Local Public Goods”. JpubE; V.6-#?, pp. 409-423.

 

-J. Stiglitz (1983). “Public Goods in Open Economies with Heterogeneous Individuals”. in J.-F. Thisse and H. Zoller, eds. Locational Analysis of Public Goods. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 55-78.

 

-J. Wilson (1987). “Trade in a Tiebout Economy”. AER V.77-#3, pp. 431-441.

 

-J. Wilson (1990). “Trade and the Distribution of Economic Well-being in an Economy with Local Public Goods”. JIE; V.29-#3/4, pp. 199-215.

 

(5) Interjurisdictional Competition in LPG Economies

 

(a) Property Tax Competition

 

-D. Starrett (1980). “On the Method of Taxation and the Provision of Local Public Goods”. AER; V.70-#3, pp. 380-392. [comment by Boadway, AER; 1982, V.72-#4, pp. ]

 

-G. Zodrow and P. Mieszkowski (1983). “The Incidence of the Property Tax: The Benefit View versus the New View”. in G. Zodrow, ed. Local Provision of Public Services: The Tiebout Model After Twenty-five Years. New York: Academic Press, pp. 109-129.

 

-J. Wilson (1984). “The Excise Tax Effects of the Property Tax”. JPubE; V.24-#?, pp. 309-329.

 

-J. Wilson (1985). “Optimal Property Taxation in the Presence of Interregional Capital Mobility”. JUE; V.18-#?, pp. 73-89.

 

-G. Zodrow and P. Mieszkowski (1986). “Pigou, Tiebout, Property Taxation, and the Underprovision of Local Public Goods”. JUE; V.19-#?, pp. 356-370.

 

-J. Wilson (1986). “A Theory of Interregional Tax Competition”. JUE; V.19-#?, pp. 296-315.

 

-S. Scotchmer (1986). “Local Public Goods in an Equilibrium: How Pecuniary Externalities Matter”. RSUE; V.16-#?, pp. 463-481.

 

-D. Wildasin (1989). “Interjurisdictional Capital Mobility: Fiscal Externality and a Corrective Subsidy”. JUE; V.25-#?, pp. 193-212.

 

-G. Myers (1990). “Optimality, Free Mobility, and the Regional Authority in a Federation”. JPubE; V.43-#?, pp. 107-121.

 

-W. Hoyt (1991). “Property Taxation, Nash Equilibrium, and Market Power”. JUE; V.30-#?, pp. 123-131.

 

-W. Hoyt (1991). “Competitive Jurisdictions, Congestion, and the Henry George Theorem: When Should Property be Taxed Instead of Land?”. RSUE; V.21-#?, pp. 351-370.

 

-D. Coates (1993). “Property Tax Competition in a Repeated Game”. RSUE; V.23-#?, pp. 111-119.

 

(b) General Fiscal Competition

 

-R. Gordon (1983). “An Optimal Taxation Approach to Fiscal Federalism”. QJE; V.98-#?, pp. 567-586.

 

-J. Mintz and H. Tulkens (1986). “Commodity Tax Competition Between Member States of a Federation: Equilibrium and Efficiency”. JPubE; V.29-#?, pp. 133-172.

 

-J.D. Wilson (1987). “Trade, Capital Mobility, and Tax Competition”. JPE; V.95-#4, pp. 835-856.

 

-D. Wildasin (1988). “Nash Equilibria in Models of Fiscal Competition”. JPubE; V.35-#?, pp. 229-240.

 

-D. Wildasin (1989). “Interjurisdictional Capital Mobility: Fiscal Externality and a Corrective Subsidy”. JUrbanE; V.25-#?, pp. 193-212.

 

-de Combrugghe and H. Tulkens (1990). “On Pareto Improving Commodity Tax Changes under Fiscal Competition”. JPubE; V.41-#?, pp. 335-350.

 

-A. Haufler (1998). “Asymmetric Commodity Tax Competition–Comment on de Combrugghe and Tulkens”. JPubE; V.67-#?, pp. 135-144.

 

-S. Bucovetsky (1991). “Asymmetric Tax Competition”. JUrbanE; V.30-#?, pp. 167-181.

 

-D. Wildasin (1991). “Income Redistribution in a Common Labor Market”. AER; V.81-#4, pp. 757-774.

 

-S. Bucovetsky and J. Wilson (1991). “Tax Competition with Two Tax Instruments”. RSUE; V.21-#3, pp. 333-350.

 

-R. Jensen and E.F. Toma (1991). “Debt in a Model of Tax Competition”. RSUE; V.21-#3, pp. 371-392.

 

-D. Wildasin (1991). “Some Rudimentary `Duopolity` Theory”. RSUE; V.21-#3, pp. 393-421.

 

-J. Wilson (1991). “Tax Competition with Interregional Differences in Factor Endowments”. RSUE; V.21-#3, pp. 423-451.

 

-D. Wildasin (1991). “Income Redistribution in a Common Labor Market”. AER; V.81-#4, pp. 757-774.

 

-R. Krelove (1992). “Competitive Tax Theory in Open Economies: Constrained Inefficiency and a Pigovian Remedy”. JPubE; V.48-#?, pp. 361-375.

 

-M. Keen and S. Lahiri (1993). “Domestic Tax Reform and International Oligopoly”. JPubE; V.51-#1, pp. 55-74.

 

-R. Kanbur and M.J. Keen (1993). “Jeux sans Frontiers: Tax Competition and Tax Coordination when Countries Differ in Size”. AER, V.83-#4, pp. 877-892.

 

-T. Persson and G. Tabellini (1992). “The Politics of 1992: Fiscal Policy and European Integration”. REStud; V.59-#4, pp. 689-701

 

b. Club Theory

 

-T. Sandler and J. Tschirhart (1980). “The Economic theory of Clubs: An Evaluative Survey”. JEL; V.18-#4, pp. 1481-1521.

 

-S. Scotchmer (1994). “Public Goods and the Invisible Hand”. in J. Quigley and E. Smolensky, eds. Modern Public Finance. Boston: Harvard University Press, pp. 93-125

 

-J. Buchanan (1965). “An Economic Theory of Clubs”. Eca; V.32-#125, pp. 1-14.

 

-M. Pauly (1967). “Clubs Commonality and the Core: An Integration of Game Theory and the Theory of Public Goods”. Eca; V.34-#3, pp. 314-324.

 

-M. Pauly (1970). “Cores and Clubs”. PC; V.9-#?, pp. 53-65.

 

-M. McGuire (1972). “Private Good Clubs and Public Good Clubs: Economic Models of Group Formation”. SwedJE; V74-#1, pp. 84-99.

 

-M. McGuire (1974). “Group Segregation and Optimal Jurisdiction”. JPE; V.82-#1, pp. 112-132.

 

-Y.-K. Ng (1973). “The Economic Theory of Clubs: Pareto Optimality Conditions”. Eca; V.40-#.159, pp. 291-298.

 

-Y.-K. Ng (1974). “The Economic Theory of Clubs: Optimal Tax Subsidy”. Eca; V.41-#163, pp. 308-321.

 

-E. Berglas (1976). “On the Theory of Clubs”. AER; V.66-#2, pp. 116-121.

 

-E. Helpman and A.L. Hillman (1977). “Two Remarks on Optimal Club Size”. Eca; V.44-#175, pp. 293-296.

 

-A.L. Hillman and P. Swan (1983). “Participation Rules for Pareto Optimal Clubs”. JPubE; V.20-#?, pp. 55-76.

 

-R. Boadway (1980). “A Note on the Market Provision of Club Goods”. JPubE; V.13-#?, pp. 131-137.

 

-E. Berglas and D. Pines (1981). “Clubs, Local Public Goods and Transportation Models”. JPubE; V.15-#?, pp. 141-162.

 

-T. Sandler and J. Tschirhart (1984). “Mixed Clubs: Further Observations”. JPubE; V.23-#?, pp. 381-389.

 

-E. Berglas and D. Pines (1984). “Resource Constraint, Replicability and Mixed Clubs: A Reply”. JPubE; V.23-#?, pp. 391-397.

 

-E. Berglas (1984). “Quantities, Qualities, and Multiple Public Services in the Tiebout Model”. JPubE; V.25-#?, pp. 409-423.

 

-S. Scotchmer (1985). “Profit Maximizing Clubs”. JPubE; V.27-#?, pp. 25-45.

 

-S. Scotchmer and M. Wooders (1987). “Competitive Equilibrium and the Core in Club Economies with Anonymous Crowding”. JPubE; V.34-#2, pp. 159-174.

 

-M. McGuire (1986). “Private Production, Colletive Consumption, and Regional Population Structure: The Interactions Between Public and Private Good Provision as Determinants of Community Composition”. Journal of Regional Science; V.26-#?, pp. 677-705.

 

-M. McGuire (1991). “Group Composition, Collective Consumption, and Collaborative Production”. AER; V.76-#5, pp. 1391-1407.

 

-J. Brueckner (1989). “Local Income Redistribution: A Club Theoretic Analysis”. JUE; V.25-#?, pp. 310-324.

 

-J. Brueckner and K. Lee (1989). “Club Theory with a Peer Group Effect”. RSUE; V.19-#?, pp. 399-420.

 

-A. Caplin and B. Nalebuff (1992). “Individuals and Institutions”. AER; V.82-#2, pp. 317-322.

 

-A. Caplin and B. Nalebuff (1997). “Competition Among Institutions”. JET; V.72-#?, pp. 306-342.

 

c. Political Groups

 

(1) Overviews

 

J. David Greenstone (1975). “Group Theories”. In Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, eds. Micropolitical Theory. Reading: Addison-Wesley, pp. 243-318.

 

Robert Salisbury (1975). “Interest Groups”. In Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, eds. Nongovernmental Politics. Reading: Addison-Wesley, pp. 171-227.

 

William Mitchell and Michael Munger (1991). “Economic Models of Interest Groups”. American Journal of Political Science; V.35-#2, pp. 512-546.

 

Todd Sandler (1992). Collective Action: Theory and Applications. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

 

Shmuel Nitzan (1994). “Modelling Rent-seeking Contests”. European Journal of Political Economy; V.10-#1, pp. 41-60.

 

Jan Potters and Frans van Winden (1995). “Models of Interest Groups: Four Different Approaches”. In N. Schofield, ed. Collective Decision-making: Social Choice and Political Economy. Boston: Kluwer, pp. 337-362.

 

(2) Simple Analytics of Group Activity

 

Mancur Olson (1965). The Logic of Collective Action. Boston: Harvard University Press.

 

Russell Hardin (1971). “Collective Action as an Agreeable n-Prisoners' Dilemma”. Behavioral Science; V.16-#5, pp. 472-481.

 

George Stigler (1974). “Free Riders and Collective Action: An Appendix to Theories of Economic Regulation”. BJE; V.5-#2, pp.359-365.

 

John Chamberlin (1974). “Provision of Collective Goods as a Function of Group Size”. APSR; V.68-#2, pp. 707-716.

 

Martin McGuire (1974). “Group Size, Group Homogeneity, and the Aggregate Provision of a Pure Public Good under Cournot Behavior”. PC; V.18, pp. 107-126.

 

John Chamberlin (1976). “A Diagrammatic Exposition of the Logic of Collective Action”. PC; V.26, pp. 59-74.

 

Norman Frohlich, Thomas Hunt, Joe Oppenheimer, and R. Harrison Wagner (1975). “Individual Contributions for Collective Goods: Alternative Models”. Journal of Conflict Resolution; V.19-#2, pp. 310-329.

 

David Austen-Smith (1981). “Voluntary Pressure Groups”. Eca; V.48-#190, pp. 143-153.

 

Norman Schofield (1975). “A Game Theoretic Analysis of Olson’s Game of Collective Action”. Journal of Conflict Resolution; V.19-#3, pp. 441-461.

 

Norman Schofield (1977). “Dynamic Games of Collective Action”. PC; V.30, pp. 77-105.

 

Russell Hardin (1982). Collective Action. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins/Resources for the Future.

 

Michael Taylor (1987). The Possibility of Cooperation. Cambridge: CUP.

 

Arye L. Hillman (1991). “Protection, Politics and Market Structure”. in E. Helpman and A. Razin, eds. International Trade and Trade Policy. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 120-140.

 

Ngo Van Long and Antoine Soubeyran (1996). “Lobbying for Protection by Heterogeneous Firms”. European Journal of Political Economy; V.12-#1, pp. 19-32.

 

Paul Pecorino (1998). “Is There a Free-Rider Problem in Lobbying? Endogenous Tariffs, Trigger Strategies, and the Number of Firms”. American Economic Review; V.88-#3, pp. 652-660.

 

Paul Pecorino (2001). “Market Structure, Tariff Lobbying and the Free-Rider Problem”. Public Choice; V.106-#3/4, pp. 203-220.

 

Richard Damania and Per G. Fredriksson (2000). “On the Formation of Industry Lobby Groups”. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. V.41-#4, pp. 315-335.

 

Christopher Magee (2002). “Endogenous Trade Policy and Lobby Formation: An Application to the Free-rider Problem”. Journal of International Economics; V.57-#2, pp. 449-471.

 

Koichi Kagitani (2003). “Resistance to Trade Liberalization in the Unionized Sector”. Open Economies Review; V.14-#4, pp. 419-435.

 

Shmuel Nitzan (1991). “Rent-seeking with Non-Identical Sharing Rules”. Public Choice; V.71-#1/2, pp. 43-50.

 

Shmuel Nitzan (1991). “Collective Rent Dissipation”. Economic Journal; V.101-#409, pp. 1522-1534.

 

Sanghack Lee (1992). “Optimal Rent-seeking Group”. American Economist; V.36-#2, pp. 58-60.

 

Sanghack Lee (1995). “Endogenous Sharing Rules in Collective-group Rent-seeking”. Public Choice; V.85-#1/2, pp. 31-44.

 

Kyung Hwan Baik (1994). “Winner Help Loser Group Formation in Rent-Seeking Contests”. Economics and Politics; V.6-#2, pp. 147-162.

 

Kyung Hwan Baik and Jason Shogren (1995). “Competitive-share Group Formation in Rent-seeking Contests”. Public Choice; V.83-#1/2, pp. 113-126.

 

(3) Entrepreneurs, Selective Incentives, and Group Formation

 

Richard Wagner (1966). “Pressure Groups and Political Entrepreneurs”. Papers in Non-Market Decison-Making; V.1, pp. 161-170.

 

Robert Salisbury (1969). “An Exchange Theory of Interest Groups”. Midwest Journal of Political Science; V.13-#1, pp. 1-32.

 

Norman Frohlich and Joe Oppenheimer (1970). “I Get by With a Little Help from My Friends”. WP; V.23-#1, pp. 104-120.

 

Norman Frohlich, Joe Oppenheimer and Oran Young (1971). Political Leadership and Collective Goods. Princeton: PUP.

 

Terry Moe (1980). “A Calculus of Group Membership”. AJPS; V.24-#4, pp. 593-632.

 

Joel Guttman (1982). “Can Political Entrepreneurs Solve the Free-Rider Problem?”. JEBO; V.3-#?, pp. 357-366.

 

Fred Frohock (1987). Rational Association. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.

 

Wolfgang Mayer (2002). “On the Efficiency of By-Product Lobbying”. Public Choice; V.112-#3/4, pp. 275-292.

 

(4) Competition between Groups and Collective Action

 

John Chamberlin (1978). “A Collective Goods Model of Pluralist Political Systems”. PC; V.33-#4, pp. 97-113.

 

Magee, Stephen, William Brock and Leslie Young (1989). “The Power Function Theory of Endogenous Industry Lobbying”. Chapter 6 of Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 86-100.

 

A. Farrell and E. Lander (1989). “Competition within and between Teams: The Lifeboat Principle”. Economics Letters; V.29-#3, pp. 205-208.

 

Kyung Hwan Baik and Sanghack Lee (1997). “Collective Rent Seeking with Endogenous Group Sizes”. European Journal of Political Economy; V.13-#1, pp. 121-130.

 

Y. Stephen Chiu (1998). “Politics, Structure of Protection, and Welfare”. Review of International Economics; V.6-#3, pp. 472-487.

 

Devashish Mitra (1999). “Endogenous Lobby Formation and Endogenous Protection: A Long-Run Model of Trade Policy Determination”. American Economic Review; V.89-#5, pp. 1116-1134.

 

Takeshi Yamazaki (2004). “Tariff Rate as a Public Good”. Review of International Economics; V.12-#1, pp. 95-107.

 

Michel Le Breton and François Salanie (2003). “Lobbying under Political Uncertainty”. Journal of Public Economics; V.87-#12, pp. 2589-2610.

 

Stevens, Dana and James Foster (1978). “The Possibility of Democratic Pluralism”. Economica; V.45-#180, pp. 401-406.

 

(5) Evidence on Group Formation

 

-Jan Potters and Randolph Sloof (1996). “Interest Groups: A Survey of Empirical Models that Try to Assess Their Influence”. European Journal of Political Economy; V.12-#3, pp. 403-442.

 

-T. Moe (1980). The Organization of Interests: Incentives and Internal Dynamics of Political Interest Groups. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

 

-D. Marsh (1976). “On Joining Interest Groups: An Empirical Consideration of the Work of Mancur Olson Jr.”. BJPS; V.6-#?, pp. 257-271.

 

-J. Berry (1978). “On the Origns of Public Interest Groups: A Test of Two Theories”. Polity; V.?-#?, pp. 379-397.

 

-J. Walker (1983). “The Origins and Maintenance of Interest Groups in America”. APSR; V.77-#?; pp. 390-406.

 

-R. Salisbury (1984). “Interest Representation: The Dominance of Institutions”. APSR; V.78-#1; pp. 64-76.

 

-P. Murrell (1984). “an Examination of the Factors Affecting the Formation of Interest Groups in OECD Countries”. PC; V.43-#?, pp. 151-171.

 

-J.M. Hansen (1985). “The Political Economy of Group Membership”. APSR; V.79-#1, pp. 79-96.

 

-R. Dawes, J. Orbell, R. Simmons, and A. van de Kragt (1986). “Organizing Groups for Collective Action”. APSR; V.80-#4, pp. 1171-1185.

 

-D. Knoke (1988). “Incentives in Collective Action Organizations”. ASR; V.53-#?, pp. 311-329.

 

-A. Miller, P. Gurin, G. Gurin, and O. Malanchuk (1981). “Group Consciousness and Political Participation”. AJPS; V.25-#?, pp. 495-511.

 

-P. Dunleavy (1988). “Group Identities and Individual Influence: Reconstructing the Theory of Interest Groups”. BJPS; V.18-#1; pp. 21-49.

 

-M. Mizruchi and T. Koenig (1986). “Economic Sources of Corporate Political Consensus: An Examination of Interindustry Relations”. ASR; V.51-#?, pp. 482-491.,

 

-A. Neustadtl and D. Clawson (1988). “Corporate Political Groupings: Does Ideology Unify Business Political Behavior”. ASR. V.53-#?; pp. 172-190.

 

-B. Kennelly and P. Murrell (1991). “Industry Characteristics and Interest Group Formation: An Empirical Study”. PC; V.70-#1, pp. 21-40.

 

-A. McFarland (1991). “Interest Groups and Political Time: Cycles in America”. BJPS; V.21-#?, pp. 257-284.

 

-J. Walker (1991). Mobilizing Interest Groups in America: Patrons, Professions and Social Movements. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

 

5. Public Goods and International Political Cooperation

 

-M. Olson and R. Zeckhauser (1966). “An Economic Theory of Alliances”. REStat; V.48-#3, pp. 266-279.

 

-M. Olson (1971). “Increasing Incentives for International Cooperation”. IO; V.25-#4, pp. 866-874.

 

-B. Russett and J. Sullivan (1971). “Collective Goods and International Organization”. IO; V.25-#4, pp. 845-865. [comment by W. Loehr, 1973, V.27-#3, pp. 421-430]

 

-J. Ruggie (1972). “Collective Goods and Future International Collaboration”. APSR; V.66-#3, pp. 874-893. [comment by W. Loehr, 1973, V.67-#4, pp. 1327-1330]

 

-T. Sandler and J. Cauley (1975). “On the Economic Theory of Alliances”. Journal of Conflict Resolution; V.19-#2, pp. pp. 330-348.

 

-T. Sandler and J. Cauley (1977). “The Design of Supranational Structures: An Economic Perspective”. International Studies Quarterly; V.21-#2, pp. 251-256.

 

-D. Snidal (1979). “Public Goods, Property Rights, and Political Organizations”. International Studies Quarterly; V.23-#4, pp. 532-566.

 

-T. Sandler, ed. (1980). The Theory and Structures of International Political Economy. Boulder: Westview.

 

-C. Kindleberger (1978). “Government and International Trade”. Princeton Essays in International Finance; #129.

 

-C. Kindleberger (1986). “International Public Goods without International Government”. AER; V.76-#1, pp. 1-13.

 

-J. Gowa (1989). “Rational Hegemons, Excludable Goods and Small Groups: An Epitaph for Hegemonic Stability Theory”. WP; V.41-#?, pp. 307-324.

 

M. Boyer (199?). International Cooperation and Public Goods:Opportunities for the Western Alliance. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

 

-A. Casella (1992). “On Markets and Clubs: Economic and Political Integration of Regions with Unequal Productivity”. AER; V.82-#2, pp.115-121.

 

-J. Feinstein (1992). “Public-Good Provision and Political Stability in Europe”. AER; V.82-#2, pp. 323-329.

 

-A. Casella and J. Feinstein (1990). “Public Goods in Trade: On the Formation of Markets and Political Jurisdictions”. ms

 

-A. Casella and B. Frey (1992). “Federalism and Clubs: Towards an Economic Theory of Overlapping Political Jurisdictions”. EER; V.36-#?, pp. 639-646.

 

-A. Casella (19944). “Trade as an Engine of Political Change: A Parable”. Eca; V.61-#243, pp. 267-284.

 

-R. Clarida and R. Findlay (1994). “After Maastricht: Public Investment, Economic Integration and International Capital Mobility”. Eca; V.61-#243, pp. 319-339.

 

6. Coalition Formation

 

a. Cooperative Game Theoretic Approaches to Coalition Formation

 

-R. Aumann and J. Dreze (1974). “Cooperative Games with Coalition Structures”. IJGT; V.3-#4, pp. 217-237.

 

-P. Shenoy (1979). “On Coalition Formation: A Game Theoretical Approach”. IJGT; V.8-#3, pp. 133-164.

 

-R. Myerson (1977). “Graphs and Cooperation in Games”. Math. of OR; V.2-#3, pp. 225-229.

 

-G. Owen (1977). “Values of Games with a priori Unions”. in R. Hein and O. Moeschlin, eds. Essays in Mathematical Economics and Game Theory. New York: Springer-Verlag, pp. 76-88.

 

-A. Kirman, C. Oddou, and S. Weber (1986). “Stochastic Communication and Coalition Formation”. Econometrica; V.54-#1, pp. 129-138.

 

-S. Hart and M. Kurz (1983). “Endogenous Formation of Coalitions”. Etrica; v.51-#4, pp. 1047-1064.

 

-S. Hart and M. Kurz (1984). “Stable Coalition Structures”. in M. Holler, ed. Coalitions and Collective Action. Vienna: Physica-Verlag, pp. 236-258.

 

-S. Hart (1988). “Axiomatic Approaches to Coalitional Bargaining”. in A. Roth, ed. The Shapley Value: Essays in Honor of Lloyd Shapley. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 305-319.

 

-M. Kurz (1988). “Coalitional Value”. in A. Roth, ed. The Shapley Value: Essays in Honor of Lloyd Shapley. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 155-173.

 

-S. Hart and A. Mas-Collel (1989). “Potential, Value, and Consistency”. Etrica; V.57-#?, pp. 589-614.

 

-S. Hart and A. Mas-Collel (1996). “Bargaining and Value”. Etrica; V.64-#2, pp. 357-380.

 

-R. Rajan (1989). “Endogenous Coalition Formation in Cooperative Oligopolies”. IER; V.30-#4, pp. 863-876.

 

-R. Aumann and R. Myerson (1988). “Endogenous Formation of Links Between Players and Coalitions: An Application of the Shapley Value”. in A. Roth, ed. The Shapley Value: Essays in Honor of Lloyd Shapley. Cambridge: CUP, pp.175-191.

 

-E. Bennett (1983). “The Aspiration Approach to Predicting Coalition Formation and Payoff Distribution in Side-Payment Games”. IJGT; V.12-#1, pp. 1-28.

 

-E. Bennett (1985). “Endogenous vs. Exogenous Coalition Formation”. Economie Applique; V.37-#3/4, pp. 611-635.

 

-E. Bennett and W. Zame (1988). “Bargaining in Cooperative Games”. IJGT; V.17-#?, pp. 279-301.

 

-D. Monderer, D. Samet, and L. Shapley (1992). “Weighted Values and the Core”. IJGT; V.21-#1, pp. 27-39.

 

-L. Zhou (1994). “A New Bargaining Set of an N-Person Game and Endogenous Coalition Formation”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.6-#3, pp. 512-526.

 

-C. Qin (1996). “Endogenous Formation of Cooperation Structures”. JET; V.69-#1, pp. 218-226.

 

-T. Ui (2000). “A Shapley Value Representation of Potential Games”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.31-#1, pp. 121-135.

 

-B. Dutta, A. van den Nouweland, and S. Tijs (1998). “Link Formation in Cooperative Situations”. IJGT; V.27-#2, pp. 245-256.

 

-M. Slikker, B. Dutta, A. van den Nouweland, Stef Tijs (2000). “Potential Maximizers and Network Formation”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.39-#1, pp. 55-70.

 

-M. Slikker (1998). “A Note on Link Formation”. Tilburg CentER for Economic Research Discussion Paper; #9820.

 

-M. Slikker (2001). “Coalition Formation and Potential Games”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.37-#2, pp. 436-448.

 

-P. Wang and Q. Wen (1998). “Network Bargaining”. ms: Pennsylvania State University.

 

-R. Evans (1996). “Value, Consistency, and Random Coalition Formation”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.12-#1, pp. 68-80.

 

-L. Kranich (1997). “Cooperative Games with Hedonic Coalitions”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.18-#?, pp. 83-97.

 

b. Strategic Foundations of Coalition Formation

 

-J. Harsanyi (1981). “The Shapley Value and the Risk Dominance Solutions of Two Bargaining Models for Characteristic Function Games”. in R. Aumann, ed. Essays in Game Theory and Mathematical Economics. Mannheim: Bibliographiches Institut, pp. 43-68.

 

-T. Ichiishi (1981). “A Societal Equilibrium Existence Lemma”. Etrica; V.49-#?, pp. 369-377.

 

-R. Selten (1981). “A Noncooperative Model of Characteristic Function Bargaining”. in V. Böhm and H. Nachtkamp, eds. Essays in Game Theory in Honor of Oscar Morgenstern. Mannheim: Bibliographisches Institut, pp. 131-151.

 

-J. Zhao (1992). “The Hybrid Solutions of an N-Person Game”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.4-#?, pp. 145-160.

 

-B. Moldovanu and E. Winter (1994). “Consistent Demands for Coalition Formation”. in N. Megiddo, ed. Essays in Game Theory in Honor of Michael Maschler. New York: Springer-Verlag, pp. 128-140.

 

-K. Binmore (1985). “Bargaining and Coalitions”. in A. Roth, ed. Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 269-304.

 

-K. Binmore, A. Rubinstein, and A. Wolinsky (1985). “The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling”. RandJE; V.17-#?, pp. 176-188.

 

-F. Gul (1989). “Bargaining Foundations of Shapley Value”. Etrica; V.57-#1, pp. 81-95. [Comment by Hart and Levy, (1999), V.67-#4, pp. 909-912; Response, pp. 913-917.]

 

-K. Chatterjee, B. Dutta, D. Ray , and K. Sengupta (1993). “A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining”. REStud; V.60-#?, pp. 463-477.

 

-M. Perry and P. Reny (1994). “A Non-Cooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core”. Etrica; V.62-#?, pp. 795-817.

 

-J.D. Pérez-Castrillo (1994). “Cooperative Outcomes through Noncooperative Games”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.7-#?, pp. 428-440.

 

-A. Okada (1996). “A Noncooperative Coalitional Bargaining Game with Random Proposers”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.16-#1, pp. 97-108.

 

-F. Bloch (1996). “Sequential Formation of Coalitions in Games with Externalities and Fixed Payoffs”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.14-#?, pp. 90-123.

 

-D. Seidmann and E. Winter (1998). “A Theory of Gradual Coalition Formation”. Review of Economic Studies; V.65-#4, pp. 793-805.

 

-D. Ray and R. Vohra (1999). “A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.26-#2, pp. 286-336.

 

-D. Ray and R. Vohra (1997). “Equilibrium Binding Agreements”. JET; V.73-#1, pp. 30-78.

 

-E. Bennett (1995). “A Nash Solution for Multilateral Bargaining Problems”. in J. Ledyard, ed.. The Economics of Informational Decentralization: Complexity, Efficiency,and Stability. Boston : Kluwer Academic, pp. 281-310.

 

-E. Bennett (1997). “Multilateral Bargaining Problems”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.19-#?, pp. 151-179.

 

-M. Jackson and A. Wolinsky (1996). “A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks”. JET; V.71-#1, pp. 44-74.

 

-C.-Z. Qin (1996). “Endogenous Formation of Cooperation Structures”. JET; V.69-#1, pp. 218-226.

 

-J.L. Ferreira (1999). “Endogenous Formation of Coalitions in Noncooperative Games”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.26-#1, pp. 40-58.

 

-J. Bergin and J. Duggan (1999). “An Implementation-Theoretic Approach to Non-cooperative Foundations”. V.86-#1, pp. 50-76.

 

-D. Pérez-Castrillo and D. Wettstein (2000). “Implementation of Bargaining Sets via Simple Mechanisms”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.31-#1, pp. 106-120.

 

C. The Possibility of Preference Aggregation

 

1. Aggregation of Preferences and Social Welfare Functions

 

a. Surveys and Overviews of Welfare Economics

 

-M. Reder (1947). Studies in the Theory of Welfare Economics. New York: Columbia University Press.

 

-W. Baumol (1952). Welfare Economics and the Theory of the State. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

 

-J. de V. Graaff (1957). Theoretical Welfare Economics. Cambridge: CUP.

 

-F. Bator (1957). “The Simple Analytics of Welfare Maximization”. AER; V.47-#1, pp. 22-59.

 

-M. Dobb (1969). Welfare Economics and the Economics of Socialism: Towards a Commonsense Critique. Cambridge: CUP. [Part I]

 

-J. Chipman and J. Moore (1978). “The New Welfare Economics 1939-1974". IER; V.19-#3, pp. 547-584.

 

-R. Boadway and N. Bruce (1984). Welfare Economics. Oxford: Blackwell.

 

-P.-O. Johansson (1991). An Introduction to Modern Welfare Economics. Cambridge: CUP.

 

-J. Broome (1978). “Choice and Value in Economics”. OEP; V.30-#3, pp. 313-333.

 

b. Aggregation of Preferences: When is There a Representative Consumer?

 

-E. Tower (1979). “The Geometry of Community Indifference Curves”. WA; V.115-#?, pp. 680-699.

 

-P. Samuelson (1956). “Social Indifference Curves”. QJE; V.70-#1, pp. 1-22.

 

-W. Gorman (1959). “Are Social Indifference Curves Convex?”. QJE; V.73-#?, pp. 485-496.

 

-T. Negishi (19??). “On Social Welfare Function”. QJE; V.?-#?, pp. 156-158.

 

-J. Vanek (1965). “A Rehabilitation of `Well-Behaved ‘Social Indifference Curves’”. Appendix to Chapter IV of General Equilibrium of International Discrimination. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, pp. 83-87.

 

-J. Dow and H. Sonnenschein (1986). “Samuelson and Chipman-Moore on Utility-Generated Community Demand”. in M. Peston and R. Quandt, eds. Prices, Competition and Equilibrium. Oxford: Philip Allan, pp. 1-6.

 

-J. Chipman and J. Moore (1979). “On Social Welfare Functions and the Aggregation of Preferences”. JET; V.21-#?, pp. 111-139.

 

-H. Varian (1984). “Social Indifference Curves and Aggregate Demand”. QJE; V.99-#3, pp. 403-414.

 

-J. Dow and S.R. da Costa Werlang (1988). “The Consistency of Welfare Judgements with a Representative Consumer”. JET; V.44-#?, pp. 269-280.

 

-M. Jerison (1994). “Optimal Income Distribution Rules and Representative Consumers”. REStud; V.61-#?, pp. 739-771.

 

-C. Blackorby, R. Davidson, and W. Schworm (1991). “Implicit Separability: Characterization and Implications for Consumer Demands”. JET; V.55-#?, pp. 364-399.

 

-C. Blackorby and W. Schworm (1993). “The Implications of Additive Community Preferences in a Multi-Consumer Economy”. REStud; V.60-#?, pp. 209-227.

 

-W. Gorman (1953). “Community Preference Fields”. Etrica; V.21-#?, pp. 63-80.

 

-W. Gorman (1961). “On A Class of Preference Fields”. Metroeconomica, V.13-#?, pp. 53-56.

 

-J. Muellbauer (1975). “Aggregation, Income Distribution and Consumer Demand”. REStud; V.42-#?, pp. 525-543.

 

-J. Muellbauer (1976). “Community Preferences and the Representative Consumer”. Etrica; V.44-#?, pp. 979-999.

 

-W. Diewert (1980). “Symmetry Conditions for Market Demand Functions”. REStud; V.47-#?, pp. 595-601.

 

-L. Lau (1982). “A Note on the Fundamental Theorem of Aggregation”. EcLets; V.9-#?, pp. 119-126.

 

-A. Lewbel (1989). “Exact Aggregation and a Representative Consumer”. QJE; V.?-#?, pp. 621-633.

 

-D. Jorgenson (1990). “Aggregate Consumer Behavior and the Measurement of Social Welfare”. Etrica; v.58-#5, pp. 1007-1040.

 

-E. Eisenberg (1961). “Aggregation of Utility Functions”. Management Science; V.7-#?, pp. 337-350.

 

-L. Hurwicz and H. Uzawa (1971). “On the Integrability of Demand Functions”. In J. Chipman, et al. eds. Preferences, Utility and Demand. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, pp. 114-148.

 

-J. Chipman (1974). “Homothetic Preferences and Aggregation”. JET; V.8-#1, pp. 26-38.

 

-W. Shafer (1977). “Revealed Preference and Aggregation”. Etrica; V.45-#?, pp. 1173-1182.

 

-Y. Kannai (1977). “Concavifiability and Constructions of Concave Utility Functions”. JMathE; V.4-#1, pp. 1-56.

 

-Y. Kannai and R. Mantel (1979). “Non-Convexifiable Pareto Sets”. Etrica; V.46-#3, pp. 571-575.

 

-G. Chichilnisky and G. Heal (1983). “Community Preferences and Social Choice”. JMathE; V.12-#1, pp. 33-61.

 

-J.-M. Grandmont (1992). “Transformations of the Commodity Space, Behavioral Heterogeneity, and the Aggregation Problem”. JET; V.57-#1, pp. 1-35.

 

-A. Kirman (1992). “Whom or What Does the Representative Individual Represent”. JEP; V.6-#2, pp. 117-136.

 

-D. Saari (1992). “The Aggregate Excess Demand Function and Other Aggregation Procedures”. Economic Theory; V.2-#3, pp. 359-388

 

-D. Saari (1995). “A Chaotic Exploration of Aggregation Paradoxes”. SIAM Review; V.37-#1, pp. 37-52.

 

-T.M. Stoker (1993). “Empirical Approaches to the Problem of Aggregation over Individuals”. JEL; V.31-#?, pp. 1827-1874.

 

-W. Hildenbrand (1994). Market Demand. Princeton: PUP.

 

-W. Hildenbrand (1998). “How Relevant are Specifications of Behavioral Relations on the Micro-Level for Modeling the Time Path of Population Aggregates”. EER; V.42-#?, pp. 437-458.

 

c. The Ordinalist Tradition of SWFs

 

(1) Compensation and the Kaldor-Hicks Criterion

 

-L. Robbins (1938). “Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: A Comment”. EJ; V.48-#192, pp. 635-641.

 

-N. Kaldor (1939). “Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility”. EJ; V.49-#195, pp. 549-552.

 

-J. Hicks (1939). “Foundations of Welfare Economics”. EJ; V.49-#?, pp. 696-712.

 

-T. de Scitovsky (1941-42). “A Note on Welfare Propositions in Economics”. REStud; V.9-#1, pp. 77-88.

 

-W. Baumol (1946-47). “Community Indifference”. REStud; V.14-#1, pp. 44-48.

 

-I.M.D. Little (1950). A Critique of Welfare Economics. Oxford: OUP.

 

-K. Arrow (1951). “Little's Critique of Welfare Economics”. AER; V.41-#5, pp. 923-934.

 

-C. Kennedy (1952-53). “The Economic Welfare Function and Dr. Little's Criterion”. REStud; V.20-#2, pp. 137-142.

 

-R. Baldwin (1953-54). “A Comparison of Welfare Criteria”. REStud; V.21-#2, pp. 154-161.

 

-A. Sen (1963). “Distribution, Transitivity and Little's Welfare Criteria”. EJ; V.73-#?, pp. 771-778.

 

-J. Chipman and J. Moore (1971). “The Compensation Principle in Welfare Economics”. in A. Zarley, ed. Papers in Quantitative Economics, V.2. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, pp. 1-77.

 

-K. Suzumura (1980). “On Distributional Value Judgements and Piecemeal Welfare Criteria”. Eca; V.47-#?, pp. 125-139.

 

-C. Blackorby and D. Donaldson (1990). “A Review Article: The Case Against the Use of the Sum of Compensating Variations in Cost-Benefit Analysis”. CJE; V.23-#3, pp. 471-495.

 

-W. Bossert (1996). “The Kaldor Compensation Test and Rational Choice”. JPubE; V.59-#?, pp. 265-276.

 

-D. Deenan and A. Snow (1999). “A Complete Characterization of Potential Compensation Tests in Terms of Hicksian Welfare Measures”. CJE; V.32-#1, pp. 215-233.

 

-N. Gravel (2001). “On the Difficulty of Combining Actual and Potential Criteria for an Increase in Welfare”. Economic Theory; V.17-#?, pp. 163-180.

 

(2) Evaluation of Real National Income

 

-J. Hicks (1940). “The Valuation of the Social Income”. Eca; V.7-#26, pp. 105-124.

 

-P. Samuelson (1950). “Evaluation of Real National Income”. OEP; V.2-#1, pp. 1-29.

 

-C. Kennedy (1954). “Alternative Proof of a Theorem in Welfare Economics”. OEP; V.6-#?, pp. 98-99.

 

-J. Chipman and J. Moore (1973). “Aggregate Demand, Real National Income and the Compensation Principle”. IER; V.14-#1, pp. 153-181.

 

-J. Chipman and J. Moore (1976). “Why and Increase in GNP Need not Imply an Increase in Potential Welfare”. KYKLOS; V.29-#?, pp. 391-248.

 

-A. Sen (1976). “Real National Income”. REStud; V.43-#?, pp. 19-39.

 

-A. Sen (1979). “The Welfare Basis of Real Income Comparisons”. JEL; V.17-#1, pp. 1-45.

 

-J. Chipman and J. Moore (1980). “Real National Income with Homothetic Preferences and a Fixed Distribution of Income”. Etrica; V.48-#2, pp. 401-422.

 

(3) Bergson-Samuelson Social Welfare Functions

 

(a) Basic Analysis

 

-A. Bergson (1938). “A Reformulation of Certain Aspects of Welfare Economics”. QJE; V.52-#?, pp. 310-334.

 

-O. Lange (1942). “The Foundations of Welfare Economics”. Etrica; V.10-#?, pp. 215-228.

 

-P. Samuelson (1947). “Welfare Economics”. Chapter 8 of Foundations of Economic Analysis. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, pp. 203-253.

 

-P. Samuelson (1981). “Bergsonian Welfare Economics”. in S. Rosefielde, ed. Economic Welfare and the Economics of Soviet Socialism. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 223-266.

 

-J. Chipman (1982). “Samuelson and Welfare Economics”. in G. Feiwel, ed. Samuelson and Neoclassical Economics. Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff, pp. 152-184.

 

-K. Arrow (1983). “Contributions to Welfare Economics”. E.C. Brown and R. Solow, eds. Paul Samuelson and Modern Economic Theory. New York: McGraw Hill, pp. 15-30.

 

-K. Suzumura (1999). “Paretian Welfare Judgements and Bergsonian Social Choice”. EJ; V.109-#204-220.

 

-K. Suzumura (2001). “Pareto Principles from Inch to Ell”. EcLets; V.70-#?, pp. 95-98.

 

-K. Suzumura and Y. Xu (2003). “On Constrained Dual Recoverability Theorems”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.45-#?, pp. 143-154.

 

(b) Single-Profile Impossibility?

 

-P. Samuelson (1967). “Arrow's Mathematical Politics”. in S. Hook, ed. Human Values and Economic Policy. New York: NYU Press, pp. 41-57.

 

-P. Hammond (1976). “Why Ethical Measures of Inequality Need Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility”. Theory and Decision; V.7-#?, pp. 263-274.

 

-R. Parks (1976). “An Impossibility Theorem for Fixed Preferences: A Dictatorial Bergson-Samuelson Welfare Function”. REStud; V.43-#?, pp. 447-450.

 

-M. Kemp and Y.K. Ng (1976). “On the Existence of Social Welfare Functions, Social Orderings and Social Decision Functions”. Eca; V.43-#1, pp. 59-66. [Comment by Samuelson and Response, Eca (1977) V.44-#?, pp. 81-90.]

 

-R. Pollak (1979). “Bergson-Samuelson Social Welfare Functions and the Theory of Social Choice”. QJE; V.93-#?, pp. 73-90.

 

-K.W.S. Roberts (1980). “Social Choice Theory: The Single-profile and Multi-profile Approaches”. REStud; V.47-#?, pp. 441-450.

 

-E. Muller (1982). “On the Existence of an Arrow and a Bergson-Samuelson Social Welfare Function”. MathSocSci; V.3-#1, pp. 1-7.

 

-A. Sen (1977). “On Weights and Measures: Informational Constraints in Social Welfare Analysis”. Etrica; V.45-#5, pp. 1539-1572. [section 9: “Bergson-Samuelson Impossibilities”]

 

-E. Pazner (1979). “Equity, Nonfeasible Alternatives and Social Choice: A Reconsideration of the Concept of Social Welfare”. In J.-J. Laffont, ed. Aggregation and the Revelation of Preferences. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp.

 

-D. Mayston (1980). “Where Did Prescriptive Welfare Economics Go Wrong?”. in D. Currie and W. Peters, eds. Contemporary Economic Analysis. London: Croom and Helm.

 

-D. Mayston (1982). “The Generation of a Social Welfare Function under Ordinal Preferences”. MathSocSci; V.3-#?, pp. 109-129. [Comment by Kemp and Ng, MathSocSci; V.4-#?, pp. 305-307.]

 

-M. Kemp and Y.K. Ng (1982). “The Incompatibility of Individualism and Ordinalism”. EcLets; V.3-#1, pp. 33-37.

 

-M. Kemp and Y.K. Ng (1987). “Arrow’s Independence Condition and the Bergson-Samuelson Tradition”. in G. Feiwel, ed. Arrow and the Foundations of the Theory of Economic Policy. London: Macmillan, pp. 223-241.

 

-K. Suzumura (1976). “Remarks on the Theory of Social Choice”. Eca; V.43-#4, pp. 381-390.

 

-N. Schofield (1980). “Generic Properties of Simple Bergson-Samuelson Welfare Functions”. JMathE; V.7-#?, pp. 175-192.

 

-A. Rubinstein (1984). “The Single Profile Analogues to Multi Profile Theorems: Mathematical Logic's Approach”. IER; V.25-#3, pp. 719-730.

 

-M. Fleurbaey and P. Mongin (2004). “The News of the Death of Welfare Economics is Greatly Exaggerated”. SC&W, forth.

 

(4) Fairness and Equity in Ordinal Social Welfare Judgements

 

(a) Fair Division

 

-H. Steinhaus (1948). “The Problem of Fair Division”. Etrica; V.16-#?, pp. 101-104.

 

-H. Steinhaus (1948). “Sur la Division Pragmatique”. Etrica; V.17-supplement, pp. 315-319.

 

-L. Dubins and E. Spanier (1961). “How to Cut a Cake Fairly”. American Mathematical Monthly; V.68-#?, pp. 1-17.

 

-E. Singer (1962). “Extension of the Classical Rule of `Divide and Choose`”. SEJ; V.38-#?, pp. 391-394.

 

-H. Kuhn (1967). “On Games of Fair Division”. In M. Shubik, ed. Essays in Mathematical Economics in Honor of Oskar Morgenstern. Princeton: PUP, pp. 29-37.

 

-V. Crawford (1977). “A Game of Fair Division”. REStud; V.44-#2, pp. 235-247.

 

-V. Crawford and W. Heller (1979). “Fair Division with Indivisible Commodities”. JET; V.21-#1, pp. 10-27.

 

-W. Samuelson (1980). “The Object Distribution Problem Revisited”. QJE; V.?-#?, pp. 85-98.

 

-M. Yaari and M. Bar-Hillel (1984). “On Dividing Justly”. Social Choice and Welfare; V.1-#1, pp. 1-24.

 

(b) Fairness and Envy

 

-W. Thomson and H. Varian (1985). “Theories of Justice Based on Symmetry”. In. L. Hurwicz, D. Schmeidler and H. Sonnenschein, ed. Social Goals and Social Organization. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 107-129.

 

-D. Foley (1967). “Resource Allocation and the Public Sector”. Yale Economic Essays; V.7-#?, pp. 45-98.

 

-D. Schmeidler and K. Vind (1972). “Fair Net Trades”. Etrica; V.40-#4, pp. 637-62.

 

-E. Pazner and D. Schmeidler (1974). “A Difficulty in the Concept of Fairness”. REStud; V.41-#3, pp. 441-443.

 

-H. Varian (1974). “Equity, Envy and Efficiency”. JET; V.9-#?, pp. 63-91.

 

-A. Feldman and A. Kirman (1974). “Fairness and Envy”. AER; V.64-#6, pp. 995-1005.

 

-H. Varian (1975). “Distributive Justice, Welfare Economics and the Theory of Fairness”. Philosophy and Public Affairs; V.4-#?, pp. 223-247.

 

-T. Daniel (1975). “A Revised Concept of Distributional Equity”. JET; V.11-#1, pp. 94-100.

 

-E. Pazner (1977). “Pitfalls in the Theory of Fairness”. JET; V.14-#2, pp. 458-466.

 

-T. Daniel (1978). “Pitfalls in the Theory of Fairness--Comment”. JET; V.19-#2, pp. 561-564.

 

-H. Varian (1976). “On the History of Concepts of Fairness”. JET; V.13-#?, pp. 486-487.

 

-H. Varian (1976). “Two Problems in the Theory of Fairness”. JPubE; V.5-#?, pp. 249-260.

 

-E. Pazner and D. Schmeidler (1978). “Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations: A New Concept in Economic Equity”. QJE; V.92-#4, pp. 671-687.

 

-A. Feldman and D. Weiman (1979). “Envy, Wealth and Class Hierarchies”. JPubE; V.11-#?, pp. 81-91.

 

-S. Goldman and C. Sussangkarn (1980). “On the Concept of Fairness”. JET; V.19-#1, pp. 210-216.

 

-P. Chapsaur and G. Laroque (1981). “Fair Allocations in Large Economies”. JET; V.25-#?, pp. 269-282.

 

-W. Thomson (1982). “An Informationally Efficient Equity Criterion”. JpubE; V.18-#?, pp. 243-263.

 

-W. Thomson (1983). “Equity in Exchange Economies”. JET; V.29-#2, pp. 217-244.

 

-T. Ten Raa (1983). “Supportability and Anonymous Equity”. JET; V.31-#?, pp. 176-181.

 

-W. Baumol (1986). Superfairness: Applications + Theory. Cambridge: MIT.

 

(c) Implementing Fair Outcomes

 

-V. Crawford (1979). “A Procedure for Generating Pareto-efficient Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations”. Etrica; V.47-#1, pp. 49-60.

 

-V. Crawford (1980). “A Self-Administered Solution of the Bargaining Problem”. REStud; V.47-#?, pp. 385-392.

 

-H. Moulin (1981). “Implementing Just and Efficient Decision Making”. JPubE; V.16-#?, pp. 193-213.

 

-G. Demange (1984). “Implementing Efficient Egalitarian Allocations”. Etrica; V.52-#?, pp. 167-1177.

 

-W. Thomson (1984). “The Manipulability of Resource Allocation Mechanisms”. REStud; V.51-#?, pp. 447-460.

 

-W. Thomson (1987). “The Vulnerability to Manipulative Behavior of Resource Allocation Mechanisms Designed to Select Equitable and Efficient Outcomes”. In T. Groves, R. Radner and S. Reiter, eds. Information, Incentives, and Economic Mechanisms. Minneapolis: Univeristy of Minnesota Press, pp. 375-396.

 

-A. Calsamiglia and A. Kirman (1993). “A Unique Informationally Efficient and Decentralized Mechanism with Fair Outcomes”. Etrica; V.61-#?, pp. 1147-1172.

 

-H. Moulin (1993). “On the Fair and Coalition Strategy-proof Allocation of Private Goods”. in K. Binmore, A. Kirman and P. Tani, eds. Frontiers of Game Theory. Cambridge: MIT, pp. 151-163.

 

-M. Fleurbaey and F. Maniquet (1997). “Implementability and Horizontal Equity Imply No Envy”. Etrica; V.65-#5, pp. 1215-1219.

 

2. Arrow's Impossibility Theorem

 

a. General Introductions and Overviews of Social Choice Theory

 

-A. Sen (1970). Collective Choice and Social Welfare. San Francisco: Holden-Day.

 

-P. Fishburn (1973). The Theory of Social Choice. Princeton: PUP.

 

-M. Taylor (1975). “Mathematical Theories of Social Choice”. in R. Greenstein and N. Polsby, eds. Handbook of Political Science. New York: Addison Wesley.

 

-J. Kelly (1978). Arrow Impossibility Theorems. New York: Academic Press.

 

-C. Plott (1976). “Axiomatic Social Choice Theory: An Overview and Interpretation”. AJPS; V.20-#3, pp. 511-596

 

-A. MacKay (1980). Arrow's Theorem: The Paradox of Social Choice. New Haven: Yale.

 

-N. Schofield (1980). “Formal Political Theory”. Quality and Quantity; V.14-#?, pp. 249-275.

 

-K. Suzumura (1983). Rational Choice, Collective Decisions and Social Welfare. Cambridge: CUP.

 

-A. Sen (1986). “Social Choice Theory”. in K. Arrow and M. Intriligator, eds. Handbook of Mathematical Economics, V. III. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 1073-1181

 

-T. Schwartz (1986). The Logic of Collective Choice. New York: Columbia University Press.

 

-T. Schwartz (1987). “Votes, Strategies and Institutions: An Introduction to the Theory of Collective Choice”. in M. McCubbins and T. Sullivan, eds. Congress: Structure and Policy. Cambridg: CUP. pp. 318-345.

 

-J. Kelly (1988). Social Choice Theory: an Introduction. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.

 

-H. Moulin (1988). Axioms of Cooperative Decision-Making. Cambridge: CUP.

 

-J. Kelly (1991). “Social Choice Bibliography”. SC&W; V.8-#?, pp. 97-169.

 

-A. Sen (1995). “Rationality and Social Choice”. AER; V.85-#1, pp. 1-24.

 

-A. Sen (1999). “The Possibility of Social Choice”. AER; V.89-#3, pp. 349-378.

 

-D. Austen-Smith and J. Banks (1999). Positive Political Theory, I: Collective Preference. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

 

b. Arrows Theorem: Overviews and Basic Proof Structure

 

-J. Kelly (1988). Social Choice Theory: An Introduction. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.

 

-K. Arrow (1951/1968). Social Choice and Individual Values. New Haven: Yale.

 

-J. Blau (1972). “A Direct Proof of Arrow’s Theorem”. Etrica; V.40-#1, pp. 61-67.

 

-R. Wilson (1972). “Social Choice Theory without the Pareto Principle”. JET; V.5-#?, pp. 478-486.

 

-K. Binmore (1975). “An Example in Group Preference”. JET; V.10-#?, pp. 377-385.

 

-J. Richelson (1977). “Conditions on Social Choice Functions”. PC; V.31-#1, pp. 79-110.

 

-A. Feldman (1974). “A Very Unsubtle Version of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem”. Economic Inquiry; V.12-#4, pp. 534-546.

 

-Stevens, Dana (1976). “A Very Unsubtle Version of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem: A Subtle Comment”. Economic Inquiry; V.14-#2, pp. 297-299.

 

-S. Barberà (1980). “Pivotal Voters: A New Proof of Arrow’s Theorem”. EcLets; V.6-#?, pp. 13-16.

 

-S. Barberà (1983). “Pivotal Voters: A Simple Proof of Arrow’s Theorem”. in P. Pattanaik and M. Salles, eds. Social Choice and Welfare. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 103-106.

 

-K. Suzumura (1988). “Reduction of Social Choice Problems: A Simple Proof of Arrow's General Possibility Theorem”. Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics; V.29-#2, pp. 219-221.

 

-K. Suzumura (1990). “Dictator Lemma: Detailed Proof”. Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics; V.31-#1, pp. 35-36.

 

-V. Denicolò (1996). “An Elementary Proof of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem”. Japanese Economic Review; V.47-#4, pp. 432-435. [correction: (2001), V.52-#1, pp. 134-135.]

 

-Takekuma, Shin-Ichi (1997). “A Proof of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem with Mathematica”. Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics; V.38-#2, pp. 139-148.

 

-J. Geanakoplos (2005). “Three Brief Proofs of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem”. Economic Theory; V.26-#1, pp. 211-215.

 

-P. Reny (2001). “Arrow’s Theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem: A Unified Approach”. Economics Letters; V.70-#1, pp. 99-105.

 

-V. Dardanoni (2001). “A Pedagogical Proof of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem”. SC&W; V.18-#1, pp. 107-112.

 

-J. Fountain (2000). “A Simple Graphical Proof of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem”. New Zealand Economic Papers; V.34-#1, pp. 89-110.

 

-P. Hansen (2002). “Another Geometric Proof of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem”. Journal of Economic Education; V.33-#3, pp. 217-235.

 

-J. Perote-Pena and A. Piggins (2002). “Geometry and Impossibility”. Economic Theory; V.20-#4, pp. 831-836.

 

-K. Nehring (2003). “Arrow’s Theorem as a Corollary”. Economics Letters; V.80-#?, pp. 379-382.

 

c. Some Initial Reactions

 

-W. Baumol (1952). “Review of Social Choice and Individual Values”. Etrica; V.20-#?, pp. 110-111.

 

-I.M.D. Little (1952). “Social Choice and Individual Values”. JPE; V.60-#5, pp. 422-432.

 

-A. Bergson (1954). “On the Concept of Social Welfare”. QJE; V.68-#2, pp. 233-252.

 

-M. Kemp (1953/4). “Arrow’s General Possibility Theorem”. REStud; V.21-#?, pp. 240-243.

 

-J. Buchanan (1954). “Social Choce, Democracy, and Free Markets”. JPE; V.62-#4, pp. 114-123.

 

-J. Buchanan (1954). “Individual Choice in Voting and the Market”. JPE; V.62-#?, pp. 334-343.

 

-E. Mishan (1957). “An Investigation into Some Alleged Contradictions in Welfare Economics”. EJ; V.68-#?, pp. 445-454.

 

-R. Brandt (1967). “Personal Values and the Justification of Institutions”. in S. Hook, ed. Human Values and Economic Policy. New York: NYU Press, pp. 22-40.

 

-F. Schick (1969). “Arrow's Proof and the Logic of Preference”. Philosophy of Science; V.36-#?, pp. 127-144.

 

d. Formal Examination of the Proof: Extensions and Restrictions

 

(1) The Consistency Conditions

 

(a) Relaxing Collective Rationality

 

-P. Fishburn (1970). “The Irrationality of Transitivity in Social Choice”. Behavioral Science; V.15-#?, pp. 119123.

 

-T. Schwartz (1970). “On the Possibility of Rational Policy Evaluation”. Theory and Decision; V.1-#?, pp. 89-106.

 

-A. Mas-Colell and H. Sonnenschein (1972). “General Possibility Theorems for Group Decision”. REStud; V.39-#?, pp. 185-192.

 

-J. Fountain and K. Suzumura (1982). “Collective Choice Rules without the Pareto Principle”. IER; V.23-#2, pp. 299-308.

 

-C. Plott (1973). “Path Independence, Rationality, and Social Choice”. Etrica; V.41-#6, ppp. 1075-1091.

 

-D. Blair (1975). “Path-Independent Social Choice: A Further Result”. Etrica; V.43-#1, pp. 173-174.

 

-R. Parks (1976). “Further Results on Path Independence, Quasi-transitivity and Social Choice”. PC; V.26-#1, pp. 75-87.

 

-J. Ferejohn and D. Grether (1977). “Weak Path Independence”. JET; V.14-#1, pp. 19-31.

 

-D. Blair, G. Bordes, J. Kelly and K. Suzumura (1976). “Impossibility Theorems without Collective Rationality”. JET; V.13-#3, pp. 361-379.

 

-G. Bordes (1976). “Consistency, Rationality and Collective Choice”. REStud; V.43-#3, pp. 451-457.

 

-J. Richelson (1978). “Some Further Results on Consistency, Rationality and Collective Choice”. REStud; V.45-#2, pp. 343-346.

 

-G. Bordes (1979). “Some More Results on Consistency, Rationality and Collective Choice”. in J.-J. Laffont, ed. Aggregation and Revelation of Preferences. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 175-197.

 

-T. Bandyopadhyay (1984). “On the Fontier between Possibility and Impossiblility Theorems in Social Choice”. JET; V.32-#1, pp. 52-66.

 

-T. Bandyopadhyay (1984). “Pareto Optimality and the Decisive Power Structure with Expansion Consistency Conditions”. JET; V.33-#?, pp. 366-375.

 

-T. Bandyopadhyay (1990). “Sequential Path Independence and Social Choice”. SC&W; V.7-#?, pp. 209-220.

 

-M. Johnson (1990). “Information, Associativity, and Choice Requirements”. JET; V.52-#?, pp. 440-452.

 

-M. Johnson (1995). “Ideal Structures of Path Independent Choice Functions”. JET; V.65-#?, pp. 468-504.

 

-D. Blair and R. Pollak (1979). “Collective Rationality and Dictatorship: The Scope of the Arrow Theorem”. JET; V.21-#?, pp. 186-194.

 

-D. Blair and R. Pollak (1982). “Acyclic Social Choice Rules”. Etrica; V.50-#4, pp. 931-934.

 

-D. Kelsey (1985). “Acyclic Social Choice without the Pareto Principle”. REStud; v.51-#?, pp. 240-243.

 

-R.-I. Nagahisa (1991). “Acyclic and Continuous Social Choice in T1 Connected Spaces”. SC&W; V.8-#?, pp. 319-332.

 

-J. Banks (1995). “Acyclic Choice from Finite Sets”. SC&W; V.12-#?, pp. 293-310.

 

-A. Sen (1993). “Internal Consistency of Choice”. Etrica; V.61-#3, pp. 495-521.

 

(b) Relaxing Completeness

 

-P. Fishburn (1974). “Impossibility Theorems without the Completeness Axiom”. Etrica; V.42-#4, pp. 695-704.

 

-J. Blau (1979). “Semiorders and Collective Choice”. JET; V.29-#?, pp. 195-206.

 

-J. Weymark (1983). “Arrow’s Theorem with Social Quasi-Orderings”. PC; V.42-#?, pp. 235-246.

 

-J.P. Barthelmy (1983). “Arrow’s Theorem: Unusual Domains and Extended Codomains”. in P. Pattanaik and M. Salles, eds. Social Choice and Welfare. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp.

 

(c) Relaxing Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives

 

-M. Taylor (1968). “Graph-theoretical Approaches to the Theory of Social Choice”. PC; V.4, pp. 35-47.

 

-D. Campbell (1973). “Social Choice and Intensity of Preference”. JPE; V.81-#1, pp. 211-218.

 

-B. Hansson (1973). “The Independence Condition in the Theory of Social Choice”. T&D; V.4-#1, pp. 25-49.

 

-P. Ray (1973). “Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives”. Etrica; V.41-#5, pp. 987-991.

 

-E. Karni and D. Schmeidler (1976). “Independence of Non-Feasible Alternatives and Independence of Non-Optimal Alternatives”. JET; V.12-#?, pp. 488-493.

 

-D. Osborne (1976). “Irrelevant Alternatives and Social Welfare”. Etrica; V.44-#?, pp. 1001-1015.

 

-D. Packard and R. Heiner (1977). “Ranking Functions and the Independence Conditions”. JET; V.16-#?, pp. 84-102.

 

-P. Hammond (1987). “Social Choice: The Science of the Impossible”. in G. Feiwel, ed. Arrow and the Ascent of Economic Theory. London: Macmillan, pp. 116-131.

 

-H. Peters and P. Wakker (1991). “Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Revealed Group Preferences”. Etrica; V.59-#?, pp. 1787-1801.

 

-G. Bordes and N. Tideman (1991). “Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives in the Theory of Voting”. Theory and Decision; V.30-#?, pp. 163-186.

 

-I. McLean (1995). “Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives before Arrow”. MathSocSci; V.30-#?, pp. 107-126.

 

-V. Denicolò (2000). “Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and the Consistency of Choice”. Economic Theory; V.15-#?, pp. 221-226.

 

(2) Restricted Domains

 

(a) Restrictions on Alternatives

 

-D. Campbell (1992). Equity, Efficiency, and Social Choice. Oxford: OUP.

 

-M. Le Breton and J. Weymark (1996). “An Introduction to Arrovian Social Welfare Functions on Economic and Political Domains”. in N. Schofield ed. Collective Decision-Making: Social Choice and Political Economy. Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 25-61.

 

-M. Le Breton (1997). “Arrovian Social Choice on Economic Domains”. in K. Arrow, A. Sen, and K. Suzumura, eds. Social Choice Re-Examined. New York: St. Martins, pp. 72-96.

 

-E. Kalai (1977). “Characterization of Domains Admitting Nondictatorial Social Welfare Functions and Nonmainpulable Voting Procedures”. JET; V.16-#?, pp. 457-469.

 

-E. Kalai, E. Muller, and M. Satterthwaite (1979). “Social Welfare Functions When Preferences are Convex, Strictly Monotonic, and Continuous”. PC; V.34-#?, pp. 87-97.

 

-E. Kalai and Z. Ritz (1980). “Characterization of the Private Alternatives Domains Admitting Arrow Social Welfare Functions”. JET; V.22-#1, pp. 23-36.

 

-K. Border (1983). “Social Welfare Functions for Economic Environments with and without the Pareto Principle”. JET; V.29-#?, pp. 205-216.

 

-D. Donaldson and J. Weymark (1988). “Social Choice in Economic Environments”. JET; V.46-#?, pp. 291-308.

 

-D. Campbell (1995). “Nonbinary Social Choice for Economic Environments”. SC&W; V.12-#?, pp. 245-254.

 

-J. Duggan (1996). “Arrow’s Theorem in Public Good Environments with Convex Technologies”. JET; V.68-#?, pp. 303-318.

 

-G. Bordes and M. Le Breton (1989). “Arrovian Theorems with Private Alternatives Domains and Selfish Individuals”. JET; V.47-#?, pp. 257-281.

 

-D. Campbell (1989). “Wilson’s Theorem for Economic Environments and Continuous Social Preferences”. SC&W; V.6-#?, pp. 315-323.

 

-D. Campbell (1989). “Arrow’s Theorem for Economic Environments and Effective Social Preferences”. SC&W; V.6-#?, pp. 325-329.

 

-J. Redekop (1991). “Social Welfare Functions on Restricted Economic Domains”. JET; V.53-#?, pp. 396-427.

 

-J. Redekop (1993). “Arrow-Inconsistent Economic Domains”. SC&W; V.10-#?, pp. 107-126.

 

-J. Redekop (1993). “Social Welfare Functions on Parametric Domains”. SC&W; V.10-#?, pp. 127-148.

 

-G. Bordes, D. Campbell, and M. Le Breton (1995). “Arrow’s Theorem for Economic Domains and Edgeworth Hyperboxes”. IER; V.36-#2, pp. 441-454.

 

-J. Bone (2003). “Simple Arrow-type Propositions in the Edgeworth Domain”. SC&W; V.20-#1, pp. 41-48.

 

-G. Bordes and M. Le Breton (1990). “Arrovian Theorems for Economic Domains: Assignments, Matchings and Pairings”. SC&W; V.7-#?, pp. 193-208.

 

-G. Bordes and M. Le Breton (1990). “Arrovian Theorems for Economic Domains. The Case where there Are Simultaneously Private and Public Goods”. SC&W; V.7-#1, pp. 1-17.

 

-J. Redekop (1996). “Arrow Theorems in Mixed Goods, Stochastic, and Dynamic Economic Environments”. SC&W; V.13-#?, pp. 95-112.

 

(b) Preference Restriction and Method of Majority Rule

 

-K.O. May (1952). “A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision”. Etrica; V.20-#?, pp. 680-684.

 

-Y. Murakami (1966). “Formal Structure of Majority Decision”. Etrica; V.34-#3, pp. 709-718.

 

-D. Black (1948). “On the Rationale of Group Decision-making”. JPE; V.56-#?, pp. 23-34.

 

-M. Dummett and R. Farquharson (1961). “Stability in Voting”. Etrica; V.29-#1, pp. 33-43.

 

-K. Inada (1964). “A Note on the Simple Majority Decision Rule”. Etrica; V.32-#4, pp. 525-531.

 

-A. Sen (1966). “A Possibility Theorem on Majority Decision”. Etrica; V.34-#?, pp. 491-499.

 

-P. Pattanaik (1968). “A Note on Democratic Decisions and the Existence of Choice Sets”. REStud; V.35-#?, pp. 1-9.

 

-A. Sen (1969). “Quasi-transitivity, Rational Choice and Collective Decisions”. REStud; V.36-#?, pp. 381-393.

 

-K. Inada (1969). “The Simple Majority Decision Rule”. Etrica; V.37-#3, pp. 490-506.

 

-P. Pattanaik (1970). “Sufficient Conditions for the Existence of a Choice Set Under Majority Voting”. Etrica; V.38-#1, pp. 165-170.

 

-A. Sen and P. Pattanaik (1970). “Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Rational Choice under Majority Rule”. JET; V.1-#?, pp. 178-202.

 

-P. Fishburn (1970). “Intransitive Individual Indifference and Transitive Majorities”. Etrica; V.38-#?, pp. 482-489.

 

-P. Fishburn (1970). “Conditions for Simple Majority Decision with Intransitive Individual Indifference”. JET; V.2-#?, pp. 354-367.

 

-P. Fishburn (1971). “The Theory of Representative Majority Decision”. Etrica; V.39-#2, pp. 273-284.

 

-P. Fishburn (1972). “A Location Theorem for Single-peaked Preferences”. JET; V.4-#?, pp. 94-97.

 

-J. Kelly (1971). “The Continuous Representation of a Social Preference Ordering”. Etrica; V.79-#3, pp. 593-597.

 

-A. Denzau and R. Parks (1975). “The Continuity of Majority Rule Equilibrium”. Etrica; V.43-#5/6, pp. 853-866.

 

-P. Fishburn (1972). “Conditions on Preferences that Guarantee a Simple Majority Winner”. JMathSoc; V2-#?, pp. 105-112.

 

-P. Pattanaik (1971). Voting and Collective Choice. Cambridge: CUP.

 

-J. Kelly (1974). “Necessity Conditions in Voting Theory”. JET; V.8-#2, pp. 149-160

 

-M. Salles (1976). “Characterization of Transitive Individual Preferences for Quasi-transitive Collective Preference Under Simple Games”; IER; V.17-#2, pp. 308-318.

 

-G. Kramer (1973). “On a Class of Equilibrium Conditions for Majority Rule”. Etrica; V.41-#2, pp. 285-297.

 

-P. Wagstaff (1976). “Proof of a Conjecture in Social Choice”. IER; V.17-#2, pp. 491-497.

 

-G. Kramer (1976). “A Note on Single-Peakedness”. IER; V.17-#2, pp. 498-502.

 

-J.-M. Grandmont (1978). “Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule”. Etrica; V.46-#2, pp. 317-330.

 

-S. Slutsky (1977). “A Characterization of Societies with Consistent Majority Decision”. REStud; V.44-#?, pp. 211-225.

 

-P. Rothstein (1990). “Order Restricted Preferences and Majority Rule”. SC&W; V.7-#?, pp. 331-343.

 

-J. Gans and M. Smart (1996). “Majority Voting with Single-Crossing Preferences”. JPubE; V.59-#?, pp. 219-237.

 

-D. Saari and F. Valognes (1999). “The Geometry of Black's Single-Peakedness and Related Conditions”. JMathE; V.32-#4, pp. 429-456.

 

(3) Topological Social Choice Theory

 

-L. Lauwers (2000). “Topological social choice”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.40-#1, pp. 1-39.

 

-G. Chichilnisky (1983). “Social Choice and Game Theory: Recent Results with a Topological Approach”. in P. Pattanaik and M. Salles, eds. Social Choice and Welfare. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 79-102.

 

-G. Chichilnisky (1977). “Spaces of Economic Agents”. JET; V.15-#?, pp. 160-173.

 

-G. Chichilnisky (1980). “Social Choice and the Topology of Spaces of Preferences”. Advances in Mathematics; V.37-#2, pp. 165-176.

 

-G. Chichilnisky (1979). “On Fixed Point Theorems and Social Choice Paradoxes”. EcLets; V.3-#?, pp. 347-331.

 

-G. Chichilnisky (1982). “Social Aggregation Rules and Continuity”. QJE; V.97-#2, pp. 337-352.

 

-N. Baigent (1984). “A Reformulation of Chichilnisky’s Impossibility Theorem”. EcLets; V.16-#1, pp. 23-25.

 

-N. Baigent (1985). “Anonymity and Continuous Social Choice”. JMathE; V.14-#1, pp. 1-4.

 

-N. Baigent (1987). “Preference Proximity and Anonymous Social Choice”. QJE; V.102-#1, pp.161-169.

 

-S. Nitzan (1989). “More on the Preservation of Preference Proximity and Anonymous Social Choice”. QJE; V.104-#?, pp.187-190.

 

-N. Baigent (1989). “Some Further Remarks on Preference Proximity”. QJE; V.104-#?, pp. 191-193.

 

-G. Chichilnisky (1993). “On Strategic Control”. QJE; V.108-#1, pp. 285-290.

 

-F. Grafe and J. Grafe (2001). “Social Welfare Functions which Preserve Distances”. SC&W; V.18-#1, pp. 59-64.

 

-D. Eckert and B. Lane (2002). “Anonymity, Ordinal Preference Proximity and Imposed Social Choices”. SC&W; V.19-#3, pp. 681-684.

 

-W.-H. Huang (2004). “Is Proximity Preservation in Social Choice Rational?”. SC&W; V.23-#3, pp. 315-332.

 

-M. LeBreton and J. Uriarte (1990). “On the Robustness of the Impossibility Result in the Topological Approach to Social Choice”. SC&W; V.7-#?, pp. 131-140. [Reply by N. Baigent and P. Huang, pp. 141-146, rejoinder pp. 147-148.]

 

-G. Chichilnisky (1991). “Social Choice and the Closed Convergence Topology”. SC&W; V.8-#?, pp. 307-317.

 

-J. Candeal and E. Indurain (1994). “The Moebius Strip and a Social Choice Paradox”. EcLets; V.45-#3, pp. 407-412.

 

-Y. Zhou (1997). “A Note on Continuous Social Choice”. SC&W; V.14-#?, pp. 245-248.

 

-G. Chichilnisky (1982). “The Topological Equivalence of the Pareto Condition and the Existence of a Dictator”. JMathE; V.9-#?, pp. 223-233.

 

-G. Chichilnisky and G. Heal (1983). “Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for a Resolution of the Social Choice Paradox”. JET; V.31-#1, pp. 68-87.

 

-B. Allen (1996). “A Remark on a Social Choice Problem”. SC&W; V.13-#1, pp. 11-16.

 

-G. Chichilnisky (1996). “A Robust Theory of Resource Allocation”. SC&W; V.13-#1, pp. 1-10.

 

-P. Mehta (1997). “Topological Methods in Social Choice: An Overview”. SC&W; V.14-#?, pp. 233-243.

 

-D. Saari (1991). “Calculus and Extensions of Arrow’s Theorem”. JMathE; V.20-#?, pp. 271-306.

 

-D. Saari (1997). “Informational Geometry of Social Choice”. SC&W; V.14-#?, pp. 211-232.

 

-Y.M. Baryshnikov (1997). “Topological and Discrete Social Choice: In Search of a Theory”. SC&W; V.14-#?, pp. 199-209.

 

-Y.M. Baryshnikov (1993). “Unifying Impossibility Theorems: A Topological Approach”. Advances in Applied Mathematics; V.14-#?, pp. 404-415.

 

-C. Horvath (2001). “On the Topological Social Choice Problem”. SC&W; V.18-#2, pp. 227-250.

 

-G. Chichilnisky and G. Heal (1997). “Social Choice with Infinite Populations: Construction of a Rule and Impossibility Results”. SC&W; V.14-#?, pp. 303-318.

 

-J.C. Candeal, E. Induráin, and J. Uriarte (1992). “Some Issues Related to the Topological Aggregation of Preferences”. SC&W; V.9-#?, pp. 213-227.

 

-B. Efimov and G. Koshevoy (1994). “A Topological Approach to Social Choice with Infinite Populations”. MathSocSci; V.27-#?, pp. 145-157.

 

-L. Lauwers (1997). “A Note on Weak ∞-Chichilnisky Rules”. SC&W; V.14-#?, pp. 357-358.

 

-J.C. Candeal, E. Induráin, and J. Uriarte (1997). “Some Issues Related to the Topological Aggregation of Preferences: Addendum”. SC&W; V.14-#?, pp. 359-361.

 

-G. Koshevoy (1997). “Homotopy Properties of Pareto Aggregation Rules”. SC&W; V.14-#?, pp. 295-302.

 

-L. Lauwers (1997). “Topological Aggregation, The Case of an Infinite Population”. SC&W; V.14-#?, pp. 319-332.

 

-J.C. Candeal, G. Chichilnisky, and E. Induráin (1997). “Topological Aggregation of Preferences: The Case of a Continuum of Agents”. SC&W; V.14-#?, pp. 333-343.

 

-L. Lauwers (1997). “Continuity and Equity with Infinite Horizons”. SC&W; V.14-#?, pp. 345-356.

 

-Y.M. Baryshnikov (2000). “On Isotopic Dictators and Homological Manipulators”. Journal Of Mathematical Economics; V.33-#1, pp. 123-134.

 

-L. Lauwers (2004). “Topological Manipulators form an Ultrafilter”. SC&W; V.23-#3, pp. 437-445.

 

-G. Chichilnisky (1990). “On the Mathematical Foundations of Political Economy”. Contributions to Political Economy; V.9-#?, pp. 25-41.

 

-G. Chichilnisky (1993). “Intersecting Families of Sets and the Topology of Cones in Economics”. Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society; V.29-#2, pp. 189-207.

 

-G. Chichilnisky (1996). “Limited Arbitrage is Necessary and Sufficient for the Non-Emptiness of the Core”. EcLets; V.52-#?, pp. 177-180.

 

-G. Chichilnisky (1996). “Markets and Games: A Simple Equivalence Among the Core, Equilibrium and Limited Arbitrage”. Metroeconomica; V.47-#3, pp. 266-280.

 

-G. Chichilnisky (1997). “A Unified Perspective on Resource Allocation: Limited Arbitrage in Necessary and Sufficient for the Existence of a Competitive Equilibrium, the Core and Social Choice”. in K. Arrow, A. Sen, and K. Suzumura, eds. Social Choice Re-examined. V.1. New York: St. Martins, pp. 121-174. [Discussion by N. Baigent, pp. 175-178.]

 

-G. Chichilnisky (1997). “Market, Arbitrage, Social Choice and the Core”. SC&W; V.14-#?, pp. 161-198.

 

-N. Schofield (1998). “Aggregation of Smooth Preferences”. SC&W; V.15-#?, pp. 161-185.

 

(4) Infinite Voters and Decisive Coalitions

 

-P. Fishburn (1970). “Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem: Concise Proof and Infinite Voters”. JET; V.2-#?, pp. 103-106.

 

-A. Kirman and D. Sonderman (1972). “Arrow's Theorem, Many Agents, and Invisible Dictators”. JET; V.5-#?, pp. 267-277.

 

-B. Hansson (1976). “The Existence of Group Preference Functions”. PC; V.28-#?, pp. 89-98.

 

-D. Brown (1974). “An Approximate Solution to Arrow's Problem”. JET; V.9-#?, pp. 375-383.

 

-D. Brown (1975). “Aggregation of Preferences”. QJE; V.89-#?, pp. 456-469.

 

-J. Ferejohn (1977). “Decisive Coalitions in the Theory of Social Choice”. JET; V.15-#?, pp. 301-306.

 

(5) Game Theoretic Approaches

 

(a) Simple Games and Cores: Some Basic Results

 

-H. Scarf (1972). “The Core of an N-Person Game”. Etrica; V.35-#?, pp. 50-69.

 

-L. Shapley (1962). “Simple Games: An Outline of the Descriptive Theory”. Behavioral Science; V.7-#1, pp. 59-66.

 

-L. Shapley (1964). “Solutions of Compound Simple Games”. in M. Dresher, L. Shapley, and A. Tucker, eds. Advances in Game Theory. (Annals of Mathematics Studies, #52). Princeton: PUP, pp. 267-305.

 

-G. Owen (1964). “Tensor Composition of Nonnegative Games”. in M. Dresher, L. Shapley, and A. Tucker, eds. Advances in Game Theory. (Annals of Mathematics Studies, #52). Princeton: PUP, pp. 307-326.

 

-N. Megiddo (1975). “Tensor Decomposition of Cooperative Games”. SIAM Journal of Applied Mathematics; V.29-#3, pp. 388-405.

 

-N. Megiddo (1974). “Nucleoluses of Compound Simple Games”. SIAM Journal of Applied Mathematics; V.26-#3, pp. 607-621.

 

-N. Megiddo (1974). “Kernels of Compound Games with Simple Components”. Pacific Journal of Mathematics; V.50-#?, pp. 531-555.

 

-H. Keiding (1984). “Heights of Simple Games”. IJGT; V.13-#1, pp. 15-26.

 

-B. Peleg (1987). “Cores and Capacities of Compound Simple Games”. SC&W; V.4-#4, pp. 307-316.

 

-A. Tayor and W. Zwicker (1999). Simple Games: Desirability Relations, Trading, Pseudoweightings. Princeton: PUP.

 

(b) Simple Games, Cores, and Social Choice Functions

 

-R. Wilson (1971). “A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Social Choice”. in B. Lieberman, ed. Social Choice. New York: Gordon and Breach.

 

-R. Wilson (1972). “The Game-Theoretic Structure of Arrow's General Possibility Theorem”. JET; V.5-#1, pp. 14-20.

 

-K. Nakamura (1975). “The Core of a Simple Game with Ordinal Preferences”. IJGT; V.4-#2, pp. 95-104.

 

-K. Nakamura (1978). “The Vetoers in a Simple Game with Ordinal Preferences”. IJGT; V.8-#1, pp. 55-61.

 

-K. Nakamura (1978). “Necessary and Sufficient Conditions on the Existence of a Class of Social Choice Functions”. Economic Studies Quarterly; V.29-#3, pp.

 

-B. Peleg (1978). “Representations of Simple Games by Social Choice Functions”. IJGT; V.7-#?, pp. 81-94.

 

-S. Ishikawa and K. Nakamura (1979). “On the Existence of the Core of a Characteristic Function Game with Ordinal Preferences”. Journal of the Operations Research Society of Japan; V.22-#3, pp. 225-232.

 

-S. Ishikawa and K. Nakamura (1980). “Representation of Characteristic Function Games by Social Choice Functions”. IJGT; V.9-#4, pp. 191-199.

 

-R. Holzman (1986). “On the Strong Representations of Games by Social Choice Functions”. JMathE; V.15-#1, pp. 39-57.

 

-H. Moulin and B. Peleg (1982). “Cores of Effectivity Functions and Implementation Theory”. JMathE; V.10-#?, pp. 115-145.

 

-B. Dutta (1984). “Effectivity Functions and Acceptable Game Forms”. Etrica; V.52-#5, pp. 1151-1166.

 

-B. Peleg (1983). “On Simple Games and Social Choice Correspondences”. in P. Pattanaik and M. Salles, eds. SC&W. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 251-268.

 

-B. Peleg (1984). Game Theoretic Analysis of Voting in Committees. Cambridge: CUP.

 

-H. Keiding (1985). “Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Stability of Effectivity Functions”. IJGT; V.14-#2, 93-101.

 

-H. Keiding (1985). “Stability of Effectivity Functions with an Infinite Set of Alternatives”. Methods of Operations Research; V.50-#?, pp. 519-530.

 

-Abdou, Joseph and H. Keiding (1991). Effectivity Functions in Social Choice. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

 

-B. Peleg (2004). “Representation of Effectivity Functions by Acceptable Game Forms: A Complete Characterization”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.47-#3, pp. 275-287.

 

-T. Lensberg (1987). “Stability and Collective Rationality”. Etrica. V.55-#4, pp. 935-962.

 

-N. Andjiga and J. Moulen (1988). “Binary Games in Constitutional Form and Collective Choice”. Mathematical Social Science; V.16-#?, pp. 189-201.

 

(6) Trade-Off Theory

 

-D. Campbell and J. Kelly (1994). “Trade-off Theory”. AER; V.84-#2, pp. 422-426.

 

-D. Campbell and J. Kelly (1997). “The Possibility-Impossibility Boundary in Social Choice”. in K. J. Arrow, A.K. Sen and K. Suzumura, eds. Social Choice Re-examined; Vol. 1. London: Macmillan, pp. 179-204.

 

-D. Campbell and J. Kelly (1993). “t or 1-t. That is the Tradeoff”. Etrica; V.61-#6, pp. 1355-1365.

 

-D. Campbell and J. Kelly (1994). “Arrow's Choice Axiom”. Economics Letters; V.44-#4; pp. 381-384.

 

-D. Campbell and J. Kelly (1995). “Nondictatorially Independent Pairs”. SC&W; V.12-#1; pp. 75-86.

 

-D. Campbell and J. Kelly (1995). “Lebesgue Measure and Social Choice Trade-offs”. Economic Theory; V.5-##3; pp. 445459.

 

-D. Campbell and J. Kelly (1995). “Asymptotic Density and Social Choice Trade-Offs”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.29-#3; pp. 181194.

 

-D. Campbell and J. Kelly (1996). “Social Choice Trade-off for an Arbitrary Measure With Application to Uncertain or Fuzzy Agenda”. Economics Letters; V.50-#1; pp. 99104.

 

-D. Campbell and J. Kelly (1996). “Independent Social Choice Correspondences”. Theory and Decision; V.41-#1; pp. 111.

 

-D. Campbell and J. Kelly (1996). “Trade-offs in the Spatial Model of Resource Allocation”. Journal of Public Economics; V.60-#1; pp. 119.

 

-D. Campbell and J. Kelly (1996). “Continuous-Valued Social Choice”. Journal of Mathematical Economics; V.25-#2; pp. 195211.

 

-D. Campbell and J. Kelly (1996). “Arrovian Social Choice Correspondences”. International Economic Review; V.37-#4; pp. 803-824.

 

-D. Campbell and J. Kelly (1997). “Sen’s Theorem and Externalities”. Economica; V.64-#255; pp. 375-386.

 

-D. Campbell and J. Kelly (1997). “Relaxing Pareto Optimality in Economic Environments”. Economic Theory; V.10-#1; pp. 115-130.

 

-D. Campbell and J. Kelly (1997). “Preference Aggregation”. Mathematica Japonica; V.45-#3; pp. 573-593.

 

-D. Campbell and J. Kelly (1998). “Quasitransitive Social Preference: Or Why Some Very Large Coalitions Have Very Little Power,” Economic Theory; V.12-#1; pp. 147-162.

 

-D. Campbell and J. Kelly (1998). “Incompatibility of Strategy-Proofness and the Condorcet Principle”. Social Choice and Welfare; V.15-#4; pp. 583-592.

 

-D. Campbell and J. Kelly (1999). “Trade-offs for Democratic Preference Revelation”. Journal of Public Economic Theory, V.1-#4, pp. 465-473.

 

-D. Campbell and J. Kelly (2000). “Information and Preference Aggregation”. Social Choice and Welfare; V.17-#1, pp. 3-24.

 

-D. Campbell and J. Kelly (2000). “Impossibility Theorems in the Arrovian Framework,” forthcoming in the Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare (North-Holland).

 

-D. Campbell and J. Kelly (2000). “A Trade-Off Result for Preference Revelation,” forthcoming in the Journal of Mathematical Economics.

 

-D. Campbell and J. Kelly (2000). “A Simple Characterization of Majority Rule,” forthcoming in Economic Theory.

 

-D. Campbell and J. Kelly (2000). “Weak Independence and Veto Power,” forthcoming in Economics Letters.

 

-D. Campbell and J. Kelly (2000). “Continuous Valued Social Choice in Economic Environments,” forthcoming in Mathematical Social Science.

 

3. Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal

 

a. Overviews

 

-J. Wrigglesworth (1985). Libertarian Conflicts in Social Choice. Cambridge: CUP.

 

-K. Suzumura (1991). “Alternative Approaches to Libertarian Rights”. In K. Arrow, ed. Issues in Contemporary Economics--Markets and Welfare. New York: NYU Press, pp. 215-242.

 

-K. Suzumura (1999). “Consequences, Opportunities, and Procedures”. SC&W; V.16-#1, pp. 17-40.

 

-K. Suzumura (2000). “Welfare Economics Beyond Welfarist-Consequentialism”. Japanese Economic Review; V.51-#1, pp.

 

b. Social Choice Approach

 

-A. Sen (1970). “The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal”. JPE; V.78-#1, pp. 152-157.

 

-J. Kelly (1976). “The Impossibility of a Just Liberal”. Etrica; V.43-#1, pp. 67-75.

 

-A. Gibbard (1974). “A Pareto-Consistent Libertarian Claim”. JET; V.7-#4, pp. 388-410.

 

-J. Kelly (1976). “Rights Exercising and a Pareto-Consistent Libertarian Claim”. JET; V.13-#?, pp. 138-153.

 

-M.J. Farrell (1976). “Liberalism in the Theory of Social Choice”. REStud; V.43-#?, pp. 3-10.

 

-A. Sen (1976). “Liberty, Unanimity and Rights”. Eca; V.43-#?, pp. 217-245.

 

-J. Ferejohn (1978). “The Distribution of Rights in Society”. in H. Gottinger and W. Leinfeller, eds. Decision Theory and Social Ethics. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, pp. 119-131.

 

-D. Stevens and J. Foster (1978). “The Possibility of Democratic Pluralism”. Eca; V.?-#?, pp. 401-406. [comment by Wrigglesworth, Eca, 1982, V.49:43-48.

 

-K. Suzumura (1978). “On the Consistency of Libertarian Claims”. REStud; V.45-#2, pp. 329-342. [correction V.46-#4, 1979, pp. 743.]

 

-K. Suzumura (1980). “Liberal Paradox and the Voluntary Exchange of Rights-Exercising”. JET; V.22-#3, pp. 407-422.

 

-W. Gaertner and L. Krüger (1981). “Self-Supporting Preferences and Individual Rights: The Possibility of Paretian Libertarianism”. Eca; V.48-#189, pp. 17-28.

 

-J. Wrigglesworth (1982). “Using Justice Principles to Resolve the `Impossibility of A Paretial Liberal`”. EcLets; V.10-#?, pp. 217-221.

 

-D. Austen-Smith (1982). “Restricted Pareto and Rights”. JET; V.26-#?, pp. 89-99.

 

-P. Hammond (1982). “Liberalism, Independent Rights and the Pareto Principle”. in L. Cohen, J. Łoś, and K.-P. Podewski, eds. Logic, Methodology, and the Philosophy of Science. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 607-620.

 

-L. Krüger and W. Gaertner (1983). “Alternative Libertarian Claims and Sen’s Paradox”. T&D; V.15-#?, pp. 211-229.

 

-K. Basu (1984). “The Right to Give Up Rights”. Eca; V.41-#?, pp. 413-422.

 

-P. Coughlin (1986). “Rights and the Private Pareto Principle”. Eca; V.53-#211, pp. 303-320.

 

-J. Riley (1986). “Generalized Social Welfare Functionals: Welfarism, Morality and Liberty”. SC&W; V.3-#?, pp. 233-254.

 

-J. Pressler (1987). “Rights and Social Choice: Is There a Paretian Libertarian Paradox?”. Economics and Philosophy; V.3-#1, pp. 1-22. [comment by Kelly and response, V.4-#?, pp. 316-325]

 

-Y. Xu (1990). “The Libertarian Paradox: Some Further Observations”. SC&W; V.7-#4, pp. 343-51.

 

-A. Brunel and M. Salles (1998). “Interpretive, Semantic and Formal Difficulties of the Social Choice Rule Approach to Rights”. in J.-F., Laslier, M. Fleurbaey, N. Gravel, and A. Trannoy, eds. (1998). Freedom in Economics: New Perspectives in Normative Analysis. London: Routledge, pp. 101-111. [Comment by Hammond follows.]

 

-P. Hammond (1998). “Rights, Free Exchange and Widespread Externalities”. in J.-F., Laslier, M. Fleurbaey, N. Gravel, and A. Trannoy, eds. (1998). Freedom in Economics: New Perspectives in Normative Analysis. London: Routledge, pp. 139157.

 

-M. Fleurbaey and A. Trannoy (2003). “The Impossibility of a Paretian Egalitarian”. SC&W; V.21-#2, pp. 243-263.

 

c. Problems with the Social Choice Approach and the Game Form Approach

 

-P. Bernholz (1974). “Is a Paretian Liberal Really Impossible?”. Public Choice; V.20-#?, pp. 99-107.

 

-P. Bernholz (1980). “A General Social Dilemma: Profitable Exchange and Intransitive Group Preferences”. ZfN; V.40-#1, pp. 1-23.

 

-R. Sugden (1978). “Social Choice and Individual Liberty”. in M. Artis and A. Nobary, eds. Contemporary Economic Analysis. London: Croom Helm.

 

-I. Levi (1982). “Liberty and Welfare”. in A. Sen and B. Williams, eds. Utilitarianism and Beyond. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 271-280.

 

-B. Barry (1986). “Lady Chatterly’s Lover and Doctor Fischer’s Bomb Party: Liberalism, Pareto Optimality, and the Problem of Objectionable Preferences”. in J. Elster and A. Hylland, eds. Foundations of Social Choice Theory. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 11-43. [response by Sen, pp. 223-232.]

 

-P. Gardenfors (1981). “Rights, Games and Social Choice”. Noûs; V.15-#3, pp. 341-356.

 

-A. Sen (1983). “Liberty and Social Choice”. Journal of Philosophy; V.7-#4, pp. 388-410.

 

-R. Sugden (1985). “Liberty, Preference and Choice”. Economics and Philosophy; V.1-#2, pp. 213-229.

 

-W. Gaertner, P. Pattanaik and K. Suzumura (1992). “Individual Rights Revisited”. Eca; V.59-#234, pp. 161-177.

 

-A. Sen (1992). “Minimal Liberty”. Eca; V.59-#234, pp. 139-159.

 

-J. Riley (1989/90). “Rights to Liberty in Purely Private Matters”. Economics and Philosophy; Part I, V.5-#?, pp. 121-166; Part II, V.6-#1, pp. 27-64.

 

-W. Gaertner (1993). “Rights and Game Forms, Types of Preference Orderings, and Pareto Inefficiency”. in W. Diewert, K. Sparemann, and F. Stehling, eds. Mathematical Modilling in Economics. Berlin: Springer, pp. 177-187.

 

-D. Campbell (1994). “A Power Structure Version of Sen’s Paretian Liberal Theorem”. Seoul Journal of Economics; V.7-#?, pp. 269-278.

 

-R. Deb (1994). “Waiver, Effectivity and Rights as Game Forms”. Eca; V.61-#?, pp. 161-178.

 

-R. Pattanaik and K. Suzumura (1994). “Rights, Welfarism, and Social Choice”. AER; V.84-#2, pp. 435-439.

 

-P. Pattanaik (1994). “Some Non-welfaristic Issues in Welfare Economics”. in B. Dutta, ed. Welfare Economics. Oxford in India Readings. Themes in Economics series. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 197-248.

 

-A. Sen (1997). “Individual Preference as the Basis of Social Choice”. in K. J. Arrow, A.K. Sen and K. Suzumura, eds. Social Choice Re-examined; Vol. 1. London: Macmillan, pp. 15-37. [comment by L. Gevers follows, pp. 38-43.]

 

-P. Pattanaik (1996). “On Modelling Individual Rights: Some Conceptual Issues”. in K. Arrow, A. Sen, and K. Suzumura, eds. Social Choice Re-Examined, V.2. New York: St. Martins, pp. 100-128. [Comment by M. Salles, pp. 129-133.]

 

-P. Pattanaik and K. Suzumura (1996). “Individual Rights and Social Evaluation: A Conceptual Framework”. Oxford Economic Papers; V.48-#2, pp. 194-212.

 

-K. Suzumura (1996). “Welfare, Rights, and Social Choice Procedure: A Perspective”. Analyse & Kritik; V.18-#?, pp. 20-37.

 

-P. Pattanaik (1996). “The Liberal Paradox: Some Interpretations When Rights Are Represented As Game Forms”. Analyse & Kritik; v.18-#1, pp. 38-53.

 

-M. Fleurbaey and W. Gaertner (1996). “Admisibility and Feasibility in Game Form”. Analyse & Kritik; v.18-#1, pp. 54-66.

 

-K. Binmore (1996). “Right or Seemly?”. Analyse & Kritik; v.18-#1, pp. 67-80.

 

-Martin van Hees (1996). “Individual Rights and Legal Validity”. Analyse & Kritik; v.18-#1, pp.

 

-A. Sen (1996). “Rights: Formulation and Consequences”. Analyse & Kritik; V.18-#1, pp. .

 

-P. Hammond (1996). “Game Forms verus Social Choice Rules as Models of Rights”. in K. Arrow, A. Sen, and K. Suzumura, eds. Social Choice Reexamined, Vol. II. London: Macmillan, pp. 82-95. [Comment by R. Deb, pp. 96-99.]

 

-P. Hammond (1995). “Social Choice of Individual and Group Rights”. in W. Barnett, H. Moulin, M. Salles and N. Schofield, eds. Social Choice, Welfare, and Ethics. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 55-77.

 

-R. Deb, P. Pattanaik, and L. Razzolini (1997). “Game Forms, Rights, and the Efficiency of Social Outcomes”. JET; V.72-#1, pp. 74-95.

 

-B. Peleg (1998). “Effectivity Functions, Game Forms, Games, and Rights”. SC&W; V.15-#1, pp. 67-80. [also in J.-F., Laslier, M. Fleurbaey, N. Gravel, and A. Trannoy, eds. (1998). Freedom in Economics: New Perspectives in Normative Analysis. London: Routledge, pp. 116-132.]

 

-M. van Hees (1999). “Liberalism, Efficiency, and Stability: Some Possibility Results”. JET; V.88-#2, pp. 294-309.

 

-M. van Hees (2000). “Negative Freedom and the Liberal Paradoxes”. Rationality and Society; V.12-#3, pp. 335-352.

 

-B. Peleg, H. Peters, and T. Storcken (2002). “Nash consistent representation of constitutions: a reaction to the Gibbard paradox”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.43-#2, pp. 267-287.

 

-R. Deb (2004). “Rights as Alternative Game Forms”. SC&W; V.22-#1, pp. 83-111.

 

4. Freedom of Choice

 

a. General Discussions of Freedom as Freedom of Choice

 

-I. Berlin (1958). “Two Concepts of Liberty”. Reprinted in I. Berlin (1969). Four Essays on Liberty. Oxford : OUP.

 

-J. Buchanan (1975). The Limits of Liberty. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

 

-P. Jones and R. Sugden (1982). “Evaluating Choice”. International Review of Law and Economics; V.2-#?, pp. 47-65.

 

-R. Sugden (1983). “Liberty, Preference and Choice”. Economics and Philosophy; V.1-#2, pp. 213-229.

 

-P. Dasgupta (1980). “Decentralization and Rights”. Eca; V.47-#?, pp. 107-124.

 

-P. Dasgupta (1986). “Positive Freedom, Markets and the Welfare State”. Oxford Review of Economic Policy; V.2-#2, pp. 25-36.

 

-A. Sen (1985). “Well-being, Agency and Freedom: The Dewey Lectures”. Journal of Philosophy; V.82-#4, pp. 169-221.

 

-A. Sen (1988). “Freedom of Choice: Concept and Content”. EER; V.32-#2/3, pp. 269-294.

 

-A. Sen (1990). “Justice: Means versus Freedoms”. Philosophy and Public Affairs; V.19-#2, pp. 111-121.

 

-A. Sen (1991). “Welfare, Preferences and Freedom”. Journal of Econometrics; V.50-#1/2, pp. 15-29.

 

-A. Sen (1993). “Markets and Freedoms: Achievements and Limitations of the Market Mechanism in Promoting Individual Freedoms”. OEP; V.45-#?, pp. 519-541.

 

-P. Pattanaik (1994). “Rights and Freedom in Welfare Economics”. EER; V.38-#3/4, pp. 731-38.

 

-P. Van Parijs (1995). Real Freedom for All: What (if Anything) Is Wrong With Capitalism? New York: Oxford University Press.

 

b. Extending an Order on a Set to the Power Set

 

-D. Packard (1979). “Preference Relations”. Journal of Mathematical Psychology; V.19-#?, pp. 295-306.

 

-K. Kim and F. Roush (1980). “Preferences on Subsets”. Journal of Mathematical Psychology; V.21-#?, pp. 279-282.

 

-D. Packard (1981). “Plausibility Orderings and Social Choice”. Synthese; V.49-#?, pp. 415-418.

 

-R. Heiner and D. Packard (1983). “More About Plausibility Orderings”. Synthese; V.55-#?, pp. 333-337.

 

-Y. Kannai and B. Peleg (1984). “A Note on the Extension of an Order on a Set to the Power Set”. JET; V.32-#?, pp. 172-175.

 

-P. Fishburn (1984). “Comment on the Kannai-Peleg Impossibility Theorem for Extending Orders”. JET; V.32-#?, pp. 176-179.

 

-R. Holzman (1984). “An Extension of Fishburn’s Theorem on Extending Orders”. JET; V.32-#?, pp. 192-196.

 

-R. Heiner and D. Packard (1984). “A Uniqueness Result for Extending Orders: with Application to Collective Choice as Inconsistency Resolution”. JET; V.32-#?, pp. 180-184.

 

-S. Barberà and P. Pattanaik (1984). “Extending an Order on a Set to the Power Set: Some Remarks on Kannai and Peleg’s Approach”. JET; V.32-#?, pp. 185-191.

 

-S. Barberà, C. Barrett, and P. Pattanaik (1984). “On Some Axioms for Ranking Sets of Alternatives”. JET; V.33-#?, pp. 301-308.

 

-S. Nitzan and P. Pattanaik (1984). “Median-based Extensions of an Ordering over a Set to the Power Set: An Axiomatic Characterization”. JET; V.34-#?, pp. 252-261.

 

-P. Pattanaik and B. Peleg (1984). “An Axiomatic Characterization of the Lexicographic Maximin Extension of an Ordering Over a Set to the Power Set”. SC&W; V.1-#?, pp. 113-122.

 

-R. Holzman (1984). “A Note on the Redundancy of an Axiom in the Pattanaik-Peleg Characterization of the Lexicographic Maximin Extension”. SC&W; V.1-#?, pp. 123-125.

 

-T. Bandyopadhyay (1988). “Extension of an Oreder on a Set to the Power Set: Some Further Observations”. MathSocSci; V.15-#?, pp. 81-85.

 

-W. Bossert (1989). “On the Extension of Preferences over a Set to the Power Set: An Axiomatic Characterization of a Quasi-Ordering”. JET; V.49-#?, pp. 84-92.

 

-P. Fishburn (1992). “Signed Orders and Power Set Extension”. JET; V.56-#1, pp. 1-19.

 

-P. Fishburn (1992). “Utility as an Additive Set Function”. Mathematics of Operations Research; V.17-#4, pp. 910-920.

 

-W. Bossert (1995). “Preference Extension Rules for Ranking Sets of Alternatives with a Fixed Cardinality”. T&D; V.39-#3, pp. 301-317.

 

-G. Laffond and J. Lainé (2000). “Majority Voting on Orders”. T&D; V.49-#3, pp. 251-289.

 

-K. Nehring and C. Puppe (1996). “Continuous Extensions of an Order on a Set to the Power Set”. JET; V.68-#?, pp. 456-479.

 

-K. Nehring and C. Puppe (1998). “Extended Partial Orders: A Unifying Structure for Abstract Choice Theory”. Annals of Operations Research; #80, 27-48.

 

-M. Ballester and J. de Miguel (2003). “Extending an Order to a Power Set: The Leximax Criterion”. SC&W; V.21-#1, pp. 63-71.

 

-W. Bossert (2000). “Opportunity Sets and Uncertain Consequences”. Journal of Mathematical Economics; V.33-#4, pp. 457-496.

 

-W. Bossert, P. Pattanaik, and Y. Xu (2000). “Choice under Complete Uncertainty: Axiomatic Characterization of some Decision Rules”. Economic Theory; V.16-#?, pp. 295-312.

 

-Jörg Naeve and Elisabeth Naeve-Steinweg (2002). “Lexicographic measurement of the information contained in opportunity sets”. SC&W; V.19-#1, pp. 155-173.

 

-R. Spiegler (2001). “Inferring a Linear Ordering over a Power Set”. Theory and Decision; V.51-#1, pp. 31-49.

 

c. Axiomatic Analyses of Freedom of Choice

 

-D. Kreps (1979). “A Representation Theorem for ‘Preferences for Flexibility’”. Etrica; V.47-#?, pp. 565-577.

 

-P. Suppes (1987). “Maximizing Freedom of Decision: An Axiomatic Analysis”. In G. Feiwel, ed. Arrow and the Foundations of the Theory of Economic Policy. London: Macmillan, pp. 243-254.

 

-P. Pattanaik and Y. Xu (1990). “On Ranking Opportunity Sets in Terms of Freedom of Choice”. Recherches Economiques de Louvain; V.54-#3/4, pp. 383-390.

 

-M. Klemisch-Ahlert (1993). “Freedom of Choice: A Comparison of Different Rankings of Opportunity Sets”. Social Choice and Welfare; V.10-#3, pp. 189-207.

 

-W. Bossert, P. Pattanaik and Y. Xu (1994). “Ranking Opportunity Sets: An Axiomatic Approach”. JET; V.63-#?, pp. 326-345.

 

-N. Gravel (1994). “Can a Ranking of Opportunity Sets Attach an Intrinsic Importance to Freedom of Choice”. AER; V.84-#2, pp. 454-458.

 

-A. Banerjee (1995). “Choice Between Opportunity Sets: A Characterization of Welfarist Behaviour”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.30-#3, pp. 293-305.

 

-K. Arrow (1995). “A Note on Freedom and Flexibility”. in K. Basu, P. Pattanaik and K. Suzumura, eds. Choice, Welfare, and Development. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 7-16.

 

-C. Puppe (1995). “Freedom of Choice and Rational Decisions”. SC&W; V.12-#?, pp. 137-153.

 

-C. Puppe (1996). “An Axiomatic Approach to ‘Preference for Freedom of Choice’”. JET; V.68-#1, pp. 174-199.

 

-B. Dutta and A. Sen (1996). “Ranking Opportunity Sets and Arrow Impossibility Theorems: Correspondence Results”. JET; V.71-#1, pp. 90-101.

 

-W. Bossert (1997). “Opportunity Sets and Individual Well-being”. Social Choice and Welfare; V.14-#1, pp. 97-112.

 

-P. Pattanaik and Y. Xu (1998). “On Preference and Freedom”. Theory and Decision; V.44-#2, pp. 173-198.

 

-N. Gravel (1998). “Ranking Opportunity Sets on the Basis of their Freedom of Choice and Their Ability to Satisfy Preferences: A Difficulty”. SC&W; V.15-#3, pp. 371-382.

 

-R. Sugden (1998). “The Metric of Opportunity”. Economics and Philosophy; V.14-#2, pp. 307-337.

 

-M. van Hees (1998). “On the Analysis of Negative Freedom”. Theory and Decision; V.45-#2, pp. 175-197.

 

-C. Puppe (1998). “Individual Freedom and Social Choice”. in J.-F., Laslier, M. Fleurbaey, N. Gravel, and A. Trannoy, eds. (1998). Freedom in Economics: New Perspectives in Normative Analysis. London: Routledge, pp. 49-68.

 

-K. Nehring and C. Puppe (1999). “On the Multi-Preference Approach to Evaluating Alternatives”. SC&W; V.16-#1, pp. 41-63.

 

-K. Nehring (1999). “Preference For Flexibility in a Savage Framework”. Etrica; V.67-#1, pp. 101-119.

 

-N. Gravel, J. Laslier, and A. Trannoy (1998). “Individual Freedom of Choice in a Social Setting”. in J.-F., Laslier, M. Fleurbaey, N. Gravel, and A. Trannoy, eds. (1998). Freedom in Economics: New Perspectives in Normative Analysis. London: Routledge, pp. 76-92.

 

-P. Pattanaik and Y. Xu (2000). “On Ranking Opportunity Sets in Economic Environments”. JET; V.93-#1, pp. 48-71.

 

-P. Pattanaik and Y. Xu (2000). “On Diversity and Freedom of Choice”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.40-#2, pp. 123-130.

 

-K. Suzumura and Y. Xu (2001). “Characterizations of Consequentialism and Nonconsequentialism”. JET; V.101-#2, pp. 423-436.

 

-K. Suzumura and Y. Xu (2003). “Consequences, Opportunities, and Generalized Consequentialism and Nonconsequentialism”. JET; V.111-#2, pp. 293-304.

 

-K. Suzumura and Y. Xu (2004). “Welfarist Consequentialism, Similarity of Attitudes, and Arrow’s General Possibility Theorem”. SC&W; V.22-#1, pp. 237-251.

 

-Y. Xu (2003). “On Ranking Compact and Comprehensive Opportunity Sets”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.45-#2, pp. 109-119.

 

-Y. Xu (2004). “On Ranking Linear Budget Sets in Terms of Freedom of Choice”. SC&W; V.22-#1, pp. 281-289.

 

-I. Carter (2004). “Choice, Freedom and Freedom of Choice”. SC&W; V.22-#1, pp. 61-81.

 

-M. Van Hees (2004). “Freedom of Choice and Diversity of Options: Some Difficulties”. SC&W; V.22-#1, pp. 253-266.

 

-Arlegi, R., M. Besada, J. Nieto, and C. Vásquez (2005). “Freedom of Choice: The Leximax Criterion in the Infinite Case”. MathSocSci; V.49-#1, pp. 1-15.

 

-E. Baharad and S. Nitzan (2000). “Extended Preferences and Freedom of Choice”. SC&W; V.17-#4, pp. 629-637.

 

-A. Romero-Medina (2001). “More on Preference and Freedom”. SC&W; V.18-#1, pp. 179-191.

 

-R. Arlegi and J. Nieto (2001). “Ranking Opportunity Sets: An Axiomatic Approach Based on the Preference for Flexibility”. SC&W; V.18-#1, pp. 23-36.

 

-S. Bavetta and M. Del Seta (2001). “Constraints and the Measurement of Freedom of Choice”. Theory and Decision; V.50-#3, pp. 213-238.

 

-R. Gekker (2001). “On the axiomatic approach to freedom as opportunity: a general characterization result”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.42-#2, pp. 169-177.

 

-E. Baharad and S. Nitzan (2003). “Essential Alternatives and Set-dependent Preferences–An Axiomatic Characterization”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.45-#2, pp. 121-129.

 

-S. Lahiri (2003). “Justifiable Preferences over Opportunity Sets”. SC&W; V.21-#1, pp. 117-129.

 

-P. Vallentyne (1989). “How to Combine Pareto Optimality with Liberty Considerations”. Theory and Decision; V.27-#3, pp. 217-240.

 

-L. Kranich (1996). “Equitable Opportunities: An Axiomatic Approach”. JET; V.71-#1, pp. 131-147.

 

-T. Miyagi and H. Morisugi (1996). “A Direct Measure of the Value of Choice-Freedom”. Papers in Regional Science; V.75-#2, pp. 121-134.

 

-Laslier, Jean-Francois, Marc Fleurbaey, Nicolas Gravel, and Alain Trannoy, eds. (1998). Freedom in Economics: New Perspectives in Normative Analysis. London: Routledge.

 

5. Interpersonal Comparability, Fairness and Social Choice

 

a. Extending Binary Relations: Szpilrajn, etc.

 

-K. Suzumura (1983). “Appendix: Elementary Properties of Binary Relations”. In Rational Choice, Collective Decisions and Social Welfare. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 6-17.

 

-E. Szpilrajn (1930). “Sur l’extension de l’ordre partiel”. Fundamenta Mathematicae; V.16-#?, pp. 386-389.

 

-B. Dushnik and E. Miller (1941). “Partially Ordered Sets”. American Journal of Mathematics; V.63-#?, pp. 600-610.

 

-K. Suzumura (1976). “Remarks on the Theory of Collective Choice”. Economica; V.43-#?, pp. 381-390.

 

-A. Banerjee and P. Pattanaik (1996). “A Note on a Property of Maximal Sets and Choice in the Absence of Universal Comparability”. EcLets; V.51-#2, pp. 191-195.

 

-D. Donaldson and J. Weymark (1998). “A Quasiordering Is the Intersection of Orderings”. JET; V.78-#?, pp. 382-387.

 

-J. Duggan (1999). “A General Extension Theorem for Binary Relations”. JET; V.86-#1, pp. 1-16.

 

-W. Bossert (1999). “Intersection Quasi-Orderings: An Alternative Proof”. Order; V.16-#3, pp. 221-225.

 

-J. Weymark (2000). “A Generalization of Moulin’s Pareto Extension Theorem”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.39-#?, pp. 235-240.

 

-P. Fishburn (1998). “Linear Extensions of Additive Partial Orders”. Order; V.15-#?, pp. 153-169.

 

-K. Suzumura and Y. Xu (2003). “Recoverability of Choice Functions and Binary Relations: Some Duality Results”. SC&W; V.21-#1, pp. 21-37.

 

-R. Suck (1994). “A Theorem on Order Extensions: Embeddability of a System of Weak Orders to Meet Solvability Constraints”. Journal of Mathematical Psychology; V.38-#?, pp. 128-134.

 

-R. Janicki and M. Koutny (1997). “Fundamentals of Modelling Concurrency using Discrete Relational Structures”. Acta Informatica; V.34-#?, pp. 367-388.

 

-J.-Y. Jaffray (1975). “Semicontinuous Extension of a Partial Order”. Journal of Mathematical Economics; V.2-#3, pp. 395-406.

 

-W. Bossert, Y. Sprumont, and K. Suzumura (2002). “Upper Semicontinuous Extensions of Binary Relations”. Journal of Mathematical Economics; V.37-#3, pp. 231-246.

 

-G. Yi (1991). “Continuous Extension of Preferences”. Journal of Mathematical Economics; V.22-#6, pp. 547-555.

 

-G. Herden and A. Pallack (2002). “On the Continuous Analogue of the Szpilrajn Theorem I”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.45-#?, pp. 115-134.

 

b. Measurability and Comparability in Social Welfare Analysis

 

-A. Sen (1970). “Interpersonal Aggregation and Partial Comparability”. Etrica; V.38-#3, pp. 393-409. [correction in Etrica, 1972, V.40: 959-960.]

 

-B. Fine (1975). “A Note on ‘Interpersonal Aggregation and Partial Comparability’”. Etrica; V.43-#1, pp. 169-172.

 

-C. Blackorby and D. Donaldson (1977). “Utility versus Equity: Some Plausible Quasi Orderings”. JPubE; V.7-#3, pp. 365-381.

 

-C. Blackorby (1975). “Degrees of Cardinality and Aggregate Partial Orderings”. Etrica; V.43-#5/6, pp. 845-852.

 

-A. Sen (1974). “Informational Bases of Alternative Welfare Approaches: Aggregation and Income Distribution”. JPubE; V.3-#?, pp. 387-403.

 

-A. Sen (1977). “On Weights and Measures: Informational Constraints in Social Welfare Analysis”. Etrica; V.45-#7, pp. 1539-1572.

 

-A. Sen (1977). “The Poverty of Welfarism”. Intermountain Economic Review; V.8-#1, pp. 1-13.

 

-A. Sen (1979). “Personal Utilities and Public Judgements”. EJ; V.89-#355, pp. 537-558.

 

-Y.K. Ng (1981). “Welfarism: A Defence Against Sen’s Attack”. EJ; V.91-#362, pp. 527-530. [Sen’s response follows, pp. 531-535.]

 

-Y.K. Ng (1990). “Welfarism and Utilitarianism: A Rehabilitation”. Utilitas; V.2-#2, pp. 171-193

 

-R. Cooter and P. Rappoport (1984). “Were the Ordinalists Wrong About Welfare Economics?”. JEL; V.22-#2, pp. 507-530. [Comment by Little and Response, JEL; V.23-#3, pp. 1186-1191.]

 

-C. Blackorby and D. Donaldson (1982). “Ratio-scale and Translation-scale Full Interpersonal Comparability without Domain Restrictions: Admissible Social-Evaluation Functions”. IER; V.25-#?, pp. 327-356.

 

-C. d'Aspermont (1985). “Axioms for Social Welfare Orderings”. in L. Hurwicz, D. Schmeidler and H. Sonnenschein, eds. Social Goals and Social Organization. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 19-76.

 

-A. Sen (1986). “Information and Invariance in Normative Choice”. in W. Heller, R. Starr, and D. Starrett, eds. Social Choice and Public Decision Making: Essays in Honor of Kenneth Arrow. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 29-55.

 

-J. Riley (1986). “Generalized Social Welfare Functionals: Welfarism, Morality, and Liberty”. SC&W; V.3-#4, pp. 233-254.

 

-J. Roemer (1991). “Welfarism and Axiomatic Bargaining Theory”. Recherches Economiques de Louvain; V.56-#3/4, pp. 287-301.

 

-A. Sen (1991). “Welfare, Preference and Freedom”. Journal of Econometrics; V.50-#1/2, pp. 15-29.

 

-P. Pattanaik and K. Suzumura (1994). “Rights, Welfarism and Social Choice”. AER; V.82-#4, pp. 435-439.

 

-C. D’Aspermont (1994). “Welfarism and Interpersonal Comparisons”. Investigaciones Economicas; V.18-#1, pp. 3-17.

 

-J. Weymark (1998). “Welfarism on Economic Domains”. MathSocSci; V.36-#3, pp. 251-268.

 

-M. Gines and F. Marhuenda (2000). “Welfarism in Economic Domains”. JET; V.93-#2, pp. 191-204.

 

-W. Bossert (2000). “Welfarism and Information Invariance”. SC&W; V.17-#2, pp. 321-336.

 

-C. Blackorby, W. Bossert, and D. Donaldson (2002). “In Defense of Welfarism”. Centre de Recherche et Développement en Économique, Cahier #02-2002.

 

-W. Bossert and J. Weymark (1997). “Utility in Social Choice”. In S. Barberà, P. Hammond, and C. Seidl, eds. Handbook of Social Choice, V.II. Dordrecht: Kluwer, forthcoming.

 

c. Money Income, Inequality, and Social Welfare

 

-S. Kolm (1969). “The Optimal Production of Social Justice”. In J. Margolis and H. Guitton, eds. Public Ecnomics. London: Macmillan, pp. 145-200.

 

-S. Kolm (1976). “Unequal Inequalities, I and II”. JET; V.12-#3, pp. 416-442 and V.13-#1, pp. 82-111.

 

-A. Atkinson (1970). “On Measurement of Inequality”. JET; V.2-#3, pp. 244-263.

 

-P. Dasgupta, A. Sen, and D. Starrett (1973). “Notes on the Measurement of Inequality”. JET; V.6-#?,

 

-A. Sen (1973). On Economic Inequality. Oxford: OUP. [Expanded edition, 1997, contains J. Foster and A. Sen, “On Economic Inequality after a Quarter Century”, pp. 107-219.]

 

-J. Muelbauer (1974). “Household Composition, Engel Curves and Welfare Comparisons between Households: A Duality Approach”. EER; V.5-#2, pp. 103-122.

 

-J. Muelbauer (1974). “Inequality Measures, Prices and Household Composition”. REStud; V.41-#4, pp. 493-504.

 

-P. Hammond (1976). “Why Ethical Measures of Inequality Need Interpersonal Comparisons”. Theory and Decision; V.7-#?, pp. 263-274.

 

-P. Hammond (1977). “Dual Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility and the Welfare Economics of Income Distribution”. JPubE; V.7-#1, pp. 51-71.

 

-C. Blackorby and D. Donaldson (1978). “Measures of Relative Equality and Their Meaning in terms of Social Welfare”. JET; V.18-#1, pp. 651-675.

 

-R. Pollak and T. Wales (1979). “Welfare Comparisons and Equivalent Scales”. AER; V.69-#2, pp. 216-221.

 

-K. Roberts (1980). “Price-Independent Welfare Prescriptions”. JPubE; V.13-#3, pp. 277-298.

 

-D. Jorgenson and D. Slesnick (1985). “General Equilibrium Analysis of Economic Policy”. In J. Piggott and J. Whalley, eds. New Developments in AGE Analysis. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 293-370.

 

d. Social Choice with Interpersonal Comparability

 

-A. Sen (1970). “Interpersonal Aggregation and Partial Comparability”. Etrica; V.38-#3, pp. 393-409. [correction in Etrica, 1972, V.40: 959-960.]

 

-B. Fine (1975). “A Note on ‘Interpersonal Aggregation and Partial Comparability’”. Etrica; V.43-#1, pp. 169-172.

 

-C. Blackorby and D. Donaldson (1977). “Utility versus Equity: Some Plausible Quasi Orderings”. JPubE; V.7-#3, pp. 365-381.

 

-C. Blackorby, D. Donaldson and J. Weymark (1984). “Social Choice with Interpersonal Utility Comparisons: A Diagramatic Introduction”. IER; V.25-#2, pp. 327-356.

 

-C. Blackorby, D. Donaldson and J. Weymark (1984). “A Welfarist Proof of Arrow’s Theorem”. Recherches Economiques de Louvain; V.56-#3/4, pp. 259-286.

 

-P. Suppes (1966). “Some Formal Models of Grading Principles”. Synthese; V.16-#?, pp. 284-306.

 

-S. Strasnick (1976). “The Problem of Social Choice: Arrow to Rawls”. Philosophy and Public Affairs; V.5-#?, pp. 241-273.

 

-K. Arrow (1977). “Extended Sympathy and the Possibility of Social Choice”. AER; V.67-#2, pp. 219-225.

 

-S. Strasnick (1979). “Extended Sympathy Comparisons and the Basis of Social Choice”. Theory and Decision; V.10-#?, pp. 311-328.

 

-L. Gevers (1979). “On Interpersonal Comparability and Social Welfare Orderings”. Etrica; V.47-#1, pp. 75-89.

 

-P. Hammond (1979). “Equity in Two Person Situations: Some Consequences”. Etrica; V.47-#5, pp. 1127-1135.

 

-K. Roberts (1980). “Possibility Theorems with Interpersonally Comparable Welfare Levels”. REStud; V.47-#?, pp. 409-420.

 

-K. Roberts (1980). “Interpersonal Comparability and Social Choice Theory”. REStud; V.47-#?, pp. 421-439.

 

-K. Roberts (1995). “Valued Opinions or Opinionated Values: The Double Aggregation Problem”. in K. Basu, P. Pattanaik and K. Suzumura, eds. Choice, Welfare, and Development. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 141-165.

 

-K. Suzumura (1982). “Equity, Efficiency and Rights in Social Choice”. MathSocSci; V.3-#?, pp. 131-155.

 

-K. Suzumura (1983). “Resolving Conflicting Views of Justice in Social Choice”. In P. Pattanaik and M. Salles, eds. Social Choice and Welfare. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 125-149.

 

-A. Borglin (1982). “States and Persons--On the Interpretation of Some Fundamental Concepts in the Theory of Justice as Fairness”. JPubE; V.18-#?, pp. 85-104.

 

-B. Lockwood (1984). “Social Choice, Interpersonal Comparability, and Welfare Economics”. In F. Van der Ploeg, ed. Mathematical Methods in Economics. New York: Wiley, pp. 371-400.

 

-M. Kaneko (1984). “On Interpersonal Utility Comparisons”. SC&W; V.1-#?, pp. 165-175.

 

-A. MacKay (1986). “Extended Sympathy and Interpersonal Utility Comparisons”. Journal of Philosophy; V.83-#?, pp. 535-549.

 

-P. Hammond (1986). “Consequentialist Social Norms for Public Decisions”. in W. Heller, R. Starr, and D. Starrett, eds. Social Choice and Public Decisions Making. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 3-27.

 

-A. MacKay (1986).”Extended Sympathy and Interpersonal Utility Comparisons”. Journal of Philosophy; V.83-#6, pp. 305-322.

 

-E. Yanovskaya (1989). “Group Choice Rules in Problems with Interpersonal Comparisons”. Automation and Remote Control; V.50-#?, pp. 822-830.

 

-A. Hylland (1991). “Subjective Interpersonal Comparison”. In J. Elster and J. Roemer, eds. Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-being. New York: Cambridge, pp. 337-370.

 

-P. Hammond (1991). “Independence of Irrelevant Interpersonal Comparisons”. SC&W; V.8-#1, pp. 1-19.

 

-P. Hammond (1991). “Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: Why and How They are and Should Be Made”. In J. Elster and J. Roemer, eds. Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-being. New York: Cambridge, pp. 200-254.

 

-W. Bossert (1991). “On Intra- and Interpersonal Utility Comparisons”. SC&W; V.8-#?, pp. 207-219.

 

-W. Bossert and F. Stehling (1992). “A Remark on Admissable Transformations for Interpersonally Comparable Utilities”. IER; V.33-#?, pp. 739-744.

 

-A. Tsoukias and P. Vincke (1995). “A New Axiomatic Foundation of Partial Comparability”. Theory and Decision; V.39-#1, pp. 79-114.

 

-K. Suzumura (1996). “Interpersonal Comparisons of the Extended Sympathy Type and the Possibility of Social Choice”. in K. Arrow, A. Sen, and K. Suzumura, eds. Social Choice Re-Examined, V.2. New York: St. Martins, pp. 202-229. [comment by K. Roberts, pp.230-236.]

 

-Khmelnitskaya, Anna B. (1996). “Social Choice Problems with Different Scales of Individual Welfare Measurement for Different Subgroups of Individuals”. In P. Kleinschmidt, A. Bachem, U. Derigs, D. Fischer, U. Leopold-Wildburger, and R. Möring, eds. Operations Research Proceedings 1995. Berlin: Springer, pp. 252-257.

 

-Khmelnitskaya, Anna B. (1999). “Social Welfare Orderings for Different Subgroup Utility Scales”. Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Discussion Paper; #198.

 

-Khmelnitskaya, Anna B. (2001). “”. in A.Tangian and J.Gruber, eds. Constructing and Applying Objective Functions. (Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems). Berlin: Springer-Verlag.

 

-Khmelnitskaya, Anna B. And John Weymark (2000). “Social Choice with Independent Subgroup Utility Scales”. Social Choice and Welfare; V.17-#4, pp. 739-748.

 

e. Utilitarianism

 

(1) The Utilitarian Tradition

 

-J. Bentham (1789). An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

 

-J.S. Mill (1861). Utilitarianism. London: Dent.

 

-H. Sidgwick (1874). The Methods of Ethics. London: Macmillan and Company.

 

-F.Y. Edgeworth (1991). Mathematical Psychics: An Essay on the Application of Mathematics to the Moral Sciences. London: C.K. Paul.

 

-J.J.C. Smart and B. Williams (1973). Utilitarianism: For and Against. Cambridge: CUP.

 

-A. Sen (1979). “Utilitarianism and Welfarism”. Journal of Philosophy; V.76-#9, pp. 463-489.

 

-J. Riley (1988). Liberal Utilitarianism: Social Choice Theory and J.S. Mill’s Philosohpy. Cambridge: CUP.

 

-A. Gibbard (1987). “Ordinal Utilitarianism”. In G. Feiwel ed. Arrow and the Foundations of the Theory of Economic Policy. London: Macmillan, Pp. 135-153.

 

-D. Lyons (1994). Rights, Welfare and Mill’s Moral Theory. Oxford: OUP.

 

-H. Miller and W. Williams, eds. (1982) The Limits of Utilitarianism. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

 

-A. Sen and B. Williams, eds. (1983). Utilitarianism and Beyond. Cambridge: CUP.

 

-S. Scheffler, ed. (1988). Consequentialism and Its Critics. Oxford: OUP.

 

(2) The Utilitarianism: Formal Characterization and Possibility

 

-E. Maskin (1978). “A Theorem on Utilitarianism”. REStud; V.45-#?, pp. 93-96.

 

-J. Mirlees (1982). “The Economic Uses of Utilitarianism”. in A. Sen and B. Williams, eds. Utilitarianism and Beyond. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 219-238.

 

-J. Broome (1991). “Utilitarian Metaphysics?”. in J. Elster and J. Roemer, eds. Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-Being. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 70-97.

 

-S. Kolm (1993). “The Impossibility of Utilitarianism”. in P. Loslowski and Y. Shinoya, eds. the Good and the Economical. Berlin: Springer, pp. 30-66.

 

-P. Hammond (1996). “Consequentialist Decision Theory and Utilitarian Ethics”. in F. Farina, F. Hahn, and F. Vannucci, eds. Ethics, Rationality, and Economic Behaviour. Oxford: OUP, pp. 92-118.

 

-Blackorby, Charles, Walter Bossert, and David Donaldson (2000). “Utilitarianism and the Theory of Justice”. in K. Arrow, A. Sen, and K. Suzumura, eds. Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare. Amsterdam: Elsevier, forth.

 

(3) Uncertainty, Cardinality and Utilitarianism

 

(a) The Harsanyi SWF

 

-J. Harsanyi (1977). “Morality and Social Welfare”. Chapter 4 in Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 48-83.

 

-J. Harsanyi (1992). “Game and Decision Theoretic Models in Ethics”. in R. Aumann and S. Hart, eds. Handbook of Game Theory, Vol. 1. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 669-707.

 

-M. Fleming (1952). “A Cardinal Concept of Welfare”. QJE; V.66-#?, pp. 366-384.

 

-J. Harsanyi (1955). “Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility”. JPE; V.63-#?, pp. 77-94.

 

-M. Fleming (1957). “Cardinal Welfare and Individualistic Ethics: A Comment”. JPE; V.65-#?, pp. 355-357.

 

-W. Vickery (1960). “Utility, Strategy and Social Decision Rules”. QJE; V.14-#?, pp. 507-535.

 

-J. Harsanyi (1977). “Rule Utilitarianism and Decision Theory”. in H. Gottinger and W. Leinfellner, eds. Decision Theory and Social Ethics. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, pp. 3-31.

 

J. Harsanyi (1977). Morality and the Theory of Rational Behavior”. Social Research; V.44-#4, pp. 623-656. [also in A. Sen and B. Williams, eds. Utilitarianism and Beyond. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 39-62.]

 

-J. Harsanyi (1978). “Bayesian Decision Theory and Utilitarian Ethics”. AER; V.88-#2, pp. 223-228.

 

-J. Harsanyi (1979). “Bayesian Decision Theory, Rule Utilitarianism, and Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem”. Theory and Decision; V.11-#?, pp. 289-317.

 

-R. Sugden and R. Weale (1979). “A Contractual Reformulation of Certain Aspects of Welfare Economics”. Eca; V.46-#?, pp. 111-123.

 

-Y.K. Ng (1975). “Bergson or Bentham? Finite Sensibility, Utility Functions and Social Welfare Functions”. RESttud; V.42-#?, pp. 545-569.

 

-Y.K. Ng (1981). “Bentham or Nash? On the Acceptable Form of Social Welfare Functions”. Economic Record; V.57-#158, pp. 238-50.

 

-L.-G. Svensson (1985). “The Utilitarian Criterion, Finite Sensibility, and the Weak Majority Preference Principle. A Futher Analysis”. SC&W; V.2-#1, pp. 23-35. [comment by Ng follows SC&W; V.2-#1, pp. 37-38.]

 

-J. Mirlees (1982). “The Economic Uses of Utilitarianism”. in A. Sen and B. Williams, eds. Utilitarianism and Beyond. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 63-84.

 

-J. Harsanyi (1980). “Rule Utilitarianism, Rights, Obligations, and the Theory of Rational Behavior”. Theory and Decision, V.12-#?, pp. 115-133. [also in Papers in Game Theory.]

 

-J. Harsanyi (1982). “Morality and the Theory of Rational Behavior”. in A. Sen and B. Williams, eds. Utilitarianism and Beyond. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 39-62.

 

-J. Harsanyi (1982). “Some Epistemological Advantages of a Rule Utilitarian Position in Ethics”. in Peter French, Theodore Uehling, and Howard Wettstein, eds. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. VII: Social and Political Philosophy. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 389-402.

 

-J. Harsanyi (1985). Rule Utilitarianism, Equality, and Justice”. Social Philosophy and Policy; V.2-#?, pp. 115-127.

 

-J. Harsanyi (1986). “Utilitarian Morality in a World of Very Half-Hearted Altruists”. in W. Heller, et al. Social Choice and Decision Making: Essays in Honor of K.J. Arrow. Vol. 1. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 57-73.

 

-J. Harsanyi (1988). “Assessing Other People’s Utilities”. in B. Munier, ed. Risk, Decision and Rationality. Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 127-138. [Comment by P. Mongin follows, pp. 139-144].

 

-P. Hammond (1987). “Reconciling Arrow’s Theory with Harsanyi’s Fundamental Utilitarianism”. In G. Feiwel, ed. Arrow and the Foundations of the Theory of Economic Policy. London: Macmillan, pp. 179-221.

 

-C. D'Aspremont, L.-A. Gerard-Varet (1991). “Utilitarian Fundamentalism and Limited Information”. in J. Elster and J. Roemer, eds. Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-Being. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 371-86.

 

-J. Harsanyi (1995). “A Theory of Prudential Values and a Rule Utilitarian Theory of Morality”. SC&W; V.12-#?, pp. 319-333.

 

-J. Harsanyi (1997). “Utilities, Preferences, and Substantive Goods”. SC&W; V.14-#?, pp. 129-145.

 

-J. Riley (2000). “Defending Rule Utilitarianism”. In B. Hooker, E. Mason, and D. Miller, eds. Morality, Rules and Consequences. Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, pp. 40-70.

 

-S.-C. Kolm (1998). “Chance and Justice: Social Policies and the Harsanyi-Vickery-Rawls Problem”. EER; V.42-#?, pp. 1393-1416.

 

-Y.-K. Ng (1999). “Utility, Informed Preference, or Happiness: Following Harsayni’s Argument to It’s Logical Conclusion”. SC&W; V.16-#2, pp. 197-216.

 

-A. Dhillon and J.-F. Mertens (1999). “Relative Utilitarianism”. Etrica; V.67-#3, pp. 471-498.

 

-U. Segal (2000). “Let’s Agree That All Dictatorships are Equally Bad”. JPE; V.108-#3, pp. 569-589.

 

-Y.-K. Ng (2000). “From Separability to Unweighted Sum: A Case for Utilitarianism”. T&D; V.49-#4, pp. 299-312.

 

-K. Nehring (2004). “The Veil of Public Ignorance”. JET; V.119-#2, pp. 247-270.

 

(b) Harsanyi v. Diamond/Sen/et al.

 

-P. Diamond (1967). “Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: Comment”. JPE; V.75-#?, pp. 765-766.

 

-P. Pattanaik (1968). “Risk, Impersonality and the Social Welfare Function”. JPE; V.76-#6, pp. 1152-1169.

 

-R. Jeffrey (1971). “On Interpersonal Utility Theory”. Journal of Philosophy; V.68-#20, pp. 647-656.

 

-J. Harsanyi (1975). “Nonlinear Social Welfare Functions: Do Welfare Economists Have a Special Exemption from Bayesian Rationality?”. Theory and Decision; V.6-#?, pp. 311-332.

 

-A. Sen (1976). “Welfare Inequalities and Rawlsian Axiomatics”. Theory and Decision; V.7-#?, pp. 271-292. [Also in R. Butts and J. Hintikka, eds. Foundational Problems in the Special Sciences. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, pp. 271-292.]

 

-J. Harsanyi (1977). “Nonlinear Social Welfare Functions: A Rejoinder to Professor Sen”. In R. Butts and J. Hintikka, eds. Foundational Problems in the Special Sciences. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, pp. 293-296. [reply by Sen follows, pp. 297-302)

 

-K. Nakamura and M. Nakayama (1978). “Discrepancy between Harsanyi and Sen on Social Preferences”. Journal of Economic Studies; V.24-#2, pp. 233-237.

 

-R. Nuan (1981). “Harsanyi v. Sen: Does Social Welfare Weigh Subjective Preferences?”. Journal of Philosophy; V.78-#?, pp. 586-600.

 

-E. McClennan (1981). “Utility and Equity: Sen vs. Harsanyi”. Journal of Philosophy; V.78-#?, pp. 600-601.

 

-R. Deschamps and L. Gevers (1978). “Separability, Risk-Bearing and Social Welfare Judgements”. in J.-J. Laffont, ed. Aggregation and Revelation of Preferences. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 145-160.

 

-R. Myerson (1981). “Utilitarianism, Egalitarianism, and the Timing Effect in Social Choice Problems”. Etrica; V.49-#4, pp. 883-897.

 

-P. Hammond (1983). “Ex-Post Optimality as a Dynamically Consistent Objective for Collective Choice Under Uncertainty”. in P. Pattanaik and M. Salles, eds. Social Choice and Welfare. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 175-205.

 

-R. Sugden (1985). “Why be Consistent?”. Economica; V.52-#6, pp. 167-183.

 

-J. Broome (1984). “Uncertainty and Fairness”. Economic Journal, V.94-#375, pp. 624-632.

 

-J. Broome (1987). “Utilitarianism and Expected Utility”. Journal of Philosophy; V.84-#8, pp. 405-422.

 

-J. Broome (1989). “Should Preferences Be Consistent?”. Economics and Philosophy; V.5-#1, pp. 7-17.

 

-L. Epstein and U. Segal (1990). “Quadratic Social Welfare Functions”. JPE; V.100-#4, pp. 691-712.

 

-J. Weymark (1991). “A Reconsideration of the Harsanyi-Sen Debate on Utilitarianism”. In J. Elster and J. Roemer, eds. Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-being. New York: Cambridge, pp. 255-320.

 

-E. Karni (1996). “Social Welfare Functions and Fairness”. SC&W; V.13-#?, pp. 487-496.

 

-E. Karni (1998). “Impartiality: Definition and Representation”. Etrica; V.66-#6, pp. 1405-1515.

 

-E. Karni and J. Weymark (1998). “An Informationally Parsimonious Impartial Observer Theorem”. SC&W; V.15-#3, pp. 321-332.

 

-E. Karni and Z. Safra (2000). “An Extension of a Theorem of von Neumann and Morgenstern with an Application to Social Choice Theory”. JMathE; V.34-#?, pp. 315-327.

 

-H.P. Nzitat (2001). “From equality to inequality: The Diamond–Sen criticism of Harsanyi’s criterion of social justice”. Pacific Economic Review; V.6-#2, pp. 239-253.

 

-P. Mongin (2001). “The Impartial Observer Theorem of Social Ethics”. Economics and Philosophy; V.17-#2, pp. 147-179.

 

-Z. Safra and E. Weissengrin (2003). “Harsanyi’s Impartial Observer Theorem with A Restricted Domain”. SC&W; V.20-#2, pp. 177-187.

 

-E. Karni (2003). “Impartiality and Interpersonal Comparisons of Variations in Well-being”. SC&W; V.21-#1, pp. 95-111.

 

-M. Mariotti (2004). “Inequality Aversion, Impartiality and Utilitarianism”. SC&W; V.23-#2, pp. 291-304.

 

(c) Harsanyi’s Aggregation Theorem

 

-A. Camacho and J. Sonstelie (1974). “Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparison of Utilities: A Note”. JPE; V.82-#3, pp. 607-611.

 

-Z. Domotor (1979). “Ordered Sum and Tensor Product of Linear Utility Structures”. Theory and Decision; V.11-#4, pp. 375-399.

 

-K. Basu (1983). “Cardinal Utility, Utilitarianism, and a Class of Invariance Axioms in Welfare Analysis”. Journal of Mathematical Economics; V.12-#?, pp. 193-206.

 

-M. Resnick (1983). “A Restriction on a Theorem of Harsanyi”. Theory and Decision; V.15-#?, pp. 309-320.

 

-P. Fishburn (1984). “On Harsanyi’s Utilitarian Cardinal Welfare Function”. Theory and Decision; V.17-#?, pp. 21-28.

 

-K. Border (1985). “More on Harsanyi’s Utilitarian Cardinal Welfare Function”. Social Choice and Welfare; V.1-#?, pp. 279-281.

 

-S. Selinger (1986). “Harsanyi’s Aggregation Theorem without Selfish Preferences”. Theory and Decision; V.20-#?, pp. 53-62.

 

-J. Harsanyi (1987). “von Neumann-Morgenstern Utilities, Risk Taking, and Welfare”. In G. Feiwel, ed. Arrow and the Ascent of Modern Economic Theory. London: Macmillan, pp. 545-558.

 

-T. Coulhan and P. Mongin (1989). “Social Choice Theory in the Case of von Neumann-Morgenstern Utilities”. Social Choice and Welfare; V.6-#?, pp. 175-187.

 

-J. Broome (1990). “Bolker-Jeffrey Expected Utility Theory and Axiomatic Utilitarianism”. REStud; V.57-#?, pp. 477-502.

 

-C. d’Aspermont and L. Gérard-Varet (1991). “Utilitarian Fundamentalism and Limited Information”. In J. Elster and J. Roemer, eds. Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-being. New York: Cambridge, pp. 371-386.

 

-P. Hammond (1992). “Harsanyi’s Utilitarian Theorem: A Simpler Proof and Some Ethical Connotations”. in R. Selten, ed. Rational Interaction: Essays in Honor of John Harsanyi. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.

 

-L. Epstein and U. Segal (1992). “Quadratic Social Welfare Functions”. Journal of Political Economy; V.100-#4, pp. 691-712.

 

-J. Weymark (1994). “Harsanyi’s Social Aggregation Theorem with Alternative Pareto Principles”. in W. Eichorn, ed. Models and Measurement of Welfare and Inequality. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.

 

-J. Weymark (1993). “Harsanyi’s Social Aggregation Theorem and the Weak Pareto Principle”. Social Choice and Welfare; V.10-#?, pp. 209-221.

 

-P. Mongin (1994). “Harsanyi’s Aggregation Theorem: Multi-Profile Version and Unsettled Questions”. Social Choice and Welfare; V.11-#?, pp. 331-354.

 

-B. De Meyer and P. Mongin (1994). “A Note on Linear Affine Aggregation”. EcLets; V.47-#?, pp. 177-183.

 

-P. Mongin (1995). “Consistent Bayesian Aggregation”. JET; V.66-#?, pp. 313-351.

 

-J. Weymark (1995). “Further Remarks on Harsanyi’s Social Aggregation Theorem and the Weak Pareto Principle”. Social Choice and Welfare; V.12-#?, pp. 87-92.

 

-P. Ghirardato and M. Marinacci (2000). “The Impossibility of Compromise: Some Uniqueness Properties of Expected Utility Preferences”. ET; V.16-#?, pp. 245-258.

 

-P. Fishburn and W. Gehrlein (1987). “Aggregation Theory for SSB Utility Functionals”. JET; V.42-#?, pp. 352-369.

 

-A. Turunen-Red and J. Weymark (1995). “Harsanyi’s Social Aggregation Theorem for Nonlinear Preference Functionals”. ms.: UNO/UBC.

 

-A. Turunen-Red and J. Weymark (1996). “Paretian Aggregation of Asymmetric Utility Functionals”. EcLets; V.53-#1, pp. 39-45.

 

-A. Turunen-Red and J. Weymark (1999). “Linear Aggregation of SSB Utility Functionals”. Theory and Decision; V.46-#3, pp. 281-294.

 

-A. Turunen-Red and A. Woodland (1999). “On Economic Applications of the Kuhn-Fourier Theorem”. in M. Wooders, ed. Topics in Mathematical Economics and Game Theory. Providence: American Mathematical Society, pp. 256-276.

 

-L. Zhou (1997). “Harsanyi’s Utilitarianism Theorems: General Societies”. JET; V.72-#?, pp. 198-207.

 

-C. Harvey (1999). “Aggregation of Individuals’ Preference Intensities into Social Preference Intensity”. SC&W; V.16-#1, pp. 65-79.

 

-C. Blackorby, D. Donaldson, and J. Weymark (1999). “Harsanyi’s Social Aggregation Theorem for State Contingent Alternatives”. Journal of Mathematical Economics; V.32-#?, pp. 365-387.

 

-C. Blackorby, D. Donaldson, and P. Mongin (2000). “Social Aggregation without the Expected Utility Hypothesis”. University of British Columbia Economics Discussion Paper.

 

-I. Gilboa, D. Samet and D. Schmeidler (2004). “Utilitarian Aggregation of Beliefs and Tastes”. Journal of Political Economy; V.112-#4, pp. 932-938.

 

(4) The Population Problem in Utilitarian Theory

 

(a) Basic Theory

 

Narveson, Jan (1967). “Utilitarianism and New Generations”. Mind; V.76-#301, pp. 62-72.

 

Sprigge, Timothy (1968). “Professor Narveson’s Utilitarianism”. Inquiry; V.11-#?, pp. 332-348. [see especially, 337-341].

 

Narveson, Jan (1973). “Moral Problems of Population”. The Monist; V.57-#1. reprinted in M. Bayles, ed. Ethics and Population. Cambridge: Schenkman, pp. 59-80.

 

Singer, Peter (1976). “A Utilitarian Population Principle”. in M. Bayles, ed. Ethics and Population. Cambridge: Schenkman, pp. 81-99.

 

Parfit, Derek (1976). “On Doing the Best for Our Children”. in M. Bayles, ed. Ethics and Population. Cambridge: Schenkman, pp. 100-115.

 

Sikora, R.I. (1975). “Utilitarianism: the Classical Principle and the Average Principle”. Canadian Journal of Philosophy; V.5-#3, pp. 409-419.

 

Anglin, Bill (1977). “The Repugnant Conclusion”. Canadian Journal of Philosophy; V.7-#4, pp. 745-754.

 

Singer, Peter (1978). “Anglin on the Obligation to Create Extra People”. Canadian Journal of Philosophy; V.6-#3, pp. 583-585.

 

Warren, Mary (1978). “Do Potential People have Moral Rights?”. in R. Sikora and Brian Barry, eds. Obligations to Future Generations. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, pp. 14-30.

 

Anglin, William (1978). “In Defense of the Potentiality Principle”. in R. Sikora and Brian Barry, eds. Obligations to Future Generations. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, pp. 31-37.

 

Narveson, Jan (1978). “Future People and Us”. in R. Sikora and Brian Barry, eds. Obligations to Future Generations. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, pp. 38-60.

 

Schwartz, Thomas (1978). “Obligations to Posterity”. in R. Sikora and Brian Barry, eds. Obligations to Future Generations. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, pp. 3-13.

 

Sikora, R.I. (1978). “Is It Wrong to Prevent the Existence of Future Generations”. in R. Sikora and Brian Barry, eds. Obligations to Future Generations. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, pp. 112-166.

 

McMahan, Jefferson (1981). “Problems of Population Theory [A review of Sikora and Barry, eds]”. Ethics; V.92-#?, pp. 96-127.

 

Hurka, Thomas (1982). “Average Utilitarianism”. Analysis; V.42-#2, pp. 65-69.

 

Hurka, Thomas (1983). “Value and Population Size”. Ethics; V.93-#?, pp. 496-507.

 

Kavka, Gregory (1982). “The Paradox of Future Individuals”. Philosophy and Public Affairs; V.11-#2, pp. 93-112.

 

Parfit, Derek (1982). “Future Generation, Further Problems”. Philosophy and Public Affairs; V.11-#2, pp. 113-172.

 

Parfit, Derek (1984). Reasons and Persons. Oxford: OUP. [especially Part IV].

 

Parfit, Derek (1986). “Overpopulation and the Quality of Life”. in Peter Singer, ed. Applied Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 145-164.

 

Temkin, Larry (1987). “Intransitivity and the Mere Addition Paradox”. Philosophy and Public Affairs; V.16-#2, pp. 138-187.

 

Sterba, James (1987). “Explaining Asymmetry: A Problem for Parfit”. Philosophy and Public Affairs; V.16-#2, pp. 188-192. [Parfit’s response follows, pp. 193-194].

 

Hudson, James (1987). “The Diminishing Marginal Value of Happy People”. Philosophical Studies; V.51-#?, pp. 123-137.

 

Hanser, Matthew (1990). “Harming Future People”. Philosophy and Public Affairs; V.19-#1, pp. 47-70.

 

Ng, Yew-Kwang (1989). “What Should We Do About Future Generations? Impossibility of Parfit’s Theory X”. Economics and Philosophy; V.5-#?, pp. 235-251.

 

Cowen, Tyler (1989). “Normative Population Theory”. Social Choice and Welfare; V.6-#1, pp. 33-43.

 

Ng, Yew-Kwang (1989). “Hurka’s Gamble and Methuselah’s Paradox: A Response to Cowen on Normative Population Theory”. Social Choice and Welfare; V.6-#1, pp. 45-49.

 

Blackorby, Charles and David Donaldson (1991). “Normative Population Theory: A Comment”. Social Choice and Welfare; V.8-#?, pp. 261-267.

 

Sider, Theodore (1991). “Might Theory X Be a Theory of Diminishing Marginal Value?”. Analysis; V.51-#?, pp. 265-271.

 

Goodin, Robert (1991). “Actual Preferences, Actual People”. Utilitas; V.3-#1, pp. 113-119.

 

Feldman, Fred (1995). “Justice, Desert and the Repugnant Conclusion”. Utilitas; V.7-#2, pp.

 

Ryberg, Jesper (1996). “Parfit’s Repugnant Conclusion”. Philosophical Quarterly; V.46-#?, pp. 202-213.

 

Parfit, Derek (1996). “Acts and Outcomes: A Reply to Boonin-Vail”. Philosophy and Public Affairs; V.25-#?, pp. 308-317.

 

Carlson, Erik (1998). “Mere Addition and Two Trilemmas of Population Ethics”. Economics and Philosophy;. V.14-#2, pp. 283-306.

 

-Fehige, Christoph (1998). “A Pareto Principle for Possible People”. In C. Fehige and U. Wessels, eds. Preferences. de Gruyter.

 

-Arrhenius, Gustaf (2000). “An Impossibility Theorem for Welfarist Axiologies”. Economics and Philosophy; V.16-#2, pp. 247-266.

 

Dasgupta, Partha (1985). “The Ethical Foundations of Population Policies”. in D.Gale Johnson and Ronald Lee, eds. Population Growth and Economic Development. Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences.

 

Dasgupta, Partha (1994). “Savings and Fertility: Ethical Issues”. Philosophy and Public Affairs; V.23-#?, pp. 99-127.

 

Sen, Amartya (1994). “Population and Reasoned Agency: Food, Fertility, and Economic Development”. in K.L. Kiessling and H. Landberg, eds. Population, Economic Development, and the Environment. Oxford: OUP, pp. 51-78.

 

Sen, Amartya (1995). “Demography and Welfare Economics”. Empirica; V.22-#1, pp. 1-21.

 

(b) Some Axiomatics

 

Blackorby, Charles and David Donaldson (1984). “Social Criteria for Evaluating Population Change”. Journal of Public Economics; V.25-#1, pp. 13-33.

 

Ng, Yew-Kwang (1986). “Social Criteria for Evaluating Population Change: An Alternative to the Blackorby-Donaldson Criterion”. Journal of Public Economics; V.29-#1, pp. 375-381.

 

Dasgupta, Partha (1988). “Lives and Well Being”. Social Choice and Welfare; V.5-#?, pp. 103-126.

 

Hammond, Peter (1988). “Consequentialist Demographic Norms and Parenting Rights”. Social Choice and Welfare; V.5-#?, pp. 127-145.

 

Bossert, Walter (1990). Maximin Welfare Orderings with Variable Population Size”. Social Choice and Welfare; V.7-#1, pp. 39-45.

 

Bossert, Walter (1990). “Social Evaluation with Variable Population Size: An Alternative Concept”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.19-#?, pp. 143-158.

 

Xu, Yongsheng (1990). “Population Evaluation Functions: Axiomatizations of Two Utilitarian Principles”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.20-#?, pp. 91-98.

 

Broome, John (1992). “The Value of Living”. Recherches Economiques de Louvain; V.58-#2, pp. 125-142. [comments by Blackorby/Donaldson and Dreze follow, with response, pp. 143-171]

 

-A. Razin and C.-W. Yuen (1995). “Utilitarian Tradeoff between Population Growth and Income Growth”. Journal of Population Economics; V.8-#1, pp. 81-87.

 

Blackorby, Charles, Walter Bossert, and David Donaldson (1995). “Intertemporal Population Ethics: Critical Level Utilitarian Principles”. Econometrica; V.63-#6, pp. 1303-1320.

 

Blackorby, Charles, Walter Bossert, and David Donaldson (1996). “Intertemporally Consistent Population Ethics: Classical Utilitarian Principles”. in K. Arrow, A. Sen, and K. Suzumura, eds. Social Choice Reexamined, Vol. II. London: Macmillan, pp. 137-162.

 

Blackorby, Charles, Walter Bossert, and David Donaldson (1996). “Quasi-ordering and Population Ethics”. Social Choice and Welfare; V.13-#?, pp. 129-150.

 

Blackorby, Charles, Walter Bossert, and David Donaldson (1996). “Leximin Population Ethics”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.31-#?, pp. 115-131.

 

Blackorby, Charles, Walter Bossert, and David Donaldson (1997). “Intertemporally Consistent Population Ethics: Birth-Date Dependent Classical Principles”. Japanese Economic Review; V.48-#3, pp. 267-292.

 

Blackorby, Charles, Walter Bossert, and David Donaldson (1997). “Birth-Date Dependent Population Ethics: Critical-Level Principles”. Journal of Economic Theory. V.77-#2, pp. 260-84.

 

Blackorby, Charles, Walter Bossert, and David Donaldson (1997). “Critical Level Utilitarianism and the Population-Ethics Dilemma”. Economics and Philosophy; V.13-#?, pp. 197-230.

 

Blackorby, Charles, Walter Bossert, and David Donaldson (1998). “Uncertainty and Critical-Level Population Principles”. Journal of Population Economics; V.11-#1, pp. 1-20.

 

Blackorby, Charles, Walter Bossert, David Donaldson, and Marc Fleurbaey (1998). “Critical Levels and the (Reverse) Repugnant Conclusion”. Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie; V.67-#1, pp. 1-15.

 

Blackorby, Charles, Walter Bossert, and David Donaldson (1999). “Information Invariance in Variable-Population Social-Choice Problems”. International Economic Review; V.40-#2, pp. 403-422.

 

Blackorby, Charles, Walter Bossert, and David Donaldson (1999). “Rationalizable Solutions to Pure Population Problems”. Social Choice and Welfare; V.16-#?, pp. 395-407.

 

Blackorby, Charles, Walter Bossert and David Donaldson (1999). “Foreign Aid and Population Policy: Some Ethical Considerations”. Journal Of Development Economics; V.59-#2, pp. 203-232.

 

Blackorby, Charles, Walter Bossert, and David Donaldson (1999). “Price-Independent Welfare Prescriptions and Population Size”. JET; V.84-#1, pp. 111-119.

 

Blackorby, Charles, Walter Bossert, and David Donaldson (1999). “Functional equations and population ethics”. Aequationes Mathematicae; V.58-#3, pp 272-284.

 

Blackorby, Charles, Walter Bossert, and David Donaldson (2000). “The Value of Limited Altruism”. JET; V.95-#1, pp. 37-70

 

Blackorby, Charles, Walter Bossert, and David Donaldson (2001). “Population Ethics and the Existence of Value Functions”. Journal of Public Economics; V.82-#2, pp. 301-308.

 

Broome, John (2003). “Representing an Ordering when Population Varies”. SC&W; V.20-#2, pp. 243-246.

 

Blackorby, Charles, Walter Bossert, and David Donaldson (2002). “Rationalizable Variable-Population Choice Functions”. Economic Theory; V.19-#2, pp. 355-378.

 

Blackorby, Charles, Walter Bossert, and David Donaldson (2002). “Population Principles with Number-Dependent Critical Levels”. Journal of Public Economic Theory, V.4-#3, pp. 347-368.

 

Broome, John (1996). “The Welfare Economics of Population”. Oxford Economic Papers; V.48-#2, pp. 177-193.

 

f. Sympathy, Fairness, and Social Choice

 

(1) John Rawls’ Non-Utilitarian Liberalism

 

-J. Rawls (1971). A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard.

 

-J. Rawls (1974). “Some Reasons for the Maximin Criterion”. AER, V.64-#2, pp. 141-145.

 

-J. Rawls (1993). Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press.

 

-J. Rawls (1997). “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”. University of Chicago Law Review; V.?-#?, pp. [also in both Collected Papers and The Law of Peoples.]

 

-J. Rawls (1999). The Law of Peoples. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

 

-J. Rawls (1999). Collected Papers. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

 

-D. Lyons (1973). “Rawls versus Utilitarianism”. Journal of Philosophy; V.69-#?, pp. 535-545.

 

-K. Arrow (1973). “Some Ordinalist Utilitarian Notes on Rawls’s Theory of Justice”. Journal of Philosophy; V.70-#?, pp. 245-263.

 

-B. Barry (1973). The Liberal Theory of Justice: A Critical Examination of the Principle Doctrine in A Theory of Justice by John Rawls. Oxford: Clarendon.

 

-P. Dasgupta (1974). “On Some Problems Arising from Professor Rawls’ Conception of Distributive Justice”. Theory and Decision; V.4-#?, pp. 325-344.

 

-S. Alexander (1974). “Social Evaluation through National Choice”. QJE; V.88-#?, pp. 597-624.

 

-P. Hammond (1975). “A Note on Extreme Inequality Aversion”. JET; V.11-#?, pp.

 

-J. Harsanyi (1975). “Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality?: A Critique of John Rawls’s Theory”. APSR; V.69-#?, pp. 594-606.

 

-E. Pazner and D. Schmeidler (1976). “Social Contract Theory and Ordinal Distributive Equity”. JPubE; V.5-#?, pp. 261-268.

 

-J. Hersztajn Moldau (1992). “On the Lexical Ordering of Social States According to Rawls’ Principles of Justice”. Economics and Philosophy; V.8-#1, pp. 141-148.

 

-R. Wolff (1977). Understanding Rawls: A Reconstruction and Critique of A Theory of Justice. Princeton: PUP.

 

-N. Daniels, ed. (1975). Reading Rawls: Critical Studies on Rawls’ A Theory of Justice. New York: Basic Books.

 

(2) The Axiomatic Characterization and the Possibility of Rawlsian Justice

 

-A. Sen (1976). “Welfare Inequalities and Rawlsian Axiomatics”. T&D; V.7-#?, pp. 243-262.

 

-P. Hammond (1976). “Equity, Arrow’s Conditions and Rawls’ Difference Principle”. Etrica; V.44-#4, pp. 793-804.

 

-S. Strasnick (1976). “Social Choice and the Derivation of Rawls’s Difference Principle”. Journal of Philosophy; V.73-#4, pp. 85-99. [Comments by A. Goldman and R.P. Wolff, pp. 845-858]

 

-R. Deschamps and L. Gevers (1977). “Separability, Risk-bearing and Social Welfare Judgements”. EER; V.10-#1, pp. 77-94.

 

-C. Plott (1978). “Rawls’s Theory of Justice: An Impossibility Result”. In H. Gottinger and W. Leinfeller, eds. Decision Theory and Social Ethics. Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 201-214.

 

-A. Gibbard (1979). “Disparate Goods and Rawls’ Difference Priniple: A Social Choice Theoretic Treatment”. Theory and Decision; V.11-#?, pp. 267-288.

 

-S. Barbera and M. Jackson (1988). “Maximin, Leximin, and the Protective Criterion: Characterizations and Comparisons”. JET; V.46-#1, pp. 34-44.

 

g. Axiomatic Comparisons of Utilitarian and Rawlsian Rules

 

-A. Sen (1974). “Rawls versus Bentham: An Axiomatic Examination of the Pure Distribution Problem”. T&D; V.6-#?, pp. 301-310.

 

-C. d’Aspermont and L. Gevers (1977). “Equity and the Informational Basis of Collective Choice”. REStud; V.44-#2, pp. 199-209.

 

-R. Deschamps and L. Gevers (1978). “Leximin and Utilitarian Rules: A Joint Characterization”. JET; V.17-#2, pp. 143-163.

 

-M. Yaari (1981). “Rawls, Edgeworth, Shapley, Nash: Theories of Distributive Justice Reexamined”. JET; V.24-#1, pp. 1-39.

 

-V. Denicolò (1999). “A Characterization of Utilitarianism without the Transitivity Axiom”. SC&W; V. 16-#2, pp. 273-278.

 

6. Manipulation and Implementation of Social Choice Rules

 

a. Overviews and Statements of the General Problem

 

-P. Dasgupta, P. Hammond and E. Maskin (1979). “The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility”. REStud; V.46-#?, pp. 185-215.

 

-E. Muller and M. Satterthwaite (1977). “The Equivalence of Strong Positive Association and Strategy-Proofness”. JET; V.14-#?, pp. 412-418.

 

-A. Sen (1995). “The Implementation of Social Choice Functions via Social Choice Correspondences: A General Formulation and Limit Result”. SC&W; V.12-#?, pp. 277-292.

 

-M. Jackson and S. Srivastava (1996). “A Characterization of Game-Theoretic Solutions Which Lead to Impossibility Theorems”. REStud; V.63-#1, pp. 23-38.

 

-J.-J. Laffont and E. Maskin (1982). “The Theory of Incentives: An Overview”. in W. Hildenbrand, ed. Advances in Economic Theory. Cambridge: CUP, pp.

 

-J. Moore (1992). “Implementation, Contracts, and Renegotiation in Environments with Complete Information”. J.J. Laffont, ed. Advances in Economic Theory. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 182-282.

 

-A. Arya, J. Glover, and U. Rajan (2000). “Implementation in Principal-Agent Models of Adverse Selection”. JET; V.93-#1, pp. 87-109.

 

-Salvador Barberà (2001). “An Introduction to Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions”. SC&W; V.18-#4, pp. 619-653.

 

-Matthew O. Jackson (2001). “A Crash Course in Implementation Theory”. SC&W; V.18-#4, pp. 655-708.

 

b. Strategy-proofness and Implementation in Dominant Strategy Mechanisms

 

(1) Resolute Mechanisms

 

-E. Muller and M. Satterthwaite (1985). “Strategy-proofness: The Existence of Dominant Strategy Mechanisms”. in L. Hurwicz, D. Schmeidler and H. Sonnenschein, eds. Social Goals and Social Organization. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 131-171.

 

-S. Barberà (1998). “Notes on Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions”. in K. Arrow, A. Sen, and K. Suzumura, eds. Social Choice Re-Examined, V.2. New York: St. Martins, pp. 26-45. [Comment by H. Moulin, pp. 46-49.]

 

-A. Gibbard (1973). “Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result”. Etrica; V.41-#4, pp. 587-601.

 

-M. Satterthwaite (1975). “Strategy-Proofness and Arrow's Conditions: Existence and Correspondence Theorems for Voting Procedures and Social Welfare Functions”. JET; V.10-#?, pp. 198-217.

 

-D. Schmiedler and H. Sonnenschein (1978). “Two Proofs of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem on the Possibility of a Strategy-proof Social Choice Function”. in H. Gottinger and W. Leinfeller, eds. Decision Theory and Social Ethics. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, pp. 227-234.

 

-P. Gärdenfors (1978). “A Concise Proof of a Theorem on Manipulation of Social Choice Functions”. PC; V.?-#?, pp.137-142.

 

-S. Barberà (1983). “Strategy-Proofness and Pivotal Voters: A Direct Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem”. IER; V.24-#2, pp. 413-417.

 

-E. Maskin (1995). “Majority Rule, Social Welfare Functions, and Game Forms”. in K. Basu, P. Pattanaik and K. Suzumura, eds. Choice, Welfare, and Development. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 100-109.

 

-L.-G. Svensson (1999). “The Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem Revisited”. MS: Department of Economics, Lund University.

 

-J.-P. Benoît (2000). “The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem: A Simple Proof”. EcLets; V.69-#?, pp. 319-322.

 

-P. Reny (2001). “Arrow’s Theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem: A Unified Approach”. EcLets; V.70-#1, pp. 99-105.

 

-A. Sen (2001). “Another Direct Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem”. EcLets; V.70-#3, pp. 381-395.

 

-E. Kalai and J. Ledyard (1998). “Repeated Implementation”. JET; V.83-#?, pp.308-317.

 

-A. Feldman (1979). “Manipulating Voting Procedures”. EcInq; V.17-#?, pp. 452-474.

 

-J.-M. Blin and M. Satterthwaite (1978). “Individual Decisions and Group Decisions: The Fundamental Differences”. JPubE; V.10-#?, pp. 247-267.

 

-J.-M. Blin and M. Satterthwaite (1977). “On Preferences, Beliefs, and Manipulation within Voting Situations”. Etrica; V.45-#4, pp. 81-888.

 

-P. Batteau, M. Blin, and B. Monjardet (1981). “Stability of Aggregation Procedures, Ultrafilters, and Simple Games”. Etrica; V.49-#2, pp. 527-534. [Comment by Muller, 1982, V.50-#5, pp. 1335-1336.]

 

-A. Beja (1993). “Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite Revisited”. MathSocSciences; V.25-#?, pp. 281-286.

 

-G. Tian (1996). “On the Existence of Optimal Truth-Dominant Mechanisms”. EcLets, V.53-#1, pp. 17-24.

 

-L. Liu and G. Tian (1999). “A characterization of the existence of optimal dominant strategy mechanisms”. Review of Economic Design; V.4-#3, pp. 205-218.

 

(2) Non-Resolute Choice Functions

 

(a) General Issue of Set-Valued Domains

 

-P. Pattanaik (1973). “On the Stability of Sincere Voting Situations”. JET; V.6-#?, pp. 558-574.

 

-P. Pattanaik (1974). “Stability of Sincere Voting under Some Classes of Non-Binary Group Decision Procedures”. JET; V.8-#?, pp. 206-224.

 

-P. Pattanaik (1975). “Strategic Voting Without Collusion under Binary and Democratic Group Decision Rules”. REStud; V.42-#?, pp. 93-103.

 

-P. Gärdenfors (1976). “Manipulation of Choice Functions”. JET; V.13-#?, pp. 217-228.

 

-J. Kelly (1977). “Strategy-proofness and Social Choice Functions without Singlevaluedness”. Etrica; V.45-#?, pp. 439-446.

 

-S. Barberá (1977). “Manipulation of Social Decision Functions”. JET; V.15-#?, pp. 266-278.

 

-P. Fishburn (1978). “A Strategic Analysis of Nonranked Voting Systems”. SIAM Journal of Applied Mathematics; V.35-#3, pp. 488-495.

 

-P. Gärdenfors (1979). “On Definitions of Manipulation of Social Choice Functions”. in J.-J. Laffont, ed. Aggregation and Revelation of Preferences. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 29-36.

 

-T. Schwartz (1982). “No Minimally Reasonable Collective-Choice Process Can be Strategy Proof”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.3-#?, pp. 57-72.

 

-K. Nehring (2000). “Monotonicity Implies Generalized Strategy-Proofness for Correspondences”. SC&W; V.17-#2, pp. 367-375.

 

-Salvador Barberà, Bhaskar Dutta, Arunava Sen (2001). “Strategy-proof Social Choice Correspondences”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.101-#2, pp. 374-394.

 

(b) Mechanisms with Lotteries as Outcomes

 

-R. Zeckhauser (1969). “Majority Rule with Lotteries on Alternatives”. QJE; V.83-#?, pp. 698-703. [Comment by Shepsle, QJE; 1970, V.84: 705-709.]

 

-K. Shepsle (1972). “The Paradox of Voting under Uncertainty”. in R. Niemi and H. Weisberg, eds. Probability Models of Collective Decision Making. Columbus: Charles E. Merrill, pp. 252-270.

 

-P. Fishburn (1972). “Lotteries and Social Choices”. JET; V.5-#?, pp. 189-207.

 

-P. Fishburn (1972). “Even Chance Lotteries in Social Choice Theory”. T&D; V.3-#?, pp. 18-40.

 

-P. Fishburn (1978). “Acceptable Social Choice Lotteries”. in H. Gottinger and W. Leinfeller, eds. Decision Theory and Social Ethics. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, pp. 133-152.

 

-A. Gibbard (1977). “The Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance”. Etrica; V.45-#?, pp. 665-681.

 

-A. Gibbard (1978). “Straightforwardness of Game Forms with Lotteries as Outcomes”. Etrica; V.46-#?, pp. 595-614.

 

-A. Gibbard (1978). “Social Decision, Strategic Behavior, and Best Outcomes”. in H. Gottinger and W. Leinfeller, eds. Decision Theory and Social Ethics. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, pp. 153-168.

 

-J. Duggan (1996). “A Geometric Proof of Gibbard’s Random Dictatorship Theorem”. Economic Theory; V.7-#?, pp. 365-369.

 

-S. Nandeibam (1998). “An Alternative Proof of Gibbard’s Random Dictatorship Theorem”. SC&W; V.15-#?, pp. 509-519.

 

-S. Barberá and H. Sonnenschein (1978). “Preference Aggregation with Randomized Social Orderings”. JET; V.18-#?, pp. 244-254.

 

-A. McLennan (1980). “Randomized Preference Aggregation: Additivity of Power and Strategy Proofness”. JET; V.22-#1, pp. 1-11.

 

-S. Barberá (1977). “The Manipulability of Social Choice Mechanisms that Do Not Leave Too Much to Chance”. Etrica; V.45-#?, pp. 1573-1589.

 

-S. Barberá (1978). “Nice Decision Schemes”. in H. Gottinger and W. Leinfeller, eds. Decision Theory and Social Ethics. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, pp. 101-117.

 

-A. Feldman (1979). “Nonmanipulable Multi-Valued Social Decision Functions”. PC; V.34-#?, pp. 177-188.

 

-A. Feldman (1980). “Strongly Nonmanipulable Multi-Valued Social Choice Rules”. PC; V.35-#?, pp. 503-509.

 

-J. Duggan and T. Schwartz (2000). “Strategic Manipulability without Resoluteness or Shared Beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite Generalized”. SC&W; V.17-#1, pp. 85-93.

 

-Jean-Pierre Benoît (2002). “Strategic Manipulation in Voting Games When Lotteries and Ties Are Permitted”. JET; V.102-#2, pp. 421-436.

 

-L. Ehlers, H. Peters and T. Storcken (2002). “ Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Decision Schemes for One-Dimensional Single-Peaked Preferences”. JET; V.105-#2, Pp. 408-434.

 

(3) Restricted Preference Domains

 

(a) Single-Peaked Preferences and Related Preference Restrictions

 

-Y. Sprumont (1995). “Strategyproof Collective Choice in Economic and Political Environments”. CJE; V.28-#1, pp. 68-107.

 

-J.-M. Blin and M. Satterthwaite (1976). “Strategy-proofness and Single-Peakedness”. PC; V.26-#?, pp. 51-58.

 

-H. Moulin (1980). “On Strategy-proofness and Single Peakedness”. PC; V.35-#?, pp. 437-455.

 

-B. Holmström (1979). “Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains”. Etrica; V.47-#?, pp. 1137-1144.

 

-P. Pattanaik and M. Sengupta (1980). “Restricted Preferences and Strategy-Proofness of a Class of Group Decision Functions”. REStud; V.47-#?, pp. 965-973.

 

-K. Kim and F. Roush (1980). “Special Domains and Non-Manipulability”. MathSocSci; V.1-#1, pp. 85-92.

 

-K. Border and J. Jordan (1983). “Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters”. REStud; V.50-#?, pp. 153-170.

 

-G. Chichilnisky and G. Heal (1997). “The Geometry of Implementation: A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Straightforward Games”. SC&W; V.14-#?, pp. 259-294.

 

-S. Barberá and B. Peleg (1990). “Strategy-proof Voting Schemes with Continuous Preferences”. SC&W; V.7-#1, pp. 31-38.

 

-S. Barberá, H. Sonnenschein, and L. Zhou (1991). “Voting by Committees”. Etrica; V.59-#?, pp. 595-609.

 

-D. Moreno and M. Walker (1991). “Nonmanipulable Voting Schemes When Participants’ Interests Are Partially Decomposable”. SC&W; V.8-#3, pp. 221-233.

 

-S. Barberá, F. Gul and E. Stacchetti (1993). “Generalized Median Voter Schemes and Committees”. JET; V.61-#?, pp. 262-289.

 

-W. Bossert and J. Weymark (1993). “Generalized Median Social Welfare Functions”. SC&W; V.10-#1, pp. 17-34.

 

-H. Peters, H. van der Stel, and T. Storcken (1993). “Generalized Median Solutions, Strategy Proofness and Strictly Convex Norms”. Zeitschrift fur Operations Research; V.38-#?, pp. 19-53.

 

-S. Serizawa (1995). “Power of Voters and Domain of Preferences where Voting by Committees is Strategy-Proof”. JET; V.67-#?, pp. 599-608.

 

-S. Barberà, J. Masso, and S. Serizawa (1998). “Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.25-#2, pp. 272-91.

 

-S. Ching and S. Serizawa (1998). “A Maximal Domain for the Existence of Strategy-Proof Rules”. JET; V.78-#1, pp. 157-166.

 

-S. Barberà, J. Masso, and S. Serizawa (1999). “Maximal Domains of Preferences Preserving Strategy-proofness for Generalized Median Voter Schemes”. SC&W; V.16-#2, pp. 321-336.

 

-S. Barbera, A. Bogomolnaia, and H. van der Stel (1998). “Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Rules for Expected Utility Maximizers”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.35-#2, pp. 89-103.

 

-M. LeBreton and A. Sen (1999). “Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability”. Etrica; V.67-#3, pp. 605-628.

 

-W. Petermans, H. Peters, H. v.d. Stel, and T. Storcken (1997). “Strategy-Proofness on Euclidean Spaces”. SC&W; V.14-#?, pp. 379-401.

 

-H. van der Stel (2000). “Strategy-Proofness, Pareto Optimality and Strictly Convex Norms”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.39-#?, pp. 277-301.

 

-Dolors Berga (2002). “Single-peakedness and strategy-proofness of generalized median voter schemes”. SC&W; V.19-#1, pp. 175-192.

 

-H. Rasmussen (1997). “Strategy-Proofness of Continuous Aggregation Maps”. SC&W; V.14-#?, pp. 249-257.

 

-M. Le Breton and J. Weymark (1999). “Strategy-proof Social Choice with Continuous Separable Preferences”. JMathE; V.32-#1, pp. 47-85.

 

-J. Weymark (1999). “Decomposable Strategy-Proof Choice Functions”. Japanese Economic Review; V.50-#3, pp. 343-355.

 

-J. Weymark (1999). “Sprumont's characterization of the uniform rule when all single-peaked preferences are admissible”. Review of Economic Design; V.4-#2, pp. 389-393.

 

-B. Peleg and P. Sudhölter (1999). “Single-peakedness and coalition-proofness”. Review of Economic Design; V.4-#2, pp. 381-387.

 

-H. Moulin (1980). “Implementing Efficient, Anonymous and Neutral Social Choice Functions”. JMathE; V.7-#?, pp. 249-269.

 

-H. Moulin (1981). “Implementing Just and Efficient Decision-Making”. JPubE; V.16-#?, pp. 193-213.

 

(b) Market Domains: Public Goods

 

-H. Sonnenschein (19??). “The Economics of Incentives: An Introductory Account”. in R. Sato and M. Beckman, eds. Technology, Organization, and Economic Structure. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, pp. 79-92. Also in D. Jacobs, E. Kalai, and M. Kamien, eds. Frontiers of Research in Economic Theory: The Nancy L. Schwartz Memorial Lectures, 1983-1997. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 3-15.

 

-J. McMillan (1979). “The Free-Rider Problem: A Survey”. EcRec; V.?-#?, pp. 95-107.

 

-J. Roberts (1986). “Incentives, Information and Iterative Planning”. in T. Groves, R. Radner and S. Reiter, eds. Information, Incentives, and Economic Mechanisms. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 349-374.

 

-W. Vickrey (1961). “Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders”. JFin; V.16-#1, pp. 8-37.

 

-E.H. Clarke (1971). “Multipart Pricing of Public Goods”. PC; V.11-#?, pp. 17-33.

 

-T. Groves (1973). “Incentives in Teams”. Etrica; V.41-#4, pp. 617-663.

 

-J. Roberts (1976). “The Incentives for Correct Revelation of Preferences and the Number of Consumers”. JPubE; V.6-#?, pp. 359-374.

 

-J. Green and J.-J. Laffont (1977). “Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods”. Etrica; V.45-#2, pp. 427-438.

 

-T. Groves and J. Ledyard (1977). “Some Limitations of Demand Revealing Processes”. PC; V.29-#2, pp. 107-124.

 

-B. Holmstrom (1979). “Groves Schemes on Restricted Domains”. Etrica; V.47-#?, pp. 1137-1142.

 

-M. Walker (1978). “A Note on the Characterization of Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences”. Etrica; V.46-#?, pp. 147-152.

 

-M. Walker (1980). “On the Nonexistence of a Dominant Strategy Mechanism for Making Optimal Public Decisions”. Etrica; V.48-#6, pp. 1521-1540.

 

-J.-J. Laffont and E. Maskin (1980). “A Differential Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms”. Etrica; V.48-#6, pp. 1507-1520.

 

-L. Zhou (1991). “Impossibility of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Economies with Public Goods”. REStud; V.58-#1, pp. 107-119.

 

-T. Saijo (1991). “Incentive-Compatibility and Individual Rationality in Public Good Economies”. JET; V.55-#?, pp. 203-212.

 

-S. Barberà and M. Jackson (1994). “A Characterization of Strategy-proof Social Choice Functions for Economies with Pure Public Goods”. SC&W; V.11-#?, pp. 241-252.

 

-S. Serizawa (1996). “Strategy-Proof and Individually Rational Social Choice Functions for a Public Goods Economy”. ET; V7-#3, pp. 501-512. [Corrigendum, ET, 1997, V.9-#2, pp. 379-380.]

 

-S. Serizawa (1996). “An Impossibility Theorem in Pure Public Goods Economies with Feasibility Constraints: Voting by Committees in Non-rectangular Feasible Sets”. Japanese Economic Review; V.47-#4, pp. 368-83.

 

-R. Deb and S. Ohseto (1999). “Strategy-proof and Individually Rational Social Choice Functions for Public Good Economies: A note”. ET; V.14-#3, pp. 685-689.

 

-H.G. Johnson (1977). “A Note on the Theory of Public Goods and `Bluffing`”. JPubE; V.7-#?, pp. 383-386.

 

-G. Fane and T. Sieper (1983). “Preference Revelation and Monopsony”. JPubE; V.20-#?, pp. 357-372.

 

(c) Market Domains: Private Goods and General Economies

 

-L. Hurwicz (1972). “On Informationally Decentralized Systems”. in C. McGuire and R. Radner, eds. Decision and Organization. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 297-336.

 

-S. Banerjee (1994). “An Alternative Proof of the Hurwicz (1972) Impossibility Theorem”. EcLets; V.44-#?, pp. 397-401.

 

-M. Satterthwaite and H. Sonneschein (1981). “Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points”. REStud; V.48-#?, pp. 587-597.

 

-R. Guesnerie and J.-J. Laffont (1982). “On the Robustness of Strategy Proof Mechanisms”. JMathE; V.10-#1, pp. 5-15.

 

-Z. Ritz (1985). “Restricted Domains, Arrow Social Welfare Functions and Noncorruptible and Nonmanipulable Social Choice Correspondences: The Case of Private and Public Alternatives”. JET; V.35-#1, pp. 1-18.

 

-M. Walker (1989). “Conflicting Interests, Decomposability, and Comparative Statics”. MathSocSci; V.18-#1, pp. 57-79.

 

-L. Hurwicz and M. Walker (1990). “On the Generic Nonoptimality of Dominant Strategy Mechanisms: A General Theorem That Includes Pure Exchange Economies”. Etrica; V.58-#3, pp. 683-704.

 

-L. Zhou (1991). “Inefficiency of Stratey-proof Allocation Mechanisms in Pure Exchange Economies”. SC&W; V.8-#?, pp. 247-254.

 

-C. Beviá and L. Corchón (1995). “On the Generic Impossibility of Truthful Behavior: A Simple Approach”. ET; V.6-#?, pp. 365-371.

 

-S. Barberà and M. Jackson (1995). “Strategy-Proof Exchange”. Etrica; V.63-#1, pp. 51-87.

 

-Y. Sprumont (1995). “A Note on Strategyproofness in Edgeworth-Box Economies”. EcLets; V.49-#?, pp. 45-50.

 

-J. Schummer (1997). “Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency on Restricted Domains of Exchange Economies”. SC&W; V.14-#?, pp. 47-56.

 

-N. Anbarci and G. Yi (1998). “An Iterative Allocation Mechanism in the Edgeworth Box”. International Advances in Economic Research; V.4-#3, pp. 253-258.

 

-L. Makowski, J. Ostroy, and U. Segal (1999). “Efficient Incentive Compatible Economies are Perfectly Competitive”. JET; V.85-#2, pp. 169-225.

 

-F. Maniquet and Y. Sprumont (1999). “Efficient Strategy-proof Allocation Functions in Linear Production Economies”. ET; V.14-#3, pp. 583-595.

 

-S. Serizawa (2002). “Inefficiency of Strategy-Proof Rules for Pure Exchange Economies”. JET; V.106-#2, pp. 219-241.

 

c. Nash Implementation of Social Choice Functions: Complete Information

 

(1) Nash Implementation

 

(a) The General Problem of Nash Implementation

 

-E. Maskin (1985). “The Theory of Implementation in Nash Equilibrium: A Survey”. in L. Hurwicz, D. Schmeidler and H. Sonnenschein, eds. Social Goals and Social Organization. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 173-204.

 

-B. Dutta (1996). “Reasonable Mechanisms and Nash Implementation”. in K. Arrow, A. Sen, and K. Suzumura, eds. Social Choice Re-Examined, V.2. New York: St. Martins, pp. 3-23.

 

-E. Maskin (1977/1999). “Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality”. REStud; V.66-#1, pp. 23-38.

 

-K. Roberts (1979). “The Characterization of Implementable Social Choice Rules”. in J.J. Laffont ed. Aggregation and Revelation of Preferences. Amsterdam: North-Holland.

 

-J. Ferejohn, D. Grether and R. McKelvey (1982). “Implementation of Democratic Social Choice Functions”. REStud; V.49-#?, pp. 439-446.

 

-S. Williams (1986). “Realization and Nash Implementation: Two Aspects of Mechanism Design”. Etrica; V.54-#1, pp. 139-151.

 

-S. Williams (2002). “Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation”. SC&W; V.6-#3/4, pp. 325-342.

 

-J. Strnad (1987). “Full Nash Implementation of Neutral Social Choice Functions”. JMathE; V.16-#1, pp. 17-37.

 

-R. Repullo (1987). “A Simple Proof of Maskin's Theorem on Nash Implementation”. SC&W; V.4-#1, pp. 39-41.

 

-T. Saijo (1988). “Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation”. Etrica; V.56-#3, pp. 693-700.

 

-R. McKelvey (1989). “Game Forms for Nash Implementation of General Social Choice Correspondences”. SC&W; V.6-#?, pp. 139-156.

 

-J. Moore and R. Repullo (1990). “Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization”. Etrica; V.58-#5, pp. 58-#5, pp. 1083-1099.

 

-B. Dutta and A. Sen (1991). “Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for 2-person Nash Implementation”. REStud; V.58-#?, pp. 121-129.

 

-T. Sjöström (1991). “On the Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation”. SC&W; V.8-#?, pp. 333-340.

 

-D. Mookherjee and S. Reichelstein (1992). “The Revelation Approach to Nash Implementation”. EcLets; V.39-#?, pp. 309-313.

 

-V. Danilov (1992). “Implementation via Nash Equilibrium”. Etrica; V.60-#1, pp. 43-56.

 

-T. Yamato (1992). “On Nash Implementation of Social Choice Correspondences”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.4-#?, pp. 484-492.

 

-M. Jackson and S. Srivastava (1992). “On Two-Person Nash Implementable Choice Functions”. SC&W; V.9-#?, pp. 263-264.

 

-H. Haller (1992). “Limitations of the Revelation Principle”. EcLets; V.39-#?, pp. 409-413.

 

-A. Ziad (1998). “A New Necessary Condition for Nash Implementation”. JMathE; V.29-#?, pp. 381-387.

 

-A. Cabrales (1999). “Adaptive Dynamics and the Implementation Problem with Complete Information”. JET; V.86-#2, pp. 159-184.

 

-W. Thomson (1999). “Monotonic extensions on economic domains”. Review of Economic Design; V.4-#1, pp. 13-33.

 

(b) Implementing the Walrasian Equilibrium

 

-L. Hurwicz (1972). “The Design of Mechanisms for Resource Allocation”. AER; V.62-#2, pp. 1-30.

 

-L. Hurwicz (1986). “Incentive Aspects of Decentralization”. in K. Arrow and M. Intriligator, eds. Handbook of Mathematical Economics; V.III. Amsterdam: North Holland, pp. 1441-1482.

 

-A. Postelwaite (1985). “Implementation via Nash Equilibria in Economic Environments”. in L. Hurwicz, D. Schmeidler and H. Sonnenschein, eds. Social Goals and Social Organization. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 205-228.

 

-T. Groves and J. Ledyard (1987). “Incentive Compatibility Since 1972". in T. Groves, R. Radner, and S. Reiter, eds. Information, Incentives, and Economics Mechanisms. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 48-111.

 

-L. Hurwicz (1979). “On Allocations Attainable Through Nash Equilibria”. in J.-J. Laffont, ed. Aggregation and Revelation of Preferences. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 397-419. [comment by W. Thomson follows].

 

-D. Schmeidler (1982). “A Condition Guaranteeing that the Nash Allocation in Walrasian”. JET; V.28-#?, pp. 376-378.

 

-D. Schmeidler (1982). “Economic Analysis via Strategy Outcome Functions: A Survey of Recent Results”. M. Deistler, E. Furst, and G. Schwodiauer, eds. Games, Economic Dynamics, and Time Series Analysis. Vienna: Physica Verlag, pp. 59-66.

 

-S. Reichelstein (1984). “A Note on Allocations Attainable Through Nash Equilibria”. JET; V.32-#?, pp. 384-390.

 

-L. Hurwicz and D. Schmeidler (1978). “Construction of Outcome Functions Guaranteeing Existence and Pareto Optimality of Nash Equilibria”. Etrica; V.46-#6, pp. 1447-1474.

 

-D. Schmeidler (1980). “Walrasian Analysis via Strategic Outcome Functions”. Etrica; V.48-#7, pp. 1585-1593.

 

-W. Thomson (1984). “The Manipulability of Resource Allocation Mechanisms”. REStud; V.51-#?, pp. 447-460.

 

-W. Thomson (1987). “The Vulnerability to Manipulative Behavior of Resource Allocation Mechanisms Designed to Select Equitable and Efficient Outcomes”. in T. Groves, R. Radner, and S. Reiter, eds. Information, Incentives, and Economics Mechanisms. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 375-396.

 

-J. Jordan (1986). “Instability in the Implementation of Walrasian Allocations”. JET; V.39-#2; pp. 301-328.

 

-S. Reichelstein and S. Reiter (1988). “Game Forms with Minimal Message Spaces”. Etrica; V.56-#3, pp. 661-692.

 

-A. Postelwaite and D. Schmeidler (1987). “Differential Information and Strategic Behavior in Economic Environments: A General Equilibrium Approach”. in T. Groves, R. Radner, and S. Reiter, eds. Information, Incentives, and Economics Mechanisms. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 330-348.

 

-A. Postelwaite and D. Wettstein (1989). “Continuous and Feasible Implementation”. REStud; V.56-#4, pp. 603-611.

 

-S. Nakamura (1990). “A Feasible Nash Implementation of Walrasian Equilibria in the Two-Agent Economy”. EcLets; V.34-#1, pp. 5-9.

 

-B. Chakravorti (1991). “Strategy Space Reduction for Feasible Implementation of Walrasian Performance”. SC&W; V.8-#?, pp. 235-245.

 

-G. Tian (1992). “Implementation of the Walrasian Correspondence without Continuous, Convex, and Ordered Preferences”. SC&W; V.9-#?, pp. 117-130.

 

-L. Hurwicz, E. Maskin, and A. Postlewaite (1995). “Feasible Nash Implementation of Social Choice Rules When the Designer Does Not Know Endowments or Production Sets”. in J. Ledyard, ed.. The Economics of Informational Decentralization: Complexity, Efficiency,and Stability. Boston : Kluwer Academic, pp. 367-433.

 

-L. Hong (1994). “Walrasian and Constrained Walrasian Correspondences and Nash Implementation”. EcLets; V.44-#?, pp. 255-259.

 

-L. Hong and S. Page (1994). “Reducing Informational Costs in Endowment Mechanisms”. Economic Design; V.1-#1, pp. 103-117.

 

-L. Hong (1995). “Nash Implementation in Production Economies”. ET; V.5-#?, pp. 401-417.

 

-B. Dutta, A. Sen, and R. Vohra (1995). “Nash Implementation through Elementary Mechanisms in an Economic Environment”. Economic Design; V.1-#?, pp. 173-203.

 

-T. Sjöström (1996). “Implementation by Demand Mechanisms”. Economic Design; V.1-#?, pp. 343-354.

 

-T. Saijo, Y. Tatamitani, and T. Yamato (1996). “Natural Implementation with a Simple Punishment”. Japanese Economic Review; V.47-#?, pp. 170-185.

 

-T. Saijo, Y. Tatamitani, and T. Yamato (1996). “Toward Natural Implementation”. IER; V.37-#?, pp. 949-980.

 

-T. Saijo, Y. Tatamitani, and T. Yamato (1999). “Characterizing Natural Implementability: The Fair and Walrasian Correspondences”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.28-#2, pp. 271-293.

 

-J. Bergin and A. Sen (1996). “Implementation in Generic Environments”. Social Choice and Welfare; V.13-#4, pp. 467-78.

 

-S. Nakamura (1998). “Impossibility of Nash Implementation in Two-Person Economies”. Review of Economic Design; V.3-#2, pp. 159-165

 

-L. Gevers (1986). “Walrasian Social Choice: Some Simple Axiomatic Approaches”. in W. Heller, R. Starr, and D. Starrett, eds. Social Choice and Public Decision Making. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 97-114.

 

-D. Campbell (1992). “Implementation of Social Welfare Functions”. IER; V.33-#3, pp. 525-533.

 

-R. Nagahisa (1991). “A Local Independence Condition for Characterization of Walrasian Allocations Rule”. JET; V.54-#?, pp. 106-123.

 

-R. Nagahisa (1992). “Walrasian Social Choice in a Large Economy”. MathSocSci; V.24-#?, pp. 73-78.

 

-R. Nagahisa (1994). “A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Walrasian Social Choice”. JET; V.62-#?, pp. 186-208.

 

-R.-I. Nagahisa and S.-C. Suh (1995). “A Characterization of the Walras Rule”. SC&W; V.12-#?, pp. 335-352.

 

(c) Implementing Walras/Lindahl Equilibia

 

-T. Groves and J. Ledyard (1977). “The Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the ‘Free Rider’ Problem”. Etrica; V.45-#4, pp. 783-809.

 

-W. Brock (1980). “The Design of Mechanisms for Efficient Allocation of Public Goods”. in S. Lin, ed. Theory and Measurement of Economic Externalities. New York: Academic Press, pp.in pp. 45-80.

 

-L. Hurwicz (1979). “Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points”. REStud; V.46-#2, pp. 217-225.

 

-M. Walker (1981). “A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl Allocations”. Etrica; V.48-#1, pp. 56-73.

 

-T. Groves and J. Ledyard (1980). “The Existence of Efficient and Incentive Compatible Equilibria with Public Goods”. Etrica; V.48-#6, pp. 1487-1506.

 

-T. Bergstrom, C. Simon, and J. Titus (1983). “Counting Groves-Ledyard Equilibria via Degree Theory”. JMathE; V.12-#?, pp. 167-184.

 

-G. Tian (1988). “On the Constrained Walrasian and Lindahl Correspondences”. EcLets; V.26-#?, pp. 299-303.

 

-G. Tian (1989). “Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondence by a Single-Valued, Feasible, and Continuous Mechanism”. REStud; V.56-#?, pp. 613-621.

 

-G. Tian (1990). “Completely Feasible and Continuous Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondence with a Message Space of Minimal Dimension”. JET; V.51-#2, pp. 443-452.

 

-G. Tian and Q. Li (1991). “Completely Feasible and Continuous Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondence with Any Number of Goods”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.21-#1, pp. 67-79.

 

-G. Tian (1993). “Implementing Lindahl Allocations by a Withholding Mechanism”. Journal of Mathematical Economics; V.22-#2, pp. 169-179.

 

-Q. Li, S. Nakamura, and G. Tian (1995). “Nash-Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondence with Decreasing Returns to Scale Technologies”. IER; V.36-#1, pp. 37-52.

 

-W. Thomson (1999). “Monotonic Extensions on Economic Domains”. Review of Economic Design; V.4-#1, pp. 13-33.

 

-R. Rob (1989). “Pollution Claim Settlements under Private Information”. JET; V.47-#?, pp. 307-333.

 

-M. Bagnoli and B. Lipman (1989). “Provision of Public Goods: Fully Implementing the Core Through Private Contributions”. REStud; V.56-#4, pp. 583-602.

 

-G. Mailath and A. Postlewaite (1990). “Asymmetric Information and Bargaining Problems with Many Agents”. REStud; V.57-#?, pp. 351-367.

 

-M. Jackson and H. Moulin (1992). “Implementing a Public Project and Distributing its Cost”. JET; V.57-#1, pp. 125-140.

 

-H. Moulin (1994). “Serial Cost Sharing of Excludable Public Goods”. REStud; V.61-#?, pp. 305-325.

 

-H. Varian (1994). “A Solution to the Problem of Externalities when Agents are Well-Informed”. AER; V.84-#5, pp. 1278-1293. [Comment by S. Ziss, AER, 1997, V.87-#1, pp. 231-235.]

 

-J. Dearden (1998). “Serial Cost Sharing of Excludable Public Goods: General Cost Functions”. Economic Theory; V.12-#?, pp. 189-196.

 

(2) Subgame Perfect Implementation

 

-J. Moore and R. Repullo (1988). “Subgame Perfect Implementation”. Etrica; V.56-#5, pp. 191-1220.

 

-D. Abreu and A. Sen (1990). “Subgame Perfect Implementation: A Necessary and Almost Sufficient Condition”. JET; V.50-#?, pp. 285-299.

 

-T. Sjöström (1993). “Implementation in Perfect Equilibrium”. SC&W; V.10-#?, pp. 97-106.

 

(3) Undominated Nash Implementation

 

-T. Palfrey and S. Srivastava (1991). “Nash Implementation using Undominated Strategies”. Etrica; V.59-#?, pp. 479-502.

 

-M. Jackson, T. Palfrey and S. Srivastava (1994). “Undominated Nash Implementation in Bounded Mechanisms”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.6-#?, pp. 474-501.

 

-T. Sjöström (1994). “Implementation in Undominated Nash Equilibria without Integer Games”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.6-#?, pp. 502-511.

 

-T. Sjöström (1996). “Credibility and Renegotiation of Outcome Functions in Implementation”. Japanese Economic Review; V.47-#?, pp. 157-169.

 

-T. Sjöström (1999). “Undominated Nash Implementation with Collusion and Renegotiation”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.26-#2, pp. 337-352.

 

-Y. Tatamitani (1993). “Double Implementation in Nash and Undominated Nash Equilibria in Social Choice Environments”. ET; V.3-#?, pp. 109-117.

 

-T. Yamato (1993). “Double Implementation in Nash and Undominated Nash Equilibrium”. JET; V.59-#?, pp. 311-323.

 

-T. Yamato (1999). “Nash Implementation and Double Implementation: Equivalence Theorems”. JMathE; V.31-#?, pp. 215-238.

 

(4) Effectivity Functions and Strong Nash Equilibrium

 

-E. Maskin (1979). “Implementation and Strong Nash Equilibrium”. in J.-J. Laffont, ed. Aggregation and Revelation of Preferences. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 433-439.

 

-H. Moulin and B. Peleg (1982). “Cores of Effectivity Functions and Implementation Theory”. JMathE; V.10-#?, pp. 115-145.

 

-B. Dutta (1984). “Effectivity Functions and Acceptable Game Forms”. Etrica; V.52-#?, pp. 1151-1166.

 

-R. Holzman (1987). “Sub-core Solutions of the Problem of Strong Implementation”. IJGT; V.16-#?, pp. 263-269.

 

-B. Dutta and A. Sen (1991). “Implementation under Strong Equilibrium: A Complete Characterization”. JMathE; V.20-#?, pp. 49-68.

 

-S.-C. Suh (1996). “An Algorithm for Checking Strong Nash Implementability”. JMathE; V.25-#?, pp. 109-122.

 

-S.-C. Suh (1997). “Double Implementation in Nash and Strong Nash Equilibria”. SC&W; V.14-#?, pp. 439-447.

 

(5) Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibrium

 

-D. Bernheim and M. Whinston (1987). “Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibrium: II. Applications”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.42-#1, pp. 13-29.

 

d. Iterated Removal of Dominated Strategies

 

(1) Dominance Solvability

 

-H. Moulin (1979). “Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes”. Etrica; V.47-#?, pp. 1337-1352.

 

-M.H. Herrero and S. Srivastava (1992). “Implementation via Backward Induction”. JET; V.56-#1, pp. 70-88.

 

-D. Abreu and H. Matsushima (1994). “Exact Implementation”. JET; V.64-#1, pp. 1-19.

 

(2) Virtual Implementation

 

-H. Matsushimia (1988). “A New Approach to the Implementation Problem”. JET; V.45-#?, pp. 128-144.

 

-D. Abreu and A. Sen (1991). “Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium”. Etrica; V.59-#?, pp. 997-1022.

 

-D. Abreu and H. Matsushima (1992). “Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information”. Etrica; V.60-#5, pp. 993-1008.

 

-J. Glazer and R. Rosenthal (1992). “A Note on Abreu-Matsushima Mechanisms”. Etrica; V.60-#6, pp. 1435-1438. [response follows, 1439-1442]

 

-A. Arya, J. Glover, and R. Young (1995). “Virtual Implementation in Separable Bayesian Environments Using Simple Mechanisms”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.9-#2, pp. 127-138.

 

-J. Glazer and M. Perry (1996). “Virtual Implementation in Backwards Induction”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.15-#1, pp. 27-32.

 

-G. Tian (1997). “Virtual Implementation in Incomplete Information Environments with Infinite Alternatives and Types”. Journal of Mathematical Economics; V.28-#3, pp. 313-339.

 

e. Implementation in Undominated Strategies

 

-T. Borgers (1991). “Undominated Strategies and Coordination in Normal Form Games”. SC&W; V.8-#?, pp. 65-78.

 

-M. Jackson (1989). “Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanism”. REStud; V.59-#?, pp. 757-775.

 

-M. Jackson and S. Srivastava (1994). “On the Relation between Nash Equilibria and Undominated Strategies for Two Person Games”. EcLets; V.45-#?, pp. 315-318.

 

f. Bayesian Implementation

 

(1) Overviews

 

-C. d'Aspermont and L.A. Gérard-Varet (1979). “Incentives and Incomplete Information”. JPubE; V.11-#1, pp. 25-45.

 

-J. Green (1985). “Differential Information, the Market, and Incentive Compatibility”. In K. Arrow and S. Honkapohja, eds. Frontiers of Economics. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 178-199.

 

-M. Harris and R. Townsend (1985). “Allocation Mechanisms, Asymmetric Information, and the ‘Revelation Principle’”. In G. Feiwel, ed. Issues in Contemporary Microeconomics and Welfare. Albany: State University of New York Press, pp. 379-384.

 

-R. Myerson (1985). “Bayesian Equilibrium and Incentive-Compatibility: An Introduction”. in L. Hurwicz, D. Schmeidler and H. Sonnenschein, eds. Social Goals and Social Organization. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 229-259.

 

-R. Myerson (1989). “Mechanism Design”. In The New Palgrave: Allocation, Information, and Markets. New York: Norton, pp. 191-206.

 

-R. Myerson (1991). “Analysis of Incentives in Bargaining and Mediation”. In H.P. Young, ed. Negotiation Analysis. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 67-85.

 

-J. Ledyard (1986). “On the Scope of the Hypothesis of Bayesian Equilibrium”. JET; V.39-#?, pp. 59-82.

 

-C. d'Aspermont, J. Crémer and L.-A. Gérard-Varet (1990). “Incentives and the Existence of Pareto-Optimal Revelation Mechanisms”. JET; V.51-#?, pp. 233-254.

 

-D. Kreps (1990). “The Revelation Principle and Mechanism Design”. Chapter 18 in A Course in Microeconomic Theory. Princeton: PUP, pp. 661-719.

 

-D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole (1991). “Bayesian Games and Mechanism Design”. Chapter 7 of Game Theory. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 243-318.

 

-T. Palfrey and S. Srivastava (1993). Bayesian Implementation. Chur: Harwood.

 

-A. Mas-Colell, M. Whinston, and J. Green (1995). “Incentives and Mechanism Design”. Chapter 23 of Microeconomic Theory. New York: Oxford University Press, pp.857-925.

 

-J. Bergin (1995). “On Some Recent Results in Incomplete Information Implementation”. CJE; V.28-#1, pp. 108-138.

 

(2) Bayesian Nash Implementation

 

(a) Auctions and Simple Trading Environments

 

-P. Milgrom (1989). “Auctions and Bidding: A Primer”. Journal of Economic Perspectives; V.3-#3, pp. 3-32.

 

-P. Klemperer (1999). “Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature”. Journal of Economic Surveys; V.13-#3, pp. 227-286.

 

-R. Cassady (1967). Auctions and Auctioneering. Berkeley: University of California Press.

 

-P. Milgrom (1985). “The Economics of Competitive Bidding: A Selective Survey”. in L. Hurwicz, D. Schmeidler, and H. Sonneschein, eds. Social Goals and Social Organization. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 261-289.

 

-R.P. McAfee and J. McMillan (1987). “Auctions and Bidding”. JEL; V.25-#2, pp. 699-738.

 

-P. Milgrom (1987). “Auction Theory”. in T. Bewley, ed. Advances in Economic Theory: Fifth World Congress. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 1-32.

 

-R. Wilson (1987). “Game Theoretic Analyses of Trading Processes”. in T. Bewley, ed. Advances in Economic Theory: Fifth World Congress. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 35-70.

 

-R. Wilson (1992). “Strategic Analysis of Auctions”. In R. Aumann and S. Hart, eds. Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications. (V.I). Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 227-279.

 

-E. Wolfstetter (1996). “Auctions: An Introduction”. Journal of Economic Surveys; V.10-#4, pp. 367-420.

 

-S. Das and R. Sundaram (1996). “Auction Theory: A Survey with Applications to Treasury Markets”. Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments; V.5-#5, pp. 1-36.

 

-J. Kagel (1995). “Auctions: A Survey of Experimental Research”. In J. Kagel and A. Roth, eds. The Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton: PUP, pp. 501-585.

 

-J.-J. Laffont (1997). “Game Theory and Empirical Economics: The Case of Auction Data”. EER; V.41-#1, pp. 1-35.

 

-W. Vickery (1961). “Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders”. JFin; V.16-#1, pp. 8-37.

 

-R. Myerson (1981). “Optimal Auction Design”. Mathematics of OR; V.6-#1, pp. 58-73.

 

-J. Riley and W. Samuelson (1981). “Optimal Auctions”. AER; V.71-#3, pp. 381-392.

 

-M. Harris and A. Raviv (1981). “Allocation Mechanisms and the Design of Auctions”. Etrica; V.49-#6, pp. 1477-1499.

 

-P. Milgrom and R. Weber (1982). “A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding”. Etrica; V.50-#5, pp. 1089-1122.

 

-M. Perry and P. Reny (1999). “On the Failure of the Linkage Principle in Multi-Unit Auctions”. Etrica; V.67-#4, pp. 895-900.

 

-R. Wilson (1977). “A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition”. REStud; V.44-#?, pp. 511-518.

 

-P. Milgrom (1979). “A Convergence Theorem for Competitive Bidding with Differential Information”. Etrica; V.47-#3, pp. 679-688.

 

-P. Milgrom (1981). “Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding”. Etrica; V.49-#4, pp. 921-943.

 

-Pesendorfer, Wolfgang and Jeroen Swinkels (1997). “The Loser’s Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions”. Etrica; V.65-#6, pp. 1247-1281.

 

-W. Pesendorfer and J. Swinkels (2000). “Efficiency and Aggregation in Auctions”. AER; V.90-#3, pp. 499-525.

 

-J. Swinkels (2001). “The Efficiency of Large, Private Value Auctions”. Etrica; V.69-#1, pp. 37-68.

 

-S. Brusco (1998). “Unique Implementation of the Full Surplus Extraction Outcome in Auctions with Correlated Types”. JET; V.20-#2, pp. 185-200.

 

-S. Athey and P. Haile (2002). “Identification of Standard Auction Models”. Econometrica; V.70-#2, pp.

 

-M. Harris and R. Townsend (1981). “Resource Allocation under Asymmetric Information”. Etrica; V.49-#1, pp. 33-64.

 

-R. Myerson and M. Satterthwaite (1983). “Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading”. JET; V.29-#?, pp. 265-281.

 

-R. Wilson (1985). “Efficient Trading”. in G. Feiwel, ed. Issues in Contemporary Microeconomics and Welfare. Albany: SUNY Press, pp. 169-208.

 

-R. Wilson (1987). “On Equilibria of Bid-Ask Markets”. in G. Feiwel, ed. Arrow and the Ascent of Economic Theory. New York: NYU Press, pp. 375-414.

 

-K. Hagerty and W. Rogerson (1987). “Robust Trading Mechanisms”. JET; V.42-#?, pp. 94-107.

 

-R. Wilson (1985). “Incentive Efficiency of Double Auctions”. Etrica; V.53-#?, pp. 1101-1115.

 

-M. Satterthwaite and M. Williams (1989). “Bilateral Trade with the Sealed-bid Double Auction: Existence and Efficiency”. JET; V.48-#?, pp. 107-133.

 

-M. Satterthwaite and M. Williams (1989). “The Rate of Convergence to Efficiency in the Buyer’s Bid Double Auction as the Market Becomes Large”. REStud; V.56-#?, pp. 477-498.

 

-T. Gresik and M. Satterthwaite (1989). “The Rate at Which a Market Converges to Efficiency as the Number of Traders Increases: An Asymptotic Result for Optimal Trading Mechanisms”. JET; V.48-#1, pp. 304-332.

 

-T. Gresik (1991). “The Efficiency of Linear Equilibria of Sealed-Bid Double Auctions”. JET; V.53-#1, pp. 173-184.

 

-T. Gresik (1991). “Ex Ante Efficient, Ex Post Individually Rational Trade”. JET; V.53-#1, pp. 131-145.

 

-P. McAfee (1992). “A Dominant Strategy Double Auction”. JET; V.56-#?, pp. 434-450.

 

-T. Gresik (1991). “Efficient Bilateral Trade with Statistically Dependent Beliefs”. JET; V.53-#1, pp. 199-205.

 

-Rubenstein, Ariel and Asher Wolinsky (1990). “Decentralized Trading, Strategic Behavior and the Walrasian Outcome”. REStud; V.57-#?, pp. 63-78.

 

-Rustichini, Aldo, Mark Satterthwaite, and Steven Williams (1994). “Convergence to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information”. Etrica; V.62-#5, pp. 1041-1063.

 

-Satterthwaite, Mark and Steven Williams (2002). “The Optimality of a Simple Market Mechanism”. Econometrica, V.70-#5, pp. 1841-1863.

 

-M. Satterthwaite (2001). “Strategy-Proofness and Markets”. Social Choice and Welfare; V.18-#1, pp. 37-58.

 

(b) General Analysis

 

-T. Palfrey (1992). “Implementation in Bayesian Equilibrium: The Multiple Equilibrium Problem in Mechanism Design”. in J.J. Laffont, ed. Advances in Economic Theory. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 283-323.

 

-R. Repullo (1986). “On the Revelation Principle under Complete and Incomplete Information”. in K. Binmore and P. Dasgupta, eds. Economic Organizations as Games. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 179-195.

  

-E. Maskin (1986). “Optimal Bayesian Mechanisms”. in W. Heller, R. Starr and D. Starrett, eds. Uncertainty, Information and Communication. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 229-238.

 

-D. Mookherjee and S. Reichelstein (1990). “Implementation via Augmented Revelation Mechanisms”. REStud; V.57-#?, pp. 453-476.

 

-M. Jackson (1991). “Bayesian Implementation”. Etrica; V.59-#?, pp. 461-478.

 

-H. Matsushima (1991). “Incentive Compatible Mechanisms with Full Transferability”. JET; V.54-#?, pp. 198-203.

 

-H. Matsushima (1993). “Bayesian Monotonicity with Side Payments”. JET; V.59-#?, pp. 107-121.

 

-K.-S. Chung (1999). “A Note on Matsushima’s Regularity Condition”. JET; V.87-#?, pp. 429-433.

 

-B. Dutta and A. Sen (1994). “Bayesian Implementation: the Necessity of Finite Mechanisms”. JET; V.64-#?, pp. 130-141.

 

-T. Yamato (1994). “Equivalence of Nash Implementability and Robust Implementability with Incomplete Information”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.11-#?, pp. 289-303.

 

-S. Li (1995). “A Unified Framework for Implementation and the Revelation Principle”. EcLets; V.49-#?, pp. 335-343.

 

-S. Brusco (1995). “Perfect Bayesian Implementation”. ET; V.5-#?, pp. 419-444.

 

-M. Aoyagi (1998). “Correlated Types and Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanisms with Budget Balance”. JET; V.79-#?, pp. 142-151.

 

-J. Bergin and A. Sen (1998). “Extensive Form Implementation in Incomplete Information Environments”. JET; V.80-#?, pp. 222-256.

 

-S. Brusco (1999). “Implementation with Extensive Form Games: One Round of Signaling Is Not Enough”. JET; V.87-#?, pp. 356-378.

 

-J. Glazer and C.-T. Ma (1989). “Efficient Allocation of a “Prize”–King Solomon’s Dilemma”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.1-#?, pp. 222-233.

 

-M. Perry and P. Reny (1999). “A General solution to King Solomon’s Dilemma”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.26-#2, pp. 279-285.

 

-A. Arya, J. Glover, and R. Young (1996). “Mechanism Design under Alternative Information Structures and Constrained Capacity”. JET; V.70-#?, pp. 420-443.

 

-J. Duggan (1997). “Virtual Bayesian Implementation”. Etrica; V.65-#5, pp. 1175-1199.

 

-B. Chakravorty, L. Corchon and S. Wilkie (1997). “Credible Implementation”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.

 

-S. Baliga, L. Corchon and T. Sjöstrom (1997). “The Theory of Implementation when the Planner is a Player”. JET; V.77-#1, pp. 15-33.

 

-S. Baliga and T. Sjöstrom (1999). “Interactive Implementation”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.27-#1, pp. 38-63.

 

-G. Kosmopoulou and S. Williams (1998). “The Robustness of the Independent Private Value Model in Bayesian Mechanism Design”. ET; V.12-#2, pp. 393-421.

 

(c) General Economic Environments

 

-K. Arrow (1979). “The Property Rights Doctrine and Demand Revelation under Complete and Incomplete Information”. in M. Boskin, ed. Economics and Human Welfare. New York: Academic Press, pp. 21-39.

 

-C. d’Aspermont and L.A. Gérard-Varet (1979). “On Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanisms”. in J.-J. Laffont, ed. Aggregation and Revelation of Preferences. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 269-288.

 

-C. d’Aspermont and L.A. Gérard-Varet (1982). “Bayesian Incentive Compatible Beliefs”. Journal of Mathematical Economics; V.10-#1, pp. 83-103.

 

-A. Postelwaite and D. Schmeidler (1986). “Implementation in Differential Information Economies”. JET; V.39-#1, pp. 14-33.

 

-A. Postelwaite and D. Schmeidler (1987). “Differential Information and Strategic Behavior in Economic Environments: A General Equilibrium Approach”. in pp. T. Groves, R. Radner and S. Reiter, eds. Information, Incentives and Economic Mechanisms. Minneapolis: Univeristy of Minnesota Press, pp.330-348.

 

-T. Palfrey and S. Srivastava (1987). “On Bayesian Implementable Allocations”. REStud; V.54-#?, pp. 193-208.

 

-T. Palfrey and S. Srivastava (1989). “Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies”. Etrica; V.57-#?, pp. 115-134.

 

-L. Blume and D. Easley (1990). “Implementation of Walrasian Expectations Equilibrium”. JET; V.51-#1, pp. 207-227.

 

-D. Wettstein (1990). “Continuous Implementation of Constrained Rational Expectations Equilibrium”. JET; V.52-#1, pp. 208-222.

 

-D. Wettstein (1992). “Continuous Implementation in Economies with Incomplete Information”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.4-#3, pp. 463-483.

 

-G. Tian (1996). “Continuous and Feasible Implementation of Expectations Lindahl Allocations”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.16-#1, pp. 135-51.

 

-L. Hong (1996). “Bayesian Implementation in Exchange Economies with State Dependent Feasible Sets and Private Information”. Social Choice and Welfare; V.13-#4, pp. 433-444.

 

-L. Hong (1998). “Feasible Bayesian Implementation with State Dependent Feasible Sets”. JET; V.80-#2, pp. 201-221.

 

-F. Forges and E. Minelli (1997). “Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms and Rational Expectations”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.75-#2, pp. 388-406.

 

-J. Duggan (1998). “An Extensive Form Solution to the Adverse Selection Problem in Principal/Multi-agent Environments”. Review of Economic Design; V.3-#2, pp. 167-191.

 

-J. Bergin and A. Sen (1998). “Extensive Form Implementation in Incomplete Information Environments”. JET; V.80-#2, pp. 222-56.

 

S. Brusco (1998). “Implementing Action Profiles with Sequential Mechanisms”. Review of Economic Design; V.3-#3, pp. 271-300.

 

-S. Baliga (1999). “Implementation in Economic Environments with Incomplete Information: The Use of Multi-Stage Games”. Games and Economic Behavior; v.27-#2, pp. 173-183.

 

-J. Ledyard and T. Palfrey (1999). “A Characterization of Interim Efficiency with Public Goods”. Etrica; V.67-#2, pp. 435-448.

 

-M. Jackson and H. Moulin (1992). “Implementing a Public Project and Distributing Its Cost”. JET; V.57-#?, pp. 125-140.

 

-J. Choi and T. Kim (1999). “A Nonparametric, Efficient Public Good Decision Mechanism: Undominated Bayesian Implementation”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.27-#1, pp. 64-85.

 

-J.-J. Laffont and D. Martimort (2000). “Mechanism Design with Collusion and Correlation”. Etrica; V.68-#2, pp. 309-342.

 

(3) Bayesian Implementation in Dominant Strategies

 

-J. Ledyard (1978). “Incomplete Information and Incentive Compatibility”. JET; V.1-#?, pp. 171-189.

 

-J. Ledyard (1979). “Dominant Strategy Mechanisms and Incomplete Information”. in J.-J. Laffont, ed. Aggregation and Revelation of Preferences. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 309-320.

 

-T. Palfrey and S. Srivastava (1989). “Mechanism Design with Incomplete Information: A Solution to the Implementation Problem”. JPE; V.97-#?, pp. 668-691.

 

-D. Mookherjee and S. Reichelstein (1992). “Dominant Strategy Implementation of Bayesian Incentive Compatible Allocation Rules”. JET; V.56-#?, pp. 378-399.

 

-L. Makowski and C. Mezzetti (1994). “Bayesian and Weakly Robust First Best Mechanisms: Characterizations”. JET; V.64-#?, pp. 500-519.

 

-G. Kosmopoulou (1999). “Payoff Equivalence between Bayesian and Ex Post Individually Rational Dominant Strategy Mechanisms”. ET; V.13-#1, pp. 229-237.

 

-S. Williams (1999). “A Characteriation of Efficient, Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanisms”. ET; V.14-#1, pp. 155-180.


II. Spatial Electoral Competition

 

A. Surveys, Overviews, Texts

 

-O. Davis, M. Hinich and P. Ordeshook (1970). “An Expository Development of a Mathematical Model of the Electoral Process”. APSR; V.64-#?, pp. 426-448.

 

-P. Ordeshook (1976). “The Spatial Theory of Elections: A Review and Critique”. in I. Budge, I. Crewe, and D. Farlie, eds. Party Identification and Beyond: Representations of Voting and Party Competition. London: Wiley.

 

-D. Austen-Smith (1983). “The Spatial Theory of Electoral Competition: Instability, Institutions, and Information”. Environment and Planning, C: Government and Policy; V.1-#?, pp. 439-459.

 

-M. Osborne (1995). “Spatial Models of Political Competition under Plurality Rule: A Survey of Some Explanations of the Number of Candidates and the Positions they Take”. CJE; V.28-#2, pp. 261-301.

 

-J. Enelow and M. Hinich (1984). The Spatial Theory of Voting: An Introduction. Cambridge: CUP.

 

-J. Enelow and M. Hinich, eds. (1990). Advances in the Spatial Theory of Voting. Cambridge: CUP

 

-M. Hinich and M. Munger (1997). Analytical Politics. Cambridge: CUP.

 

-D. Austen-Smith and J. Banks (1999). Positive Political Theory, I: Collective Preference. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. [Chapter’s 5 and 6]

 

B. Simple Spatial Models

 

1. One-Dimensional Models

 

-H. Hotelling (1929). “Stability in Competition”. EJ; V.39-#?, pp. 41-57.

 

-A. Smithies (1941). “Optimum Location in Spatial Competition”. JPE; V.49-#?, pp. 423-439.

 

-A. Downs (1957). An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper.

 

-D. Black (1968). The Theory of Committees and Elections. Cambridge: CUP.

 

-A. Denzau, A. Kats and S. Slutsky (1985). “Multi-Agent Equilibria with Market Share and Ranking Objectives”. SC&W; V.2-#1, pp. 37-50.

 

-M. Hinich and P. Ordeshook (1974). “The Electoral College: A Spatial Analysis”. Political Methodoogy; pp. 1-29.

 

-M. Hinich, R. Mickelsen and P. Ordeshook (1975). “The Electoral College v. Direct Vote: Policy Trials, Reversals and Indeterminate Outcomes”. Journal of Math. Sociology; V.4-#?, pp. 3-36.

 

2. Multi-Dimensional Models

 

a. Overviews and Basic Structure

 

-O. Davis and M. Hinich (1966). “A Mathematical Model of Policy Formation in a Democratic Society”. in J. Bernd, ed. Mathematical Applications in Political Science--II. Dallas: SMU Press, pp. 175-208.

 

-O. Davis and M. Hinich (1967). “Some Results Related to a Mathematical Model of Policy Formation in a Democratic Society”. in J. Bernd, ed. Mathematical Applications in Political Science--III. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, pp. 14-38.

 

-O. Davis and M. Hinich (1968). “On the Power and Importance of the Mean Preference in a Mathematical Model of Democratic Choice”. PC; V.5-#?, pp. 59-72.

 

-D. Rae and M. Taylor (1971). “Decision Rules and Policy Outcomes”. BJPS; V.1-#?, pp. 71-90.

 

-R. Hoyer and L. Mayer (1974). “Comparing Strategies in a Spatial Model of Electoral Competition”. AJPS; V.?-#?, pp. 501-523.

 

-A. Denzau and R. Parks (1975). “The Continuity of Majority Rule Equilibrium”. Etrica; V.53-#5/6, pp. 853-866.

 

-S. Feld and B. Grofman (1987). “Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for a Majority Winner in n-Dimensional Spatial Voting Games: An Intuitive Geometric Approach”. AJPS; V.31-#4, pp. 709-728.

 

-N. Miller, B. Grofman and S. Feld (1989). “The Geometry of Majority Rule”. Journal of Theoretical Politics; V.1-#4, pp. 379-406.

 

-S. Feld and B. Grofman (1992). “Who’s Afraid of the Big, Bad Cycle: Evidence from 36 Elections”. Journal of Theoretical Politics; V.4-#2, pp. 231-237.

 

-J. Adams and E. Adams (2000). “The Geometry of Voting Cycles”. Journal of Theoretical Politics; V.12-#2, pp. 131-153.

 

-R. McKelvey (1990). “Game Theoretic Models of Voting in Multidimensional Issue Spaces”. in T. Ichiishi, A. Neuman and Y. Tauman, eds. Game Theory and Applications. San Diego: Academic Press, pp. 317-335.

 

-N. Schofield (1986). Social Choice and Democracy. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.

 

-J. Roemer (1998). “Why the Poor Do Not Expropriate the Rich: An Old Argument in New Garb”. Journal of Public Economics; V.70-#?, pp. 399-424.

 

b. Symmetry Conditions and Stability

 

-C. Plott (1967). “A Notion of Equilibrium and its Possibility under Majority Rule”. AER; V.57-#?, pp. 787-806.

 

-O. Davis, M. DeGroot and M. Hinich (1972). “Social Preference Orderings and Majority Rule”. Etrica; V.40-#1, pp. 147-157.

 

-J. Enelow and M. Hinich (1983). “On Plott's Pairwise Symmetry Condition for Majority Rule Equilibrium”. PC; V.40-#?, pp. 317-321.

 

-J. Sloss (1973). “Stable Outcomes in Majority Rule Voting Games”. PC; V.15-#1, pp. 19-48.

 

R. Hoyer and L. Mayer (1974). “Comparing Strategies in a Spatial Model of Electoral Competition”. AJPS; V.18-#3, pp. 501-523.

 

-R. Hoyer and L. Mayer (1975). “Social Preference Orderings under Majority Rule”. Etrica; V.43-#4, pp. 803-806.

 

-R. McKelvey and R. Wendell (1975). “Voting Equilibria in Multidimensional Choice Spaces”. Mathematics of Operations Research; V.1-#2, pp. 144-158.

 

-R. McKelvey (1976). “Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Control”. JET; V.12-#?, pp. 472-482.

 

-N. Schofield (1978). “Instability of Simple Dynamic Games”. REStud; V.40-#?, pp. 575-594.

 

-R. McKelvey (1979). “General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models”. Etrica; V.47-#5, pp. 1085-1112.

 

-L. Cohen (1979). “Cyclic Sets in Multidimensional Voting Models”. JET; V.20-#1, pp. 1-12.

 

-S. Matthews (1980). “Pairwise Symmetry Conditions for Voting Equilibria”. IJGT; V.9-#3, pp. 141-156.

 

-L. Cohen and S. Matthews (1980). “Constrained Plott Equilibria, Directional Equilibria and Global Cycling Sets”. REStud; V47-#?, pp. 975-986.

 

-S. Matthews (1982). “Local Simple Games in Public Choice Mechanisms”. IER; V.23-#3, pp. 623-645.

 

-R. McKelvey, P. Ordeshook, and P. Ungar (1980). “Conditions for Voting Equilibria in Continuous Voter Distributions”. SIAM Journal of Applied Mathematics; V.39-#1, pp. 161-168.

 

-Richards, Diana (1994). “Intransitivities in Multidimensional Spatial Voting: Period Three Implies Chaos”. SC&W; V.11-#2, pp. 109-119.

 

-D. Austen-Smith and J. Banks (1999). “Cycling of Simple Rules in the Spatial Model”. SC&W; V.16-#4, pp. 663-672.

 

-B. Dutta, M. Jackson, and M. Le Breton (2004). “Equilibrium Agenda Formation”. SC&W; V.23-#1, pp. 21-57.

 

c. The Core, Core Stability, etc.

 

(1) Global Cores

 

-J. Sloss (1973). “Stable Outcomes in Majority Rule Voting Games”. PC; V.15-#1, pp. 19-48.

 

-A. Rubinstein (1979). “A Note About the ‘Nowhere Denseness’ of Societies Having an Equilibrium Under Majority Rule”. Etrica; V.47-#2, pp. 511-514.

 

-J. Laing, S. Nakabayashi, and B. Slotznick (1983). “Winners, Blockers and the Status-Quo: Simple Collective Decision Games and the Core”. PC; V.40-#3, pp. 263-279.

 

-M. Le Breton (1987). “On the Core of Voting Games”. SC&W; V.4-#4, pp. 295-305.

 

-M. Truchon (1995). “Voting Games and Collective Choice Rules”. Mathematical Social Science; V.29-#?, pp. 165-179.

 

-N. Andjiga and B. Mbih (2000). “A Note on the Core of Voting Games”. Journal of Mathematical Economics; V.33-#3, pp. 367-372.

 

(2) Local Cores

 

-G. Kramer and A. Klevorick (1974). “Existence of a ‘Local’ Cooperative Equilibrium in a Class of Voting Games”. REStud; V.41-#4, pp. 539-548.

 

-M. Salles and R. Wendell (1977). “A Further Result on the Core of Voting Games”. IJGT; V.6-#1, pp. 35-40.

 

-N. Schofield (1980). “Generic Properties of Simple Bergson-Samuelson Social Welfare Functions”. JMathE; V.7-#?, pp. 175-192.

 

-N. Schofield (1983). “Generic Instability of Majority Rule”. REStud; V.50-#?, pp. 695-705.

 

-G. Cox (1984). “Non-Collegial Simple Games and the Nowhere Denseness of the Set of Preference Profiles Having a Core”. SC&W; V.1-#?, pp. 159-164.

 

-M. Le Breton and M. Salles (1987). “On the Generic Emptiness of the Local Core of Voting Games”. SC&W; V.4-#4, pp. 287-294.

 

(3) Some Experimental Results

 

-J. Beryl, R. McKelvey, P. Ordeshook and M. Winer (1976). “An Experimental Test of the Core in a Simple N-person, Cooperative, Nonsidepayment Game”. JCR; V.20-#?, pp. 453-479.

 

-M. Fiorina and C. Plott (1978). “Committee Decisions under Majority Rule: An Experimental Study”. APSR; V.72-#?, pp. 575-598.

 

-R. Mckelvey and P. Ordeshook (1981). “Experiments on the Core: Some Disconcerting Results”. JCR; V.25-#?, pp. 709-724.

 

d. Interpreting/Evaluating the Chaos Results

 

-W. Riker (1980). “Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions”. American Political Science Review; V.74-#?, pp. 432-446. [Comments by P. Ordeshook and D. Rae, with response by Riker follow]

 

-W. Riker (1982). Liberalism against Populism: A Confrontation between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice. San Francisco: W.H. Freeman.

 

-P. Ordeshook and K. Shepsle, eds (1982). Political Equilibrium. Boston: Kluwer Nijhoff.

 

-N. Miller (1983). “Pluralism and Social Choice”. APSR; V.77-#3, pp. 734-747.

 

-T. Schwartz (1985). “The Meaning of Instability”. ms: University of Texas.

 

-G. Tullock (1967). “The General Irrelevance of the Impossibility Theorem”. QJE; V.81-#?, pp. 256-270. [comment by P. Simpson, QJE; 1969, V.83: 478-490]

 

-K. Arrow (1969). “Tullock and an Existence Theorem”. PC; V.6-#?, pp. 105-111.

 

-N. Schofield (1984). “The General Relevance of the Imposibility Theorem in Smooth Social Choice”. Theory and Decision; V.16-#?, pp. 21-44.

 

-G. Tullock (1981). “Why So Much Stability?”. PC; V.37-#?, pp. 189-205.

 

-K. Shepsle and B. Weingast (1981). “Structure-Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice”. PC; V.37-#?, pp. 503-519.

 

-R. Niemi (1983). “Why So Much Stability?: Another Opinion”. PC; V.41-#?, pp. 261-270.

 

-M. McCubbins and T. Schwartz (1985). “The Politics of the Flatland”. PC; V.46-#?, pp. 45-60.

 

-J. Hill (1985). “Why So Much Stability?: The Impact of Agency Determined Stability”. PC; V.46-#?, pp. 275-287.

 

-T. Hammond and G. Miller (1987). “Distant Friends and Nearby Enemies: The Politics of Legislative Coalitions Formation”. PC; V.53-#?, pp. 277-284.

 

e. Deliberation and Democracy: Social Choice Theoretic Approaches

 

-J. Coleman and J. Ferejohn (1986). “Democracy and Social Choice”. Ethics; V.97-#?, pp. 6-25.

 

-J. Cohen (1986). “An Epistemic Conception of Democracy”. Ethics; V.97-#?, pp. 26-38.

 

-C. Pateman (1986). “Social Choice or Democracy? A Comment on Coleman and Ferejohn”. Ethics; V.97-#?, pp. 39-46.

 

-D. Estlund (1990). “Democracy without Preference”. Philosophical Review; V.99-#3, pp. 397-423.

 

-D. Miller (1991). “Deliberative Democracy and Social Choice”. Political Studies; V.40-#?, pp. 54-67.

 

-R. Hardin (1993). “Public Choice verus Democracy”. In D. Copp, J. Hampton and J. Roemer, eds. The Idea of Democracy. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 157-172.

 

-J. Knight and J. Johnson (1994). “Aggregation and Deliberation: On the Possibility of Democratic Legitimacy”. Political Theory; V.22-#2, pp. 277-296.

 

-D. van Mill (1996). “The Possibility of Rational Outcomes from Democratic Discourse and Procedures”. Journal of Politics; V.58-#?, pp. 734-752.

 

-T. Kuran (1998). “Insincere Deliberation and Democratic Failure”. Critical Review; V12-#4, pp. 529-544.

 

-C. List, I. McLean, J. Fishkin, and R. Luskin (2000). “Can Deliberation Induce Greater Preference Structuration”. MS: University of Texas.

 

-C. List, I. McLean, J. Fishkin, and R. Luskin (2001). “Deliberation, Preference Structuration, and Cycles: Evidence from Deliberative Polls”. MS: University of Texas.

 

-J. Dryzek and C. List (2003). “Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy: A Reconciliation”. British Journal of Political Science; V.33-#1, pp. 1-28.

 

-J. Cohen (1989). “Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy”. In A. Hamlin and P. Petit, eds. The Good Polity: Normative Analysis of the State. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 17-34.

 

-J. Fishkin (1991). Democracy and Deliberation. New Haven: Yale University Press.

 

-J. Habermas (1996). Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy. Cambridge: MIT Press.

 

-A. Gutmann and D. Thompson (1996). Democracy and Disagreement. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

 

-J. Rawls (1997). “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”. University of Chicago Law Review; V.94-#?, pp. 765-807.

 

-I.M. Young (2000). Inclusion and Democracy. Cambridge: CUP.

 

-J. Bohman and W. Rehg, eds. (1997). Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics. Cambridge: MIT Press.

 

-J. Elster, ed. (1998). Deliberative Democracy. Cambridge: CUP.

 

3. Alternative Solution Concepts and Limitation of Chaos

 

a. Supramajority Rules and the Core

 

-N. Schofield, B. Grofman and S. Feld (1988). “The Core and the Stability of Group Choice in Spatial Voting Games”. APSR; V.82-#1, pp. 195-211.

 

-J. Ferejohn and D. Grether (1974). “On a Class of Rational Social Decision Procedures”. JET; V.8-#?, pp. 471-481.

 

-G. Kramer (1977). “A Dynamical Model of Political Equilibrium”. JET; V.16-#?, pp. 310-334.

 

-J. Greenberg (1977). Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives”. Etrica; V.47-#?, pp. 627-636.

 

-S. Slutsky (1979). “Equilibrium under α-Majority Voting”. Etrica; V.47-#?, pp. 1113-1125.

 

-J. Greenberg and S. Weber (1984). “Balancedness, Nonemptiness of the Core and the Existence of a Majority Equilibrium”. IJGT; V.13-#2, pp. 65-68.

 

-N. Schofield (1983). “Equilibria in Simple Dynamic Games”. in P. Pattanaik and M. Salles, eds. SC&W. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 269-284.

 

-N. Schofield (1984). “Social Equilibrium Cycles on Compact Sets”. JET; V.33-#?, pp. 59-71.

 

-J. Strnad (1985). “The Structure of Continuous Valued Neutral Social Choice Functions”. SC&W; V.2-#?, pp. 181-195.

 

-M. Le Breton (1989). “A Note on Balancedness and Nonemptiness of the Core in Voting Games”. IJGT; V.8-#1, pp. 111-117.

 

-R. McKelvey and N. Schofield (1986). “Structural Instability of the Core”. JMath E; V.15-#?, pp. 179-198.

 

-R. McKelvey and N. Schofield (1987). “Generalized Symmetry Conditions at a Core Point”. Etrica; V.55-#4, pp. 923-933.

 

-J. Banks (1994). “Singularity Theory and Core Existence in the Spatial Model”. JMathE; V.24-#4, pp. 523-536.

 

-H. Kim (1995). “The Strongly Stable Core in Weighted Voting Games”. PC; V.,84-#1/2, pp. 77-90.

 

-D. Saari (1997). “The Generic Existence of a Core for q-Rules”. Economic Theory; V.9-#2, pp. 219-260.

 

-A. Meirowitz (2004). “The Core of Social Choice Problems with Monotone Preferences and a Feasibility Constraint”. SC&W; V.23-#3, pp. 467-478.

 

-N. Schofield (1995). “Existence of a Smooth Social Choice Functor”. in W. Barnett, et al., eds. Social Choice, Welfare and Ethics. Cambridge: CUP, pp.

 

-N. Schofield (1996). “The Heart of a Polity”. in N. Schofield ed. Social Choice and Political Economy. Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 183-220.

 

-D. Austen-Smith (1996). “Refinements of the Heart”. in N. Schofield ed. Social Choice and Political Economy. Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 221-236.

 

-N. Schofield (1998). “Aggregation of Smooth Social Preferences”. SC&W; V.15-#?, pp. 161-185.

 

-N. Schofield (1999). “The C 1 Topology on the space of Smooth Preference Profiles”. SC&W; V.16-#?, pp. 445-470.

 

-N. Schofield (1999). “The Heart and the Uncovered Set”. Journal of Economics (ZfN), Supplement 8 (Mathematical Utility Theory; eds. G. Herden, N. Knoche, C. Seidl, W. Trockel), pp. 79-114.

 

-N. Schofield (1999). “A Smooth Social Choice Method of Preference Aggregation”. in M. Wooders, ed. Topics in Mathematical Economics and Game Theory. Providence: American Mathematical Society, pp. 213-232.

 

-C. Tovey (1997). “Probabilities of Preferences and Cycles with Super Majority Rules”. JET; V.75-#2, pp. 271-279.

 

-A. Caplin and B. Nalebuff (1988). “On 64% Majority Rule”. Etrica; V.56-#4, pp. 787-814.

 

-A. Caplin and B. Nalebuff (1991). “Aggregation and Social Choice: A Mean Voter Theorem”. Etrica; V.59-#1, pp. 1-23.

 

-B. Ma and J. Weiss (1993). “On Some Generalizations of a Mean Voter Theorem”. EcLet; V.42-#?, pp. 185-188.

 

-B. Ma and J. Weiss (1995). “On the Invariance of a Mean Voter Theorem”. JET; V.66-#?, pp. 264-274.

 

b. The Bargaining Set

 

-R. Aumann and M. Maschler (1964). “The Bargaining Set for Cooperative Games”. in M. Dresher, L. Shapley and A. Tucker, eds. Advances in Game Theory. Princeton: PUP, pp. 443-476.

 

-M. Davis and M. Maschler (1967). “Existence of Stable Payoff Configurations for Cooperative Games”. in M. Shubik, ed. Essays in Mathematical Economics in Honor of Oskar Morgenstern. Princeton, PUP, pp. 39-52.

 

-B. Peleg (1967). “Existence Theorem for the Bargaiing Set ole.gif ”. in M. Shubik, ed. Essays in Mathematical Economics in Honor of Oskar Morgenstern. Princeton, PUP, pp. 53-56.

 

-M. Maschler (1976). “An Advantage of the Bargaining Set over the Core”. JET; V.13-#?, pp. 184-192.

 

-R. Wilson (1971). “Stable Coalition Proposals in Majority-Rule Voting”. JET; V.3-#?, pp. 254-271.

 

-N. Schofield (1980). “The Bargaining Set in Voting Games”. Behavioral Science; V.25-#?, pp. 120-129.

 

-N. Schofield (1982). “Bargaining Set and Stability in Coalition Governments”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.3-#?, pp. 9-31.

 

c. Stability Set

 

-M. Maschler and B. Peleg, (1976). “Stable sets and stable points of set-valued dynamic systems with applications to game theory”. SIAM J. Control Optimization; V.14-#6, pp. 985-995.

 

-A. Rubinstein (1980). “Stability of Decision Systems Under Majority Rule”. JET; V.23-#2, pp. 150-159.

 

-M. Le Breton and M. Salles (1990). “The Stability Set of Voting Games: Classification and Genericity Results”. IJGT; V.19-#2, pp. 111-127.

 

-S. Li (1993). “Stability of Voting Games”. SC&W; V.10-#?, pp. 51-56.

 

-M. S.-Y. Chwe (1994). “Farsighted Coalitional Stability”. JET; V.63-#2, pp. 299-325.

 

-B. Chakravorti (1999). “Far-Sightedness and the Voting Paradox”. JET; V.84-#2, pp. 216-226.

 

d. Competitive Solution

 

-R. McKelvey, P. Ordeshook and M. Winer (1978). “The Competitive Solution for N-person Games without Transferable Utility, with an Application to Committee Games”. APSR; V.72-#?, pp. 599-615.

 

-R. McKelvey and P. Ordeshook (1983). “Some Experimental Results that Fail to Support the Competitive Solution”. PC; V.40-#?, pp. 281-292.

 

-D. Koehler (1987). “The P-set: A Structure-Induced Equilibrium for Sequential Legislative Voting”. AJPS; V.31-#4, pp. 940-964.

 

-A. Stefanescu (2000). “Predicting Stable Configurations of Coalitions in Cooperative Games and Exchange Economies”. IJGT; V.29-#3, pp. 391-412.

 

e. Graphs, Tournaments, and Voting

 

(1) Graphs and Tournaments: Overviews

 

-J.-F. Laslier (1997). Tournament Solutions and Majority Voting. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.

 

-F. Harary, R. Norman, and D. Cartwright (1965). Structural Models: An Introduction to the Theory of Directed Graphs. New York: Wiley.

 

-G. Chartrand (1977). Introductory Graph Theory. New York: Dover.

 

-F. Harary and L. Moser (1966). “The Theory of Round Robin Tournaments”. American Mathematical Monthly; V.73-#3, pp. 231-246.

 

-J. Moon (1968). Topics on Tournaments. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston.

 

-K.B. Reid and L. Beineke (1979). “Tournaments”. in L. Beineke and R. Wilson, eds. Selected Topics in Graph Theory. London: Academic Press, pp. 169-204.

 

-L. Beineke (1981). “A Tour Through Tournaments, or Bipartite and Ordinary Tournaments: A Comparative Survey”. Combinatorics: Swansea, 1981. (London Mathematical Society Lecture Notes, 52). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 41-55.

 

-J. Bang-Jensen and G. Gutin (1996). “Paths, Trees and Cycles in Tournaments”. Congressus Nummerantium; V.115-#?, pp. 131-170.

 

-K.B. Reid (1996). “Tournaments: Scores, Kings, Generalizations and Special Topics”. Congressus Nummerantium; V.115-#?, pp. 171-211.

 

-Bang-Jensen, Jørgen and Gregory Gutin (1998). “Generalizations of Tournaments: A Survey”. Journal of Graph Theory; V.28-#4, pp. 171-202.

 

-Lu, Xiaoyun; Wang, Da-Wei; Wong, C. K. (2000). “On the Bounded Domination Number of Tournaments”. Discrete Mathematics; V.220-#1/3, pp. 257-261.

 

(2) Some Voting Rules

 

(a) Overviews

 

-D. Black (1958). Theory of Committees and Elections. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [Part II provides and overview of Condorcet, Borda, and others.]

 

-M. Dummett (1984). Voting Procedures. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

 

-K. Arrow and H. Raynaud (1986). Social Choice and Multicriterion Decision-Making. Cambridge: MIT Press.

 

-J. Levin and B. Nalebuff (1995). “An Introduction to Vote-Counting Schemes”. Journal of Economic Perspectives; V.9-#1, pp. 3-26.

 

-D. Saari (1995). Basic Geometry of Voting. Berlin: Springer.

 

-D. McGarvey (1953). “A Theorem on the Construction of Voting Paradoxes”. Etrica; V.21-#?, pp. 608-610.

 

-R. Stearns (1959). “The Voting Problem”. American Mathematical Monthly; V.66-#?, pp. 761-763

 

-M. Taylor (1968). “Graph-theoretical Approaches to the Theory of Social Choice”. PC; V.4, pp. 35-47.

 

-N. Miller (1977). “Graph-Theoretical Approaches to the Theory of Voting”. AJPS; V.21-#4, pp. 769-803.

 

-P. Fishburn (1977). “Condorcet Social Choice Functions”. SIAM Journal of Applied Mathematics; V.33-#3, pp. 469-489.

 

-J. Richelson (1975). “A Comparative Analysis of Social Choice Functions”; Behavioral Science; V.20-#5, pp. 331-337.

 

J. Richelson (1978). “A Comparative Analysis of Social Choice Functions, II”; Behavioral Science; V23-#1, pp. 38-44.

 

J. Richelson (1978). “A Comparative Analysis of Social Choice Functions, III”; Behavioral Science; V.23-#3, pp. 169-176.

 

J. Richelson (1981). “A Comparative Analysis of Social Choice Functions, IV”; Behavioral Science; V.35-#4, pp. 346-353.

 

-P. Fishburn (1984). “Discrete Mathematics in Voting and Group Choice”. SIAM Journal on Algebraic and Discrete Methods; V.5-#2, pp. 263-275.

 

-H. Nurmi (1995). “On the Difficulty of Making Social Choices”. T&D; V.38-#1, pp. 99-119.

 

-D. Smith (1999). “Manipulability Measures of Common Social Choice Functions”. SC&W; v.16-#4, pp. 639-661.

 

(b) Condorcet

 

-Marquis de Condorcet (1785). Essai sur l’Application de l’Analyse á la Probabilité des Décisions Rendues á la Pluralité des Voix. Paris.

 

(c) Borda Rules

 

-J.C. de Borda (1781). Mémoir sur les Élections au Scrutin. Paris: Histoire de’Académie Royale des Sciences.

 

-P. Gärdenfors (1973). “Positional Voting Functions”. T&D; V.4-#1, pp. 1-24.

 

-J. Smith (1973). “Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate”. Etrica; V.41-#6, pp. 1027-1041.

 

-H.P. Young (1974). “A Note on Preference Aggregation”. Etrica; V.42-#6, pp. 1129-1131.

 

-B. Fine and K. Fine (1974). “Social Choice and Individual Ranking, I and II”. REStud; V.41-#3, pp. 303-322, V.41-#4, pp. 459-475.

 

-H.P. Young (1974). “An Axiomatization of Borda’s Rule”. JET; V.9-#1, pp. 43-52.

 

-H.P. Young (1975). “Social Choice Scoring Rules”. SIAM Journal of Applied Mathematics; V.28-#?, pp. 824-838.

 

-B. Hansson and H. Sahlquist (1976). “A Proof Technique for Social Choice with Variable Electorate”. JET; V.13-#?, pp. 193-200.

 

-P. Fishburn and W. Gehrlein (1976). “Borda’s Rule, Positional Voting, and Condorcet’s Simple Majority Principle”. PC; V.28-#?, pp. 79-88.

 

-D. Farkas and S. Nitzan (1979). “The Borda Rule and Pareto Stability: A Comment”. Etrica; V.47-#?, pp. 1305-1306.

 

-S. Nitzan and A. Rubinstein (1981). “A Further Characterization of Borda Ranking Methods”. PC; V.36-#?, pp. 153-158.

 

-D. Saari (1990). “The Borda Dictionary”. SC&W; V.7-#4, pp. 279-317.

 

-M.R. Sanver (2002). “ Scoring Rules Cannot Respect Majority in Choice and Elimination Simultaneously”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.43-#2, pp. pp. 151-155.

 

(d) Kemeny Rules

 

-J. Kemeny (1959). “Mathematics without Numbers”. Daedalus; #88, pp. 571-591.

 

-P. Slater (1961). “Inconsistencies in a Schedule of Paired Comparisons”. Biometrika; V.48-#3/4, pp. 303-312.

 

-H.P. Young and A. Levenglick (1978). “A Consistent Extension of Condorcet’s Election Principle”. SIAM Journal of Applied Mathematics; V.35-#2, pp. 285-300.

 

-D. Saari and V. Merlin (2000). “A Geometric Examination of Kemeny's Rule”. SC&W; V.17-#3, pp. 403-438

 

-D. Saari and V. Merlin (2000). “Changes that Cause Changes”. SC&W; V.17-#4, pp. 691-705.

 

-T. Ratliff (2001). “A Comparison of Dodgson’s Method and Kemeny’s Rule”. SC&W; V.18-#1, pp. 79-89.

 

(e) Copeland Rules

 

-A. Copeland (1951). “A ‘Reasonable’ Social Welfare Function”. ms: University of Michigan Seminar on Applications of Mathematics to the Social Sciences.

 

-A. Rubinstein (1980). “Ranking Participants in a Tournament”. SIAM Journal of Applied Mathematics; V.38-#1, pp. 108-111.

 

-D. Henriet (1985). “The Copeland Choice Function: An Axiomatic Characterization”. SC&W; V.2-#1, pp. 49-63.

 

-B. Grofman, G. Owen, N. Noviello, and A. Glazer (1987). “Stability and Centrality of Legislative Choice in the Spatial Context”. APSR; V.81-#2, pp. 539-552.

 

-D. Saari and V. Merlin (1996). “The Copeland Method. I. Relationships and the Dictionary”. ET; V.8-#1, pp. 51-76.

 

-V. Merlin and D. Saari (1997). “The Copeland Method. II. Manipulation, Monotonicity, and Paradoxes”. JET; V.72-#1, pp. 148-172.

 

(f) Schwartz Rules--Top Cycle Sets

 

-T. Schwartz (1972). “Rationality and the Myth of the Maximum”. Noûs; V.6-#?, pp. 97-117.

 

-B. Hansson (1973). “The Independence Condition in the Theory of Social Choice”. T&D; V.4-#1, pp. 25-49.

 

-R. Deb (1977). “On Schwartz’ Rule”. JET; V.16-#1, pp. 103-110.

 

-G. Bordes (1976). “Consistency, Rationality, and Collective Choice”. REStud; V.43-#?, pp. 447-457.

 

-D. Packard and R. Heiner (1977). “Ranking Functions and Independence Conditions”. JET; V.16-#1, 84-102.

 

(3) The Uncovered Set and Variants

 

(a) Axiomatic Approaches

 

-B. Monjardet (1978). “An Axiomatic Theory of Tournament Aggregation”. Mathematics of Operations Research; V.3-#?, pp. 334-351.

 

-N. Miller (1980). “A New Solution Set for Tournaments and Majority Voting: Further Graph-Theoretical Approaches to the Theory of Voting”. AJPS; V.24-#1, pp. 68-96. [“Two Corrections”, AJPS; V.27: 382-385; and errata, V.28: 434.]

 

-K. Shepsle and B. Weingast (1984). “Uncovered Sets and Sophisticated Voting Outcomes with Implications for Agenda Institutions”. AJPS; V.28-#1, pp. 49-74.

 

-R. McKelvey (1986). “Covering, Dominance, and Institution-Free Properties of Social Choice”. AJPS; V.30-#2, pp. 283-314.

 

-G. Cox (1987). “The Uncovered Set and the Core”. AJPS; V.31-#2, pp. 408-422.

 

-R. Hartley and M. Kilgour (1987). “The Geometry of the Uncovered Set in the Three Voter Spatial Model”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.14-#2, pp.

 

-S. Feld, B. Grofman, R. Hartly, M. Kilgour, and N. Miller, with N. Noviello (1987). “The Uncovered Set in Spatial Voting Games”. Theory and Decision; V.23-#?, pp. 129-155.

 

-G. Bordes, M. Le Breton, and M. Salles (1992). “Gillies and Miller's Subrelations of a Relation over an Infinite Set of Alternatives: General Results; and Applications to Voting Games”. Mathematics of Operations Research; V.17-#3, pp. 509-518.

 

-B. Dutta (1988). “Covering Sets and a New Condorcet Choice Correspondence”. JET; V.44-#?, pp. 63-80.

 

-T. Schwartz (1990). “Cyclic Tournaments and Cooperative Majority Voting”. SC&W; V.7-#1, pp. 19-29.

 

-J. Banks, G. Bordes, and M. Le Breton (1991). “Covering Relations, Closest Orderings and Hamiltonian Bypaths in Tournaments”. SC&W; V.8-#?, pp. 355-363.

 

-N. Miller, B. Grofman, and S. Feld (1990). “Cycle Avoiding Trajectories, Strategic Agendas, and the Duality of Memory and Foresight: An Informal Exposition”. PC; V.64-#?, pp. 265-277.

 

-G. Laffond and J.-F. Laslier (1991). “Slater’s Winners of a Tournament May Not Be in the Banks Set”. SC&W; V.8-#?, pp. 365-369.

 

-G. Laffond, J. Laslier, and M. LeBreton (1993). “More on the Tournament Equilibrium Set”. Mathematiques, Informatiques et Sciences Humaines; V.31-#123, pp. 37-44.

 

-G. Laffond, J. Laslier, and M. LeBreton (1994). “The Copeland Value of Condorcet Choice Correspondences”. Discrete Applied Mathematics; V.55-#?, pp. 273-279.

 

-V.S. Levchenkov (1998). “Tournament Choice: A Generalization of the Covering Relation”. Automation and Remote Control; V.59-#8, part 2, pp. 1177-1185.

 

-O. Hudry (1999). “A Smallest Tournament for Which the Banks Set and the Copeland Set Are Disjoint”. SC&W; V. 16-#1, pp. 137-143.

 

-D. Epstein (1998). “Uncovering Some Subtelties of the Uncovered Set: Social Choice Theory and Distributive Politics”. SC&W; V.15-#?, pp. 81-93.

 

-G. Woeginger (2003). “Banks Winners in Tournaments are Difficult to Recognize”. SC&W; V.20-#3, pp. 523-528.

 

-O. Hudry (2004). “A Note on ‘Banks Winners in Tournaments are Difficult to Recognize’”. SC&W; V.23-#1, pp. 113-114.

 

-B. Dutta, M. Jackson, and M. Le Breton (2004). “Equilibrium Agenda Formation”. SC&W; V.23-#1, pp. 21-57.

 

-G. Bordes (1983). “On the Possibility of Reasonable Consistent Majoritarian Choice: Some Positive Results”. JET; V.31-#?, pp. 122-132.

 

-H. Moulin (1986). “Choosing from a Tournament”. SC&W; V.3-#?, pp. 271-291.

 

-G. Laffond, J.F. Laslier, and M. LeBreton (1995). “Condorcet Choice Correspondences: A Set-Theoretical Comparison”. Mathemaical Social Sciences; V.30-#1, pp. 23-35.

 

-G. Laffond, J.F. Laslier, and J.-F. Lainé (1996). “Composition Consistent Tournament Solutions and Social Choice Functions”. SC&W; V.13-#1, pp. 75-93.

 

-J.-F. Laslier (1996). “Rank-Based Choice Correspondences”. EcLets; V.52-#3, pp. 279-286.

 

-B. Dutta and J.-F. Laslier (1999). “Comparison Functions and Choice Correspondences”. SC&W; V.16-#4, pp. 513-532.

 

-G. Laffond and J. Lanié (1994). “Weak Covering Relations”. T&D; V.37-#?, pp. 245-265.

 

-J. Peris and B. Subiza (1999). “Condorcet Choice Correspondences for Weak Tournaments”. SC&W; V.16-#2, pp. 217-231.

 

-P. De Donder, M. Le Breton, and M. Truchon (2000). “Choosing From a Weighted Tournament”. Mathematical Social Science; V.40-#1, pp. 85-109.

 

-N. Schofield (1999). “The Heart and the Uncovered Set”. Journal of Economics (ZfN), Supplement 8 (Mathematical Utility Theory; eds. G. Herden, N. Knoche, C. Seidl, W. Trockel), pp. 79-114.

 

(b) Strategic Approaches

 

-R. McKelvey and P. Ordeshook (1976). “Symmetric Spatial Games without Majority Rule Equilibria”. APSR; V.70-#?, pp. 1172-1184.

 

-G. Kramer (1978). “The Existence of Electoral Equilibrium”. in P. Ordeshook, ed. Game Theory and Political Science. New York: NYU Press, pp. 375-389.

 

-R. Farquharson (1969). The Theory of Voting. New Haven: Yale University Press.

 

-G. Kramer (1972). “Sophisticated Voting over Multidimensional Choice Spaces”. Journal of Math. Sociology; V.2-#?, pp. 165-180.

 

-R. McKelvey and R. Niemi (1978). “A Multistage Game Representation of Sophisticated Voting for Binary Procedures”. JET; V.18-#1, pp. 1-22.

 

-B. Bjurulf and R. Niemi (1982). “Order-of-Voting Effects”. in M. Holler, ed. Power, Voting, and Voting Power. Würzburg: Physica-Verlag, pp.

 

-H. Moulin (1979). “Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes”. Etrica; V.47-#6, pp. 1337-1351.

 

-J. Banks (1985). “Sophisticated Voting Outcomes and Agenda Control”. SC&W; V.1-#?, pp. 296-306.

 

-J. Banks and G. Bordes (1988). “Voting Games, Indifference, and Consistent Social Choice Rules”. SC&W; V.5-#1, pp. 31-44.

 

-N. Miller, B. Grofman, and S. Feld (1990). “The Structure of the Banks Set”. PC; V.66-#?, pp. 243-251.

 

-M.J. Herrero and S. Srivastava (1992). “Implementation via Backward Induction”. JET; V.56-#1, pp. 70-88.

 

-B. Dutta and A. Sen (1993). “Implementing Generalized Condorcet Social Choice Functions via Backward Induction”. SC&W; V.10-#2, pp. 149-160.

 

-S. Srivastava and M. Trick (1996). “Sophisticated Voting Rules: The Case of Two Tournaments”. SC&W; V.13-#3, pp. 275-289.

 

-P. Coughlan and M. Le Breton (1999). “A Social Choice Function Implementable via Backward Induction with Values in the Ultimate Uncovered Set”. Review of Economic Design; V.4-#2, pp. 153-160.

 

-D. Fisher and J. Ryan (1992). “Optimal Strategies for a Generalized ‘Scissors, Paper and Stone’ Game”. American Mathematical Monthly; V.99-#10, pp. 935-942.

 

-D. Fisher and J. Ryan (1995). “Tournament Games and Positive Tournaments”. Journal of Graph Theory; V.19-#2, pp. 217-236.

 

-D. Fisher and J. Ryan (1995). “Condorcet Voting and Tournament Games”. Linear Algebra and its Applications; V.217-#1/3, pp. 87-100.

 

-D. Fisher, J.R. Lundgren, S. Merz, and K. Reid (1998). “The Domination and Competition Graphs of a Tournament”. Journal of Graph Theory; V.29-#2, pp. 103-110.

 

-G. Laffond, J.F. Laslier, and M. LeBreton (1993). “The Bipartisan Set of a Tournament Game”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.5-#1, pp. 182-201.

 

-G. Laffond, J.F. Laslier, and M. LeBreton (1994). “Social-Choice Mediators”. AER; V.84-#2, pp. 448-453.

 

-J. Duggan and M. LeBreton (1996). “Dutta’s Minimal Covering Sets and Shapley’s Weak Saddles”. JET; V.70-#?, pp. 257-265.

 

-J. Duggan and M. LeBreton (2001). “Mixed Refinements of Shapley Saddles and Weak Tounraments”. SC&W; V.18-#1, pp. 65-78.

 

-J. Banks, J. Duggan, and M. LeBreton (2002). “Bounds for Mixed Strategy Equilibria and the Spatial Model of Elections”. Journal of Economic Theory; JET; V.103-#1, pp. 88-105.

 

-Jean-François Laslier and Nathalie Picard (2002). “Distributive Politics and Electoral Competition”. JET; V.103-#1, pp. 106-130.

 

-G. Laffond, J.-F. Laslier, and M. LeBreton (1997). “A Theorem on Symmetric Two-Player Zero-Sum Games”. JET; V.72-#2, pp. 426-431.

 

-G. Laffond, J.-F. Laslier and M. Le Breton (2000). “K-Player Additive Extension of Two-Player Games with an Application to the Borda Electoral Competition Game”. T&D; V. 48-#2, pp. 129-137.

 

f. Stochastic Environments and the Yolk

 

-J. Ferejohn, R. McKelvey and E. Packel (1980). “Nonequilibrium Solutions for Legislative Systems”. Behavioral Science; V.25-#?, pp. 140-148.

 

-E. Packel (1981). “A Stochastic Solution Concept for n-Person Games”. Mathematics of Operations Research; V.6-#3, pp. 349-362.

 

-E. Hoffman and E. Packel (1982). “A Stochastic Model of Committee Voting with Exogenous Costs: Theory and Experiments”. Behavioral Science; V.27-#?, pp. 43-56.

 

-J. Ferejohn, R. McKelvey and E. Packel (1984). “Limiting Distributions for Continuous State Markov Voting Models”. SC&W; V.1-#1, pp. 45-67. [correction, G. Kramer and R. McKelvey, 1984, V.1-#3, pp. 243-244.]

 

-B. Grofman, G. Owen, N. Noviello, and A. Glazer (1987). “Stability and Centrality of Legislative Choice in the Spatial Context”. APSR; V.81-#2, pp. 539-552.

 

-N. Miller, B. Grofman, and S. Feld (1989). “The Geometry of Majority Rule”. Journal of Theoretical Politics; V.1-#4, pp. 379-406.

 

-S. Feld and B. Grofman (1991). “The Half-Win Set and the Geometry of Spatial Voting Games”. PC; V.70-#?, pp. 245-250.

 

-S. Feld, B. Grofman and N. Miller (1988). “Centripetal Forces in Spatial Voting: On the Size of the Yolk”. PC; V.59-#?, pp. 37-50.

 

-D. Koehler (1990). “The Size of the Yolk: Computations for Odd and Even-Numbered Committees”. SC&W; V.7-#?, pp. 231-245. [comment by R. Stone and C. Tovey, and Response, SC&W; 1992, V.9-#1, pp. 33-41]

 

-R. Stone and C. Tovey (1992). “Limiting Median Lines do Not Suffice to Determine the Yolk”. SC&W; V.9-#1, pp. 33-35.

 

-S. Feld, B. Grofman and N. Miller (1989). “Limits on Agenda Control in Spatial Voting Games”. Mathematical and Computer Modelling; V.12-#4/5, pp. 405-416.

 

4. Empirical Research on Spatial Competition

 

a. Methods

 

-G. Rabinowitz (1975). “An Introduction to Nonmetric Multidimensional Scaling”. AJPS; V.19-#2, pp. 343-390.

 

-J.D. Carroll (1980). “Multidimensional Scaling”. Annual Review of Psychology; V.31, pp. 607-649,

 

-C. Coombs (1964) A Theory of Data. New York: Wiley.

 

-R. Shepard, A.K. Romney and S. Nerlove, eds. Multidimensional Scaling, Volume 1: Theory. New York: Seminar Press.

 

-B. Jones (1974). “Some Considerations in the US of Nonmetric Multidimensional Scaling”. Political Methodology; V.?-#?, pp. 1-30.

 

-G. Rabinowitz (1976). “A Procedure for Ordering Object Pairs Consistent with the Multidimensional Unfolding Model”. Psychometrika; V.45-#?, pp. 349-373.

 

-R. McKelvey and W. Zavonia (1975). “A Statistical Method for the Analysis of Ordinal Level Dependent Variables”. Journal of Math. Sociology; V.4-#?, pp. 103-120.

 

-J. Aldrich and R. McKelvey (1977). “A Method of Scaling with Applications to the 1968 and 1972 Presidential Elections”. APSR; V.71-#?, pp. 111-130.

 

-L. Cahoon, M. Hinich and P. Ordeshook (1978). “A Statistical Multidimensional Scaling Method Based on the Spatial Theory of Voting”. New York: Academic Press, pp. 243-278.

 

-C. Tovey (1993). “Some Foundations for Empirical Study in the Euclidean Model of Social Choice”. in W. Barnett, M. Hinich and N. Schofield, eds. Political Economy: Institutions, Competition, and Representation. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 175-194

 

-K. Poole (1998). “Recovering a Basic Space from a Set of Issue Scales”. AJPS; V.42-#3, pp. 954-993.

 

b. Results

 

-H. Weisberg and J. Rusk (1970). “Dimensions of Candidate Evaluation”. APSR; V.64-#?, pp. 1167-1185.

 

-G. Rabinowitz (1978). “On the Nature of Political Issues: Insights from a Spatial Analysis”. AJPS; v.22-#4, pp. 793-817.

 

-G. Rabinowitz, P. Gurian and S. Macdonald (1984). “The Structure of Presidential Elections and the Process of Realignment, 1944-1980". American Journal of Political Science, V.28-#?, pp. 611-635.

 

-K. Poole and H. Rosenthal (1984). “US Presidential Elections 1968-1980: A Spatial Analysis”. AJPS; V.28-#?, pp. 282-312.

 

-T. Palfrey and K. Poole (1987). “The Relationship Between Information, Ideology, and Voting Behavior”. AJPS; V.?-#?, pp. 511-530.

 

-S. Macdonald and G. Rabinowitz (1987). “The Dynamics of Structural Realignment”. APSR; V.81-#3, pp. 775-796.

 

-G. Platt, K. Poole and H. Rosenthal (1992). “Directional and Euclidean Theories of Voting Behavior: A Legislative Comparison”. Legislative Studies Quarterly; V.17-#4, pp. 561-572.

 

-S. Macdonald and G. Rabinowitz (1993). “Direction and Uncertainty in a Model of Issue Voting”. Journal of Theoretical Politics; V.5-#1, pp. 61-87.

 

c. Experimental Methods

 

-R. McKelvey and P. Ordeshook (1990). “A Decade of Experimental Research on Spatial Models of Elections and Committees”. in J. Enelow and M. Hinich, eds. Advances in the Spatial Theory of Voting. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 99-144.

 

5. Valence Politics, and their Relationship to the Spatial Model

 

-D. Stokes (1992). “Valence Politics”. in D. Kavanagh, ed. Electoral Politics. Oxford: OUP (Clarendon), pp. 141-164.

 

-D. Stokes (1963). “Spatial Models of Party Competition”. APSR; V.57-#2, pp. 368-377.

 

-S. Matthews (1979). “A Simple Direction Model of Electoral Competition”. PC; V.34-#?, pp. 141-156.

 

-S. Macdonald and G. Rabinowitz (1987). “The Dynamics of Structural Realignment”. APSR; V.81-#3, pp. 775-796.

 

-G. Rabinowitz and S. Macdonald (1989). “A Directional Theory of Issue Voting”. APSR; V.83-#1, pp. 93-121.

 

-S. Macdonald and G. Rabinowitz (1993). “Direction and Uncertainty in a Model of Issue Voting”. Journal of Theoretical Politics; V.5-#1, pp. 61-87.

 

-Westholm, Anders (1997). “Distance versus Direction: The Illusory Defeat of the Proximity Theory of Electoral Choice”. APSR; V.91-#4, pp. 865-885.

 

-Kramer, Jorgen and Hans Rattinger (1997). “The Proximity and Directional Theories of Issue Voting: Comparative Results for the US and Germany”. European Journal of Political Science; V.32-#1, pp. 1-29.

 

-Gilljam, Mikael (1997). “The Directional Theory under the Magnifying Glass: A Reappraisal”. Journal of Theoretical Politics; V.9-#1, pp. 5-12.

 

-Merrill, Samuel, Bernard Grofman, and Scott Feld (1997). “Directional and Proximity Models of Voter Utility and Choice: A New Synthesis and an Illustrative Test of Competing Models”. Journal of Theoretical Politics; V.9-#1, pp. 25-48.

 

-Pierce, Roy (1997). “Directional versus Proximity Models: Verisimilitude as the Criterion”. Journal of Theoretical Politics; V.9-#1, pp. 61-74.

 

-S. Macdonald, G. Rabinowitz, and O. Listhaug (1998). “On Attempting to Rehabilitate the Proximity Model: Sometimes the Patient Just Can’t Be Helped”. Journal of Politics; V.60-#?, pp. 653-690.

 

-Dow, Jay (1998). “Direction and Proximity Models of Voter Choice in Recent US Presidential Elections”. Public Choice; V.96-#?, pp. 259-270.

 

-Merrill, Samuel, Bernard Grofman, and Scott Feld (1999). “Nash Equilibrium Strategies in Directional Models of Two-Candidate Spatial Competition”. Public Choice; V.98-#?, pp. 369-383.

 

-Lewis, Jeffrey and Gary King (1999). “No Evidence on Directional vs. Proximity Voting”. Political Analysis; V.8-#1, pp. 21-33.

 

-S. Ansolabehere and J. Snyder (2000). “Valence Politics and Equilibrium in Spatial Election Models”. PC; V.103-#?, pp. 327-336.

 

-Westholm, Anders (2001). “The Return of Epicycles: Some Crossroads in Spatial Modeling Revisited”. Journal of Politics; V.63-#2, pp. 436-481.

 

-S. Macdonald, G. Rabinowitz, and O. Listhaug (2001). “Sophistry versus Science: On Further Efforts to Rehabilitate the Proximity Model”. Journal of Politics; V.63-#2, pp. 482-500.

 

-Enriqueta Aragones and Thomas Palfrey (2002). “Mixed Equilibrium in a Downsian Model with a Favored Candidate”. JET; V.103-#1, pp. 131-161.

 

C. Spatial Competition with Entry and/or Multiple Parties (Including voting rules)

 

-K. Shepsle (1990). Models of Multiparty Electoral Competition. Chur: Harwood.

 

-K. Shepsle and R. Cohen (1990). “Multiparty Competition, Entry, and Entry Deterrence in Spatial Models of Elections”. in J. Enelow and M. Hinich, eds. Advances in the Spatial Theory of Voting. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 12-45.

 

-M. Osborne (1995). “Spatial Models of Political Competition under Plurality Rule: A Survey of Some Explanations of the Number of Candidates and the Positions they Take”. CJE; V.28-#2, pp. 261-301.

 

-W. Riker (1976). “The Number of Political Parties: A Reexamination of Duverger's Law”. Comparative Political Studies; V.9-#?, pp. 93-106.

 

-W. Riker (1982). “The Two Party System and Duverger's Law”. APSR; V.76-#?, pp. 753-766.

 

-W. Riker (1986). “Duverger’s Law Revisited”. in B. Grofman and A. Lipjhart, eds. Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences. New York: Agathon Press, pp. 19-42.

 

-B. Humes (1990). “Multi-party Competition with Exit: A Comment on Duverger’s Law”. PC; V.64-#?, pp. 229-238.

 

-S. Brams and P. Straffin (1982). “The Entry Problem in a Political Race”. in P. Ordeshook and K. Shepsle, eds. Political Equilibrium. Amsterdam: Nihjoff, pp. 181-195.

 

-T. Palfrey (1984). “Spatial Equilibrium with Entry”. REStud; V.51-#?, pp. 139-156.

 

-T. Palfrey (1989). “A Mathematical Proof of Duverger's Law”. in P. Ordeshook, ed. Models of Strategic Choice in Politics. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 69-91.

 

-J. Greenberg and S. Weber (1985). “Multiparty Equilibria under Proportional Representation”. APSR; V.79-#?, pp 693-703.

 

-J. Greenberg and K. Shepsle (1987). “The Effect of Electoral Rewards in Multiparty Competition with Entry”. APSR; V.81-#2, pp. 525-537.

 

-S. Wright and W. Riker (1989). “Plurality and Runoff Systems and Numbers of Candidates”. PC; V.60-#?, pp. 155-175.

 

-T. Fedderson, I. Sened and S. Wright (1990). “Rational voting and Candidate Entry under Plurality Rule”. AJPS; V.34-#4, pp. 1005-1016.

 

-T. Fedderson (1992). “A Voting Model Implying Duverger’s Law and Positive Turnout”. AJPS; V.36-#4, pp. 938-962.

 

-R. Myerson and R. Weber (1993). “A Theory of Voting Equilibria”. APSR; V.87-#1, pp. 102-114.

 

-M. Osborne (1993). “Candidate Positioning and Entry in a Political Competition”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.5-#?, pp. 133-151.

 

-G. Cox (1994). “Strategic Voting Equilibria under the Single Non-Transferable Vote”. APSR; V.88-#3, pp. 608-621.

 

-O. Neto and G. Cox (1997). “Electoral Institutions, Cleavage Structures, and the Number of Parties”. AJPS; V.41-#1, pp. 149-174.

 

-M. Fey (1997). “Stability and Coordination in Duverger’s Law: A Formal Model of Preelection Polls and Strategic Voting”. APSR; V.91-#1, pp. 135-147.

 

-A. Gerber and I. Ortuño-Ortin (1998). “Political Compromise and Endogenous Formation of Coalitions”. SC&W; V.15-#?, pp. 445-454.

 

-G. Laffond, J.F. Laslier, and M. Le Breton (2000). “K-Player Additive Extensions of Two-Player Games with an Application to the Borda Electoral Competition Game”. Theory and Decision; V.48-#2, pp. 129-137.

 

-G. Cox (1999). “Electoral Rules and the Calculus of Mobilization”. LSQ; V.24-#3, pp. 387–419.

 

-D. Canon (1999). “Electoral Systems and the Representation of Minority Interests in Legislatures”. LSQ; V.24-#3, pp. 331–385.

 

-M. Duverger (1954). Political parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State. New York: Wiley.

 

-M. Duverger (1986). “Duverger’s Law: Forty Years Later”. in B. Grofman and A. Lipjhart, eds. Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences. New York: Agathon Press, pp. 69-84.

 

-D. Rae (1967). The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws. New Haven: Yale.

 

-R. Taagepera and M. Shugart (1989). Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems. New Haven: Yale University Press.

 

-M. Shugart and J. Carey (1992). Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics. Cambridge: CUP.

 

-A. Lijphart (1995). Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies 1945-1990. Oxford: OUP.

 

-A. Lijphart (1999). Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries. New Haven: Yale University Press.

 

-G. Cox (1997). Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral System. Cambridge: CUP.

 

-A. Przeworski, S. Stokes, and B. Manin (1997). Democracy, Accountability, and Representation. Cambridge: CUP.

 

D. Multiconstituency Spatial Models

 

-D. Austen-Smith (1981). “Party Policy and Campaign Costs in a Multi-Constituency Model of Electoral Competition”. PC; V.37-#?, pp. 389-402.

 

-D. Austen-Smith (1984). “Two-Party Competition with Many Constituencies”. MathSocSci; V.7-#?, pp. 17-198.

 

-D. Austen-Smith (1986). “Legislative Coalitions and Electoral Equilibrium”. PC; V.50-#?, pp. 185-210.

 

-D. Austen-Smith (1987). “Parties, Districts and the Spatial Theory of Elections”. SC&W; V.4-#1, pp. 9-23.

 

-D. Austen-Smith (1992). “Electing Legislatures”. in N. Schofield, ed. Social Choice Theory and Political Economy. New York: Kluwer-Nijhoff.

 

-J. Snyder (1994). “Safe Seats, Marginal Seats, and Party Platforms: The Logic of Platform Differentiation”. E&P; V.6-#3, pp. 201-213.

 

E. Spatial Competition under Alternate Voting Regimes

 

-M. Dummett (1984). Voting Procedures. Oxford: OUP.

 

-J. Levin and B. Nalebuff (1995). “An Introduction to Vote-Counting Schemes”. Journal of Economic Perspectives; V.9-#1, pp. 3-26.

 

-S. Brams and P. Fishburn (1983). Approval Voting. Boston: Birkhauser.

 

-G. Cox (1984). “Strategic Electoral Equilibrium in Multicandidate Elections: Approval Voting in Practice”. AJPS; V.28-#?, pp. 722-738.

 

-G. Cox (1985). “Electoral Equilibrium under Approval Voting”. AJPS; V.29-#?, pp. 112-118.

 

-G. Cox (1987). “Electoral Equilibrium under Alternative Voting Institutions”. AJPS; V.?-#?, pp. 82-108.

 

-G. Cox (1989). “Undominated Candidate Strategies under Alternative Voting Rules”. Mathematical and Computer Modelling; V.12-#4/5, pp. 451-459.

 

-G. Cox (1990). “Multicandidate Spatial Competition”. in J. Enelow and M. Hinich, eds. Advances in the Spatial Theory of Voting. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 179-198.

 

-D. Austen-Smith (1989). “Sincere Voting in Models of Legislative Elections”. SC&W; V.6-#?, pp. 287-299.

 

-G. Cox (1990). “Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral Systems”. American Journal of Political Science; V.34-#4, pp. 903-935.

 

-R. Myerson (1993). “Proportional Representation, Approval Voting, and Coalitionally Straightforward Elections”. in W. Barnett, M. Hinich and N. Schofield, eds. Political Economy: Institutions, Competition, and Representation. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 1007-133.

 

-R. Myerson (1993). “Effectiveness of Electoral Systems for Reducing Government Corruption: A Game Theoretic Analysis”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.5-#?, pp. 118-132.

 

-R. Myerson (1993). “Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities under Alternative Electoral Systems”. APSR; V.87-#4, pp. 856-869.

 

-K. Ueda (1998). “On the Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities: A Note”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.25-#1, pp. 132-143.

 

-R. Myerson (1995). “Analysis of Democratic Institutions: Structure, Conduct, Performance”. Journal of Economic Perspectives; V.9-#1, pp. 77-89.

 

-R. Myerson (1997). “Economic Analysis of Political Institutions: An Introduction”. in D. Kreps and K. Wallis, eds. Advances in Economic Theory and Econometrics: Theory and Applications. V.1. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 46-65.

 

-R. Myerson (1999). “Theoretical Comparisons of Electoral Systems”. EER; V.43-#4-6, pp. 671-697.

 

-G. Cox (1997). Making Votes Count. Cambridge: CUP.

 

-D. Rae (1971). The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws. New Haven: Yale University Press.

 

-V. Bogdanor. (1984). Democracy and Elections: Electoral Systems and Their Political Consequences. Cambridge: CUP.

 

-A. Lijphart and B. Grofman, eds. (1984). Choosing an Electoral System. New York: Praeger.

 

-A. Lijphart (1990). “The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, 1945-1985". APSR; V.84-#?, pp. 481-496.

 

F. Party Activists and Spatial Competition

 

-P. Aranson and P. Ordeshook (1972). “Spatial Strategies for Sequential Elections”. in R. Niemi and H. Weisberg, eds. Probability Models of Collective Decision Making. Columbus: Charles Merrill, pp.

 

-J. Coleman (1972). “The Positions of Political Parties in Elections”. in R. Niemi and H. Weisberg, eds. Probability Models of Collective Decision Making. Columbus: Charles Merrill, pp.

 

-J. Aldrich (1983). “A Downsian Spatial Model with Party Activism”. APSR; V.77-#?, pp. 974-990.

 

-J. Aldrich (1983). “A Spatial Model with Party Activists: Implications for Electoral Dynamics”. PC; V.41-#?, pp. 63-100.

 

-J. Aldrich and M. McGinnis (1989). “A Model of Party Constraints on Optimal Candidate Positions”. Mathematical and Computer Modelling; V.12-#4/5, pp. 437-450.

 

-J. Snyder, Jr. (1994). “Safe Seats, Marginal Seats, and Party Platforms: The Logic of Platform Differentiation”. Economics and Politics; V.6-#3, pp. 201-213.

 

-B. Caillaud and J. Tirole (1999). “Party Governance and Ideological Bias”. EER; V.43-#?, pp. 779-789.

 

G. Spatial Competition with Imperfect/Asymmetric Information

 

1. The Paradox of Voting

 

a. Decision-theoretic Approaches

 

-J. Aldrich (1993). “Rational Choice and Turnout”. AJPS; V.34-#1, pp. 246-278.

 

-C.J. Uhlaner (1993). “What the Downsian Voter Weighs: A Reassessment of the Costs and Benefits of Action”. in B. Grofman, ed. Information, Participation, and Choice: An Economic Theory of Democracy in Perspective. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 67-79.

 

-W. Riker and P. Ordeshook (1968). “A Theory of the Calculus of Voting”. APSR; V.62-#1, pp. 25-42.

 

-W. Riker and P. Ordeshook (197?). “A General Theory of the Calculus of Voting”. in J. Herndon and J. Bernd, eds. Mathematical Applications in Political Science--V!. Charlottesville, University of Virginia Press, pp. 32-78.

 

-J. Ferejohn and M. Fiorina (1974). “The Paradox of Not Voting: A Decision Theoretic Analysis”. APSR; V.68-#2, pp. 525-536. [comments by G. Strom, S. Stephens, L. Mayer and I.J. Good, N. Beck, G. Tullock, R.E. Goodin and K.W.S. Robers, and response by Ferejohn and Fiorina, APSR; 1975; V.69-#?, pp. 908-928]

 

-P. Meehl (1977). “The Selfish Voter Paradox and the Thrown Away Vote Argument”. APSR; V.71-#1, pp. 11-30.

 

-G. Chamberlin and M. Rothschild (1981). “A Note on the Probability of Casting a Decisive Vote”. JET; V.25-#?, pp. 152-162.

 

-J. Ledyard (1981). “The Paradox of Voting and Candidate Competition: A General Equilibrium Analysis”. in G. Horwich and J. Quirk, eds. Essays in Contemporary Fields of Economics. West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, pp. 54-80.

 

-C. Foster (1984). “The Performance of Rational Voter Models in Recent Presidential Elections”. APSR; V.78-#3, pp. 678-690.

 

-T. Schwartz (1987). “Your vote Counts on Account of the Way it is Counted: An Institutional Solution to the Paradox of Not Voting”. PC; V.54-#?, pp. 101-121.

 

-G. Cox and M. Munger (1989). “Closeness, Expenditures and Turnout in the 1988 U.S. House Elections”. APSR V.83-#?, pp. 217-231.

 

-B. Grofman (1993). “Is Turnout the Paradox that Ate Rational Choice Theory?”. in B. Grofman, ed. Information, Participation, & Choice: An Economic Theory of Democracy in Perspective. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 93-103.

 

-C. Uhlaner (1989). “Rational Turnout: The Neglected Role of Groups”. AJPS; V.33-#2, pp. 390-422.

 

-C. Uhlaner (1989). “‘Relational Goods’ and Participation: Incorporating Sociability into a Theory of Action”. PC; V.62-#?, pp. 253-285..

 

-J. Dennis (1991). “Theories of Turnout: An Empirical Comparison of Alienationist and Rationalist Perspectives”. in W. Crotty, ed. Political Participation and American Democracy. New York: Greenwood Press.

 

-J. Matsusaka and F. Palda (1993). “The Downsian Voter Meets the Ecological Fallacy”. PC; V.77-#4, pp. 855-878.

 

-R. Morton (1991). “Groups in Rational Turnout Models”. APSR; V.35-#3, pp. 758-776.

 

-A. Glazer (1993). “Political Equilibrium under Group Identification”. in B. Grofman, ed. Information, Participation, & Choice: An Economic Theory of Democracy in Perspective. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 81-92.

 

-J. Filer, L. Kenny, and R. Morton (1993). “Redistribution, Income, and Voting”. AJPS; V.34-#1, pp. 63-87.

 

-J. Matsusaka and F. Palda (1993). “The Downsian Voter Meets the Ecological Fallacy”. PC; V.77-#?, pp. 855-878.

 

-K. Greene and O. Nikolaev (1999). “Voter Participation and the Redistributive State”. PC; V.98-#1/2, pp. 213-226.

 

-M. Lapp (1999). “Incorporating Groups into Rational Choice Explanations of Turnout”. PC; V.98-#1/2, pp. 171-185.

 

-R. Shachar and B. Nalebuff (1999). “Follow the Leader: Theory and Evidence on Political Participation”. AER; V.89-#3, pp. 525-547.

 

b. Game Theoretic Approaches

 

-T. Palfrey and H. Rosenthal (1983). “A Strategic Calculus of Voting”. PC, V.41-#1, pp. 7-53.

 

-J. Ledyard (1984). “The Pure Theory of Large Two-Candidate Elections”. PC; V.44-#1, pp. 7-41.

 

-T. Palfrey and H. Rosenthal (1985). “Voter Participation and Strategic Uncertainty”. APSR; V.79-#1, pp. 62-78.

 

-T. Fedderson (1992). “A Voting Model Implying Duverger’s Law and Positive Turnout”. AJPS; V.36-#4, pp. 938-962.

 

-T. Fedderson and W. Pesendorfer (1996). “The Swing Voter’s Curse”. AER; V.86-#3, pp. 408-424.

 

-T. Fedderson and W. Pesendorfer (1999). “Abstention in Elections with Asymmetric Information and Diverse Preferences”. APSR; V.93-#2, pp. 381-398.

 

-W. Pesendorfer and J. Swinkels (1997). “The Loser’s Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions”. Etrica; V.65-#6, pp. 1247-1282.

 

-W. Pesendorfer and J. Swinkels (2000). “Efficiency and Aggregation in Auctions”. AER; V.90-#3, pp. 499-525.

 

2. Uninformed Politicians

 

a. Competition among Asymmetrically Informed Politicians

 

-J. Ferejohn and R. Noll (1978). “Uncertainty and the Formal Theory of Political Campaigns”. APSR; V.72-#?, pp. 492-505.

 

-J. Ledyard (1989). “Information Aggregation in Two-Candidate Elections”. in P. Ordeshook, ed. Strategic Models of Politics. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. pp. 7-30.

 

-K. Kollman, J. Miller, and S. Page (1992). “Adaptive Parties in Spatial Elections”. APSR; V.86-#4, pp. 929-937.

 

-J. Miller and P. Staedler (1998). “The Dynamics of Locally Adaptive Parties under Spatial Voting”. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control; V.23-#?, pp. 171-189.

 

b. Probabilistic Voting

 

(1) Overviews/Surveys

 

-P. Coughlin (1986). “Probabilistic Voting Models”. in S. Kotz and N. Johnson, eds. Encyclopedia of Statistical Sciences. Vol. 7. New York: Wiley, pp. 204-210.

 

-P. Coughlin (1990). “Candidate Uncertainty and Electoral Equilibria”. in J. Enelow and M. Hinich, eds. Advances in the Spatial Theory of Voting. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 145-166.

 

-P. Coughlin (1992). Probabilistic Voting Theory. Cambridge: CUP.

 

-J.-D. Lafay (1993). “The Silent Revolution of Probabilistic Voting”. In A. Breton, G. Galeotti, P. Salmon, and R. Wintrobe, eds. Preferences and Democracy. Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 159-191.

 

(2) Probabilistic Participation (i.e. Abstentions)

 

-M. Hinich and P. Ordeshook (1969). “Abstentions and Equilibrium in the Political Process”. PC; V.7-#?, pp. 79-106.

 

-M. Hinich and P. Ordeshook (1970). “Plurality Maximization vs. Vote Maximization: A Spatial Analysis with Variable Participation”. APSR; V.64-#?, pp. 772-791.

 

-M. Hinich, J. Ledyard and P. Ordeshook (1972). “Nonvoting and the Existence of Equilibrium under Majority Rule”. JET; V.4-#?, pp. 144-153.

 

-M. Hinich, J. Ledyard and P. Ordeshook (1973). “A Theory of Electoral Equilibrium: A Spatial Analysis Based on the Theory of Games”. JoP; V.35-#?, pp. 154-193.

 

-S. Slutsky (1975). “Abstentions and Majority Equilibrium”. JET; V.11-#?, pp. 292-304.

 

-R. McKelvey (1975). “Policy-Related Voting and Electoral Equilibrium”. Etrica; V.43-#5/6, pp. 815-

 

-A. Denzau and A. Kats (1977). “Expected Plurality Voting Equilibrium and Social Choice Functions”. REStud; V.44-#?, pp. 227-233.

 

-P. Coughlin (1982). “Pareto Optimality of Policy Proposals with Probabilistic Voting”. PC; V.39-#?, pp. 427-433.

 

-D. Austen-Smith (1981). “Party Policy and Campaign Costs in a Multiconstituency Model of Electoral Competition”. PC; V.37-#?, pp. 389-402.

 

-J. Enelow and M. Hinich (1984). “Probabilistic Voting and the Importance of Centrist Ideologies in Democratic Elections”. JoP; V.46-#?, pp. 459478.

 

(3) Probabilistic Voting with Full Participation

 

(a) Structure of Equilibrium

 

-W. Comanor (1976). “The Median Voter Rule and the Theory of Political Choice”. PC; V.5-#?, pp. 169-177.

 

-M. Hinich (1977). “Equilibrium in Spatial Voting: The Median Voter Result is an Artifact”. JET; V.16-#?, pp. 208-219. [comment by G. Kramer, 1978, V.19: 565-567].

 

-M. Hinich (1978). “The Mean versus the Median in Spatial Voting Games”. in P. Ordeshook, ed. Game Theory and Political Science. New York: NYU Press, pp. 357-374.

 

-P. Coughlin (1979). “Nonlinear Optimization and Equilibria in Policy Formation Games with Random Voting”. in V. Lakshmikantham, ed. Applied Nonlinear Analysis. New York: Academic Press.

 

-P. Coughlin and S. Nitzan (1981). “Electoral Outcomes with Probabilistic Voting and Nash Social Welfare Maxima”. JPubE; V.15-#?, pp. 113-121.

 

-P. Coughlin and S. Nitzan (1981). “Directional and Local Electoral Equilibria with Probabilistic Voting”. JET; V.24-#?, pp. 226-239.

 

-P. Coughlin (1983). “Social Utility Functions for Strategic Decisions in Probabilistic Voting Models”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.4-#?, pp. 275-293.

 

-P. Coughlin (1984). “Davis-Hinich Conditions and Median Outcomes in Probabilistic Voting Models”. JET; V.34-#1, pp. 1-12.

 

-L. Samuelson (1984). “Electoral Equilibria with Restricted Strategies”. Public Choice; V.43-#3, pp. 307-327.

 

-L. Samuelson (1985). “On the Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives in Probabilistic Choice Models”. JET; V.35-#2, pp. 376-389.

 

-A. Feldman and K.-H. Lee (1988). “Existence of Electoral Equilibrium with Probabilistic Voting”. JPubE; V.35-#?, pp. 205-227.

 

-J. Enelow and M. Hinich (1989). “A General Probabilistic Spatial Theory of Elections”. PC; V.61-#?, pp. 101-113.

 

-T.-M. Lin, J. Enelow, and H. Dorussen (1999). “Equilibrium in Multicandidate Probabilistic Spatial Voting”. PC; V.98-#1/2, pp. 59-82.

 

-J. Adams (1999). “Multiparty Spatial Competition with Probabilistic Voting”. PC; V.99-#3/4, pp. 259-274.

 

(b) Elections, Income Distribution, and Efficiency

 

-P. Coughlin (1986). “Elections and Income Distribution”. PC; V.50-#?, pp. 27-91.

 

-A. Lindbeck and J. Weibull (1987). “Balanced Budget Redistribution as the Outcome of Political Competition”. PC; V.52-#?, pp. 273-297.

 

-R. Morton (1988). “A Group Majority Voting Model of Public Good Provision”. SC&W; V.4-#?, pp. 117-131.

 

-D. Wittman (1989). “Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results”. JPE; V.97-#6, pp. 1395-1424.

 

-D. Usher (1994). “The Significance of the Probabilistic Voting Theorem”. CJE; V.27-#2, pp. 433-445.

 

-W. Mayer and J. Li (1994). “Interest Groups, Electoral Competition, and Probabilistic Voting for Trade Policies”. E&P; V.6-#1, pp. 59-77.

 

-D. Clark and J. Thomas (1995). “Probabilistic Voting, Campaign Contributions, and Efficiency”. AER; V.85-#1, pp. 254-259.

 

-C.C. Yang (1995). “Endogenous Tariff Formation under Representative Democracy: A Probabilistic Voting Model”. AER; V.85-#4, pp. 956-963.

 

-W. Mayer (1998). “Trade Policy Platforms of Competing Parties: What Makes Them Different?”. RIE; V.6-#2, pp. 185-203.

 

c. Candidates with Policy Preferences

 

-D. Wittman (1990). “Spatial Strategies When Candidates Have Policy Preferences”. in J. Enelow and M. Hinich, eds. Advances in the Spatial Theory of Voting. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 66-98.

 

-D. Wittman (1977). “Candidates with Policy Preferences: A Dynamic Model”. JET; V.14-#?, pp. 180-189.

 

-D. Wittman (1983). “Candidate Motivation: A Synthesis of Alternative Theories”. APSR; V.77-#?, pp. 142-157.

 

-I. Hansson and C. Stuart (1984). “Voting Competitions with Interested Politicians: Platforms do not Converge to the Preferences of the Median Voter”. PC; V.44-#?, pp. 431-441.

 

-R. Calvert (1985). “Robustness of the Multidimensional Voting Model: Candidate Motivations, Uncertainty, and Convergence”. AJPS; V.29--#1, pp. 69-95.

 

-D. Mitchell (1987). “Candidate Behavior under Mixed Motives”. SC&W; V.4-#?, pp. 153-160.

 

-J. Enelow (1992). “An Expanded Approach to Analyzing Policy-minded Candidates”. PC; V.74-#?, pp. 425-445.

 

-A. Lindbeck and J. Weibull (1993). “A Model of Political Equilibrium in a Representative Democracy”. JPubE; V.51-#?, pp. 195-209.

 

-R. Morton (1993). “Incomplete Information and Ideological Explanations of Platform Divergence”. APSR, V.87-#2, pp. 382-392.

 

-J. Roemer (1994). “A Theory of Differentiated Politics in a Single-Issue Framework”. SC&W; V.11-#4, pp. 355-380.

 

-J. Roemer (1995). “Political Cycles”. E&P; V.7-#1, pp. 1-20.

 

-J. Roemer (1997). “Political-Economic Equilibrium when Parties Represent Constituents: The Unidimensional Case”. SC&W; V.14-#?, pp. 479-502.

 

-R. Ball (1999). “Discontinuity and Non-existence of Equilibrium in the Probabilistic Spatial Voting Model”. SC&W; V.16-#4, pp. 533-555.

 

-R. Ball (1999). “Opposition Backlash and Platform Convergence in a Spatial Voting Model with Campaign Contributions”. PC; V.98-#3/4, pp. 269-286.

 

-I. Ortuño-Ortin (1997). “A Spatial Model of Political Competition with Proportional Representation”. SC&W; V.14-#?, pp. 427-438.

 

d. Citizen Signaling

 

-S. Lohmann (1993). “A Signalling Model of Informative and Manipulative Political Action”. APSR; V.87-#2, pp.319-333.

 

-S. Lohmann (1995). “A Signaling Model of Competitive Political Pressures”. Economics and Politics; V.7-#3, pp. 181-206.

 

-S. Lohmann (1994). “The Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989-1991". World Politics; V.47-#1, pp. 42-101.

 

-S. Lohmann (1994). “Information Aggregation Through Costly Political Action”. American Economic Review; V.84-#3, pp. 518-530.

 

-S. Lohmann (1993). “A Welfare Analysis of Political Action”. in William Barnett, Melvin Hinich, and Norman Schofield, eds. Political Economy: Institutions, Competition and Representation. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 437-461.

 

3. Uninformed Voters

 

a. The Condorcet Jury Theorem and Information Aggregation by Voting

 

(1) With Naive Voters

 

-B. Grofman, G. Owen, and S. Feld (1983). “Thirteen Theorems in Search of the Truth”. Theory and Decision; V.15-#?, pp. 261-278.

 

-B. Grofman and G. Owen (1986). “Condorcet Models, Avenues for Future Research”. in B. Grofman and G. Owen, eds. Information Pooling and Group Decision Making. Greenwich, Ct.: JAI Press, pp. 93-102.

 

-J. Boland (1989). “Majority Systems and the Condorcet Jury Theorem”. The Statistician; V.38-#3, pp. 181-189.

 

-J. Boland, F. Proschan, and Y.L. Tong (1989). “Modelling Dependence in Simple and Indirect Majority Systems”. Journal of Applied Probability; V.26-#1, pp. 81-88.

 

-W. Hoeffding (1956). “On the Distribution of the Number of Successes in Independent Trials”. Annals of Mathematical Statistics; V.27-#3, pp. 713-721.

 

-S. Nitzan and J. Paroush (1982). “Optimal Decision Rules in Uncertain Dichotomous Choice Situations”. IER; V.23-#2, pp. 289-297.

 

-L. Shapley and B. Grofman (1984). “Optimizing Group Judgemental Accuracy in the Presence of Interdependencies”. PC; V.43-#3, pp. 329-343.

 

-H.P. Young (1986). “Optimal Ranking and Pairwise Choice from Pairwise Comparisons”. in B. Grofman and G. Owen, eds. Information Pooling and Group Decision Making. Greenwich, Ct.: JAI Press, pp. 113-122.

 

-N. Miller (1986). “Information, Electorates, and Democracy: Some Extensions and Interpretation of the Condorcet Jury Theorem”. in B. Grofman and G. Owen, eds. Information Pooling and Group Decision Making. Greenwich, Ct.: JAI Press, pp. 173-192.

 

-B. Grofman and S. Feld (1988). “Rousseau’s General Will: A Condorcetian Perspective”. APSR; V.82-#2, pp. 567-576. [comment and response, V.83-#4, pp. 1317-1340]

 

-H.P. Young (1988). “Condorcet’s Theory of Voting”. APSR; V.82-#4, pp. 1231-1244.

 

-G. Owen, B. Grofman, and S. Feld (1989). “Proving a Distribution-Free Generalization of the Condorcet Jury Theorem”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.17-#1,pp. 1-16.

 

-K. Ladha (1992). “The Condorcet Jury Theorem, Free Speech, and Correlated Votes”. AJPS; V.36-#3, pp. 617-634.

 

-K. Ladha (1993). “Condorcet’s Jury Theorem in the Light of de Finetti’s Theorem: Majority Rule with Correlated Votes”. SC&W; V.10-#1, pp. 69-86.

 

-K. Ladha (1995). “Information Pooling through Majority-Rule Voting: Condorcet's Jury Theorem with Correlated Votes”. JEBO; V.26-#3, pp. 353-72.

 

-K. Ladha (1996). “Hypothesis Testing and Collective Decision-making”. in N. Schofield ed. Social Choice and Political Economy. Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 385-392.

 

-K. Ladha and G. Miller (1996). “Political Discourse, Factions, and the General Will: Correlated Voting and Condorcet's Jury Theorem”. in N. Schofield, ed. Collective Decision-Making: Social Choice and Political Economy. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, pp. 393-410.

 

-S. Berg (1993). “Condorcet’s Jury Theorem, Dependency among Jurors”. SC&W; V.10-#1, pp. 87-95.

 

-S. Berg (1993). “Condorcet’s Jury Theorem Revisited”. EJPE; V.9-#?, pp. 437-446.

 

-S. Berg (1994). “Evaluation of Some Weighted Majority Decision Rules under Dependent Voting”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.28-#2, pp. 71-83.

 

-S. Berg (1997). “Indirect Voting Systems: Banzhaf Numbers, Majority Functions and Collective Competence”. European Journal of Political Economy; V.13-#3, pp. 557-73.

 

-S. Kanazawa (1998). “A Brief Note On A Further Refinement of the Condorcet Jury Theorem for Heterogeneous Groups”. MathSoc Sci; V.35-#1, pp. 69-73. [erratum, V.36-#1, pg 69.]

 

-J. Paroush (1998). “Stay Away from Fair Coins: A Condorcet Jury Theorem”. SC&W; V.15-#1,pp. 15-20.

 

-D. Barend and J. Paroush (1998). “When is Condorcet’s Jury Theorem Valid?”. SC&W; V.15-#4, pp. 481-488.

 

R. Ben-Yashar and J. Paroush (2000). “A Nonasymptotic Condorcet Jury Theorem”. SC&W; V.17-#2, pp. 189-199.

 

-M. Fey (2003). “A Note on the Condorcet Jury Theorem with Supermajority Voting Rules”. SC&W; V.20-#1, pp. 27-32.

 

-S. Nitzan and J. Paroush (1984). “Partial Information on Decisional Competence and the Desirability of the Expert Rule in Uncertain Dichotomous Choice Situations”. Theory and Decision; V.17-#?, pp. 275-286.

 

-D. Karotkin, S. Nitzan, and J. Paroush (1988). “The Essential Ranking of Decision Rules in Small Panels of Experts”. Theory and Decision; V.24-#?, pp. 253-268.

 

-D. Berend and J. Harmse (1993). “Expert rule versus Majority Rule under Partial Information”. Theory and Decision; V.35-#?, pp. 179-197.

 

-D. Karotkin and J. Paroush (1994). “Variability of Decisional Ability and the Essential Order of Decision Rules”. JEBO; V.23-#?, pp. 343-354.

 

-L. Louis and Y.S. Ching (1996). “Majority Vote of Even and Odd Experts in a Polychotomous Choice Situation”. T&D; V.41-#1, pp. 13-36.

 

-L. Sapir (1998). “The Optimality of Expert and Majority Rules under Exponentially Distributed Competence”. Theory and Decision; V.45-#1, pp. 19-35.

 

-D. Estlund (1994). “Opinion Leaders, Independence, and Condorcet’s Jury Theorem”. T&D; V.36-#?, pp. 131-162.

 

-D. Katzner (1999). “Participation and the Location of Decision Making in the Firm”. Journal of Comparative Economics; V.27-#1, pp. 150-167.

 

(2) With Strategic Voters

 

-R. Myerson (1998). “Population Uncertainty and Poisson Games”. IJGT; V.27-#3, pp. 375-392.

 

-R. Myerson (2000). “Large Poisson Games”. JET; V.94-#1, pp. 7-45.

 

-R. Myerson (1998). “Extended Poisson Games and the Condorcet Jury Theorem”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.25-#1, pp. 111-131.

 

-R. Myerson (2002). “Comparison of Scoring Rules in Poisson Voting Games”. JET; V.103-#1, pp. 219-251.

 

-T. Fedderson and W. Pesendorfer (1997). “Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections with Private Information”. Etrica; V.65-#5, pp. 1029-1058.

 

-D. Austen-Smith and J. Banks (1996). “Information, Aggregation, Rationality and the Condorcet Jury Theorem”. APSR; V.90-#1, pp. 34-45.

 

-J. Wit (1998). “Rational Choice and the Condorcet Jury Theorem”. G&EB; V.22-#?, pp. 364-376.

 

-T. Fedderson and W. Pesendorfer (1998). “Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts under Strategic Voting”. APSR; V.92-#1, pp. 23-35.

 

-T. Fedderson and W. Pesendorfer (1999). “Elections, Information Aggregation, and Strategic Voting”. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America; V. 96-#19, pp. 10572-10574.

 

-A. McLennan (1998). “Consequences of the Condorcet Jury Theorem for Beneficial Information Aggregation by Rational Agents”. APSR; V.92-#2, pp. 413-418.

 

-E. Dekel and M. Piccione (2000). “Sequential Voting Procedures in Symmetric Binary Elections”. JPE; V.108-#1, pp. 34-55.

 

-J. Duggan and C. Martinelli (2001). “A Bayesian Model of Voting in Juries”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.37-#2, pp. 259-294.

 

-H. Li, S. Rosen, and W. Suen (2001). “Conflicts and Common Interests in Committees”. AER; V.91-#5, pp. 1478-1497.

 

-Adam Meirowitz (2002). “Informative Voting and Condorcet Jury Theorems with a Continuum of Types”. SC&W; V.19-#1, pp. 219-236.

 

-C. Martinelli (2002). “Convergence Results for Unanimous Voting”. JET; V.105-#2, pp. 278-297.

 

-J. Glazer and A. Rubinstein (1998). “Motives and Implementation: On the Design of Mechanisms to Elicit Opinions”. JET; V.79-#2, pp. 157-173.

 

-P. Coughlan (2000). “In Defense of Unanimous Jury Verdicts: Mistrials, Communication and Strategic Voting”. APSR; V.94-#2, pp. 375-393.

 

-D. Gerardi (2000). “Jury Verdicts and Preference Diversity”. APSR; V.94-#2, pp. 395-406.

 

-S. Guarnaschelli, R. McKelvey, and T. Palfrey (2000). “An Experimental Study of Jury Decision Rules”. APSR; V.94-#2, pp. 407-423.

 

-H. Margolis (2001). “Pivotal Voting”. Journal of Theoretical Politics; V.13-#1, pp. 111-116.

 

-H. Margolis (2001). “Game Theory and Juries: A Miraculous Result”. Journal of Theoretical Politics; V.13-#4, pp. 425-435.

 

-Howard Margolis (2002). “Pivotal Voting and the Emperor’s New Clothes”. SC&W; V.19-#1, pp. 95-111.

 

b. Uninformed Voters with Rational Expectations and Information Aggregation

 

(1) On the Idea of Rationally Ignorant Voters

 

-A. Downs (1957). “Specific Effects of Information Costs”. Part III of An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper-Collins.

 

-P. Converse (1962). “Information Flow and the Stability of Political Attitudes”. Public Opinion Quarterly; V.26-#?, pp. 578-599.

 

-P. Converse (1964). “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics”. in D. Apter, ed. Ideology and Discontent. New York: Free Press, pp. 206-261.

 

-S. Popkin, J. Gorman, C. Phillips, and J. Smith (1976). “What Have You Done for Me Lately? Toward an Investment Theory of Voting”. APSR; V.70-#?, pp. 779-805.

 

-G. Quattrone and A. Tversky (1988). “Contrasting Rational and Psychological Analyses of Political Choice”. APSR; V.82-#?, pp. 719-736.

 

-R. Huckfeldt and J. Sprague (1990). “Social Order and Political Chaos: The Structural Setting of Political Information”. in J. Ferejohn and J. Kuklinski, eds. Information and Democratic Processes. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, pp. 23-58.

 

-M. MacKuen (1990). “Speaking of Politics: Individual Conversational Choice, Public Opinion, and the Prospects for Deliberative Democracy”. in J. Ferejohn and J. Kuklinski, eds. Information and Democratic Processes. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, pp. 59-99.

 

-M. Krassa (1990). “The Structure of Interaction and the Transmisssion of Political Influence and Information”. in J. Ferejohn and J. Kuklinski, eds. Information and Democratic Processes. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, pp. 100-113.

 

-P. Sniderman, J. Glaser and R. Griffin (1990). “Information and Electoral Choice”. in J. Ferejohn and J. Kuklinski, eds. Information and Democratic Processes. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, pp. 117-135.

 

-W. Rahn, J. Aldrich, E. Borgida, and J. Sullivan (1990). “A Social-Cognitive Model of Candidate Appraisal”. in J. Ferejohn and J. Kuklinski, eds. Information and Democratic Processes. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, pp. 136-159.

 

-S. Iyengar (1990). “Shortcuts to Political Knowledge: The Role of Selective Attention and Accessibility”. in J. Ferejohn and J. Kuklinski, eds. Information and Democratic Processes. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, pp. 160-185.

 

-P. Converse (1990). “Popular Representation and the Distribution of Information”. in J. Ferejohn and J. Kuklinski, eds. Information and Democratic Processes. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, pp. 369-388.

 

-S. Popkin (1991). The Reasoning Voter: Communication and Persuasion in Presidential Campaigns. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

 

-P. Sniderman, R. Brody, and P. Tetlock (1991). Reasoning and Choice: Explorations in Political Psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

 

-S. Popkin (1993). “Information Shortcuts and the Reasoning Voter”. in B. Grofman, ed. Information, Participation, and Choice: An Economic Theory of Democracy in Perspective. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 17-35.

 

-R. Noll (1993). “Downsian Thresholds and the Theory of Political Advertising”. in B. Grofman, ed. Information, Participation, and Choice: An Economic Theory of Democracy in Perspective. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 37-54.

 

-J. Matsusaka (1995). “The Economic Approach to Demoracy”. in M. Tommasi and K. Ierulli, eds. The Economics of Human Behavior. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 140-154.

 

-A. Lupia and M. McCubbins (1998). The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They Need to Know?. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

 

(2) Rationally Ignorant Voters and Ideology

 

-M. Hinich and W. Pollard (1981). “A New Approach to the Spatial Theory of Electoral Competition”. AJPS; V.25-#2, pp. 323-341.

 

-J. Enelow and M. Hinich (1981). “A New Approach to Voter Uncertainty in the Downsian Spatial Model”. AJPS; V.25-#3, 483-493.

 

-J. Enelow and M. Hinich (1982). “Ideology, Issues and the Spatial Theory of Elections”. APSR; V.76-#?, pp. 493-501.

 

-J. Enelow and M. Hinich (1982). “Nonspatial Candidate Characteristics and Electoral Competition”. JoP; V.44-#?, pp. 115-130.

 

-J. Enelow and M. Hinich (1990). “The Theory of Predictive Mappings”. in J. Enelow and M. Hinich, eds. Advances in the Spatial Theory of Voting. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 167-178.

 

-M. Hinich and M. Munger (1992). “A Spatial Theory of Ideology”. Journal of Theoretical Politics; V.4-#1, pp. 5-30.

 

-M. Hinich and M. Munger (1993). “Political Ideology, Communication, and Community”. in W. Barnett, M. Hinich and N. Schofield, eds. Political Economy: Institutions, Competition, and Representation. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 25-50.

 

-M. Hinich and M. Munger (1994). Ideology and the Theory of Political Choice. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

 

-A. Denzau and R. Mackay (1981). “Structure-Induced Equilibria with Perfect Foresight Expectations”. AJPS; V.25-#4, pp. 762-769.

 

-J. Enelow and M. Hinich (1983). “Voter Expectations in Multi-Stage Voting Systems: An Equilibrium Result”. AJPS; V.27-#4, pp. 820-827.

 

-J. Enelow and M. Hinich (1983). “Voting One Issue At A Time: the Question of Voter Forecasts”. APSR; V.77-#2, pp. 435-445.

 

-J. Enelow (1984). “A Generalized Model of Voting One Issue at a Time with Applications to Congress”. AJPS; V.28-#3, pp. 587-597.

 

-D. Epple and J. Kadane (1990). “Sequential Voting with Endogenous Voter Forecasts”. APSR; V.84-#1, pp. 165-175.

 

(3) Informational Shortcuts: Polls, Advice (Biased and Not), etc.

 

-R. Calvert (1986). Models of Imperfect Information in Politics. Chur: Harwood.

 

-B. Grofman and J. Withers (1993). “Information-Pooling Models of Electoral Politics”. in B. Grofman, ed. Information, Participation, & Choice: An Economic Theory of Democracy in Perspective. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 55-64.

 

-R. McKelvey and P. Ordeshook (1985). “Elections with Limited Information: A Fulfilled Expectations Model using Contemporaneous Poll and Endorsement Data as Information Sources”. JET; V.36-#1, pp. 55-85.

 

-R. McKelvey and P. Ordeshook (1987). “Elections with Limited Information: A Multidimensional Model”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.14-#1, pp. 77-99.

 

-R. McKelvey and P. Ordeshook (1986). “Information, Electoral Equilibria, and the Democratic Ideal”. JoP; V.48-#4, pp. 909-937.

 

-R. McKelvey and P. Ordeshook (1985). “Sequential Elections with Limited Information”. AJPS; V.29-#3, pp. 480-512.

 

-R. McKelvey and P. Ordeshook (1986). “Sequential Elections with Limited Information: A Fomal Analysis”. SC&W; V.3-#3, pp. 199-211.

 

-R. Calvert (1985). “The Value of Biased Information: A Rational Choice Model of Political Advice”. JoP; V.47-#2, pp. 530-555.

 

-B. Grofman and B. Norrander (1990). “Efficient Use of Reference Group Cues in a Single Dimension”. PC; V.64-#?, pp. 213-217.

 

-A. Lupia (1993). “Credibility and the Responsiveness of Legislation”. in W. Barnett, M. Hinich and N. Schofield, eds. Political Economy: Institutions, Competition, and Representation. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 379-404.

 

-M. Fey (1997). “Stability and Coordination in Duverger’s Law: A Formal Model of Preelection Polls and Strategic Voting”. APSR; V.91-#1, pp. 135-147.

 

-T. Fedderson and W. Pesendorfer (1997). “The Swing Voter’s Curse”. AER; V.86-#3, pp. 408-424.

 

-T. Fedderson and W. Pesendorfer (1999). “Abstention in Elections with Asymmetric Information and Diverse Preferences”. APSR; V.93-#2, pp. 381-398.

 

-T. Fedderson and W. Pesendorfer (1999). “Elections, Information Aggregation, and Strategic Voting”. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America; V. 96-#19, pp. 10572-10574.

 

-J. Wit (1999). “Social Learning in a Common Interest Voting Game”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.26-#1, pp. 131-156.

 

-M. S.-Y. Chwe (1999). “Minority Voting Rights Can Maximize Majority Welfare”. APSR; V.93-#1, pp. 85-97.

 

-E. Dekel and M. Piccione (2000). “Sequential Voting Procedures in Symmetric Binary Elections”. JPE; V.108-#1, pp. 34-55.

 

-Howard Margolis (2002). “Pivotal Voting and the Emperor’s New Clothes”. SC&W; V.19-#1, pp. 95-111.

 

-S. Lohmann (1998). “An Information Rationale for the Power of Special Interests”. APSR; V.92-#4, pp. 809-827.

 

-R. Myerson (1999). “Informational Origins of Political Bias Towards Critical Groups of Voters”. EER; V.43-#4-6, pp. 767-778.

 

-A. Prat (2002). “Campaign Advertising and Voter Welfare”. REStud; forth.

 

-A. Cukierman (1991). “Asymmetric Information and the Electoral Momentum of Public Opinion Polls”. PC; V.70-#?, pp. 181-213.

 

-C.S. Hong and K. Konrad (1998). “Bandwagon Effects and Two-Party Majority Voting”. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty; V.16-#2, pp. 165-172.

 

(4) Some Related Empirical Work

 

(a) What Do Voters Know? (And Why it Matters)

 

-B. Berelson, P. Lazarsfeld, and W. McPhee (1954). Voting. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

 

-A. Campbell, P. Converse, W. Miller, and D. Stokes (1960). The American Voter. New York: Wiley.

 

-V.O. Key (1961). Public Opinion and American Democracy. New York: Knopf.

 

-P. Converse (1975). “Public Opinion and Voting Behavior”. in F. Greenstein and N. Posby, eds. Handbook of Political Science: Vol. 4. Reading: Addison-Wesley, pp. 75-169.

 

-N. Nie, S. Verba and J. Petrocik (1976). The Changing American Voter. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

 

-D. Kinder and D. Sears (1985). “Public Opinion and Political Action”. in G. Lindzey and A. Aronson, eds. Handbook of Social Psychology. New York: Random House, pp. 659-741.

 

-B. Page and R. Shapiro (1992). The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in American’s Policy Preferences. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

 

-J. Zaller (1992). The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

 

-M. Delli Caripini and S. Keeter (1996). What Americans Know About Politics and Why It Matters. New Haven: Yale University Press.

 

-W. Flanigan and N. Zingale (1998). Political Behavior of the American Electorate. (9th Edition) Washington, DC: CQ Press.

 

(b) Econometric Studies

 

-B. Roberts (1989). “Voters, Investors and the Consumption of Political Information”. in P. Ordeshook, ed. Models of Strategic Choice in Politics. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 31-47.

 

-S. Peltzman (1990). “How Efficient is the Voting Market?”. Journal of Law and Economics; V.33-#?, pp. 27-63.

 

-A. Lupia (1994). “Shortcuts versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections”. APSR; V.88-#1, pp. 63-76.

 

(c) Experimental Studies

 

-R. McKelvey and P. Ordeshook (1984). “Rational Expectations and Elections: Some Experimental Results based on A Multidimensional Model”. PC; V.44-#1, pp. 44-#?, pp. 61-102.

 

-R. McKelvey and P. Ordeshook (1984). “A Decade of Experimental Research on Spatial Models of Elections and Committees”. in J. Enelow and M. Hinich, eds. Advances in the spatial theory of voting. Cambridge: CUP, pp. pp. 99-144.

 

-R. McKelvey and P. Ordeshook (1990). “Information and Elections: Retrospective Voting and Rational Expectations”. in J. Ferejohn and J. Kuklinski, eds. Information and Democratic Processes. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, pp. 281-312.

 

-R. Forsythe, R. Myerson, T. Rietz, and R. Weber (1993). “An Experiment on Coordination in Multi-candidate Elections: The Importance of Polls and Election Histories”. SC&W; V.10-#?, pp. 223-247.

 

-A. Lupia (1994). “The Effect of Information on Voting Behavior and Electoral Outcomes: An Experimental Study of Direct Legislation”. PC; V.78-#1, pp. 65-86.

 

-R. Morton and K. Williams (1999). “Information Asymmetries and Simultaneous versus Sequential Voting”. APSR; V.93-#1, pp. 53-67.

 

c. Prospective (i.e. “Issue”) Voting

 

(1) Ambiguous Political Platforms

 

-R. Zeckhauser (1969). “Majority Rule with Lotteries on Alternatives”. QJE, V.83-#?, pp. 696-703. (Comment by Shepsle, 1970, V.84-#?, pp. 705-709.

 

-P. Fishburn (1972). “Lotteries and Social Choices”. JET; V.5-#?, pp. 189-207.

 

-P. Fishburn (1978). “Acceptable Social Chice Lotteries”. in H. Gottinger and W. Leinfeller, eds. Decision Theory and Social Ethics: Issues in Social Choice. Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 133-152.

 

-K. Shepsle (1972). “Parties, Voters and the Risk Environment”. in R. Niemi and H. Weisberg, eds. Probability Models of Collective Decision Making. Columbus: Charles Merrill, pp. 273-297.

 

-K. Shepsle (1972). “The Strategy of Ambiguity: Uncertainty and Electoral Competition”. APSR; V.66-#?, pp. 555-568.

 

-R. McKelvey and J. Richelson (1974). “Cycles of Risk”. PC; V.18-#?, pp. 41-66.

 

-B. Page (1976). “The Theory of Political Ambiguity”. APSR; V.70-#?, pp. 742-752.

 

-R. McKelvey (1980). “Ambiguity in Spatial Models of Policy Formation”. PC; V.35-#?, pp. 385-402.

 

-A. Glazer (1990). “The Strategy of Candidate Ambiguity”. APSR; V.84-#1, pp. 237-241.

 

(2) Signaling Models

 

-J. Banks (1991). Signaling Models in Political Science. Chur: Harwood.

 

-J. Banks (1985). “A Model of Electoral Competition with Incomplete Information”. JET; V.50-#?, pp. 309-325.

 

-W.R. Reed (1989). “Information in Political Markets: A Little Knowledge Can be a Dangerous Thing”. JLEO; V.5-#?, pp. 355-374.

 

-J. Harrington (1992). “The Revelation of Information Through the Electoral Process: An Exploratory Analysis”. E&P; V.4-#3, pp. 255-275.

 

-J. Harrington (1992). “Modeling the Role of Information in Elections”. Mathematical and Computer Modeling; V.16-#4/5, pp. 133-145.

 

-C. Schultz (1996). “Polarization and Inefficient Policies”. REStud; V.63-#2, pp. 331-344.

 

(3) Rational Voters with Model Uncertainty

 

-J. Harrington (1993). “Economic Policy, Economic Performance, and Elections”. AER; V.83-#1, pp.27-42.

 

-J. Roemer (1994). “The Strategic Role of Party Ideology when Voters are Uncertain about How the Economy Works”. APSR; V.88-#2, pp. 327-335.

 

-C. Schultz (1995). “The Politics of Persuasion when Voters are Rational”. ScanJE; V.97-#3, pp. 357-368.

 

-W. Letterie and O. Swank (1998). “Economic Policy, Model Uncertainty and Elections”. E&P; V.10-#1, pp. 85-103.

 

-Cukierman, Alex and Mariano Tommasi (1998). “When Does it Take a Nixon to Go to China?”. AER; V.88-#1, pp. 180-197.

 

-T. Piketty (1995). “Social Mobility and Redistributive Politics”. QJE; V.110-#3, pp. 551-584.

 

d. Retrospective Voting

 

(1) General Uncertainty

 

-M. Fiorina (1977). “An Outline for a Model of Party Choice”. AJPS; V.21-#3, pp. 601-625.

 

-M. Fiorina (1981). Retrospective Voting in American National Elections. New Haven: Yale.

 

-G. Kramer (1971). “A Dynamical Model of Political Equilibrium”. JET; V.16-#?, pp. 310-334.

 

-M. Zechman (1979). “Dynamic Models of the Voter's Decision Calculus: Incorporating Retrospective Considerations into Rational Choice Models of Voting Behavior”. PC; V.34-#?, pp. 297-315.

 

-H. Weisberg and M. Fiorina (1972). “Candidate Preference under Uncertainty: An Expanded View of Rational Voting”. R. Niemi and H. Weisberg, eds. Probability Models of Collective Deicsion Making. Columbus: Merrill, pp. 237-256.

 

(2) Moral Hazard

 

-J. Ferejohn (1993). “The Spatial Model and Elections”. in B. Grofman, ed. Information, Participation, & Choice: An Economic Theory of Democracy in Perspective. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 107-124.

 

-R. Barro (1973). “The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model”. PC; V.14-#?, pp. 19-42.

 

-M.D. Bernhardt and D. Ingberman (1985). “Candidate Reputations and the ‘Incumbency Effect’”. JPubE; V.27-#?, pp. 47-67.

 

-J. Ferejohn (1986). “Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control”. PC; V.50-#1/3, pp. 5-25.

 

-H. Chappell and W. Keech (1986). “Policy Motivation and Party Differences in a Dynamic Model of Party Competition”. APSR; V.80-#3, pp. 881-899.

 

-A. Alesina (1988). “Credibility and Convergence in a Two-Party System with Rational Voters”. AER; V.78-#4, pp. 796-805.

 

-A. Alesina and S. Spear (1988). “An Overlapping Generations Model of Electoral Competition”. JPubE; V.37-#?, pp. 359-379.

 

-A. Alesina and A. Cukierman (1990). “The Politics of Ambiguity”. QJE; V.105-#4, pp. 829-850.

 

-E. Aragones and Z. Neeman (2000). Strategic Ambiguity in Electoral Competition”. Journal of Theoretical Politics; V.12-#2, pp. 183-204.

 

-D. Ingberman (1989). “Reputational Dynamics in Spatial Competition”. Mathematical and Computer Modelling; V.12-#4/5, pp. 479-496.

 

-D. Austen-Smith and J. Banks (1989). “Electoral Accountability and Incumbency”. in P. Ordeshook, ed. Strategic Models of Politics. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. pp. 121-148.

 

-M. Fiorina and K. Shepsle (1990). “A Positive Theory of Negative Voting”. in J. Ferejohn and J. Kuklinski, ed. Information and Democratic Process. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, pp. 219-239.

 

-J. Harrington (1992). “The Role of Party Reputation in the Formation of Policy”. JPubE; V. 49-#?, pp. 107-121.

 

(3) Adverse Selection

 

-W. Rogoff and A. Sibert (1988). “Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles”. REStud; V.55-#1, pp. 1-16.

 

-K. Rogoff (1990). “Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles”. AER; V.80-#1, pp. 21-36.

 

-J. Harrington (1993). “The Impact of Reelection Pressures on the Fulfillment of Campaign Promises”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.5-#?, pp. 71-97.

 

-S. Lohmann (1998). “Rationalizing the Political Business Cycle Model”. E&P; V.10-#1, pp. 1-17.

 

-J. Duggan (2000). “Repeated Elections with Asymmetric Information”. Economics and Politics; V.12-#2, pp. 109-135.

 

(4) Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection

 

-J. Banks and R. Sundaram (1993). “Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in a Repeated Elections Model”. in W. Barnett, M. Hinich and N. Schofield, eds. Political Economy: Institutions, Competition, and Representation. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 295-311.

 

-J. Banks and R. Sundaram (1998). “Optimal Retention in Agency Problems”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.82-#2, pp. 293-323.

 

-W.R. Reed (1994). “A Retrospective Voting Model with Heterogeneous Politicians”. E&P; V.6-#1, pp. 39-55.

 

-W.R. Reed and J. Cho (1998). “A Comparison of Prospective and Retrospective Voting with Heterogeneous Politicians”. PC; V.96-#1/2, pp. 93-116.


III. Legislative Politics

 

A. Models of Legislative Decision-Making

 

1. Overviews and Surveys

 

-R.D. Arnold (1990). The Logic of Congressional Action. New Haven: Yale University Press.

 

-K. Shepsle (1989). “The Changing Textbook Congress”. in J. Chubb and P. Peterson, eds. Can Government Govern? Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 238-266.

 

-K. Krehbiel (1988). “Spatial Models of Legislative Choice”. LSQ; V.13-#3, pp. 259-319.

 

2. Theory of Legislative Decision-Making

 

a. Legislative Coalitions and Government Formation

 

-D. Austen-Smith (1986). “Legislative Coalitions and Electoral Equilibrium”. PC; V.50-#?, pp. 185-210.

 

-D. Austen-Smith and J. Banks (1988). “Elections, Coalitions and Legislative Outcomes”. APSR; V.82-#2, pp. 405-422.

 

-M. Laver and K. Shepsle (1990). “Coalitions and Cabinet Government”. APSR; V.84-#?, pp. 873-890.

 

-D. Austen-Smith and J. Banks (1990). “Stable Governments and the Allocation of Policy Portfolios”. APSR; V.84-#?, pp. 891-906.

 

-D. Baron (1989). “A Noncooperative Theory of Legislative Coalition”. AJPS; V.33-#4, pp. 1048-1084.

 

-D. Baron (1991). “A Spatial Bargaining Model of Government Formation in Parliamentary Systems”. APSR; V.82-#?, pp. 137-164.

 

-D. Baron (1993). “Government Formation and Endogenous Parties”. APSR; V.87-#1, pp. 34-47.

 

-N. Schofield (1993). “Party Competition in a Spatial Model of Coalition Formation”. in W. Barnett, M. Hinich and N. Schofield, eds. Political Economy: Institutions, Competition, and Representation. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 135-174.

 

-L. Dodd (1976). Coalitions in Parliamentary Government. Princeton: PUP.

 

-M. Laver and N. Schofield (1990). Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe. Oxford: OUP.

 

-M. Laver and I. Budge (1992). Party Policy and Coalition Government. London: Macmillan.

 

b. Internal Politics of the Legislature

 

(1) Logrolling

 

-R. Wilson (1969). “An Axiomatic Model of Logrolling”. AER; V.59-#3, pp. 331-341.

 

-J. Kadane (1972). “On Division of the Question”. PC; V.13-#?, pp. 47-54.

 

-P. Bernholz (1973). “Logrolling, Arrow Paradox and Cyclical Majorities”. PC; V.15-#?, pp. 87-95.

 

-P. Bernholz (1974). “Logrolling, Arrow-Paradox and Decision Rules--A Generalization”. KYKLOS; V.27-#1, pp. 49-61.

 

-W. Riker and S. Brams (1973). “The Paradox of Vote Trading”. APSR; V.67-#4, pp. 1235-1247.

 

-D. Koehler (1975). “Vote Trading and Voting Paradox: A Proof of Logical Equivalence”. APSR; V.69-#?, pp. 954-960. [comments and response follow]

 

-T. Schwartz (1977). “Collective Choice, Separation of Issues and Vote Trading”. APSR; V.77-#?, pp. 999-1010.

 

-J. Enelow and D. Koehler (1979). “Vote Trading in a Legislative Context: an Analysis of Cooperative and Noncooperative Strategies”. PC; V.34-#?, pp. 157-175.

 

-J. Enelow (1979). “Noncooperative Counterthreats to Vote Trading”. AJPS; V.23-#1, pp. 121-138.

 

-N. Miller (1977). “Logrolling, Vote Trading, and the Paradox of Voting: A Game-Theoretical Overview”. PC; V.30-#?, pp. 51-75.

 

-T. Schwartz (1981). “The Universal Instability Theorem”. PC; V.37-#?, pp. 487-501.

 

-K. Koford (1982). “Centralized Vote Trading”. PC; V.39-#?, pp. 245-268.

 

-P. Bernholz (1982). “Externalities as a Necessary Condition for Cyclical Social Preferences”. QJE; V.?-#?, pp. 699-705.

 

-P. Bernholz (19??). “On the Stability of Logrolling Outcomes in Stochastic Voting Games”. PC; V.33-#3, pp. 65-82.

 

-J. Enelow (1986). “The Stability of Logrolling: An Expectations Approach”. PC; V.51-#3, pp. 285-294.

 

-D. Abler (1989). “Vote Trading on Farm Legislation in the House”. Journal of Agricultural Economics; V.71-#?, pp. 583-591.

 

-T. Stratmann (1992). “The Effects of Logrolling on Congressional Voting”. AER; V.82-#5, pp. 1162-1176.

 

-T. Groseclose (1996). “An Examination of the Market for Favors and Votes in Congress”. EcInq; V.34-#2, pp. 320-340.

 

(2) Universalism and Reciprocity

 

-B. Weingast (1979). “A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional Norms”. AJPS; V.23-#2, pp. 245-262.

 

-M. Fiorina (1981). “Universalism, Reciprocity and Distributive Policymaking in Majority Rule Institutions”. Research in Public Policy Analysis and Management; V.1, pp. 197-221.

 

-K. Shepsle and B. Weingast (1981). “Political Preferences for the Pork Barrel: A Generalization”. AJPS; V.25-#1, pp. 96-111.

 

-G. Miller and J. Oppenheimer (1982). “Universalism in Experimental Committees”. APSR; V.76-#?, pp. 561-574.

 

-E. Niou and P. Ordeshook (1985). “Universalism in Congress”. AJPS; V.29-#2, pp. 246258.

 

-M. Collie (1988). “Universalism and the Parties in the US House of Representatives”. AJPS; V.?-#?, pp.

 

-R. Axelrod (1981). “The Emergence of Cooperation Among Egoists”. APSR; V.75-#?, pp. 306-318.

 

-R. Axelrod (1984). The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books.

 

-R. Axelrod (1986). “An Evolutionary Approach to Norms”. APSR; V.80-#?, pp. 1095-1112.

 

-J. Bendor (1987). “In Good Times and In Bad: Reciprocity in an Uncertain World”. AJPS; V.31-#?, pp. 531-558.

 

-R. Calvert (1989). “Reciprocity among Self-Interested Actors: Uncertainty, Asymmetry, and Distribution”. in P. Ordeshook, ed. Strategic Models of Politics. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. pp. 269-293.

 

(3) Party

 

-G. Cox and M. McCubbins (1993). Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House. Berkeley: University of California Press.

 

-S. Patterson and G. Caldeira (1988). “Party Voting in the US Congress”. BJPS; V.18-#?, pp. 111-131.

 

-M. Collie (1989). “Electoral Patterns and Voting Alignments in the US House, 1886-1986". LSQ; V14-#1, pp. 107-127.

 

-P. Hurley and R. Wilson (1989). “Partisan Voting Patterns in the US Senate, 1877-1986". LSQ; V.14-#2, pp. 225-250.

 

-P. Hurley (1989). “Parties and Coalitions in Congress”. in C. Deering, ed. Congressional Politics. Chicago: Dorsey Press.

 

(4) Leadership

 

-C. Jones (1968). “Joseph G. Cannon and Howard W. Smith: An Essay on the Limits of Leadership in the House of Reprensentatives”. APSR; V.30-#?, pp. 617-646.

 

-J. Cooper and D. Brady (1981). “Institutional Context and Leadership Style: The House from Cannon to Rayburn”. APSR; V.75-#?, pp. 411-425.

 

-C. Deering and S. Smith (1981). “Majority Party Leadership and the New House Subcommittee System”. in F. Mackaman, ed. Understanding Congressional Leadership. Washington, DC: CQ Press, pp. 261-292.

 

-B. Sinclair (1982). “Majority Party Leadership Strategies for Coping with the New US House”. in F. Mackaman, ed. Understanding Congressional Leadership. Washington, DC: CQ Press, pp. 181-206.

 

-D. Rohde and K. Shepsle (1987). “Leaders and Followers in the House of Representatives: Reflections on Woodrow Wilson's Congressional Government”. Congress and the Presidency; V.14-#?, pp. 111-134.

 

-B. Rundquist and G. Strom (1987). “Bill Construction in Legislative Committees: A Study of the US House”. LSQ; V.12-#1, pp. 97-113.

 

-B. Sinclair (1989). “Leadership Strategies in the Modern House”. in C. Deering, ed. Congressional Politics. Chicago: Dorsey Press, pp. 135-154.

 

-R. Calvert (1987). “Reputation and Legislative Leadership”. PC; V.55-#?, pp.81-119.

 

-W. Bianco and R. Bates (1990). “Cooperation by Design: Leadership, Structure, and Collective Dilemmas”. APSR; V.84-#1, pp. 133-147.

 

-R. Calvert (1992). “Leadership and Its Basis in Problems of Social Coordination”. International Political Science Review; V.13-#?, pp. 7-24.

 

(5) Seniority

 

-G. Goodwin, jr. (1959). “The Seniority System in Congress”. APSR; V.55-#?, pp. 412-436.

 

-R. Wolfinger and J. Heifetz (1965). “Safe Seats, Seniority, and Power in Congress”. APSR; V.59-#?, pp. 337-349.

 

-N. Polsby (1968). “The Institutionalization of the US House of Representatives”. APSR; V.62-#2, pp. 144-168.

 

-N. Polsby, M. Gallaher and B. Rundquist (1969). “The Growth of the Seniority System in the US House of Representatives”. APSR; V.63-#?, pp. 787-807.

 

-M. Abram and J. Cooper (1968). “The Rise of Seniority in the House of Representatives”. Polity; V.1-#?, pp. 52-85.

 

-R. McKelvey and R. Riezman (1992). “Seniority in Legislatures”. APSR; V.83-#?, pp. 1181-1206.

 

-R. McKelvey and R. Riezman (1993). “Initial versus Continuing Proposal Power in Legislative Seniority Systems”. in W. Barnett, M. Hinich and N. Schofield, eds. Political Economy: Institutions, Competition, and Representation. Cambridge: CUP, pp.279-292.

 

(6) Communication/Debate

 

-D. Austen-Smith and W. Riker (1987). “Asymmetric Information and the Coherence of Legislation”. APSR; V.81-#3, pp. 897-918. [correction, 1990, V.84-#1, pp. 243-245]

 

-S. Matthews (1989). “Veto Threats: Rhetoric in a Bargaining Game”. QJE; V.104-#2, pp. 347-369.

 

-D. Austen-Smith (1990). “Information Transmission in Debate”. AJPS; V.34-#1, pp. 124-152.

 

-D. Austen-Smith (1990). “Credible Debate Equilibria”. SC&W; V.7-#?, pp. 75-93.

 

-D. Austen-Smith (1993). “Information Acquisition and Orthogonal Argument”. in W. Barnett, et al., eds. Political Economy: Institutions, Information, Competition, and Representation. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 407-436.

 

-R. Calvert (1992). “Rational Actors, Equilibrium and Social Institutions”. in J. Knight and I. Sened, eds. Explaining Social Institutions. Cambridge: CUP.

 

-R. Calvert (1993). “Communication in Institutions: Efficiency in a Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Hidden Information”. in W. Barnett, M. Hinich and N. Schofield, eds. Political Economy: Institutions, Competition, and Representation. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 197-222.

 

-D. Spector (2000). “Rational Debate Leads to Unidimensional Conflict”. QJE; V.115-#1, pp. 181-200.

 

-D. Diermeier and T. Fedderson (2000). “Information and Congressional Hearings”. AJPS; V.44-#1, pp. 51-65.

 

-M. Ottaviani and P. Sørensen (2000). “Information Aggregation in Debate: Who Should Speak First”. Journal of Public Economics; V.

 

c. The Executive and Congressional Outcomes

 

-R. Neustadt (1960). Presidential Power: The Politics of Presidential Leadership. New York: Wiley.

 

-J. Bond and R. Fleischer (1980). “The Limits of Presidential Popularity as a Source of Influence in Congress”. LSQ; V.5-#1, pp. 69-78.

 

-J. Bond and R. Fleischer (1984). “Presidential Popularity and Congressional Voting”. Western Political Quarterly; V.37-#?, pp. 291-306.

 

-R. Kiewiet and M. McCubbins (1988). “Presidential Influence on Congressional Appropriations”. AJPS; V.32-#?, pp. 713-736.

 

-T. Sullivan (1988). “Headcounts, Expectations, and Presidential Coalitions in Congress”. AJPS; V.32-#?, pp. 567-589.

 

-T. Sullivan (1988). “The Bargaining Approach to Presidential Leadership in Congress”. Presidential Research; V.10-#?, pp. 12-22.

 

-T. Sullivan (1990). “Bargaining with the President: A Simple Game and New Evidence”. APSR; V.84-#?, pp. 1167-1195.

 

-T. Sullivan (1990). “Explaining why President's Count: Signaling and Information”. JoP; V.52-#?, pp. 939-962.

 

-G. Edwards (1989). At the Margins: Presidential Leadership in Congress. New Haven: Yale.

 

3. Lobbying, Legislative Preferences and Legislative Outcomes

 

a. Traditional Group Theory

 

-J.D. Greenstone (1975). “Group Theories”. in F. Greenstein and N. Polsby, eds. Handbood of Political Science--Volume 2. Reading: Addison-Wesley, pp. 243-318.

 

-R. Salisbury (1975). “Interest Groups”. in F. Greenstein and N. Polsby, eds. Handbood of Political Science--Volume 4. Reading: Addison-Wesley, pp.

 

-J. Berry (1984). The Interest Group Society. Boston: Little, Brown.

 

-K. Schlozman and J. Tierney (1986). Organized Interests and American Democracy. New York: Harper and Row.

 

-A. Bentley (1908). The Process of Government. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

 

-E. Latham (1952). “The Group Basis of Politics: Notes for a Theory”. APSR; V.46-#?, pp. 376-397.

 

-E. Latham (1952). The Group Basis of Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

 

-V.O. Key (1952). Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups. New York: Crowell.

 

-D. Truman (1953). The Governmental Process. New York: Knopf.

 

-G. McConnell (1966). Private Power and American Democracy. New York: Knopf.

 

-E.E. Schattschneider (1960). The Semisovereign People. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

 

-J.R. Golembiewski (1960). “The Group Basis of Politics: Notes on Analysis and Development”. APSR; V.54-#, pp. 962-971.

 

-T. Lowi (1969/1979). The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the US. New York: Norton.

 

-G.D. Garson (1974). “The Origins of Interest Group Theory: A Critique of Process”. APSR; V.68-#< pp. 1505-1519.

 

-G.D. Garson (1978). Group Theories of Politics. Beverly Hills: Sage.

 

-R. Dahl (1982). Dilemmas of a Pluralist Democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press.

 

-A. McFarland (1987). “Interest Groups and Theories of Power in America”. BJPS; V.17-#?, pp. 129-147.

 

-J. Chamberlin (1978). “A Collective Goods Model of Pluralist Political Systems”. PC; V.33-#4, pp. 97-113.

 

-L Rothenberg (1992). Linking Citizens to Government: Interest Group Politics at Common Cause. Cambridge: CUP.

 

-J. Heinz, E. Laumann, R. Nelson and R. Salisbury (1993). The Hollow Core: Private Interests in National Policy Making. Cambridge: Harvard.

 

-J.M. Hansen (1987). “Choosing Sides: The Creation of an Agricultural Policy Network in Congress, 1919-1932". Studies in American Political Development; V.2, pp. 183-229.

 

-P. Bachrach and M. Baratz (1962). “Two Faces of Power”. APSR; V.56-#4, pp. 947-952.

 

-P. Bachrach and M. Baratz (1963). “Decisions and Non-Decisions”. APSR; V.57-#3, pp. 632-642.

 

-I. Balbus (1971). “The Concept of Interest in Pluralist and Marxian Analysis”. Politics and Society; V.1-#2, pp. 151-177.

 

-J. Manley (1983). “Neo-Pluralism: A Class Analysis of Pluralism I and II”. APSR; V.77-#2, pp. 368-383. [Comments by Lindblom and Dahl, APSR, 1983, V.77-#2, pp. 384-389.]

 

-R. Smith (1995). “Interest Group Influence in Congress”. Legislative Studies Quarterly; V.20-#1, pp. 89-139.

 

b. Simple Venality and the Market for Votes

 

-G. Stigler (1971). “The Theory of Economic Regulation”. Bell Journal; V.2-#1, pp. 3-21.

 

-S. Peltzman (1976). “Toward a More General Theory of Regulation”. JLawEcon; V.19-#2, pp. 211-240.

 

-T. Keeler (1984). “Theories of Regulation and the Deregulation Movement”. PC; V.44-#?, pp. 103-145.

 

-G. Becker (1983). “A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence”. QJE; V.98-#3, pp. 371-400.

 

-G. Becker (1985). “Public Policies, Pressure Groups and Deadweight Costs”. JPubE; V.28-#?, pp. 329-347.

 

-D. Wittman (1989). “Pressure Group Size and the Politics of Income Redistribution”. SC&W; V.6-#?, pp. 275-286.

 

-J. Goodman and P. Porter (1988). “Theory of Competitive Regulatory Equilibrium”. PC; V.59-#?, pp. 51-66.

 

-J. Snyder (1991). “On Buying Legislatures”. E&P; V.3-#2, pp. 93-109.

 

-E. Rasmusen and M. Zupan (1991). “Extending the Economic Theory of Regulation to the Form of Policy”. PC; V.72-#< pp. 167-191.

 

-T. Groseclose (1996). “An Examination of the Market for Favors and Votes in Congress”. EcInq; V.34-#2, pp. 320-340.

 

-T. Philipson and J. Snyder, Jr. (1996). “Equilibrium and Efficiency in an Organized Vote Market”. PC; V.89-#3/4, pp. 245-265.

 

-T. Groseclose and J. Snyder, Jr. (1996). “Buying Supermajorities”. APSR; V.90-#2, pp. 303-315.

 

-D. Diermeier and R. Myerson (1999). “Bicameralism and Its Consequences for the Internal Organization of Commerce”. AER; V.89-#5, pp. 1182-1196.

 

-P. Aranson and M. Hinich (1979). “Some Aspects of the Political Economy of Election Campaign Contribution Laws”. PC; V.34-#?, pp. 435-461.

 

c. Campaign Contributions, Elections and Policy Choice

 

-A. Denzau and M. Munger (1986). “Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized Interests Get Represented”. APSR; V.80-#1, pp. 89-106.

 

-D. Baron (1989). “Service-Induced Campaign Contributions and the Electoral Equilibrium”. QJE; V.104-#1, pp. 45-72.

 

-D. Baron (1989). “Service-Induced Campaign Contributions, Incumbent Shirking, and Reelection Opportunities”. in P. Ordeshook, ed. Models of Strategic Choice in Politics. Ann Arbor: Univerity of Michigan Press, pp. 93-119.

 

-J. Snyder (1989). “Election Goals and the Allocation of Campaign Resources”. Etrica; V.57-#3, pp.637-660.

 

-J. Snyder (1990). “Campaign Contributions as Investments: the US House of Representatives, 1980-1986". JPE; V.1195-1227.

 

-J. Snyder (1993). “The Market for Campaign Contributions: Evidence for the US Senate, 1980-1986". E&P; V.5-#3, pp. 219-240.

 

-M. Hinich and M. Munger (1989). “Political Investment, Voter Perceptions, and Candidate Strategy: An Equilibrium Spatial Analysis”. in P. Ordeshook, ed. Models of Strategic Choice in Politics. Ann Arbor: Univerity of Michigan Press, pp. 49-67.

 

-R. Morton and C. Cameron (1991). “Elections and the Theory of Campaign Contributions: A Survey and Critical Analysis”. E&P; V.4-#1, pp. 79-108.

 

-D. Austen-Smith (1987). “Interest Groups, Campaign Contributions and Probabilistic Voting”. PC; V.54-#?, pp. 435-461.

 

-D. Wittman (1989). “Pressure Group Size and the Politics of Income Redistribution”. SC&W; V.6-#?, pp. 275-286.

 

-P. Coughlin, D. Mueller and P. Murrell (1990). “A Model of Electoral Competition with Interest Groups”. EcLets; V.32-#?, pp. 307-311.

 

-P. Coughlin, D. Mueller and P. Murrell (1990). “Electoral Politics, Interest Groups and the Size of Government”. EcInq; V.28-#?, pp. 682-705.

 

-W. Mayer and J. Li (1994). “Interest Groups, Electoral Competition, and Probabilistic Voting for Trade Policies”. E&P; V.6-#1, pp. 59-77.

 

-S. Edelman (1992). “Two Politicians, A PAC and How They Interact: Two Extensive Form Games”. E&P; V.4-#3, pp. 289-305.

 

-C. Cameron and J. Enelow (1992). “Asymmetric Policy Effects, Campaign Contributions, and the Spatial Theory of Elections”. Mathematical and Computer Modelling; V.16-#8/9, pp. 117-132.

 

-D. Ingberman (1992). “Incumbent Reputations and Ideological Campaign Contributions in Spatial Competition”. Mathematical and Computer Modelling; V.16-#8/9, pp. 147-169.

 

-D. Baron and J. Mo (1993). “Campaign Contributions and Party-Candidate Competition in Services and Policies”. in W. Barnett, et al., eds. Political Economy: Institutions, Information, Competition, and Representation. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 313-354.

 

-J. Londregan and T. Romer (1993). “Polarization, Incumbency and the Personal Vote”. in W. Barnett, et al., eds. Political Economy: Institutions, Information, Competition, and Representation. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 355-357.

 

-D. Baron (1994). “Electoral Competition with Informed and Uninformed Voters”. APSR; V.88-#1, pp. 33-47.

 

-Lohmann, Susanne (1994). “Information Aggregation Through Costly Political Action”. American Economic Review; V.84-#3, pp. 518-530.

 

-Lohmann, Susanne (1993). “A Welfare Analysis of Political Action”. in William Barnett, Melvin Hinich, and Norman Schofield, eds. Political Economy: Institutions, Competition and Representation. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 437-461.

 

-G. Grossman and E. Helpman (1996). “Electoral Competition with Special Interest Politics”. REStud; V.63-#2, pp. 265-86.

 

-A. Dixit (1996). “Special-Interest Lobbying and Endogenous Commodity Taxation”. Eastern Economic Journal; V.22-#4, pp. 375-388.

 

-A. Dixit, G. Grossman, and E. Helpman (1997). “Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Tax Policy”. JPE; V.105-#4, pp. 752-69.

 

-M. Garfinkel and J. Lee (2000). “Political Influence and the Dynamic Consistency of Policy”. AER; V.90-#3, pp. 649-666.

 

-R. Boylan (2000). “An Optimal Auction Perspective on Lobbying”. SC&W; V.17-#1, pp. 55-68.

 

-R. Damania and P.G. Fredriksson (2000). “On the Formation of Industry Lobby Groups”. JEBO. V.41-#4, pp. 315-335.

 

-D. Wittman (1998). “Rational Expectations and Democratic Politics”. Paper presented at 1999 PC Meetings, New Orleans, LA.

 

-S. Coate and S. Morris (1999). “Policy Persistence”. AER; V.89-#5, pp. 1327-1336.

 

-W. Dougan and J. Snyder (1996). “Interest-Group Politics under Majority Rule”. JPubE; V.61-#1, pp. 49-71.

 

-J. Potters, R. Sloof, and F. van Winden (1997). “Campaign Expenditures, Contributions and Direct Endorsements: The Strategic Use of Information and Money to Influence Voters”. EJPE, V.13-#1, pp. 1-31.

 

-R. Sloof (1999). “Campaign Contributions and the Desirability of Full Disclosure Laws”. E&P; V.11-!, pp. 83-107.

 

-G. Grossman and E. Helpman (1999). “Competing for Endorsements”. AER; V.89-#3, pp. 501-524.

 

-A. Prat (2002). “Campaign Spending with Office-Seeking Politicians, Rational Voters, and Multiple Lobbies”. JET; V.103-#2, pp. 162-189.

 

d. Lobbying as Strategic Information Transmission

 

-J. Potters and F. van Winden (1990). “Modelling Political Pressure as Transmission of Information”. EJPE; V.6-#1, pp. 61-88.

 

-J. Potters and F. van Winden (1992). “Lobbying and Asymmetric Information”. PC; V.74-#?, pp. 269-292.

 

-D. Austen-Smith and J. Wright (1992). “Competitive Lobbying for a Legislator's Vote”. SC&W; V.9-#?, pp. 229-257.

 

-R. Sloof (1997). “Competitive Lobbying for a Legislator’s Vote: A Comment”. SC&W; V.14-#?, pp. 449-464.

 

-S. Ainsworth and I. Sened (1993). “The Role of Lobbyists: Entrepreneurs with Two Audiences”. AJPS; V.37-#3, pp. 834-866.

 

-A. Ainsworth (1993). “Regulating Lobbyists and Interest Group Influence”. JoP; V.55-#1, pp. 41-56.

 

-D. Austen-Smith (1993). “Information and Influence: Lobbying for Agendas and Votes”. AJPS; V.37-#?, pp. 799-833.

 

-D. Austen-Smith and J. Wright (1994). “Counteractive Lobbying”. AJPS; V.38-#1, pp. 25-44.

 

-F. Baumgartner and B. Leech (1996). “The Multiple Ambiguities of ‘Counteractive Lobbying’”. AJPS; V.41-#2, pp. 521-542 .

 

-D. Austen-Smith and J. Wright (1996). “Theory and Evidence for Counteractive Lobbying”. AJPS; V.41-#2, pp. 543-564 .

 

-F. Baumgartner and B. Leech (1996). “Good Theories Deserve Good Data”. AJPS; V.41-#2, pp. 565-569 .

 

-R. Ball (1995). “Interest Groups, Influence and Welfare”. E&P; V.7-#2, pp. 119-146.

 

-D. Austen-Smith (1995). “Campaign Contributions and Access”. APSR; V.89-#3, pp. 566-581.

 

-Lohmann, Susanne (1995). “Information, Access, and Contributions: A Signaling Model of Lobbying”. Public Choice; V.85-#3-4, pp. 267-84.

 

-E. Rasmusen (1993). “Lobbying when the Decisionmaker can Acquire Independent Information”. PC; V.77-#?, pp. 899-913. [Comment by R. Sloof (1997), V.91-#1/2, pp. 199-207, and response 209-214.]

 

-J. Lagerlöf (1997). “Lobbying, Information, and Private and Social Welfare”. EJPE, V.13-#3, pp. 615-637.

 

-S. Ainsworth (1997). “The Role of Legislators in the Determination of Interest Group Influence”. LSQ; V.22-#4, pp. 517-533.

 

-D. Austen-Smith (1998). “Allocating Access for Information and Contributions”. JLEO; V.14-#2, pp. 277-303.

 

-K. Kollman (1997). “Inviting Friends to Lobby: Interest Groups, Ideological Bias, and Congressional Committees”. AJPS; V.41-#2, pp. 519-544.

 

-M. Bennedsen and S. Feldmann (2002). “Lobbying Legislatures”. JPE; V.110-#4, pp. 919-946.

 

e. Empirical Analyses of Private Political Spending

 

(1) The Organization of Political Spending: Who Has PACs

 

-R. Pittman (1976). “The Effects of Industry Concentration and Regulation on Contribution in Three 1972 US Senate Campaigns”. PC; V.27-#?, pp. 71-80.

 

-R. Pittman (1977). “Market Structure and Campaign Contributions”. PC, V.31-#?, pp. 37-51.

 

-E. Esty and R. Caves (1983). “Market Structure and Political Influence: New Data on Political Expenditures, Activity and Success”. EcInq; V.?-#?, pp. 24-38.

 

-G. Andres (1985). “Business Involvement in Campaign Finance: Factors Influencing the Decision to Form a Corporate PAC”. PS; V.18-#?, pp. 156-181.

 

-M. Masters and G. Keim (1985). “Determinants of PAC Participation among Large Corporations”. JoP; V.47-#?, pp. 1158-1173.

 

-C. Humphries (1991). “Corporations, PACs, and the Strategic Link between Contributions and Lobbying Activities”. Western Political Quarterly; V.44-#?, pp. 353-372.

 

-K. Grier, M. Munger and B. Roberts (1991). “The Industrial Organization of Corporate Political Participation”. SEJ; V.57-#3, pp. 727-738.

 

-K. Grier, M. Munger and B. Roberts (1994). “The Determinants of Industry Political Activity, 1978-1986". APSR; V.88-#4, pp. 911-926.

 

-T. McKeown (1994). “Epidemiology of Corporate PAC Participation among Large Corporations”. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization; V.24-#?, pp. 153-168.

 

(2) The Allocation of Political Money

 

-D. Gopoian (1984). “What Makes PACs Tick? An Analysis of the Allocation Patterns of Economic Interest Groups”. AJPS; V.28-#?, pp. 259-281.

 

-K. Poole and T. Romer (1985). “Patterns of PAC Contributions to the 1980 Campaigns for the US House of Representatives”. PC; V.47-#?, pp. 63-111.

 

-K. Grier and M. Munger (1986). “The Impact of Legislator Attributes on Interest-Group Campaign Contributions”. Journal of Labor Economics; V.7-#?, pp. 349-361.

 

-K. Grier and M. Munger (1991). “Committee Assignments, Constituent Preferences, and Campaign Contributions”. EcInq; V.29-#?, pp. 24-43.

 

-K. Grier and M. Munger (1993). “Corporate, Labor, and Trade Association Contributions to the US House and Senate, 1978-1986". JoP; V.55-#, pp. 614-643.

 

-J. Snyder (1990). “Campaign Contributions as Investment”. JPE; V.98-#?, pp. 1195-1127.

 

-T. Stratman (1992). “Are Contributors Rational? Untangling Strategies of PACs”. JPE; V.100-#3, pp. 647-664.

 

-J. Snyder Jr. (1992). “Long-Term Investing in Politicians; or, Give Early, Give Often”. Journal of Law and Economics; V.35-#1, pp. 15-43.

 

-D. Clawson, A. Neustadtl and J. Bearden (1986). “The Logic of Business Unity: Corporate Contributions to the 1980 Elections”. ASR; V.51-#?, pp. 797-811.

 

-V. Burris (1987). “The Political Partisanship of American Business: A Study of Corporate PACs”. ASR; V.91-#1, pp. 732-744.

 

-D. Jacobs (1988). “Corporate Economic Power and the State: A Longitudinal Assessment”. AJS; V.93-#4, pp. 852-881.

 

-D. Clawson and A. Neustadtl (1989). “Interlocks, PACs, and Corporate Conservatism”. AJS; V.94-#4, pp. 749-793.

 

(3) Campaign Contributions and Election Outcomes

 

-M. Malbin, ed. (1980). Money and Politics in the US. Washington, DC: AEI.

 

-G. Jacobson (1980). Money in Congressional Elections. New Haven: Yale University Press.

 

-G. Jacobson (1985). “The Republican Advantage in Campaign Finance”. in J. Chubb and P. Peterson, eds. The New Direction in American Politics. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 143-173.

 

-G. Jacobson (1985). “Money and Votes Reconsidered: Congressional Elections, 1972-1982". PC; V.47-#?, pp. 13-46.

 

-G. Jacobson (1989). “Parties and PACs in Congressional Elections”. in L. Dodd and B. Oppenheimer, eds. Congress Reconsidered (4th edition). Washington, DC: CQ Press, pp. 117-152.

 

-D. Magleby and C. Nelson (1990). The Money Chase: Congressional Campaign Finance Reform. Washington, DC: Brookings.

 

-M. Nugent and J. Johannes (1990). Money, Elections and Democracy. Boulder: Westview.

 

(4) Campaign Contributions and Legislator Voting Behavior

 

-L. Salamon and J. Siegfried (1977). “Economic Power and Political Influence: The Impact of Industry Structure on Public Policy”. APSR; V.71-#?, pp. 1026-1043.

 

-H. Chappell, jr. (1982). “Campaign Contributions and Congressional Voting: A Simultaneous Probit-Tobit Model”. REStat; V.64-#?, pp. 77-83.

 

-W. Welch (1982). “Campaign Contributions and Voting: Milk Money and Dairy Price Supports”. Western Political Quarterly; V.25-#?, pp. 478-495.

 

-J. Wright (1985). “PACs, Contributions, and Roll Calls: An Organizational Perspective”. APSR; V.75-#?, pp. 400-414.

 

-J. Wright (1989). “PAC Contributions, Lobbying, and Representation”. JOP; V.51-#?, pp. 713-729.

 

-J. Wright (1990). “Contributions, Lobbing, and Committee Voting in the US House of Representatives”. APSR; V.84-#?, pp. 417-438.

 

-J. Grenzke (1989). “Shopping in the Congressional Supermarket: The Currency is Complex”. AJPS; V.33-#1, pp. 1-24.

 

-J. Frendreis and R. Waterman (1985). “PAC Contributions and Legislative Behavior: Senate Voting on Trucking Deregulation”. Social Science Quarterly; V.66-#?, pp. 401-412.

 

-R. Hall and F. Wayman (1990). “Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees”. APSR; V.84-#?, pp. 797-820.

 

-T. Stratman (1991). “What Do Campaign Contributions Buy? Deciphering Causal Effects of Money and Votes”. SEJ; V.57-#?, pp. 606-620.

 

-T. Stratman (2002). “Can Special Interests Buy Congressional Votes? Evidence from Financial Services Legislation”. Journal of Law and Economics; V.45-#2, pp. 345-374.

 

-S. Levitt (1998). “Are PACs Trying to Influence Politicians or Voters?”. Economics and Politics; V.10-#1, pp. 19-35.

 

-E. Handler and J. Mulkern (1982). Business in Politics: Campaign Strategies of Corporate PACs. Lexington: Lexington Books.

 

4. Constituency Constraints on Legislative Decision-Making

 

-D. Mayhew (1974). Congress: The Electoral Connection. New Haven: Yale University Press.

 

-M. Fiorina (1977/89). Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment. New Haven: Yale University Press.

 

-R. Fenno (1978). Home Style: House Members in Their Districts. Boston: Little , Brown.

 

-B. Cain, J. Ferejohn and M. Fiorina (1987). The Personal Vote. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

 

-M. Fiorina and R. Noll (1978). “Voters, Bureaucrats, and Legislators: A Rational Choice Perspective on the Growth of Bureaucracy”. JPubE; V.9-#?, pp. 239-254.

 

-B. Weingast, K. Shepsle and C. Johnsen (1981). “The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics”. JPE; V.89-#4, pp. 642-664.

 

-G. Cox, M. McCubbins and T. Sullivan (1984). “Policy Choice as an Electoral Investment”. SC&W; V.1-#?, pp. 231-342.

 

-M. McCubbins and T. Sullivan (1984). “Constituency Influences on Legislative Policy Choice”. Quality and Quantity; V.18-#?, pp. 299-319.

 

-G. Cox and M. McCubbins (1986). “Electoral Politics as a Redistributive Game”. JoP; V.48-#?, pp. 370-389.

 

-A. Lindbeck and J. Weibull (1987). “Balanced-Budget Redistribution as the Outcome of Political Competition”. PC; V.52-#?, pp. 273-297.

 

-A. Lindbeck and J. Weibull (1993). “A Model of Political Equilibrium in a Representative Democracy”. JPubE; V.51-#?, pp. 272-297.

 

-S. Coate and S. Morris (1995). “On the Form of Transfers to Special Interests”. JPE; V.103-#?, pp. 1210-1235.

 

-A. Dixit and J. Londregan (1995). “Redistributive Politics and Economic Efficiency”. APSR; V.89-#4, pp. 856-866.

 

-A. Dixit and J. Londregan (1996). “The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Politics”. JoP; V.58-#4, pp. 1132-1155.

 

-A. Dixit and J. Londregan (1998). “Ideology, Tactics, and Efficiency in Redistributive Politics”. QJE; V.?-#?, pp. 497-529.

 

-A. Dixit and J. Londregan (1998). “Fiscal Federalism and Redistributive Politics”. JPubE; V.68-#?, pp. 153-180.

 

-A. Dixit and J. Londregan (2000). “Political Power and the Credibility of Government Debt”. JET; V.94-#1, pp. 80-105.

 

-A. Denzau, W. Riker and K. Shepsle (1985). “Farquharson and Fenno: Sophisticated Voting and Home Style”. APSR; V79-#?, pp. 1117-1134.

 

-J. Wilkerson (1990). “Reelection and Representation in Conflict: The Case of Agenda Manipulation”. LSQ; V.15-#?, pp. 263-282.

 

-D. Austen-Smith (1992). “Explaining the Vote: Constituency Constraints on Sophisticated Voting”. AJPS; V.36-#1, pp. 68-95.

 

5. Empirical Research on Legislative Decision-Making

 

a. Methodological Issues

 

(1) General Discussions

 

-D. McCrone and W. Stone (1986). “The Structure of Constituency Representation: On Theory and Method”. JoP; V.48-#?, pp. 956-975.

 

-H. Weisberg (1978). “Evaluating Theories of Congressional Roll Call Voting”. AJPS; V.22-#?, pp. 554-577.

 

-T. Hammond and J. Fraser (1983). “Baselines for Evaluating Explanations of Coalition Behavior in Congress”. JoP; V.45-#?, pp. 634-656. [Comment by Weisberg follows]

 

-K. Poole and H. Rosenthal (1987). “Analysis of Congressional Coalition Patterns: A Unidimensional Spatial Model”. LSQ; V.12-#1, pp. 55-75.

 

-T. Hammond and J. Fraser (1982). “What Roll Calls Should We Exclude from Conservative Coalition Calculations?”. LSQ; V.7-#3, pp. 423-434.

 

-K. Poole (1988). “Recent Developments in Analytical Models of Voting in the US Congress”. LSQ; V.13-#1, pp. 117-133.

 

(2) Interest Group Evaluations and Ideology

 

-H. Kritzer (1978). “Ideology and American Political Elites”. Public Opinion Quarterly; V.42-#?, pp. 484-502.

 

-K. Poole (1981). “Dimensions of Interest Group Evaluation of the US Senate, 1969-1978". AJPS; V. 25-#1, pp. 48-67.

 

-S. Smith (1981). “The Consistency and Ideological Structure of the US Senate Voting Alignments, 1957-1976". AJPS; V.25-#4, pp. 780-795.

 

-K. Poole and R.S. Daniels (1985). “Ideology, Party and Voting in the US Congress, 1959-1980". APSR; V79-#?, pp. 373-399.

 

-K. Poole and H. Rosenthal (1984). “The Polarization of American Politics”. JoP; V.46-#?, pp. 1060-1079.

 

-L. Fowler (1982). “How Interest Groups Select Issues for Rating Voting Records of Members in the US Congress”. LSQ; V.7-#3, pp. 401-413.

 

-R. Carson and J. Oppenheimer (1984). “A Method for Estimating the Personal Ideology of Political Representatives”. APSR; V.78-#?, pp. 163-178.

 

-K. Krehbiel (1986). “A Technique for Estimating Congressmen's Ideal Points”. JoP; V.48-#1, pp. 97-115.

 

-M. Herron (1999). “Artificial Extremism in Interest Group Ratings and the Preferences versus Party Debate”. LSQ; V.24-#4, pp. 525-542.

 

-E. Smith, R. Herrera and C. Herrera (1990). “The Measurement Characteristics of Congressional Roll Call Indexes”. LSQ; V.15-#?, pp. 283-295.

 

-J. Snyder (1992). “Artificial Extremism in Interest Group Ratings”. LSQ; V.17-#3, pp. 319-345.

 

-T. Groseclose, S. Levitt, and J. Snyder (1996). “An Inflation Index for ADA Scores”. ms: Ohio State.

 

-T. Groseclose, S. Levitt, and J. Snyder (1996). “Comparing Interest Group Scores across Time and Chambers: Adjusted ADA Scores for the U.S. Congress”. APSR; V.93-#1, pp. 33-50.

 

-J. Londregan (1999). “Estimating Legislator’s Ideal Points”. Political Analysis; V.8-#1, pp. 35-56.

 

-T. Brunell. W. Koetzle, J. DiNardo, B. Grofman and S. Feld (1999). “The R2 = .93: Where Then Do They Differ? Comparing Liberal and Conservative Interest Group Ratings”. LSQ; V.24-#1, pp. 87-101.

 

-B. Burden, G. Caldeira, and T. Groseclose (2000). “Measuring the Ideologies of U.S. Senators: The Song Remains the Same”. LSQ; V.25-#2, pp. 237-258.

 

-Kim Qualile Hill (2001). “Multiple-Method Measurement of Legislators’ Ideologies”. Legislative Studies Quarterly; V.26-#2, pp. 263-274.

 

b. Roll Call Votes and the Spatial Structure of Congress

 

-K. Poole and H. Rosenthal (1985). “A Spatial Model for Legislative Roll Call Analysis”. AJPS; V.29-#?, pp. 357-384.

 

-K. Poole and H. Rosenthal (1985). “The Political Economy of Roll Call Voting in the `Multiparty` Congress of the US”. EJPE; V.1-#1, pp. 45-58.

 

-K. Poole and H. Rosenthal (1991). “Patterns of Congressional Voting”. AJPS; V.35-#1, pp. 228-278.

 

-K. Poole and H. Rosenthal (1991). “The Spatial Mapping of Minimum Wage Legislation”. in A. Alesina and G. Carliner, eds. Politics and Economics in the 1980s. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 215-246.

 

-K. Koford (1989). “Dimensions in Congressional Voting”. APSR; V.83-#?, pp. 949-962. [Comment by Poole/Rosenthal and Response, APSR, 1991, V.85-#3, pp. 955-975]

 

-K. Koford (1990). “Dimensions, Transactions Costs and Coalitions in Legislative Voting”. E&P; V.2-#1, pp. 59-82.

 

-K. Poole, F. Sowell, and S. Spear (1992). “Evaluating Dimensionality in Spatial Voting Models”. Mathematical and Computer Modelling; V.16-#8/9, pp. 85-101.

 

-J. Snyder (1992). “Committee Power, Structure-Induced Equilibria, and Roll Call Votes”. AJPS; V.36-#1, pp. 1-30. [comment by Rosenthal and response follow]

 

-K. Poole and H. Rosenthal (1993). “Spatial Realignment and the Mapping of Issues in American History: The Evidence from Roll-Call Voting”. in W. Riker, ed. Agenda Formation. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 13-39.

 

-K. Poole and H. Rosenthal (1994). “Dimensional Simplification and Economic Theories of Legislative Behavior”. E&P; V.6-#2, pp. 163-172.

 

-K. Koford (1994). “What Can we Learn about Congressional Politics from Dimensional Studies of Roll Call Voting”. E&P; V.6-#2, pp. 173-186.

 

-K. Krehbiel (1994). “Deference, Extremism and Interest Group Ratings”. LSQ; V.19-#1, pp. 61-77.

 

-K. Poole and H. Rosenthal (1997). Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting. New York: Oxford University Press.

 

-K. Poole and H. Rosenthal (2001). “D-NOMINATE after 10 Years: A Comparative Update to Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll-Call Voting”. Legislative Studies Quarterly; V.26-#1, pp. 5-29.

 

-P. van Doren (1990). “Can We Learn the Causes of Congressional Decisions from Roll Call Data”. LSQ; V.15-#3, pp. 311-340.

 

-S. Levitt (1996). “How Do Senators Vote?: Disentangling the Role of Voter Preference, Party Affiliation, and Senator Ideology”. AER; V.86-#3, pp. 425-441.

 

-J. Heckman and J. Snyder (1997). “Linear Probability Models of the Demand For Attributes with an Empirical Application to Estimating the Preferences of Legislators”. Rand Journal of Economics; V.28-#?, pp. S142-s189.

 

-James Snyder and Tim Groseclose (2000). “Estimating Party Influence on Roll Call Voting”. AJPS; V.44-#2, pp. 193-211.

 

-Keith Krehbiel (2000). “Party Discipline and Measures of Partisanship”. AJPS; V.44-#2, pp. 212-227.

 

-Nolan McCarty, Keith Poole, and Howard Rosenthal (2001). “The Hunt for Party Discipline in Congress”. APSR; V.95-#3, pp. 673-687.

 

-S. Ansolabehere, J. Snyder, and C. Stewart III (2001). “The Effects of Party and Preferences on Congressional Roll-Call Voting”. Legislative Studies Quarterly; V.26-#4, pp. 533-572.

 

-James Snyder and Tim Groseclose (2001). “Estimating Party Influence on Roll Call Voting: Regression Coefficients versus Classification Success”. APSR; V.95-#3, pp. 689-698.

 

-Gary Cox and Keith Poole (2002). “On Measuring Partisanship in Roll-Call Voting: The U.S. House of Representatives, 1877-1999”. AJPS; V.46-#3, pp. 477-489.

 

c. Constituent Interest, Ideology and Representation

 

-J. Kingdon (1973). Congressmen's Voting Decisions. New York:Harper and Row.

 

-M. Fiorina (1974). Representatives, Roll Calls, and Constituencies. Lexington: DC Heath.

 

-J. Silberman and G. Durden (1976). “Determining Legislative Preferences on the Minimum Wage: An Economic Approach”. JPE; V.84-#2, pp. 317-329.

 

-J. Kau and P. Rubin (1978). “Voting on Minimum Wages: A Time Series Analysis”. JPE; V.86-#?, pp. 337-342

 

-R. Bernstein and S. Horn (1981). “Explaining House Voting on Energy Policy: Ideology and the Conditional Effects of Party and District Economic Interests”. Western Political Quarterly; V.34-#?, pp. 235-245.

 

-J. Kau and P. Rubin (1982). Congressmen, Constituents and Contributors. Boston: Nijhoff.

 

-J. Kalt and M. Zupan (1984). “Amending the Economic Theory of Regulation: Ideology and Capture in Legislative Politics”. AER; V.74-#3, pp. 301-322.

 

-J. Peltzman (1984). “Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting”. JLawEc; V.27-#?, pp. 181-210.

 

-S. Pettzman (1985). “An Economic Interpretation of the History of Congressional Voting in the Twentieth Century”. AER; V.75-#?, pp. 656-675.

 

-D. Nelson and E. Silberberg (1987). “Ideology and Legislator Shirking”. EcInq; V.25-#1, pp. 15-25.

 

-W. Dougan and M. Munger (1989). “The Rationality of Ideology”. JLawEc; V.32-#1, pp. 119-142.

 

-J. Kalt and M. Zupan (1990). “The Apparent Ideological Behavior of Legislators: Testing for Principal-Agent Slack in Political Institutions”. JLawEc; V.33-#?, pp. 103-131.

 

-B. Bender (1991). “The Influence of Ideology on Congressional Voting”. EcInq; V.29-#3, pp. 416-428.

 

-J. Jackson and J. Kingdon (1992). “Ideology, Interest Group Scores, and Legislative Votes”. AJPS; V.36-#3, pp. 804-823.

 

-B. Goff and K. Grier (1993). “On the (Mis)measurement of Legislator Ideology and Shirking”. PC; V.76-#1/2, pp. 5-20.

 

-K. Poole and T. Romer (1993). “Ideology, Shirking and Representation”. PC; V.77-#?, pp. 185-196.

 

-R. Stein and K. Bickers (1994). “Congressional Elections and the Pork Barrel”. JoP; V.56-#2, pp. 377-399.

 

-K. Poole and H. Rosenthal (1996). “Are Legislators Ideologues or Agents of Constituents?”. EER; V.40-#3-5, pp. 707-717.

 

-S. Levitt (1996). “How Do Senators Vote? Disentangling the Role of Voter Preferences, Party Affiliation, and Senator Ideology”. AER; V.86-#3, pp. 425-441.

 

B. Political Structure and Stability

 

1. Overviews

 

-K. Shepsle (1986). “The Positive Theory of Legislative Institutions: An Enrichment of Social Choice and Spatial Theory”. PC; V.50-#?, pp. 135-178.

 

-H. Rosenthal (1990). “The Setter Model”. in J. Enelow and M. Hinich, eds. Advances in the Spatial Theory of Voting. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 199-234.

 

2. Agenda-Setting and Sophisticated Voting

 

a. Agenda-Setting with Naive Voters

 

-M. Levine and C. Plott (1977). “Agenda Influence and Its Implications”. Virginia Law Review; V.63-#?, pp. 561-604.

 

-C. Plott and M. Levine (1978). “A Model of Agenda Influence on Committee Decisions”. AER; V.68-#1, pp. 146-160.

 

-R. McKelvey (1981). “A Theory of Optimal Agenda Design”. Management Science; V.27-#3, pp. 303-321.

 

b. Sophisticated Voting

 

-R. Farquharson (1969). The Theory of Voting. New Haven: Yale University Press.

 

-G. Kramer (1972). “Sophisticated Voting over Multidimensional Choice Spaces”. Journal of Math. Sociology; V.2-#?, pp. 165-180.

 

-R. McKelvey and R. Niemi (1978). “A Multistage Game Representation of Sophisticated Voting for Binary Procedures”. JET; V.18-#1, pp. 1-22.

 

-H. Moulin (1979). “Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes”. Etrica; V.47-#6, pp. 1337-1351. [comment by Gretlein, 1982, V.50-#2, pp. 527-528]

 

-H. Moulin (1981). “Prudence versus Sophistication in Voting Strategy”. JET; V.24-#?, pp. 398-412.

 

-R. Gretlein (1983). “Dominance Elimination Procedures on Finite Alternative Games”. IJGT; V.12-#2, pp. 107-113.

 

-R. Niemi and A. Frank (1982). “Sophisticated Voting under the Plurality Procedure”. in P. Ordeshook and K. Shepsle, eds. Political Equilibrium. Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff, pp. 151-172.

 

-K. Shepsle and B. Weingast (1984). “Uncovered Sets and Sophisticated Voting Outcomes with Implications for Agenda Institutions”. AJPS; V.28-#1, pp. 49-74.

 

-J. Ferejohn, M. Fiorina and R. McKelvey (1987). “Sophisticated Voting and Agenda Independence in the Distributive Politics Setting”. AJPS; V.31-#?, pp. 169-193.

 

-J. Banks (1985). “Sophisticated Voting Outcomes and Agenda Control”. SC&W; V.1-#?, pp. 295-306.

 

-P. Ordeshook and T. Schwartz (1987). “Agendas and the Control of Political Outcomes”. APSR; V.81-#1, pp. 179-199.

 

-P. Ordeshook and T. Palfrey (1988). “Agendas, Strategic Voting, and Signaling with Incomplete Information”. AJPS; V.32-#?, pp. 441-466.

 

-J. Banks and F. Gasmi (1987). “Endogenous Agenda Formation in Three-Person Committees”. SC&W; V.4-#?, pp. 133-152.

 

-D. Austen-Smith (1987). “Sophisticated Sincerity: Voting over Endogenous Agendas”. APSR; V.81-#4, pp. 1323-1329.

 

-J. Banks (1989). “Equilibrium Outcomes in Two-Stage Ammendment Procedures”. AJPS; V.33-#?, pp. 25-43.

 

-J.P. Jung (1989). “Condorcet Consistent Binary Agendas Under Incomplete Information”. in P. Ordeshook, ed. Models of Strategic Choice in Politics. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 315-341.

 

-K.B. Reid (1990). “The relationship between two algorithms for decisions via sophisticated majority voting with an agenda”. Discrete Applied Mathematics; V.31-#1, pp. 23-28.

 

-K.B. Reid (1991). “Majority Tournaments: Sincere and Sophisticated Voting Decisions under Amendment Procedure”. Mathematical Social Sciences; V.21-#1, pp. 1-19.

 

-K.B. Reid (1997). “Equitable agendas: agendas ensuring identical sincere and sophisticated voting decisions”. Social Choice and Welfare; V.14-#3, pp. 363-377.

 

-T. Groseclose and K. Krehbiel (1993). “On the Pervasiveness of Sophisticated Sincerity”. in W. Barnett, M. Hinich and N. Schofield, eds. Political Economy: Institutions, Competition, and Representation. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 247-277.

 

-B. Sloth (1993). “The Theory of Voting and Equilibria in Noncooperative Games”. G&EB; V.5-#?, pp. 152-169.

 

-J. Enelow and D. Koehler (1980). “The Amendment in Legislative Strategy: Sophisticated Voting in the US Congress”. Journal of Politics; V.42-#?, pp. 398-413.

 

-J. Enelow (1981). “Saving Amendments, Killer Amendments, and an Expected Utility Theory of Sophisticated Voting”. JoP; V.43-#?, pp. 1063-1089.

 

-K. Krehbiel and D. Rivers (1990). “Sophisticated Voting in Congress: A Reconsideration”. JoP; V.52-#2, pp. 548-578.

 

-R. Calvert and R. Fenno (1994). “Strategy and Sophisticated Voting in the Senate”. JoP; V.56-#2, pp. 349-376.

 

-K. Krehbiel (1986). “Sophisticated and Myopic Committees: An Experimental Study”. AJPS; V.30-#?, pp. 542-561.

 

-R. Herzberg and R. Wilson (1988). “Results on Sophisticated Voting in an Experimental Setting”. JoP; V.50-#?, pp. 471-486.

 

-A. Denzau and R. Mackay (1981). “Structure-Induced Equilibria with Perfect Foresight Expectations”. AJPS; V.25-#4, pp. 762-769.

 

-J. Enelow and M. Hinich (1983). “Voter Expectations in Multi-Stage Voting Systems: An Equilibrium Result”. AJPS; V.27-#4, pp. 820-827.

 

-J. Enelow and M. Hinich (1983). “Voting One Issue At A Time: the Question of Voter Forecasts”. APSR; V.77-#2, pp. 435-445.

 

-J. Enelow (1984). “A Generalized Model of Voting One Issue at a Time with Applications to Congress”. AJPS; V.28-#3, pp. 587-597.

 

-D. Epple and J. Kadane (1990). “Sequential Voting with Endogenous Voter Forecasts”. APSR; V.84-#1, pp. 165-175.

 

3. Committee Structure

 

a. Creation, Operation and Reform of the Modern Committee System

 

(1) Creation and Operation of Standing Committees

 

-J. Cooper (1970). The Origins of the Standing Committees and the Development of the Modern House. Houston: Rice University Studies; V.56-#3.

 

-H.D. Price (1977). “Careers and Committees in the American Congress: The Problem of Structural Change”. in W. Aydelotte, ed. The History of Parliamentary Behavior. Princeton: PUP.

 

-W. Stubbs (1985). Congressional Committees,1789-1982. Westport: Greenwood Press.

 

-T. Skladony (1985). “The House Goes to Work: Select and Standing Committees in the US House of Representatives, 1789-1825". Congress and the Presidency; V.12-#?, pp. 165-187.

 

-G. Gamm and K. Shepsle (1989). “Emergence of Legislative Institutions: Standing Committees in the House and Senate, 1810-1825". LSQ; V.14-#1, pp. 39-66.

 

-C. Stewart (1992). “Committee Hierarchies in the Modernizing House”. AJPS; V.36-#4, pp. 835-856.

 

-R. Fenno (1965). “The Internal Distribution of Influence in the House”. in D. Truman, ed. The Congress and America's Future. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, pp. 52-76.

 

-R. Fenno (1962). “The House Appropriations Committee as a Political System: The Problem of Integration”. APSR; V.46-#?, pp. 310-324.

 

-J. Manley (1965). “The House Committee on Ways and Means: Conflict Management in a Congressional Committee”. APSR; V.59-#?, pp. 927-939.

 

-D. Brady and D. Epstein (1997). “Intraparty preferences, heterogeneity, and the origins of the modern congress: progressive reformers in the house and senate,1890-1920". JLEO; V.13-#1, pp. 26-49.

 

-J. Manley (1970). The Politics of Finance: The House Committee on Ways and Means. Boston: Little, Brown.

 

-R. Fenno (1973). Congressmen in Committees. Boston: Little, Brown.

 

-S. Smith and C. Deering (1990). Committees in Congress. Washington, DC: CQ Press.

 

(2) The Politics and Consequences of Reform

 

-D. Rohde (1974). “Committee Reform in the House of Representatives and the Subcommittee Bill of Rights”. Annals of the Academy of Political and Social Science, V.411, pp. 39-47.

 

-R. Davidson and W. Oleszek (1977). Congress Against Itself. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

 

-C. Rudder (1977). “Committee Reform and the Revenue Process”. in L. Dodd and B. Oppenheimer, eds. Congress Reconsidered (1st ed.). Washington, DC: CQ, pp. 117-139.

 

-C. Rudder (1978). “The Policy Impact of Reform of the Committee on Ways and Means”. in L. Rieselbach, ed. Legislative Reform. Lexington: Lexington Books, pp. 73-89.

 

-K. Shepsle (1988). “Representation and Governance: The Great Legislative Trade-off”. Political Science Quarterly; V.103-#3, pp. 461484.

 

-R. Strahan (1988). “Agenda Change and Committee Politics in the Post-Reform House”. LSQ; V.13-#2, pp. 177-197.

 

-L. Dodd and B. Oppenheimer (1989). “Consolidating Power in the House: The Rise of a New Oligarchy”. L. Dodd and B. Oppenheimer, eds. Congress Reconsidered (4th ed.). Washington, DC: CQ Press, pp. 39-64.

 

-R. Hall (1989). “Committee Decision Making in the Post-Reform House”. L. Dodd and B. Oppenheimer, eds. Congress Reconsidered (4th ed.). Washington, DC: CQ Press, pp. 197-223.

 

-Laura Arnold (2001). “The Distribution of Senate Committee Positions: Change or More of the Same?”. Legislative Studies Quarterly; V.26-#2, pp. 227-248.

 

(3) The Emergence of Subcommittee Government

 

-N. Ornstein (1975). “Causes and Consequences of Congressional Change: Subcommittee Reforms in the House of Representatives, 1970-1973". in N. Ornstein, ed. Congress in Change: Evolution and Reform. New York: Praeger, pp. 88-114.

 

-S. Haeberle (1978). “The Institutionalization of the Subcommittee in the US House of Representatives”. JoP; V.40-#?, pp. 1054-1065.

 

-R. Davidson (1981). “Subcommittee Government: New Channels for Policy Making”, in T. Mann and N. Ornstein eds. The New Congress. Washington, DC: AEI, pp. 99-133.

 

-C. Deering (1982). “Subcommittee Government in the US House: An Analysis of Bill Management”. LSQ; V.7-#4, pp. 533-546.

 

-R. Hall and C.L Evans (1990). “The Power of Subcommittees”. JoP; V.52-#2, pp. 335-355.

 

(4) Multiple Referral and Reorganization of Jurisdiction

 

-R. Davidson, W. Oleszek and T. Kephart (1988). “One Bill, Many Committees: Multiple Referrals in the US House”. LSQ; V.13-#1, pp. 3-28.

 

-R. Davidson (1989). “Multiple Referral of Legislation in the US Senate”. LSQ; V.14-#?, pp. 375-392.

 

-M. Collie and J. Cooper (1989). “Multiple Referral and the `New` Committee System in the House of Representatives”. L. Dodd and B. Oppenheimer, eds. Congress Reconsidered (4th ed.). Washington, DC: CQ Press, pp. 245272.

 

-G. Young and J. Cooper (1990). “Multiple Referral and the Transformation of House Decision Making”. in L. Dodd and B. Oppenheimer, eds. Congress Reconsidered (5th ed.). Washington, DC: CQ Press.

 

-B. Jones, F. Baumgartner and J. Talbert (1993). “The Destruction of Issue Monopolies in Congress”. APSR; V.87-#3, pp. 657-671.

 

-D. King (1994). “The Nature of Congressional Committee Jurisdictions”. APSR; V.88-#1, pp. 48-62.

 

b. Committee Membership

 

-N. Masters (1961). “Committee Assignments in the House of Representatives”. APSR; V.55-#?, pp. 345-357.

 

-D. Rohde and K. Shepsle (1973). “Democratic Committee Assignments in the House of Representatives: Strategic Aspects of a Social Choice Process”. APSR; V.67-#3, pp. 889-905.

 

-K. Shepsle (1975). “Congressional Committee Assignments: An Optimization Model with Institutional Constraints”. PC; V.21-#?, pp. 55-78.

 

-K. Shepsle (1978). The Giant Jigsaw Puzzle: Committee Assignments in the Modern House. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

 

-I. Gertzog (1976). “The Routinization of Committee Assignments in the US House of Representatives”. AJPS; V.?-#?, pp. 693-713.

 

-S. Cowart (1981). “Representation of High Demand Constituencies on Review Committees: A Research Note”. PC; V.37-#?, pp 337-342.

 

-B. Benson (1981). “Why are Congressional Committees Dominated by ‘High Demand’ Legislators”. SEJ; V.48-#?, pp. 68-77.

 

-B. Weingast and W. Marshall (1988). “The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, are not Organized as Markets”. JPE; V.96-#1, pp. 132-163.

 

-M. Munger (1988). “Allocation of Desirable Committee Assignments: Extended Queues versus Committee Expansion”. AJPS; V.32-#2, pp. 316-344.

 

-K. Krehbiel (1990). “Are Congressional Committees Made Up Of Preference Outliers?”. APSR; V.84-#1, pp. 149-163.

 

-R. Hall and B. Grofman (1990). “The Committee Assignment and the Conditional Nature of Committee Bias”. APSR; V.84-#4, pp. 1149-1166.

 

-K. Grier and M. Munger (1991). “Committee Assignments, Constituent Pressures, and Campaign Contributions”. EcInq; V.?-#?, pp. 24-43.

 

-T. Groseclose (1994). “Testing Committee Composition Hypotheses for the US Congress”; JoP; V.56-#2, pp. 440-458.

 

-J. Londregan and J. Snyder (1994). “Comparing Committee and Floor Preferences”. LSQ; V.19-#2, pp. 233-266.

 

-T. Gilligan and K. Krehbiel (1994). “The Gains from Exchange Hypothesis of Legislative Organization”. LSQ; V.19-#2, pp. 181-214.

 

-L. Fowler, S. Douglass and W. Clark, jr. (1980). “The Electoral Effects of House Committee Assignments”. JoP; V.42-#?, pp. 307-319.

 

-T. Cook (1983). “The Policy Impact of the Committee Assignment Process in the House”. JoP; V.45-#?, pp. 1027-1036.

 

-B. Benson (1983). “Logrolling and High Demand Committee Review”. PC; V.?-#?, pp. 427-434.

 

-C. Bullock (198?). “US Senate Committee Assignments: Preferences, Motivation and Success”. AJPS; V.?-#?, pp. 789-808.

 

-B. Hinckley (1975). “Policy Content, Committee Membership and Behavior”. AJPS; V.19-#3, pp. 543-557.

 

-R. Hall (1987). “Participation and Purpose in Committee Decision-Making”. APSR; V.81-#1, pp. 105-127.

 

-T. Gilligan and K Krehbiel (1997). “Specialization decisions within committee “. JLEO; V.13-#2, pp. 366-386.

 

4. Monopoly Jurisdiction and SIE

 

a. The Basic Model

 

-K. Shepsle (1979). “Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models”. AJPS; V.23-#1, pp. 27-58.

 

-K. Shepsle (1979). “The Role of Institutional Structure in the Creation of Policy Equilibrium”. in D. Rae and T. Eismeir, eds. Public Choice and Public Policy. Beverley Hills: Sage, pp. 249-

 

-J. Ferejohn (1986). “Logrolling in an Institutional Context: A Case Study of Foodstamp Legislation”. in G. Wright, L. Rieselbach, and L. Dodd, eds. Congress and Policy Change. New York: Agathon Press. pp. 222-253.

 

-S. Feld and B. Grofman (1988). “Majority Rule Outcomes and the Structure of Debate in One-Issue-At-A-Time Voting”. PC; V.50-#?, pp. 239-252.

 

-R. McKelvey and P. Ordeshook (1984). “An Experimental Study of the Effects of Procedural Rules on Committee Behavior”. JoP; V.46-#?, pp. 182-205.

 

-K. Shepsle and B. Weingast (1984). “When do Rules of Procedure Matter”. JoP; V.46-#?, pp. 206-221.

 

-R. Wilson (1986). “Forward and Backward Agenda Procedures: Committee Experiments on Structurally Induced Equilibrium”. JoP; V.48-#?, pp390-409.

 

-C. Mouw and M. MacKuen (1992). “The Strategic Agenda in Legislative Politics”. APSR; V.86-#1, pp. 87-105.

 

-G. Cox (2001). “Agenda Setting in the U.S. House: A Majority-Party Monopoly?”. Legislative Studies Quarterly; V.26-#2, pp. 185-210.

 

-Keith Krehbiel and Alan Wiseman (2001). “Joseph G. Cannon: Majoritarian from Illinois”. Legislative Studies Quarterly; V.26-#3, pp. 357-389.

 

b. Rational Expectations, Sophisticated Voting and Committee Power

 

(1) Simple Rules

 

-K. Krehbiel (1987). “Sophisticated Committees and Structure-Induced Equilibria in Congress”. in M. McCubbins and T. Sullivan, eds. Congress: Structure and Policy. Cambridg: CUP. pp. 376-402.

 

-A. Denzau and R. Mackay (1983). “Gatekeeping and Monopoly Power of Committees: An Analysis of Sincere and Sophisticated Behavior”. AJPS, V27-#?, pp. 740-761.

 

-A. Denzau, W. Riker and K. Shepsle (1985). “Farquharson and Fenno: Sophisticated Voting and Home Style”. American Political Science Review; V.79-#?, pp. 1117-1134.

 

-K. Krehbiel (1985). “Obstruction and Representativeness in Legislatures”. AJPS; V.29-#?, pp. 643-659.

 

-J. Aldrich (1989). “Power and Order in Congress”. in Home Style and Washington Work. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 219-252.

 

-K. Krehbiel (1989). “A Rationale for Restrictive Rules”. in Home Style and Washington Work. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 165-197.

 

-K. Krehbiel and D. Rivers (1988). “The Analysis of Committee Power: An Application to Senate Voting on the Minimum Wage”. AJPS; V.32-#4, pp. 1151-1174. [Comment by J. Wilkerson, 1991, V.35-#3, pp. 611-623]

 

-D. Baron and J. Ferejohn (1989). “The Power to Propose”. in P. Ordeshook, ed. Models of Strategic Choice in Politics. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 343-366.

 

-D. Baron and J. Ferejohn (1989). “Bargaining in Legislatures”. APSR; V.83-#4, pp. 1181-1206.

 

-D. Baron (1991). “Majoritarian Incentives, Pork Barrel Programs, and Procedural Control”. AJPS; V.35-#1, pp. 57-90.

 

-D. Baron and E. Kalai (1993). “The Simplest Equilibrium of a Majority Rule Division Game”. JET; V.61-#?, pp. 290-301.

 

-D. Baron (1994). “A Sequential Choice Theory Perspective on Legislative Organization”. LSQ; V.19-#2, pp. 267-296.

 

-J. Banks and J. Duggan (2000). “A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice”. APSR; V.94-#1, pp. 73-88.

 

-N. McCarty (2000). “Proposal Rights, Veto Rights, and Political Bargaining”. AJPS; V.44-#3, pp. 506-522.

 

-P. Norman (2002). “Legislative Bargaining and Coalition Formation”. JET; V.102-#2, pp. 322-353

 

-Hülya Eraslan (2002). “Uniqueness of Stationary Equilibrium Payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn Model”. JET; V.103-#1, pp. 11-30.

 

-Hülya Eraslan and Antonio Merlo (2002). “Majority Rule in a Stochastic Model of Bargaining”. JET; V.103-#1, pp. 31-48

 

-Matthew Jackson and Boaz Moselle (2002). “Coalition and Party Formation in a Legislative Voting Game”. JET; V.103-#1, pp. 49-87

 

-B. Weingast (1989). “Floor Behavior in the US Congress: Committee Behavior under the Open Rule”. APSR; V.83-#3, pp. 795-815.

 

-D. Dion (1992). “The Robustness of Structure-Induced Equilibrium”. AJPS; V.36-#2, pp. 462-482.

 

-D. Dion and J. Huber (1996). “Procedural Choice and the House Committee on Rules”. JoP; V.58-#1, pp. 25-53.

 

-K. Krehbiel (1997). “Restrictive Rules Reconsidered”. AJPS; V.41-#3, pp. 919-944. [comment by Dion and Huber with reply by Krehbiel follows, 945-964.]

 

(2) Complex Rules

 

-S. Bach (1981). “Special Rules in the House of Representatives: Themes and Contemporary Variations”. Congressional Studies; V.8-#?, pp. 37-58.

 

-S. Bach (1982). The Structure of Choice in the House of Representatives: The Impact of Complex Special Rules”. Harvard Journal on Legislation; V.18-#?, pp. 553-602.

 

-S. Bach and S. Smith (1987). Managing Uncertainty in the House of Representatives: Adaptation and Innovation in Special Rules. Washington, DC: Brookings.

 

-S. Smith (1989). Call to Order: Floor Politics in the House and Senate. Washington, DC: Brookings.

 

-T. Gilligan and K. Krehbiel (1988). “Complex Rules and Congressional Outcomes: An Event Study of Energy Tax Legislation”. JoP; V.50-#3, pp. 625-654.

 

-K. Krehbiel (1986). “Unanimous Consent Agreements: Going Along in the Senate”. JoP; V.48-#?, pp. 541-564.

 

-S. Smith and M. Flathman (1989). “Managing the Senate Floor: Complex Unanimous Consent Agreements since the 1950s”. LSQ; V.14-#3, pp. 349-374.

 

-G. Cox (2000). “On the Effects of Legislative Rules”. LSQ; V.25-#2, pp. 169-192.

 

(3) Conference Committees

 

-J. Ferejohn (1975). “Who Wins in Conference Committees”. JoP; V.37-#?, pp. 1033-1046.

 

-G. Strom and B. Rundquist (1977). “A Revised Theory of Winning in House-Senate Conferences”. APSR; V.71-#?, pp. 448-453.

 

-D. Gross (1980). “House-Senate Conference Committees: A Comparative State Perspective”. AJPS; V.24-#?, pp. 769-778.

 

-K. Shepsle and B. Weingast (1987). “The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power”. American Political Science Review; V.81-#1, pp. 85-104. (Comment by K. Krehbiel and Response, APSR, 1987, V.81-#3, pp. 929-945)

 

-S. Smith (1988). “An Essay on Sequence, Position, Goals and Committee Power”. LSQ; V.13-#2, pp. 151-176.

 

-K. Shepsle and B. Weingast (1989). “Penultimate Power: Conference Committees and the Legislative Process”. Home Style and Washington Work. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 199-217.

 

(4) Executive Veto

 

-T. Hammond and G. Miller (1987). “The Core of the Constitution”. APSR; V.81-#4, pp. 1155-1174.

 

-J. Carter and D. Schap (1987). “Executive Veto, Legislative Override, and Structure-Induced Equilibrium”. PC; V.52-#?, pp. 227-244.

 

-D. Schap (1986). “Executive Veto and Informational Strategy: A Structure-Induced Equilibrium Analsysis”. AJPS; V.30-#?, pp. 755-770.

 

-R. Kiewiet and M. McCubbins (1988). “Presidential Influence on Congressional Appropriations Decisions”. AJPS; V.32-#?, pp. 713-736.

 

c. Asymmetric Information and Committee Power

 

-R. Fenno (1973). Congressmen in Committees. Boston: Little, Brown.

 

-K. Krehbiel (1991). Information and Legislative Organization. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

 

-T. Gilligan and K. Krehbiel (1987). “Collective Decisionmaking and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Ammendment Procedures”. JLEO; V.3-#2, pp. 287-335.

 

-T. Gilligan and K. Krehbiel (1989). “Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules with a Heterogeneous Committee”. AJPS; V.33-#2, pp. 459-490.

 

-T. Gilligan and K. Krehbiel (1989). “Collective Choice without Procedural Commitment”. in P. Ordeshook, ed. Models of Strategic Choice in Politics. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 295-341.

 

-T. Gilligan and K. Krehbiel (1990). “Organization of Informative Committees by a Rational Legislature”. AJPS; V.34-#2, pp. 531-564.

 

-T. Gilligan (199?). “Performance in an Institutionalized Legislature”. Political Analysis, V.?, pp. 1-25.

 

-D. Austen-Smith (1993). “Information and Influence: Lobbying for Agendas and Votes”. AJPS; V.37-#3, pp. 799-833.

 

-D. Austen-Smith (1993). “Interested Experts and Policy Advice: Multiple Referrals under Open Rule”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.5-#?, pp. 3-43.

 

-A. Lupia (1993). “Credibility and Responsiveness of Direct Legislation”. in W. Barnett, et al., eds. Political Economy: Institutions, Information, Competition, and Representation. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 379-404.

 

-D. Diermeier (1995). “Commitment, Deference, and Legislative Institutions”. APSR; V.89-#2, pp. 344-355

 

-D. Epstein (1997). “An Informational Rationale for Committee Gatekeeping Power”. PC; V.91-#3/4, pp. 271-299.

 

-D. Epstein (1998). “Partisan and Bipartisan Signaling in Congress”. JLEO; V.14-#2, pp. 183-204.

 

-D. Diermeier and T. Fedderson (2000). “Information and Congressional Hearings”. AJPS; V.44-#1, pp. 51-65.

 

-D. Baron (2000). “Legislative Organization with Informational Committees”. AJPS; V.44-#3, pp. 485-505.

 

-V. Krishna and J. Morgan (2000). “Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules: Some Amendments”. APSR; V.95-#2, pp. 435-452. [Responese by Krehbiel follows, pp. 453-457.]

 

-M. Battaglini (2000). “Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk”. Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science Discussion Paper, #1295.


IV. Bureaucracy and Regulation

 

A. Regulatory Capture and Rent-seeking

 

-S. Huntington (1954). “The Marasmus of the ICC: The Commission, The Railroads and the Public Interest”. Yale Law Journal; V.61-#?, pp. 467-509.

 

-M. Bernstein (1955). Regulating Business by Independent Commission. Princeton: PUP.

 

-G. Kolko (1965). Railroads and Regulation, 1877-1918. New York: Norton.

 

-G. Stigler (1971). “The Theory of Economic Regulation”. Bell Journal; V.2-#1, pp. 3-21.

 

-G. Stigler (1974). “Free Riders and Collective Action: An Appendix to Theories of Economic Regulation”. BJE; V.5-#2, pp.359-365.

 

-W. Jordan (1972). “Producer Protection, Prior Market Structure and the Effects of Government Regulation”. JLawEc; V.15-#1, pp. 151-176.

 

-S. Peltzman (1976). “Toward a More General Theory of Regulation”. JLawEcon; V.19-#2, pp. 211-240.

 

-A. Krueger (1974). “The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking Society”. AER; V.64-#3, pp. 291-303.

 

-J. Buchanan, R. Tollison and G. Tullock, eds. (1980). Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society. College Station: Texas A&M Press.

 

-C. Rowley, R. Tollison and G. Tullock, eds. (1988). The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking. Boston: Kluwer.

 

B. Bureaucratic Control and Agenda Setting

 

-W. Niskanen (1971). Bureaucracy and Representative Government. Chicago: Aldine.

 

-J. Migue and G. Belanger (1974). “Toward a Theory of Managerial Discretion”. PC; V.17-#?, pp. 27-48.

 

-A. Breton and R. Wintrobe (1975). “The Equilibrium Size of a Budget-Maximizing Bureau: A Note on Niskanen's Theory of Bureaucracy”. JPE; V.83-#1, pp. 195-207.

 

-W. Niskanen (1975). “Bureaucrats and Politicians”. JLaw E; V.18-#3, pp. 617-643.

 

-T. McGuire, M. Coiner and L. Spancake (1979). “Budget Maximizing Agencies and Efficiency in Government”. PC; V.34-#?, pp. 333-357.

 

-R. Mackay and C. Weaver (1979). “On the Mutuality of Interest between Bureaus and High Demand Review Committees: A Perverse Result”. PC; V.34-#?, pp. 481-491.

 

-M. Munger (1984). “On the Mutuality of Interest Between Bureaus and High Demand Review Committees: The Case of Joint Production”. PC; V.43-#?, pp. 211-215.

 

-J. Conybeare (198?). “Bureaucracy, Monopoly and Competition: A Critical Analysis of the Budget-Maximizing Model of Bureaucracy”. AJPS; V.?-#?, pp. 478-502.

 

-T. Romer and H. Rosenthal (1978). “Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas, and the Status Quo”. V.33-#?, pp. 27-43.

 

-T. Romer and H. Rosenthal (1979). “Bureaucrats versus Voters: On the Political Economy of Resource Allocation by Direct Democracy”. QJE; V.93-#?, pp. 563-587.

 

-R. Filimon, T. Romer and H. Rosenthal (1982). “Asymmetric Information and Agenda Control: The Bases of Monopoly Power in Government Spending”. JPubE; V.17-#?, pp. 51-70.

 

-T. Romer and H. Rosenthal (1982). “An Exploration in the Politics and Economics of Local Public Services”. ZfN; V.?-supplement, pp. 105-125.

 

-T. Romer, H. Rosenthal and K. Ladha (1984). “If At First You Don't Succeed: Budgeting by a Sequence of Referenda”. in H. Hanusch, ed. Public Finance and the Quest for Efficiency. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, pp. 87-108.

 

-R. Mackay and C. Weaver (1978). “Monopoly Bureaus and Fiscal Outcomes”. in G. Tullock and R. Wagner, eds. Policy Analysis and Deductive Reasoning. Lexington: DC Heath.

 

-A. Denzau and R. Mackay (1980). “A Model of Benefit and Tax Share Discrimination by a Monopoly Bureau”. JPubE; V13-#?, pp. 341-368.

 

-R. Mackay and C. Weaver (1983). “Commodity Bundling and Agenda Control in the Public Sector”. QJE; V.?-#?, pp. 611-635.

 

-R. Mackay and C. Weaver (1981). “Agenda Control by Budget Maximizers in a Multi-Bureau Setting”. PC; V.37-#?, pp. 447-472.

 

-B. Spencer (1980). “Outside Information and the Degree of Monopoly Power of a Public Bureau”. SEJ; V.47-#?, pp. 228-233.

 

-David M. Primo (2002). “Rethinking Political Bargaining: Policymaking with a Single Proposer”. Journal of Law Economics and Organization; V.18-#2, pp. 411-427.

 

-R. Katzman (1980). Regulatory Bureaucracy. Cambridte: MIT.

 

-J.Q. Wilson (1980). The Politics of Regulation. New York: Basic Books.

 

C. Congressional Control: Delegation and Monitoring

 

1. Basic Theory of Congressional Domination

 

-L. Dodd and R. Schott (1979). Congress and the Administrative State. New York: Wiley.

 

-R.D. Arnold (1979). Congress and the Bureaucracy. New Haven: Yale University Press.

 

-J. Aberbach (1990). Keeping a Watchful Eye: The Politics of Congressional Oversight. Washington, DC: Brookings.

 

-J. Huber and C. Shipan (2000). “The Costs of Control: Legislators, Agencies, and Transaction Costs”. LSQ; V.25-#1, pp. 25-52.

 

-B. Mitnick (1975). “The Theory of Agency: The Policing `Paradox` and Regulatory Behavior”. PC; V.24-#2, pp. 27-42.

 

-M. Fiorina (1981). “Congressional Control of the Bureaucracy: A Mistmatch of Incentives and Capabilities”. in L. Dodd and B. Oppenheimer, eds. Congress Reconsidered (2nd edition). Wahsington, DC: CQ Press, pp. 332-348.

 

-B. Weingast (1981). “Regulation, Reregulation, and Deregulation: The Political Foundations of Agnecy Clientele Relationships”. Law and Contemporary Problems; V.44-#?, pp. 147-177.

 

-B. Weingast (1984). “The Congressional-Bureaucratic System: A Principal Agent Perspective (with Applications to the SEC)”. PC; V.44-#?, pp.147-191.

 

-Barry Weingast and Mark Moran (1983). “Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission”. JPE. V.91-#5; pp. 765-800.

 

-R. Calvert, M. Moran and B. Weingast (1987). “Congressional Influence over Policy Making: The Case of the FTC”. in M. McCubbins and T. Sullivan, eds. Congress: Structure and Policy. Cambridgw: CUP., pp. 493-522.

 

-Terry Moe (1987). “An Assessment of the Positive Theory of ‘Congressional Dominance’”. LSQ. V.12-#4; pp. 475-520.

 

-M. McCubbins, R. Noll and B. Weingast (1987). “Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control”. JLEO; V.3-#2, pp. 243-277.

 

-M. McCubbins, R. Noll and B. Weingast (1989). “Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies”. Virginia Law Review; V.75-#3, pp. 431-482.

 

-T. Gilligan, W. Marshall and B. Weingast (1989). “Regulation and the Theory of Legislative Choice: the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887". JLawEc; V.32-#1, pp. 35-61.

 

-K. Shepsle (1992). “Bureaucratic Drift, Coalitional Drift, and Time Consistency”. JLEO; V.8-#?, pp. 111-118.

 

-K. Poole and H. Rosenthal (1993). “The Enduring Nineteenth Century Battle for Economic Regulation: The Interstate Commerce Act Revisited”. JLawEc; V.36-#?, pp. 837-860.

 

-K. Poole and H. Rosenthal (1993). “Congress and Railroad Regulation, 1874-1883" . in C. Goldin and G. Libecap, eds. The Regulated Economy: A Historical Approach to Political Economy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 81-120.

 

-T. Moe (1982). “Regulatory Performance and Presidential Administration”. AJPS; V.26-#2, pp. 197-224.

 

2. The Decision to Delegate and the Form of Delegation

 

-M. Fiorina (1982). “Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Administrative Process”. PC; V.39-#?, pp. 33-66.

 

-M. McCubbins (1985). “The Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure”. AJPS; V.?-#?, pp. 721-748.

 

-Matthew McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz (1984). “Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms”. AJPS. V.2-#1; pp. 165-179.

 

-M. Fiorina (1985). “Group Concentration and the Delegation of Legislative Authority”. in R. Noll, ed. Regulatory Policy and the Social Sciences. Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 175-197.

 

-M. Fiorina (1986). “Legislator Uncertainty, Legislative Control, and the Delegation of Legislative Power”. JLEO; V.2-#1, pp. 33-51.

 

-M. McCubbins and T. Page (1986). “The Congressional Foundations of Agency Performance”. PC; V.51-#2, pp. 173-190.

 

-J. Ferejohn (1987). “The Structure of Agency Decision Processes”. in M. McCubbins and T. Sullivan, eds. Congress: Structure and Policy. Cambridgw: CUP, pp. 441-461.

 

-M. McCubbins and T. Page (1987). “A Theory of Congressional Delegation”. in M. McCubbins and T. Sullivan, eds. Congress: Structure and Policy. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 409-425.

 

-D.R. Kiewiet and M. McCubbins (1991). The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

 

D. Synthesis

 

1. Non Strategic Analysis

 

-J. Bendor and T. Moe (1985). “An Adaptive Model of Bureaucratic Politics”. APSR; V.79-#?, pp. 755-774.

 

-J. Bendor and T. Moe (1986). “Agenda Control, Committee Capture, and the Dynamics of Institutional Power”. APSR; V.80-#4, pp. 11871207.

 

-T. Moe (1985). “Control and Feedback in Economic Regulation: The Case of the NLRB”. APSR; V.79-#4, pp. 1094-1116.

 

-T. Moe (1987). “Interests, Institutions, and Positive Theory: The Politics of the NLRB”. Studies in American Political Development; V.2, pp. 236-299.

 

-T. Moe (1989). “The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure”. in J. Chubb and P. Peterson, eds. Can Government Govern? Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 267-329.

 

-T. Hammond and J. Knott (1996). “Who Controls the Bureaucracy?: Presidential Power, Congressional Dominance, Legal Constraints, and Bureaucratic Autonomy in a Model of Multi-Institutional Policy-Making”. JLEO; V.12-#1, pp. 119-166.

 

2. Complete Information Strategic Analysis

 

-G. Miller (1977). “Bureaucratic Compliance as a Game on the Unit Square”. Public Choice; V.29-#?, pp. 37-52.

 

-G. Miller and T. Moe (1983). “Bureaucrats, Legislators and the Size of Government”. APSR; V.77-#?, pp. 297-322.

 

-K. Moene (1986). “Types of Bureaucratic Interaction”. JPubE; V.29-#?, pp. 333-345.

 

-K. Chan and S. Mestelman (1988). “Institutions, Efficiency and the Strategic Behavior of Sponsors and Bureaus”. JPubE; V.37-#?, pp. 91-102.

 

-D. Brito and M. Intriligator (1980). “A Game Theoretic Approach to Bureaucratic Behavior”. in P.T. Liu, ed. Dynamic Optimization and Mathematical Economics. New York: Plenum Press, pp. 223-236.

 

-C. Eavey and G. Miller (1984). “Bureaucratic Agenda Control: Imposition or Bargaining?”. APSR; V.78-#?, pp. 719-733.

 

-M. Altfeld and G. Miller (1984). “Sources of Bureaucratic Influence: Expertise and Agenda Control”. Journal of Conflict Resolution; V.28-#4, pp. 701-730.

 

-B.D. Wood (1988). “Principals, Bureaucrats, and Responsiveness in Clean Air Enforcements”. American Political Science Review; V.82-#1, pp. 213-234.

 

3. Asymmetric Information Strategic Analysis

 

-P. Spiller (1990). “Agency and the Role of Political Institutions”. in J. Ferejohn and J. Kuklinski, eds. Information and Democratic Processes. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, pp. 269-278.

 

-B. Spencer (1982). “Asymmetric Information and Excessive Budgets in Government Bureaucracies: A Principal Agent Perspective”. JEBO; V.3-#?, pp. 197-224.

 

-J. Bendor, S. Taylor and R. Van Gaslen (1985). “Bureaucratic Expertise versus Legislative Authority: A Model of Deception and Monitoring in Budgeting”. APSR; V.79-#?, pp. 1041-1060.

 

-J. Bendor, S. Taylor and R. Van Gaalen (1987). “Politicians, Bureaucrats and Asymmetric Information”. AJPS; V.31-#4, pp. 796-828.

 

-J. Bendor, S. Taylor and R. Van Gaalen (1987). “Stacking the Deck: Bureaucratic Missions and Policy Design”. APSR; V.81-#3, pp. 873-896.

 

-P. Fenn and C.G. Veljanovski (1988). “A Positive Economic Theory of Regulatory Enforcement”. EJ; V.98-#?, pp. 1055-1070.

 

-S. Morton (1988). “Strategic Voting in Repeated Referenda”. SC&W; V.5-#1, pp. 45-68.

 

-D. Baron (1988). “Regulation and Legilsative Choice”. RandJE; V.19-#3, pp. 467-77.

 

-P. Spiller (1990). “Politicians, Interest Groups, and Regulators: A Multiple-Principals Agency Theory of Regulation of `Let Them be Bribed`”. JLawEc; V.33-#?, pp. 65-101.

 

-J. Banks (1989). “Agency Budgets, Cost Information and Auditing”. AJPS; V.33-#3, pp. 670-699.

 

-J. Banks (1990). “Monopoly Agenda Control and Asymmetric Information”. QJE; V.105-#2, pp.445-464.

 

-J. Banks (1993). “Two-Sided Uncertainty in the Monopoly Agenda Setter Model”. Journal of Public Economics; V.50-#3, pp. 429-444.

 

-J. Banks and B. Weingast (1992). “The Political Control of Bureaucracies under Asymmetric Information”. AJPS; V.36-#2, pp. 509-524.

 

-A. Lupia (1992). “Busy Voters, Agenda Control, and the Power of Information”. APSR; V.86-#2, pp. 390-403.

 

-C. Cameron and B.P. Rosendorf (1993). “A Signaling Theory of Congressional Oversight”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.5-#?, pp. 44-70.

 

-D. Epstein and S. O’Halloran (1994). “Administrative Procedures, Information and Agency Discretion”. AJPS; V.38-#3, pp. 697-722.

 

-D. Epstein and S. O’Halloran (1995). “A Theory of Strategic Oversight: Congress, Lobbyists, and the Bureaucracy”. JLEO; V.11-#?, pp. 227-255.

 

-A. Lupia and M. McCubbins (1994). “Learning from Oversight: Fire Alarms and Police Patrols Reconstructed”. JLEO; V.10-#1, pp. 96-125.

 

-Hopenhayn, Hugo and Susanne Lohmann (1996). “Fire-Alarm Signals and the Political Oversight of Regulatory Agencies”. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization; V.12-#1, pp. 196-213.

 

-O. Swank, W. Letterie, and H. van Dalen (1999). “A Theory of Policy Advice”. JLEO; V.15-#3, pp. 602-614.

 

-J.-J. Laffont and J. Tirole (1993). A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation. Cambridge: MIT Press.

 

-J. Tirole (1994). “The Internal Organization of Government”. OEP; V.46-#1, pp. 1-29

 

-J.-J. Laffont (1999). “Political Economy, Information and Incentives”. EER; V.43-#?, pp. 649-669.

 

-J.-J. Laffont and J. Tirole (1990). “The Politics of Government Decision-Making: Regulatory Institutions”. JLEO; V.6-#1, pp. 1-31.

 

-J.-J. Laffont and J. Tirole (1991). “The Politics of Regulatory Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture”. QJE; V.106-#4, pp. 1088-1127.

 

-J.-J. Laffont (1996). “Industrial Policy and Politics”. IJIO; V.14-#1, pp. 1-27.

 

-D. Martimort (1996). “The Multiprincipal Nature of Government”. EER; V.40-#3/5, pp. 673-685.

 

-D. Martimort (1996). “A Theory of Bureaucratization Based on Reciprocity and Collusive Behavior”. ScanJE; V.99-#4, pp. 555-579.

 

-J.-J. Laffont and D. Martimort (1998). “Collusion and Delegation”. RandJE; V.29-#2, pp. 280-305.

 

-J.-J. Laffont and D. Martimort (1998). “Transaction Costs, Institutional Design and the Separation of Powers”. EER; V.42-#3/5, pp. 673-684.

 

-J.-J. Laffont and D. Martimort (1999). “Separation of Regulators Against Collusive Behavior”. RandJE; V.30-#2, pp. 232-262.

 

-D. Martimort (1999). “Renegotiation Design with Multiple Regulators”. JET; V.88-#2, pp. 261-293.

 

-D. Martimort (1999). “The Life Cycle of Regulatory Agencies: Dynamic Capture and Transaction Costs”. Review of Economic Studies; V.66-#4, pp. 929-947.

 

-M. Boyer and J.-J. Laffont (1999). “Toward a Political Theory of the Emergence of Environmental Incentive Regulation”. RandJE; V.30-#1, pp. 137-157.

 

-R. de Figueiredo, P. Spiller, and S. Urbiztondo (1999). “An Informational Perspective on Administrative Procedures”. JLEO; V.15-#1, pp. 283-305.