The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy
Professor: Douglas Nelson
Office: Tilton 108 (Murphy Institute), Phone: 865-5317
Phone: 865-5317
email: dnelson@tulane.edu
Webpage: http://www.tulane.edu/~dnelson/
For a .pdf file of this syllabus click here
This course provides an advanced overview of contemporary approaches to the analysis of political economy. Emphasis is placed on trade policy and competition policies. Specifically, we will focus on the development of a variety of micro-analytic models of the interaction between economics and politics. We begin with a derivation of citizen preferences over policies based on economic attributes in a general equilibrium context. With political preferences in hand, we examine a number of alternative “institutional” environments: single-issue referendum; single-issue lobbying; electoral competition; and agency models.
Evaluation: Your performance in this course will be evaluated on the basis of 2 problem sets (worth 100 points) and 1 takehome examination (worth points 100 points). To receive an A, you must earn at least 90 percent of the points available. To pass the course you must earn at least 60 percent of the points available. Grades between these limits will be determined on the basis of your performance relative to that of the class as a whole.
Readings: The core readings for the course will be drawn from classic and current research papers. Where possible, I will assign papers that are available online.
The attached syllabus contains a large number of references. We will only read a fraction of these (those marked by stars–“►”). However, a person contemplating research in political economy would be wise to read more widely.
Some helpful surveys on the Political Economy of Trade:
Douglas Nelson (1988). “Endogenous Tariff Theory: A Critical Survey”. American Journal of Political Science; V.32-#3, pp. 796-837.
Arye L. Hillman (1988). The Political Economy of Protection. Chur: Harwood Academic Publishers.
Robert Baldwin (1989). “The Political Economy of Trade Policy”. Journal of Economic Perspectives; V.3-#4, pp. 119-135.
Dani Rodrik (1995). “Political Economy of Trade Policy”. in G. Grossman and K Rogoff, eds. Handbook of International Economics--V.III. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 1457-1494.
Raymond Riezman and John Wilson (1995). “Politics and Trade Policy”. In Jeffrey Banks and Eric Hanushek, eds. Modern Political Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 108-144.
Robert Baldwin (1996). “The Political Economy of Trade Policy: Integrating the Perspectives of Economists and Political Scientists”. In Robert Feenstra, Gene Grossman, and Douglas Irwin, eds. The Political Economy of Trade Policy. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 147-173.
Jeffry Frieden and Ronald Rogowski (1996). “The Impact of the International Economy on National Policies: An Analytical Overview”. In Robert Keohane and Helen Milner, eds. Internationalization and Domestic Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 25-47.
James Alt, Jeffry Frieden, Michael Gilligan, Dani Rodrik, and Ronald Rogowski (1996). “The Politics of International Trade: Enduring Puzzles and an Agenda for Inquiry”. Comparative Political Studies; V.29-#6, pp. 689-717.
Elhanan Helpman (1997). “Politics and Trade Policy”. In D. Kreps and K. Wallace, eds. Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, Volume I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 19-45.
Stephen Magee (1997). “Endogenous Protection: The Empirical Evidence”. in Dennis C. Mueller, ed, Perspectives On Public Choice: A Handbook. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 526- 561.
Alan Deardorff and Robert Stern (1998). “An Overview of the Modeling of the Choices and Consequences of U.S. Trade Policies”. In A. Deardorff and R. Stern, eds. Constituent Interests and U.S. Trade Policies. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 29-55.
Helen Milner (1999). “The Political Economy of International Trade”. Annual Review of Political Science; V.2, pp. 91-114.
Kishore Gawande and Pravin Krishna (2003). “The Political Economy of Trade Policy: Empirical Approaches”. In E. Kwan Choi and James Harrigan, eds. Handbook of International Trade. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 213-250.
William Kaempfer, Edward Tower and Thomas Willett (2003), “Trade Protectionism.” in C. Rowley, editor, Encyclopedia of Public Choice. Routledge, pp. 550-576
Some recent advanced texts in political economy:
Avinash Dixit (1998). The Making of Economic Policy: A Transaction Cost Politics Perspective. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini (2000). Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Allan Drazen (2000). Political Economy in Macroeconomics. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Jean-Jacques Laffont (2000). Incentives and Political Economy. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
John Roemer (2001). Political Competition: Theory and Application. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (2001). Special Interest Politics. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Prerequisites: It is assumes that you have completed graduate level microeconomic theory. This, and the mathematical tools used in microeconomic theory, will be used in the readings, the lectures, the exercises, and the examinations. We will be reading a number of papers applying standard econometric tools, and it is assumed that you have sufficient knowledge of these tools to read such material.
Homework. The syllabus that follows this course description lists the reading that you are expected to have done for the lecture on the listed date. Several problem sets will be distributed in class. Homework is due on or before the first class in which that material is discussed. Late homework will not be accepted, and will receive a score of 0. The percent of total available homework credit will be taken as your homework score. For example, if you answer 90% of the homework questions correctly, your homework score is 90.
Short Syllabus
Topic I: Deriving Policy Preferences in General Equilibrium
Topic II: Referendum Models
Topic III: Organizing for Political Action
Topic IV: Chicago School Theory and Empirics
Topic V: Lobbying Models
Topic VI: Contributions, Elections and Trade Policy
Topic VII: Institutions and Equilibrium Outcomes
Topic VIII: Domestic Political Economy of Integration
Topic IX: Political Economy of Immigration Policy
Topic X: Political Economy of Policy Reform
Topic XI: Industry-Level Policy–Antidumping
Topic XII: Industry-Level Policy–Competition Policy
Syllabus/Reading List
Topic I. Deriving Policy Preferences in GE
● Theory: The Stolper-Samuelson Theorem and Generalizations
►Nelson notes: Stolper-Samuelson theorem [Generalizations optional]
■Wolfgang Stolper and Paul Samuelson (1941). “Protection and Real Wages”. Review of Economic Studies. V.9-#1, pp. 58-73.
■ Ronald Jones (1965). “The Structure of Simple General Equilibrium Models”. Journal of Political Economy; V.73-#6, pp. 557-572.
■ Ronald Jones and José Scheinkman (1977). “The Relevance of the Two-Sector Production Model in Trade Theory”. Journal of Political Economy; V.85-#5, pp. 909-935.
■ James Cassing (1981). “On the Relationship between Commodity Price Changes and Factor-Owners Real Positions”. Journal of Political Economy; V.89-#3, pp. 593-595.
■ Ronald Jones (1985). “Relative Prices and Real Factor Rewards: A Reinterpretation”. Economics Letters; V.19-#1, pp. 47-49.
■Peter Lloyd and Albert Schweinberger (1988). “Trade Expenditure Functions and the Gains from Trade”. Journal of International Economics; V.24-#3/4, pp. 275-297.
■ S. Tokarick (1995). “Friends, Enemies and Factor Diversification: Implications for Protectionist Pressure”. Journal of Economic Integration; V.10-#4, pp. 434-443.
■ Peter Lloyd and A. Schweinberger (1997). “Conflict Generating Product Price Changes: The Imputed Output Approach”. European Economic Review; V.41-#8, pp. 1569-1587.
■ Peter Lloyd (2000). “Generalizing the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem: A Tale of Two Matrices”. Review of International Economics; V.8-#4, pp. 597-613.
● Theory: Deriving Preferences
►Nelson notes: Deriving trade policy preferences
■ Jagdish Bhagwati (1982). “Shifting Comparative Advantage, Protectionist Demands and Policy Response”. in J. Bhagwati, ed. Import Competition and Response. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 153-184.
■ Elias Dinopoulos (1983). “Import Competition, International Factor Mobility and Lobbying Responses”. Journal of International Economics; V.14-#3/4, pp. 395-410.
■ Jaime deMelo and Sherman Robinson (1982). “Trade Adjustment Policies and Income Distribution in Three Archetype Developing Economies”. Journal of Development Economics; V.10-#1, pp. 67-92.
■ Robert Baldwin (1984). “Rent-Seeking and Trade Policy: An Industry Approach”. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; V.120-#4, pp. 662-676.
■ James Cassing (1996). “Protectionist Mutual Funds”. European Journal of Political Economy; V.12-#1, pp. 1-18.
■Torben Iverson and David Soskice (2001). “An Asset Theory of Social Policy Preference”. American Political Science Review; V.95-#4, pp. 875-893.
■ Andy Baker (2003). “Why is Trade Reform so Popular in Latin America: A Consumption Based Theory of Trade Policy Preferences”. World Politics; V.55-#3, pp. 423-455.
● Application/Empirics, 1: Revealed Preferences–The Magee Test
►Stephen Magee (1978). “Three Simple Tests of the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem”. in P. Oppenheimer, ed. Issues in International Economics; Stocksfield: Oriel Press, pp. 138-153.
■ Eugene Beaulieu (2002). “The Stopler-Samuelson Theorem Faces Congress”. Review of International Economics; V.10-#2, pp. 343-360.
■ Eugene Beaulieu and Christopher Magee (2004), “Four Simple Tests of Campaign Contributions and Trade Preferences”. Economics & Politics; V.16-#2, pp. 163-187.
■Christopher Magee (2004). “Industry and Factor Linkages between Lobby Groups”. in Devashish Mitra and Arvind Panagariya, eds. The Political Economy of Trade, Aid and Foreign Investment Policies. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 159-175.
■ Michael Hiscox (2001). “The Magee Test Revisited: Industry Lobbying Patterns and the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem”. Ms: Harvard University.
● Application/Empirics, 2: Case Studies, Firms
■ Moran, Theodore (1973). “Foregin Expansion as a ‘Institutional Necessity’ for Corporate Capitalism: The Search for a Radical Model”. World Politics; V.25-#3, pp. 369-386.
■ T. Pugel and I. Walter (1985). “US Corporate Interests and the Political Economy of Trade”. Review of Economics and Statistics; V.67-#3, pp. 465-473.
■ I.M. Destler and John Odell (1987). Anti-Protection: Changing Forces in US Trade Politics. Washington, DC: IIE.
■ V. Aggarwal, R. Keohane and D. Yoffie (1987). “The Dynamics of Negotiated Protection”. American Political Science Review; V.81-#2, pp. 345-366.
■ Helen Milner (1988). Resisting Protectionism: Global Industries and the Politics of International Trade. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
■ Helen Milner and David Yoffie (1989). “Between Free Trade and Protectionism: Strategic Trade Policy and a Theory of Corporate Trade Demands”. International Organization; V.43-#2, pp. 239-272.
■ David Baron (1997). “Integrated Strategy, Trade Policy, and Global Competition”. California Management Review; V.39-#2, pp. 145-169.
■ Michael Lusztig (1998). “The Limits of Rent Seeking: Why Protectionists Become Free Traders”. Review of International Political Economy; V.5-#1, pp. 38-63.
■ Oona Hathaway (1998). “Positive Feedback: The Impact of Trade Liberalization on Industry Demands for Protection”. International Organization; V.52-#3, pp. 575-612.
■ Strom Thacker (2000). “Private Sector Trade Politics in Mexico”. Business and Politics; V.2-#2, article 3.
■ Wendy Hansen and Neil Mitchell (2001). “Globalization or National Capitalism: Large Firms, National Strategies, and Political Activities”. Business and Politics; V.3-#1, pp. 5-19.
■James Alt, Fredrik Carlsen, Per Heum and Kœre Johansen (1999). “Asset Specificity and the Political Behavior of Firms: Lobbying for Subsidies in Norway”. International Organization; V.53-#1, pp. 99-116.
■ Zahariadis, Nikolaos (2001). “Asset Specificity and State Subsidies in Industrialized Countries”. International Studies Quarterly; V.45-#4, 603-616.
● Applications/Empirics, 3: Case studies, labor
■ Alan Deardorff and Robert Stern (1979). “American Labor’s Stake in International Trade”. In ICS, ed. Tariffs, Quotas and Trade: The Politics of Protectionism. San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, pp. 125-148.
■ Anne Krueger (1980). “Protectionist Pressures, Imports and Employment in the US”. Scandinavian Journal of Economics; V.82-#2, pp. 133-146.
■ Peter Donohue (1993). “‘Free Trade’ Unions and the State: Trade Liberalization’s Endorsement by the AFL-CIO, 1943-1962”. Research in Political Economy; Vol. 13, pp. 1-73.
■ John Conybeare and Mark Zinkula (1996). “Who Voted against the NAFTA? Trade Unions versus Free Trade”. World Economy; V.19-#1, pp. 1-12.
■ James Shoch (2000). “Contesting Globalization: Organized Labor, NAFTA, and the 1997 and 1998 Fast-Track Fights”. Politics and Society; V.28-#1, pp. 119-150.
■ James Shoch (2001). “Organized Labor versus Globalization: NAFTA, Fast Track, and PNTR with China”. In Lowell Turner, et al. eds, Rekindling the Movement: Labor’s Quest for Relevance in the 21st Century. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 275-313.
● Applications/Empirics, 4: Public Opinion Poll Data
■ Edward Balistreri (1997). “The Performance of the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek Model in Predicting Endogenous Trade Policy Forces at the Individual Level”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.30-#1, pp. 1-17.
■ Matthew Mendelsohn and Robert Wolfe (2001). “Probing the Aftermyth of Seattle: Canadian Public Opinion on International Trade, 1980-2000”. International Journal V.56-#2, pp. 234-260.
■ Eugene Beaulieu (2002). “Factor or Industry Cleavages in Trade Policy: An Empirical Analysis of the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem”. Economics & Politics; V.14-#2, pp. 99-131.
■ Matthew Gabel (1998). “Economic Integration and Mass Politics: Market Liberalization and Public Attitudes in the European Union”. American Journal of Political Science; V.42-#3, pp. 936-953.
■ Matthew Gabel (1998). Interests and Integration: Market Liberalization, Public Opinion, and the European Union. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
■ Eric Uslaner (1998). “Trade Winds: NAFTA and the Rational Public”. Political Behavior; V.20-#4, pp. 341-360.
►Kenneth Scheve and Matthew Slaughter (2001). “What Determines Individual Trade Policy Preferences”. Journal of International Economics; V.54-#2, pp. 267-292.
►Kevin O’Rourke and R. Sinnott (2001). “The Determinants of Individual Trade Policy Preferences: International Survey Evidence”. Brookings Trade Policy Forum 2001, Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 157-206.
■Karl Kaltenthaler, Ronald Gelleny, and Stephen Ceccoli (2004). “Explaining Citizen Support for Trade Liberalization”. International Studies Quarterly; V.48-#4, pp. 829-852.
■Anna Maria Mayda and D. Rodrik (2005). “Why Are Some People (and Countries) More Protectionist Than Others?”. European Economic Review; V.49-#6, pp. 1393-1430.
►Jens Hainmueller and Michael Hiscox (2005). “Learning to Love Globalization: The Effects of Education on Individual Attitudes Toward International Trade”. International Organization; V.60-#2, pp. 469-498.
■Michael Hiscox (2006). “Through A Glass Darkly: Framing Effects and Individuals' Attitudes Toward Trade”. International Organization; V.60-#3, pp. 755-780.
■Kevin O'Rourke (2006). “Heckscher-Ohlin Theory and Individual Attitudes Toward Globalization”. In Ronald Findlay, Rolf Henriksson, Håkan Lindgren, and Mats Lundahl, eds. Eli Heckscher, International Trade, and Economic History. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 107-138.
■Andy Baker (2005). “Who Wants to Globalize? Consumer Tastes and Labor Markets in a Theory of Trade Policy Beliefs”. American Journal of Political Science; V.49-#4, pp. 924-938.
■Guido Porto (2006). “Using Survey Data to Assess the Distributional Effects of Trade Policy”. Journal of International Economics; V.70-#1, pp. 140-160.
■ Hermann, Richard, Philip Tetlock, and Matthew Diascro (2001). “How Americans Think about Trade: Reconciling Conflicts Among Money, Power, and Principles”. International Studies Quarterly; V.45-#2, pp. 191-218.
■ Skonieczny, Amy (2001). “Constructing NAFTA: Myth, Representation, and the Discursive Construction of U.S. Foreign Policy”. International Studies Quarterly, V.45-#3, pp. 433-454.
■ David Rankin (2001). “Indentities, Interests, and Imports”. Political Behavior; V.23-#4, pp. 351-376.
■ Michael Bailey (2003). “The Politics of the Difficult: The Role of Public Opinion in Early Cold War Aid and Trade Policies”. Legislative Studies Quarterly; V.28-#2, pp. 147-177.
■ H. Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (2004). “The Peculiar Political Economy of NAFTA: Complexity, Uncertainty and Footloose Policy Preferences”. in Devashish Mitra and Arvind Panagariya, eds. The Political Economy of Trade, Aid and Foreign Investment Policies. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 159-175.
● Applications/Empirics, 5: Direct Evidence on Factor Mobility
■ Gene Grossman and James Levinsohn (1989). “Import Competition and Stock Market Return to Capital”. American Economic Review; V.79-#5, pp. 1065-1087.
■ Douglas Nelson and Charles Wasley (1989). “Two is Not Enough: A Capital Market Test of 3x2 Endogenous Tariff Theory”. ms: Murphy Institute, Tulane University.
■ James Brander (1991). “Election Polls, Free Trade, and the Stock Market”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.24-#4, pp. 827-843.
■ Aileen Thompson (1993). “The Anticipated Sectoral Adjustment to the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement: An Event Study Analysis”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.26-#2, pp. 253-271.
■ Aileen Thompson (1994). “Trade Liberalization, Comparative Advantage, and Scale Economies: Stock Market Evidence from Canada”. Journal of International Economics; V.37-#1/2, pp. 1-27.
■ Karen Schnietz and Joanne Oxley (2001). “Globalization Derailed? Multinational Investors’ Response to the 1997 Demise of Fast-Track Trade Authority”. Journal of International Business Studies; V.32-#3, pp. 479-496.
■ Marc Epstein and Karen Schnietz (2002). “Measuring the Cost of Environmental and Trade Protests to Globalization: An Event Study of the Failed 1999 Seattle WTO Talks”. World Trade Journal; V.16-#2, pp. 129-160
■ Fiona McGillivray (2003). “Redistributive Politics and Stock Price Dispersion”. British Journal of Political Science; V.33-#3, pp. 367-395.
■ Benjamin Leibman and Kasaundra Tomlin (2007). “Steel Safeguards and the Welfare of Steel Firms and Downstream Consumers of Steel: A Shareholder Wealth Perspective”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.40-#3, pp. 812-643.
■ Valerie Ramey and Matthew Shapiro (1998). “Costly Capital Reallocation and the Effects of Government Spending”. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy; #48, pp. 145-194.
■ Valerie Ramey and Matthew Shapiro (2001). “Displaced Capital: A Study of Aerospace Plant Closings”. Journal of Political Economy; V.109-#5, pp. 958-992.
■ Olivier Blanchard and Lawrence Katz (1992). “Regional Evolutions”. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity; #1, pp. 1-61.
■ Robert Topel (1994). “Regional Labor Markets and the Determinants of Wage Inequality”. American Economic Review; V.84-#2, pp. 17-22.
■ Robert Topel (1994). “Wage Inequality and Regional Labour Market Performance in the US”. in T. Tachibanaki, ed.. Labour Market and Economic Performance: Europe, Japan and the USA. New York: St. Martin's Press; pp. 93-127.
■ Michael Hiscox (2002). “Interindustry Factor Mobility and Technological Change: Evidence on Wage and Profit Dispersion Across US Industries, 1820-1990”. Journal of Economic History; V.62-#2, pp. 383-416.
■ Robert Hall (2004). “Measuring Factor Adjustment Costs”. Quarterly Journal of Economics; V.119-#3, pp. 899-928.
■ James Townsend (2007). “Do Tariff Adjustments Affect the Wages of Workers in Protected Industries: Evidence from the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.40-#1, pp. 69-92.
Topic II. Referendum Models
● Theory: The Basic Referendum Model
■ Peter Wagstaff (1975). “Consensus Tariff Policy”. Economic Record; V.51-#133, pp. 105-108
►Wolfgang Mayer (1984). “Endogenous Tariff Formation”. American Economic Review; V.74-#5, pp. 970-985.
►Julio Rotemberg (2003). “Commercial Policy with Altruistic Voters”. Journal of Political Economy; V.111-#1, pp. 202-226.
■John McLaren (2004). “Trade Policy Making by an Assembly”. in Devashish Mitra and Arvind Panagariya, eds. The Political Economy of Trade, Aid and Foreign Investment Policies. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 11-29.
■Carl Davidson, Steve Matusz and Doug Nelson (2006). “Fairness and the Political Economy of Trade”. World Economy; V.29-#8, pp. 989-1004.
■Carl Davidson, Steve Matusz and Doug Nelson (2007). “Can Compensation Save Free Trade”. Journal of International Economics; V.71-#1, pp. 167-186.
■ Ronald Fischer and P. Serra (1996). “Income Inequality and Choice of Free Trade in a Model of Intraindustry Trade”. Quarterly Journal of Economics; V.111-#1, pp. 41-64.
■ Satya Das (2001). “Endogenous Distribution and the Political Economy of Trade Policy”. European Journal of Political Economy; V.17-#3, pp. 465-491.
● Theory: Dimensionality, 1–Spatial Models
■ Charles Plott (1967). “A Notion of Equilibrium and its Possibility under Majority Rule”. American Economic Review; V.57-#4, pp. 787-806.
■ Richard McKelvey (1976). “Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Control”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.12-#3, pp. 472-482.
■ Scott Feld and Bernard Grofman (1987). “Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for a Majority Winner in n-Dimensional Spatial Voting Games: An Intuitive Geometric Approach”. American Journal of Political Science; V.31-#4, pp. 709-728.
■ James Cassing and Arye L. Hillman (1985). “Political Influence Motives and the Choice Between Tariffs and Quotas”. Journal of International Economics; V.19-#3/4, pp. 279-290.
■ Wolfgang Mayer and Raymond Riezman (1987). “Endogenous Choice of Trade Policy Instruments”. Journal of International Economics; V.23-#3/4, pp. 377-381.
■ Wolfgang Mayer and Raymond Riezman (1989). “Tariff Formation in a Multidimensional Voting Model”. Economics & Politics; V.1-#1, pp. 61-79.
■ Wolfgang Mayer and Raymond Riezman (1990). “Voter Preferences for Trade Policy Instruments”. Economics & Politics; V.2-#3, pp. 259-273.
■ Wolfgang Mayer (2002). “Systematic Political Grass-Root Support for Tariffs”. Review of International Economics; V.10-#4, pp. 657-670.
■ Ronald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1986). “Tariffs, Quotas and Domestic-Content Protection: Some Political Economy Considerations”. Public Choice; V.50-#1/3, pp. 221-242.
■ Peter Lloyd and Rod Falvey (1986). “The Choice of Instrument for Industry Protection”. in R. Snape, ed. Issues in World Trade Policy: GATT at the Crossroads. New York: St. Martins, pp. 152-170.
■ Alan Deardorff (1987). “Why Do Governments Prefer Nontariff Barriers”. Carnegie Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy; #26, pp. 191-216.
■ Stephen Magee, William Brock, and Leslie Young (1989). “Optimal Obfuscation and the Theory of the Second Worst: The Politically Efficient Policy”. Chapter 18 in Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 257-263. [Mathematical appendix, pp. 363-364.]
■ William Kaempfer, J. Harold McClure and Thomas Willett (1989). “Incremental Protection and Efficient Political Choice Between Tariffs and Quotas”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.22-#2, pp. 228-236.
■ Michael Moore and Steven Suranovic (1992). “Lobbying vs. Administered Protection: Endogenous Industry Choice and National Welfare”. Journal of International Economics; V.32-#3/4, pp. 289-303.
■ B. Peter Rosendorff (1996). “Endogenous Trade Restrictions and Domestic Political Pressure”. in R. Feenstra, G. Grossman and D. Irwin, eds. The Political Economy of Trade Policy. Cambridge: MIT, pp. 245-264.
■ B. Peter Rosendorff (1996). “Voluntary Export Restraints, Antidumping Procedure, and Domestic Politics”. American Economic Review; V.86-#3, pp. 544-561.
■ Devashish Mitra (2000). “On the Endogenous Choice between Protection and Promotion”. Economics & Politics; V.12-#1, pp. 33-51.
■ Giovanni Maggi and Andrés Rodriguez-Clare (2000). “Import Penetration and the Politics of Protection”. Journal of International Economics; V.51-#2, pp. 287-304.
■ Simon Anderson and Nicolas Schmitt (2003). “Nontariff Barriers and Trade Liberalization”. Economic Inquiry; V.41-#1, pp. 80-97.
■ Carol McAusland (2003). “Voting for Pollution Policy: The Importance of Income Inequality and Openness to Trade”. Journal of International Economics; V.61-#2, pp. 425-451.
■ Kenneth Shepsle (1979). “Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models”. American Journal of Political Science; V.23-#1, pp. 27-58.
■ Jonathan Crystal (2003). “What do Producers Want? On the Origins of Societal Policy Preferences”. European Journal of International Relations; V.9-#3, pp. 407-439.
■Kenneth Shepsle and Barry Weingast (1984). “Uncovered Sets and Sophisticated Voting Outcomes with Implications for Agenda Institutions”. American Journal of Political Science; V.28-#1, pp. 49-74.
■Richard McKelvey (1986). “Covering, Dominance, and Institution-Free Properties of Social Choice”. American Journal of Political Science; V.30-#2, pp. 283-314.
■Gary Cox (1987). “The Uncovered Set and the Core”. American Journal of Political Science; V.31-#2, pp. 408-422.
■Scott Feld, Bernard Grofman, Richard Hartly, Marc Kilgour, and Norman Miller, with N. Noviello (1987). “The Uncovered Set in Spatial Voting Games”. Theory and Decision; V.23-#2, pp. 129-155.
■David Epstein (1998). “Uncovering Some Subtelties of the Uncovered Set: Social Choice Theory and Distributive Politics”. Social Choice & Welfare; V.15-#1, pp. 81-93.
■Jean-François Laslier and Nathalie Picard (2002). “Distributive Politics and Electoral Competition”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.103-#1, pp. 106-130.
■Jeffrey Banks, John Duggan and Michel LeBreton (2002). “Bounds for Mixed Strategy Equilibria and the Spatial Model of Elections”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.103-#1, pp. 88-105.
■Jeffrey Banks, John Duggan and Michel LeBreton (2006). “Social Choice and Electoral Competition in the General Spatial Model”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.126-#1, pp. 194-234.
■Bhaskar Dutta, Matthew Jackson, and Michel Le Breton (2005). “The Banks Set and the Uncovered Set in budget Allocation Problems”. in David Austen-Smith and John Duggan, eds. Social Choice and Strategic Decisions. Berlin: Springer, pp. 163-199.
● Theory: Dimensionality, 2–Citizen Candidate Models
■ Osborne, M and A. Slivinski (1996). “A Model of Political Competition”. Quarterly Journal of Economics; V.111-#1, pp. 65-96.
■ Besley, Timothy and Stephen Coate (1997). “An Economic Model of Representative Democracy”. Quarterly Journal of Economics; V.112-#1, pp. 85-114.
■ Besley, Timothy and Stephen Coate (1997). “Sources of Inefficiency in a Representative Democracy: A Dynamic Analysis”. American Economic Review; V.88-#1, pp. 139-156.
■ Besley, Timothy and Stephen Coate (2001). “Lobbying and Welfare in a Representative Democracy”. Review of Economic Studies; V.68-#1, pp. 67-82.
■ Hamlin, Alan and Michael Hjortlund (2000). “Proportional Representation with Citizen Candidates”. Public Choice; V.103-#3/4, pp. 205-230.
■ De Sinopoli, Francesco and Alessandro Turrini (2002). “A Remark on Voters’ Rationality in a Model of Representative Democracy”. Journal of Public Economic Theory, V.4-#2, pp. 163-170.
■ De Sinopoli, Francesco (2003). “A Note on Forward Induction in a Model of Representative Democracy”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.46-#1, pp. 41-54.
■ Dhillon, Amrita and Ben Lockwood (2002). “Multiple Equilibria in the Citizen-Candidate Model of Representative Democracy”. Journal of Public Economic Theory; V.4-#2, pp. 171-184.
■ Dhillon, Amrita and Ben Lockwood (2002). “When are Plurality Rule Voting Games Dominance Solvable?”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.46-#1, pp. 55-75.
■ Didier Laussel (2002). “Delegation Effects in Representative Democracies: Do They Foster Extremism?”. Journal of Public Economics; V.85-#2, pp. 191-205.
■ Besley, Timothy and Stephen Coate (2003). “On the Public Choice Critique of Welfare Economics”. Public Choice; V.114-#3/4, pp. 253-273.
■ Besley, Timothy and Stephen Coate (2003). “Centralized versus Decentralized Provision of Local Public Goods: A Political Economy Analysis”. Journal of Public Economics; V.87-#12, pp. 2611-2637.
■ Caselli, Francesco and Massimo Morelli (2004). “Bad Politicians”. Journal of Public Economics; V.88-#3/4, pp. 797-782.
■ Laussel, Didier and Christian Montet (1997). “Les Déterminants Politiques du Protectionnisme: un Apercu de Developements Recent”. In Patrick Aruts, Andre Cartapanis, and Didier Laussel, eds. Politiques Economiques: Fondements Théoriques. Paris: Economica.
■ Laussel, Didier and Raymond Riezman (2001). “The Sources of Protectionist Drift in Representative Democracies”. European Economic Review; V.49-#7, pp. 1855-1876.
■ Gerald Willmann (2003). “Why Legislators are Protectionists: The Role of Majoritarian Voting in Setting Tariffs”. Ms: Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel.
■ Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini (1992). “The Politics of 1992: Fiscal Policy and European Integration”. Review of Economic Studies; V.59-#4, pp. 689-701.
■ Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini (1994). “Representative democracy and capital taxation”. Journal of Public Economics; V.55-#1, pp. 53-70.
■ Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini (1996). “Federal Fiscal Constitutions: Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard”. Econometrica; V.64-#3, pp. 623-646.
● Application/Empirics, 1: National Voting and Trade Policy
■ Hannelore Weck-Hannemann (1990). “Protectionism in Direct Democracy”. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics; V.146-#3, pp. 389-418.
■ Richard Johnston and Michael Percy (1980). “Reciprocity, Imperial Sentiment, and Party Politics”. Canadian Journal of Political Science; V.13-#4, pp. 711-729.
■ Eugene Beaulieu and J.C. Herbert Emery (2001). “Pork Packers, Reciprocity, and Laurier's Defeat in the 1911 Canadian General Election”. Journal of Economic History; V.61-#4, pp. 1083-1101.
■ John Conybeare (1984). “Politicians and Protection: Tariffs and Elections in Australia”. Public Choice; V.43-#2, pp. 203-209.
■ Douglas Irwin (1994). “The Political Economy of Free Trade: Voting in the British General Election of 1906”. Journal of Law and Economics; V.37-#1, pp. 75-108.
■ Douglas Irwin (1996). “Industry or Class Cleavages over Trade Policy?: Evidence from the British General Election of 1923”. in R. Feenstra, G. Grossman and D. Irwin, eds. The Political Economy of Trade Policy. Cambridge: MIT, pp. 53-75.
►H. Keith Hall, Chihwa Kao, and Douglas Nelson (1998). “Women and Tariffs: Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer Model”. Economic Inquiry; V.36-#2, pp. 320-332.
►Pushan Dutt and Devashish Mitra (2002). “Endogenous Trade Policy through Majority Voting: An Empirical Investigation”. Journal of International Economics; V.58-#1, pp. 107-133.
■ Pushan Dutt and Devashish Mitra (2006). “Labor versus Capital in Trade Policy: The Role of Ideology and Inequality”. Journal of International Economics; V.69-#2, pp. 310-320.
● Applications/Empirics, 2: Legislative Voting and Trade Policy
■ Robert Baldwin (1976). “The Political Economy of Postwar US Trade Policy”. NYU C.J. Devine Institute of Finance Bulletin--#4.
■ Robert Baldwin (1985). “Import Policy at the Congressional Level”. Chapter 2 of The Political Economy of U.S. Import Policy. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 33-78.
■ Cletus Coughlin (1985). “Domestic Content Legislation: House Voting and the Economic Theory of Regulation”. Economic Inquiry; V.23-#3, pp. 437-448.
■ Suzanne Tosini and Edward Tower (1987). “The Textile Bill of 1985: The Determinants of Congressional Voting Patterns”. Public Choice; V.54-#1, pp. 19-25.
■ John McCarthur and Stephen Marks (1988). “Constituent Interest vs. Legislator Ideology: The Role of Political Opportunity Cost”. Economic Inquiry; V.26-#3, pp. 461-470.
■ John McCarthur and Stephen Marks (1989). “Empirical Analyses of the Determinants of Protection: A Survey and Some New Results”. in J. Odell and T. Willett, eds. International Trade Policies: Gains from Exchange Between Economics and Political Science. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. pp. 105-139.
■ Stanley Nollen and Harvey Iglarsh (1990). “Explanations of Protectionism in International Trade”. Public Choice; V.66-#2, pp. 137-153.
■ Larry Wade and John Gates (1990). “A New Tariff Map of the United States (House of Representatives)”. Political Geography Quarterly; V.9-#3, pp. 284-304.
■ James Lutz (1991). “Determinants of Protectionist Attitudes in the United States House of Representatives”. International Trade Journal; V.5-#3, pp. 301-328.
■ Stephen Marks (1993). “Economic Interests and Voting on the Omnibus Trade Bill of 1987”. Public Choice, V.75-#1, pp. 21-42.
■ William Kaempfer and Stephen Marks (1993). “The Expected Effects of Trade Liberalisation: Evidence from U.S. Congressional Action on Fast-Track Authority”. World Economy; V.16-#6, pp. 725-740.
■ Ellison, Sara Fisher and Wallace Mullin (1995). “Economics and Politics: The Case of Sugar Tariff Reform”. Journal of Law and Economics; V.38-#2, pp. 335-366.
■ Krishna Srinivasan (1997). “An Empirical Analysis of the Political Economy of Tariffs”. Economics & Politics; V.9-#1, pp. 55-70.
■ Erik Gartzke and J. Mark Wrighton (1998). “Thinking Globally or Acting Locally? Determinants of the GATT Vote in Congress”. Legislative Studies Quarterly; V.23-#1, pp. 33-55.
■ Bruce A. Blonigen, David N. Figlio (1998). “Voting for Protection: Does Direct Foreign Investment Influence Legislator Behavior?”. American Economic Review; V.88-#4, pp. 1002-1014 .
►Michael Bailey and David Brady (1998). “Heterogeneity and Representation: The Senate and Free Trade”. American Journal of Political Science; V.42-#2, pp. 524-544.
■ Benjamin Fordham (1998). “Economic Interests, Party and Ideology in Early Cold War U.S. Foreign Policy”. International Organization; V.52-#2, pp. 359-396.
■ Michael Bailey (2001). “Quiet Influence: The Representation of Diffuse Interests on Trade Policy, 1983–94”. Legislative Studies Quarterly; V.26-#1, pp. 45-80.
■ Michael Hiscox (2002). “Commerce, Coalitions, and Factor Mobility: Evidence from Congressional Votes on Trade Legislation”. American Political Science Review; V.96-#3, pp. 593-608.
■ Michael Hiscox (2000). “Lame Ducks and Safe Seats: Effects of Marginality on Congressional Voting on the NAFTA and GATT Agreements”. Ms: Harvard University.
■Jeffrey Ladewig (2006). “Domestic Influences on International Trade Policy: Factor Mobility in the United States, 1963-1992”. International Organization; V.60-#1, pp. 69-103.
■ Benjamin Fordham and Timothy McKeown (2003). “Selection and Influence: Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on Trade Policy”. International Organization; V.57-#3, pp. 519-549.
■Alok Bohara and Kishore Gawande (2004). “Interest and Ideology in the 1988 Omnibus Trade Act: A Bayesian Multivariate Probit Analysis”. in Devashish Mitra and Arvind Panagariya, eds. The Political Economy of Trade, Aid and Foreign Investment Policies. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 113-157.
■Brian Goff and Kevin Grier (1993). “On the (Mis)measurement of Legislator Ideology and Shirking”. Public Choice; V.76-#1/2, pp. 5-20.
■Keith Poole and Thomas Romer (1993). “Ideology, Shirking and Representation”. Public Choice; V.77-#1, pp. 185-196.
■Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal (1996). “Are Legislators Ideologues or Agents of Constituents?”. European Economic Review; V.40-#3-5, pp. 707-717.
■Steven Levitt (1996). “How Do Senators Vote? Disentangling the Role of Voter Preferences, Party Affiliation, and Senator Ideology”. American Economic Review; V.86-#3, pp. 425-441.
■James Heckman and James Snyder (1997). “Linear Probability Models of Demand for Attributes with an Empirical Application to Estimating the Preferences of Legislators”. Rand Journal of Economics; V.28 (Special Issue in Honor of Richard Quandt); pp. S142-S189.
● Applications/Empirics, 3A: Time Series Analysis–Macro Analysis
■ T. McKeown (1984). “Firms and Tariff Change: Explaining the Demand for Protection”. World Politics; V.36-#2, pp. 215-233.
■ J. Cassing, T. McKeown and J. Ochs (1986). “The Political Economy of the Tariff Cycle”. American Political Science Review; V.80-#3, pp. 843-862.
■ R. Dornbusch and J. Frankel (1987). “Macroeconomics and Protection”. in R. Stern, ed. US Trade Policies in a Changing World Economy. Cambridge: MIT. pp. 77-130.
■ Magee, Stephen P. (1987). “The Political-Economy of US Protectionism”. in H. Giersch, ed. Free Trade and the World Economy: Towards and Opening of Markets. Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr, pp. 368-402.
■ Magee, Stephen P. and Leslie Young (1987). “Endogenous Protection in the United States, 1900-1984". in Stern, ed. U.S. T