TI 0 114

The Political Economy of Trade and Competition Policy


Professor: Douglas Nelson

Office: Tilton 108 (Murphy Institute), Phone: 865-5317

Phone: 865-5317

email: dnelson@tulane.edu

Webpage: http://www.tulane.edu/~dnelson/

For a .pdf file of this syllabus click here



This course provides an advanced overview of contemporary approaches to the analysis of political economy. Emphasis is placed on trade policy and competition policies. Specifically, we will focus on the development of a variety of micro-analytic models of the interaction between economics and politics. We begin with a derivation of citizen preferences over policies based on economic attributes in a general equilibrium context. With political preferences in hand, we examine a number of alternative “institutional” environments: single-issue referendum; single-issue lobbying; electoral competition; and agency models.


Evaluation: Your performance in this course will be evaluated on the basis of 2 problem sets (worth 100 points) and 1 takehome examination (worth points 100 points). To receive an A, you must earn at least 90 percent of the points available. To pass the course you must earn at least 60 percent of the points available. Grades between these limits will be determined on the basis of your performance relative to that of the class as a whole.


Readings: The core readings for the course will be drawn from classic and current research papers. Where possible, I will assign papers that are available online.


The attached syllabus contains a large number of references. We will only read a fraction of these (those marked by stars–“”). However, a person contemplating research in political economy would be wise to read more widely.



Some helpful surveys on the Political Economy of Trade:

 

Douglas Nelson (1988). “Endogenous Tariff Theory: A Critical Survey”. American Journal of Political Science; V.32-#3, pp. 796-837.

 

Arye L. Hillman (1988). The Political Economy of Protection. Chur: Harwood Academic Publishers.

 

Robert Baldwin (1989). “The Political Economy of Trade Policy”. Journal of Economic Perspectives; V.3-#4, pp. 119-135.

 

Dani Rodrik (1995). “Political Economy of Trade Policy”. in G. Grossman and K Rogoff, eds. Handbook of International Economics--V.III. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 1457-1494.

 

Raymond Riezman and John Wilson (1995). “Politics and Trade Policy”. In Jeffrey Banks and Eric Hanushek, eds. Modern Political Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 108-144.

 

Robert Baldwin (1996). “The Political Economy of Trade Policy: Integrating the Perspectives of Economists and Political Scientists”. In Robert Feenstra, Gene Grossman, and Douglas Irwin, eds. The Political Economy of Trade Policy. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 147-173.

 

Jeffry Frieden and Ronald Rogowski (1996). “The Impact of the International Economy on National Policies: An Analytical Overview”. In Robert Keohane and Helen Milner, eds. Internationalization and Domestic Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 25-47.

 

James Alt, Jeffry Frieden, Michael Gilligan, Dani Rodrik, and Ronald Rogowski (1996). “The Politics of International Trade: Enduring Puzzles and an Agenda for Inquiry”. Comparative Political Studies; V.29-#6, pp. 689-717.

 

Elhanan Helpman (1997). “Politics and Trade Policy”. In D. Kreps and K. Wallace, eds. Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, Volume I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 19-45.

 

Stephen Magee (1997). “Endogenous Protection: The Empirical Evidence”. in Dennis C. Mueller, ed, Perspectives On Public Choice: A Handbook. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 526- 561.

 

Alan Deardorff and Robert Stern (1998). “An Overview of the Modeling of the Choices and Consequences of U.S. Trade Policies”. In A. Deardorff and R. Stern, eds. Constituent Interests and U.S. Trade Policies. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 29-55.

 

Helen Milner (1999). “The Political Economy of International Trade”. Annual Review of Political Science; V.2, pp. 91-114.

 

Kishore Gawande and Pravin Krishna (2003). “The Political Economy of Trade Policy: Empirical Approaches”. In E. Kwan Choi and James Harrigan, eds. Handbook of International Trade. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 213-250.

 

William Kaempfer, Edward Tower and Thomas Willett (2003), “Trade Protectionism.” in C. Rowley, editor, Encyclopedia of Public Choice. Routledge, pp. 550-576


Some recent advanced texts in political economy:

 

Avinash Dixit (1998). The Making of Economic Policy: A Transaction Cost Politics Perspective. Cambridge: MIT Press.

 

Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini (2000). Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy. Cambridge: MIT Press.

 

Allan Drazen (2000). Political Economy in Macroeconomics. Cambridge: MIT Press.

 

Jean-Jacques Laffont (2000). Incentives and Political Economy. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

 

John Roemer (2001). Political Competition: Theory and Application. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

 

Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (2001). Special Interest Politics. Cambridge: MIT Press.


Prerequisites: It is assumes that you have completed graduate level microeconomic theory. This, and the mathematical tools used in microeconomic theory, will be used in the readings, the lectures, the exercises, and the examinations. We will be reading a number of papers applying standard econometric tools, and it is assumed that you have sufficient knowledge of these tools to read such material.


Homework. The syllabus that follows this course description lists the reading that you are expected to have done for the lecture on the listed date. Several problem sets will be distributed in class. Homework is due on or before the first class in which that material is discussed. Late homework will not be accepted, and will receive a score of 0. The percent of total available homework credit will be taken as your homework score. For example, if you answer 90% of the homework questions correctly, your homework score is 90.




Short Syllabus


Topic I: Deriving Policy Preferences in General Equilibrium

Topic II: Referendum Models

Topic III: Organizing for Political Action

Topic IV: Chicago School Theory and Empirics

Topic V: Lobbying Models

Topic VI: Contributions, Elections and Trade Policy

Topic VII: Institutions and Equilibrium Outcomes

Topic VIII: Domestic Political Economy of Integration

Topic IX: Political Economy of Immigration Policy

Topic X: Political Economy of Policy Reform

Topic XI: Industry-Level Policy–Antidumping

Topic XII: Industry-Level Policy–Competition Policy



TI 0 114

Syllabus/Reading List

30 May - 4 July 2002


Topic I. Deriving Policy Preferences in GE

 

● Theory: The Stolper-Samuelson Theorem and Generalizations

 

►Nelson notes: Stolper-Samuelson theorem [Generalizations optional]

 

■Wolfgang Stolper and Paul Samuelson (1941). “Protection and Real Wages”. Review of Economic Studies. V.9-#1, pp. 58-73.

 

■ Ronald Jones (1965). “The Structure of Simple General Equilibrium Models”. Journal of Political Economy; V.73-#6, pp. 557-572.

 

■ Ronald Jones and José Scheinkman (1977). “The Relevance of the Two-Sector Production Model in Trade Theory”. Journal of Political Economy; V.85-#5, pp. 909-935.

 

■ James Cassing (1981). “On the Relationship between Commodity Price Changes and Factor-Owners Real Positions”. Journal of Political Economy; V.89-#3, pp. 593-595.

 

■ Ronald Jones (1985). “Relative Prices and Real Factor Rewards: A Reinterpretation”. Economics Letters; V.19-#1, pp. 47-49.

 

■Peter Lloyd and Albert Schweinberger (1988). Trade Expenditure Functions and the Gains from Trade”. Journal of International Economics; V.24-#3/4, pp. 275-297.

 

■ S. Tokarick (1995). “Friends, Enemies and Factor Diversification: Implications for Protectionist Pressure”. Journal of Economic Integration; V.10-#4, pp. 434-443.

 

■ Peter Lloyd and A. Schweinberger (1997). “Conflict Generating Product Price Changes: The Imputed Output Approach”. European Economic Review; V.41-#8, pp. 1569-1587.

 

■ Peter Lloyd (2000). “Generalizing the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem: A Tale of Two Matrices”. Review of International Economics; V.8-#4, pp. 597-613.

 

● Theory: Deriving Preferences

 

►Nelson notes: Deriving trade policy preferences

 

■ Jagdish Bhagwati (1982). “Shifting Comparative Advantage, Protectionist Demands and Policy Response”. in J. Bhagwati, ed. Import Competition and Response. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 153-184.

 

■ Elias Dinopoulos (1983). “Import Competition, International Factor Mobility and Lobbying Responses”. Journal of International Economics; V.14-#3/4, pp. 395-410.

 

■ Jaime deMelo and Sherman Robinson (1982). “Trade Adjustment Policies and Income Distribution in Three Archetype Developing Economies”. Journal of Development Economics; V.10-#1, pp. 67-92.

 

■ Robert Baldwin (1984). “Rent-Seeking and Trade Policy: An Industry Approach”. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; V.120-#4, pp. 662-676.

 

■ James Cassing (1996). “Protectionist Mutual Funds”. European Journal of Political Economy; V.12-#1, pp. 1-18.

 

■Torben Iverson and David Soskice (2001). An Asset Theory of Social Policy Preference”. American Political Science Review; V.95-#4, pp. 875-893.

 

■ Andy Baker (2003). “Why is Trade Reform so Popular in Latin America: A Consumption Based Theory of Trade Policy Preferences”. World Politics; V.55-#3, pp. 423-455.

 

● Application/Empirics, 1: Revealed Preferences–The Magee Test

 

►Stephen Magee (1978). “Three Simple Tests of the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem”. in P. Oppenheimer, ed. Issues in International Economics; Stocksfield: Oriel Press, pp. 138-153.

 

■ Eugene Beaulieu (2002). “The Stopler-Samuelson Theorem Faces Congress”. Review of International Economics; V.10-#2, pp. 343-360.

 

■ Eugene Beaulieu and Christopher Magee (2004), “Four Simple Tests of Campaign Contributions and Trade Preferences”. Economics & Politics; V.16-#2, pp. 163-187.

 

■Christopher Magee (2004).Industry and Factor Linkages between Lobby Groups”. in Devashish Mitra and Arvind Panagariya, eds. The Political Economy of Trade, Aid and Foreign Investment Policies. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 159-175.

 

■ Michael Hiscox (2001). “The Magee Test Revisited: Industry Lobbying Patterns and the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem”. Ms: Harvard University.

 

● Application/Empirics, 2: Case Studies, Firms

 

■ Moran, Theodore (1973). “Foregin Expansion as a ‘Institutional Necessity’ for Corporate Capitalism: The Search for a Radical Model”. World Politics; V.25-#3, pp. 369-386.

 

■ T. Pugel and I. Walter (1985). “US Corporate Interests and the Political Economy of Trade”. Review of Economics and Statistics; V.67-#3, pp. 465-473.

 

■ I.M. Destler and John Odell (1987). Anti-Protection: Changing Forces in US Trade Politics. Washington, DC: IIE.

 

V. Aggarwal, R. Keohane and D. Yoffie (1987). “The Dynamics of Negotiated Protection”. American Political Science Review; V.81-#2, pp. 345-366.

 

■ Helen Milner (1988). Resisting Protectionism: Global Industries and the Politics of International Trade. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

 

■ Helen Milner and David Yoffie (1989). “Between Free Trade and Protectionism: Strategic Trade Policy and a Theory of Corporate Trade Demands”. International Organization; V.43-#2, pp. 239-272.

 

■ David Baron (1997). “Integrated Strategy, Trade Policy, and Global Competition”. California Management Review; V.39-#2, pp. 145-169.

 

■ Michael Lusztig (1998). “The Limits of Rent Seeking: Why Protectionists Become Free Traders”. Review of International Political Economy; V.5-#1, pp. 38-63.

 

■ Oona Hathaway (1998). “Positive Feedback: The Impact of Trade Liberalization on Industry Demands for Protection”. International Organization; V.52-#3, pp. 575-612.

 

■ Strom Thacker (2000). “Private Sector Trade Politics in Mexico”. Business and Politics; V.2-#2, article 3.

 

■ Wendy Hansen and Neil Mitchell (2001). “Globalization or National Capitalism: Large Firms, National Strategies, and Political Activities”. Business and Politics; V.3-#1, pp. 5-19.

 

■James Alt, Fredrik Carlsen, Per Heum and Kœre Johansen (1999). “Asset Specificity and the Political Behavior of Firms: Lobbying for Subsidies in Norway”. International Organization; V.53-#1, pp. 99-116.

 

■ Zahariadis, Nikolaos (2001). “Asset Specificity and State Subsidies in Industrialized Countries”. International Studies Quarterly; V.45-#4, 603-616.

 

● Applications/Empirics, 3: Case studies, labor

 

■ Alan Deardorff and Robert Stern (1979). “American Labor’s Stake in International Trade”. In ICS, ed. Tariffs, Quotas and Trade: The Politics of Protectionism. San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, pp. 125-148.

 

■ Anne Krueger (1980). “Protectionist Pressures, Imports and Employment in the US”. Scandinavian Journal of Economics; V.82-#2, pp. 133-146.

 

■ Peter Donohue (1993). “‘Free Trade’ Unions and the State: Trade Liberalization’s Endorsement by the AFL-CIO, 1943-1962”. Research in Political Economy; Vol. 13, pp. 1-73.

 

■ John Conybeare and Mark Zinkula (1996). “Who Voted against the NAFTA? Trade Unions versus Free Trade”. World Economy; V.19-#1, pp. 1-12.

 

■ James Shoch (2000). “Contesting Globalization: Organized Labor, NAFTA, and the 1997 and 1998 Fast-Track Fights”. Politics and Society; V.28-#1, pp. 119-150.

 

■ James Shoch (2001). “Organized Labor versus Globalization: NAFTA, Fast Track, and PNTR with China”. In Lowell Turner, et al. eds, Rekindling the Movement: Labor’s Quest for Relevance in the 21st Century. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 275-313.

 

● Applications/Empirics, 4: Public Opinion Poll Data

 

■ Edward Balistreri (1997). “The Performance of the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek Model in Predicting Endogenous Trade Policy Forces at the Individual Level”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.30-#1, pp. 1-17.

 

■ Matthew Mendelsohn and Robert Wolfe (2001). “Probing the Aftermyth of Seattle: Canadian Public Opinion on International Trade, 1980-2000”. International Journal V.56-#2, pp. 234-260.

 

■ Eugene Beaulieu (2002). “Factor or Industry Cleavages in Trade Policy: An Empirical Analysis of the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem”. Economics & Politics; V.14-#2, pp. 99-131.

 

■ Matthew Gabel (1998). “Economic Integration and Mass Politics: Market Liberalization and Public Attitudes in the European Union”. American Journal of Political Science; V.42-#3, pp. 936-953.

 

■ Matthew Gabel (1998). Interests and Integration: Market Liberalization, Public Opinion, and the European Union. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

 

■ Eric Uslaner (1998). “Trade Winds: NAFTA and the Rational Public”. Political Behavior; V.20-#4, pp. 341-360.

 

►Kenneth Scheve and Matthew Slaughter (2001). “What Determines Individual Trade Policy Preferences”. Journal of International Economics; V.54-#2, pp. 267-292.

 

►Kevin O’Rourke and R. Sinnott (2001). “The Determinants of Individual Trade Policy Preferences: International Survey Evidence”. Brookings Trade Policy Forum 2001, Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 157-206.

 

■Karl Kaltenthaler, Ronald Gelleny, and Stephen Ceccoli (2004). Explaining Citizen Support for Trade Liberalization”. International Studies Quarterly; V.48-#4, pp. 829-852.

 

■Anna Maria Mayda and D. Rodrik (2005). “Why Are Some People (and Countries) More Protectionist Than Others?”. European Economic Review; V.49-#6, pp. 1393-1430.

 

Jens Hainmueller and Michael Hiscox (2005). “Learning to Love Globalization: The Effects of Education on Individual Attitudes Toward International Trade”. International Organization; V.60-#2, pp. 469-498.

 

■Michael Hiscox (2006).Through A Glass Darkly: Framing Effects and Individuals' Attitudes Toward Trade”. International Organization; V.60-#3, pp. 755-780.

 

■Kevin O'Rourke (2006).“Heckscher-Ohlin Theory and Individual Attitudes Toward Globalization”. In Ronald Findlay, Rolf Henriksson, Håkan Lindgren, and Mats Lundahl, eds. Eli Heckscher, International Trade, and Economic History. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 107-138.

 

■Andy Baker (2005). Who Wants to Globalize? Consumer Tastes and Labor Markets in a Theory of Trade Policy Beliefs”. American Journal of Political Science; V.49-#4, pp. 924-938.

 

■Guido Porto (2006). Using Survey Data to Assess the Distributional Effects of Trade Policy. Journal of International Economics; V.70-#1, pp. 140-160.

 

Sanz, Ismael and Ferran Martínez i Coma (2008). Skill and support to globalisation in the EU. Applied Economics Letters, V.15-#4, pp. 271-275.

 

■Eugene Beaulieu, Michael Benarroch and James D. Gaisford (2011). "Intra-industry Trade Liberalization: Why Skilled Workers are More Likely to Support Free Trade". Reveiw of International Economics; V.19-#3, pp. 579-594.

 

Daniel Y. Kono (2008). “Does Public Opinion Affect Trade Policy”. Business and Politics; V.10-#2, Article 2.

 

■ Hermann, Richard, Philip Tetlock, and Matthew Diascro (2001). “How Americans Think about Trade: Reconciling Conflicts Among Money, Power, and Principles”. International Studies Quarterly; V.45-#2, pp. 191-218.

 

■ Skonieczny, Amy (2001). “Constructing NAFTA: Myth, Representation, and the Discursive Construction of U.S. Foreign Policy”. International Studies Quarterly, V.45-#3, pp. 433-454.

 

■ David Rankin (2001). “Indentities, Interests, and Imports”. Political Behavior; V.23-#4, pp. 351-376.

 

■ Michael Bailey (2003). “The Politics of the Difficult: The Role of Public Opinion in Early Cold War Aid and Trade Policies”. Legislative Studies Quarterly; V.28-#2, pp. 147-177.

 

■ H. Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (2004). “The Peculiar Political Economy of NAFTA: Complexity, Uncertainty and Footloose Policy Preferences”. in Devashish Mitra and Arvind Panagariya, eds. The Political Economy of Trade, Aid and Foreign Investment Policies. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 159-175.

 

● Applications/Empirics, 5: Direct Evidence on Factor Mobility

 

■ Gene Grossman and James Levinsohn (1989). “Import Competition and Stock Market Return to Capital”. American Economic Review; V.79-#5, pp. 1065-1087.

 

■ Douglas Nelson and Charles Wasley (1989). “Two is Not Enough: A Capital Market Test of 3x2 Endogenous Tariff Theory”. ms: Murphy Institute, Tulane University.

 

■ James Brander (1991). “Election Polls, Free Trade, and the Stock Market”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.24-#4, pp. 827-843.

 

■ Aileen Thompson (1993). “The Anticipated Sectoral Adjustment to the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement: An Event Study Analysis”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.26-#2, pp. 253-271.

 

■ Aileen Thompson (1994). “Trade Liberalization, Comparative Advantage, and Scale Economies: Stock Market Evidence from Canada”. Journal of International Economics; V.37-#1/2, pp. 1-27.

 

■ Karen Schnietz and Joanne Oxley (2001). “Globalization Derailed? Multinational Investors’ Response to the 1997 Demise of Fast-Track Trade Authority”. Journal of International Business Studies; V.32-#3, pp. 479-496.

 

■ Marc Epstein and Karen Schnietz (2002). “Measuring the Cost of Environmental and Trade Protests to Globalization: An Event Study of the Failed 1999 Seattle WTO Talks”. World Trade Journal; V.16-#2, pp. 129-160

 

■ Fiona McGillivray (2003). “Redistributive Politics and Stock Price Dispersion”. British Journal of Political Science; V.33-#3, pp. 367-395.

 

■ Benjamin Leibman and Kasaundra Tomlin (2007). “Steel Safeguards and the Welfare of Steel Firms and Downstream Consumers of Steel: A Shareholder Wealth Perspective”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.40-#3, pp. 812-643.

 

■ Valerie Ramey and Matthew Shapiro (1998). “Costly Capital Reallocation and the Effects of Government Spending”. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy; #48, pp. 145-194.

 

■ Valerie Ramey and Matthew Shapiro (2001). “Displaced Capital: A Study of Aerospace Plant Closings”. Journal of Political Economy; V.109-#5, pp. 958-992.

 

Olivier Blanchard and Lawrence Katz (1992). “Regional Evolutions”. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity; #1, pp. 1-61.

 

■ Robert Topel (1994). “Regional Labor Markets and the Determinants of Wage Inequality”. American Economic Review; V.84-#2, pp. 17-22.

 

■ Robert Topel (1994). “Wage Inequality and Regional Labour Market Performance in the US”. in T. Tachibanaki, ed.. Labour Market and Economic Performance: Europe, Japan and the USA. New York: St. Martin's Press; pp. 93-127.

 

■ Michael Hiscox (2002). “Interindustry Factor Mobility and Technological Change: Evidence on Wage and Profit Dispersion Across US Industries, 1820-1990”. Journal of Economic History; V.62-#2, pp. 383-416.

 

■ Robert Hall (2004). “Measuring Factor Adjustment Costs”. Quarterly Journal of Economics; V.119-#3, pp. 899-928.

 

■ James Townsend (2007). “Do Tariff Adjustments Affect the Wages of Workers in Protected Industries: Evidence from the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.40-#1, pp. 69-92.


Topic II. Referendum Models

 

● Theory: The Basic Referendum Model

 

■ Peter Wagstaff (1975). “Consensus Tariff Policy”. Economic Record; V.51-#133, pp. 105-108

 

►Wolfgang Mayer (1984). “Endogenous Tariff Formation”. American Economic Review; V.74-#5, pp. 970-985.

 

►Julio Rotemberg (2003). “Commercial Policy with Altruistic Voters”. Journal of Political Economy; V.111-#1, pp. 202-226.

 

■John McLaren (2004).Trade Policy Making by an Assembly”. in Devashish Mitra and Arvind Panagariya, eds. The Political Economy of Trade, Aid and Foreign Investment Policies. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 11-29.

 

Carl Davidson, Steve Matusz and Doug Nelson (2006). “Fairness and the Political Economy of Trade”. World Economy; V.29-#8, pp. 989-1004.

 

Carl Davidson, Steve Matusz and Doug Nelson (2007). “Can Compensation Save Free Trade”. Journal of International Economics; V.71-#1, pp. 167-186.

 

■ Ronald Fischer and P. Serra (1996). “Income Inequality and Choice of Free Trade in a Model of Intraindustry Trade”. Quarterly Journal of Economics; V.111-#1, pp. 41-64.

 

■ Satya Das (2001). “Endogenous Distribution and the Political Economy of Trade Policy”. European Journal of Political Economy; V.17-#3, pp. 465-491.

 

● Theory: Dimensionality, 1–Spatial Models

 

■ Charles Plott (1967). “A Notion of Equilibrium and its Possibility under Majority Rule”. American Economic Review; V.57-#4, pp. 787-806.

 

■ Richard McKelvey (1976). “Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Control”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.12-#3, pp. 472-482.

 

■ Scott Feld and Bernard Grofman (1987). “Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for a Majority Winner in n-Dimensional Spatial Voting Games: An Intuitive Geometric Approach”. American Journal of Political Science; V.31-#4, pp. 709-728.

 

■ James Cassing and Arye L. Hillman (1985). “Political Influence Motives and the Choice Between Tariffs and Quotas”. Journal of International Economics; V.19-#3/4, pp. 279-290.

 

■ Wolfgang Mayer and Raymond Riezman (1987). “Endogenous Choice of Trade Policy Instruments”. Journal of International Economics; V.23-#3/4, pp. 377-381.

 

■ Wolfgang Mayer and Raymond Riezman (1989). “Tariff Formation in a Multidimensional Voting Model”. Economics & Politics; V.1-#1, pp. 61-79.

 

■ Wolfgang Mayer and Raymond Riezman (1990). “Voter Preferences for Trade Policy Instruments”. Economics & Politics; V.2-#3, pp. 259-273.

 

■ Wolfgang Mayer (2002). “Systematic Political Grass-Root Support for Tariffs”. Review of International Economics; V.10-#4, pp. 657-670.

 

■ Ronald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1986). “Tariffs, Quotas and Domestic-Content Protection: Some Political Economy Considerations”. Public Choice; V.50-#1/3, pp. 221-242.

 

■ Peter Lloyd and Rod Falvey (1986). “The Choice of Instrument for Industry Protection”. in R. Snape, ed. Issues in World Trade Policy: GATT at the Crossroads. New York: St. Martins, pp. 152-170.

 

■ Alan Deardorff (1987). “Why Do Governments Prefer Nontariff Barriers”. Carnegie Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy; #26, pp. 191-216.

 

■ Stephen Magee, William Brock, and Leslie Young (1989). “Optimal Obfuscation and the Theory of the Second Worst: The Politically Efficient Policy”. Chapter 18 in Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 257-263. [Mathematical appendix, pp. 363-364.]

 

■ William Kaempfer, J. Harold McClure and Thomas Willett (1989). “Incremental Protection and Efficient Political Choice Between Tariffs and Quotas”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.22-#2, pp. 228-236.

 

■ Michael Moore and Steven Suranovic (1992). “Lobbying vs. Administered Protection: Endogenous Industry Choice and National Welfare”. Journal of International Economics; V.32-#3/4, pp. 289-303.

 

■ B. Peter Rosendorff (1996). “Endogenous Trade Restrictions and Domestic Political Pressure”. in R. Feenstra, G. Grossman and D. Irwin, eds. The Political Economy of Trade Policy. Cambridge: MIT, pp. 245-264.

 

■ B. Peter Rosendorff (1996). “Voluntary Export Restraints, Antidumping Procedure, and Domestic Politics”. American Economic Review; V.86-#3, pp. 544-561.

 

■ Devashish Mitra (2000). “On the Endogenous Choice between Protection and Promotion”. Economics & Politics; V.12-#1, pp. 33-51.

 

■ Giovanni Maggi and Andrés Rodriguez-Clare (2000). “Import Penetration and the Politics of Protection”. Journal of International Economics; V.51-#2, pp. 287-304.

 

■ Simon Anderson and Nicolas Schmitt (2003). “Nontariff Barriers and Trade Liberalization”. Economic Inquiry; V.41-#1, pp. 80-97.

 

■ Carol McAusland (2003). “Voting for Pollution Policy: The Importance of Income Inequality and Openness to Trade”. Journal of International Economics; V.61-#2, pp. 425-451.

 

■ Kenneth Shepsle (1979). “Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models”. American Journal of Political Science; V.23-#1, pp. 27-58.

 

■ Jonathan Crystal (2003). “What do Producers Want? On the Origins of Societal Policy Preferences”. European Journal of International Relations; V.9-#3, pp. 407-439.

 

Kenneth Shepsle and Barry Weingast (1984). Uncovered Sets and Sophisticated Voting Outcomes with Implications for Agenda Institutions. American Journal of Political Science; V.28-#1, pp. 49-74.

 

Richard McKelvey (1986). Covering, Dominance, and Institution-Free Properties of Social Choice. American Journal of Political Science; V.30-#2, pp. 283-314.

 

Gary Cox (1987). The Uncovered Set and the Core. American Journal of Political Science; V.31-#2, pp. 408-422.

 

Scott Feld, Bernard Grofman, Richard Hartly, Marc Kilgour, and Norman Miller, with N. Noviello (1987). The Uncovered Set in Spatial Voting Games. Theory and Decision; V.23-#2, pp. 129-155.

 

David Epstein (1998). Uncovering Some Subtelties of the Uncovered Set: Social Choice Theory and Distributive Politics. Social Choice & Welfare; V.15-#1, pp. 81-93.

 

Jean-François Laslier and Nathalie Picard (2002). Distributive Politics and Electoral Competition. Journal of Economic Theory; V.103-#1, pp. 106-130.

 

■Jeffrey Banks, John Duggan and Michel LeBreton (2002). Bounds for Mixed Strategy Equilibria and the Spatial Model of Elections. Journal of Economic Theory; V.103-#1, pp. 88-105.

 

■Jeffrey Banks, John Duggan and Michel LeBreton (2006). Social Choice and Electoral Competition in the General Spatial Model. Journal of Economic Theory; V.126-#1, pp. 194-234.

 

■Bhaskar Dutta, Matthew Jackson, and Michel Le Breton (2005). The Banks Set and the Uncovered Set in budget Allocation Problems. in David Austen-Smith and John Duggan, eds. Social Choice and Strategic Decisions. Berlin: Springer, pp. 163-199.

 

● Theory: Dimensionality, 2–Citizen Candidate Models

 

■ Osborne, M and A. Slivinski (1996). “A Model of Political Competition”. Quarterly Journal of Economics; V.111-#1, pp. 65-96.

 

■ Besley, Timothy and Stephen Coate (1997). “An Economic Model of Representative Democracy”. Quarterly Journal of Economics; V.112-#1, pp. 85-114.

 

■ Besley, Timothy and Stephen Coate (1997). “Sources of Inefficiency in a Representative Democracy: A Dynamic Analysis”. American Economic Review; V.88-#1, pp. 139-156.

 

■ Besley, Timothy and Stephen Coate (2001). “Lobbying and Welfare in a Representative Democracy”. Review of Economic Studies; V.68-#1, pp. 67-82.

 

■ Hamlin, Alan and Michael Hjortlund (2000). “Proportional Representation with Citizen Candidates”. Public Choice; V.103-#3/4, pp. 205-230.

 

■ De Sinopoli, Francesco and Alessandro Turrini (2002). “A Remark on Voters’ Rationality in a Model of Representative Democracy”. Journal of Public Economic Theory, V.4-#2, pp. 163-170.

 

■ De Sinopoli, Francesco (2003). “A Note on Forward Induction in a Model of Representative Democracy”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.46-#1, pp. 41-54.

 

■ Dhillon, Amrita and Ben Lockwood (2002). “Multiple Equilibria in the Citizen-Candidate Model of Representative Democracy”. Journal of Public Economic Theory; V.4-#2, pp. 171-184.

 

■ Dhillon, Amrita and Ben Lockwood (2002). “When are Plurality Rule Voting Games Dominance Solvable?”. Games and Economic Behavior; V.46-#1, pp. 55-75.

 

■ Didier Laussel (2002). “Delegation Effects in Representative Democracies: Do They Foster Extremism?”. Journal of Public Economics; V.85-#2, pp. 191-205.

 

■ Besley, Timothy and Stephen Coate (2003). “On the Public Choice Critique of Welfare Economics”. Public Choice; V.114-#3/4, pp. 253-273.

 

■ Besley, Timothy and Stephen Coate (2003). “Centralized versus Decentralized Provision of Local Public Goods: A Political Economy Analysis”. Journal of Public Economics; V.87-#12, pp. 2611-2637.

 

■ Caselli, Francesco and Massimo Morelli (2004). “Bad Politicians”. Journal of Public Economics; V.88-#3/4, pp. 797-782.

 

■ Laussel, Didier and Christian Montet (1997). “Les Déterminants Politiques du Protectionnisme: un Apercu de Developements Recent”. In Patrick Aruts, Andre Cartapanis, and Didier Laussel, eds. Politiques Economiques: Fondements Théoriques. Paris: Economica.

 

■ Laussel, Didier and Raymond Riezman (2001). “The Sources of Protectionist Drift in Representative Democracies”. European Economic Review; V.49-#7, pp. 1855-1876.

 

■ Gerald Willmann (2003). “Why Legislators are Protectionists: The Role of Majoritarian Voting in Setting Tariffs”. Ms: Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel.

 

■ Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini (1992). “The Politics of 1992: Fiscal Policy and European Integration”. Review of Economic Studies; V.59-#4, pp. 689-701.

 

■ Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini (1994). “Representative democracy and capital taxation”. Journal of Public Economics; V.55-#1, pp. 53-70.

 

■ Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini (1996). “Federal Fiscal Constitutions: Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard”. Econometrica; V.64-#3, pp. 623-646.

 

● Application/Empirics, 1: National Voting and Trade Policy

 

■ Hannelore Weck-Hannemann (1990). “Protectionism in Direct Democracy”. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics; V.146-#3, pp. 389-418.

 

■ Richard Johnston and Michael Percy (1980). “Reciprocity, Imperial Sentiment, and Party Politics”. Canadian Journal of Political Science; V.13-#4, pp. 711-729.

 

■ Eugene Beaulieu and J.C. Herbert Emery (2001). “Pork Packers, Reciprocity, and Laurier's Defeat in the 1911 Canadian General Election”. Journal of Economic History; V.61-#4, pp. 1083-1101.

 

■ John Conybeare (1984). “Politicians and Protection: Tariffs and Elections in Australia”. Public Choice; V.43-#2, pp. 203-209.

 

■ Douglas Irwin (1994). “The Political Economy of Free Trade: Voting in the British General Election of 1906”. Journal of Law and Economics; V.37-#1, pp. 75-108.

 

■ Douglas Irwin (1996). “Industry or Class Cleavages over Trade Policy?: Evidence from the British General Election of 1923”. in R. Feenstra, G. Grossman and D. Irwin, eds. The Political Economy of Trade Policy. Cambridge: MIT, pp. 53-75.

 

H. Keith Hall, Chihwa Kao, and Douglas Nelson (1998). “Women and Tariffs: Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer Model”. Economic Inquiry; V.36-#2, pp. 320-332.

 

►Pushan Dutt and Devashish Mitra (2002). “Endogenous Trade Policy through Majority Voting: An Empirical Investigation”. Journal of International Economics; V.58-#1, pp. 107-133.

 

■ Pushan Dutt and Devashish Mitra (2006).Labor versus Capital in Trade Policy: The Role of Ideology and Inequality. Journal of International Economics; V.69-#2, pp. 310-320.

 

● Applications/Empirics, 2: Legislative Voting and Trade Policy

 

■ Robert Baldwin (1976). “The Political Economy of Postwar US Trade Policy”. NYU C.J. Devine Institute of Finance Bulletin--#4.

 

■ Robert Baldwin (1985). “Import Policy at the Congressional Level”. Chapter 2 of The Political Economy of U.S. Import Policy. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 33-78.

 

■ Cletus Coughlin (1985). “Domestic Content Legislation: House Voting and the Economic Theory of Regulation”. Economic Inquiry; V.23-#3, pp. 437-448.

 

■ Suzanne Tosini and Edward Tower (1987). “The Textile Bill of 1985: The Determinants of Congressional Voting Patterns”. Public Choice; V.54-#1, pp. 19-25.

 

■ John McCarthur and Stephen Marks (1988). “Constituent Interest vs. Legislator Ideology: The Role of Political Opportunity Cost”. Economic Inquiry; V.26-#3, pp. 461-470.

 

■ John McCarthur and Stephen Marks (1989). “Empirical Analyses of the Determinants of Protection: A Survey and Some New Results”. in J. Odell and T. Willett, eds. International Trade Policies: Gains from Exchange Between Economics and Political Science. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. pp. 105-139.

 

■ Stanley Nollen and Harvey Iglarsh (1990). “Explanations of Protectionism in International Trade”. Public Choice; V.66-#2, pp. 137-153.

 

■ Larry Wade and John Gates (1990). “A New Tariff Map of the United States (House of Representatives)”. Political Geography Quarterly; V.9-#3, pp. 284-304.

 

■ James Lutz (1991). “Determinants of Protectionist Attitudes in the United States House of Representatives”. International Trade Journal; V.5-#3, pp. 301-328.

 

■ Stephen Marks (1993). “Economic Interests and Voting on the Omnibus Trade Bill of 1987”. Public Choice, V.75-#1, pp. 21-42.

 

■ William Kaempfer and Stephen Marks (1993). “The Expected Effects of Trade Liberalisation: Evidence from U.S. Congressional Action on Fast-Track Authority”. World Economy; V.16-#6, pp. 725-740.

 

Ellison, Sara Fisher and Wallace Mullin (1995). “Economics and Politics: The Case of Sugar Tariff Reform”. Journal of Law and Economics; V.38-#2, pp. 335-366.

 

■ Krishna Srinivasan (1997). “An Empirical Analysis of the Political Economy of Tariffs”. Economics & Politics; V.9-#1, pp. 55-70.

 

■ Erik Gartzke and J. Mark Wrighton (1998). “Thinking Globally or Acting Locally? Determinants of the GATT Vote in Congress”. Legislative Studies Quarterly; V.23-#1, pp. 33-55.

 

■ Bruce A. Blonigen, David N. Figlio (1998). “Voting for Protection: Does Direct Foreign Investment Influence Legislator Behavior?”. American Economic Review; V.88-#4, pp. 1002-1014 .

 

Michael Bailey and David Brady (1998). “Heterogeneity and Representation: The Senate and Free Trade”. American Journal of Political Science; V.42-#2, pp. 524-544.

 

■ Benjamin Fordham (1998). “Economic Interests, Party and Ideology in Early Cold War U.S. Foreign Policy”. International Organization; V.52-#2, pp. 359-396.

 

■ Michael Bailey (2001). “Quiet Influence: The Representation of Diffuse Interests on Trade Policy, 1983–94”. Legislative Studies Quarterly; V.26-#1, pp. 45-80.

 

■ Michael Hiscox (2002). “Commerce, Coalitions, and Factor Mobility: Evidence from Congressional Votes on Trade Legislation”. American Political Science Review; V.96-#3, pp. 593-608.

 

■ Michael Hiscox (2000). “Lame Ducks and Safe Seats: Effects of Marginality on Congressional Voting on the NAFTA and GATT Agreements”. Ms: Harvard University.

 

■Jeffrey Ladewig (2006).Domestic Influences on International Trade Policy: Factor Mobility in the United States, 1963-1992. International Organization; V.60-#1, pp. 69-103.

 

■ Benjamin Fordham and Timothy McKeown (2003). “Selection and Influence: Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on Trade Policy”. International Organization; V.57-#3, pp. 519-549.

 

■Alok Bohara and Kishore Gawande (2004). Interest and Ideology in the 1988 Omnibus Trade Act: A Bayesian Multivariate Probit Analysis”. in Devashish Mitra and Arvind Panagariya, eds. The Political Economy of Trade, Aid and Foreign Investment Policies. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 113-157.

 

■Robert Feinberg, Thomas Husted and Kara Reynolds (2011). "Trade Policy and Antitrust: Do Consumers Matter to Legislators?". Review of International Economics; V.19-#3, pp. 525-538.

 

Brian Goff and Kevin  Grier (1993). On the (Mis)measurement of Legislator Ideology and Shirking. Public Choice; V.76-#1/2, pp. 5-20.

 

Keith Poole and Thomas Romer (1993). Ideology, Shirking and Representation. Public Choice; V.77-#1, pp. 185-196.

 

Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal (1996). Are Legislators Ideologues or Agents of Constituents?. European Economic Review; V.40-#3-5, pp. 707-717.

 

Steven Levitt (1996). How Do Senators Vote? Disentangling the Role of Voter Preferences, Party Affiliation, and Senator Ideology. American Economic Review; V.86-#3, pp. 425-441.

 

■James Heckman and James Snyder (1997). Linear Probability Models of Demand for Attributes with an Empirical Application to Estimating the Preferences of Legislators. Rand Journal of Economics; V.28 (Special Issue in Honor of Richard Quandt); pp. S142-S189.

 

● Applications/Empirics, 3A: Time Series Analysis–Macro Analysis

 

■ T. McKeown (1984). “Firms and Tariff Change: Explaining the Demand for Protection”. World Politics; V.36-#2, pp. 215-233.

 

■ J. Cassing, T. McKeown and J. Ochs (1986). “The Political Economy of the Tariff Cycle”. American Political Science Review; V.80-#3, pp. 843-862.

 

■ R. Dornbusch and J. Frankel (1987). “Macroeconomics and Protection”. in R. Stern, ed. US Trade Policies in a Changing World Economy. Cambridge: MIT. pp. 77-130.

 

■ Magee, Stephen P. (1987). “The Political-Economy of US Protectionism”. in H. Giersch, ed. Free Trade and the World Economy: Towards and Opening of Markets. Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr, pp. 368-402.

 

■ Magee, Stephen P. and Leslie Young (1987). “Endogenous Protection in the United States, 1900-1984". in Stern, ed. U.S. Trade Policies in a Changing World Economy. Cambridge: MIT, pp. 145-195.

 

■ Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn O’Halloran (1994). “Divided Government and US Trade Policy: Theory and Evidence”. International Organization; V.48-#4, pp. 592-632.

 

■ David Epstein and Sharyn O’Halloran (1996). “The Partisan Paradox and the US Tariff, 1877-1934”. International Organization; V.50-#2, pp. 301-324.

 

H.K. Hall, C. Kao, and D. Nelson (1998). “Women and Tariffs: Testing the Gender Gap Hypothesis in a Downs-Mayer Political-Economy Model”. Economic Inquiry, 1998, V.36-#2, pp. 320-332.

 

William Thompson and Lawrence Vescera (1992). “Growth Waves, Systemic Openness, and Protectionism”. International Organization; V.46-#2, pp. 493-532.

 

■ R. Reuveny and W. Thompson (1997). “The Timing of Protectionism”. Review of International Political Economy; V.4-#?, pp. 179-213.

 

■ W. Thompson and R. Reuveny (1998). “Tariffs and Trade Fluctuations: Does Protectionism Matter as Much as We Think?”. International Organization; V.52-#2, pp. 421-440.

 

■ William Thompson and Rafael Reuveny (2001). “Explaining Protectionism: Seventeen Perspectives and One Long-Term Common Denominator”. Global Society; V.15-#3, pp. 229-249.

 

● Applications/Empirics, 3B: Time Series Analysis–Tariff Endogeneity

 

■ Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1989). “The Behavior of US Tariff Rates”. American Economic Review; V.79-#1, pp. 91-110. [comment by Sadorsky, 1994, V.84-#4, pp. 1097-1103.]

 

■ Alok Bohara and William Kaempfer (1991). “A Test of Tariff Endogeneity in the United States”. American Economic Review; V.81-#4, pp. 952-960.

 

■ Alok Bohara and William Kaempfer (1991). “Testing the Endogeneity of Tariff Policy in the US: Further Evidence”. Economics Letters; V.35-#3, pp. 311-315.

 

■ Sanghamitra Das and Satya Das (1994). “Quantitative Assessment of Tariff Endogeneity: Interwar vs. Postwar”. Economics Letters; V.44-#1/2, pp. 139-146.

 

■ G. Gardner, D. Slottje and K. Kimbrough (1992). “Tariff Behavior in Five European Countries”. Economics Letters; V. 39-#1, pp. 73-78.

 

■ A. Bohara and W. Kaempfer (1994). “Tariff Behavior in Five European Countries: Further Evidence”. Economics Letters; V.45-#2, pp. 213-216.

 

■ Irene Henriques and Perry Sadorsky (1994). “The Determinants and Persistence of Canadian Tariff Rates”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.27-#1, pp. 112-128.

 

■ Robert Krol (1996). “Testing Tariff Endogeneity in Japan: A Comparison of Pre- and Post-War Periods”. Economics Letters; V.50-#?, pp. 399-406.

 

■ John Thornton and Philip Molyneux (1997). “Tariff Endogeneity: Evidence from 19th Century Europe”. Economics Letters; V.56-#3, pp. 345-350.

 

■ Richard Sherman (2002). “Import Prices and the Political Economy of Tariffs: Evidence from Germany, Japan, and the United States, 1954-1994”. Economics Letters; V.76-#1, pp. 11-17.

 

● Applications/Empirics, 4: Historical Analyses of Equilibrium Policy

 

■ Charles Kindleberger (1951). “Group Behavior and International Trade”. Journal of Political Economy; V.59-#1, pp. 30-46.

 

■ James Kurth (1979). “The Political Consequences of the Product Cycle”. International Organization; V.33-#1, pp. 1-34.

 

■ Alan Milward (1981). “Tariffs as Constitutions”. in S. Strange and R. Tooze, eds. The International Politics of Surplus Capacity. London: Allen and Unwin. pp. 57-66.

 

■ Peter Gourevitch (1986). Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

 

■ Paul Bairoch (1988). “European Trade Policy, 1815-1914”. in P. Mathias and S. Pollard, eds. Cambridge Economic History of Europe. V.8, Industrial Economies. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 1-160.

 

■ Ronald Rogowski (1987). “Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade”. American Political Science Review; V.81-#4, pp. 1121-1137.

 

■ Ronald Rogowski (1989). Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

 

■ Douglas Nelson (1991). “No Theorems without Theory: On Rogowski’s Comparative Political Economy of Trade Policy”.

 

■ Paul Midford (1993). “International Trade and Domestic Politics: Improving on Rogowski’s Model of Political Alignments”. International Organization; V.47-#4, pp. 535-564.

 

■ Douglas Irwin (1989). “Political Economy and Peel’s Repeal of the Corn Laws”. Economics & Politics; V.1-#1, pp. 41-59.

 

■ G. Anderson and Robert Tollison (1985). “Ideology, Interest Groups, and the Repeal of the Corn Laws”. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, V.141-#2, pp. 197-212.

 

■ Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (1991). “Specific Factors, Capital Markets, Portfolio Diversification and Free Trade: Domestic Determinants of the Repeal of the Corn Laws”. World Politics; V.43-#4, pp. 545-569.

 

■ Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (2003). “Ideology, Party and Interests in the British Parliament of 1841-1847”. British Journal of Political Science; V.33-#4, pp. 581-605.

 

■ Iain McClean (1998). “Irish Potatoes, Indian Corn, and British Politics: Interests, Ideology, Heresthetics and the Repeal of the Corn Laws”. In A. Dobson and J. Stanyer, eds. Contemporary Political Studies 1998–Vol. 1. Nottingham: PSA, pp. 124-141.

 

■ Iain McClean and Camilla Bustani (1999). “Irish Potatoes and British Politics: Interests, Ideology, Heresthetics and the Repeal of the Corn Laws”. Political Studies; V.47-#5, pp. 817-836.

 

■ Daniel Verdier (1994). Democracy and International Trade: Britain, France, and the United States, 1860-1990. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

 

■ Mark Brawley (1997). “Factoral or Sectoral Conflict? Partially Mobile Factors and the Politics of Trade in Imperial Germany”. International Studies Quarterly; V.41-#4, pp. 633-653.

 

■ John Conybeare (1991). “Voting for Protection: An Electoral Model of Tariff Policy”. International Organization; V. 45-#1, pp. 57-81.

 

■ Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1996). “Log-Rolling and Economic Interests in the Passage of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff,” Carnegie-Rochester Series on Public Policy; #45, pp. 173-200.

 

■ Michael Hiscox (2001). “Class Versus Industry Cleavages: Inter-Industry Factor Mobility and the Politics of Trade”. International Organization; V.55-#1, pp. 1-46.

 

■ Michael Hiscox (2002). “Factor Specificity, Inter-industry Mobility, and Technological Change: Evidence from Manufacturing Wages and Profits in the U.S.”. Journal of Economic History; V.62-#2, pp. 383-416.

 

■ Michael Hiscox (2001). International Trade and Political Conflict: Commerce, Coalitions, and Mobility. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

 

■ Fiona McGillivray, Iain McLean, Robert Pahre, and Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (2002). International Trade And Political Institutions: Instituting Trade in the Long 19 th Century. Brookfield, VT: Edward Elgar.

 

■ Jeffrey Williamson (2006). “Explaining World Tariffs, 1870-1938: Stolper-Samuelson, Strategic Tariffs, and State Revenues”. In Ronald Findlay, Rolf Henriksson, Håkan Lindgren, and Mats Lundahl, eds. Eli Heckscher, International Trade, and Economic History. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 199-228.

 

● Applications/Empirics, 5: CGE Analysis

 

■ John Freeman and Daniel Houser (1998). “A Computable Equilibrium Model for the Study of Political Economy”. American Journal of Political Science; V.42-#2, pp. 628-660.

 

■ Stanley Winer and Thomas Rutherford (1993). “Coercive Redistribution and the Franchise: A Preliminary Investigation Using Computable General Equilibrium Modelling”. In Albert Breton, Gianluigi Galeotti, Pierre Salmon, and Ronald Wintrobe, eds Preferences and Democracy. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, pp. 351-375.

 

■ Thomas Rutherford and Stanley Winer (2005). “Tax Policy in a Computable Model of Economic and Political Equilibrium”. Chapter 7 in Walter Hettich and Stanley Winer, Democratic Choice and Taxation: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 153-192.

 

■ Louis Hotte and Stanley Winer (2001). “Political Influence, Economic Interests and Endogenous Tax Structure in a Computable Equilibrium Framework: With Application to the United States, 1973 and 1983”. Public Choice; V.109-#1/2, pp. 69-99.

 

■ Ken Kollman, John Miller and Scott Page, eds. (2003). Computational Models in Political Economy. Cambridge: MIT.


Topic III. Organizing for Political Action

 

● Theory: Internal Accounts of Asymmetric Organization

 

■ Gerhard Lehmbruch (1986). “Interest Groups, Government and the Politics of Protectionism”. Aussenwirtschaft; V.41-#2/3, pp. 273-302.

 

William Mitchell and Michael Munger (1991). “Economic Models of Interest Groups”. American Journal of Political Science; V.35-#2, pp. 512-546.

 

■ James Alt and Michael Gilligan (1994). “The Political Economy of Trading States: Factor Specificity, Collective Action Problems and Domestic Political Institutions”. Journal of Political Philosophy; V.2-#2, pp. 165-192.

 

■ Jan Potters and Frans van Winden (1995). “Models of Interest Groups: Four Different Approaches”. In N. Schofield, ed. Collective Decision-making: Social Choice and Political Economy. Boston: Kluwer, pp. 337-362.

 

■ Mancur Olson (1965). The Logic of Collective Action. Boston: Harvard University Press.

 

■ Richard Wagner (1966). “Pressure Groups and Political Entrepreneurs”. Papers in Non-Market Decision-Making; V.1, pp. 161-170.

 

■ Robert Salisbury (1969). “An Exchange Theory of Interest Groups”. Midwest Journal of Political Science; V.13-#1, pp. 1-32.

 

John Chamberlin (1974).Provision of Collective Goods as a Function of Group Size. American Political Science Review; V.68-#2, pp. 707-716

 

■ Martin McGuire (1974). Group Size, Group Homogeneity, and the Aggregate Provision of a Pure Public Good under Cournot Behavior. Public Choice; V.18, pp. 107-126.

 

■ George Stigler (1974). “Free Riders and Collective Action: An Appendix to Theories of Economic Regulation”. Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science; V.5-#2, pp. 359-365.

 

John Chamberlin (1976).A Diagrammatic Exposition of the Logic of Collective Action. Public Choice; V.26, pp. 59-74.

 

Koji Okuguchi (1984).Utility Function, Group Size and the Aggregate Provision of a Public Good. Public Choice; V.42, pp. 247-256.

 

■ David Austen-Smith (1981). “Voluntary Pressure Groups”. Economica; V.48-#190, pp. 143-153.

 

■ Wolfgang Mayer (2002). “On the Efficiency of By-Product Lobbying”. Public Choice; V.112-#3/4, pp. 275-292.

 

■ David Yoffie (1987). “Corporate Strategies for Political Action: A Rational Model”. In A. Marcus, et al. Eds. Business Strategy and Public Policy. Westport: Quorum Books, pp. 43-60.

 

■ Todd Sandler (1992). Collective Action: Theory and Applications. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

 

■ Dani Rodrik (1986). “Tariffs, Subsidies, and Welfare with Endogenous Policy”. Journal of International Economics; V.21-#3/4, pp. 285-299.

 

■ Paul Pecorino (1998). “Is There a Free-Rider Problem in Lobbying? Endogenous Tariffs, Trigger Strategies, and the Number of Firms”. American Economic Review; V.88-#3, pp. 652-660.

 

■ Christopher Magee (2002). “Endogenous Trade Policy and Lobby Formation: An Application to the Free-rider Problem”. Journal of International Economics; V.57-#2, pp. 449-471.

 

■ Arye L. Hillman (1991). “Protection, Politics and Market Structure”. in E. Helpman and A. Razin, eds. International Trade and Trade Policy. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 120-140.

 

■ Ngo Van Long and Antoine Soubeyran (1996). “Lobbying for Protection by Heterogeneous Firms”. European Journal of Political Economy; V.12-#1, pp. 19-32.

 

■ Arye Hillman, Ngo Van Long and Antoine Soubeyran (2001). “Protection, Lobbying and Market Structure”. Journal of International Economics; V.54-#2, pp. 383-409.

 

■ Paul Pecorino (2001). “Market Structure, Tariff Lobbying and the Free-Rider Problem”. Public Choice; V.106-#3/4, pp. 203-220.

 

■ Takeshi Yamazaki (2004). “Tariff Rate as a Public Good”. Review of International Economics; V.12-#1, pp. 95-107.

 

■ Koichi Kagitani (2003). “Resistance to Trade Liberalization in the Unionized Sector”. Open Economies Review; V.14-#4, pp. 419-435.

 

■ Richard Damania and Per G. Fredriksson (2000). “On the Formation of Industry Lobby Groups”. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. V.41-#4, pp. 315-335.

 

Richard Damania and Per G. Fredriksson (2003). “Trade Policy Reform, Endogenous Lobby Group Formation, and Environmental Policy”. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. V.52-#1, pp. 47-69.

 

Richard Damania, Per G. Fredriksson, and Thomas Osang (2004). “Collusion, Collective Action and Protection: Theory and Evidence”. Public Choice; V.121-#3/4, pp. 279-308.

 

Chamberlin, John (1978). “A Collective Goods Model of Pluralist Political Systems”. Public Choice; V.33-#4, pp. 97-113.

 

■ Stephen Magee, William Brock and Leslie Young (1989). “The Power Function Model of Endogenous Industry Lobbying”. Chapter 6 of Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 86-100. [also appendix to chapter 6, pp. 278-291.]

 

■ Y. Stephen Chiu (1998). “Politics, Structure of Protection, and Welfare”. Review of International Economics; V.6-#3, pp. 472-487.

 

►Devashish Mitra (1999). “Endogenous Lobby Formation and Endogenous Protection: A Long-Run Model of Trade Policy Determination”. American Economic Review; V.89-#5, pp. 1116-1134.

 

■ Michel Le Breton and François Salanie (2003). “Lobbying under Political Uncertainty”. Journal of Public Economics; V.87-#12, pp. 2589-2610.

 

● Application/Empirics

 

■ David Yoffie and Sigrid Bergenstein (1985). “Creating Political Advantage: The Rise of the Corporate Political Entrepreneur”. California Management Review; V.28-#1, pp. 124-139.

 

■ Leonard Lynn and Timothy McKeown (1988). Organizing Business: Trade Associations in America and Japan. Washington, DC: AEI.

 

■ Kevin Grier, Michael Munger, and Brian Roberts (1991). “The Industrial Organization of Corporate Political Participation”. Southern Economic Journal; V.57-#3, pp. 727-738.

 

■ Kevin Grier, Michael Munger, and Brian Roberts (1994). “The Determinants of Industry Political Activity, 1978-1986”. American Political Science Review; V.88-#4, pp. 911-926.

 

■ Timothy McKeown (1994). “Epidemiology of Corporate PAC Participation among Large Corporations”. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization; V.24-#2, pp. 153-168.

 

■ Hansen, Wendy, Neil Mitchell and Jeffrey Drope (2005). “The Logic of Private and Collective Action”. American Journal of Political Science; V.49-#1, pp. 150-167.

 

■ Kathleen Rehbein (1995). “Foreign-owned Firms’ Campaign Contributions in the United States: An Exploratory Survey”. Policy Studies Journal; V.23-#1, pp. 41-61.

 

■ Neil Mitchell, Wendy Hansen and Eric Jepsen (1997). “The Determinants of Domestic and Foreign Corporate Political Activity”. Journal of Politics; V.59-#4, pp. 1096-1113.

 

■ Hansen, Wendy and Neil Mitchell (2000). “Disaggregating and Explaining Corporate Political Activity: Domestic and Foreign Corporations in National Politics”. American Political Science Review; V.94-#4, pp. 891-903.

 

■ Wendy Hansen, Neil Mitchell, and Jeffrey Drope (2004). “Collective Action, Pluralism, and the Legitimacy Tariff: Corporate Activity or Inactivity in Politics”. Political Research Quarterly; V.57-#1, pp. 421-429.

 

►Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (1991). “Lessons in Lobbying for Free Trade in 19th-Century Britain: To Concentrate or Not”. American Political Science Review; V.85-#1, pp. 37-58.

 

■ Iain McLain (2002). “Falsifying Olson? The UK Victories of Free Trade 1846 and 1906”. Ms: Nuffield College, Oxford.

 

■ Stephanie Lenway, Carol Jacobson, and Judith Goldstein (1990). “To Lobby or Petition: The Political Environment of US Trade Policy”. Journal of Management, V.16-#1, pp. 116-134.

 

■ Stephanie Lenway and Kathleen Rehbein (1991). “Leaders, Followers, and Free Riders: An Empirical Test of Variation in Corporate Political Involvement”. Academy of Management Journal; V.34-#4, pp. 893-906.

 

■ Mark Herander and Roger Pupp (1991). “Firm Participation in Steel Industry Lobbying”. Economic Inquiry; V.29-#1, pp. 134-147.

 

■ Stephanie Lenway and Douglas Schuler (1991). “The Determinants of Corporate Political Involvement in Trade Protection: The Case of the Steel Industry.” in R. Baldwin, ed. Empirical Studies of Commercial Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 75-105.

 

■ Douglas Schuler (1996). “Corporate Political Strategy and Foreign Competition: The Case of the Steel Industry”. Academy of Management Journal; V.39-#3, pp. 720-737.

 

■ Stephanie Lenway, Randal Morck, and Bernard Yeung (1996). “Rent Seeking, Protectionsim and Innovation in the American Steel Industry”. Economic Journal; V.106-#435, pp. 410-421.

 

■ Randall Morck, Jungsywan Sepanski and Bernard Yeung (2001). “Habitual and Occasional Lobbyers in the US Steel Industry - An EM Algorithm Approach”. Economic Inquiry, V.39-#3, pp. 365-79.

 

■ Kishore Gawande (1997). “US Non-Tariff Barriers as Privately Provided Public Goods”. Journal of Public Economics; V.64-#1, pp. 61-81.

 

►Kishore Gawande (1998). “Stigler-Olson Lobbying Behavior in Protectionist Industries: Evidence from the Lobbying Power Function”. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization; V.35-#4, pp. 477-499.

 

■ Schiller, Wendy (1999). “Trade Politics in the American Congress: A Study of the Interaction of Political Geography and Interest Group Behavior”. Political Geography; V.18-#7, pp. 769-789.

 

■ Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt (2000). Geography, International Trade, and Political Mobilization in U.S. Industries”. American Journal of Political Science; V.44-#4, pp. 703-719.

 

■ Michael Gilligan (1997). Empowering Exporters: Reciprocity, Delegation and Collective Action in American Trade Policy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

 

■ Stephen P. Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1996). “Endogenous Free-Riding in Protectionist Lobbies: Theory and Evidence”. Ms: University of Texas.


Topic IV. Chicago School Theory and Empirics

 

● Theory: Regulation Theoretic Models (Active State/‘Passive’ Groups)

 

■ George Stigler (1971). “The Theory of Economic Regulation”. Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science; V.2-#1, pp. 3-21.

 

■ Sam Peltzman (1976). “Toward a More General Theory of Regulation”. Journal of Law and Economics; V.19-#2, pp. 211-240. [Comments by Hirshleifer and Becker]

 

■ Bruce Gardner (1983). “Efficient Redistribution through Commodity Markets”. American Journal of Agricultural Economics; V.65-#1, pp. 225-234.

 

Patrick Messerlin (1981). “The Political Economy of Protectionism: The Bureaucratic Case”. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; V.117-#3, pp. 469-495.

 

Arye L. Hillman (1982). “Declining Industries and Political Support Protectionist Motives”. American Economic Review; V.72-#5, pp. 1180-1187.

 

■ James Cassing and Arye L. Hillman (1986). “Shifting Comparative Advantage and Senescent Industry Collapse”. American Economic Review; V.76-#3, pp. 516-523.

 

Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1991). “Protectionist Responses and Declining Industries”. Journal of International Economics; V.30-#1/2, pp. 87-103.

 

■ J.P. Choi (2001). “Protectionist Response to Import Competition in Declining Industries Reconsidered”. European Journal of Political Economy; V.17-#1, pp. 193-201

 

■ David Feldman and Ira Gang (1996). “Revenue Motives and Trade Liberalization”. Review of International Economics; V.4-#3, pp. 276-281.

 

■ Michael Leidy (1994). “Trade Policy and Indirect Rent-Seeking: A Synthesis of Recent Work”. Economics & Politics; V.6-#2, pp. 97-118.

 

■ David Gould and Graeme Woodbridge (1997). Building Trade Barriers and Knocking them Down”. Review of International Economics; V.5-#2, pp. 256-271.

 

■ John Devereux and Lein Lein Chen (1999). “Growth, the External Terms of Trade and Endogenous Trade Liberalization”. Public Choice; V.98-#1/2, pp. 43-57.

 

● Application/Empirics: Ad Hoc Chicago Empirics

 

■ K. Anderson and R. Baldwin (1987). “The Political Market for Protection in Industrial Countries”. in A.M. El-Agraa, ed., Protection, Cooperation, Integration and Development. New York: Macmillan.

 

■ Edward Ray (1981). “The Determinants of Tariffs and Nontariff Trade Restrictions in the US”. Journal of Political Economy; V.89-#1, pp. 105-121.

 

■ Edward Ray (1981). “Tariff and Nontariff Barriers to Trade in the US and Abroad”. Review of Economics and Statistics; V.63-#2, pp. 161-168.

 

■ Howard Marvel and Edward Ray (1983). “The Kennedy Round: Evidence on the Regulation of International Trade in the US”. American Economic Review; V.73-#1, pp. 190-197.

 

■ Edward Ray (1987). “The Impact of Special Interests on Preferential Tariff Concessions in the United States”. Review of Economics and Statistics; V.69-#2, pp. 187-193.

 

■ Edward Ray (1987). “Changing Patterns of Protectionism: The Fall in Tariffs and the Rise in Non-Tariff Barriers”. Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business; V.8-#2, pp. 285-327.

 

■ Edward Ray (1991). “Protection of Manufactures and the US”. in D. Greenaway, ed. Global Protectionism: Is the US Playing on a Level Field. London: MacMillan, pp. 12-36.

 

■ Réal Lavergne (1983). The Political Economy of U.S. Tariffs: An Empirical Analysis. Toronto: Academic Press Canada.

 

■ William Dougan (1985). “Tariffs and the Economic Theory of Regulation”. Research in Law and Economics; V.6, pp. 187-210.

 

■ Paul Godek (1985). “Industry Structure and Redistribution Through Trade Restrictions”. Journal of Law and Economics; V.28-#3, pp. 687-703.

 

■ Rod Tyers (1990). “Implicit Policy Preferences and the Assessment of Negotiable Trade Policy Reforms”. European Economic Review; V.34-#7, pp. 1399-1426.

 

■ Rod Tyers (2004). “Implicit Policy Preferences and Trade Reform by Tariff Aggregates”. Australian National University Working Papers in Economics, #445.

 

Daniel Trefler (1993). “Trade Liberalization and the Theory of Endogenous Protection: An Econometric Study of US Import Policy”. Journal of Political Economy; V.101-#1, pp. 138-160.

 

■ Andrew Dick (1996). “Explaining Managed Trade as Rational Cheating”. Review of International Economics; V.4-#1, pp. 1-16.

 

Jong-Wha Lee and Philip Swagel (1997). “Trade Barriers and Trade Flows across Countries and Industries”. Review of Economics and Statistics; V.79-#3, pp. 372-82.

 

■ Kishore Gawande (1997). “Testing Theories of Endogenous Protection: Robust Evidence From U.S. Nontariff Barrier Data”. in K. Maskus, P. Hooper, E. Leamer, and J.D. Richardson, eds. Quiet Pioneering: Robert M. Stern and His International Economic Legacy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 37-70.

 

Kishore Gawande (1998). “Comparing Theories of Endogenous Protection: Bayesian Comparison of Tobit Models Using Gibbs Sampling Output”. Review of Economics and Statistics; V.80-#1, pp. 128-140.

 

■ Kishore Gawande and Alok Bohara (2000). “Errors-in-Variables Bounds in a Tobit Model of Endogenous Protection”. Southern Economic Journal; V.66-#4, pp. 881-905. [ProQuest]

 

■ Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt (1999). “Industrial Location and Protection: The Political and Economic Geography of U.S. Nontariff Barriers”. American Journal of Political Science; V.43-#4, pp. 1028-1050.


Topic V. Lobbying Models

 

● Theory, 1: Active Lobbies, Passive State

 

Ronald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1982). “Endogenous Tariffs, the Political Economy of Trade Restrictions and Welfare”. in J. Bhagwati, ed. Import Competition and Response. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 223-234.

 

Leslie Young (1982). “Comment on Findlay and Wellisz”. in J. Bhagwati, ed. Import Competition and Response. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 238-243.

 

■ Ronald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz (1983). “Some Aspects of the Political Economy of Trade Restrictions”. KYKLOS, V.36-#3, pp. 469-481.

 

■ Shabtai Donnenfeld and Shlomo Weber (1985). “Lobbying for Tariffs and the Cost of Protection”. Recherches Economiques de Louvain; V.51-#1, pp. 21-27.

 

■ Gary Becker (1983). “A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence”. Quarterly Journal of Economics; V.98-#3, pp. 371-400.

 

■ Gary Becker (1985). “Public Policies, Pressure Groups and Deadweight Costs”. Journal of Public Economics; V.28-#3, pp. 329-347.

 

■ Stanislaw Wellisz and John D. Wilson (1986). “Lobbying and Tariff Formation: A Deadweight Loss Consideration”. Journal of International Economics; V.20-#3/4, pp. 367-375.

 

■ John D. Wilson (1990). “Are Efficiency Improvements in Government Transfer Policies Self-Defeating in Political Equilibrium?”. Economics & Politics; V.2-#3, pp. 241-258.

 

■ Raul Fabella (1991). “The Bias in Favor of Pro-Tariff Lobbies”. Journal of Public Economics; V.44-#1, pp. 87-93.

 

■ Lorenzo Kristov, Peter Lindert, and Robert McClelland (1992). “Pressure Groups and Redistribution”. Journal of Public Economics; V.48-#2, pp. 135-163.

 

■ Jay Coggins, Theodore Graham-Tomasi and Terry Roe (1991). “Existence of Equilibrium in a Lobbying Economy”. International Economic Review; V.32-#3, pp. 533-550.

 

■ Kazuharu Kiyono, Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara and Kaoru Ueda (1991). “Industry Specific Interests and Trade Protection: A Game Theoretic Analysis”. Economic Studies Quarterly; V.42-#4, pp. 347-361.

 

■ Aidt, Toke Skovsgaard (1997). “Cooperative Lobbying and Endogenous Trade Policy”. Public Choice; V.93-#3/4, pp. 455-475.

 

■ Aidt, Toke Skovsgaard (2002). “Strategic Political Participation and Redistribution”. Economics & Politics; V.14-#1, pp. 19-40.

 

■ Aidt, Toke Skovsgaard (2003). “Redistribution and Deadweight Cost: The Role of Political Competition”. European Journal of Political Economy; V.19-#2, pp. 205-226.

 

■ Mary Lovely and Douglas Nelson (1994). “Illegal Trade and Endogenous Tariff Formation”. Public Finance/Finance Publique, V.49-supplement, pp. 182-194.

 

■ Paul Pecorino (1997). “Exogenous Tariff Changes with Endogenous Lobbying Response”. Public Choice; V.92-#1/2, pp. 91-108. [errata, Public Choice; V.94-#1/2, pg. 221]

 

■ John Conlon and Paul Pecorino (1998). “Primary and Secondary Reform”. Economic Inquiry; V.36-#4, pp. 590-602.

 

■ Paul Pecorino (1999). “Endogenous Export Subsidies as a Revenue-Seeking Activity: Some Implications for the Evolution of Protection”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.32-#3, pp. 785-798.

 

■ Beverly Lapham and Roger Ware (2001). “A Dynamic Model of Endogenous Trade Policy”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.34-#1, pp. 225-239.

 

■ Richard Jensen and Marie Thursby (1986). “Endogenous Tariff Policy under Uncertainty”. ms.: Ohio State University.

 

■ Robert Baldwin (1982). “The Political Economy of Protectionism”. in J. Bhagwati, ed. Import Competition and Response. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 263-292.

 

■ Robert Feenstra and Jagdish Bhagwati (1982). “Tariff Seeking and the Efficient Tariff”. in J. Bhagwati, ed. Import Competition and Response. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 245-258.

 

■ Ronald Findlay (1990). “The New Political Economy: Its Explanatory Power for LDCs”. Economics & Politics; V.2-#2, pp. 193-221.

 

■ Richard Clarida and Ronald Findlay (1991). “Endogenous Comparative Advantage, Government, and the Pattern of Trade”. NBER Working Paper, #3813.

 

■ Richard Baldwin (1987). “Politically Realistic Objective Functions and Trade Policy: PROFs and Tariffs”. Economics Letters; V.24-#3, pp. 287-290.

 

■ David Gould and Graeme Woodbridge (1997). “Building Trade Barriers and Knocking Them Down”. Review of International Economics; V.5-#2, pp. 256-271.

 

● Application/Empirics, 1: Basic Empirics of Lobbying

 

Richard Smith (1995). “Interest Group Influence in Congress”. Legislative Studies Quarterly; V.20-#1, pp. 89-139.

 

■ Jan Potters and Randolph Sloof (1996). “Interest Groups: A Survey of Empirical Models that Try to Assess Their Influence”. European Journal of Political Economy; V.12-#3, pp. 403-442.

 

■Henry Chapell (1982).Campaign Contributions and Congressional Voting: A Simultaneous Probit-Tobit Model”. Review of Economics and Statistics; V.64-#1, pp. 77-83.

 

■Richard Hall and Frank Wayman (1990). Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees. American Political Science Review; V.84-#3, pp. 797-820.

 

■James Snyder (1990).Campaign Contributions as Investments: The U.S. House of Representatives, 1980-1986”. Journal of Political Economy; V.98-#6, pp. 1195-1227.

 

Thomas Stratmann (1991). What Do Campaign Contributions Buy? Deciphering Causal Effects of Money and Votes. Southern Economic Journal; V.57-#?, pp. 606-620.

 

Steven Levitt (1998). Are PACs Trying to Influence Politicians or Voters?. Economics and Politics; V.10-#1, pp. 19-35.

 

Thomas Stratmann (2002). Can Special Interests Buy Congressional Votes? Evidence from Financial Services Legislation. Journal of Law and Economics; V.45-#2, pp. 345-374.

 

■Thomas Stratmann (2002).Are Contributors Rational? Untangling Strategies of Political Action Committees. Journal of Political Economy; V.100-#3, pp. 647-664.

 

■ Micky Tripathi, Stephen Ansolabehere, and James M. Snyder Jr (2002). “Are PAC Contributions and Lobbying Linked? New Evidence from the 1995 Lobby Disclosure Act”. Business and Politics (Online Version); V.4-#2, Article 2.

 

■ E.E. Schattschneider (1935). Politics, Pressure, and the Tariff. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.

 

■ Raymond Bauer, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and Lewis A. Dexter (1963). American Business and Public Policy: The Politics of Foreign Trade. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company.

 

■ Stanley Nollen and Dennis Quinn (1994). “Free Trade, Fair Trade, Strategic Trade, and Protectionism in the US Congress, 1987-1988”. International Organization; V.48-#3, pp. 491-525.

 

Robert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000). “Is Trade Policy for Sale? Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Bills”. Public Choice; V.105-#1/2, pp.

 

■ Robert Baldwin and Christopher Magee (2000). Congressional Trade Votes: From NAFTA Approval to Fast Track Defeat. Washington, DC: IIE.

 

■ Christopher Magee (2002). “Do Political Action Committees Give Money to Candidates for Electoral or Influence Motives?”. Public Choice; V.112-#3/4, pp. 373-399.

 

■Rigoberto Lopez (2001). Campaign Contributions and Agricultural Subsidies”. Economics & Politics; V.13-#3, pp. 257-279.

 

■ Fordham, Benjamin and Timothy McKeown (2003). “Selection and Influence: Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on Trade Policy”. International Organization; V.57-#3, pp. 519-549.

 

■ David Jackson and Steven Engel (2003). “Friends Don’t Let Friends Vote for Free Trade: The Dynamics of the Labor PAC Punishment Strategy”. Political Research Quarterly; V.56-#4, pp. 441-448.

 

■ Michael Hiscox (2004). “International Capital Mobility and Trade Politics: Capital Flows, Political Coalitions and Lobbying”. Economics and Politics; V.16-#3, pp. 253-285.

 

■ Jeffrey Drope and Wendy Hansen (2004). “Purchasing Protection? The Effect of Political Spending on Trade Policy”. Political Research Quarterly; V.57-#1, pp. 27-37.

 

■Omer Gokcekus, Justin Knowles and Edward Tower (2004). Sweetening the Pot: How American Sugar Buys Protection”. in Devashish Mitra and Arvind Panagariya, eds. The Political Economy of Trade, Aid and Foreign Investment Policies. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 177-194.

 

■Robert Fisher, Omer Gokcekus, and Edward Tower (2004). 'Steeling' Votes at Low Prices for the Steel Import Quota Bill of 1999”. in Douglas Nelson, ed. The Political Economy of Policy Reform. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 105-129.

 

■Christopher Magee and Stephen Magee (2004). The Madison Paradox and the Low Cost of Reducing Special-Interest Legislation”. in Douglas Nelson, ed. The Political Economy of Policy Reform. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 131-154.

 

■ Erinc Yeldan, and Terry Roe (1991). “Political Economy of Rent-Seeking under Alternative Trade Regimes”. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; V.127-#3, pp. 563-583.

 

■ Marcel Fafchamps, Elisabeth Sadoulet, and Alain de Janvry (1993). “Tariff Seeking in a General Equilibrium Framework”. Journal of International Trade and Economic Development; V.2-#2, pp. 167-189.

 

■ Marcel Fafchamps, Alain de Janvry, and Elisabeth Sadoulet (1999). “Social Heterogeneity and Wasteful Lobbying”. Public Choice; V.98-#1/2, pp. 5-27.

 

■ Kym Anderson (1995). “Lobbying Incentives and the Pattern of Protection in Rich and Poor Countries”. Economic Development and Cultural Change; V.43-#2, pp. 401-423.

 

● Theory, 2: Active Lobbies/Active State–Menu Auction Models

 

■ B. Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986). “Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence”. Quarterly Journal of Economics; V.101-#1, pp. 1-31.

 

■ B. Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston (1986). “Common Agency”. Econometrica; V.54-#4, pp. 923-942.

 

■ Didier Laussel and Michel Le Breton (2001). “Conflict and Cooperation: The Structure of Equilibrium Payoffs in Common Agency”. Journal of Economic Theory; V.100-#1, pp. 93-128.

 

►Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1994). “Protection for Sale”. American Economic Review; V.84-#4, pp. 833-850.

 

■ Avinash Dixit (1996). “Special-Interest Lobbying and Endogenous Commodity Taxation”. Eastern Economic Journal; V.22-#4, pp. 375-388.

 

►Avinash Dixit, Gene Grossman, and Elhanan Helpman (1997). “Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Tax Policy”. Journal of Political Economy; V.105-#4, pp. 752-69.

 

■ Wilfred Ethier (2006). “Selling Protection for Sale”. Asia Pacific Journal of Accounting and Economics; V.13-#2, pp. 153-162.

 

■ Wilfred Ethier (2006). “The Theory of Trade Policy and Trade Agreements: A Critique”. European Journal of Political Economy; forthcoming.

 

■ Richard Baldwin and Frederic Robert-Nicoud (2006). “Protection for Sale Made Easy”. CEPR Discussion Paper #5452.

 

■ S. Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1994). “Lobbying and Adjustment in Declining Industries”. European Economic Review; V.38-#3/4, pp. 586-595.

 

►S. Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1997). “The Political Economy of Declining Industries: Senescent Industry Collapse Revisited”. Journal of International Economics; V.42-#1/2, pp. 221-237.

 

■ Richard Damania (2002). “Influence in Decline: Lobbying in Contracting Industries”. Economics and Politics; V.14-#2, pp. 209-223.

 

■ Christopher Magee (2002). “Declining Industries and Persistent Tariff Protection”. Review of International Economics; V.10-#4, pp. 749-762.

 

■ Caroline Freund and Çağlar Özden (2008). “Trade Policy and Loss Aversion”. American Economic Review; V.98-#4, pp. 1675-1691.

 

■ Christopher Magee (2003). “Endogenous Tariffs and Trade Adjustment Assistance”. Journal of International Economics; V.60-#1, pp. 203-222.

 

►Scott Bradford (2003). “Protection and Jobs: Explaining the Structure of Trade Barriers across Industries”. Journal of International Economics; V.61-#1, pp. 19-39.

 

►Scott Bradford (2006). “Protection and Unemployment”. Journal of International Economics; V.69-#2, pp. 257-271.

 

■ Richard Baldwin and Frederic Robert-Nicoud (2007). “Entry and Asymmetric Lobbying: Why Governments Pick Losers”. Journal of the European Economic Association; V.5-#5, pp. 1064-1093.

 

■ Raymond Riezman and John D. Wilson (1997). “Political Reform and Trade Policy”. Journal of International Economics; V.42-#1/2, pp. 67-90.

 

■ Martin Rama and Guido Tabellini (1998). “Lobbying by Capital and Labor over Trade and Labor Market Policies”. European Economic Review; V.42-#7, pp. 1295-1316.

 

Noel Gaston and Douglas Nelson (2004). “Structural Change and the Labor Market Effects of Globalization”. Review of International Economics; V.12-#5, pp. 769-792.

 

■ Hideo Konishi, Kamal Saggi, and Shlomo Weber (1999). “Endogenous Trade Policy under Foreign Direst Investment”. Journal of International Economics; V.49-#2, pp. 289-308.

 

■Joachim Schleich and David Orden (2000). “Environmental Quality and Industry Protection with Noncooperative versus Cooperative Domestic and Trade Policies”. Review of International Economics; V.8-#4, pp. 681-697.

 

■ Paola Conconi (2003). “Green Lobbies and Transboundary Pollution in Large Open Economies”. Journal of International Economics; V.59-#2, pp. 399-422.

 

■ Lai, Yu-Bong (2003). “Interest Groups, Economic Competition and Endogenous Public Policy”. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics; V.159-#2, pp.

 

■ Richard Boylan (2000). “An Optimal Auction Perspective on Lobbying”. Social Choice & Welfare; V.17-#1, pp. 55-68.

 

■ Besley, Timothy and Stephen Coate (2001). “Lobbying and Welfare in a Representative Democracy”. Review of Economic Studies; V.68-#1, pp. 67-82.

 

►Georg Kirchsteiger and Andrea Prat (2001). “Inefficient Equilibria in Lobbying”. Journal of Public Economics; V.82-#3, pp. 349-375.

 

■ Michel Le Breton and François Salanie (2003). “Lobbying under Political Uncertainty”. Journal of Public Economics; V.87-#12, pp. 2589-2610.

 

■ David Martimort and Aggey Semenov (2008). “Ideological Uncertainty and Lobbying Competition”. Journal of Public Economics; V.92-#3/4, pp. 456-481.

 

● Application/Empirics, 2: Testing the PfS Model

 

Susumu Imai, Hajime Katayama and Kala Krishna (2008). Is Protection Really for Sale?: A Survey and Directions for Future Research. NBER Working Paper, #13899.

 

Pinelopi Goldberg and Giovanni Maggi (1999). “Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation”. American Economic Review; V.89-#5, pp. 1135-1155.

 

Usree Bandyopadhyay and Kishore Gawande (2000). “Is Protection for Sale? Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of Endogenous Protection”. Review of Economics and Statistics; V.82-#1, pp. 139-152.

 

►Theo Eicher and Thomas Osang (2002). “Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation, comment”. American Economic Review; V.92-#5, pp. 1702-1710.

 

■Hadi Salehi Esfahani (2005). Searching for the (Dark) Forces Behind Protection”. Oxford Economic Papers; V.57-#2, pp. 283-314.

 

■Xenia Matschke and Shane Sherlund (2006). Do Labor Issues Matter in the Determination of U.S. Trade Policy”. American Economic Review; V.96-#1, pp. 405-421.

 

■Rigoberto Lopez and Xenia Matschke (2006). Food Protection for Sale”. Review of International Economics; V.14-#3, pp. 380-391.

 

■Kishore Gawande and Bernard Hoekman (2006). Lobbying and Agricultural Trade Policy in the US”. International Organization; V.60-#3, pp. 527-561.

 

Kishore Gawande, Pravin Krishna and Michael Robbins (2006). “Foreign Lobbies and US Trade Policy”. Review of Economics and Statistics; V.88-#3, pp. 563-571.

 

■Hiau Look Kee, Marcelo Olarreaga and Peri Silva (2007). Market Access for Sale”. Journal of Development Economics; V.82-#1, pp. 79-94.

 

■ Giovanni Facchini, Johannes Van Biesebroeck and Gerald Willmann (2006). “Protection for Sale with Imperfect Rent Capture”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.39-#3, pp. 845-873.

 

■ McCalman, Phillip (2004). “Protection for Sale and Trade Liberalization: An Empirical Investigation”. Review of International Economics; V.12-#1, pp. 81-94.

 

■ Olivier Cadot, Jaime de Melo, and Marcelo Olarreaga (2004). “Lobbying, Counterlobbying, and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Poor and Rich Countries”. World Bank Economic Review; V.18-#3, pp. 345-366.

 

Matilde Bombardini (2005). Firm Heterogeneity and Lobby Participation. Journal of International Economics, V.75-#2, pp. 329-348..

 

■ Devashish Mitra, Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet Ulubaşoğlu (2006). “Can We Obtain Realistic Parameter Estimates from the 'Protection for Sale' Model”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.39-#1, pp. 187-210.

 

Josh Ederington and Minier (2008). Reconsidering the Empirical Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Model of Endogenous Protection. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.41-#2, pp. 501-516.

 

Susumu Imai, Hajime Katayama and Kala Krishna (2006). Protection for Sale or Surge Protection. European Economic Review, forthcoming.

 

Susumu Imai, Hajime Katayama and Kala Krishna (2008). A Quantile Based Test of the Protection For Sale Model. NBER Working Paper, #13900.

 

■ Jean-Marie Grether, Jaime de Melo and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001). “Who Determines Mexican Trade Policy”. Journal of Development Economics; V.64-#2, pp. 343-370.

 

■ Lee Branstetter and Robert Feenstra (2002). “Trade and Foreign Direct Investment in China: A Political Economy Approach”. Journal of International Economics; V.58-#2, pp. 335-358.

 

►Devashish Mitra, Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet Ulubaşoğlu (2002). “‘Protection for Sale’ In A Developing Country: Democracy vs. Dictatorship”. Review of Economics & Statistics; V.84-#3, pp. 497-508.

 

■ Devashish Mitra, Dimitrios Thomakos and Mehmet Ulubaşoğlu (2004). “Protection versus Promotion: An Empirical Investigation”. Economics & Politics; V.16-#2, pp. 147-162.

 

■Hadi Salehi Esfahani and Stephanie Leaphart (2000). Estimating Trade Policy Models of Trade Policy: An Empirical Study of Protection in Turkey”. Ms: University of Illinois, Champagne-Urbana.

 

■ Daniel Y. Kono (2006). “Optimal Obfuscation: Democracy and Trade Policy Transparency”. American Political Science Review; V.100-#3, pp. 369-384.

 

Topic VI. Contributions, Elections and Trade Policy

 

● Partisan Competition with Contributions: Magee/Brock/Young

 

■ Stephen Magee, William Brock and Leslie Young (1989). Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

 

■ David Austen-Smith (1991). “Rational Consumers and Irrational Voters: A Review Essay on Magee, Brock and Young”. Economics & Politics; V.3-#1, pp. 73-92.

 

● Theory: Partisan Competition with Probabilistic Voting

 

■ Peter Coughlin (1992). Probabilistic Voting Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

 

■Jeffrey Banks and John Duggan (2005). Probabilistic Voting in the Spatial Model of Elections: The Theory of Office Motivated Candidates. in David Austen-Smith and John Duggan, eds. Social Choice and Strategic Decisions. Berlin: Springer, pp. 15-56.

 

Assar Lindbeck and Jurgen Weibull (1987). Balanced-Budget Redistribution as the Outcome of Political Competition. Public Choice; V.52-#3, pp. 273-297.

 

A. Lindbeck and J. Weibull (1993). A Model of Political Equilibrium in a Representative Democracy. Journal of Public Economics; V.51-#2, pp. 272-297.

 

S. Coate and S. Morris (1995). On the Form of Transfers to Special Interests. Journal of Political Economy; V.103-#6, pp. 1210-1235.

 

A. Dixit and J. Londregan (1995). Redistributive Politics and Economic Efficiency. American Political Science Review; V.89-#4, pp. 856-866.

 

A. Dixit and J. Londregan (1996). The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Politics. Journal of Politics; V.58-#4, pp. 1132-1155.

 

A. Dixit and J. Londregan (1998). Ideology, Tactics, and Efficiency in Redistributive Politics. Quarterly Journal of Economics; V.113-#2, pp. 497-529.

 

A. Dixit and J. Londregan (1998). Fiscal Federalism and Redistributive Politics. Journal of Public Economics; V.68-#2, pp. 153-180.

 

A. Dixit and J. Londregan (2000). Political Power and the Credibility of Government Debt. Journal of Economic Theory; V.94-#1, pp. 80-105.

 

Rebecca Morton and Charles Cameron (1991). Elections and the Theory of Campaign Contributions: A Survey and Critical Analysis. Economics &Politics; V.4-#1, pp. 79-108.

 

David Austen-Smith (1987). Interest Groups, Campaign Contributions and Probabilistic Voting. Public Choice; V.54-#2, pp. 123-239.

 

■Melvin Hinich and Michael Munger (1989). Political Investment, Voter Perceptions, and Candidate Strategy: An Equilibrium Spatial Analysis. in Peter Ordeshook, ed. Models of Strategic Choice in Politics. Ann Arbor: Univerity of Michigan Press, pp. 49-67.

 

Charles Cameron and James Enelow (1992). Asymmetric Policy Effects, Campaign Contributions, and the Spatial Theory of Elections. Mathematical and Computer Modelling; V.16-#8/9, pp. 117-132.

 

David Baron and J. Mo (1993). Campaign Contributions and Party-Candidate Competition in Services and Policies. in W. Barnett, et al., eds. Political Economy: Institutions, Information, Competition, and Representation. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 313-354.

 

John Londregan and Thomas Romer (1993). Polarization, Incumbency and the Personal Vote. in W. Barnett, et al., eds. Political Economy: Institutions, Information, Competition, and Representation. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 355-357.

 

David Baron (1994). Electoral Competition with Informed and Uninformed Voters. American Political Science Review; V.88-#1, pp. 33-47.

 

Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1996). Electoral Competition with Special Interest Politics. Review of Economic Studies; V.63-#2, pp. 265-86.

 

►Alex Cukierman and Yossi Spiegel (2003). “When is the Median Voter Paradigm a Reasonable Guide for Policy Choices in a Representative Democracy?”. Economics & Politics; V. 15-#3, pp. 247-284.

 

■ Wolfgang Mayer (1993). “Lobbying for Tariff Policies”. Review of International Economics; V.1-#3, pp. 221-233.

 

■ Wolfgang Mayer and Jun Li (1994). “Interest Groups, Electoral Competition, and Probabilistic Voting for Trade Policies”. Economics & Politics; V.6-#1, pp. 59-77.

 

■ Derek Clark and Jonathan Thomas (1995). Probabilistic Voting, Campaign Contributions, and Efficiency”. American Economic Review; V.85-#1, pp. 254-259.

 

■ C.C. Yang (1995). “Endogenous Tariff Formation under Representative Democracy: A Probabilistic Voting Model”. American Economic Review; V.85-#4, pp. 956-963.

 

■ Wolfgang Mayer (1998). “Trade Policy Platforms of Competing Parties: What Makes Them Different?”. Review of International Economics; V.6-#2, pp. 185-203.

 

■ Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (2005). “A Protectionist Bias in Majoritarian Politics”. Quarterly Journal of Economics; V.120-#?, pp. 1239-1282.

 

■ James Anderson and Maurizio Zanardi (2004). “Political Pressure Deflection”. ms: Boston College.


Topic VII. Institutions and Equilibrium Outcomes

 

● Theory: Institutions, Organization and Outcomes

 

■ Theodore Lowi (1964). “American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies, and Political Theory”. World Politics; V.16-#4, pp. 676-715.

 

►H. Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1989). “Institutional Structure and Time Horizon in a Simple Political-Economy Model: The Lowi Effect”. International Spectator; V.24-#3/4, pp.153-173.

 

H. Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992). “Institutional Structure in the Political Economy of Protection: Legislated versus Administered Protection”. Economics & Politics; V.4-#1, pp. 61-77.

 

■ Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith (2004). “The Impact of Leadership Turnover on Trading Relations between States”. International Organization; V.58-#3, pp. 567-600.

 

■ Michael Hall (2006). “Coalition Formation and Models of Capitalism”. Business and Politics: V.8-#1, Article 2.

 

■ Jonas Pontusson (1995). “From Comparative Public Policy to Political Economy: Putting Political Institutions in their Place and Taking Interests Seriously”. Comparative Political Studies; V.28-#1, pp. 117-147.

 

● Empirics/Applications, 1: Fiscal Institutions–The Income Tax

 

■ Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985). “Special Interests and the Adoption of the Income Tax in the US”. Journal of Economic History; V.45-#3, pp. 607-625.

 

■ Bennett Baack and Edward Ray (1985). “The Political Economy of the Origin and Development of the Federal Income Tax”. in R. Higgs, ed. Emergence of Modern Political Economy (Research in Economic History, supplement 4). Greenwood: JAI Press, pp. 121-138.

 

■ John Mark Hansen (1990). “Taxation and the Political Economy of the Tariff”. International Organization; V.44-#4, pp. 527-551.

 

■ Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992). “Tax Regimes, Tariff Revenues and Government Spending”. Economica; V.59-#1, pp. 75-92.

 

■ Grant Gardner and Kent Kimbrough (1992). “Tax Smoothing and Tariff Behavior in the US”. Journal of Macroeconomics; V.14-#4, pp. 711-729.

 

■ John Hobson (1997). The Wealth of States: A Comparative Sociology of International Economic and Political Change. Cambridge: CUP.

 

■ Roger Gordon and Wei Li (2005). “Tax Structures in Developing Countries: Many Puzzles and a Possible Explanation”. MS: UC San Diego and University of Virginia.

 

■ Roger Gordon and Wei Li (2005). “Puzzling Tax Structures in Developing Countries: A Comparison of Two Alternative Explanations”. MS: UC San Diego and University of Virginia

 

● Empirics/Applications, 2: Fiscal Institutions–The Welfare State

 

■ Cameron, David (1978). “The Expansion of the Public Sector”. American Political Science Review; V.72-#4, pp. 1243-1261.

 

Ruggie, John (1982). “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order. International Organization, V.36-#, pp. 379-415.

 

Ruggie, John (1994). “Trade, Protectionism, and the Future of Welfare Capitalism. Journal of International Affairs; V.48-#1, pp. 1-11.

 

■Bates, Robert, Philip Brock and Fill Tiefenthaler (1991). “Risk and Trade Regimes: Another Exploration”. International Organization, V.45-#1, pp. 1-18.

 

Garrett, Geoffrey (1995). “Capital Mobility,Trade and the Domestic Politics of Economic Policy”. International Organization; V49-#4, pp. 657-687.

 

Rodrik, Dani (1997). “International Trade and Big Government”. in B.J. Cohen, ed., International Trade and Finance: New Frontiers for Research--Essays in Honor of Peter B. Kenen. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 89-121.

 

Rodrik, Dani (1998). “Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments?”. Journal of Political Economy; V.106-#5, pp. 997-1032.

 

Alesina, Alberto and Romain Wacziarg (1999). “Openness, Country Size and Government”. Journal of Public Economics; V.69-#3, pp. 305-321.

 

■Iversen, Torben and Thomas Cusak (2000). The Causes of Welfare State Expansion: Deindustrialization or Globalization”. World Politics; V.52-#3, pp. 313-349.

 

Burgoon, Brian (2001). “Globalization and Welfare Compensation: Disentangling the Ties that Bind”. International Organization; V.55-#3, pp. 509-551.

 

Garrett. Geoffrey and Deborah Mitchell (2001). “Globalization, Government Spending and Taxation in
the OECD
”. European Journal of Political Research; V.39-#2, pp. 145-178.

 

Pierson, Paul (2001). “The Dynamics of Welfare State Expansion: Trade Openness, De-industrialization, and Partisan Politics”. in Paul Pierson, ed. The New Politics of the Welfare State. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 80–104.

 

Adserà, Alicia and Carles Boix (2002). “Trade, Democracy, and the Size of the Public Sector: The Political Underpinnings of Openness”. International Organization; V.56-#2, pp. 229-262.

 

■Crepaz, Markus (2002). “Global, Constitutional, and Partisan Determinants of Redistribution in Fifteen OECD Countries.Comparative Politics; V.34-#2, pp. 169-188.

 

Mares, Isabela (2004). “Economic Insecurity and Social Policy Expansion: Evidence from Interwar Europe”. International Organization; V58-#4, pp. 745-774.

 

■Boix, Carles (2006). “Between Redistribution and Trade: The Political Economy of Protectionism and Domestic Compensation”. in P. Bardhan, S. Bowles, and M. Wallerstein, eds. Globalisation and Egalitarian Redistribution. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 192-216.

 

■Gemmel, Norman, Richard Kneller, and Ismael Sanz (2008).Foreign Investment, International Trade and the Size and Structure of Public Expenditures”. European Journal of Political Economy, V.24-#1, pp. 151-171.

 

■ Hays, Jude, Sean Ehrlich and Clint Peinhardt (2005). “Government Spending and Public Support for Trade in the OECD: An Empirical Test of the Embedded Liberalism Thesis”. International Organization, V.59-#2, pp. 473-494.

 

■Scheve, Kenneth and Matthew Slaughter (2004). “Economic Insecurity and the Globalization of Production”. American Journal of Political Science. V.48-#4, pp. 662-674.

 

■Scheve, Kenneth and Matthew Slaughter (2006). “Public Opinion, International Integration, and the Welfare State”. in P. Bardhan, S. Bowles, and M. Wallerstein, eds. Globalisation and Egalitarian Redistribution. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 217-260.

 

Burgoon, Brian (2009). “The Demand Side of Globalization Politics: Trade Openness and Welfare Compensation in Europe”. European Journal of Political Reserach; V.46-#3, forth.

 

Burgoon, Brian and Michael Hiscox (2009). “Trade Openness and Political Compensation: Labor Demands for Adjustment Assistance”. ms.

 

Anna Maria Mayda, Kevin O'Rourke and Richard Sinnott (2007). “Risk, government and globalization: International survey evidence”. NBER Working Paper, #13037.

 

● Empirics/Applications, 3: Legislative Institutions and the RTAA

 

■ Stephan Haggard (1988). “The Institutional Foundations of Hegemony: Explaining the Trade Agreements Act of 1934”. International Organization. V.42-#1; pp. 91-119.

 

■ Douglas Nelson (1989). “Domestic Political Preconditions of US Trade Policy: Liberal Structure and Protectionist Dynamics”. Journal of Public Policy; V.9-#1, pp. 83-108.

 

■ Sharyn O’Halloran (1994). Politics, Process, and American Trade Policy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

 

■ Michael Bailey, Judith Goldstein and Barry Weingast (1997). “The Institutional Roots of American Trade Policy: Politics, Coalitions, and International Trade”. World Politics; V.49-#3, pp. 309-338.

 

■ Daniel Nielson (2003). “Supplying Trade Reform: Political Institutions and Liberalization in Middle-Income Presidential Democracies”. American Journal of Political Science; V.47-#3, pp. 470-491.

 

■ Douglas Irwin and Randall Kroszner (1999). “Interests, Institutions, and Ideology in Securing Policy Change: The Republican Conversion to Trade Liberalization after Smoot-Hawley”. Journal of Law and Economics; V.42-#2, pp. 643-674.

 

■ Michael Hiscox (1999). “The Magic Bullet? The RTAA, Institutional Reform, and Trade Liberalization”. International Organization; V.53-#4, pp. 669-698.

 

■ Karen Schnietz (2000). “The Institutional Foundations of U.S. Trade Policy: Revisiting Explanations for the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act”. Journal of Policy History, V.12-#4, pp. 417-444.

 

■ Karen Schnietz (2003). “The Reaction of Private Interests to the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act”. International Organization; V.57-#1, pp. 213-233. 

 

Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini (1999). “The Size and Scope of Government: Comparative Politics with Rational Politicians”. European Economic Review; V.43-#4/6, pp. 699-735.

 

● Applications/Empirics, 4: Parties, Partisan Change and Trade Policy

 

■ Richard Watson (1956). “The Tariff Revolution: A Study of Shifting Party Attitudes”. Journal of Politics; V.18-#4, pp. 678-701.

 

■ Charles Stewart III and Barry Weingast (1992). “Stacking the Senate, Changing the Nation: Republican Rotten Boroughs, Statehood Politics, and American Political Development”. Studies in American Political Development; V.6-#2, pp. 223-271.

 

■ Eric Uslaner (1994). “Political Parties, Ideas, Interests, and Free Trade in the United States”. In Charles Doran and Gregory Marchildon, eds. The Nafta Puzzle: Political Parties and Trade in North America. Boulder: Westview.

 

■ William Keech and K. Pak (1995). “Partisanship, Institutions, and Change in American Trade Politics”. Journal of Politics; V.57-#4, pp. 1130-1142.

 

■ David Epstein and Sharyn O’Halloran (1996). “The Partisan Paradox and the US Tariff, 1877-1934”. International Organization; V.50-#2, pp. 301-324.

 

■ Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997). “The Role of the Median Legislator in US Trade Policy: A Historical Analysis”. Economic Inquiry; V.35-#1, pp. 97-107.

 

►Fiona McGillivray (1997). “Party Discipline as a Determinant of the Endogenous Formation of Tariffs”. American Journal of Political Science, V.41-#2, pp. 584-607.

 

■ David Brady, Judith Goldstein, and Daniel Kessler (2002). “Does Party Matter? An Historical Test Using Senate Tariff Votes in Three Institutional Settings”. Journal of Law Economics and Organization; V.18-#1, pp. 140-154.

 

H. Keith Hall, Chihwa Kao, and Douglas Nelson (1998). “Women and Tariffs: Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer Model”. Economic Inquiry; V.36-#2, pp. 320-332.

 

■ Michael Hiscox (2000). “Floor Debates over International Trade: Partisan and Constituency Effects in Congressional Debates on Trade Legislation”. Ms: Harvard University.

 

■ Michael Hiscox (2006). “Will Trade be Partisan Again (and Why Isn't it Already)? Trade and the American Political Parties in the 1890s and 1990s”. Legislative Studies Quarterly, forthcoming.

 

■Helen Milner and B. Judkins (2004). “Partisanship, Trade Policy and Globalization: Is There a Left-Right Divide on Trade Policy”. International Studies Quarterly; V.48-#1, pp. 95-120.

 

■ Alok Bohara, Alejandro Camargo, Therese Grijalva, and Kishore Gawande (2005). “Fundamental Dimensions in U.S. Trade Policy”. Journal of International Economics; 65-#1, pp. 93-125.

 

■ James Shoch (1998). “Party Politics and International Economic Activism: The Reagan-Bush Years”. Political Science Quarterly; V.113-#1, pp. 113-131.

 

■ James Shoch (2001). Trading Blows: Party Competition and U.S. Trade Policy in a Globalizing Era. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

 

● Applications/Empirics, 5: Divided Government

 

■ Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn O'Halloran (1994). “Divided Government and U.S. Trade Policy: Theory and Evidence”. International Organization; V.48-#4, pp. 595-632.

 

■ David Epstein and Sharyn O’Halloran (1996). “Divided Government and the Design of Administrative Procedures”. Journal of Politics; V.58-#2, pp. 373-398.

 

■ Helen Milner and B. Peter Rosendorff (1997). “Democratic Politics and International Trade Negotiations: Elections and Divided Government as Constraints on Trade Liberalization”. Journal of Conflict Resolution; V.41-#1, pp. 117-146.

 

■ John Coleman (1998). “Bipartisan Order and Partisan Disorder in Postwar Trade Policy”. Ms: University of Wisconsin, Political Science.

 

■ David Karol (2000). “Divided Government and U.S. Trade Policy: Much Ado About Nothing?”. International Organization; V.54-#4, pp. 825-844.

 

■ Richard Sherman (2002). “Delegation, Ratification, and US Trade Policy: Why Divided Government Causes Lower Tariffs”. Comparative Political Studies; V.350#10, pp. 1171-1197.

 

■ Robert Pahre (2001). “Divided Government and International Cooperation in Austria-Hungary, Sweden-Norway, and the European Union”. European Union Politics; V.2-#2, pp. 131-162.

 

■ James Sundquist (1988). “Needed: A Political Theory for the New Era of Coalition Government in the United States”. Political Science Quarterly; V.103-#4, pp. 613-635.

 

■ David Mayhew (1991). Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking and Investigations, 1946-1990. New Haven: Yale University Press.

 

■ Morris Fiorina (1996). Divided Government (2nd ed.). Boston: Allyn & Bacon.

 

■ David Brady (1993). “The Causes and Consequences of Divided Government: Toward a New Theory of American Politics”. American Political Science Review; V.87-#1, pp. 189-194.

 

■ David McKay (1994). “Divided and Governed? Recent Research on Divided Government in the United States”. British Journal of Political Science; V.24-# 4, pp. 517-534.

 

■ Keith Krehbiel (1996). “Institutional and Partisan Sources of Gridlock: A Theory of Divided and Unified Government”. Journal of Theoretical Politics; V.8-#1, pp. 7-40.

 

■ John Coleman (1999). “Unified Government, Divided Government, and Party Responsiveness.” American Political Science Review; V.93-#4, pp. 821-35.

 

■ David Epstein and Sharyn O’Halloran (1999). Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making under Separate Powers. New York: Cambridge University Press.


Topic VIII. Domestic Political Economy of Integration

 

● Free Trade Areas and Customs Unions

 

■ J. deMelo, A. Panagariya and D. Rodrik (1993). “The New Regionalism: A Country Perspective”. in J. deMelo and A. Panagariya, ed. New Dimensions in Regional Integration. New York: Cambridge/CEPR, pp.159-193 [esp. section 3).

 

■ M. Richardson (1993). “Endogenous Protection and Trade Diversion”. Journal of International Economics; V.34-#3/4, pp. 309-324.

 

■ M. Richardson (1994). “Why a Free Trade Area: The Tariff Also Rises”. Economics & Politics; V.6-#1, pp. 79-96. [also in Bhagwati, Krishna, and Panagariya, pp. 357-376.]

 

■ M. Richardson (1995). “Tariff Revenue Competition in a Free Trade Area”. European Economic Review; V.39-#7, pp. 1429-1437.

 

■ D. Desruelle and M. Richardson (1997). “Fortress Europe: Jericho or Chateau d’If?”. Review of International Economics; V.5-#1, pp. 32-46.

 

■ S. Nagaoka (1994). “Does Regional Integration Promote Liberalization? A Case of Endogenous Protection”. Journal of the Japanese and International Economies; V.8-#4, pp. 551-564.

 

■ A. Panagariya and R. Findlay (1995). “A. Political Economy Analysis of Free Trade Areas and Customs Unions”. in G. Grossman, R. Feenstra and D. Irwin eds. The Political Economy of Trade Policy. Cambridge: MIT, pp. 265-287. [also in Bhagwati, Krishna, and Panagariya, pp. 335-356.]

 

■ S. Bandyopadhyay and H. Wall (1999). “Customs Union or Free Trade Area? The Role of Political Asymmetries”. Review of International Economics; V.7-#4, pp. 665-672.

 

■ G. Grossman and E. Helpman (1995). “The Politics of Free Trade Areas”. American Economic Review; V.85-#4, pp. 667-690. [also in Bhagwati, Krishna, and Panagariya, pp. 299-334.]

 

■ Giovanni Maggi and Andres Rodriguez-Clare (1998). “The Value of Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressures”. Journal of Political Economy; V.106-#3, pp. 575-601.

 

■ Devashish Mitra (2002). “Endogenous Political Organization and the Value of Trade Agreements”. Journal of International Economics; V.57-#2, pp. 473-485.

 

■ Arvind Panagariya and Rupa Duttagupta (2002). “Politics of Free Trade Areas: Tariffs versus Quotas”. Journal of International Economics; V.58-#2, pp. 413-427.

 

■ Olivier Cadot, Jaime deMelo, and Marcelo Olarreaga (1999). “Regional Integration and Lobbying for Tariffs Against Non-members”. International Economic Review; V.40-#3, pp. 635-657.

 

■ Olivier Cadot, Jaime deMelo, and Marcelo Olarreaga (2002). “Harmonizing External Quotas in an FTA: A Step Backward”. Economics & Politics; V.14-#3, pp. 259-282.

 

■ Olivier Cadot, Jaime deMelo, and Marcelo Olarreaga (2003). “The Protectionist Bias of Duty Drawbacks: Evidence from Mercosur”. Journal of International Economics; V.59-#1, pp. 161-182.

 

■ Ronald Cox (1995). “Corporate Coalitions and Industrial Restructuring: Explaining Regional Trade Agreements”. Competition & Change; V.1-#?, pp. 13-30.

 

■ William Avery (1998). “Domestic Interests in NAFTA Bargaining”. Political Science Quarterly; V.113-#2, pp. 281-305.

 

■ James Shoch (2000). “Contesting Globalization: Organized Labor, NAFTA, and the 1997 and 1998 Fast-Track Fights”. Politics and Society; V.28-#1, pp. 119-150.

 

■ Chase, Kerry (2003). “Economic Interests and Reciprocal Trading Arrangements: The Case of NAFTA”. International Organization; V.57-#1, pp. 137-174.

 

■ Constantinos Syropoulos (2003). “Rules for the Disposition of Tariff Revenues and the Determination of Common External Tariffs in Customs Unions”. Journal of International Economics; V.60-#2, pp. 387-416.

 

■ Christopher S. Magee (2003). “Endogenous Preferential Trade Agreements: An Empirical Analysis”. Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy; V.2-#1, Article 15.

 

● Effect on Multilateral Liberalization (optional topic)

 

■ B. Hoekman and M. Leidy (1993). “What to Expect from Regional and Multilateral Trade Negotiations: A Public Choice Perspective”. in K. Anderson and R. Blackhurst, eds. Regional Integration and the Global Trading System. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, pp. 246-269.

 

■ A.O. Krueger (1995). “The Role of the NAFTA Debate in US Trade Policy”. Australian Economic Papers; V.34-#64, pp. 5-16.

 

■ Wei, S.-J. and J. Frankel (1996). “Can Regional Blocs be a Stepping Stone to Global Free Trade?”. International Review of Economics and Finance; V.5-#4, pp. 339-347.

 

■ R. Baldwin (1996). “A Domino Theory of Regionalism”. In R. Baldwin, P. Haaparanta, and J. Kiander, eds. Expanding Membership of the EU. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 25-48. [also in Bhagwati, Krishna, and Panagariya, pp. 479-502.]

 

■ P. Krishna (1996). “A Political Economy Analysis of Preferential Trading and Multilateralism”. Eastern Economic Journal; V.22-#4, pp. 477-483.

 

■ P. Krishna (1998). “Regionalism and Multilateralism: A Political Economy Approach”. Quarterly Journal of Economics; V.113-#1, pp. 228-250. [also in Bhagwati, Krishna, and Panagariya, pp. 453-477.]

 

■ P. Levy and T.N. Srinivasan (1996). “Regionalism and the (Dis)advantage of Dispute-Settlement Access”. American Economic Review; V.86-#2, pp. 93-98.

 

■ P. Levy (1997). “A Political-Economic Analysis of Free-Trade Agreements”. American Economic Review; V.87-#4, pp. 506-519. [also in Bhagwati, Krishna, and Panagariya, pp. 429-451.]

 

■ P. Levy (1998). “Learning from Trade Agreements”. ms: Yale University.

 

■ O. Cadot, J. de Melo, and M. Olarreaga (2001). “Can Bilateralism Ease the Pains of Multilateral Trade Liberalization?”. European Economic Review; V.45-#1, pp. 27-44.

 

● Empirics, 1: Macro Perspectives

 

■ S. Bilal (1998). “Political Economy Considerations in the Supply of Trade Protection in Regional Integration Agreements”. Journal of Common Market Studies; V.36-#1, pp. 1-31.

 

■ Stephen P. Magee and Hak-Loh Lee (1999). “Endogenous Regionalism's Free Trade Bias: Special Interests in the EEC, 1968-1983”. in Bernardo Bortolotti and Gianluca Fiorentini, eds, Pressure Groups and Self Regulation. New York: Oxford Press, 1999, 51-85.

 

■ S. Magee and H.-O. Lee (2001). “Endogenous Tariff Creation and Tariff Diversion in a Customs Union”. European Economic Review; V. 45-#3, pp. 495-518.

 

■ S. Magee and H.-O. Lee (1997). “Tariff Creation and Tariff Diversion in Customs Unions: The Endogenous External Tariff of the EEC, 1968-1983”. Nota di Lavoro; V.38-#97, pp. 1-39.

 

■ M. Olarreaga and I. Soloaga (1998). “Endogenous Tariff Formation: The Case of Mercosur”. World Bank Economic Review; V.12-#2, pp. 297-320.

 

● Empirics, 2: Legislative Voting on NAFTA

 

■ W. Kaempfer and S. Marks (1993). “The Expected Effects of Trade Liberalisation: Evidence from U.S. Congressional Action on Fast-Track Authority”. World Economy; V.16-#6, pp. 725-740.

 

■ F. Boadu and M. Thompson (1993). “The Political Economy of the U.S.-Mexico Free Trade Agreement: Analysis of the Congressional Fast Track Vote”. Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics; V.25-#2, pp. 27-35.

 

■ L. Kahane (1996). “Senate Voting Patterns on the 1991 Extension of the Fast Track Trade Procedures: Prelude to NAFTA”. Public Choice; V.87-#1, pp. 35-53.

 

■ L. Kahane (1996). “Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA: An Empirical Analysis”. American Journal of Economics and Sociology; V.55-#4, pp. 395-409.

 

■ J. Conybeare and M. Zinkula (1996). “Who Voted Against the NAFTA”. World Economy; V.19-#1, pp. 1-12.

 

■ J. Steagall and K. Jennings (1996). “Unions, PAC Contributions, and the NAFTA Vote”. Journal of Labor Research; V.17-#3, pp. 515-521.

 

■ J. Steagall and K. Jennings (1996). “Unions and NAFTA’s Legislative Passage: Confrontation and Cover”. Labor Studies Journal, V21-#1, pp. 61-79.

 

■ J. Garand, C.D, Livingston, and K. Wink (1996). “Dispositions, Constituencies, and Cross-Pressures: Modelling Roll-Call Voting on the North American Free Trade Agreement”. Political Research Quarterly; V.49-#4, pp. 729-748.

 

■ J. Box-Steffenmeister, L. Arnold, and C. Zorn (1997). “The Strategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress: A Study of the North American Free Trade Agreement”. American Political Science Review; V.91-#2, pp. 324-338.

 

■ W. Thorbecke (1997). “Explaining House Voting on the North American Free Trade Agreement”. Public Choice; V.92-#3/4, pp. 231-242.

 

■ D. Holian, T. Krebs, and M. Walsh (1997). “Constituency Opinion, Ross Perot, and Roll-Call Behavior in the U.S. House: The Case of the NAFTA”. Legislative Studies Quarterly; V.22-#3, pp. 369-392.

 

■ C. Don Livingston and Kenneth Wink (1997). “The Passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement in the U.S. House of Representatives: Presidential Leadership or Presidential Luck?”. Presidential Studies Quarterly; V.27-#1, pp. 52-70.

 

■ Eric Uslaner (1998). “Let the Chits Fall Where they May? Executive and Constituency Influences on Gongressional Voting Behavior on NAFTA”. Legislative Studies Quarterly; V.23-#3, pp. 347-371.

 

■ Kamdar, Nipoli and Jorge Gonzalez (1998). “An Empirical Analysis of the U.S. Senate Vote on NAFTA and GATT”. International Advances in Economic Research; V.4-#2, pp. 105-14.

 

■ I.-B. Kang and K. Greene (1999). “A Political Economic Analysis of Congressional Voting Patterns on NAFTA”. Public Choice; V.98-#3/4, pp. 385-397.

 

■ K. Schnietz and T. Nieman (1999). “Politics Matter: The 1997 Derailment of Fast-Track Negotiating Authority”. Business and Politics, V.1-#?, pp. 233-251.

 

■ K. Bardwell (2000). “The Puzzling Decline in House Support for Free Trade: Was Fast Track a Referendum on NAFTA?”. Legislative Studies Quarterly; V.25-#4, pp. 591-610.

 

■ Gretchen Phillips and Edward Tower (2004). “Labor PAC Contributions and NAFTA Legislators: Rhetoric or Redistribution”. In M. Plummer, ed. Empirical Methods in International Trade: Essays in Honor of Mordechai Kreinin. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.


Topic IX. Political Economy of Immigration Policy

 

● Simple Models

 

■ J. Bhagwati (1985). “Structural Adjustment and International Factor Mobility: Some Issues”. in K. Jungenfelt and D. Hague, eds. Structural Adjustment in Developed Open Economies. New York: St. Martins, pp. 127-149.

 

■ Hillman, Arye L. (1994). “The Political Economy of Migration Policy”. in H. Siebert, ed. Migration: A Challenge for Europe. Tubingen: Mohr (Siebeck), pp. 263-282.

 

■ A.L Hillman and A. Weiss (1999). “Beyond International Factor Movements: Cultural Preferences, Endogenous Policies, and the Migration of People: An Overview”. in R. Faini, J. deMelo, and K. Zimmermann, eds. (1999). Migration: The Controversies and the Evidence. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 76-90.

 

■ F. Sollner (1999). “A Note on the Political Economy of Immigration”. Public Choice; V.100-#3/4, pp. 245-251.

 

■ S. Bilal, J.-M. Grether, and J. de Melo (1998). “Attitudes Towards Immigration: A Trade-Theoretic Approach”. Review of International Economics; V.11-#2, pp. 253-267.

 

■ J. Benhabib (1996). “On the Political Economy of Immigration”. European Economic Review; V.40-#9, pp. 1737-1743.

 

■ A.L. Hillman and A. Weiss (1999). “A Theory of Permissible Illegal Immigration”. European Journal of Political Economy; V.15-#4, pp. 585-604.

 

■ J.-M. Grether, J. deMelo, and T. Muller (2001). “The Political Economy of Migration in a Ricardo-Viner Model”. In S. Djajic, ed. International Migration: Trends, Policy, Impact. London: Routledge, pp. 42-68.

 

■ Nelson, Douglas and Yongsheng Xu (2001). “Political Economy of Illegal Migration”. Ms: Murphy Institute.

 

J. Atsu Amegashi (2004). “A Political Economy of Immigration Quotas”. Economics of Governance; V.5-#3, pp. 255-267.

 

■ Facchini, Giovanni and Gerald Willmann (2005). “The Political Economy of International Factor Mobility”. Journal of International Economics; V.67-#1, pp. 201-219.

 

■ Facchini, Giovanni, Anna Maria Mayda and Prachi Mishra (2007). “Do Interest Groups Affect Immigration?”. ms.

 

■ Giorgio Bellettini and Carlotta Berti Ceroni (2004). “Can Unions Hurt Workers Workers?: A Positive Analysis of Immigration Policy”. Economics and Politics, V.20-#1, pp. 106-124.

 

■ Florence Miguet (2008). “Voting About Immigration Policy: What Does the Swiss Experience Tell Us?”. European Journal of Political Economy; V.24-#3, pp. 628-641.

 

■ Gil Epstein and Shmuel Nitzan (2004). “The Struggle Over Migration Policy”. Journal of Population Economics; V.19-#4, pp. 704-723.

 

■ J.E. Campos and D. Lien (1995). “Political Instability and Illegal Immigration”. Journal of Population Economics; V.8-#1, pp. 23-33.

 

■ Epstein, Gil S.; Hillman, Arye L.; Ursprung, Heinrich W. (1999). “The King Never Emigrates”. Review of Development Economics; V.3-#2, pp. 107-121.

 

■ Epstein, Gil S.; Hillman, Arye L. (1998).”Herd Effects and Migration”. CEPR Discussion Paper, #1811.

 

● Fiscal Effects

 

■ G. Freeman (1986). “Migration and the Political Economy of the Welfare State”. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science; #485, pp. 51-63.

 

■ D. Epple and T. Romer (1991). “Mobility and Redistribution”. Journal of Political Economy; V.99-#4, pp. 828-858.

 

■ Lejour, A.M. and H. Verbon (1994). “Labour Mobility and Decision Making on Social Insurance in an Integrated Market”. Public Choice; V.79-#1/2, pp. 161-185.

 

■ I. Mazza and F. van Winden (1996). “A Political Economic Analysis of Labor Migration and Income Redistribution”. Public Choice; V.88-#2, pp. 333-363.

 

■ U. Scholten and M. Thum (1996). “Public Pensions and Immigration Policy in a Democracy”. Public Choice; V.87-#3/4, pp. 347-361.

 

■ O. Flores (1997). “The Political Economy of Immigration Quotas”. Atlantic Economic Journal; V.25-#1, pp. 50-59.

 

■ A. Haupt and W. Peters (1998). “Public Pensions and Voting on Immigration”. Public Choice; V.95-#?, pp. 403-413.

 

■ Ph. Michel, P. Pestieau, J.-P. Vidal (1998). “Labor Migration and Redistribution with Alternative Assimilation Policies: The Small Economy Case”. Regional Science and Urban Economics; V.28-#3, pp. 363-377.

 

■ H. Cremer and P. Pestieau (1998). “Social Insurance, Majority Voting and Labor Mobility”. Journal of Public Economics; V.68-#3, pp. 397-420.

 

■ A. Razin and E. Sadka (2001). “Interactions between International Migration and the Welfare State”. In S. Djajic, ed. International Migration: Trends, Policy, Impact. London: Routledge, pp. 69-88.

 

■ A. Razin, E. Sadka, and P. Swagel (2002). “Tax Burden and Migration: A Political-Economy Theory and Evidence”. Journal of Public Economics; V.85-#2, pp. 167-190.

 

■ Alexander Kemnitz (2002). “On the Political Economy of Low Skilled Immigration and the Welfare State”. International Tax and Public Finance; V.9-#4, pp. 423-434.

 

■ G. Epstein and L. Hillman (2003). “Unemployed Immigrants and Voter Sentiment in the Welfare State”. Journal of Public Economics V.87-#7/8, pp. 1641-1655.

 

■ T. Leers, L. Meijdam, and H. Verbon (2004). “Ageing, Migration and Endogenous Public Pensions”. Journal of Public Economics; V.88-#1/2, pp. 131-159.

 

■ J. Dolmas and G. Huffman (2004). “On the Political Economy of Immigration and Income Redistribution”. International Economic Review; V.45-#4, pp. 1129-1168.

 

■ J. Thum (2004). “Controlling Migration in an Open Labor Market. Public Choice; V.119-#3/4, pp. 425-443.

 

■ M. Gradstein and M. Schiff (2004). “The Political Economy of Social Exclusion, with Implications for Immigration Policy. Journal of Population Economics; V.19-#2, pp. 327-344.

 

K. Mayr (2007). Immigration and Income Redistribution: A Political Economy Analysis. Public Choice; V.131-#1/2, pp. 101-116.

 

■ A. Cukierman, Z. Hercowitz, and D. Pines (1994). “The Political Economy of Immigration”. Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Paper, #17/93.

 

■ R. Benabou and E. Ok (2001). “Social Mobility and the Demand for Redistribution: The POUM Hypothesis”. Quarterly Journal of Economics; V.116-#2, pp. 447-487.

 

● Empirics 1: Preferences

 

■ J. Citrin, B. Reingold, and D. Green (1990). “American Identity and the Politics of Ethnic Change”. Journal of Politics; V.52-#4, pp. 1124-1153.

 

■ R. de la Garza, A. Falcon, F.C. Garcia, and J. Garcia (1996). “Attitudes toward U.S. Immigration Policy: The Case of Mexicans, Puerto Ricans and Cubans”. Migration World; V.21-#2/3, pp. 13-17.

 

■ T. Espenshade and K. Hempstead (1996). “Contemporary American Attitudes Toward U.S. Immigration”. International Migration Review; V.30-#2, pp. 535-570.

 

■ G. Huber and T. Espenshade (1997). “Neo-isolationism, Balanced-Budget Conservatism, and the Fiscal Impacts of Migrants”. International Migration Review; V.31-#4, pp. 1031-1054.

 

■ J. Lapinski, P. Peltola, G. Shaw, and A. Yang (1997). “Immigrants and Immigration”. Public Opinion Quarterly; V.61-#2, pp. 356-383.

 

■ J. Citrin, D.P. Green, C. Muste and C. Wong. (1997). “Public Opinion Toward Immigration Reform: The Role of Economic Motivations,” Journal of Politics. V.59-#3, pp. 858-881.

 

■ T. Espenshade and M. Belanger (1997). “U.S. Public Perceptions and Reactions to Mexican Migration”. in F. Bean, et al., eds. At The Crossroads: Mexican Migration and U.S. Policy. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield.

 

■ T. Espenshade and M. Belanger (1998). “Immigration and Public Opinion”. In M. Suárez-Orozco, ed. Crossings: Mexican Immigration in Interdisciplinary Perspectives. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, pp. 365-403.

 

■ M. Hood and I. Morris (1997). “Amigo or Enemigo?: Context, Attitudes and Anglo Public Opinion Toward Immigration”. Social Science Quarterly; V.78-#2, pp. 309-323.

 

■ N. Binder, J. Polinard, and R. Wrinkle (1997). “Mexican-American and Anglo Attitudes Toward Immigration Reform: A View from the Border”. Social Science Quarterly; V.78-#2, pp. 324-337.

 

■ S. Cummings and T. Lambert (1997). “Anti-Hispanic and Anti-Asian Sentiments Among African-Americans”. Social Science Quarterly; V.78-#2, pp. 338-353.

 

■ J. Lapinski, P. Peltola, and A. Yang (1997). “The Polls, Trends: Immigrants and Immigration”. Public Opinion Quarterly; V.61-#2, pp. 356-393.

 

■ K. Lee (1998). Huddled Masses, Muddled Laws: Why Contemporary Immigration Policy Fails to Reflect Public Opinion. Westport: Praeger.

 

■ J. Diamond (1998). “African-American Attitudes towards United States Immigration Policy”. International Migration Review; V.32-#2, pp. 451-470.

 

■ R. de la Garza (1997). “Interests, not Passions: Mexican-American Attitudes toward Mexico, Immigraion from Mexico, and Other Issues Shaping U.S.-Mexico Relations”. International Migration Review; V.32-#2, pp. 401-422.

 

■ R. Simon and J. Lynch (1999). “A Comparative Assessment of Public Opinion Toward Immigrants and Immigration Politics”. International Migration Review; V.33-#2, pp. 455-467.

 

■ Burns, Peter and James Gimpel (2000). “Economic Insecurity, Prejudicial Stereotypes, and Public Opinion on Immigration Policy”. Political Science Quarterly; V.115-#2, pp. 201-225.

 

■ J. Fetzer (2000). Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the United States, France, and Germany. Cambridge: CUP.

 

■ K. Scheve and M. Slaughter (2001). “Labor Market Competition and Individual Preferences over Immigration Policy”. Review of Economics and Statistics; V.83-#1, pp. 133-145.

 

■ Gordon Hanson, Kenneth Scheve, and Matthew Slaughter (2007). “Public Finance and Individual Preferences over Globalization Strategies”. Economics & Politics; V.19-#1, pp. 1-33.

 

■ R.C. Chandler and Y.-m. Tsai (2001). “Social Factors Influencing Immigration Attitudes” An Analysis of Data from the General Social Survey”. Social Science Journal; V.38-#?, pp. 177-188.

 

I. Gang, F. Rivera-Batiz and M. Yun (2002). “Economic Strain, Ethnic Concentration and Attitudes Towards Foreigners in the European Union”. IZA Discussion Paper, #578.

 

■K. O'Rourke and R. Sinnott (2006). The Determinants of Individual Attitudes Toward Immigration”. European Journal of Political Economy; V.27-#4, pp. 838-861.

 

■ A.M. Mayda (2006). “Who is Against Immigration? A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward Immigrants”. Review of Economics and Statistics; V.88-#3, pp. 510-530.

 

■ A.M. Mayda (2008). “Why are People More Pro-Trade than Pro-Migration?”. Economics Letters; forthcoming.

 

■ Giovanni Facchini and Anna Maria Mayda (2007). From Individual Attitudes toward Migrants to Migration Policy Outcomes: Theory and Evidence”. Economic Policy; forthcoming.

 

■ Giovanni Facchini and Anna Maria Mayda (2007). Individual Attitudes toward Immigrants: Welfare State Determinants across Countries”. Review of Economics and Statistics; forthcoming.

 

■Jens Hainmueller and Michael Hiscox (2005). Educated Preferences: Explaining Individual Attitudes Toward Immigration in Europe. Ms: Harvard University

 

● Empirics 2: The Prop. 187 Referendum

 

■ C. Tolbert and R. Hero (1996). “Race/Ethnicity and Direct Democracy: An Analysis of California’s Illegal Immigration Initiative”. Journal of Politics; V.58-#3, pp. 806-818.

 

■ C. Tolbert and R. Hero (1996). “A Racial/Ethnic Diversity Interpretation of Politics and Policy in the States of the US”. American Journal of Political Science; V.40-#3, pp. 851-871.

 

■ K. MacDonald and B. Cain (1997). “Nativism, Partisanship and Immigration: An Analysis of Prop. 187". in M. Preston, B. Cain, and S. Bass, eds. Racial and Ethnic Politics in California. Berkeley: Institute for Governmental Studies.

 

■ R.M. Alvarez and T. Butterfield (2000). “The Resurgence of Nativism in California? The Case of Prop. 187 and Illegal Immigration”. Social Science Quarterly, V.81-#1, pp. 167-179.

 

■ L. Newton (2000). “Why Some Latinos Supported Proposition 187: Testing Economic Threat and Cultural Identity Hypotheses”. Social Science Quarterly, V.81-#1, pp. 180-193.

 

■ M. Hood and I. Morris (2000). “Brother, Can You Spare a Dime? Racial/Ethnic Context and the Anglo Vote on Proposition 187". Social Science Quarterly, V.81-#1, pp. 194-206.

 

■ Y.-T. Lee, V. Ottai, and I. Hussain (2001). “Attitudes toward 'Illegal' Immigration into the United States: California Proposition 187”. Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences; V.23-#4, pp. 430-443.

 

● Empirics 3: Enforcement

 

■ W. Shughart, R. Tollison, and M. Kimenyi (1986). “The Political Economy of Immigration Restrictions”. Yale Journal of Regulation; V.4-#?, pp. 79-97.

 

■ A. Dávila, J. Pagán, and M. Grau (1999). “Immigration Reform, the INS, and the Distribution of Interior and Border Enforcement Resources”. Public Choice; V.99-#3/4, pp. 327-345.

 

■ G. Hanson and A. Spilimbergo (2001). “Political Economy, Sectoral Shocks, and Border Enforcement”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.34-#3, pp. 612-638.

 

■ T. Dunn (1996). The Militarization of the U.S.-Mexico Border, 1978-1992: Low-Intensity Conflict Comes Home. Austin: Univerity of Texas Press.

 

■ P. Andreas (2000). Border Games: Policing the U.S.-Mexico Divide. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.


Topic X. Political Economy of Policy Reform

 

● Theory

 

►R. Fernandez and D. Rodrik (1991). “Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty”. American Economic Review; V.81-#5, pp. 1146-1155.

 

■ Sanjay Jain and Sharun Mukand (2003). “Redistributive Promises and the Adoption of Economic Reform”. American Economic Review, V.93-#1, pp. 256-264.

 

■ Antonio Ciccone (2004). “Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty–Comment”. American Economic Review; V.94-#3, pp. 785-795.

 

■ Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard Roland (1992). “Economic Reform and Dynamic Political Constraints”. Review of Economic Studies; V.59-#4, pp. 703-730.

 

►A. Alessina and A. Drazen (1991). “Why are Stabilizations Delayed?”. American Economic Review; V.81-#5, pp. 1170-1188.

 

■ Raul Labán and Federico Sturzenegger (1994). “Distributional Conflict, Financial Adaptation and Delayed Stabilization”. Economics & Politics; V.6-#3, pp. 257-276.

 

►Douglas Nelson (1999). “Problems in the Political Economy of Trade Policy Reform”. Journal of International Trade and Economic Development, 1999, V.8-#1, pp. 3-26.

 

● Application/Empirics

 

■ Joan Nelson (1984). “The Political Economy of Stabilization: Commitment, Capacity, and Public Response”. World Development; V.12-#10, pp. 983-1006.

 

►Stephan Haggard and Steven Webb (1993). “What Do We Know about the Political Economy of Economic Reform”. World Bank Research Observer; V.8-#2, pp. 143-168.

 

■ Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards (1990). “Macroeconomic Populism”. Journal of Development Economics; V.32-#2, pp. 247-277.

 

■ Jeffrey Sachs (1990). “Social Conflict and Populist Policies in Latin America”. in R. Brunetta and C. Dell'Aringa, eds. Labour Relations and Economic Performance. New York: NYU Press. in pp. 137-169.

 

■ Karen Remmer (1991). “The Political Impact of Economic Crisis in Latin America in the 1980s”. American Political Science Review; V.85-#3, pp. 777-800.

 

■ Nouriel Roubini (1991). “Economic and Political Determinants of Budget Deficits in Developing Countries”. Journal of International Money and Finance, V.10-supplement, pp. 49-72.

 

■ Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1991). “Explaining Fiscal Policies and Inflation in Developing Countries”. Journal of International Money and Finance; V.10-Supplement, pp. 16-48.

 

►Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1994). “Political Instability, Political Weakness and Inflation: an Empirical Analysis”. In C. Sims, ed. Advances in Econometrics, Sixth World Congress--V.II. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 355-376.

 

■ Sebastian Edwards (1994). “The Political Economy of Inflation and Stabilization in Developing Countries”. Economic Development and Cultural Change; V.42-#2, pp. 235-266.

 

■ Andrés Velasco (1994). “The State and Economic Policy: Chile 1952-1992". in B. Bosworth, R. Dornbusch, and R. Laban, eds. The Chilean Economy: Policy Lessons and Challenges. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 379-429.

 

■ Aaron Tornell (1995). “Are Economic Crises Necessary for Trade Liberalization and Economic Reform?: The Mexican Experience”. in R. Dornbusch and S. Edwards,eds. Reform, Recovery and Growth: Latin America and the Middle East. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 53-73.

 

■ Barbara Geddes (1995). “The Politics of Economic Liberalization”. Latin American Research Review; V.30-#2, pp. 195-214.

 

■ Javier Corrales (1997/98). “Do Economic Crises Contribute to Economic Reforms? Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990s”. Political Science Quarterly; V.112-#4, pp. 617-644.

 

►Allan Drazen and William Easterly (2001). “Do Crises Induce Reform? Simple Empirical Tests of the Conventional Wisdom”. Economics & Politics; V.13-#2, pp. 129-157.


Topic XI. Industry-Level Policy: Anti-Dumping Policy

 

● Theory: Some Economics of Administered Protection

 

■ Bruce Blonigen and Thomas Prusa (2003). “Antidumping”. In E. Kwan Choi and James Harrigan, eds. Handbook of International Trade. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 251-284.

 

■ Klaus Stegemann (1985). “Antidumping Policy and the Consumer”. Journal of World Trade Law; V.19-#5, pp. 466-484.

 

■ Michael Webb (1987). “Anti-Dumping Laws, Production Location and Prices”. Journal of International Economics; V.22-#3/4, pp. 363-368.

 

■ George Yarrow (1987). “Economic Aspects of Antidumping Policies”. Oxford Review of Economic Policy; V.3-#1, pp. 66-79.

 

■ Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1989). “Dumping, Anti-dumping, and Emergency Protection”. Journal of World Trade; V.23-#1, pp. 27-44.

 

■ Michael Leidy and Bernard Hoekman (1990). “Production Effects of Price- and Cost- Based Anti-dumping Laws Under Flexible Exchange Rates”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.23-#4, pp. 873-895.

 

■ Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1992). “The Effect of Domestic Antidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopoly”. Journal of International Economics; V.32-#3/4, pp. 265-287.

 

■ Joseph Francois (1992). “Countervailing the Effects of Subsidies: An Economic Analysis”. Journal of World Trade; V.26-#1, pp. 5-13.

 

■ Robert Willig (1998). “Economic Effects of Antidumping Policy”. in R. Lawrence ed. Brookings Trade Forum 1998. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 57-79.

 

■ Avinash Dixit (1988). “Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties Under Oligopoly”. European Economic Review; V.32-#1, pp. 55-68.

 

■ Barbara Spencer (1988). “Countervailing Duty Laws and Subsidies to Imperfectly Competitive Industries”. in Baldwin, et al., eds. Issues in US-EC Trade Relations. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER; pp. 313-334.

 

■ Barbara Spencer (1988). “Capital Subsidies and Countervailing Duties in Oligopolistic Industries”. Journal of International Economics; V.25-#1/2, pp. 45-69.

 

■ David Collie (1991). “Export Subsidies and Countervailing Tariffs”. Journal of International Economics; V.31-#3/4, pp. 309-324.

 

■ David Collie (1992). “Export Subsidies, Entry Deterrence and Countervailing Tariffs”. Manchester School; V.60-#2, pp. 136-151.

 

■ Michael Webb (1992). “The Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Laws”. Economic Inquiry; V.30-#3, pp. 437-448.

 

■ Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1991). “Strategic Use of Antidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusion”. ms: Stanford University.

 

■ James Reitzes (1993). “Antidumping Policy”. International Economic Review; V.34-#4, pp. 745-763.

 

■ James Cassing (1994). “Strategic Responses to Antidumping Laws and Legal Interpretations: Producing for Export Markets using Lawyers and Other Factors of Production”. Journal of Economic Integration; V.9-#2, pp. 156-171.

 

■ Thomas Prusa (1994). “Pricing Behavior in the Presence of Antidumping Laws”. Journal of Economic Integration; V.9-#2, pp. 260-289.

 

■ James Hartigan (1994). “Dumping and Signaling”. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization; V.23-#?, pp. 69-81.

 

■ James Hartigan (1995). “Collusive Aspects of Cost Revelation Through Antidumping Complaints”. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics; V.151-#3, pp. 478-489.

 

■ James Hartigan (1996). “Predatory Dumping”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.29-#1, pp. 228-239.

 

■ Pedro Barros and Xavier Martinez-Giralt (1999). “On the Effects of Antidumping Legislation”. Regional Science and Urban Economics; V.29-#1, pp. 53-72.

 

■ Reinhilde Veugelers and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999). “European Anti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National and International Collusion”. European Economic Review; V.43-#1, pp. 1-28.

 

■ Hylke Vandenbussche and Xavier Wauthy (2001). “Inflicting Injury through Product Quality: How European Antidumping Policy Disadvantages European Producers”. European Journal Of Political Economy; V.17-#1, pp. 101-116.

 

■ Wilfried Pauwels, Hylke Vandenbussche; and Marcel Weverbergh (2001). “Strategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Duties”. International Journal of the Economics of Business, V.8-#1, pp. 75-99.

 

● Theory: Political Economy of Administered Protection

 

H. Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1992). “Institutional Structure in the Political Economy of Protection: Legislated versus Administered Protection”. Economics & Politics; V.4-#1, pp. 61-77.

 

■ J. Michael Finger (1992). “Dumping and Antidumping: The Rhetoric and Reality of Protection in Industrial Countries”. World Bank Research Observer; V.7-#2, pp. 121-143

 

■ Michael Moore (1992). “Bureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a Repeated Game”. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics; V.148-#4, pp. 607-627.

 

■ Bernard Hoekman and Michael Leidy (1992). “Cascading Contingent Protection”. European Economic Review; V.36-#4, pp. 883-892.

 

■ Robert Feinberg and Seth Kaplan (1993). “Fishing Downstream: The Political Economy of Effective Administered Protection”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.26-#1, pp. 150-158.

 

■ Simon Anderson, Nicolas Schmitt, and J.-J. Thisse (1995). “Who Benefits from Antidumping Legislation?”. Journal of International Economics; V.38-#3/4, pp. 321-337.

 

■ David Baron (1997). “Integrated Strategy and International Trade Disputes: The Kodak-Fujifilm Case”. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy; V.6-#2, pp. 291-346.

 

■ Arvind Panagariya and Poonam Gupta (1998). “Anti-Dumping versus Price Negotiation”. World Economy; V.21-#8, pp. 1003-1019.

 

■ Wolfgang Mayer (1999). “The Political Economy of Administering Trade Laws”. in J. Piggott and A. Woodland, eds. International Trade Policy and the Pacific Rim. London: Macmillan, pp. 245-262.

 

■ Bruce Blonigen and Chad Bown (2003). “Antidumping and Retaliation Threats”. Journal of International Economics; V.60-#2, pp. 249-273.

 

● Empirics

 

■ J. Michael Finger, H.Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982). “The Political Economy of Administered Protection”. American Economic Review; V.72-#3, pp. 452-466.

 

Robert Baldwin (1985). “The International Trade Commission”. Chapter 3 of The Political Economy of U.S. Import Policy. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 79-114.

 

■ Robert Baldwin and Michael Moore (1992). “Political Aspects of the Administration of the Trade Remedy Law”. in R. Boltuck and R. Litan, eds. Down in the Dumps: Administration of the Unfair Trade Laws. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 253-280.

 

■ Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Lenway (1989). “Interests or Institutions: An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC Relations”. International Studies Quarterly; V.33-#3, pp. 303-327.

 

■ Wendy Hansen (1990). “The International Trade Commission and the Politics of Protection”. American Political Science Review; V.84-#1, pp. 21-46.

 

■ Robert Baldwin and J. Steagall (1991). “An Analysis of Factors Influencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping, Countervailing Duty and Safeguards Cases”. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; V.130-#2, pp. 290-307.

 

■ Michael Moore (1992). “Rules or Politics? An Empirical Analysis of Antidumping Decisions”. Economic Inquiry; V.30-#3, pp. 449-466.

 

■ Thomas Prusa (1991). “The Selection of Antidumping Cases for ITC Determination”. in R. Baldwin, ed. Empirical Studies of Commercial Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 47-71.

 

■ Wendy Hansen and Thomas Prusa (1997). “The Economics and Politics of Trade Policy: An Empirical Analysis of ITC Decision Making”. Review of International Economics; V.5-#2, pp. 230-245.

 

■ J. Michael Finger (1981). “The Industry-Country Incidence of Less-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Trade”. Quarterly Review of Economics and Business; V.21-#2, pp. 260-279.

 

■ Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1994). “Measuring Industry-specific Protection: Antidumping in the US”. Brookings Papers on Economic Analysis; 1994: Microeconomics, pp. 51-118. [comments]

 

■ Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1996). “Differences in Uses and Effects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sources”. in A. Krueger, ed. The Political Economy of American Trade Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 385-415.

 

■ Robert Baldwin (1981). “US Political Pressures Against Adjustment to Greater Imports”. in W. Hong and L. Krause, eds. Trade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of the Pacific Basin. Seoul: Korea Development Institute.

 

■ Robert Baldwin (1985). “Decision Making at the Presidential Level”. Chapter 4 of The Political Economy of U.S. Import Policy. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 115-174. [especially 115-133.]

 

■ Frederick Boadu, Fred Ruppel and A. Angel (1992). “An Empirical Model of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in Trade Restrictions”. European Journal of Political Economy; V.8-#?, pp. 281-293.

 

■ Brian Hindley and Patrick Messerlin (1996). Antidumping Industrial Policy: Legalized Protectionism in the WTO and What To Do About It. Washington, D.C.: AEI Press.

 

■ Patrick Messerlin (1990). “The EC Antidumping Regulations: A First Economic Appraisal”. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; V.126-#3, pp. 562-587.

 

■ P.K. Matthew Tharakan (1991). “The Political Economy of Antidumping Undertakings in the European Communities”. European Economic Review; V.35-#6, pp. 1341-1359.

 

■ P.K. Matthew Tharakan and Jean Waelbroeck (1994). “Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and in the US: An Experiment in Comparative Political Economy”. European Economic Review; V.38-#1, pp. 171-193.

 

■ Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schuknecht (1996). “Antidumping Policy in the European Community: Political Discretion or Technical Determination”. Economics & Politics; V.8-#2, pp. 111-131.

 

■ P.K. Mathew Tharakan and Birgit Kerstens (1998). “Contingent Protection and International Trade: An Analysis of the Antidumping Policy of the European Union”. In P.K.M. Tharakan and D. Van Den Bulcke, eds. International Trade, Foreign Direct Investment and the Economic Environment. New York: St. Martin’s Press, Pp. 41-58.

 

■ Donald Feaver (1997). “Forces Affecting the Administration of Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Policy in Australia: Statutory Failure or Regulatory Capture?”. Australian Journal of Public Administration; V.56-#4, pp. 67-77.

 

■ Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1998). “Unlocking Australia’s Contingent Protection Black Box”. Economic Record; V.74-#224, pp. 62-73.

 

■ Donald Feaver and Kenneth Wilson (1999). “Unravelling Causation: An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Protection in Australia”. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; V.135-#4, pp. 692-708.

 

■ Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (2001). “Trade Policy in Transition? The Political Economy of Antidumping in Japan”. Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy; V.6-#1, pp. 22-46.

 

■ Michael Knetter and Thomas Prusa (2000). “Macroeconomic Factors and Antidumping Filings: Evidence from Four Countries”. Journal of International Economics; V.61-#1, pp. 1-17.


Topic XII. Industry Level Policy: Competition Policy

 

● Theory

 

■ Antoine Auquier and Richard Caves (1979), “Monopolistic Export Industries, Trade Taxes, and Optimal Competition Policy”, Economic Journal; V.89-#355; pp. 559-581.

 

■ Homi Katrak (1980). “Multinational Monopolies and Monopoly Regulation”. Oxford Economic Papers; V.32-#3, pp. 453-466.

 

■ Shabtai Donnenfeld (1982). “Domestic Regulation and the Preservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Markets”. Southern Economic Journal; V.49-#4, pp. 954-965.

 

■ I. Dierckx, C. Matutes and Damien Neven (1991). “Cost Differences and Survival in Declining Industries: A Case for ‘Picking Winners’?”. European Economic Review; V.35-#8, pp. 1507-1528.

 

■ Sajal Lahiri and Yoshiyasu Ono (1994). “Industrial Policy and National Welfare in the Presence of Monopoly”. Japan and the World Economy; v.6-#1, pp. 61-73.

 

■ Janusz Ordover, Alan Sykes and Robert Willig (1983). “Unfair International Trade Practices”. International Law and Politics; V.15-#? , pp. 323-337.

 

■ Janusz Ordover Robert Willig (1986). “Perspectives on Mergers and World Competition”. In Ronald Grieson, ed. Antitrust and Regulation. Lexington: Lexington Books, pp. 201-218.

 

■ Pedro Barros and Luis Cabral (1994). “Merger Policy in Open Economies”. European Economic Review; V.38-#5, pp. 1041-1055.

 

■ Simon Cowan (1989). “Trade and Competition Policies for Oligopolies”. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; V.125-#3, pp. 464-483.

 

■ Ngo Van Long and Neil Vousden (1995). “The Effects of Trade Liberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergers”. Review of International Economics; V.3-#2, pp. 141-155.

 

■ Christopher Bliss (1996). “Trade and Competition Control”. in J. Bhagwati and R. Hudec, eds. Fair Trade and Harmonization. V.1: Economic Analysis. Cambridge: MIT, pp. 313-328.

 

■ James Levinsohn (1996). “Competition Policy and International Trade”. in J. Bhagwati and R. Hudec, eds. Fair Trade and Harmonization. V.1: Economic Analysis. Cambridge: MIT, pp. 329-356.

 

■ Massimo Motta and Fabrizio Onida (1996). “Trade Policy and Competition Policy”. Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia; V.56-#1/2, pp. 67-97.

 

■ Paul Jensen and Kala Krishna (1996). “Entry Policy in an Open Economy”. Indian Economic Review; V.31-#1, pp. 41-56.

 

■ Keith Head and J. Ries (1997). “International Mergers and Welfare under Decentralized Competition Policy”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.30-#4B, pp. 1104-1123.

 

■ Damien Neven and Paul Seabright (1997). “Trade Liberalization and the Coordination of Competition Policy”. in L. Waverman, W. Comanor, and A. Goto, eds. Competition Policy in the Global Economy: Modalities for Cooperation. London: Routledge, pp. 381-406.

 

■ Henrik Horn and James Levionsohn (2001). “Merger Policies and Trade Liberalization”. Economic Journal, V.111-#470, pp. 244-276.

 

■ P.J. Lloyd (1998). “Globalisation and Competition Policies”. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; V.134-#2, pp. 161-185.

 

■ Rod Falvey (1998). “Mergers in Open Economies”. World Economy; V.21-#8, pp. 1061-1076.

 

■ Martin Richardson (1998). “Foreign Entry and Domestic Welfare”. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; V.134-#2, pp. 250-262.

 

■ Martin Richardson (1999). “Trade and Competition Policies: concordia discors?”. Oxford Economic Papers; V.51-#4, pp. 649-664.

 

■ Michihiro Ohyama (1999). “Market, Trade, and Welfare in General Equilibrium”. Japanese Economic Review; V.50-#1, pp. 1-24.

 

■ Theresa Greaney (1999). “Strategic Trade and Competition Policies to Assist Distressed Industries”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.32-#3, pp. 767-784.

 

■ James Reitzes and Oliver Grawe (1999). “Entry Policy and Entry Subsidies”. Review of International Economics; V.7-#4, pp. 732-743.

 

■ Hylke Vandenbussche (2000). “Trade Policy versus Competition Policy: Complements or Substitutes”. De Economist, V.148-#5, pp. 625-642.

 

■ Makoto Yano (2001). “Trade Imbalance and Domestic Market Competition Policy”. International Economic Review; V.42-#3, pp. 729-750.

 

■ Rodney D. Ludema (2001), “Market Collusion and the Politics of Protection”. European Journal of Political Economy; V.17-#4, pp. 817-833.

 

■ Stephen F. Hamilton and Kyle Stiegert (2001). “Vertical Coordination, Antitrust Law, and International Trade”. Journal of Law and Economics; V.43-#1, pp. 143-156.

 

■ Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001). “External effects of domestic regulations: comparing internal and international barriers to trade”. International Review of Law and Economics; V.21-#2, pp. 135-155.

 

■ Vivek Ghosal (2002). “Potential Foreign Competition in U.S. Manufacturing”. International Journal of Industrial Organization; V.20-#10, pp. 1461-1489.

 

Legal/Institutional Analysis of Trade and Competition Policy

 

■ H. Applebaum and D. Grace (1987). “US Antitrust Law and Antidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979". Antitrust Law Journal; V.56-#2, pp. 497-518.

 

■ Kenneth Elzinga (1987). “Antitrust Policy and Trade Policy: An Economist's Perspective”. Antitrust Law Journal; V.56-#?,

 

■ Joel Davidow (1980). “Competition, Trade and the Antitrust Division”. Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business; V.?-#?, pp.

 

■ Diane Wood (1989). “‘Unfair’ Trade Injury: A Competition-Based Approach”. Stanford Law Review; V.41-#?, pp.

 

■ Joel Davidow (1991). “The Relationship between Anti-Trust Laws and Trade Laws in the US”. World Economy; V.14-#1, pp. 37-52.

 

■ Robert Feinberg (1991). “Antitrust Policy and International Trade Liberalization”. World Competition; V.14-#4, pp. 13-19.

 

■ Ronald Cass (1993). “Price Discrimination and Predation Analysis in Antitrust and International Trade: A Comment”. University of Cincinnati Law Review; V.61-#3, pp. 877-888.

 

■ Kenneth Kelly (1993). “Empirical Analysis for Antitrust and International Trade Law”. University of Cincinnati Law Review; V.61-#3, pp. 889-902.

 

■ Richard Boltuck and Seth Kaplan (1993). “Conflicting Entitlements: Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation be Reconociled”. University of Cincinnati Law Review; V.61-#?, pp. 903-917.

 

■ Morris Morkre and Kenneth Kelly (1993). “Perspectives on the Effects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industries”. University of Cincinnati Law Review; V.61-#3, pp. 919-944.

 

■ Frederic M. Scherer (1994). Competition Policies for an Integrated World Economy. Washington, DC: Brookings.

 

■ Patrick Messerlin (1994). “Should Antidumping Rules Be Replaced by National or International Competition Rules?”. Aussenwirtschaft; V.49-#2/3, pp. 351-374.

 

■ Patrick Messerlin (1996). “Competition Policy and Antidumping Reform: An Exercise in Transition”. In Jeffrey Schott, ed. The World Trading System: Challenges Ahead. Washington, DC: IIE, pp. 219-246.

 

■ Peter Lloyd and Gary Sampson (1995). “Competition and Trade Policy: Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Round”. World Economy; V.18-#5, pp. 681-705.

 

■ Alexis Jacquemin (1995). “Towards an Internationalisation of Competition Policy?”. World Economy, V.18-#6, pp. 781-789.

 

■ Pierre Buigues, Alexis Jacquemin, and André Sapir, eds. (1995). European policies on competition, trade and industry: Conflict and complementarities. Brookfield, Vt.: Elgar.

 

■ Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1994). “Competition, Competition Policy and the GATT”. World Economy; V.17-#2, pp. 121-150.

 

■ Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1996). “Dumping, Antidumping and Antitrust”. Journal of World Trade; V.30-#?, pp. 27-52.

 

■ Michael Trebilcock (1996). “Competition Policy and Trade Policy–Mediating the Interface”. Journal of World Trade; V.30-#4, pp. 71-105.

 

■ Edward M. Graham (1996). Global Corporations and National Governments. Washington, DC: Brookings.

 

■ American Bar Association (1996). “Symposium: The Role of Foreign Competition in U.S. Merger Enforcement”. Antitrust Law Journal; V.65-#1.

 

■ Bernard Hoekman (1997). “Competition Policy and the Global Trading System”. World Economy; V.20-#4, pp. 383-406.

 

■ J. David Richardson and Edward M. Graham (1997). Global Competition Policies: An Agenda. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.

 

■ J. David Richardson and Edward M. Graham, eds. (1997). Global Competition Policies. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.

 

■ Alan Sykes (1998). “Antidumping and Antitrust: What Problems Does Each Address?”. in R. Lawrence ed. Brookings Trade Forum 1998. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 1-43.

 

■ Alan Sykes (1999). “Regulatory Protectionism and the Law of International Trade”. University of Chicago Law Review; V.66-#1, pp. 1-46.

 

■ Merit Janow (1998). “Unilateral and Bilateral Approaches to Competition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experience”. in R. Lawrence ed. Brookings Trade Forum 1998. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 253-285.

 

■ J. David Richardson (1998). “Multilateralizing Conventions”. in R. Lawrence ed. Brookings Trade Forum 1998. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 335-374.

 

■ I.M. Destler (1998). “U.S. Approach to International Competition Policy”. in R. Lawrence ed. Brookings Trade Forum 1998. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 395-418.

 

■ P.K. Matthew Tharakan and Peter Lloyd, eds. “Special Issue: Competition Policy in a Changing Economic Environment”. World Economy, V.21-#8.

 

■ Alan Sykes (1999). “The (Limited) Role of Regulatory Harmonization in International Goods and Services Markets”. Journal of International Economic Law; V.2-#1, pp. 49-70.

 

■ Joel Davidow (1999). “Antitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual or Potential Enforcement of Trade Laws”. Journal of International Economic Law; V.2-#4, pp. 681-93.

 

■ Alan Sykes (2000). “Regulatory Competition or Regulatory Harmonization? A Silly Question?”. Journal of International Economic Law; V.3-#2, pp. 257-264.

 

■ Daniel Tarullo (2000). “Norms and Institutions in Global Competition Policy”. American Journal of International Law; V.94-#3, pp. 478-504.

 

■ Peter Lloyd and Kerrin Vautier (2001). “Regional Approaches to Cross-border Competition Policies”. In S. Lahiri, ed. Regionalism and Globalization: Theory and Practice. London: Routledge, pp. 282-304.


Final Examination: Distributed , Due .