ECONOMICS 756: INTERNATIONAL TRADE, II


Professor: Douglas Nelson
Office: 108 Tilton (Murphy Institute)
Phone: 865-5317



This course has two fundamental goals:


1) To develop an understanding of the intuition, theory and method underlying research on trade policy; and


2) To develop an overall picture of the body of research on international trade policy.


International Trade I (Econ 755) emphasized the development of general equilibrium tools for the analysis of international trade and their application to positive problems of the economics of international trade. The emphasis of that course was primarily theoretical. This semester we examine several important areas of current research on international trade: attempts to evaluate the aggregate welfare effects of international trade policy; theoretical and empirical work evaluating the legal structures regulating international trade; theoretical and empirical work on the relationship between international trade and labor market outcomes; and, time permitting, theoretical and empirical work on the political economy of trade policy.


Developments in research on trade policy have been intimately related to the development of virtually every branch of economics. Since we cannot hope to cover all the interesting and important branches of this important field, we will pursue the two goals with a dual strategy. We will cover a small number of topics in considerable depth, emphasizing the link (or lack thereof) between theory and empirical content in contemporary research on the topic. Every week the seminar will study (approximately) three papers in detail. Those papers will be presented and discussed by the members of the seminar. In addition to our detailed consideration of these topics, every student will be expected to prepare a research paper on some aspect of trade policy, broadly construed.


While we will not have a textbook, many of the topics we will cover are discussed in more or less detail in your text from last semester:


J. Bhagwati, A. Panagariya, and T.N. Srinivasan (1998). Lectures on International Trade. Cambridge: MIT Press [BPS].


It is assumed that you have had graduate microeconomics (ECON 611) and international trade I (ECON 755). Standard sources you might want to keep handy are:


H. Varian (1984). Microeconomic Analysis. New York: Norton.


A. Dixit and V. Norman (1980). Theory of International Trade. Cambridge: Nisbet/Cambridge University Press. [Compact and clear. A masterly exposition of mainline trade theory. Useful to know also for its notation, which has become quite standard in trade theory.] (Dixit/Norman)


K.Y. Wong (1995). International Trade in Goods and Factor Mobility. Cambridge: MIT Press. [An advanced text, similar coverage to BPS, less emphasis on intuition, more emphasis on technique, and a distinctive emphasis on factor mobility] (Wong)


A. Woodland (1982). International Trade and Resource Allocation. Amsterdam: North Holland. [My favorite graduate-level trade text. Builds all tools from scratch, with an emphasis on duality methods (like Dixit/Norman and Wong), with excellent exercises after each chapter. Unfortunately, now out of print.) [Woodland]


Additional texts on trade policy to which we will have occasional recourse are:


W.M. Corden (1997). Trade Policy and Economic Welfare. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [There is no better presentation of the general issues and approaches to modern research on trade policy] (Corden)

 

D. Greenaway (1983). International Trade Policy: From Tariffs to the New Protectionism. London: Macmillan. [Very nice treatment of many of the topics covered in this course. Particularly strong on applied analysis of policy.]


N. Vousden (1990). The Economics of Trade Protection. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [Especially useful for its presentation of current issues in trade policy research at a moderate technical level]

 

H. Bowen, A. Hollander, and J.-M. Viaene (1998). Applied International Trade Analysis. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. [At about the same level as BPS, but with a stronger emphasis on applied work.] (BHV)


J. Bhagwati, ed. (1987). International Trade: Selected Readings. Cambridge: MIT Press. [A useful collection of classic and standard readings on international trade] (Bhagwati)


E. Helpman and P. Krugman (1985). Market Structure and Foreign Trade. Cambridge: MIT Press. [An excellent, synthetic treatment of theoretical research on the positive aspects of international trade under imperfect competition by two of the pioneers in the field.] (H&K, 1985)


E. Helpman and P. Krugman (1989). Trade Policy and Market Structure. Cambridge: MIT Press. [This book covers the normative theory associated with models of the sort developed in the previous book. While an easier read, this is also a considerably less satisfactory work.] (H&K, 1989)


G. Grossman, ed. (1992). Imperfect Competition and International Trade. Cambridge: MIT Press. [Excellent complement to the text treatments in the two Helpman/Krugman volumes.] (Grossman)


This course spends some time on the law and economics of trade regulation. The industry standard treatments of the legal issues are:

 

J. Jackson (1997). The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations. Cambridge: MIT Press.

 

J. Jackson, W. Davey, and A. Sykes (1995). Legal Problems of International Economic Relations. 3d Edition. St. Paul: West.


Some fairly extensive bibliographies of literatures covering many of the same topics that we will cover this term can be found at http://www.tulane.edu/~dnelson/BIBS/Bibs.htm. These are easiest to use in WordPerfect format, because you can use the outline feature.


Your performance in the course will be evaluated on the basis of: 1) active participation in the seminar (paper presentation and discussion); and 2) the preparation of a research paper.


1) With respect to seminar participation: I will expect all participants to have read (at least) all the assigned material (text and papers, whether they will be discussed or not) by the first class in which they are assigned. This is a necessary condition for intelligent participation and, thus, for a passing grade. A grade of "A" for this course requires a more active approach to the material involving discussion past the immediate content of the papers being presented. To that end, I strongly recommend reading beyond the required material on a regular basis.


2) With respect to the paper: To insure that everyone is on track for the paper I require a paper proposal to be submitted no later than the first class session in week 4. This must be typed and not more than two pages long. The paper itself is due in class on the last regularly scheduled class period. The paper must be original work, on a trade policy topic (though not necessarily on a topic we will cover in class). Plagiarism will not be tolerated. If you have any doubt about what plagiarism is, please see me before turning in your paper. There will be no second chances with respect to plagiarism. For those of you that are considering writing a dissertation in trade (or a field related to trade) I would strongly urge you to use this opportunity to identify the relevant theory and data some aspect of that work.



Short Syllabus: Economics 756


Topic I: Welfare Economics of International Trade


Week1: Basic Economics of Gains from Trade


Week 2: Basic Applied Welfare Theory for Trade


Week 3: Implementing Trade Policy Analysis in Partial and General Equilibrium


Week 4: VERs and the Multi-Fibre Arrangement


Week 5: Distortions and Policy Targeting


Topic II: Law and Economics of Trade Regulation


Week 6: Administered Protection,1: Law and Economics of the Escape Clause


Week 7: Administered Protection, 2: Law and Economics of Title VII


Week 8: Administered Protection, 3: Some Analytics of Title VII


Week 9: Trade and Competition Policy, 1: Legal/Institutional Analysis


Week 10: Trade and Competition Policy, 2: Some Analytics


Topic III: Liberalization, Labor Markets and Adjustment Assistance


Week 11: Analytics of Trade and Labor Markets: The Stolper-Samuelson Theorem


Week 12: Empirics of Trade and Labor Markets, 1: Is there a Link between Trade and Wages?


Week 13: Empirics of Trade and Labor Markets, 2: Adjusting to International Trade


Week 14: Law and Economics of Adjustment Assistance




Syllabus and Reading List: Econ 756


Topic I. Welfare Economics of International Trade

 

● Gains from Trade

 

■ Basic Economics of Gains from Trade

 

*Dixit/Norman, Chapter 3, section 2


BPS, Chapter 18, sections 1-4.


Wong, Chapter 8, sections 1-4.


*A. Dixit (1985). “Tax Policy in Open Economies”. in A. Auerbach and M. Feldstein, Handbook of Public Economics (V.I). Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 313-374. Sections 1 and 2.

 

■ Generalizing the CRS Case: Customs Unions and the Kemp-Wan Theorem (Alternative Topic)


M. Kemp and H. Wan (1976). “An Elementary Proposition Concerning the Formation of Customs Unions”. in M. Kemp, Three Topics in the Theory of International Trade: Distribution, Welfare and Uncertainty. Amsterdam: North-Holland. in Bhagwati.


M. Kemp and H. Wan (1993). The Welfare Economics of International Trade. Chur: Harwood. Part I.


Wong, Chapter 8, section 10


BPS, Chapter 31


R. Baldwin and A. Venables (1995). “Regional Economic Integration”. in G. Grossman and K. Rogoff, eds. Handbook of International Economics, V.III. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 1597-1644.

 

■ Implementing Gains from Trade with and without Lump-Sum Compensation (Alternative Topic)


BPS, Chapter 18, sections 5 and 6

 

J. Chipman and J. Moore (1972). “Social Utility and the Gains from Trade”. Journal of International Economics; V.2-#2, pp. 157-172.

 

M. Ohyama (1972). “Trade and Welfare in General Equilibrium”. Keio Economic Studies; V.9-#1, pp. 37-73.


*J.M. Grandmont and D. McFadden (1972). “A Technical Note on the Classical Gains from Trade”. Journal of International Economics; V.2-#?, pp. 109-125.


*A. Dixit and V. Norman (1980). “Gains from Trade: Commodity Taxes”. in Theory of International Trade. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 79-80.


W. Diewert, A. Turunen-Red and A. Woodland (1989). “Productivity- and Pareto-Improving Changes in Taxes and Tariffs”. Review of Economic Studies; V.56-#2, pp. 199-216.


M. Kemp and H. Wan (1993). The Welfare Economics of International Trade. Chur: Harwood. Part II.


*P. Hammond and J. Sempere (1995). “Limits to the Potential Gains from Trade”.Economic Journal; V.105-#432, pp. 1180-1204


E. Grinols (1996). “Pure and Mixed Price and Income Compensation Schemes: Breaking Political Roadblocks to Trade Reform”. in R. Feenstra, G. Grossman and D. Irwin, eds. The Political Economy of Trade Policy. Cambridge: MIT, pp. 129-144.

 

J. Ju and K. Krishna (2000). “Evaluating Trade Reform with Many Consumers”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.33-#3, pp. 787-798.


*R. Guesnerie (2001). “Second Best Redistributive Policies: The Case of International Trade”. Journal of Public Economic Theory; V.3-#1, pp. 15-25.

 

Hisahiro Naito (1996). “Tariffs and Production Subsidies for Income Redistribution under Asymmetric Information”. University of Michigan RSIE Paper; #391.


*D. Spector (2001). “Is It Possible to Redistribute the Gains from Trade Using Income Taxation?”. Journal of International Economics; V.55-#?, pp. 441-460.

 

■ Welfare Analytics under Variable Returns to Scale (Alternative topic)

 

Wong, Chapter 9, section 1


J. Markusen and J. Melvin (1984). “The Gains-from-Trade Theorem with Increasing Returns to Scale”. in H. Kierzkowski, ed. Monopolistic Competition and International Trade. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 10-33.


M. Kemp and A. Schweinberger (1991). “Variable Returns to Scale, Non-Uniqueness of Equilibrium and the Gains from International Trade”. Review of Economic Studies; V.58-#?, pp. 807-816.

 

● The Economics of Protection: Applied Welfare Analysis

 

■ Some Useful Surveys on Trade and Protection


W.M. Corden (1975). “The Costs and Consequences of Protection: A Survey of Empirical Work”. in P. Kenen, ed. International Trade and Finance. New York: CUP, pp. 51-91.


W.M. Corden (1984). “The Normative Theory of International Trade”. in R. Jones and P. Kenen, eds. Handbook of International Economics, V.I. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 63-130.


J. Anderson (1994). “The Theory of Protection”. in D. Greenaway and L.A. Winters, eds. Surveys in International Trade. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 106-138.


R. Feenstra (1995). “Estimating the Effects of Trade Policy”. in G. Grossman and K. Rogoff, eds. Handbook of International Economics, V.III. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 1553-1595.


S. Laird (1998). “Quantifying Commercial Policies”. in J. Francois and K. Reinert, eds. Applied Methods for Trade Policy Analysis: A Handbook. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 27-75.

 

H. Bowen, A. Hollander, and J.-M. Viaene (1998). “Trade Policy”. Chapter 5 of Applied International Trade Analysis. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 159-227.

 

D. Slesnick (1998). “Empirical Approaches to the Measurement of Welfare”. Journal of Economic Literature; V.36-#4, pp. 2108-2165.

 

■ Basic Applied Welfare Theory for Trade Policy


Woodland, Chapters 10 and 11


*BPS, Chapter 19


*B.N. Jeon and G. von Furstenberg (1986). “Techniques for Measuring the Welfare Effects of Protection: Appraising the Choices”. Journal of Policy Modeling; V.8-#2, pp. 273-303.

 

*E. Grinols and K. Wong (1991). “An Exact Measure of Welfare Change”. Canadian Journal Economics; V.24-#2, pp. 428-449.


*J. Anderson and J.P. Neary (1996). “A New Approach to Evaluating Trade Policy”. Review of Economic Studies; V.63-#1, pp. 107-125.


W. Martin (1998). “Measuring Welfare Changes with Distortions”. in J. Francois and K. Reinert, eds. Applied Methods for Trade Policy Analysis: A Handbook. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 76-93.


J. Anderson and J.P. Neary (1994). “Measuring the Restrictiveness of Trade Policy”. World Bank Economic Review, V.8-#2, pp. 151-169.


J. Anderson (1995). “Tariff Index Theory”. Review of International Economics; V.3-#2, pp. 156-173.


*K. O’Rourke (1997). “Measuring Protection: A Cautionary Tale”. Journal of Development Economics; V.53-#1, pp. 169-183.

 

*C. Bach and W. Martin (2001). “Would the Right Tariff Aggregator for Policy Analysis Please Stand Up?”. Journal of Policy Modeling; V.23-#6, pp. 621-635.

 

■ Implementing Trade Policy Analysis

 

○ Partial Equilibrium


D. Rousslang and J. Suomela (1985). Calculating the Consumer and Net Welfare Costs to the US of Import Relief. Washington, D.C.: US-ITC.

 

D. Rousslang and J. Suomela (1988) “Calculating the Welfare Costs of Import Restrictions in the Imperfect Substitutes Model”. Applied Economics; V.20-#5, pp. 691-700.

 

M. Jones (1993). “The Geometry of Protectionism in the Imperfect Substitutes Model: A Reminder”. Southern Economic Journal; V.60-#1, pp. 235-238.

 

D. Rousslang (1991). “Welfare Cost of Import Restraints in the Presence of Domestic Taxes”. Journal of Policy Modeling; V.13-#3, pp. 459-465.


J. Francois and H.K. Hall (1996). “Partial Equilibrium Modelling”. in J. Francois and K. Reinert, eds. Applied Methods for Trade Policy Analysis: A Handbook. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 122-155.


S.P. Magee (1973). “The Welfare Effects of Restrictions on US Trade”.Brookings Papers on Economic Activity; #3, pp. 65-108.


D. Tarr and M. Morkre (1984). Aggregate Costs to the US of Tariffs and Quotas on Imports. Washington, D.C.: FTC.


*G. Hufbauer and K. Elliott (1994). Measuring the Costs of Protection in the US. Washington, D.C.: IIE. (Chapters 1 and 2)

 

○ General Equilibrium

 

CGE Based Analysis

 

*P. Kehoe and T. Kehoe (1994). “A Primer on Static Applied General Equilibrium Models”. Federal Reserve Bank of Minnesota Quarterly Review; V.18-#2, pp. 2-16.

 

C. Zarazaga (1999). “Measuring the Benefits from Unilateral Trade Liberalization, Part 1: Static Models”. Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Economic and Financial Review; third quarter, pp. 14-25.

 

C. Zarazaga (2000). “Measuring the Benefits from Unilateral Trade Liberalization, Part 2: Dynamic Models”. Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Economic and Financial Review; first quarter, pp. 29-40.


K. Reinert and D. Roland-Holst (1996). “Social Accounting Matrices”. in J. Francois and K. Reinert, eds. Applied Methods for Trade Policy Analysis: A Handbook. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 94-121.


*S. Devarajan, D. Go, J. Lewis, S. Robinson, and P. Sinko (1996). “Simple General Equilibrium Modeling”. in J. Francois and K. Reinert, eds. Applied Methods for Trade Policy Analysis: A Handbook. Cambridge: CUP, 156-184.


D. Roland-Holst, K. Reinert and C. Shiells (1994). “A General Equilibrium Analysis of North American Economic Integration”. in J. Francois and C. Shiells, eds. Modelling Trade Policy: Applied General Equilibrium Assessments of North American Free Trade. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 47-82.

 

P. Kehoe and T. Kehoe (1994). “Capturing NAFTA's Impact With Applied General Equilibrium Models”. Federal Reserve Bank of Minnesota Quarterly Review; V.18-#2, pp.

 

J. Francois, B.J. McDonald, and H. Nordstrom (1996). “The Uruguay Round: A Numerically Based Qualitative Assessment”. in W. Martin and A Winters, eds., The Uruguay Round and Developing Countries. Cambridge Univesity Press, pp. 253-291.

 

*G. Harrison, T. Rutherford, and D. Tarr (1997). “Quantifying the Uruguay Round”. Economic Journal; V.107-#444, pp. 1405-1430.

 

C.F. Bach, W. Martin, and J. Stevens (1996). “China and the WTO: Tariff Offers, Exemptions and Welfare Implications”. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; V.132-#3, pp. 409-431.

 

Regression-based Analysis

 

*H. Wall (1999). “Using the Gravity Model to Estimate the Costs of Protection”. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Review; January/February, pp. 33-40.

 

*David Gould (1998). “Has NAFTA Changed North America’s Trade”. Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Review; First Quarter, pp. 12-23.


*E. Leamer (1988). “Measures of Openness”. in R. Baldwin, ed. Trade Policy Issues and Empirical Analysis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 147-204.


*H. Wolff (1993). “Trade Orientation: Measurement and Consequences”.Estudios de EconomÍa; V.20-#3, pp. 51-86. [esp. pp. 51-75.]


*L. Pritchett (1996). “Measuring Outward Orientation in LDCs: Can It Be Done?”. Journal of Development Economics; V.49-#2, pp. 307-335.


E. Leamer (1990). “The Structure and Effects of Tariff and Nontariff Barriers in 1983". in R. Jones and A. Krueger, eds. The Political Economy of International Trade. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 224-260.


*J. Frankel, E. Stein, and S. Wei (1995). “Trading Blocs and the Americas: The Natural, the Unnatural, and the Super-Natural”. Journal of Development Economics; V.47-#?, pp. 61-95.


*J. Harrigan (1996). “Openness to Trade in Manufactures in the OECD”. Journal of International Economics; V.40-#1/2, pp. 23-39.


R. Lawrence (1987). “Imports in Japan: Closed Markets or Minds?”. Brookings Papers on Economic Analysis; V.1987-#2, pp. 517-554.


G. Saxonhouse (1989). “Product Differentiation, Economies of Scale and Access to the Japanese Market”. in R. Feenstra, ed. Trade Policies for International Competitiveness. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 145-174.

 

○ Intermediate Goods and Effective Rates of Protection (Alternative topic)

 

Theory

 

BPS, Chapter 15


*W.M. Corden (1966). “The Structure of a Tariff System and the Effective Protective Rate”. Journal of Political Economy, V.74-#?, pp. 221-237.


*J. Bhagwati and T.N. Srinivasan (1973). “The General Equilibrium Theory of Effective Protection and Resource Allocation”. Journal of International Economics; V.3-#?, pp. 259-282. (Comment by Sendo (1974), Journal of International Economics, V.4-#?, pp. 213-215)


*Y. Uekawa (1979). “The Theory of Effective Protection, Resource Allocation and the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem: The Many Industry Case”. Journal of International Economics; V.9-#?, pp. 151-171.

 

Empirical Research


*D. Greenaway (1988). “Effective Tariff Protection in the UK”. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics; V.50-#?, pp. 313-324.


*C. Ennew, D. Greenaway, and G. Reed (1990). “Further Evidence on Effective Tariffs and Effective Protection in the UK”. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics; V.52-#1, pp. 69-78.

 

■ Voluntary Export Restraints

 

○ Effects on Importers

 

T. Murray, W. Schmidt and I. Walter (1978). “Alternative Forms of Protection against Market Disruption”. Kyklos; V.31-#4, pp. 624-637.

 

B.J. Liu (1986). “On Voluntary Export Restraints”. Economic Essays; V.15-#1, pp. 45-62.

 

C. Hamilton (1985). “Voluntary Export Restraints and Trade Diversion”. Journal of Common Market Studies; V.23-#4, pp. 345-355.

 

S. Suranovic (1991). “The Ineffectiveness of Quantitative Restrictions with Production Diversion”. Southern Economic Journal; V.58-#2, pp. 379-91.

 

K. Krishna (1989). “What do VERs Do?”. in R. Sato and J. Nelson, eds. Beyond Trade Friction: Japan-US Economic Relations. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 76-92.

 

M. Kemp, K. Shimomura, and M. Okawa (1997). “Voluntary Export Restraints and Economic Welfare: A General Equilibrium Analysis”. Japanese Economic Review; V.48-#2, pp. 187-98.

 

○ Effects on Exporters

 

C. Hamilton (1986). “Import Quotas and Voluntary Export Restraints: Focusing on Exporting Countries”. in. C. Findlay and R. Garnaut, eds. The Political Economy of Manufacturing Sector Protection in ASEAN and Australia; Sydney: Allen and Unwin, pp. 214-234.

 

C. Hamilton (1986). “ASEAN Systems for Allocation of Export Licenses under VERs”. in. C. Findlay and R. Garnaut, eds. The Political Economy of Manufacturing Sector Protection in ASEAN and Australia; Sydney: Allen and Unwin, pp. 235-247.

 

C. Hamilton (1986). “An Assessment of Voluntary Export Restraints on Hong Kong Exports to Europe and the US”. Economica; V.53-#211, pp. 159-178.

 

T. Bark and J. deMelo (1988). “Export Quota Allocations, Export Earnings, and Market Diversification”. World Bank Economic Review; V.2-#3, pp. 341-348.

 

T. Bark and J. deMelo (1989). “Efficiency and Export Earnings Implications of Two-Tier Quota Allocation Rules”. International Economic Journal; V.3-#3, pp. 31-42.

 

J. de Melo and L.A. Winters (1990). “Voluntary Export Restraints and Resource Allocation in Exporting Countries”. World Bank Economic Review; V.2-#4, pp. 209-233.

 

J. deMelo and L.A. Winters (1993). “Do Exporters Gain from VERs?”. European Economic Review; V.37-#?, pp. 1331-1349.

 

○ The Multi-Fibre Arrangement

 

D. Greenaway (1986). “Estimating the Welfare Affects of Voluntary Export Restraints and Tariffs: An Application to Non-Leather Footwear in the UK. Applied Economics; V.18-#?, pp. 1065-1083.

 

R. Erzan, J. Goto and P. Holmes (1990). “Effects of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement on Developing Countries’ Trade: An Empirical Investigation”. in C. Hamilton, ed. Textiles Trade and the Developing Countries. Washington, DC: The World Bank.

 

I. Trela and J. Whalley (1990). “Global Effects of Developed Country Trade Restrictions in Textiles and Apparel”. Economic Journal; V.100-#403, pp. 1190-1205.

 

I. Trela and J. Whalley (1995). “Internal Quota-Allocation Schemes and the Costs of the MFA”. Review of International Economics; V.3-#3, pp. 284-306.

 

K. Krishna, R. Erzan and L.H. Tan (1994). “Rent Sharing in the Multi-Fibre Arrangement: Theory and Evidence from US Apparel Imports from Hong Kong”. Review of International Economics; V.2-#1, pp. 62-73.

 

K. Krishna, W. Martin, and L.H. Tan (1997). “Imputing License Prices: The Limitations of a Cost-Based Approach”. Journal of Development Economics; V.52-#?, pp. 355-374.

 

K. Krishna and L.H. Tan (1998). Rags and Riches: Implementing Apparel Quotas under the Multi-Fibre Arrangement. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.


*J. Anderson and J.P. Neary (1994). “The Trade Restrictiveness of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement”. World Bank Economic Review; V.8-#2, pp. 171-189.

 

○ Strategic Analysis

 

*K. Krishna (1989), “Trade Restrictions as Facilitating Devices”, Journal of International Economics. V.26-#3/4, pp. 251-270.

 

H. Quirmbach (1988). “Comparative Statics for Oligopoly: Demand Shift Effects”. International Economic Review; V.29-#3, pp. 451-59.

 

M. Yano (1989). “Voluntary Export Restraints and Expectations: An Analysis of Export Quotas in Oligopolistic Markets”. International Economic Review; V.30-#4, pp. 707-723.

 

W. Ethier (1991). “Voluntary Export Restraints”. in A. Takayama, et al. eds. Trade, Policy, and Adjustments. San Diego: Academic Press, pp. 3-18.

 

J. Dean and S. Gangopadhyay (1991). “Market Equilibrium under the ‘Threat’ of a VER”. Journal of International Economics; V.30-#1/2, pp. 137-52.

 

J. Dean and S. Gangopadhyay (1992). “Strategic Trade Practices in the Presence of a VER”. International Economic Review; V.33-#3, pp. 645-59.

 

J. Reitzes and O. Grawe (1994). “Market-share Quotas”. Journal of International Economics; V.36-#3/4, pp. 431-447.

 

N. Bjorkstein (1994). “Voluntary Import Expansions and Voluntary Export Restraints in an Oligopoly Model with Capacity Constraints”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.27-#2, pp. 446-457.

 

C. Syropoulos (1996). “On Pareto-Improving Voluntary Export Restraints”. International Journal of Industrial Organization; V.14-#1, pp. 71-84.

 

S. McCorriston and I. Sheldon (1997). “The (Non-)Equivalence of Tariffs and Quantity Restraints as ‘Rent-Shifting’ Policies”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.30-#4, pp. 1220-33.

 

K. Suzumura and J. Ishikawa (1997). “Voluntary Export Restraints and Economic Welfare”. Japanese Economic Review; V.48-#2, pp. 176-86.

 

J. Ishikawa (1998). “Who Benefits from Voluntary Export Restraints?”. Review of International Economics; V.6-#1, pp. 129-41.

 

K. Miyagiwa and Y. Ohno (1998). “Planting Disinformation through Voluntary Export Restraints”. Pacific Economic Review; V.3-#2, pp. 91-103.

 

○ The Automobile VER (alternate topic)

 

R. Feenstra (1984) “Voluntary Export Restraint in US Autos, 1980-81: Quality, Employment and Welfare Effects”. in R. Baldwin and A. Krueger, eds. The Structure and Evolution of Recent US Trade Policies; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 35-65. also in Bhagwati.

 

R. Feenstra (1988). “Quality Change Under Trade Restraints in Japanese Autos”. Quarterly Journal of Economics; V.103-#1, pp. 131-146.

 

P. Goldberg (1995). “Product differentiation and Oligopoly in International Markets: The Case of the US Automobile Industry”. Econometrica; V.63-#4, pp. 891-952.

 

S. Berry, J. Levinsohn, and A. Pakes (1995). “Automobile Prices in Market Equilibrium”. Econometrica; V.63-#4, pp. 841-890.

 

*S. Berry, J. Levinsohn, and A. Pakes (1999). “Voluntary Export Restraints in Automobiles: Evaluating a Trade Policy”. American Economic Review; V.89-#3, pp. 400-430.

 

J. Ries (1995). “Windfall Profits and Vertical Relationships: Who Gained in the Japanese Auto Industry from VERs?”. Journal of Industrial Economics; V.41-#3, pp. 259-76

 

A. Dixit (1987). “Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy for the US Automobile Industry”. in R. Feenstra, ed. Empirical Research in International Trade. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 141-169.

 

K. Krishna, K. Hogan, and P. Swagel (1994). “The Non-Optimality of Optimal Trade Policies: The US Automobile Industry Revisited, 1979-1985". in P. Krugman and A. Smith, eds. Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 11-37.

 

M. Fuss, S. Murphy and L. Waverman (1992). “The State of North American and Japanese Motor Vehicle Industries: A Partially Calibrated Model to Examine the Impacts of Trade Policy Changes”. NBER Working Paper; #4225.

 

deMelo, J. and D. Tarr (1996). “VERs Under Imperfect Competition and Foreign Direct Investment: A Case Study of the US-Japan Auto VER”. Japan and the World Economy; V.8-1, pp. 11-33.

 

● Distortions and Policy Targeting

 

■ Basic Theory


*BPS, Chapters 17 and 20.


BPS, Chapters 22-28.


Wong, Chapter 11, sections 1-5


*A. Dixit (1985). “Tax Policy in Open Economies”. in A. Auerbach and M. Feldstein, Handbook of Public Economics (V.I). Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 313-374. Sections 2 and 3.


*H.G. Johnson (1965). “Optimal Trade Intervention in the Presence of Domestic Distortion”. R. Caves, et al. Trade, Growth and the Balance of Payments. also in Bhagwati.


*J. Bhagwati (1971). “The Generalized Theory of Distortions and Welfare”. J. Bhagwati, et al. Trade, Balance of Payments and Growth; also in Bhagwati.


T.N. Srinivasan (1996). “The Generalized Theory of Distortions and Welfare Two Decades Later”. in R. Feenstra, G. Grossman, and D. Irwin, eds. The Political Economy of Trade Policy. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 3-25.


*J. Anderson, G. Bannister and J.P. Neary (1995). “Domestic Distortions and International Trade”. International Economic Review; V.36-#1, pp. 139-157.


*P. Krishna and A. Panagariya (2000). “A Unification of the Theory of Second Best”. Journal of International Economics; V.52-#2, pp. 235-257.

 

■ The Infant Industry Argument: An Example


Corden, Chapter 9


M. Kemp (1960). “The Mill-Bastable Infant-Industry Dogma”. Journal of Political Economy. V.68-#1, pp. 65-67.


*M. Kemp (1974). “Learning by Doing: Formal Tests for Intervention in an Open Economy”. Keio Economic Studies. V.11-#1, pp. 1-7.


*R. Baldwin (1969). “The Case Against Infant-Industry Protection”.Journal of Political Economy. V.77-#2, pp. 295-305.


*A. Krueger and B. Tuncer (1982). “An Empirical Test of the Infant-Industry Argument”. American Economic Review. V.72-#5, pp. 1142-1152.


R.E.B. Lucas (1984). “An Empirical Test of the Infant Industry Argument: Comment”. American Economic Review; V.74-#5, pp. 1110-11. [reply]


*A. Harrison (1994). “An Empirical Test of the Infant Industry Argument: Comment”. American Economic Review; V.84-#4, pp. 1090-95. [reply follows, pp. 1096]

 

-K. Head (1994). “Infant Industry Protection in the Steel Rail Industry”. Journal of International Economics; V.37-#3/4, pp. 141-165.

 

*D. Irwin (2000). “Did Late-Nineteenth-Century U.S. Tariffs Promote Infant Industries? Evidence from the Tinplate Industry”. Journal of Economic History; V.60-#2, pp. 335-360.


L. Westphal (1982). “Fostering Technological Mastery by Means of Selective Infant-Industry Protection”. in M. Syrquin and S. Teitel, Trade, Stability, Technology and Equity in Latin America. New York: Academic Press, pp. 255-279.


M. Bell, B. Ross-Larson, and L. Westphal (1984). “Assessing the Performance of Infant Industries”. Journal of Development Economics; V.16-#?, pp. 101-128.

 

■ Tariffs, Optimal and Otherwise: Another Example (Alternative)


BPS, Chapter 21


*A. Dixit (1985). “Tax Policy in Open Economies”. in A. Auerbach and M. Feldstein, Handbook of Public Economics (V.I). Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 313-374. Sections 3 and 5.


*R. Jones (1969). “Tariffs and Trade in General Equilibrium”. American Economic Review. V.59-#3, pp. 418-423.


*E. Bond (1990). “The Optimum Tariff Structure in Higher Dimensions”.International Economic Review; V.31-#1, pp. 103-116.


J.P. Neary (1993). “Welfare Effects of Tariffs and Investment Taxes”. in W. Ethier, E. Helpman and J.P. Neary, eds. Theory, Policy and Dynamics in International Trade. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 131-156

 

■ Immiserizing Growth: Another Example (Alternative)


BPS, Chapter 29.


Wong, Chapter 10, Section 6


*J. Bhagwati (1958). “Immiserizing Growth: A Geometrical Note”. Review of Economic Studies; V.25-#3, pp. 201-205. [in Caves and Johnson]


*H.G. Johnson (1967). “The Possibility of Income Loss from Increased Efficiency or Factor Accumulation in the Presence of Tariffs”. Economic Journal; V.77-#305, pp. 151-154. [in Bhagwati]


R. Brecher and C. DÍaz-Alejandro (1977). “Tariffs, Foreign Capital and Immiserizing Growth”. Journal of International Economics; V.7-#?, pp. 317-322. [in Bhagwati]

 

● Incremental Policy Reform (Alternative)


BPS, Chapter 35


*A. Dixit (1985). “Tax Policy in Open Economies”. in A. Auerbach and M. Feldstein, Handbook of Public Economics (V.I). Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 313-374. Section 4.

 

A. Turunen-Red and A. Woodland (2001). “The Anatomy of Multilateral Trade Policy Reform”. In S. Lahiri, ed. Regionalism and Globalization: Theory and Practice. London: Routledge, pp. 61-91.


*W. Diewert, A. Turunen-Red and A. Woodland (1989). “Productivity- and Pareto-Improving Changes in Taxes and Tariffs”. Review of Economic Studies; V.56-#2, pp. 199-216.

 

W.E. Diewert, A. Turunen-Red and A. Woodland (1991). “Tariff Reform in a Small Open Many-Household Economy with Domestic Distortions and Non-Traded Goods”. International Economic Review; V.32-#4, pp. 937-957.

 

R. Falvey (1994). “Revenue Enhancing Tariff Reform”. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; V.130-#1, pp. 175-189.

 

M. Keen and J. Ligthart (2002). “Coordinating Tariff Reduction and Domestic Tax Reform”. Journal of International Economics; V.56-#2, pp. 489-507.

 

R. Falvey (1988). “Tariffs, Quotas and Piecemeal Policy Reform”. Journal of International Economics; V.25-#?, pp. 177-183.


*J. Anderson and J.P. Neary (1992). “Trade Reform with Quotas, Partial Rent Retention and Tariffs”. Econometrica; V.60-#1, pp. 57-76.

 

J.P. Neary (1995). “Trade Liberalisation and Shadow Prices in the Presence of Tariffs and Quotas”. International Economic Review; V.36-#3, pp. 531-554.


Topic II. The Law and Economics of Trade Regulation

 

● Administered Protection, 1: The Escape Clause, Basics

 

R. Lawrence and R. Litan (1986). Saving free trade: A pragmatic approach. Washington, DC: Brookings.

 

J.M. Finger (1996). “Legalized Backsliding: Safeguard Provisions in GATT”. in W. Martin and A Winters, eds., The Uruguay Round and Developing Countries. Cambridge Univesity Press, pp. 316-340.

 

J. Jackson (1997). “Safeguards and Adjustment Policies”. Chapter 7 of The World Trading System: Law and Policy in International Economic Relations. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 175-211.

 

P. Merciai (1981). “Safeguard Measures in the GATT”. Journal of World Trade Law; V.15-#1, pp. 41-66.

 

P. Stern and A. Wechsler (1986). “Escape Clause Relief and Recessions: An Economic and Legal Look at Section 201”. In G. Saxonhouse, and K. Yamamura, ed. Law and trade issues of the Japanese economy: American and Japanese perspectives. Seattle: University of Washington Press, pp. 195-217.

 

J. Hartigan, P. Perry, and S. Kamma (1986). “The Value of Administered Protection: A Capital Market Approach”. Review of Economics and Statistics; V.68-#4, pp. 610-617.

 

C. Coughlin, J. Terza, and N. Khalifah (1989). “The Determinants of Escape Clause Petitions”. Review of Economics and Statistics; V.71-#2, pp. 341-347.

 

K. Rehbein, and S. Lenway (1993). “Industry Structure or Managerial Discretion: The Determinants of Industry Political Success in the U.S. International Trade Commission’s Escape Clause Investigations”. In J. Post, ed. Research in Corporate Social Performance and Policy. Volume 14. Greenwich, Conn. and London: JAI Press, pp. 3-18.

 

B. Blonigen and R. Feenstra (1997). “Protectionist Threats and Foreign Direct Investment”. In R. Feenstra, ed. The Effects of U.S. Trade Protection and Promotion Policies. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 55-80.

 

R. Staiger and G. Tabellini (1991). “Rules versus Discretion in Trade Policy: An Empirical Analysis”. In Baldwin, Robert E., ed. Empirical Studies of Commercial Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press?NBER, pp. 11-40.

 

R. Staiger and G. Tabellini (1999). “Do GATT Rules Help Governments Make Domestic Commitments?”. Economics and Politics; V.11-#2, pp. 109-144.

 

● Administered Protection, 1: The Escape Clause, The Injury Test

 

W. Perry (1985). “Administration of Import Trade Laws by the US ITC”. Boston University International Law Journal;

 

P. Jameson (1986). “Recent ITC Practice Regarding the Material Injury Standard: A Critique”. Law and Policy in International Business; V.18-#?, pp. 517-577.

 

G. Grossman (1986). “Imports as a Cause of Injury: The Case of the US Steel Industry”. Journal of International Economics; V.20-#?, pp. 201-223.

 

R. Pindyck and J. Rotemberg (1987). “Are Imports to Blame? Attribution of Injury Under the 1974 Act”. Journal of Law and Economics; V.30-#?, pp 101-122.

 

K. Kelly (1988). “The Analysis of Causality in Escape Clause Cases”. Journal of Industrial Economics; V.37-#2, pp. 187-207.

 

M. Morkre and H. Kruth (1989). “Determining Whether Dumped Or Subsidized Imports Injure Domestic Industries: The ITC Approach”. Contemporary Policy Issues; V.7-#3, pp. 78-95.

 

M. Knoll (1989). “Legal and Economic Framework for Analysis of Injury by the US ITC”. Journal of World Trade;

 

M. Knoll (1989). “An Economic Approach to the Determination of Injury under US Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Law”. NYU Journal of International Law and Policy; V.22-#?, pp. 37-116.

 

N.D. Palmeter (1987). “Injury Determinations in Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty Cases--A Commentary on US Practice”. Journal of World Trade Law; V.21-#1, pp. 7-45.

 

N.D. Palmeter (1987). “Dumping Margins and Material Injury: The USITC is Free to Choose”. Journal of World Trade Law; V.21-#?, pp. 173-175.

 

D. Rousslang (1988). “Import Injury in U.S. Trade Law: An Economic View”. International Review of Law and Economics; V.8-#1, pp. 117-122.

 

T. Murray and D. Rousslang (1989). “A Method for Estimating Injury Caused by Unfair Trade Practices”. International Review of Law and Economics; V.9-#2, pp. 149-164.

 

A. Sykes (1989). “Countervailing Duty Law: An Economic Perspective”. Columbia Law Review; V.89-#2, pp. 199-263.

 

M. Knoll (1989). “An Economic Approach to the Determination of Injury under U.S. Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Law”. NYU Journal of International Law and Politics; V.22-#?, pp. 37-116.

 

R. Cass and W. Schwartz (1990). “Causality, Coherence and Transparency in the Implementation of International Trade Laws”. in M. Trebilcock and R. York, eds. Fair Exchange: Reforming Trade Remedy Laws. Toronto: C.D. Howe, pp. 24-90.

 

S. Kaplan (1991). “Injury and Causation in USITC Antidumping Determinations: Five Recent Approaches”. in Tharakan, ed.

 

R. Boltuck (1991). “Assessing the Effects on the Domestic Industry of Price Dumping”. in Tharakan, ed.

 

A. Sykes (1996). “The Economics of Injury in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Cases”. International Review of Law and Economics; V.16-#?, pp. 5-26.

 

M. Morkre (1993). “The Effect of Subsidized Imports on Domestic Industry: A Comparison of Market Structures”. Journal of Policy Modeling; V.15-#1, pp. 49-61.

 

W. Mock, jr. (1986). “Cumulation of Import Statistics in Injury Investigations Before the ITC”. Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business;

 

W. Hansen and T. Prusa (1996). “Cumulation and ITC Decision-making: The Sum of the Parts is Greater than the Whole”. Economic Inquiry; V.34-#?, pp. 746-769.

 

T. Prusa (1998). “Cumulation and Anti-dumping: A Challenge to Competition”. World Economy; V.21-#8, pp. 1021-1033.

 

P.K.M. Tharakan, D. Greenaway, and J. Tharakan (1998). “Cumulation and Injury Determination of the European Community in Antidumping Cases”. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; V.134-#2, pp. 320-339.

 

B. Steen (1987). “Economically Meaningful Markets: An Alternative to Defining `Like Product` and `Domestic Industry` under the Trade Agreements Act of 1979”. Virginia Law Review;

 

R. Boltuck and S. Kaplan (1998). “An Economic Approach to ITC Sunset Reviews”. in R. Lawrence ed. Brookings Trade Forum 1998. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 219-239.

 

● Administered Protection, 2A: Title VII, The Basics

 

J. Jackson (1997). “Unfair Trade and the Rules on Dumping”. Chapter 10 of The World Trading System: Law and Policy in International Economic Relations. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 247-277.

 

J. Jackson (1997). “The Perplexities of Subsidies in International Trade”. Chapter 11 of The World Trading System: Law and Policy in International Economic Relations. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 279-303.

 

J. Jackson and E. Vermlust, eds. (1989). Anti-Dumping Law and Practice: A Comparative Study. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

 

P. Tharakan, ed. (1991). Policy Implications of Antidumping Measures. Amsterdam: North-Holland.

 

C. Barshefsky and N. Zucker (1988). “Ammendments to the Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws under the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988". North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation;

 

G. Horlick and G. Oliver (1989). “Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Law Provisions of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988". Journal of World Trade; V23-#3, pp. 5-49.

 

R. Cass (1990). “Trade Subsidy Law: Can Foolish Inconsistency Be Good Enough for Government Work?” Law and Policy in International Business; V.21-#?, pp. 609-661.

 

J.M. Finger, ed. (1993). Antidumping: How it Works and Who Gets Hurt. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

 

R. Clarida (1996). “Dumping: In Theory, in Policy, and in Practice”. in J. Bhagwati and R. Hudec, eds. Fair Trade and Harmonization. V.1: Economic Analysis. Cambridge: MIT, pp. 357-389.

 

G. Winham and H. Grant (1994). “Antidumping and Countervailing Duties in Regional Trade Agreements: Canada-U.S. FTA, NAFTA, and Beyond”. Minnesota Journal of Global Trade; V.3-#1, pp.

 

● Administered Protection, 2B: Title VII, Less than Fair Value Test

 

A. Holmer, S. Haggerty and W. Hunter (1984). “Identifying and Measuring Subsidies under Countervailing Duty Law: An Attempt at Synthesis”. The Commerce Department Speaks on Import Administration and Export Administration, 1984. Washington, DC: Practicing Law Institute, pp. 301-460.

 

C. Goetz, L. Granet and W. Schwartz (1986). “The Meaning of ‘Subsidy’ and ‘Injury’ in Countervailing Duty Law”. International Review of Law and Economics; V.6-#?, pp. 17-32.

 

R. Diamond (1989). “Economic Foundations of Countervailing Duty Law”. Virginia Journal of International Law; V.29-#?, pp. 767-812.

 

R. Diamond (1990). “A Search for Economic and Financial Principles in the Administration of US Countervailing Duty Law”. Law and Policy in International Business. V.21-#?, pp. 507-607.

 

N.D. Palmeter (1986). “Torquemada and the Tariff Act: The Inquisitor Rides Again”. International Lawyer; V.20-#?, pp. 641-657.

 

N.D. Palmeter (1988). “Exchange Rates and Anti-Dumping Determinations”. Journal of World Trade Law; V.22-#?, pp. 73-80.

 

M. Coursey and D. Binder (1989). “Hypothetical Calculations under the US Antidumping Law: Foreign Market Value, US Price and Weighted-Average Dumping Margins”. American University Journal of International Law and Policy; V.4-#?, pp. 537-553.

 

W. Bollom and D. Simons (1990). “The Use of Accounting Data in Antidumping Cases: A Public Policy Perspective”. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy; V.9-#1, pp. 1-18.

 

R. Boltuck and R. Litan, eds. (1992). Down in the Dumps: Administration of the Unfair Trade Laws. Washington, DC: Brookings.

 

J.M. Finger (1992). “The Meaning of ‘Unfair’ in United States Import Policy”. Minnesota Journal of Global Trade; V.1-#1, pp. 35-56.

 

J.M. Finger and K.C. Fung (1994). “Will GATT Enforcement Control Antidumping”. Journal of Economic Integration; V.9-#2, pp. 198-213.

 

● Administered Protection, 3: Title VII, Some Analytics

 

■ Basic Economics

 

K. Stegemann (1985). “Antidumping Policy and the Consumer”. Journal of World Trade Law; V.19-#5, pp. 466-484.

 

M. Webb (1987). “Anti-Dumping Laws, Production Location and Prices”. Journal of International Economics; V.22-#?, pp.

 

G. Yarrow (1987). “Economic Aspects of Antidumping Policies”. Oxford Review of Economic Policy; V.3-#?, pp.

 

B. Hoekman and M. Leidy (1989). “Dumping, Anti-dumping, and Emergency Protection”. Journal of World Trade; V.23-#1, pp. 27-44.

 

M. Leidy and B. Hoekman (1990). “Production Effects of Price- and Cost- Based Anti-dumping Laws Under Flexible Exchange Rates”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.23-#4, pp. 873-895.

 

R. Staiger and F. Wolak (1992). “The Effect of Domestic Antidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopoly”. Journal of International Economics; V.32-#3/4, pp. 265-287.

 

B. Hoekman and M. Leidy (1992). “Cascading Contingent Protection”. European Economic Review; V.36-#?, pp. 883-892.

 

R. Feinberg and S. Kaplan (1993). Fishing Downstream: The Political Economy of Effective Administered Protection. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.26-#1, pp. 150-158.

 

J. Francois (1992). “Countervailing the Effects of Subsidies: An Economic Analysis”. Journal of World Trade; V.26-#1, pp. 5-13.

 

R. Willig (1998). “Economic Effects of Antidumping Policy”. in R. Lawrence ed. Brookings Trade Forum 1998. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 57-79.

 

■ Title VII under Oligopoly

 

A. Dixit (1988). “Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties Under Oligopoly”. European Economic Review; V.32-#?, pp. 55-68.

 

B. Spencer (1988). “Countervailing Duty Laws and Subsidies to Imperfectly Competitive Industries”. in Baldwin, et al., eds. Issues in US-EC Trade Relations. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER; pp. 313-334.

 

B. Spencer (1988). “Capital Subsidies and Countervailing Duties in Oligopolistic Industries”. Journal of International Economics; V.25-#?, pp. 45-69.

 

D. Collie (1991). “Export Subsidies and Countervailing Tariffs”. Journal of International Economics; V.31-#3/4, pp. 309-324.

 

D. Collie (1992). “Export Subsidies, Entry Deterrence and Countervailing Tariffs”. Manchester School; V.60-#2, pp. 136-151.

 

M. Webb (1992). “The Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Laws”. Economic Inquiry; V.30-#?, pp. 437-448.

 

R. Staiger and F. Wolak (1991). “Strategic Use of Antidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusion”. ms: Stanford University.

 

J. Reitzes (1993). “Antidumping Policy”. International Economic Review; V.34-#4, pp. 745-763.

 

J. Cassing (1994). “Strategic Responses to Antidumping Laws and Legal Interpretations: Producing for Export Markets using Lawyers and Other Factors of Production”. Journal of Economic Integration; V.9-#2, pp. 156-171.

 

T. Prusa (1994). “Pricing Behavior in the Presence of Antidumping Laws”. Journal of Economic Integration; V.9-#2, pp. 260-289.

 

J. Hartigan (1994). “Dumping and Signaling”. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization; V.23-#?, pp. 69-81.

 

J. Hartigan (1995). “Collusive Aspects of Cost Revelation Through Antidumping Complaints”. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics; V.151-#3, pp. 478-489.

 

J. Hartigan (1996).“Predatory Dumping”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.29-#1, pp. 228-239.

 

S. Anderson, N. Schmitt, and J.-J. Thisse (1995). . “Who Benefits from Antidumping Legislation?”. Journal of International Economics; V.38-$3/4, pp. 321-337.

 

D. Bernhofen (1995). “Price Dumping in Intermediate Good Markets”. Journal of International Economics; V.39-#1/2, pp. 159-173.

 

D. Baron (1997). “Integrated Strategy and International Trade Disputes: The Kodak-Fujifilm Case”. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy; V.6-#2, pp. 291-346.

 

A. Panagariya and P. Gupta (1998). “Anti-Dumping versus Price Negotiation”. World Economy; V.21-#8, pp. 1003-1019.

 

P. Barros and X. Martinez-Giralt (1999). “On the Effects of Antidumping Legislation”. Regional Science and Urban Economics; V.29-#1, pp. 53-72.

 

J. Hartigan (2000). “An Antidumping Law Can Be procompetitive”. Pacific Economic Review; V.5-#1, pp. 5-14.

 

Reinhilde Veugelers and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999). “European Anti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National and International Collusion”. European Economic Review; V.43-#1, pp. 1-28

 

Hylke Vandenbussche and Xavier Wauthy (2001). “Inflicting Injury through Product Quality: How European Antidumping Policy Disadvantages European Producers”. European Journal Of Political Economy; V.17-#1, pp. 101-116.

 

Wilfried Pauwels; Hylke Vandenbussche; and Marcel Weverbergh (2001). “Strategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Duties”. International Journal of the Economics of Business, V.8-#1, pp. 75-99.

 

Hylke Vandenbussche, Reinhilde Veugelers and Jozef Konings (2001). “Union Wage Bargaining and European Antidumping Policy”. Oxford Economic Papers; V.53-#2, pp. 297-317.

 

■ Empirical Research on Scope and Consequences of ADD/CVD

 

L. Gard and J. Riedel (1980). “Safeguard Protection of Industry in Developed Countries: Assessment of Implications for Developing Countries”. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; V.116-#3, pp. 471-492.

 

J.M. Finger (1981). “The Industry-Country Incidence of Less-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Trade”. Quarterly Review of Economics and Business; V.21-#?, pp. 260-279.

 

M. Herander and J.B. Schwartz (1984). “An Empirical Test of the Impact of the Threat of US Trade Policy: The Case of Antidumping Duties”. Southern Economic Journal; V.51-#1, pp. 59-79.

 

J.M. Finger and T. Murray (1990). “Policing Unfair Imports: The US Example”. Journal of World Trade; V.24-#4, pp. 39-53.

 

J. Devault (1990). “The Administration of US Antidumping Duties: Some Empirical Observations”. World Ecoomy; V.13-#1, pp. 75-88.

 

R. Staiger and F. Wolak (1994). “The Trade Effects of Antidumping Law: Theory and Evidence”. in A. Deardorff and R. Stern, eds. Analytical and Negotiating Issues in the Global Trading System. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 231-261.

 

R. Staiger and F. Wolak (1994). “Measuring Industry-specific Protection: Antidumping in the US”. Brookings Papers on Economic Analysis; 1994: Microeconomics, pp. 51-118. [comments]

 

R. Staiger and F. Wolak (1996). “Differences in Uses and Effects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sources”. in A. Krueger, ed. The Political Economy of American Trade Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 385-415.

 

H.J. Shin (1998). “Possible Instances of Predatory Pricing in Recent U.S. Antidumping Cases”. in R. Lawrence ed. Brookings Trade Forum 1998. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 81-97.

 

P. Conway and S. Dhar (1994). “The Economic Effects of Widespread Application of Anti-dumping Duties to Import Pricing”. Journal of Economic Integration; V.9-#2, pp. 172-197.

 

H. Marvel and E. Ray (1995). “Countervailing Duties”. Economic Journal; V.105-#433, pp. 1576-1593.

 

C. Krupp and P. Pollard (1996). “Market Responses to Antidumping Laws: Some Evidence from the US Chemical Industry”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.29-#1, pp. 199-227.

 

D. Bernhofen (1999). “Vertical Integration as a Cause of Dumping: Evidence from the OECD”. ms: Clark University.

 

J. Hartigan, P. Perry and S. Kamma (1986). “The Value of Administered Protection: A Capital Market Approach”. Review of Economics and Statistics; V.68-#4, pp. 610-617.

 

J. Hartigan, S. Kamma and P. Perry (1989). “The Injury Determination Category and the Value of Relief from Dumping”. Review of Economics and Statistics; V.71-#1, pp. 183-186.

 

J. Hartigan, S. Kamma and P. Perry (1990). “Bifurcated vs. Single Injury Determination in USITC Antidumping Investigations”. Journal of International Economics; V.5-#1, pp. 47-63.

 

S. Lenway, K. Rehbein and L. Starks (1990). “The Impact of Protectionism on Firm Wealth: The Experience of the Steel Industry”. Southern Economic Journal; V.?-#?, pp. 1079-1093.

 

K. Rehbein and L. Starks (1995). “Changes in US Trade Policies: The Wealth Effecs on Japanese Steel Firms”. Japan and the World Economy; v.7-#3, pp. 309-327.

 

M. Melvin and Q. Sun (1997) “U.S. protectionist policy and stock prices of U.S. import-competing and Korean and Taiwanese export-oriented firms”. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, V.5-#1, pp. 1-23.

 

J. Rayburn and S. Lenway (1991). “An Investigation of the Behavior of Accruals in the Semiconductor Industry: 1985". ms: University of Minnesota.

 

P. Messerlin and Y. Noguchi (1998). “Antidumping Policies in Electronic Products”. in R. Lawrence ed. Brookings Trade Forum 1998. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 147-171.

 

D. Irwin (1998). “The Semiconductor Industry”. in R. Lawrence ed. Brookings Trade Forum 1998. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 173-200.

 

P. Messerlin (1990). “The EC Antidumping Regulations: A First Economic Appraisal”. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; V.126-#?, pp. 562-587.

 

P. Messerlin and G. Reed (1995). “Antidumping Policies in the US and the EC”. Economic Journal; V.105-#433, pp. 1565-1575.

 

J. Bourgeois and P. Messerlin (1998). “The European Community’s Experience”. in R. Lawrence ed. Brookings Trade Forum 1998. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 127-145.

 

T. Lloyd, O. Morrissey, and G. Reed (1998). “Estimating the Impact of Anti-Dumping and Anti-Cartel Actions using Intervention Analysis”. Economic Journal; V.108-#447, pp. 458-476.

 

P. Brenton (2001). “Anti-dumping Policies in the EU and Trade Diversion”, European Journal of Political Economy; V.17-#3, pp. 593-607.

 

A. Lasagni (2000). “Does country targeted Antidumping policy by the EU create Trade Diversion”. Journal of World Trade; V.34-#4, pp. 137-159.

 

Jozef Konings, Hylke Vandenbussche and L. Springael (2002). “Import Diversion under European Antidumping Policy”. Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade;

 

M. Dutz (1998). “Economic Impact of Canadian Antidumping Law”. in R. Lawrence ed. Brookings Trade Forum 1998. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 99-125.

 

● Trade and Competition Policy, 1: Legal/Institutional Analysis

 

H. Applebaum and D. Grace (1987). “US Antitrust Law and Antidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979". Antitrust Law Journal; V.56-#2, pp. 497-518.

 

K. Elzinga (1987). “Antitrust Policy and Trade Policy: An Economist’s Perspective”. Antitrust Law Journal;

 

J. Davidow (1980). “Competition, Trade and the Antitrust Division”. Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business; V.?-#?, pp.

 

D. Wood (1989). “‘Unfair’ Trade Injury: A Competition-Based Approach”. Stanford Law Review;

 

J. Davidow (1991). “The Relationship between Anti-Trust Laws and Trade Laws in the US”. World Economy; V.14-#1, pp. 37-52.

 

R. Feinberg (1991). “Antitrust Policy and International Trade Liberalization”. World Competition; V.14-#4, pp. 13-19.

 

R. Cass (1993). “Price Discrimination and Predation Analysis in Antitrust and International Trade: A Comment”. University of Cincinnati Law Review; V.61-#3, pp. 877-888.

 

K. Kelly (1993). “Empirical Analysis for Antitrust and International Trade Law”. University of Cincinnati Law Review; V.61-#3, pp. 889-902.

 

R. Boltuck and S. Kaplan (1993). “Conflicting Entitlements: Can Antidumping and Antitrust Regulation be Reconciled”. University of Cincinnati Law Review; V.61-#3, pp. 903-917.

 

M. Morkre and K. Kelly (1993). “Perspectives on the Effects of Unfair Imports on Domestic Industries”. University of Cincinnati Law Review; V.61-#3, pp. 919-944.

 

F.M. Scherer (1994). Competition Policies for an Integrated World Economy. Washington, DC: Brookings.

 

P. Messerlin (1994). “Should Antidumping Rules Be Replaced by National or International Competition Rules?”. Aussenwirtschaft; V.49-#?, pp. 351-374.

 

P. Lloyd and G. Sampson (1995). “Competition and Trade Policy: Identifying the Issues After the Uruguay Round”. World Economy; V.18-#?, pp. 681-705.

 

A. Jacquemin (1995). “Towards an Internationalisation of Competition Policy?”. World Economy, V.18-#?, pp. 781-789.

 

P. Buigues, A. Jacquemin, and A. Sapir, eds. (1995). European policies on competition, trade and industry: Conflict and complementarities. Brookfield, Vt.: Elgar.

 

B. Hoekman and P. Mavroidis (1994). “Competition, Competition Policy and the GATT”. World Economy; V.17-#?, pp. 121-150.

 

B. Hoekman and P. Mavroidis (1996). “Dumping, Antidumping and Antitrust”. Journal of World Trade; V.30-#?, pp. 27-52.

 

M. Trebilcock (1996). “Competition Policy and Trade Policy–Mediating the Interface”. Journal of World Trade; V.30-#4, pp. 71-105.

 

E. M. Graham (1996). Global Corporations and National Governments. Washington, DC: Brookings.

 

American Bar Association (1996). “Symposium: The Role of Foreign Competition in U.S. Merger Enforcement”. Antitrust Law Journal; V.65-#1.

 

B. Hoekman (1997). “Competition Policy and the Global Trading System”. World Economy; V.20-#4, pp. 383-406.

 

J.D. Richardson and E.M. Graham (1997). Global Competition Policies: An Agenda. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.

 

J.D. Richardson and E.M. Graham, eds. (1997). Global Competition Policies. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.

 

M. Janow (1998). “Unilateral and Bilateral Approaches to Competition Policy Drawing on the Trade Experience”. in R. Lawrence ed. Brookings Trade Forum 1998. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 253-285.

 

J.D. Richardson (1998). “Multilateralizing Conventions”. in R. Lawrence ed. Brookings Trade Forum 1998. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 335-374.

 

I.M. Destler (1998). “U.S. Approach to International Competition Policy”. in R. Lawrence ed. Brookings Trade Forum 1998. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 395-418.

 

A. Sykes (1998). “Antidumping and Antitrust: What Problems Does Each Address?”. in R. Lawrence ed. Brookings Trade Forum 1998. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 1-43.

 

A. Sykes (1999). “Regulatory Protectionism and the Law of International Trade”. University of Chicago Law Review; V.66-#1, pp. 1-46.

 

A. Sykes (1999). “The (Limited) Role of Regulatory Harmonization in International Goods and Services Markets”. Journal of International Economic Law; V.2-#1, pp. 49-70.

 

-E. Fox (1999). “Competition Law and the Millennium Round”. Journal of International Economic Law; V.2-#2, pp. 665-659.

 

-J. Davidow (1999). “Antitrust Issues Arising Out of Actual or Potential Enforcement of Trade Laws”. Journal of International Economic Law; V.2-#2, pp. 681-693.

 

A. Sykes (2000). “Regulatory Competition or Regulatory Harmonization? A Silly Question?”. Journal of International Economic Law; V.3-#2, pp. 257-264.

 

P.J. Lloyd and K. Vautier (2001). “Regional Approaches to Cross-border Competition Policies”. In S. Lahiri, ed. Regionalism and Globalization: Theory and Practice. London: Routledge, pp. 283-304.

 

● Trade and Competition Policy, 2: Some Analytics

 

R. Caves (1979). “International Cartels and Monopolies in International Trade”. in R. Dornbusch and J. Frenkel, eds. International Economic Policy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 39-73.

 

A.A. Auquier and R. Caves (1979), “Monopolistic Export Industries, Trade Taxes, and Optimal Competition Policy”, Economic Journal. V.89-#?; pp. 559-581.

 

H. Katrak (1980). “Multinational Monopolies and Monopoly Regulation”. Oxford Economic Papers; V.32-#3, pp. 453-466.

 

S. Donnenfeld (1982). “Domestic Regulation and the Preservation of Monopoly Power in Foreign Markets”. Southern Economic Journal; V.49-#4, pp. 954-965.

 

C. Davidson (1984), “Cartel Stability and Tariff Policy”, Journal of International Economics. V.17-#3; pp. 219-237.

 

J. Haubrich and V. Lambson (1986). “Dynamic Collusion in an Open Economy”. Economics Letters; V.20-#?, pp. 75-78.

 

J. Rotemberg and G. Saloner (1989). “Tariffs vs Quotas with Implicit Collusion”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.22-#2, pp. 237-244.

 

K.C. Fung (1987). “Industry Structure, Anti-Trust and Tariffs”. International Journal of Industrial Organization. V.5-#?, pp. 447-456.

 

C. Syropoulos (1992). “Quantitative Restrictions and Tariffs with Endogenous Firm Behavior”. European Economic Review; V.36-#?, pp. 1627-1646.

 

C. Syropoulos (1994). “Endogenous Timing in Games of Commercial Policy”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.27-#4, pp. 847-864.

 

C. Syropoulos (1996). “Nontariff Trade Controls and Leader-Follower Relations in International Competition”. Economica; V.63-#252, pp. 633-648.

 

R. Rothschild (1986). “Raising Rivals’ Costs: Regulation as a Competitive Strategy in Intra-Industry Trade”. in D. Greenaway and P. Tharakan, eds. Imperfect Competition and International Trade. Sussex: Wheatsheaf, pp. 34-46.

 

R. Rothschild (1988). “The Impact of Market Share, Tariffs and Quotas on the Performance of International Cartels”. Economics Letters; V.27-#?, pp. 79-82.

 

-R. Rothschild (1990). “The Impact of Tariffs and Quotas on Collusion in International Markets”. Manchester School; V.58-#2, pp. 105-119.

 

I. Dierckx, C. Matutes and D. Neven (1991). “Cost Differences and Survival in Declining Industries: A Case for ‘Picking Winners’?”. European Economic Review; V.35-#?, pp. 1507-1528.

 

S. Lahiri and Y. Ono (1994). “Industrial Policy and National Welfare in the Presence of Monopoly”. Japan and the World Economy; v.6-#1, pp. 61-73.

 

J. Ordover, A. Sykes and R. Willig (1983). “Unfair International Trade Practices”. International Law and Politics; V.15-#?, pp. 323-337.

 

P. Barros and L. Cabral (1994). “Merger Policy in Open Economies”. European Economic Review; V.38-#?, pp. 1041-1055.

 

S. Cowan (1989). “Trade and Competition Policies for Oligopolies”. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; V.125-#?, pp. 464-483.

 

David L. Kaserman, Francois Melese (1993). “Horizontal Mergers and the Balance of Trade”. Managerial and Decision Economics; V.14-#1, pp. 83-90.

 

Chih-Min Pan (1995). “Vertical Mergers and the Balance of Trade”. Managerial and Decision Economics; V.16-#2, pp. 145-153.

 

N.V. Long and N. Vousden (1995). “The Effects of Trade Liberalisation on Cost-Reducing Horizontal Mergers”. Review of International Economics; V.3-#2, pp. 141-155.

 

D. Bernhofen (1996). “Vertical Integration and International Predation”. Review of International Economics; V.4-#1, pp. 90-98.

 

C. Bliss (1996). “Trade and Competition Control”. in J. Bhagwati and R. Hudec, eds. Fair Trade and Harmonization. V.1: Economic Analysis. Cambridge: MIT, pp. 313-328.

 

J. Levinsohn (1996). “Competition Policy and International Trade”. in J. Bhagwati and R. Hudec, eds. Fair Trade and Harmonization. V.1: Economic Analysis. Cambridge: MIT, pp. 329-356.

 

M. Motta and F. Onida (1996). “Trade Policy and Competition Policy”. Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia; V.56-#1/2, pp. 67-97.

 

P. Jensen and K. Krishna (1996). “Entry Policy in an Open Economy”. Indian Economic Review; V.31-#1, pp. 41-56.

 

K. Head and J. Ries (1997). “International Mergers and Welfare under Decentralized Competition Policy”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.30-#4B, pp. 1104-1123.

 

P.-P, Combes, B. Caillaud, B. Jullien (1997). “Common Market with Regulated Firms”. Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, #47, pp.

 

D. Neven and P. Seabright (1997). “Trade Liberalization and the Coordination of Competition Policy”. in L. Waverman, W. Comanor, and A. Goto, eds. Competition Policy in the Global Economy: Modalities for Cooperation. London: Routledge, pp. 381-406.

 

H. Horn and J. Levionsohn (2001). “Merger Policies and Trade Liberalization”. Economic Journal, V.111-#?, pp. 244-276.

 

P.J. Lloyd (1998). “Globalisation and Competition Policies”. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; V.134-#2, pp. 161-185.

 

R. Falvey (1998). “Mergers in Open Economies”. World Economy; V.21-#8, pp. 1061-1076.

 

P.K.M. Tharakan and P.J. Lloyd, eds. (1998). “Special Issue on Competition Policy in a Global Economy”. World Economy; V.21-#8.

 

M. Richardson (1998). “Foreign Entry and Domestic Welfare”. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; V.134-#2, pp. 250-262.

 

M. Richardson (1999). “Trade and Competition Policies: concordia discors?”. Oxford Economic Papers; V.51-#4, pp. 649-664.

 

M. Ohyama (1999). “Market, Trade, and Welfare in General Equilibrium”. Japanese Economic Review; V.50-#1, pp. 1-24.

 

T. Greaney (1999). “Strategic Trade and Competition Policies to Assist Distressed Industries”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.32-#3, pp. 767-784.

 

J. Reitzes and O. Grawe (1999). “Entry Policy and Entry Subsidies”. Review of International Economics; V.7-#4, pp. 732-743.

 

M. Yano (2001). “Trade Imbalance and Domestic Market Competition Policy”. International Economic Review; V.42-#3, pp. 729-750.

 

Rodney D. Ludema (2001), “Market Collusion and the Politics of Protection”. European Journal of Political Economy; V.17-#4, pp. 817-833

 

Breton and Pierre Salmon (2001). “External Effects of Domestic Regulations: Comparing Internal and International Barriers to Trade”. International Review of Law and Economics; V.21-#2, pp. 135-155.


Topic III. Liberalization, Labor Markets and Adjustment Assistance

 

● Trade and Labor Markets

 

■ Analytics of Trade and Labor Markets: The Stolper-Samuelson Theorem


*Wolfgang Stolper and Paul Samuelson (1941). “Protection and Real Wages”.Review of Economic Studies; V.9-#1, pp.58-73.


*Jones, Ronald (1965). “The Structure of Simple General Equilibrium Models”.Journal of Political Economy; V.73-#6, pp. 557-572.


*Jones, Ronald (2000). “Technical Progress, Price Adjustments and Wages”.Review of International Economics; V.8-#3, pp. 497-503


L.A. Metzler (1949). “Tariffs, the Terms of Trade, and the Distribution of National Income”. Journal of Political Economy. V.57-#1, pp. 1-29. also in Caves and Johnson.


Jagdish Bhagwati (1959). “Protection, Real Wages, and Real Incomes”.Economic Journal; V.69-#276, pp. 733-748.


H.G. Johnson (1960). “Income Distribution, the Offer Curve and the Effects of Tariffs”. Manchester School; V.28-#3, pp. 215-242.


W. Ethier (1984). “Protection and Real Incomes Once Again”. Quarterly Journal of Economics; V.99-#1, pp. 193-200.


*Jones, Ronald and José Scheinkman (1977). “The Relevance of the Two-Sector Production Model in Trade Theory”. Journal of Political Economy; V.85-#5, pp. 909-935.


*P.J. Lloyd and A. Schweinberger (1997). “Conflict Generating Product Price Changes: The Imputed Output Approach”. European Economic Review; V.41-#?, pp. 1569-1587.


*B. Xu (2001). “Factor Bias, Sector Bias and the Effects of Technical Progress on Relative Factor Prices”. Journal of International Economics; V.54-#1, pp. 5-25.

 

■ Empirics of Trade and Labor Markets, 1: Is there a Link between Trade and Wages

 

○ Factor Content Studies


*Deardorff, Alan and Robert Staiger (1988). “An Interpretation of the Factor Content of Trade”. Journal of International Economics; V.24-#1/2, pp. 93-107.


*Leamer, Edward (1996). “What’s the Use of Factor Contents”. Journal of International Economics, V50-#1, pp. 17-49.


P. Krugman (2000). “Technology, Trade and Factor Prices”. Journal of International Economics, V50-#1, pp. 51-71


A. Deardorff (2000). “Factor Prices and the Factor Content of Trade Revisited: What’s the Use”. Journal of International Economics, V50-#1, pp. 73-90.


A. Panagariya (2000). “Evaluating the Factor-Content Approach to Measuring the Effect of Trade on Wage Inequality”. Journal of International Economics, V50-#1, pp. 91-116.


W. Kohler (1999). “Trade and Wages: What Can Factor Contents Tell Us?”. ms: Department of Economics, University of Linz.


L. Katz and K. Murphy (1992). “Changes in Relative Wages, 1963-1987: Supply and Demand Factors”. Quarterly Journal of Economics; V.107-#1, pp. 35-78.


*G. Borjas, R. Freeman and L. Katz (1997). “How Much Do Immigration and Trade Affect Labor Market Outcomes”. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity; 1997-#1, pp. 1-90. [comments]

 

E. Berman, J. Bound and Z. Grilliches (1994). “Changes in the Demand for Skilled Labor within US Manufacturing: Evidence from the Annual Survey of Manufactures”. Quarterly Journal of Economics; V.109-#2, pp. 367-397.


R. Baldwin (2000). “Inferring Relative Factor Price Changes from Quantitative Data”. in M. Blomström and L. Goldberg, Eds. Topics in Empirical International Economics: A Festschrift in Honor of Bob Lipsey. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 47-64.

 

○ Mandated Wage (Jones-Baldwin) Regressions


*Baldwin, Robert and G. Cain (2000). “Shifts in Relative US Wages: The Role of Trade, Technology and Factor Endowments”. Review of Economics and Statistics; V.82-#4, pp. 580-595..


*Feenstra, Robert and Gordon Hanson (1999). “Productivity Measurement and the Impact of Trade and Technology on Wages: Estimates for the US, 1972-1990”.Quarterly Journal of Economics; V.114-#3, pp. 907-940.


*Leamer, Edward (1996). “In Search of Stolper-Samuelson Effects on US Wages”. in S. Collins, ed. Imports, Exports and the American Worker. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 141-214.


T. Desjonqueres, S. Machin, and J. Van Reenen (1999). “Another Nail in the Coffin? Or Can the Trade Based Explanation of Changing Skill Structures be Resurrected?”. Scandinavian Journal of Economics; V.101-#4, pp. 533-554.


*J. Haskel and M. Slaughter (1999). “Trade, Technology and U.K. Wage Inequality”. Economic Journal; V.111-#468, pp. 163-187.


Baldwin, Robert and R. Spence Hilton (1984). “A Technique for Indicating Comparative Costs and Predicting Changes in Trade Ratios”. Review of Economics and Statistics; V.66-#1, pp. 105-110.


R.S. Hilton (1984). “Commodity Trade and Relative Return to Factors of Production”. Journal of International Economics; V.16-#?, pp. 259-270.

 

○ GNP Function Approach (Alternative)


James Harrigan and Rita Balaban (1997). “U.S. Wages in General Equilibrium: Estimating the Effects of Trade, Technology, and Factor Supplies, 1963-1991". ms.: Federal Reserve Bank of New York.


*J. Harrigan (2000). “International Trade and American Wages in General Equilibrium, 1967-1995.  in R. Feenstra, ed. The Impact of International Trade on Wages. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 171-193.


D. Burgess (1976). “Tariffs and Income Distribution--Some Empirical Evidence for the US”. Journal of Political Economy; V.84-#1, pp. 17-45.


J. Chipman (1978). “Towards the Construction of an Optimal Aggregative Model of International Trade: West Germany, 1963-1975". Annals of Economic and Social Measurement; V.6-#?, pp. 535-554.


Kohli, Ulrich (1991). Technology, Duality, and Foreign Trade. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

 

○ CGE Approaches (Alternative)


R. Rowthorn, R. Kozul-Wright, and Y. Akyüz (1997). “Adapting to North-South Trade: A General Equilibrium Approach to Policy Options”. Oxford Economic Papers; V.49-#3, pp. 483-503.


R. Tyers and Y. Yang (1997). “Trade with Asia and Skill Upgrading: Effects on Labor Markets in the Older Industrial Countries”. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv,; V.133-#3, pp. 383-417.


P. Krugman (1995). “Growing World Trade: Causes and Consequences”. Brookings Papers on Economic Analysis, #1, pp. 327-362. [comment]


W. Cline (1997). Trade and Income Distribution. Washington, DC: IIE. [Chapters 3 & 4]


P. Minford, J. Riley, and E. Nowell (1997). “Trade Technology and Labor Markets in the World Economy, 1970-1990: A Computable General Equilibrium Analysis”. Journal of Development Studies; V.34-#?, pp. 1-34.


A. Smith (1998). “The Labour Market Effects of Trade: A Computable General Equilibrium Approach”. in Mathias Dewatripont, AndrÉ Sapir, and Khalid Sekkat, eds. Trade and Jobs in Europe: Much Ado About Nothing? Oxford: Oxford University Press.


J. Francois and D. Nelson (1998). “Trade, Technology and Wages: General Equilibrium Mechanics”. Economic Journal, V.108-#450, pp. 1483-1499.


K. Reinert and D. Roland-Holst (1998). “North-South Trade and Occupational Wages: Some Evidence from North America”. Review of International Economics; V.6-#1, pp. 74-89.

 

○ Trade and Labor Demand Elasticity

 

D. Rodrik (1997). “Consequences of Trade for Labor Markets and the Employment Relationship”. Has Globalization Gone Too Far. Washington, DC: IIE, pp. 11-27.

 

P. Krugman (1999). “Domestic Policies in a Global Economy”. In S. Collins and R. Lawrence, eds. Brookings Trade Forum 1999. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 73-93. [esp. “Appendix: Trade and the Elasticity of Demand for Labor”, pp. 89-93.]

 

Jean, Sebastien (2000). “The Effect of International Trade on Labor-Demand Elasticities: Intersectoral Matters”. Review of International Economics; V.8-#3, pp. 504-16.

 

M. Slaughter (2001). “International Trade and Labor-Demand Elasticities”. Journal of International Economics; V.54-#1, pp. 27-56.

 

Sajjid Chinoy, Pravin Krishna, and Devashish Mitra (2001). “Trade Liberalization and Labor Demand Elasticities: Evidence from Turkey”. Journal of International Economics, V.55-#2, pp. 391-409.

 

Panagariya, A. (1999). “Trade Openness: Consequences for the Elasticity of Demand for Labor and Wage Outcomes”. Ms: University of Maryland.

 

■ Labor Market Microstructure, Trade and Wages (Alternative)


*Steven Matusz (1985). “The Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson Model with Implicit Contracts”.Quarterly Journal of Economics; V.100-#4, pp. 1313-1329.


*C. Davidson, L. Martin, and S. Matusz (1999). “Trade and Search Generated Unemployment”. Journal of International Economics; V.48-#2, pp. 271-299.


*Andrew Bernard and J. Bradford Jensen (1995). “Exporters, Jobs, and Wages in U.S. Manufacturing: 1976-1987.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Microeconomics, pp.67-112.


*Andrew Bernard and J. Bradford Jensen (1997). “Exporters, Skill Upgrading, and the Wage Gap.” Journal of International Economics, V.42-#1/2, pp. 3-31.

 

Borjas, George and Valerie Ramey (1994). “The Relationship between Wage Inequality and International Trade”. In J.H. Bergstrand, T.F. Cosimano, J.W. Houck, and R.G. Sheehan, eds. The Changing Distribution of Income in an Open U.S. Economy. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 217-241.

 

*Noel Gaston and Daniel Trefler (1995). “Union Wage Sensitivity to Trade and Protection: Theory and Evidence.” Journal of International Economics; V.39-#1/2, pp.1-25.

 

■ Trade and Labor Market Adjustment

 

○ Adjustment Costs and the Welfare Economics of Adjustment Assistance


W.M. Corden (1974). Trade Policy and Economic Welfare. Oxford: OUP. pp. 104-112.


A. Deardorff (1987). “Safeguards Policy and the Conservative Social Welfare Function”.  in H. Kierzkowski, ed. Protection and Competition in International Trade. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 22-40.


J.P. Neary (1982). “Intersectoral Capital Mobility, Wage Stickiness, and the Case for Trade Adjustment Assistance”. in J. Bhagwati, ed. Import Competition and Response. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 39-64.


M. Mussa (1982). “Government Policy and the Adjustment Process”. in J. Bhagwati, ed. Import Competition and Response. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 13-122.


P. Diamond (1982). “Protection, Trade Adjustment Assistance, and Income Distribution”. J. Bhagwati, ed. Import Competition and Response. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 123-145.


H. Flam, T. Persson and L.E.O. Svensson (1983). “Optimal Subsidies to Declining Industries”. Journal of Public Economics; V.22-#?, pp. 327-345.


M. Riordan and R. Staiger (1993). “Sectoral Shocks and Structural Unemployment”. International Economic Review; V.34-#3, pp. 611-629.


R. Feenstra and T. Lewis (1994). “Trade Adjustment Assistance and Pareto Gains from Trade”. Journal of International Economics; V.36-#3/4, pp. 201-222.


J. Brander and B. Spencer (1994). “Trade Adjustment Assistance: Welfare and Incentive Effects of Payments to Displaced Workers”.  Journal of International Economics; V.36-#3/4, pp. 239-261.


W. Mayer (1994). “Optimal Pursuit of Safeguard Actions over Time”. in A. Deardorff and R. Stern, eds. Analytical and Negotiating Issues in the Global Trading System. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 315-355.


K.C. Fung and R. Staiger (1996). “Trade Liberalization and Trade Adjustment Assistance”. in M. Canzoneri, W. Ethier and V. Grilli, eds. The New Transatlantic Economy. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 265-286.

 

○ Stochastic Shocks

 

R. Staiger and G. Tabellini (1989). “Rules and Discretion in Trade Policy”. European Economic Review; V.33-#?, pp. 1265-1277.


R. Boadway and D. Wildasin (1990). “Optimal Tax-Subsidy Policies for Industrial Adjustment to Uncertain Shocks”. Oxford Economic Paper; V.42-#?, pp. 105-134.


M. Gavin (1990). “Structural Adjustment to a Terms of Trade Disturbance”: The Role of Relative Prices”. Journal of International Economics; V.28-#?, pp. 217-243.


A. Dixit and R. Rob (1994). “Risk-Sharing, Adjustment and Trade”. Journal of International Economics; V.36-#3/4, pp. 263-287.


R.H. Bates, P. Brock and J. Tiefenthaler (1991). “Risk and Trade Regimes: Another Look”. International Organization; V.45-#1, pp. 1-18.


D. Rodrik (1998). “Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments?”.Journal of Political Economy; V.106-#5, pp. 997-1032.

 

■ Empirics of Trade and Adjustment

 

○ Identifying Trade Sensitive Sectors and Trade-Displaced Workers


J. Martin (1979). “Measuring the Effects of Changes in Trade Flows: A Survey of Recent Research”. In The Impact of the Newly Industrialized Countries on Production and Trade in Manufactures. Paris: OECD.


J. Martin and J. Evans (1981). “Notes on Measuring the Employment Displacement Effects of Trade by the Accounting Procedure”. Oxford Economic Paper; V.33-#1, pp. 154-164.


G. Grossman (1982). “Comment”. In J. Bhagwati, ed. Import Competition and Response. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 396-399.


C. Driver, A. Kilpatrick and B. Naisbitt (1988). “The Sensitivity of Estimated Employment Effects in Input-Output Studies: An Example of the Use of Marginal versus Average Coefficients”. Economic Modelling; V.5-#2, pp. 145-150.


C.M. Aho and J. Orr (1981). “Trade Sensitive Employment: Who are the Affected Workers?”. Monthly Labor Review; V.104-#2, pp. 29-35.


C. K. Schoepfle (1982). “Imports and Domestic Employment: Identifying Affected Industries”. Monthly Labor Review; V.105-#8, pp. 13-26.

 

○ Empirics of Trade and Employment

 

US Case


A. Krueger (1980). “Restructruing for Import Competition from Developing Countries, I: Labor Displacements and Economic Redeployment in the US”.Journal of Policy Modeling; V.2-#?, pp. 165-184.


G. Grossman (1987). “The Employment and Wage Effects of Import Competition in the US”. Journal of International Economics and Integration; V.2-#1, pp. 1-23.


W. Dickens (1988). “The Effects of Trade on Employment: Techniques and Evidence”. In L. D’A. Tyson, W. Dickens and J. Zysman, eds. The Dynamics of Trade and Employment. Cambridge: Ballinger, pp. 41-85.


D. Kruse (1988). “International Trade and the Labor Market Experience of Displaced Workers”. Industrial and Labor Relations Review; V.41-#3, pp. 402-417.


C. Mann (1988). “The Effect of Foreign Competition in Prices and Quanitites on the Employment in Import Sensitive U.S. Industries”. International Trade Journal; V.2-#?, pp. 409-444.


A. Revenga (1992). “Exporting Jobs? The Impact of Import Competition on Employment and Wages in US Manufacturing”. Quarterly Journal of Economics; V.107-#1, pp. 255-284.


T. Hungerford (1995). “International Trade, Comparative Advantage, and the Incidence of Layoff Employment Spells”. Review of Economics and Statistics; V.77-#3, pp. 511-521.


J. Addison, D. Fox, and C. Ruhm (1995). “Trade and Displacement in Manufacturing”. Monthly Labor Review; V.118-#?, pp. 58-67.


D. Clark, H. Herzog, and A. Schlottmann (1998). “Import Competition, Employment Risk, and the Job-Search Outcomes of Trade-Displaced Manufacturing Workers”. Industrial Relations; V.37-#2, pp. 182-206.


L. Kletzer (1998). “International Trade and Job Displacement in U.S. Manufacturing, 1979-1991". in S. Collins, ed. Imports, Exports, and the American Worker. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 422-472.


R. Staiger, A. Deardorff, and R. Stern (1987). “Employment Effects of Japanese and American Protectionism”. In D. Salvatore, ed. The New Protectionist Threat to World Welfare. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 164-180.


H. Lee and D. Roland-Holst (1994). “Shifting Comparative Advantage and the Employment Effects of US-Japan Trade”. World Economy; V.17-#3, pp. 323-363.

 

European Cases


D. Schumacher (1984). “North-South Trade and Shifts in Employment: A Comparative Analysis of Six European Community Countries”. International Labor Review; V.3-#?, pp. 333-347.


A. Sapir and D. Schumacher (1985). “The Employment Impact of Shifts in the Composition of Commodity and Services Trade”. Employment Growth and Structural Change. Paris: OECD.


C. Driver, A. Kilpatrick and B. Naisbitt (198?). “The Employment Effects of Changes in the Structure of UK Trade”. Journal of Economic Studies; V.12-#5, pp. 19-38.


C. Driver, A. Kilpatrick and B. Naisbitt (1985). “The UK Employment Effects of Trade Expansion with the EEC and the NICs”. European Economic Review; V.30-#2, pp. 427-38.


P. Messerlin (1995). “The Impact of Trade and Capital Movements on Labour: Evidence on The French Case”. OECD Economic Studies, #24, pp. 89-124.


J. Konigs and H. Vandenbussche (1995). “The Effect of Foreign Competition on UK Employment and Wages: Evidence from Firm-level Panel Data”. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; V.131-#4, pp. 655-671.


K. Aiginger, R. Winter-Ebmer, and J. Zweimüller (1996). “Eastern European Trade and the Austrian Labor Market”. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; V.132-#3, pp. 476-500.

 

D. Greenaway, R. Hine, and P. Wright (1999). “An Empirical Assessment of the Impact of Trade on Employment in the United Kingdom”. European Journal of Political Economy; V.15-#3, pp. 485-500.

 

Other


K. Lang (1998). “The Effect of Trade Liberalization on Wages and Employment: The Case of New Zealand”. Journal of Labor Economics; V.16-#4, pp. 792-814.


N. Gaston (1998). “The Impact of International Trade and Protection on Australian Manufacturing Employment”. Australian Economic Papers; V.37-#2, pp. 119-136.


A. Deardorff and R. Stern (1986). “Changes in Trade and Employment in the Major Industrialized Countries”. Chapter 9 in The Michigan Model of World Trade and Production. Cambridge: MIT, pp. 199-218.


B. Balassa (1986). “The Employment Effects of Trade in Manufactured Products Between Developed and Developing Countries”. Journal of Policy Modeling; V8-#3, pp. 371-390.

 

A. Wood (1991). “How Much Does Trade with the South Affect Workers in the North?”. World Bank Research Observer; V.6-#3, pp. 19-35.

 

○ Intra-Industry Trade and Adjustment


B. Balassa (1966). “Tariff Reductions and Trade in Manufactures Among the Industrial Countries”. American Economic Review; V.56-#3, pp. 466-473.


G. Hufbauer and J. Chilas (1972). “Specialization by Industrial Countries: Extent and Consequences”. in H. Giersch, ed. The International Division of Labor: Problems and Perspectives. Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr, pp. 3-38.


L. Lundberg and P. Hansson (1986). “Intra-Industry Trade and Its Consequences for Adjustment”. in D. Greenaway and P.K.M. Tharakan, eds. Imperfect Competition and International Trade: The Policy Aspects of Intra-Industry Trade. Brighton: Wheatsheaf, pp. 129-147.


R. Hine (1989). “Customs Union Enlargement and Adjustment: Spain’s Accession to the European Community”. Journal of Common Market Studies; V.28-#1, pp. 1-28.


C. Hamilton and P. Kniest (1991). “Trade Liberalisation, Structural Adjustment and Intra-industry Trade”. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; V.127-#2, pp. 356-367.


M. Brülhart (1994). “Marginal Intra-industry Trade: Measurement and Relevance for the Pattern of Industrial Adjustment”. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; V.130-#3, pp. 600-613.


P. Dixon and J. Menon (1997). “Measures of Intra-industry Trade as Indicators of Factor Market Disruption”. Economic Record; V.73-#222, pp. 233-237.


J. Menon and P. Dixon (1997). “Intra-Industry versus Inter-Industry Trade: Relevance for Adjustment Costs”. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; V.133-#1, pp. 164-169.


A. Azhar, R. Elliott, and C. Milner (1998). “Static and Dynamic Measurement of Intra-Industry Trade and Adjustment: A Geometric Reappraisal”. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; V.134-#?, pp. 404-422.


M. Brülhart and R. Elliott (1998). “Adjustment to the European Single Market: Inferences from Intra-industry Trade Patterns”. Journal of Economic Studies; V.25-#3, pp. 225-247.

 

M. Brülhart (2000). “Dynamics of Intra-Industry Trade and Labour-Market Adjustment”. Review of International Economics, V8-#3, pp. 420-435.


M. Lovely and D. Nelson (2000). “Marginal Intra Industry Trade and Labour Adjustment”. Review of International Economics, V8-#3, pp. 436-447.


M. Lovely and D. Nelson (2001). “”Intra-Industry Trade as an Indicator of Labor-Market Adjustment”. Ms: Syracuse University/Tulane University.


M. Brülhart, Anthony Murphy, and Eric Strobl (1998). “Intra-Industry Trade and Job Turnover”.  GLM Research Paper, No. 98/4.

 

● Law and Economics of Trade Adjustment Assistance

 

■ Institutions and Policy


R. Baldwin and J. Mutti (1973). “Policy Issues in Adjustment Assistance: The US”. in H. Hughes, ed. Prospects for Partnership: Industrialization and Trade Policies in the 1970s. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins/World Bank, pp. 148-177.


OECD (1975). Adjustment for Trade: Studies in Industrial Adjustment Problems and Policies.  Paris: OECD.


C. Frank and S. Levinson (1977). Foreign Trade and Domestic Aid. Washington, DC: Brookings.

 

W. Dewald, ed. (1978). The Impact of International Trade and Investment on Employment. Washington, DC: US Department of Labor.


J.D. Richardson (1982). “Trade Adjustment Assistance Under the Trade Act of 1974: An Analytical Examination and Worker Survey”. in J. Bhagwati, ed. Import Competition and Response. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 321-368.


R. Lawrence and R. Litan (1986). Saving Free Trade: A Pragmatic Approach. Washington, DC: Brookings.


L. Jacobson (1998). “Compensation Programs”. in S. Collins, ed. Imports, Exports, and the American Worker. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 473-537.


E. Kapstein (1998). “Trade Liberalization and the Politics of Trade Adjustment Assistance”. International Labour Review; v.137-#4, pp. 501-516.

 

■ Some Basic Analytics

 

W.M. Corden (1974). Trade Policy and Economic Welfare. Oxford: OUP. pp. 104-112.

 

A. Deardorff (1987). “Safeguards Policy and the Conservative Social Welfare Function”. in H. Kierzkowski, ed. Protection and Competition in International Trade. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 22-40.

 

P. Neary (1982). “Intersectoral Capital Mobility, Wage Stickiness, and the Case for Trade Adjustment Assistance”. in J. Bhagwati, ed. Import Competition and Response. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 39-64.

 

M. Mussa (1982). “Government Policy and the Adjustment Process”. in J. Bhagwati, ed. Import Competition and Response. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 13-122.

 

P. Diamond (1982). “Protection, Trade Adjustment Assistance, and Income Distribution”. J. Bhagwati, ed. Import Competition and Response. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 123-145.

 

H. Flam, T. Persson and L.E.O. Svensson (1983). “Optimal Subsidies to Declining Industries”. Journal of Public Economics; V.22-#?, pp. 327-345.

 

R. Boadway and D. Wildasin (1990). “Optimal Tax-Subsidy Policies for Industrial Adjustment to Uncertain Shocks”. Oxford Economic Papers; V.42-#?, pp. 105-134.

 

M. Gavin (1990). “Structural Adjustment to a Terms of Trade Disturbance”: The Role of Relative Prices”. Journal of International Economics; V.28-#?, pp. 217-243.

 

M. Riordan and R. Staiger (1993). “Sectoral Shocks and Structural Unemployment”. International Economic Review; V.34-#?, pp. 611-629.

 

R. Feenstra and T. Lewis (1994). “Trade Adjustment Assistance and Pareto Gains from Trade”. Journal of International Economics; V.36-#3/4, pp. 201-222.

 

J. Brander and B. Spencer (1994). “Trade Adjustment Assistance: Welfare and Incentive Effects of Payments to Displaced Workers”. Journal of International Economics; V.36-#3/4, pp. 239-261.

 

A. Dixit and R. Rob (1994). “Risk-Sharing, Adjustment and Trade”. Journal of International Economics; V.36-#3/4, pp. 263-287.

 

W. Mayer (1994). “Optimal Pursuit of Safeguard Actions over Time”. in A. Deardorff and R. Stern, eds. Analytical and Negotiating Issues in the Global Trading System. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 315-355.

 

K.C. Fung and R. Staiger (1996). “Trade Liberalization and Trade Adjustment Assistance”. in M. Canzoneri, W. Ethier and V. Grilli, eds. The New Transatlantic Economy. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 265-286.

 

■ Uncertainty and Tariffs as Insurance

 

S. Turnovsky (1978). “The Distribution of Welfare Gains from Price Stabilization: A Survey of Some Theoretical Issues”. in F. Adams and S. Klein, eds. Stabilizing World Commodity Markets. Lexington: D.C. Heath, pp. 119-148,

 

D. Newberry and J. Stiglitz (1981). The Theory of Commodity Price Stabilization. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

 

D. Newberry (1984). “Commodity Price Stabilization in Imperfectly Competitive Markets”. in G. Storey, A. Schmitz and A. Sarris, eds. International Agricultural Trade. Boulder: Westview Press.

 

C. Gilbert (1985). “Futures Trading and the Welfare Evaluation of Commodity Price Stabilisation”. Economic Journal; V.95-#379, pp. 637-661.

 

S. Turnovsky, H. Shalit and A. Schmitz (1980). “Consumer’s Surplus, Price Instability, and Consumer Welfare”. Econometrica; V.48-#1, pp. 135-152.

 

E.K. Choi and S. Johnson (1987). “Consumers’ Surplus and Price Uncertainty”. International Economic Review; V.?-#?, pp. 407-411.

 

E.K. Choi and S. Johnson (1991). “Uncertainty, Price Stabilization and Welfare”. Southern Economic Journal; V.57-#3, pp. 789-797.

 

D. Newberry and J. Stiglitz (1984). “Pareto Inferior Trade”. Review of Economic Studies. V.51-#1, pp. 1-12.

 

J. Eaton and G. Grossman (1985). “Tariffs as Insurance: Optimal Commercial Policy When Domestic Markets are Incomplete”. Canadian Journal of Economics. V.18-#2, pp. 258-272.

 

J. Cassing, A.L. Hillman and N.V.Long (1986). “Risk Aversion, Terms of Trade Uncertainty and Social Consensus Trade Policy”. Oxford Economic Papers. V.38-#?, pp. 234-242.

 

D. DeMeza (1987). “The Optimal Tariff and Quota when Terms of Trade are Random”. Oxford Economic Papers; V39-#?, pp. 412-417.

 

R. Fernandez and D. Rodrik (1991). “Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty”. American Economic Review; V.81-#5, pp. 1146-1155.

 

S. Lahiri and J. Sheen (1990). “Terms of Trade Vulnerability and National Welfare in a Small Open Economy”. Oxford Economic Papers; V.42-#?, pp. 526-543.

 

O. Shy (1988). “A General Equilibrium Model of Pareto Inferior Trade”. Journal of International Economics; V.25-#?, pp. 143-154.

 

A.L. Hillman, E. Katz and J. Rosenberg (1987). “Workers as Insurance: Anticipated Government Assistance and Factor Demand”. Oxford Economic Papers; V.39-#?, 813-820.

 

A. Dixit (1987). “Trade and Insurance with Moral Hazard”. Journal of International Economics; V.23-#?, pp. 201-220.

 

A. Dixit (1989). “Trade and Insurance with Adverse Selection”. Review of Economic Studies; V.56-#?, pp. 235-248.

 

A.Dixit (1989). “Trade and Insurance with Imperfectly Observed Outcomes”. Quarterly Journal of Economics; V.104-#1, pp. 195-203.


R.H. Bates, P. Brock and J. Tiefenthaler (1991). “Risk and Trade Regimes: Another Look”. International Organization; V.45-#1, pp. 1-18.


D. Rodrik (1998). “Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments?”.Journal of Political Economy; V.106-#5, pp. 997-1032.

 

R. Staiger and G. Tabellini (1987). “Distortionary Trade Policy and Excessive Protection”. American Economic Review; V.77-#5, pp.

 

H. Lapan (1988). “The Optimal Tariff, Production Lags, and Time Consistency”. American Economic Review; V.78-#3, pp. 395-401.

 

H. Lapan (1991). “The Optimal Tariff, Time Consistency and Immiserizing Growth in a Large Country”. Journal of International Economics; V.6-#1, pp. 27-39.

 

P. Srivastava (1994). “Nationalizing to Liberalize: Credibility in Trade Liberalization”. Journal of International Economics; V.36-#3/4, pp. 449-465.

 

R. Staiger and G. Tabellini (1989). “Rules and Discretion in Trade Policy”. European Economic Review; V.33-#?, pp. 1265-1277.

 

R. Fischer and T. Prusa (1999). “Contingent Protection as Better Insurance”. NBER Working Paper, #6933.


Topic IV. Political Economy of Trade Policy

 

● Deriving Trade Policy Preferences

 

■ Some Theory

 

J. Bhagwati (1982). “Shifting Comparative Advantage, Protectionist Demands and Policy Response”. in J. Bhagwati, ed. Import Competition and Response. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 153-184.

 

E. Dinopoulos (1983). “Import Competition, International Factor Mobility and Lobbying Responses”. Journal of International Economics; V.14-#?, pp. 395-410.

 

J. deMelo and S. Robinson (1982). “Trade Adjustment Policies and Income Distribution in Three Archetype Developing Economies”. Journal of Development Economics; V.10-#?, pp. 67-92.

 

R. Baldwin (1984). “Rent-Seeking and Trade Policy: An Industry Approach”. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; V.120-#4, pp. 662-676.

 

L. Leger (1993). “Land Rents and the Demand for Protection”. International Trade Journal; V.7-#4, pp. 435-462.

 

■ Some Empirics

 

T. Pugel and I. Walter (1985). “US Corporate Interests and the Political Economy of Trade”. Review of Economics and Statistics; V.??-#?, pp. 465-473.

 

V. Aggarwal, R. Keohane and D. Yoffie (1987). “The Dynamics of Negotiated Protection”. American Political Science Review; V.81-#2, pp. 345-366.

 

H. Milner and D. Yoffie (1989). “Between Free Trade and Protectionism: Strategic Trade Policy and a Theory of Corporate Trade Demands”. International Organization; V.43-#2, pp. 239-272.

 

S. Magee (1978). “Three Simple Tests of the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem”. in P. Oppenheimer, ed. Issues in International Economics; Stocksfield: Oriel Press, pp. 138-153.

 

D. Nelson and C. Wasley (1989). “Two is Not Enough: A Capital Market Test of 3x2 Endogenous Tariff Theory”. ms: Murphy Institute, Tulane University.

 

A. Krueger (1980). “Protectionist Pressures, Imports and Employment in the US”. Scandinavian Journal of Economics; V.??-#?, pp. 133-146.

 

I.M. Destler and J. Odell (1987). Anti-Protection: Changing Forces in US Trade Politics. Washington, DC: IIE.

 

H. Milner (1988). Resisting Protectionism: Global Industries and the Politics of International Trade. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

 

E. Balisteri (1997). “The Performance of the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek Model in Predicting Endogenous Trade Policy Forces at the Individual Level”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.30-#1, pp. 1-17.

 

K. Scheve and M. Slaughter (2001). “What Determines Individual Trade Policy Preferences”. Journal of International Economics; V.54-#2, pp. 267-292.

 

K. O’Rourke and R. Sinnott (2001). “The Determinants of Individual Trade Policy Preferences: International Survey Evidence”. Brookings Trade Policy Forum 2001, forthcoming.

 

A.M. Mayda and D. Rodrik (2001). “Why Are Some People (and Countries) More Protectionist Than Others?”. ms: Kennedy School of Government.

 

● Organizing Economic Interests to Pursue Political Goals

 

P. Murrell (1981?). “Comparative Growth and Comparative Advantage: Tests of the Effects of Interest Group Behavior on Foreign Trade Patterns”. Public Choice; V.??-#?, pp. 35-53

 

D. Yoffie and S. Bergenstein (1985). “Creating Political Advantage: The Rise of the Corporate Political Entrepreneur”. California Management Review; V.28-#1, pp. 124-139.

 

G. Lehmbruch (1986). “Interest Groups, Government and the Politics of Protectionism”. Aussenwirtschaft; V.41-#2/3, pp. 273-302.

 

H.K. Hall and D. Nelson (1989). “Institutional Structure and Time Horizon in a Simple Political-Economy Model: The Lowi Effect”. International Spectator; V.24-#3/4, pp.153-173.

 

A.L. Hillman (1991). “Protection, Politics and Market Structure”. in E. Helpman and A. Razin, eds. International Trade and Trade Policy. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 120-140.

 

M. Herander and R. Pupp (1991). “Firm Participation in Steel Industry Lobbying”. Economic Inquiry; V.29-#?, pp. 134-147.

 

S. Lenway and D. Schuler (1991). “The Determinants of Corporate Political Involvement in Trade Protection: The Case of the Steel Industry.” in R. Baldwin, ed. Empirical Studies of Commercial Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 75-105.

 

P. Midford (1993). “International Trade and Domestic Politics: Improving on Rogowski’s Model of Political Alignments”. International Organization; V.47-#?, pp. 535-564.

 

J. Alt and M. Gilligan (1994). “The Political Economy of Trading States: Factor Specificity, Collective Action Problems and Domestic Political Institutions”. Journal of Political Philosophy; V.2-#?, pp. 165-192.

 

K. Gawande (1997). “US Non-Tariff Barriers as Privately Provided Public Goods”. Journal of Public Economics; V.64-#?, pp. 61-81.

 

K. Gawande (1998). “Stigler-Olson Lobbying Behavior in Protectionist Industries: Evidence from the Lobbying Power Function”. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization; V.35-#?, pp. 477-499.

 

Y. S. Chiu (1998). “Politics, Structure of Protection, and Welfare”. Review of International Economics; V.6-#3, pp.

 

D. Mitra (1999). “Endogenous Lobby Formation and Endogenous Protection: A Long-Run Model of Trade Policy Determination”. American Economic Review; V.89-#5, pp. 1116-1134.

 

R. Damania and P.G. Fredriksson (2000). “On the Formation of Industry Lobby Groups”. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. V.41-#4, pp. 315-335.

 

L. Salamon and J. Siegfried (1977). “Economic Power and Political Influence: The Impact of Industry Structure on Public Policy”. American Political Science Review; V.71-#?, pp. 1026-1043.

 

E. Esty and R. Caves (1983). “Market Structure and Political Influence: New Data on Political Expenditures, Activity and Success”. Economic Inquiry; V.?-#?, pp. 24-38.

 

D. Jacobs (1988). “Corporate Economic Power and the State: A Longitudinal Assessment”. American Journal of Sociology; V.93-#4, pp. 852-881.

 

D. Clawson and A. Neustadtl (1989). “Interlocks, PACs, and Corporate Conservatism”. American Journal of Sociology; V.94-#4, pp. 749-793.

 

K. Grier, M. Munger and B. Roberts (1991). “The Industrial Organization of Corporate Political Participation”. Southern Economic Journal; V.57-#3, pp. 727-738.

 

B. Kennelly and P. Murrell (1991). “Industry Characteristics and Interest Group Formation: An Empirical Study”. Public Choice; V.70-#1, pp. 21-40.

 

L. Kristov, P. Lindert and R. McClelland (1992). “Pressure Groups and Redistribution”. Journal of Public Economics; V.48-#?, pp. 135-163.

 

T. Moe (1980). The Organization of Interests. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

 

G.K. Wilson (1977). Unions in American National Politics. London: Macmillan.

 

G.K. Wilson (1985). Business and Politics: A Comparative Introduction. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House.

 

L. Lynn and T. McKeown (1988). Organizing Business: Trade Associations in America and Japan. Washington,DC: AEI.

 

D. Mitchell (1970). “Labor and the Tariff Question”. Industrial Relations; V.1-#3, pp. 268-276.

 

● Simple Models of Political Economic Equilibrium

 

■ Support Function Models


*A.L. Hillman (1982). “Declining Industries and Political Support Protectionist Motives”. American Economic Review; V.72-#5, pp. 1180-1187.


*J. Cassing and A.L. Hillman (1986). “Shifting Comparative Advantage and Senescent Industry Collapse”. American Economic Review; V.76-#?, pp. 516-523.


*N.V. Long and N. Vousden (1991). “Protectionist Responses and Declining Industries”. Journal of International Economics; V.30-#1/2, pp. 87-103.


*S. Wellisz and J.D. Wilson (1986). “Lobbying and Tariff Formation: A Deadweight Loss Consideration”. Journal of International Economics; V.20-#?, pp. 367-375.


R.V. Fabella (1991). “The Bias in Favor of Pro-Tariff Lobbies”. Journal of Public Economics; V.44-#1, pp. 87-93.

 

■ Voting Models


*W. Mayer (1984). “Endogenous Tariff Formation”. American Economic Review; V.74-#5, pp. 970-985.


W. Mayer and J. Li (1994). “Interest Groups, Electoral Competition, and Probabilistic Voting for Trade Policies”. Economics & Politics; V.6-#1, pp. 59-77.


W. Mayer (1998). “Trade Policy Platforms of Competing Parties: What Makes Them Different?”. Review of International Economics; V.6-#2, pp. 185-203.


C.C. Yang (1995). “Endogenous Tariff Formation under Representative Democracy: A Probabilistic Voting Model”. American Economic Review; V.85-#4, pp. 956-963.


*H.K. Hall, C. Kao, and D. Nelson (1998). “Women and Tariffs: Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer Model”. Economic Inquiry; V.36-#2, pp. 320-332.

 

■ Lobbying Models


*R. Findlay and S. Wellisz (1982). “Endogenous Tariffs, the Political Economy of Trade Restrictions and Welfare”. in J. Bhagwati, ed. Import Competition and Response. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 223-234.


*H.K. Hall and D. Nelson (1992). “Institutional Structure in the Political Economy of Protection: Legislated versus Administered Protection”. Economics & Politics; V.4-#1, pp. 61-77.


*W. Mayer (1993). “Lobbying for Tariff Policies”. Review of International Economics; V.1-#3, pp. 221-233.

 

■ Another Lobbying Model-Grossman and Helpman


*G. Grossman and E. Helpman (1994). “Protection for Sale”. American Economic Review; V.84-#4, pp. 833-850.


A. Dixit (1996). “Special-Interest Lobbying and Endogenous Commodity Taxation”. Eastern Economic Journal; V.22-#4, pp. 375-388.


*A. Dixit, G. Grossman, and E. Helpman (1997). “Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Tax Policy”. Journal of Political Economy; V.105-#4, pp. 752-69.


*S. Lael Brainard and Thierry Verdier (1997). “The Political Economy of Declining Industries: Senescent Industry Collapse Revisited”. Journal of International Economics; V.42-#1/2, pp. 221-237.


R. Boylan (2000). “An Optimal Auction Perspective on Lobbying”. Social Choice and Welfare; V.17-#1, pp. 55-68.


*D. Mitra (1999). “Endogenous Lobby Formation and Endogenous Protection: A Long-Run Model of Trade Policy Determination”. American Economic Review; V.89-#5, pp. 1116-1134.


*P. Goldberg and G. Maggi (1999). “Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation”. American Economic Review; V.89-#5, pp. 1135-1155.

 

● Political -Economy Empirics (Alternative)

 

■ Ad Hoc Chicago Empirics


E. Ray (1981). “The Determinants of Tariffs and Nontariff Trade Restrictions in the US”. Journal of Political Economy; V.89-#1, pp. 105-121.


W. Dougan (1985). “Tariffs and the Economic Theory of Regulation”.Research in Law and Economics; V.6, pp. 187-210.


P. Godek (1985). “Industry Structure and Redistribution Through Trade Restrictions”. Journal of Law and Economics; V.28-#3, pp. 687-703.


R. Tyers (1990). “Implicit Policy Preferences and the Assessment of Negotiable Trade Policy Reforms”. European Economic Review; V.34-#?, pp. 1399-1426.


*D. Trefler (1993). “Trade Liberalization and the Theory of Endogenous Protection: An Econometric Study of US Import Policy”. Journal of Political Economy; V.101-#1, pp. 138-160.


*J.W. Lee and P. Swagel (1997). “Trade Barriers and Trade Flows across Countries and Industries”. Review of Economics and Statistics; V.79-#3, pp. 372-82.

 

■ Congressional Voting


R. Baldwin (1976). “The Political Economy of Postwar US Trade Policy”.NYU C.J. Devine Institute of Finance Bulletin--#4.


*C. Coughlin (1985). “Domestic Content Legislation: House Voting and the Economic Theory of Regulation”. Economic Inquiry; V.23-#?, pp. 437-448.


*J. McCarthur and S. Marks (1988). “Constituent Interest vs. Legislator Ideology: The Role of Political Opportunity Cost”. Economic Inquiry; V.26-#?, pp. 461-470.


S. Nollen and H. Iglarsh (1990). “Explanations of Protectionism in International Trade”. PC; V.66-#?, pp. 137-153.


S. Marks (1993). “Economic Interests and Voting on the Omnibus Trade Bill of 1987". PC, V.75-#1, pp. 21-42.


K. Srinivasan (1997). “An Empirical Analysis of the Political Economy of Tariffs”. Economics & Politics; V.9-#1, pp. 55-70.


*W. Keech and K. Pak (1995). “Partisanship, Institutions, and Change in American Trade Politics”. JoP; V.57-#4, pp. 1130-1142.


*W. Hansen and T. Prusa (1997). “The Role of the Median Legislator in US Trade Policy: A Historical Analysis”. Economic Inquiry; V.35-#1, pp. 97-107.


*M. Bailey and D. Brady (1998). “Heterogeneity and Representation: The Senate and Free Trade”. American Journal of Political Science; V.42-#2, pp. 524-544.


*R. Baldwin and C. Magee (1998). “Is Trade Policy for Sale? Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Bills”. NBER Working Paper, #6376.

 

■ Administered Protection

 

○ Presidential Preferences and Discretion


R. Baldwin (1981). “US Political Pressures Against Adjustment to Greater Imports”. in W. Hong and L. Krause, eds. Trade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of the Pacific Basin. Seoul: Korea Development Institute.


F. Boadu, F. Ruppel and A. Angel (1992). “An Empirical Model of Presidential Popularity and Presidential Discretion in Trade Restrictions”. European Journal of Political Economy; V.8-#?, pp. 281-293.

 

○ The ITA’s LTFV Decision


*J.M. Finger, H.K. Hall and D.R. Nelson (1982). “The Political Economy of Administered Protection”. American Economic Review; V.72-#3, pp. 452-466.


R. Baldwin and M. Moore (1992). “Political Aspects of the Administration of the Trade Remedy Law”. in R. Boltuck and R. Litan, eds. Down in the Dumps: Administration of the Unfair Trade Laws. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 253-280.

 

W.L. Hansen and K. O. Park (1995). “Nation-state and Pluralistic Decision Making in Trade Policy: The Case of the International Trade Administration”. International Studies Quarterly; V.39-#2, pp. 181-211.

 

○ The ITC’s Injury Decision


J. Goldstein and S. Lenway (1989). “Interests or Institutions: An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC Relations”. International Studies Quarterly; V.33-#3, pp. 303-327.


W. Hansen (1990). “The International Trade Commission and the Politics of Protection”. American Political Science Review; V.84-#1, pp. 21-46.


*R. Baldwin and J. Steagall (1991). “An Analysis of Factors Influencing ITC Decisions in Antidumping, Countervailing Duty and Safeguards Cases”. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; V.130-#2, pp. 290-307.


*M. Moore (1992). “Rules or Politics? An Empirical Analysis of Antidumping Decisions”. Economic Inquiry; V.30-#3, pp. 449-466.


T. Prusa (1991). “The Selection of Antidumping Cases for ITC Determination”. in R. Baldwin, ed. Empirical Studies of Commercial Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 47-71.


*W. Hansen and T. Prusa (1997). “The Economics and Politics of Trade Policy: An Empirical Analysis of ITC Decision Making”. Review of International Economics; V.5-#2, pp. 230-245.

 

J. DeVault (2002). “Congressional Dominance and the International Trade Commission”. Public Choice; V.110-#1/2, pp. 1-22.

 

○ Harassment and Withdrawal: Who Files and Why?


J.M. Finger (1981). “The Industry-Country Incidence of Less-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Trade”. Quarterly Review of Economics and Business; V.21-#?, pp. 260-279.


*R. Staiger and F. Wolak (1994). “Measuring Industry-specific Protection: Antidumping in the US”. Brookings Papers on Economic Analysis; 1994: Microeconomics, pp. 51-118. [comments]


*R. Staiger and F. Wolak (1996). “Differences in Uses and Effects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sources”. in A. Krueger, ed. The Political Economy of American Trade Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 385-415.

 

○ Comparative Analysis


P. Messerlin (1990). “The EC Antidumping Regulations: A First Economic Appraisal”. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; V.126-#?, pp. 562-587.


P.K.M. Thrakan (1991). “The Poltical Economy of Antidumping Undertakings in the European Communities”. European Economic Review; V.35-#?, pp. 1341-1359.


P.K.M. Tharakan and J. Waelbroeck (1994). “Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Decisions in the EC and in the US: An Experiment in Comparative Political Economy”. European Economic Review; V.38-#1, pp. 171-193.


A. Eymann and L. Schuknecht (1996). “Antidumping Policy in the European Community: Political Discretion or Technical Determination”. Economics & Politics; V.8-#2, pp. 111-131.

 

■ Macroeconomics in the Political Economy of Protection

 

○ Tariff Protection


R. Dornbusch and J. Frankel (1987). “Macroeconomics and Protection”.  in R. Stern, ed. US Trade Policies in a Changing World Economy. Cambridge: MIT.  pp. 77-130.


*G. Gardner and K. Kimbrough (1989). “The Behavior of US Tariff Rates”. American Economic Review; V.79-#1, pp. 91-110. [comment by Sadorsky, 1994, V.84-#4, pp. 1097-1103.]


*A. Bohara and W. Kaempfer (1991). “A Test of Tariff Endogeneity in the United States”. American Economic Review; V.81-#4, pp. 952-960.


A. Bohara and W. Kaempfer (1991). “Testing the Endogeneity of Tariff Policy in the US: Further Evidence”. Economics Letters; V.35-#?, pp. 311-315.


*S. Das and S.P. Das (1994). “Quantitative Assessment of Tariff Endogeneity: Interwar vs. Postwar”. Economics Letters; V.44-#?, pp. 139-146.


*M. Crucini (1994). “Sources of Variation in Real Tariff Rates: The US, 1900-1940”. American Economic Review; V.84-#3, pp. 732-743.


*D. Irwin (1996). “Changes in US Tariffs: Prices or Policies?”. American Economic Review; V.88-#4, pp. 1015-1026.


M. Crucini and J. Kahn (1996). “Tariffs and Aggregate Economic Activity: Lessons from the Great Depression”. Journal of Monetary Economics; V.38-#?, pp. 427-467.


A. Bohara and W. Kaempfer (1992). “Endogenous Protection and Retaliation Between Canada and the US”. Economics Letters; V.38-#?, pp. 335-339.


G. Gardner, D. Slottje and K. Kimbrough (1992). “Tariff Behavior in Five European Countries”. Economics Letters; V. 39-#?, pp. 73-78.


A. Bohara and W. Kaempfer (1994). “Tariff Behavior in Five European Countries: Further Evidence”. Economics Letters; V.45-#?, pp. 213-216.


I. Henriques and P. Sadorsky (1994). “The Determinants and Persistence of Canadian Tariff Rates”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.27-#1, pp. 112-128.


W. Thompson and L. Vescera (1992). “Growth Waves, Systemic Openness, and Protectionism”. International Organization; V.46-#2, pp. 493-532.

 

○ Administered Protection


*W. Takacs (1981). “Pressures for Protectionism: An Empirical Analysis”. Economic Inquiry; V.19-#?, pp. 687-693.


Salvatore, Dominick (1987). “Import Penetration, Exchange Rates, and Protectionism in the US”. Journal of Policy Modelling; V.9: pp. 125-141.


*C. Coughlin, J. Terza and N.A. Kahlifah (1989). “The Determinants of Escape Clause Petitions”. Review of Economics and Statistics; V.71-#2, pp. 341-347.


*M. Leidy (1997). “Macroeconomic Conditions and Pressures for Protection under Antidumping and Countervaling Duty Laws: Empirical Evidence from the US”. IMF Staff Papers; V.44-#1, pp. 132-144.

 

● Political Economy of Policy Reform


R. Fernandez and D. Rodrik (1991). “Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty”. American Economic Review; V.81-#5, pp. 1146-1155.


A. Alessina and A. Drazen (1991). “Why are Stabilizations Delayed?”. American Economic Review; V.81-#5, pp. 1170-1188.


T. Groves, Y. Hong, J. McMillan and B. Naughton (1994). “Autonomy and Incentives in Chinese State Enterprises”. Quarterly Journal of Economics; V.109-#1, pp. 183-209.


D. Nelson (1999). “Problems in the Political Economy of Trade Policy Reform”. Journal of International Trade and Economic Development, 1999, V.8-#1, pp. 3-26.