ECONOMICS 756: INTERNATIONAL TRADE, II

Professor: Douglas Nelson
Office: 108 Tilton (Murphy Institute)
Phone: 865-5317

This course has two fundamental goals:

1) To develop an understanding of the intuition, theory and method underlying research on trade policy; and

2) To develop an overall picture of the body of research on international trade policy.

International Trade I (Econ 755) emphasized the development of general equilibrium tools for the analysis of international trade and their application to positive problems of the economics of international trade. The emphasis of that course was primarily theoretical. This semester we examine several important areas of current research on international trade: attempts to evaluate the aggregate welfare effects of international trade policy; theoretical and empirical work evaluating the legal structures regulating international trade; theoretical and empirical work on the relationship between international trade and labor market outcomes; and, time permitting, theoretical and empirical work on the political economy of trade policy.

Developments in research on trade policy have been intimately related to the development of virtually every branch of economics. Since we cannot hope to cover all the interesting and important branches of this important field, we will pursue the two goals with a dual strategy. We will cover a small number of topics in considerable depth, emphasizing the link (or lack thereof) between theory and empirical content in contemporary research on the topic. Every week the seminar will study (approximately) three papers in detail. Those papers will be presented and discussed by the members of the seminar. In addition to our detailed consideration of these topics, every student will be expected to prepare a research paper on some aspect of trade policy, broadly construed.

While we will not have a textbook, many of the topics we will cover are discussed in more or less detail in your text from last semester:

J. Bhagwati, A. Panagariya, and T.N. Srinivasan (1998). Lectures on International Trade. Cambridge: MIT Press [BPS].

It is assumed that you have had graduate microeconomics (ECON 611) and international trade I (ECON 755). Standard sources you might want to keep handy are:

H. Varian (1984). Microeconomic Analysis. New York: Norton.

A. Dixit and V. Norman (1980). Theory of International Trade. Cambridge: Nisbet/Cambridge University Press. [Compact and clear. A masterly exposition of mainline trade theory. Useful to know also for its notation, which has become quite standard in trade theory.] (Dixit/Norman)

K.Y. Wong (1995). International Trade in Goods and Factor Mobility. Cambridge: MIT Press. [An advanced text, similar coverage to BPS, less emphasis on intuition, more emphasis on technique, and a distinctive emphasis on factor mobility] (Wong)

A. Woodland (1982). International Trade and Resource Allocation. Amsterdam: North Holland. [My favorite graduate-level trade text. Builds all tools from scratch, with an emphasis on duality methods (like Dixit/Norman and Wong), with excellent exercises after each chapter. Unfortunately, now out of print.) [Woodland]

Additional texts on trade policy to which we will have occasional recourse are:

W.M. Corden (1997). Trade Policy and Economic Welfare. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [There is no better presentation of the general issues and approaches to modern research on trade policy] (Corden)

D. Greenaway (1983). International Trade Policy: From Tariffs to the New Protectionism. London: Macmillan. [Very nice treatment of many of the topics covered in this course. Particularly strong on applied analysis of policy.]

N. Vousden (1990). The Economics of Trade Protection. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [Especially useful for its presentation of current issues in trade policy research at a moderate technical level]

H. Bowen, A. Hollander, and J.-M. Viaene (1998). Applied International Trade Analysis. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. [At about the same level as BPS, but with a stronger emphasis on applied work.] (BHV)

J. Bhagwati, ed. (1987). International Trade: Selected Readings. Cambridge: MIT Press. [A useful collection of classic and standard readings on international trade] (Bhagwati)

E. Helpman and P. Krugman (1985). Market Structure and Foreign Trade. Cambridge: MIT Press. [An excellent, synthetic treatment of theoretical research on the positive aspects of international trade under imperfect competition by two of the pioneers in the field.] (H&K, 1985)

E. Helpman and P. Krugman (1989). Trade Policy and Market Structure. Cambridge: MIT Press. [This book covers the normative theory associated with models of the sort developed in the previous book. While an easier read, this is also a considerably less satisfactory work.] (H&K, 1989)

G. Grossman, ed. (1992). Imperfect Competition and International Trade. Cambridge: MIT Press. [Excellent complement to the text treatments in the two Helpman/Krugman volumes.] (Grossman)

This course spends some time on the law and economics of trade regulation. The industry standard treatments of the legal issues are:

J. Jackson (1997). The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations. Cambridge: MIT Press.

J. Jackson, W. Davey, and A. Sykes (1995). Legal Problems of International Economic Relations. 3d Edition. St. Paul: West.

Some fairly extensive bibliographies of literatures covering many of the same topics that we will cover this term can be found at http://www.tulane.edu/~dnelson/BIBS/Bibs.htm. These are easiest to use in WordPerfect format, because you can use the outline feature.

Your performance in the course will be evaluated on the basis of: 1) active participation in the seminar (paper presentation and discussion); and 2) the preparation of a research paper.

1) With respect to seminar participation: I will expect all participants to have read (at least) all the assigned material (text and papers, whether they will be discussed or not) by the first class in which they are assigned. This is a necessary condition for intelligent participation and, thus, for a passing grade. A grade of "A" for this course requires a more active approach to the material involving discussion past the immediate content of the papers being presented. To that end, I strongly recommend reading beyond the required material on a regular basis.

2) With respect to the paper: To insure that everyone is on track for the paper I require a paper proposal to be submitted no later than the first class session in week 4. This must be typed and not more than two pages long. The paper itself is due in class on the last regularly scheduled class period. The paper must be original work, on a trade policy topic (though not necessarily on a topic we will cover in class). Plagiarism will not be tolerated. If you have any doubt about what plagiarism is, please see me before turning in your paper. There will be no second chances with respect to plagiarism. For those of you that are considering writing a dissertation in trade (or a field related to trade) I would strongly urge you to use this opportunity to identify the relevant theory and data some aspect of that work.

Short Syllabus: Economics 756

Topic I: Welfare Economics of International Trade

Week1: Basic Economics of Gains from Trade

Week 2: Basic Applied Welfare Theory for Trade

Week 3: Implementing Trade Policy Analysis in Partial and General Equilibrium

Week 4: VERs and the Multi-Fibre Arrangement

Week 5: Distortions and Policy Targeting

Topic II: Law and Economics of Trade Regulation

Week 6: Administered Protection,1: Law and Economics of the Escape Clause

Week 7: Administered Protection, 2: Law and Economics of Title VII

Week 8: Administered Protection, 3: Some Analytics of Title VII

Week 9: Trade and Competition Policy, 1: Legal/Institutional Analysis

Week 10: Trade and Competition Policy, 2: Some Analytics

Topic III: Liberalization, Labor Markets and Adjustment Assistance

Week 11: Analytics of Trade and Labor Markets: The Stolper-Samuelson Theorem

Week 12: Empirics of Trade and Labor Markets, 1: Is there a Link between Trade and Wages?

Week 13: Empirics of Trade and Labor Markets, 2: Adjusting to International Trade

Week 14: Law and Economics of Adjustment Assistance

Syllabus and Reading List: Econ 756

Topic I. Welfare Economics of International Trade

● Gains from Trade

■ Basic Economics of Gains from Trade

*Dixit/Norman, Chapter 3, section 2

BPS, Chapter 18, sections 1-4.

Wong, Chapter 8, sections 1-4.

*A. Dixit (1985). “Tax Policy in Open Economies”. in A. Auerbach and M. Feldstein, Handbook of Public Economics (V.I). Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 313-374. Sections 1 and 2.

■ Generalizing the CRS Case: Customs Unions and the Kemp-Wan Theorem (Alternative Topic)

M. Kemp and H. Wan (1976). “An Elementary Proposition Concerning the Formation of Customs Unions”. in M. Kemp, Three Topics in the Theory of International Trade: Distribution, Welfare and Uncertainty. Amsterdam: North-Holland. in Bhagwati.

M. Kemp and H. Wan (1993). The Welfare Economics of International Trade. Chur: Harwood. Part I.

Wong, Chapter 8, section 10

BPS, Chapter 31

R. Baldwin and A. Venables (1995). “Regional Economic Integration”. in G. Grossman and K. Rogoff, eds. Handbook of International Economics, V.III. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 1597-1644.

■ Implementing Gains from Trade with and without Lump-Sum Compensation (Alternative Topic)

BPS, Chapter 18, sections 5 and 6

J. Chipman and J. Moore (1972). “Social Utility and the Gains from Trade”. Journal of International Economics; V.2-#2, pp. 157-172.

M. Ohyama (1972). “Trade and Welfare in General Equilibrium”. Keio Economic Studies; V.9-#1, pp. 37-73.

*J.M. Grandmont and D. McFadden (1972). “A Technical Note on the Classical Gains from Trade”. Journal of International Economics; V.2-#?, pp. 109-125.

*A. Dixit and V. Norman (1980). “Gains from Trade: Commodity Taxes”. in Theory of International Trade. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 79-80.

W. Diewert, A. Turunen-Red and A. Woodland (1989). “Productivity- and Pareto-Improving Changes in Taxes and Tariffs”. Review of Economic Studies; V.56-#2, pp. 199-216.

M. Kemp and H. Wan (1993). The Welfare Economics of International Trade. Chur: Harwood. Part II.

*P. Hammond and J. Sempere (1995). “Limits to the Potential Gains from Trade”.Economic Journal; V.105-#432, pp. 1180-1204

E. Grinols (1996). “Pure and Mixed Price and Income Compensation Schemes: Breaking Political Roadblocks to Trade Reform”. in R. Feenstra, G. Grossman and D. Irwin, eds. The Political Economy of Trade Policy. Cambridge: MIT, pp. 129-144.

J. Ju and K. Krishna (2000). “Evaluating Trade Reform with Many Consumers”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.33-#3, pp. 787-798.

*R. Guesnerie (2001). “Second Best Redistributive Policies: The Case of International Trade”. Journal of Public Economic Theory; V.3-#1, pp. 15-25.

Hisahiro Naito (1996). “Tariffs and Production Subsidies for Income Redistribution under Asymmetric Information”. University of Michigan RSIE Paper; #391.

*D. Spector (2001). “Is It Possible to Redistribute the Gains from Trade Using Income Taxation?”. Journal of International Economics; V.55-#?, pp. 441-460.

■ Welfare Analytics under Variable Returns to Scale (Alternative topic)

Wong, Chapter 9, section 1

J. Markusen and J. Melvin (1984). “The Gains-from-Trade Theorem with Increasing Returns to Scale”. in H. Kierzkowski, ed. Monopolistic Competition and International Trade. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 10-33.

M. Kemp and A. Schweinberger (1991). “Variable Returns to Scale, Non-Uniqueness of Equilibrium and the Gains from International Trade”. Review of Economic Studies; V.58-#?, pp. 807-816.

● The Economics of Protection: Applied Welfare Analysis

■ Some Useful Surveys on Trade and Protection

W.M. Corden (1975). “The Costs and Consequences of Protection: A Survey of Empirical Work”. in P. Kenen, ed. International Trade and Finance. New York: CUP, pp. 51-91.

W.M. Corden (1984). “The Normative Theory of International Trade”. in R. Jones and P. Kenen, eds. Handbook of International Economics, V.I. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 63-130.

J. Anderson (1994). “The Theory of Protection”. in D. Greenaway and L.A. Winters, eds. Surveys in International Trade. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 106-138.

R. Feenstra (1995). “Estimating the Effects of Trade Policy”. in G. Grossman and K. Rogoff, eds. Handbook of International Economics, V.III. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 1553-1595.

S. Laird (1998). “Quantifying Commercial Policies”. in J. Francois and K. Reinert, eds. Applied Methods for Trade Policy Analysis: A Handbook. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 27-75.

H. Bowen, A. Hollander, and J.-M. Viaene (1998). “Trade Policy”. Chapter 5 of Applied International Trade Analysis. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 159-227.

D. Slesnick (1998). “Empirical Approaches to the Measurement of Welfare”. Journal of Economic Literature; V.36-#4, pp. 2108-2165.

■ Basic Applied Welfare Theory for Trade Policy

Woodland, Chapters 10 and 11

*BPS, Chapter 19

*B.N. Jeon and G. von Furstenberg (1986). “Techniques for Measuring the Welfare Effects of Protection: Appraising the Choices”. Journal of Policy Modeling; V.8-#2, pp. 273-303.

*E. Grinols and K. Wong (1991). “An Exact Measure of Welfare Change”. Canadian Journal Economics; V.24-#2, pp. 428-449.

*J. Anderson and J.P. Neary (1996). “A New Approach to Evaluating Trade Policy”. Review of Economic Studies; V.63-#1, pp. 107-125.

W. Martin (1998). “Measuring Welfare Changes with Distortions”. in J. Francois and K. Reinert, eds. Applied Methods for Trade Policy Analysis: A Handbook. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 76-93.

J. Anderson and J.P. Neary (1994). “Measuring the Restrictiveness of Trade Policy”. World Bank Economic Review, V.8-#2, pp. 151-169.

J. Anderson (1995). “Tariff Index Theory”. Review of International Economics; V.3-#2, pp. 156-173.

*K. O’Rourke (1997). “Measuring Protection: A Cautionary Tale”. Journal of Development Economics; V.53-#1, pp. 169-183.

*C. Bach and W. Martin (2001). “Would the Right Tariff Aggregator for Policy Analysis Please Stand Up?”. Journal of Policy Modeling; V.23-#6, pp. 621-635.

■ Implementing Trade Policy Analysis

○ Partial Equilibrium

D. Rousslang and J. Suomela (1985). Calculating the Consumer and Net Welfare Costs to the US of Import Relief. Washington, D.C.: US-ITC.

D. Rousslang and J. Suomela (1988) “Calculating the Welfare Costs of Import Restrictions in the Imperfect Substitutes Model”. Applied Economics; V.20-#5, pp. 691-700.

M. Jones (1993). “The Geometry of Protectionism in the Imperfect Substitutes Model: A Reminder”. Southern Economic Journal; V.60-#1, pp. 235-238.

D. Rousslang (1991). “Welfare Cost of Import Restraints in the Presence of Domestic Taxes”. Journal of Policy Modeling; V.13-#3, pp. 459-465.

J. Francois and H.K. Hall (1996). “Partial Equilibrium Modelling”. in J. Francois and K. Reinert, eds. Applied Methods for Trade Policy Analysis: A Handbook. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 122-155.

S.P. Magee (1973). “The Welfare Effects of Restrictions on US Trade”.Brookings Papers on Economic Activity; #3, pp. 65-108.

D. Tarr and M. Morkre (1984). Aggregate Costs to the US of Tariffs and Quotas on Imports. Washington, D.C.: FTC.

*G. Hufbauer and K. Elliott (1994). Measuring the Costs of Protection in the US. Washington, D.C.: IIE. (Chapters 1 and 2)

○ General Equilibrium

– CGE Based Analysis

*P. Kehoe and T. Kehoe (1994). “A Primer on Static Applied General Equilibrium Models”. Federal Reserve Bank of Minnesota Quarterly Review; V.18-#2, pp. 2-16.

C. Zarazaga (1999). “Measuring the Benefits from Unilateral Trade Liberalization, Part 1: Static Models”. Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Economic and Financial Review; third quarter, pp. 14-25.

C. Zarazaga (2000). “Measuring the Benefits from Unilateral Trade Liberalization, Part 2: Dynamic Models”. Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Economic and Financial Review; first quarter, pp. 29-40.

K. Reinert and D. Roland-Holst (1996). “Social Accounting Matrices”. in J. Francois and K. Reinert, eds. Applied Methods for Trade Policy Analysis: A Handbook. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 94-121.

*S. Devarajan, D. Go, J. Lewis, S. Robinson, and P. Sinko (1996). “Simple General Equilibrium Modeling”. in J. Francois and K. Reinert, eds. Applied Methods for Trade Policy Analysis: A Handbook. Cambridge: CUP, 156-184.

D. Roland-Holst, K. Reinert and C. Shiells (1994). “A General Equilibrium Analysis of North American Economic Integration”. in J. Francois and C. Shiells, eds. Modelling Trade Policy: Applied General Equilibrium Assessments of North American Free Trade. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 47-82.

P. Kehoe and T. Kehoe (1994). “Capturing NAFTA's Impact With Applied General Equilibrium Models”. Federal Reserve Bank of Minnesota Quarterly Review; V.18-#2, pp.

J. Francois, B.J. McDonald, and H. Nordstrom (1996). “The Uruguay Round: A Numerically Based Qualitative Assessment”. in W. Martin and A Winters, eds., The Uruguay Round and Developing Countries. Cambridge Univesity Press, pp. 253-291.

*G. Harrison, T. Rutherford, and D. Tarr (1997). “Quantifying the Uruguay Round”. Economic Journal; V.107-#444, pp. 1405-1430.

C.F. Bach, W. Martin, and J. Stevens (1996). “China and the WTO: Tariff Offers, Exemptions and Welfare Implications”. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; V.132-#3, pp. 409-431.

– Regression-based Analysis

*H. Wall (1999). “Using the Gravity Model to Estimate the Costs of Protection”. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Review; January/February, pp. 33-40.

*David Gould (1998). “Has NAFTA Changed North America’s Trade”. Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Review; First Quarter, pp. 12-23.

*E. Leamer (1988). “Measures of Openness”. in R. Baldwin, ed. Trade Policy Issues and Empirical Analysis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 147-204.

*H. Wolff (1993). “Trade Orientation: Measurement and Consequences”.Estudios de EconomÍa; V.20-#3, pp. 51-86. [esp. pp. 51-75.]

*L. Pritchett (1996). “Measuring Outward Orientation in LDCs: Can It Be Done?”. Journal of Development Economics; V.49-#2, pp. 307-335.

E. Leamer (1990). “The Structure and Effects of Tariff and Nontariff Barriers in 1983". in R. Jones and A. Krueger, eds. The Political Economy of International Trade. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 224-260.

*J. Frankel, E. Stein, and S. Wei (1995). “Trading Blocs and the Americas: The Natural, the Unnatural, and the Super-Natural”. Journal of Development Economics; V.47-#?, pp. 61-95.

*J. Harrigan (1996). “Openness to Trade in Manufactures in the OECD”. Journal of International Economics; V.40-#1/2, pp. 23-39.

R. Lawrence (1987). “Imports in Japan: Closed Markets or Minds?”. Brookings Papers on Economic Analysis; V.1987-#2, pp. 517-554.

G. Saxonhouse (1989). “Product Differentiation, Economies of Scale and Access to the Japanese Market”. in R. Feenstra, ed. Trade Policies for International Competitiveness. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 145-174.

○ Intermediate Goods and Effective Rates of Protection (Alternative topic)

– Theory

BPS, Chapter 15

*W.M. Corden (1966). “The Structure of a Tariff System and the Effective Protective Rate”. Journal of Political Economy, V.74-#?, pp. 221-237.

*J. Bhagwati and T.N. Srinivasan (1973). “The General Equilibrium Theory of Effective Protection and Resource Allocation”. Journal of International Economics; V.3-#?, pp. 259-282. (Comment by Sendo (1974), Journal of International Economics, V.4-#?, pp. 213-215)

*Y. Uekawa (1979). “The Theory of Effective Protection, Resource Allocation and the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem: The Many Industry Case”. Journal of International Economics; V.9-#?, pp. 151-171.

– Empirical Research

*D. Greenaway (1988). “Effective Tariff Protection in the UK”. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics; V.50-#?, pp. 313-324.

*C. Ennew, D. Greenaway, and G. Reed (1990). “Further Evidence on Effective Tariffs and Effective Protection in the UK”. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics; V.52-#1, pp. 69-78.

■ Voluntary Export Restraints

○ Effects on Importers

T. Murray, W. Schmidt and I. Walter (1978). “Alternative Forms of Protection against Market Disruption”. Kyklos; V.31-#4, pp. 624-637.

B.J. Liu (1986). “On Voluntary Export Restraints”. Economic Essays; V.15-#1, pp. 45-62.

C. Hamilton (1985). “Voluntary Export Restraints and Trade Diversion”. Journal of Common Market Studies; V.23-#4, pp. 345-355.

S. Suranovic (1991). “The Ineffectiveness of Quantitative Restrictions with Production Diversion”. Southern Economic Journal; V.58-#2, pp. 379-91.

K. Krishna (1989). “What do VERs Do?”. in R. Sato and J. Nelson, eds. Beyond Trade Friction: Japan-US Economic Relations. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 76-92.

M. Kemp, K. Shimomura, and M. Okawa (1997). “Voluntary Export Restraints and Economic Welfare: A General Equilibrium Analysis”. Japanese Economic Review; V.48-#2, pp. 187-98.

○ Effects on Exporters

C. Hamilton (1986). “Import Quotas and Voluntary Export Restraints: Focusing on Exporting Countries”. in. C. Findlay and R. Garnaut, eds. The Political Economy of Manufacturing Sector Protection in ASEAN and Australia; Sydney: Allen and Unwin, pp. 214-234.

C. Hamilton (1986). “ASEAN Systems for Allocation of Export Licenses under VERs”. in. C. Findlay and R. Garnaut, eds. The Political Economy of Manufacturing Sector Protection in ASEAN and Australia; Sydney: Allen and Unwin, pp. 235-247.

C. Hamilton (1986). “An Assessment of Voluntary Export Restraints on Hong Kong Exports to Europe and the US”. Economica; V.53-#211, pp. 159-178.

T. Bark and J. deMelo (1988). “Export Quota Allocations, Export Earnings, and Market Diversification”. World Bank Economic Review; V.2-#3, pp. 341-348.

T. Bark and J. deMelo (1989). “Efficiency and Export Earnings Implications of Two-Tier Quota Allocation Rules”. International Economic Journal; V.3-#3, pp. 31-42.

J. de Melo and L.A. Winters (1990). “Voluntary Export Restraints and Resource Allocation in Exporting Countries”. World Bank Economic Review; V.2-#4, pp. 209-233.

J. deMelo and L.A. Winters (1993). “Do Exporters Gain from VERs?”. European Economic Review; V.37-#?, pp. 1331-1349.

○ The Multi-Fibre Arrangement

D. Greenaway (1986). “Estimating the Welfare Affects of Voluntary Export Restraints and Tariffs: An Application to Non-Leather Footwear in the UK. Applied Economics; V.18-#?, pp. 1065-1083.

R. Erzan, J. Goto and P. Holmes (1990). “Effects of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement on Developing Countries’ Trade: An Empirical Investigation”. in C. Hamilton, ed. Textiles Trade and the Developing Countries. Washington, DC: The World Bank.

I. Trela and J. Whalley (1990). “Global Effects of Developed Country Trade Restrictions in Textiles and Apparel”. Economic Journal; V.100-#403, pp. 1190-1205.

I. Trela and J. Whalley (1995). “Internal Quota-Allocation Schemes and the Costs of the MFA”. Review of International Economics; V.3-#3, pp. 284-306.

K. Krishna, R. Erzan and L.H. Tan (1994). “Rent Sharing in the Multi-Fibre Arrangement: Theory and Evidence from US Apparel Imports from Hong Kong”. Review of International Economics; V.2-#1, pp. 62-73.

K. Krishna, W. Martin, and L.H. Tan (1997). “Imputing License Prices: The Limitations of a Cost-Based Approach”. Journal of Development Economics; V.52-#?, pp. 355-374.

K. Krishna and L.H. Tan (1998). Rags and Riches: Implementing Apparel Quotas under the Multi-Fibre Arrangement. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

*J. Anderson and J.P. Neary (1994). “The Trade Restrictiveness of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement”. World Bank Economic Review; V.8-#2, pp. 171-189.

○ Strategic Analysis

*K. Krishna (1989), “Trade Restrictions as Facilitating Devices”, Journal of International Economics. V.26-#3/4, pp. 251-270.

H. Quirmbach (1988). “Comparative Statics for Oligopoly: Demand Shift Effects”. International Economic Review; V.29-#3, pp. 451-59.

M. Yano (1989). “Voluntary Export Restraints and Expectations: An Analysis of Export Quotas in Oligopolistic Markets”. International Economic Review; V.30-#4, pp. 707-723.

W. Ethier (1991). “Voluntary Export Restraints”. in A. Takayama, et al. eds. Trade, Policy, and Adjustments. San Diego: Academic Press, pp. 3-18.

J. Dean and S. Gangopadhyay (1991). “Market Equilibrium under the ‘Threat’ of a VER”. Journal of International Economics; V.30-#1/2, pp. 137-52.

J. Dean and S. Gangopadhyay (1992). “Strategic Trade Practices in the Presence of a VER”. International Economic Review; V.33-#3, pp. 645-59.

J. Reitzes and O. Grawe (1994). “Market-share Quotas”. Journal of International Economics; V.36-#3/4, pp. 431-447.

N. Bjorkstein (1994). “Voluntary Import Expansions and Voluntary Export Restraints in an Oligopoly Model with Capacity Constraints”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.27-#2, pp. 446-457.

C. Syropoulos (1996). “On Pareto-Improving Voluntary Export Restraints”. International Journal of Industrial Organization; V.14-#1, pp. 71-84.

S. McCorriston and I. Sheldon (1997). “The (Non-)Equivalence of Tariffs and Quantity Restraints as ‘Rent-Shifting’ Policies”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.30-#4, pp. 1220-33.

K. Suzumura and J. Ishikawa (1997). “Voluntary Export Restraints and Economic Welfare”. Japanese Economic Review; V.48-#2, pp. 176-86.

J. Ishikawa (1998). “Who Benefits from Voluntary Export Restraints?”. Review of International Economics; V.6-#1, pp. 129-41.

K. Miyagiwa and Y. Ohno (1998). “Planting Disinformation through Voluntary Export Restraints”. Pacific Economic Review; V.3-#2, pp. 91-103.

○ The Automobile VER (alternate topic)

R. Feenstra (1984) “Voluntary Export Restraint in US Autos, 1980-81: Quality, Employment and Welfare Effects”. in R. Baldwin and A. Krueger, eds. The Structure and Evolution of Recent US Trade Policies; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 35-65. also in Bhagwati.

R. Feenstra (1988). “Quality Change Under Trade Restraints in Japanese Autos”. Quarterly Journal of Economics; V.103-#1, pp. 131-146.

P. Goldberg (1995). “Product differentiation and Oligopoly in International Markets: The Case of the US Automobile Industry”. Econometrica; V.63-#4, pp. 891-952.

S. Berry, J. Levinsohn, and A. Pakes (1995). “Automobile Prices in Market Equilibrium”. Econometrica; V.63-#4, pp. 841-890.

*S. Berry, J. Levinsohn, and A. Pakes (1999). “Voluntary Export Restraints in Automobiles: Evaluating a Trade Policy”. American Economic Review; V.89-#3, pp. 400-430.

J. Ries (1995). “Windfall Profits and Vertical Relationships: Who Gained in the Japanese Auto Industry from VERs?”. Journal of Industrial Economics; V.41-#3, pp. 259-76

A. Dixit (1987). “Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy for the US Automobile Industry”. in R. Feenstra, ed. Empirical Research in International Trade. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 141-169.

K. Krishna, K. Hogan, and P. Swagel (1994). “The Non-Optimality of Optimal Trade Policies: The US Automobile Industry Revisited, 1979-1985". in P. Krugman and A. Smith, eds. Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 11-37.

M. Fuss, S. Murphy and L. Waverman (1992). “The State of North American and Japanese Motor Vehicle Industries: A Partially Calibrated Model to Examine the Impacts of Trade Policy Changes”. NBER Working Paper; #4225.

deMelo, J. and D. Tarr (1996). “VERs Under Imperfect Competition and Foreign Direct Investment: A Case Study of the US-Japan Auto VER”. Japan and the World Economy; V.8-1, pp. 11-33.

● Distortions and Policy Targeting

■ Basic Theory

*BPS, Chapters 17 and 20.

BPS, Chapters 22-28.

Wong, Chapter 11, sections 1-5

*A. Dixit (1985). “Tax Policy in Open Economies”. in A. Auerbach and M. Feldstein, Handbook of Public Economics (V.I). Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 313-374. Sections 2 and 3.

*H.G. Johnson (1965). “Optimal Trade Intervention in the Presence of Domestic Distortion”. R. Caves, et al. Trade, Growth and the Balance of Payments. also in Bhagwati.

*J. Bhagwati (1971). “The Generalized Theory of Distortions and Welfare”. J. Bhagwati, et al. Trade, Balance of Payments and Growth; also in Bhagwati.

T.N. Srinivasan (1996). “The Generalized Theory of Distortions and Welfare Two Decades Later”. in R. Feenstra, G. Grossman, and D. Irwin, eds. The Political Economy of Trade Policy. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 3-25.

*J. Anderson, G. Bannister and J.P. Neary (1995). “Domestic Distortions and International Trade”. International Economic Review; V.36-#1, pp. 139-157.

*P. Krishna and A. Panagariya (2000). “A Unification of the Theory of Second Best”. Journal of International Economics; V.52-#2, pp. 235-257.

■ The Infant Industry Argument: An Example

Corden, Chapter 9

M. Kemp (1960). “The Mill-Bastable Infant-Industry Dogma”. Journal of Political Economy. V.68-#1, pp. 65-67.

*M. Kemp (1974). “Learning by Doing: Formal Tests for Intervention in an Open Economy”. Keio Economic Studies. V.11-#1, pp. 1-7.

*R. Baldwin (1969). “The Case Against Infant-Industry Protection”.Journal of Political Economy. V.77-#2, pp. 295-305.

*A. Krueger and B. Tuncer (1982). “An Empirical Test of the Infant-Industry Argument”. American Economic Review. V.72-#5, pp. 1142-1152.

R.E.B. Lucas (1984). “An Empirical Test of the Infant Industry Argument: Comment”. American Economic Review; V.74-#5, pp. 1110-11. [reply]

*A. Harrison (1994). “An Empirical Test of the Infant Industry Argument: Comment”. American Economic Review; V.84-#4, pp. 1090-95. [reply follows, pp. 1096]

-K. Head (1994). “Infant Industry Protection in the Steel Rail Industry”. Journal of International Economics; V.37-#3/4, pp. 141-165.

*D. Irwin (2000). “Did Late-Nineteenth-Century U.S. Tariffs Promote Infant Industries? Evidence from the Tinplate Industry”. Journal of Economic History; V.60-#2, pp. 335-360.

L. Westphal (1982). “Fostering Technological Mastery by Means of Selective Infant-Industry Protection”. in M. Syrquin and S. Teitel, Trade, Stability, Technology and Equity in Latin America. New York: Academic Press, pp. 255-279.

M. Bell, B. Ross-Larson, and L. Westphal (1984). “Assessing the Performance of Infant Industries”. Journal of Development Economics; V.16-#?, pp. 101-128.

■ Tariffs, Optimal and Otherwise: Another Example (Alternative)

BPS, Chapter 21

*A. Dixit (1985). “Tax Policy in Open Economies”. in A. Auerbach and M. Feldstein, Handbook of Public Economics (V.I). Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 313-374. Sections 3 and 5.

*R. Jones (1969). “Tariffs and Trade in General Equilibrium”. American Economic Review. V.59-#3, pp. 418-423.

*E. Bond (1990). “The Optimum Tariff Structure in Higher Dimensions”.International Economic Review; V.31-#1, pp. 103-116.

J.P. Neary (1993). “Welfare Effects of Tariffs and Investment Taxes”. in W. Ethier, E. Helpman and J.P. Neary, eds. Theory, Policy and Dynamics in International Trade. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 131-156

■ Immiserizing Growth: Another Example (Alternative)

BPS, Chapter 29.

Wong, Chapter 10, Section 6

*J. Bhagwati (1958). “Immiserizing Growth: A Geometrical Note”. Review of Economic Studies; V.25-#3, pp. 201-205. [in Caves and Johnson]

*H.G. Johnson (1967). “The Possibility of Income Loss from Increased Efficiency or Factor Accumulation in the Presence of Tariffs”. Economic Journal; V.77-#305, pp. 151-154. [in Bhagwati]

R. Brecher and C. DÍaz-Alejandro (1977). “Tariffs, Foreign Capital and Immiserizing Growth”. Journal of International Economics; V.7-#?, pp. 317-322. [in Bhagwati]

● Incremental Policy Reform (Alternative)

BPS, Chapter 35

*A. Dixit (1985). “Tax Policy in Open Economies”. in A. Auerbach and M. Feldstein, Handbook of Public Economics (V.I). Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 313-374. Section 4.

A. Turunen-Red and A. Woodland (2001). “The Anatomy of Multilateral Trade Policy Reform”. In S. Lahiri, ed. Regionalism and Globalization: Theory and Practice. London: Routledge, pp. 61-91.

*W. Diewert, A. Turunen-Red and A. Woodland (1989). “Productivity- and Pareto-Improving Changes in Taxes and Tariffs”. Review of Economic Studies; V.56-#2, pp. 199-216.

W.E. Diewert, A. Turunen-Red and A. Woodland (1991). “Tariff Reform in a Small Open Many-Household Economy with Domestic Distortions and Non-Traded Goods”. International Economic Review; V.32-#4, pp. 937-957.

R. Falvey (1994). “Revenue Enhancing Tariff Reform”. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; V.130-#1, pp. 175-189.

M. Keen and J. Ligthart (2002). “Coordinating Tariff Reduction and Domestic Tax Reform”. Journal of International Economics; V.56-#2, pp. 489-507.

R. Falvey (1988). “Tariffs, Quotas and Piecemeal Policy Reform”. Journal of International Economics; V.25-#?, pp. 177-183.

*J. Anderson and J.P. Neary (1992). “Trade Reform with Quotas, Partial Rent Retention and Tariffs”. Econometrica; V.60-#1, pp. 57-76.

J.P. Neary (1995). “Trade Liberalisation and Shadow Prices in the Presence of Tariffs and Quotas”. International Economic Review; V.36-#3, pp. 531-554.

Topic II. The Law and Economics of Trade Regulation

● Administered Protection, 1: The Escape Clause, Basics

R. Lawrence and R. Litan (1986). Saving free trade: A pragmatic approach. Washington, DC: Brookings.

J.M. Finger (1996). “Legalized Backsliding: Safeguard Provisions in GATT”. in W. Martin and A Winters, eds., The Uruguay Round and Developing Countries. Cambridge Univesity Press, pp. 316-340.

J. Jackson (1997). “Safeguards and Adjustment Policies”. Chapter 7 of The World Trading System: Law and Policy in International Economic Relations. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 175-211.

P. Merciai (1981). “Safeguard Measures in the GATT”. Journal of World Trade Law; V.15-#1, pp. 41-66.

P. Stern and A. Wechsler (1986). “Escape Clause Relief and Recessions: An Economic and Legal Look at Section 201”. In G. Saxonhouse, and K. Yamamura, ed. Law and trade issues of the Japanese economy: American and Japanese perspectives. Seattle: University of Washington Press, pp. 195-217.

J. Hartigan, P. Perry, and S. Kamma (1986). “The Value of Administered Protection: A Capital Market Approach”. Review of Economics and Statistics; V.68-#4, pp. 610-617.

C. Coughlin, J. Terza, and N. Khalifah (1989). “The Determinants of Escape Clause Petitions”. Review of Economics and Statistics; V.71-#2, pp. 341-347.

K. Rehbein, and S. Lenway (1993). “Industry Structure or Managerial Discretion: The Determinants of Industry Political Success in the U.S. International Trade Commission’s Escape Clause Investigations”. In J. Post, ed. Research in Corporate Social Performance and Policy. Volume 14. Greenwich, Conn. and London: JAI Press, pp. 3-18.

B. Blonigen and R. Feenstra (1997). “Protectionist Threats and Foreign Direct Investment”. In R. Feenstra, ed. The Effects of U.S. Trade Protection and Promotion Policies. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 55-80.

R. Staiger and G. Tabellini (1991). “Rules versus Discretion in Trade Policy: An Empirical Analysis”. In Baldwin, Robert E., ed. Empirical Studies of Commercial Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press?NBER, pp. 11-40.

R. Staiger and G. Tabellini (1999). “Do GATT Rules Help Governments Make Domestic Commitments?”. Economics and Politics; V.11-#2, pp. 109-144.

● Administered Protection, 1: The Escape Clause, The Injury Test

W. Perry (1985). “Administration of Import Trade Laws by the US ITC”. Boston University International Law Journal;

P. Jameson (1986). “Recent ITC Practice Regarding the Material Injury Standard: A Critique”. Law and Policy in International Business; V.18-#?, pp. 517-577.

G. Grossman (1986). “Imports as a Cause of Injury: The Case of the US Steel Industry”. Journal of International Economics; V.20-#?, pp. 201-223.

R. Pindyck and J. Rotemberg (1987). “Are Imports to Blame? Attribution of Injury Under the 1974 Act”. Journal of Law and Economics; V.30-#?, pp 101-122.

K. Kelly (1988). “The Analysis of Causality in Escape Clause Cases”. Journal of Industrial Economics; V.37-#2, pp. 187-207.

M. Morkre and H. Kruth (1989). “Determining Whether Dumped Or Subsidized Imports Injure Domestic Industries: The ITC Approach”. Contemporary Policy Issues; V.7-#3, pp. 78-95.

M. Knoll (1989). “Legal and Economic Framework for Analysis of Injury by the US ITC”. Journal of World Trade;

M. Knoll (1989). “An Economic Approach to the Determination of Injury under US Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Law”. NYU Journal of International Law and Policy; V.22-#?, pp. 37-116.

N.D. Palmeter (1987). “Injury Determinations in Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty Cases--A Commentary on US Practice”. Journal of World Trade Law; V.21-#1, pp. 7-45.

N.D. Palmeter (1987). “Dumping Margins and Material Injury: The USITC is Free to Choose”. Journal of World Trade Law; V.21-#?, pp. 173-175.

D. Rousslang (1988). “Import Injury in U.S. Trade Law: An Economic View”. International Review of Law and Economics; V.8-#1, pp. 117-122.

T. Murray and D. Rousslang (1989). “A Method for Estimating Injury Caused by Unfair Trade Practices”. International Review of Law and Economics; V.9-#2, pp. 149-164.

A. Sykes (1989). “Countervailing Duty Law: An Economic Perspective”. Columbia Law Review; V.89-#2, pp. 199-263.

M. Knoll (1989). “An Economic Approach to the Determination of Injury under U.S. Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Law”. NYU Journal of International Law and Politics; V.22-#?, pp. 37-116.

R. Cass and W. Schwartz (1990). “Causality, Coherence and Transparency in the Implementation of International Trade Laws”. in M. Trebilcock and R. York, eds. Fair Exchange: Reforming Trade Remedy Laws. Toronto: C.D. Howe, pp. 24-90.

S. Kaplan (1991). “Injury and Causation in USITC Antidumping Determinations: Five Recent Approaches”. in Tharakan, ed.

R. Boltuck (1991). “Assessing the Effects on the Domestic Industry of Price Dumping”. in Tharakan, ed.

A. Sykes (1996). “The Economics of Injury in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Cases”. International Review of Law and Economics; V.16-#?, pp. 5-26.

M. Morkre (1993). “The Effect of Subsidized Imports on Domestic Industry: A Comparison of Market Structures”. Journal of Policy Modeling; V.15-#1, pp. 49-61.

W. Mock, jr. (1986). “Cumulation of Import Statistics in Injury Investigations Before the ITC”. Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business;

W. Hansen and T. Prusa (1996). “Cumulation and ITC Decision-making: The Sum of the Parts is Greater than the Whole”. Economic Inquiry; V.34-#?, pp. 746-769.

T. Prusa (1998). “Cumulation and Anti-dumping: A Challenge to Competition”. World Economy; V.21-#8, pp. 1021-1033.

P.K.M. Tharakan, D. Greenaway, and J. Tharakan (1998). “Cumulation and Injury Determination of the European Community in Antidumping Cases”. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; V.134-#2, pp. 320-339.

B. Steen (1987). “Economically Meaningful Markets: An Alternative to Defining `Like Product` and `Domestic Industry` under the Trade Agreements Act of 1979”. Virginia Law Review;

R. Boltuck and S. Kaplan (1998). “An Economic Approach to ITC Sunset Reviews”. in R. Lawrence ed. Brookings Trade Forum 1998. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 219-239.

● Administered Protection, 2A: Title VII, The Basics

J. Jackson (1997). “Unfair Trade and the Rules on Dumping”. Chapter 10 of The World Trading System: Law and Policy in International Economic Relations. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 247-277.

J. Jackson (1997). “The Perplexities of Subsidies in International Trade”. Chapter 11 of The World Trading System: Law and Policy in International Economic Relations. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 279-303.

J. Jackson and E. Vermlust, eds. (1989). Anti-Dumping Law and Practice: A Comparative Study. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

P. Tharakan, ed. (1991). Policy Implications of Antidumping Measures. Amsterdam: North-Holland.

C. Barshefsky and N. Zucker (1988). “Ammendments to the Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws under the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988". North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation;

G. Horlick and G. Oliver (1989). “Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Law Provisions of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988". Journal of World Trade; V23-#3, pp. 5-49.

R. Cass (1990). “Trade Subsidy Law: Can Foolish Inconsistency Be Good Enough for Government Work?” Law and Policy in International Business; V.21-#?, pp. 609-661.

J.M. Finger, ed. (1993). Antidumping: How it Works and Who Gets Hurt. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

R. Clarida (1996). “Dumping: In Theory, in Policy, and in Practice”. in J. Bhagwati and R. Hudec, eds. Fair Trade and Harmonization. V.1: Economic Analysis. Cambridge: MIT, pp. 357-389.

G. Winham and H. Grant (1994). “Antidumping and Countervailing Duties in Regional Trade Agreements: Canada-U.S. FTA, NAFTA, and Beyond”. Minnesota Journal of Global Trade; V.3-#1, pp.

● Administered Protection, 2B: Title VII, Less than Fair Value Test

A. Holmer, S. Haggerty and W. Hunter (1984). “Identifying and Measuring Subsidies under Countervailing Duty Law: An Attempt at Synthesis”. The Commerce Department Speaks on Import Administration and Export Administration, 1984. Washington, DC: Practicing Law Institute, pp. 301-460.

C. Goetz, L. Granet and W. Schwartz (1986). “The Meaning of ‘Subsidy’ and ‘Injury’ in Countervailing Duty Law”. International Review of Law and Economics; V.6-#?, pp. 17-32.

R. Diamond (1989). “Economic Foundations of Countervailing Duty Law”. Virginia Journal of International Law; V.29-#?, pp. 767-812.

R. Diamond (1990). “A Search for Economic and Financial Principles in the Administration of US Countervailing Duty Law”. Law and Policy in International Business. V.21-#?, pp. 507-607.

N.D. Palmeter (1986). “Torquemada and the Tariff Act: The Inquisitor Rides Again”. International Lawyer; V.20-#?, pp. 641-657.

N.D. Palmeter (1988). “Exchange Rates and Anti-Dumping Determinations”. Journal of World Trade Law; V.22-#?, pp. 73-80.

M. Coursey and D. Binder (1989). “Hypothetical Calculations under the US Antidumping Law: Foreign Market Value, US Price and Weighted-Average Dumping Margins”. American University Journal of International Law and Policy; V.4-#?, pp. 537-553.

W. Bollom and D. Simons (1990). “The Use of Accounting Data in Antidumping Cases: A Public Policy Perspective”. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy; V.9-#1, pp. 1-18.

R. Boltuck and R. Litan, eds. (1992). Down in the Dumps: Administration of the Unfair Trade Laws. Washington, DC: Brookings.

J.M. Finger (1992). “The Meaning of ‘Unfair’ in United States Import Policy”. Minnesota Journal of Global Trade; V.1-#1, pp. 35-56.

J.M. Finger and K.C. Fung (1994). “Will GATT Enforcement Control Antidumping”. Journal of Economic Integration; V.9-#2, pp. 198-213.

● Administered Protection, 3: Title VII, Some Analytics

■ Basic Economics

K. Stegemann (1985). “Antidumping Policy and the Consumer”. Journal of World Trade Law; V.19-#5, pp. 466-484.

M. Webb (1987). “Anti-Dumping Laws, Production Location and Prices”. Journal of International Economics; V.22-#?, pp.

G. Yarrow (1987). “Economic Aspects of Antidumping Policies”. Oxford Review of Economic Policy; V.3-#?, pp.

B. Hoekman and M. Leidy (1989). “Dumping, Anti-dumping, and Emergency Protection”. Journal of World Trade; V.23-#1, pp. 27-44.

M. Leidy and B. Hoekman (1990). “Production Effects of Price- and Cost- Based Anti-dumping Laws Under Flexible Exchange Rates”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.23-#4, pp. 873-895.

R. Staiger and F. Wolak (1992). “The Effect of Domestic Antidumping Law in the Presence of Foreign Monopoly”. Journal of International Economics; V.32-#3/4, pp. 265-287.

B. Hoekman and M. Leidy (1992). “Cascading Contingent Protection”. European Economic Review; V.36-#?, pp. 883-892.

R. Feinberg and S. Kaplan (1993). “Fishing Downstream: The Political Economy of Effective Administered Protection”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.26-#1, pp. 150-158.

J. Francois (1992). “Countervailing the Effects of Subsidies: An Economic Analysis”. Journal of World Trade; V.26-#1, pp. 5-13.

R. Willig (1998). “Economic Effects of Antidumping Policy”. in R. Lawrence ed. Brookings Trade Forum 1998. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 57-79.

■ Title VII under Oligopoly

A. Dixit (1988). “Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties Under Oligopoly”. European Economic Review; V.32-#?, pp. 55-68.

B. Spencer (1988). “Countervailing Duty Laws and Subsidies to Imperfectly Competitive Industries”. in Baldwin, et al., eds. Issues in US-EC Trade Relations. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER; pp. 313-334.

B. Spencer (1988). “Capital Subsidies and Countervailing Duties in Oligopolistic Industries”. Journal of International Economics; V.25-#?, pp. 45-69.

D. Collie (1991). “Export Subsidies and Countervailing Tariffs”. Journal of International Economics; V.31-#3/4, pp. 309-324.

D. Collie (1992). “Export Subsidies, Entry Deterrence and Countervailing Tariffs”. Manchester School; V.60-#2, pp. 136-151.

M. Webb (1992). “The Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Laws”. Economic Inquiry; V.30-#?, pp. 437-448.

R. Staiger and F. Wolak (1991). “Strategic Use of Antidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusion”. ms: Stanford University.

J. Reitzes (1993). “Antidumping Policy”. International Economic Review; V.34-#4, pp. 745-763.

J. Cassing (1994). “Strategic Responses to Antidumping Laws and Legal Interpretations: Producing for Export Markets using Lawyers and Other Factors of Production”. Journal of Economic Integration; V.9-#2, pp. 156-171.

T. Prusa (1994). “Pricing Behavior in the Presence of Antidumping Laws”. Journal of Economic Integration; V.9-#2, pp. 260-289.

J. Hartigan (1994). “Dumping and Signaling”. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization; V.23-#?, pp. 69-81.

J. Hartigan (1995). “Collusive Aspects of Cost Revelation Through Antidumping Complaints”. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics; V.151-#3, pp. 478-489.

J. Hartigan (1996).“Predatory Dumping”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.29-#1, pp. 228-239.

S. Anderson, N. Schmitt, and J.-J. Thisse (1995). . “Who Benefits from Antidumping Legislation?”. Journal of International Economics; V.38-$3/4, pp. 321-337.

D. Bernhofen (1995). “Price Dumping in Intermediate Good Markets”. Journal of International Economics; V.39-#1/2, pp. 159-173.

D. Baron (1997). “Integrated Strategy and International Trade Disputes: The Kodak-Fujifilm Case”. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy; V.6-#2, pp. 291-346.

A. Panagariya and P. Gupta (1998). “Anti-Dumping versus Price Negotiation”. World Economy; V.21-#8, pp. 1003-1019.

P. Barros and X. Martinez-Giralt (1999). “On the Effects of Antidumping Legislation”. Regional Science and Urban Economics; V.29-#1, pp. 53-72.

J. Hartigan (2000). “An Antidumping Law Can Be procompetitive”. Pacific Economic Review; V.5-#1, pp. 5-14.

Reinhilde Veugelers and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999). “European Anti-dumping Policy and the Profitability of National and International Collusion”. European Economic Review; V.43-#1, pp. 1-28

Hylke Vandenbussche and Xavier Wauthy (2001). “Inflicting Injury through Product Quality: How European Antidumping Policy Disadvantages European Producers”. European Journal Of Political Economy; V.17-#1, pp. 101-116.

Wilfried Pauwels; Hylke Vandenbussche; and Marcel Weverbergh (2001). “Strategic Behaviour under European Antidumping Duties”. International Journal of the Economics of Business, V.8-#1, pp. 75-99.

Hylke Vandenbussche, Reinhilde Veugelers and Jozef Konings (2001). “Union Wage Bargaining and European Antidumping Policy”. Oxford Economic Papers; V.53-#2, pp. 297-317.

■ Empirical Research on Scope and Consequences of ADD/CVD

L. Gard and J. Riedel (1980). “Safeguard Protection of Industry in Developed Countries: Assessment of Implications for Developing Countries”. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; V.116-#3, pp. 471-492.

J.M. Finger (1981). “The Industry-Country Incidence of Less-than-Fair-Value Cases in US Import Trade”. Quarterly Review of Economics and Business; V.21-#?, pp. 260-279.

M. Herander and J.B. Schwartz (1984). “An Empirical Test of the Impact of the Threat of US Trade Policy: The Case of Antidumping Duties”. Southern Economic Journal; V.51-#1, pp. 59-79.

J.M. Finger and T. Murray (1990). “Policing Unfair Imports: The US Example”. Journal of World Trade; V.24-#4, pp. 39-53.

J. Devault (1990). “The Administration of US Antidumping Duties: Some Empirical Observations”. World Ecoomy; V.13-#1, pp. 75-88.

R. Staiger and F. Wolak (1994). “The Trade Effects of Antidumping Law: Theory and Evidence”. in A. Deardorff and R. Stern, eds. Analytical and Negotiating Issues in the Global Trading System. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 231-261.

R. Staiger and F. Wolak (1994). “Measuring Industry-specific Protection: Antidumping in the US”. Brookings Papers on Economic Analysis; 1994: Microeconomics, pp. 51-118. [comments]

R. Staiger and F. Wolak (1996). “Differences in Uses and Effects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sources”. in A. Krueger, ed. The Political Economy of American Trade Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 385-415.

H.J. Shin (1998). “Possible Instances of Predatory Pricing in Recent U.S. Antidumping Cases”. in R. Lawrence ed. Brookings Trade Forum 1998. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 81-97.

P. Conway and S. Dhar (1994). “The Economic Effects of Widespread Application of Anti-dumping Duties to Import Pricing”. Journal of Economic Integration; V.9-#2, pp. 172-197.

H. Marvel and E. Ray (1995). “Countervailing Duties”. Economic Journal; V.105-#433, pp. 1576-1593.

C. Krupp and P. Pollard (1996). “Market Responses to Antidumping Laws: Some Evidence from the US Chemical Industry”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.29-#1, pp. 199-227.

D. Bernhofen (1999). “Vertical Integration as a Cause of Dumping: Evidence from the OECD”. ms: Clark University.

J. Hartigan, P. Perry and S. Kamma (1986). “The Value of Administered Protection: A Capital Market Approach”. Review of Economics and Statistics; V.68-#4, pp. 610-617.

J. Hartigan, S. Kamma and P. Perry (1989). “The Injury Determination Category and the Value of Relief from Dumping”. Review of Economics and Statistics; V.71-#1, pp. 183-186.

J. Hartigan, S. Kamma and P. Perry (1990). “Bifurcated vs. Single Injury Determination in USITC Antidumping Investigations”. Journal of International Economics; V.5-#1, pp. 47-63.

S. Lenway, K. Rehbein and L. Starks (1990). “The Impact of Protectionism on Firm Wealth: The Experience of the Steel Industry”. Southern Economic Journal; V.?-#?, pp. 1079-1093.

K. Rehbein and L. Starks (1995). “Changes in US Trade Policies: The Wealth Effecs on Japanese Steel Firms”. Japan and the World Economy; v.7-#3, pp. 309-327.

M. Melvin and Q. Sun (1997) “U.S. protectionist policy and stock prices of U.S. import-competing and Korean and Taiwanese export-oriented firms”. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, V.5-#1, pp. 1-23.

J. Rayburn and S. Lenway (1991). “An Investigation of the Behavior of Accruals in the Semiconductor Industry: 1985". ms: University of Minnesota.

P. Messerlin and Y. Noguchi (1998). “Antidumping Policies in Electronic Products”. in R. Lawrence ed. Brookings Trade Forum 1998. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 147-171.

D. Irwin (1998). “The Semiconductor Industry”. in R. Lawrence ed. Brookings Trade Forum 1998. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 173-200.

P. Messerlin (1990). “The EC Antidumping Regulations: A First Economic Appraisal”. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; V.126-#?, pp. 562-587.

P. Messerlin and G. Reed (1995). “Antidumping Policies in the US and the EC”. Economic Journal; V.105-#433, pp. 1565-1575.

J. Bourgeois and P. Messerlin (1998). “The European Community’s Experience”. in R. Lawrence ed. Brookings Trade Forum 1998. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 127-145.

T. Lloyd, O. Morrissey, and G. Reed (1998). “Estimating the Impact of Anti-Dumping and Anti-Cartel Actions using Intervention Analysis”. Economic Journal; V.108-#447, pp. 458-476.

P. Brenton (2001). “Anti-dumping Policies in the EU and Trade Diversion”, European Journal of Political Economy; V.17-#3, pp. 593-607.

A. Lasagni (2000). “Does country targeted Antidumping policy by the EU create Trade Diversion”. Journal of World Trade; V.34-#4, pp. 137-159.

Jozef Konings, Hylke Vandenbussche and L. Springael (2002). “Import Diversion under European Antidumping Policy”. Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade;

M. Dutz (1998). “Economic Impact of Canadian Antidumping Law”. in R. Lawrence ed. Brookings Trade Forum 1998. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 99-125.

● Trade and Competition Policy, 1: Legal/Institutional Analysis

H. Applebaum and D. Grace (1987). “US Antitrust Law and Antidumping Actions under Title VII of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979". Antitrust Law Journal; V.56-#2, pp. 497-518.

K. El