Economics 713: Introduction to Modern Political Economy
Professor: Douglas Nelson
Office: 108 Tilton Hall (Murphy Institute)
Office Hours: 3:00-5:00 TW
This course provides a one semester introduction to the scope and method of modern research on political economy. Political economy is taken to mean, at a minimum, the explicit study of the relationship between the economic and political systems. The first part of the course will focus on microanalytic approaches to this analysis. That is, we will consider the behavior of rational individuals pursuing primarily economic interests through political institutions. We will be particularly interested in the political mechanisms of voting and lobbying. In the second part of the course we will shift our focus to a macro analytic perspective. That is, we will be interested in the structural relationships between the state, the economy and civil society. In particular, we will be interested both in the static and dynamic nature of these relationships.
Class Participation: It is in the nature of a survey course that we will cover a substantial amount of material. For this to work, it is expected that everyone will read, at least, all of the assigned material prior to its discussion in class. Active and informed discussion over the entire semester is a necessary condition for an A in this course. It should probably go without saying that absences from class are not acceptable.
Reaction Papers: There will be no examinations in this course. Instead every member of the class will write a short reaction paper every other week. Specifically: the members of the class will be divided into two groups (A and B); every other week each member of the relevant group will prepare a reaction paper; the papers will be evaluated on a scale of + (excellent command of the material), 0 (satisfactory command of the material), - (unsatisfactory command of the material). My expectation is that most students, most of the time will earn 0's. A necessary condition of an A is a preponderance of +'s.
Each week, there will be several papers assigned. A reaction paper identifies some common aspect of the assigned papers and discusses that aspect. Note well: reaction papers are not book reports, you must make an analytical point and provide a clear argument for that point. In general, reaction papers will be no shorter than 3 double-spaced pages long, nor longer than 5 double-spaced pages.
Research Papers. In addition to the reaction papers, every student will be expected to prepare a research paper on some aspect of modern political economy. To ensure satisfactory progress toward this goal, by the fourth meeting of the seminar I will expect a brief (no more than one page) paper proposal. At this early date I do not expect a detailed proposal. Rather, I expect a statement of a reasonably coherent problem that will sustain a semester-sized piece of research.
Econ 713 Introduction to Modern Political Economy Syllabus
I. Introduction: The Scope and Method of Modern Political Economy
-M. Weber (19??). "". from Chapter 1 of Economy and Society. Berkeley: University of California Press.
-Something on methodological individualism
-something on functionalism
-something on the macro-micro problem
II. Tools for Microanalytic Political-Economy Analysis
A. Individual Choice, Social Choice and Choice in a Social Environment
1. Welfare Economics and the Weberian State
-K. Arrow (1963). Social Choice and Individual Values. New Haven: Yale. Chapters 1-4.
-P. Samuelson (1947). "Welfare Economics". Chapter 8 of Foundations of Welfare Economics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
-A. Atkinson and J. Stiglitz (1980). "Normative Analysis". Lecture 11 in Lectures on Public Economics. New York: McGraw Hill.
-P. Samuelson (1981). "Bergsonian Welfare Economics". in S. Rosefielde, ed. Economic Welfare and the Economics of Soviet Socialism. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 223-266.
2. Social Choice
-K. Arrow (1963). Social Choice and Individual Values. New Haven: Yale. Chapters 5-7.
-P. Samuelson (1967). "Arrow's Mathematical Politics". in S. Hook, ed. Human Values and Economic Policy. New York: NYU Press, pp. 41-57.
3. Strategic Behaviour and Its Control
-E. Muller and M. Satterthwaite (1985). "Strategy-proofness: The Existence of Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms". in L. Hurwicz, D. Schmiedler and H. Sonnenschein, eds. Social Goals and Social Organization. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 131-171.
-E. Maskin (1985). "The Theory of Implementation in Nash Equilibrium: A Survey". in L. Hurwicz, D. Schmiedler and H. Sonnenschein, eds. Social Goals and Social Organization. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 173-204.
-J. Moore (1994). "Implementation, Contracts, and Renegotiation in Environments with Complete Information". in J.J. Laffont, ed. Advances in Economic Theory: Sixth World Conference. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 182-282.
4. Choice in a Social Environment
a. Practical Reason, Metapreferences and Constitution of Agents
-H. Frankfurt (1971). "Freedom of Will and the Concept of a Person". Journal of Philosophy, V.68-#?, pp. 5-20.
-R. Jeffrey (1974). "Preferences among Preferences". Journal of Philosophy. V.71-#?, pp. 377-391.
-E.P. Thompson (195?). "Moral Economy of the English Crowd". Past and Present; #50, pp. 76-136.
b. Game Theory and the Socialization of Rationality
-K. Binmore (1987). "Modeling Rational Players, Part I". Economics and Philosophy; V.3-#?, pp. 179-214.
-J.F. Mertens (1991). "Equilibrium and Rationality: Context and History Dependence". in K. Arrow, ed. Issues in Contemporary Economics: Markets and Welfare. New York: NYU Press, pp. 198-210.
B. Basic Political Processes
-A. Downs (1957). An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper.
-D. Black (1968). The Theory of Committees and Elections. Cambridge: CUP.
-O. Davis, M. Hinich and P. Ordeshook (1970). "An Expository Development of a Mathematical Model of the Electoral Process". APSR; V.64-#?, pp. 426-448.
-D. Austen-Smith (1983). "The Spatial Theory of Electoral Competition: Instability, Institutions, and Information". Environment and Planning, C: Government and Policy; V.1-#?, pp. 439-459.
-R. McKelvey (1976). "Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Control". JET; V.12-#?, pp. 472-482.
-R. McKelvey (1986). "Covering, Dominance, and Institution-Free Properties of Social Choice". AJPS; V.30-#2, pp. 283-314.
2. Group Formation
-J.D. Greenstone (1975). "Group Theories". in F. Greenstein and N. Polsby, eds. Handbood of Political Science--Volume 2. Reading: Addison-Wesley, pp. 243-318.
-R. Salisbury (1975). "Interest Groups". in F. Greenstein and N. Polsby, eds. Handbood of Political Science--Volume 4. Reading: Addison-Wesley, pp.
-W. Mitchell and M. Munger (1991). "Economic Models of Interest Groups". AJPS; V.35-#2, pp. 512-546.
-R. Wagner (1966). "Pressure Groups and Political Entrepreneurs". Papers in Non-Market Decison-Making; V.1, pp. 161-170.
-G. Stigler (1974). "Free Riders and Collective Action: An Appendix to Theories of Economic Regulation". BJE; V.5-#2, pp.359-365.
-D. Austen-Smith (1981). "Voluntary Pressure Groups". Eca; V.48-#?, pp. 143-153.
-J. Guttman (1982). "Can Political Entrepreneurs Solve the Free-Rider Problem?". JEBO; V.3-#?, pp. 357-366.
-J. Buchanan (1965). "An Economic Theory of Clubs". Eca; V.32-#125, pp. 1-14.
-M. McGuire (1972). "Private Good Clubs and Public Good Clubs: Economic Models of Group Formation". SwedJE; V74-#1, pp. 84-99.
-S. Scotchmer (1985). "Profit Maximizing Clubs". JPubE; V.27-#?, pp. 25-45.
-M. McGuire (1991). "Group Composition, Collective Consumption, and Collaborative Production". AER; V.76-#5, pp. 1391-1407.
3. Lobbying and Direct Representaiton of Interest
-L. Salamon and J. Siegfried (1977). "Economic Power and Political Influence: The Impact of Industry Structure on Public Policy". APSR; V.71-#?, pp. 1026-1043.
-E. Esty and R. Caves (1983). "Market Structure and Political Influence: New Data on Political Expenditures, Activity and Success". EcInq; V.?-#?, pp. 24-38.
-D. Jacobs (1988). "Corporate Economic Power and the State: A Longitudinal Assessment". American Journal of Sociology; V.93-#4, pp. 852-881.
-P. Schmitter (1981). "Interest Intermediation and Regime Governability in Contemporary Western Europe and North America". in Suzanne Berger, ed. Organizing Interests in Western Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 285-327.
-G. Lehmbruch (1984). "Concertation and the Structure of Corporatist Networks". in John Goldthorpe, ed. Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 60-80.
III. Microanalytic Political-Economy
A. Politician Preferences and Political-Economic Equilibrium in Partial Equilibrium
1. The Basic Capture\Chicago School Model
a. Regulatory Capture with Passive Citizen-Agents
-M. Bernstein (1955). "The Life Cycle of Regulatory Commissions". Chapter 3 of Regulating Business by Independent Commission. Princeton: PUP.
-G. Stigler (1971). "The Theory of Economic Regulation". Bell Journal; V.2-#1, pp. 3-21.
-S. Peltzman (1976). "Toward a More General Theory of Regulation". JLawEcon; V.19-#2, pp. 211-240.
(1) Application to Trade Regulation
-B. Gardner (1983). “Efficient Redistribution Through Commodity Markets”. American Journal of Agricultural Economics; V.65-#1, pp. 225-234.
-W. Dougan (1985). "Tariffs and the Economic Theory of Regulation". Research in Law and Economics; V.6, pp. 187-210.
-P. Godek (1985). "Industry Structure and Redistribution Through Trade Restrictions". Journal of Law and Economics; V.28=#?, pp. 687-703.
-E. Ray (1991). "Protection of Manufactures and the US". in D. Greenaway, ed. Global Protectionism: Is the US Playing on a Level Field. London: MacMillan, pp. 12-36.
-H. Marvel and E. Ray (1983). "The Kennedy Round: Evidence on the Regulation of International Trade in the US". AER; V.73-#1, pp. 190-197.
-R. Tyers (1990). "Implicit Policy Preferences and the Assessment of Negotiable Trade Policy Reforms". EER; V.34-#?, pp. 1399-1426.
-D. Trefler (1993). "Trade Liberalization and the Theory of Endogenous Protection: An Econometric Study of US Import Policy". JPE; V.101-#1, pp. 138-160.
(2) Application to Domestic Regulation (optional topic)
-B.P. Pashigian (1976). “Consequences and Causes of Public Ownership of Urban Transit Facilities”. JPE; V.84-#6, pp. 1239-1259.
-B. Abrams and R. Settle (1978). "The Economic Theory of Regulation and Public Financing of Presidential Elections". Journal of Political Economy; V.36-#2, pp. 245-257.
-P. Linneman (1980). “The Effects of Consumer Safety Standards: The 1973 Mattress Falmmability Standard”. JLawEcon; V.23-#2, pp. 461-479.
-R. Faith, D. Leavens and R. Tollison (1982). "Antitrust Porkbarel". Journal of Law and Economics;
-B.P. Pashigian (1985). “Environmental Protection: Whose Self-Interest is Being Protected”. EcInq; V.23-#?, pp. 551-584.
-R. Amacher, R. Higgins, W. Shughart and R. Tollison (1985). "The Behavior of Regulatory Activity over the Business Cycle: An Empirical Test". Economic Inquiry; V.23-#1, pp. 7-19.
-Robert Mackay and J. Reid (1979). "On Understanding the Birth and Evolution of the SEC: Where are We in the Theory of Regulation". in G. Walton, ed. Regulatory Change in an Atmosphere of Crisis. San Diego: Academic Press, pp. 101-121.
-R. Barke and W. Riker (1982). "A Political Theory of Regulation with Some Observations on Railway Abandonments". Public Choice; V.39-#?, pp. 73-106.
-B.L. Gardner (1987). “Causes of US Farm Commodity Programs”. JPE; V.95-#2, pp. 290-310.
b. Regulatory Capture with Strategic Behavior by Citizen Agents
-G. Becker (1983). "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence". QJE; V.98-#3, pp. 371-400.
-G. Becker (1985). "Public Policies, Pressure Groups and Deadweight Costs". JPubE; V.28-#?, pp. 329-347.
-A.L. Hillman (1982). "Declining Industries and Political Support Protectionist Motives". AER; V.72-#5, pp. 1180-1187.
-J. Cassing and A.L. Hillman (1986). "Shifting Comparative Advantage and Senescent Industry Collapse". AER; V.76-#?, pp. 516-523.
-N.V. Long and N. Vousden (1991). "Protectionist Responses and Declining Industries". JIE; V.30-#1/2, pp. 87-103.
-M. Leidy (1994). "Trade Policy and Indirect Rent-Seeking: A Synthesis of Recent Work". E&P; V.6-#2, pp. 97-118.
-S.L. Brainard and T. Verdier (1994). "Lobbying and Adjustment in Declining Industries". EER; V.38-#?, pp. 586-595.
2. Institutions and the Rochester-Carnegie-Caltech School Model
a. Bureaucratic Control and Agenda-Setting
-W. Niskanen (1975). "Bureaucrats and Politicians". JLaw E; V.18-#3, pp. 617-643.
-R. Mackay and C. Weaver (1979). "On the Mutuality of Interest between Bureaus and High Demand Review Committees: A Perverse Result". PC; V.34-#?, pp. 481-491.
-T. Romer and H. Rosenthal (1978). "Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas, and the Status Quo". V.33-#?, pp. 27-43.
-T. Romer and H. Rosenthal (1979). "Bureaucrats versus Voters: On the Political Economy of Resource Allocation by Direct Democracy". QJE; V.93-#?, pp. 563-587.
-A. Denzau and R. Mackay (1980). "A Model of Benefit and Tax Share Discrimination by a Monopoly Bureau". JPubE; V13-#?, pp. 341-368.
b. Congressional Control: Delegation and Monitoring
-Matthew McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz (1984). "Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms". AJPS. V.2-#1; pp. 165-179.
-M. Fiorina (1985). "Group Concentration and the Delegation of Legislative Authority". in R. Noll, ed. Regulatory Policy and the Social Sciences. Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 175-197.
-Barry Weingast and Mark Moran (1983). "Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission". JPE. V.91-#5; pp. 765-800.
-Terry Moe (1987). "An Assessment of the Positive Theory of `Congressional Dominance'". LSQ. V.12-#4; pp. 475-520.
-C. Eavey and G. Miller (1984). "Bureaucratic Agenda Control: Imposition or Bargaining?". APSR; V.78-#?, pp. 719-733.
-J.-J. Laffont and J. Tirole (1990). "The Politics of Government Decision-Making: Regulatory Institutions". JLEO; V.6-#1, pp. 1-31.
-J.-J. Laffont and J. Tirole (1991). "The Politics of Regulatory Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture". QJE; V.106-#4, pp. 1088-1127.
-P. Spiller (1990). "Politicians, Interest Groups, and Regulators: A Multiple-Principals Agency Theory of Regulation of `Let Them be Bribed`". JlawEc; V.33-#?, pp. 65-101.
-J. Banks (1989). "Agency Budgets, Cost Information and Auditing". AJPS; V.33-#3, pp. 670-699.
-J. Banks (1980). "Monopoly Agenda Control and Asymmetric Information". AJE; V.105-#?, pp.445-464.
B. General Equilibrium and Endogenous Policy Theory
1. An Introduction to Endogenous Policy Modelling
a. Deriving Preferences over Policy
H.K. Hall and D. Nelson. "Institutional Structure and Time Horizon in a Simple Political-Economy Model: The Lowi Effect". (1989) International Spectator; V.24-#3/4, pp. 153-173.
2. Endogenous Determination of Tax Policy
a. Optimal Taxation and Its Limits
-A. Sandmo (1976). "Optimal Taxation: An Introduction to the Literature". JPubE; V.6-#?, pp. 37-54.
-W. Baumol and D. Bradford (1970). "Optimal Departures from Marginal Cost Pricing". AER; V.60-#3, pp. 265-283.
-K. Roberts (1984). "The Theoretical Limits to Redistribution". REStud; V.51-#2, pp. 177-195.
b. Political Determination of Tax Policy
-T. Romer (1975). "Individual Welfare, Majority Voting and the Propertiels of a Linear Income Tax". JPubE; V.4-#2, pp. 163-185.
-T. Romer (1977). "Majority Voting on Tax Parameters: Some Further Results". JPubE; V.7-#?, pp. 127-133.
-K. Roberts (1977)."Voting Over Income Tax Schedules". JPubE; V.8-#3, pp. 329-340.
-A. Denzau and R. Mackay (1976). "Benefit Shares and Majority Voting". AER; V.66-#1, pp. 69-76. [comment by Staaf and West, and response, AER, 1980, V.70-#3, pp. 461-473]
-J. Weymark (1984). "Majority-Rule Directions of Income Tax Reform and Second-Best Optimality". ScanJE; V.86-#2, pp. 194-213.
-S. Kanbur and G. Myles (1992). "Policy Choice and Political Constraints". EJPE; V.8-#1, pp. 1-29.
3. Endogenous Determination of Trade Policy
-R. Findlay and S. Wellisz (1982). "Endogenous Tariffs, the Political Economy of Trade Restrictions and Welfare". in J. Bhagwati, ed. Import Competition and Response. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp.
-W. Mayer (1984). "Endogenous Tariff Formation". AER; V.74-#5, pp. 970-985.
-H.K. Hall and D. Nelson (1992). "Institutional Structure in the Political Economy of Protection: Legislated versus Administered Protection". E&P; V.4-#1, pp. 61-77.
4. Intergenerational Conflict and the Political Economy of Social Security
-R. Boadway and D. Wildasin (1989). "Voting Models of Social Security Determination". in B. Gustafsson and N.A. Klevmarken, eds. The Political Economy of Social Security. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
-G. Tabellini (1991). "The Politics of Intergenerational Redistribution". JPE; V.99-#2, pp. 335-357.
-F. Breyer (1994). "The Political Economy of Intergenerational Redistribution". EJPE; V.10-#1, pp.
-R. Wright (1986). "The Redistributive Role of Unemployment Insurance and the Dynamics of Voting". JPubE; V.31-#?, pp. 377-399.
C. Market Planning and the Market Socialism Debate
1. The Basic Argument
-O. Lange (1936/7). "On the Economic Theory of Socialism: Part One/Part Two". Review of Economic Studies; V.4-#1, pp. 53-71; and V.4-#2, pp. 123-142.
-F. von Hayek (1940). "Socialist Calculation: The Competitive Solution". Economica; V.7-#26, pp. 125-149.
-P. Bardhan and J. Romer (1992). "Market Socialism: A Case for Rejuvenation". Economic Perspectives; V.6-#3, pp. 101-116.
2. The Informational Problems with Planning
-F. von Hayek (1945). "The Use of Knowledge in Society". AER; V.35-#4, pp. 519-530.
-L. Hurwicz (1973). "The Design of Resource Allocation Mechanisms". AER; V.63-#2, pp. 1-30.
-T. Groves and J. Ledyard (1987). "Incentive Compatibility Since 1972". in T. Groves, R. Radner and S. Reiter, eds. Information, Incentives, and Economic Mechanisms. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 48-111.
-I. Ortuño-Ortin and J. Romer (1993). "Politically Realistic Implementation with Inspection: The Equity-Honesty-Welfare Tradeoff". E&P; V.5-#3, pp. 255-270.
3. The Political Problems with Planning
-K. Shepsle and B. Weingast (1984). "Political Solutions to Market Problems". APSR; V.78-#?, pp. 417-434.
-D. Wittman (1989). "Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results". JPE; V.97-#6, pp. 1395-1424.
-A. Shleifer and R. Vishny (1994). "The Politics of Market Socialism". EcPerspectives; V.8-#2, pp. 165-176.
IV. Macroanalytic Approaches to Political Economy
A. Power, Structure and Order
1. The Analysis of Power
-T. Parsons (1963). "On the Concept of Political Power". Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society; V.107-#?, pp. 232-262.
-J. Harsanyi (1962). "Measurement of Social Power, Opportunity Costs and the Theory of Two-Person Bargaining Games". Behavioral Science; V.7-#?, pp. 67-80.
-W. Riker (1964). "Some Ambiguities in the Notion of Power". APSR; V.58-#?, pp. 341-349.
-S. Lukes (1974). Power: A Radical View. London: Blackwell.
2. Economic, Political, and Political Economic Structure
a. Social and Political Constitution of Industrial Structure
-N. Luhmann, "The Economy as a Social System". in Luhmann, The Differentiation of Society. New York: Columbia University Press. pp. 190-225.
-J.R. Hollingsworth and L. Lindberg (1985). "The Governance of the American Economy: The Role of Markets, Clans, Hierarchies, and Associative Behavior". in W. Streeck and P. Schmitter, eds. Private Interest Government: Beyond Market and State. Beverly Hills: Sage, pp. 221-254.
-P. Schmitter (1990). "Sectors in Modern Capitalism: Modes of Governance and Variations in Performance". in R. Brunetta and C. Dell'Aringa, eds. Labour Relations and Economic Performance. New York: NYU Press, pp. 3-39.
-R. Burt (1980). "Cooptive Corporate Actor Networks: A Reconsideration of Interlocking Directorates involving American Manufacturing". Administrative Science Quarterly; V.25-#?, pp. 557-582.
-H. White (1981). "Where Do Markets Come From?". American Journal of Sociology; V.87-#3, pp. 517-547.
-R. Burt (1988). "The Stability of American Markets". American Journal of Sociology; V.94-#2, pp. 356-395.
b. Division of Labor, Class and Class Struggle
-A. Abbott (1988). The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
-J. Schumpeter (1927). "Social Classes in an Ethnically Homogeneous Environment". translation in J. Schumpeter, Imperialism and Social Classes. Oxford: Blackwell.
-G. Lenski (1952). "American Social Classes: Statistical Strata or Social Groups?". American Journal of Sociology; V.58-#2, pp. 139-144.
-N. Poulantzas (1974). Classes in Contemporary Capitalism. London: New Left Books.
-E.O. Wright (1978). Class, Crisis and the State. London: New Left Books.
-E.O. Wright (1985). Classes. London: New Left Books.
-C. Offe and H. Wiesenthal (1980). "Two Logics of Collective Action". in M. Zeitlin, ed. Political Power and Social Theory. pp. 67-115.
-R. Burt (1977). "Positions in Multiple Network Systems, Part 1: A General Conception of Stratification and Prestige in a System of Actors Cast as a Social Topology". Social Forces; V.56-#?, pp. 106-131.
-R. Brieger (1981). "The Social Class Structure of Occupational Mobility". AJS; V.87-#?, pp. 578-611.
-P. Marsden (1985). "Latent Structure Models for Relationally Defined Social Classes". AJS; V.90-#5, pp. 1002-1021.
c. The Capitalist State
-M. Mann (1984). "The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results". Archives Européennes de Sociologie; V.25-#?, pp. 185-213.
-R. Miliband (1969). The State in Capitalist Society. New York: Basic Books.
-N. Poulantzas (1968). Political Power and Social Classes. London: New Left Books.
-N. Poulantzas (1978). State, Power, Socialism. London: New Left Books.
-D. Easton (1990). The Analysis of Political Structure. New York: Routledge.
B. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy
1. What is the Historical Relationship between Capitalism and Democracy?
-J. Schumpeter (1947). Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. New York: Harper and Brothers.
-B. Moore (1966). Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making
-T. Skocpol (1979). States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China. Cambridge: CUP.
-K. Bollen and R. Jackman (1985). "Economic and Noneconomic Determinants of Political Democracy in the 1960s". Research in Political Sociology; #1, pp. 27-48.
-A. Kohli (1986). "Democracy and Development". in J. Lewis and V. Kalab, ed. Development Strategies Reconsidered. New Brunswick: Transaction Books, pp. 153-182.
-A. Hirschman (1994). "The On-and-Off Connection Between Political and Economic Progress". AER; V.84-#2, pp. 343-348.
2. Is There a Necessary Relationship between Capitalism and Democracy?
-S.M. Lipset (1949). "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy". APSR; V.53-#?, pp. 69-105.
-D. Neubauer (1967). "Some Conditions of Democracy". APSR; V.61-#4, p. 1002-1009.
-S. Huntington (1968). Political Order and Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale.
-G. Therborn (19??). "The Rule of Capital and the Rise of Democracy". New Left Review; V.?-#?, pp.
-D. Rueschmeyer, E.H. Stephens, and J. Stephens (1992). Capitalist Development and Democracy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
-D. North (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. Cambridge: CUP.
3. Is there A Tendency to Crisis in Market-Based Democracy
-J. Schumpeter (1947). Can Capitalism Survive? New York: Harper.
-J. Habermas (1973). Legitimation Crisis. Boston: Beacon Press.
-M. Kalecki (1943). "Political Aspects of Full Employment". Political Quarterly; #4, pp. 322-331.
-R. Boddy and J. Crotty (1975). "Class Conflict and Macro-Policy: The Political Business Cycle". Review of Radical Political Economy; V.7-#1, pp. 1-19. [Comment by H. Sherman and response, RRPE; 1976, V.8-#2, pp. 55-67]
C. The Political Economy of Structural Transformation
1. Economic Change and Political Realignment
2.The Political-Economy of Transitions
-R. Dornbusch and S. Edwards (1990). "Macroeconomic Populism". JDevE; V.32-#2, pp. 247-277.
-J. Sachs (1990). "Social Conflict and Populist Policies in Latin America". in R. Brunetta and C. Dell'Aringa, eds. Labour Relations and Economic Performance. New York: NYU Press. in pp. 137-169.
-R. Fernandez and D. Rodrik (1991). "Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty". AER; V.81-#5, pp. 1146-1155.
-A. Alessina and A. Drazen (1991). "Why are Stabilizations Delayed?", AER; V.81-#5, pp. 1170-1188.
-A. Drazen and V. Grilli (1993). "The Benefit of Crises for Economic Reforms". AER; V.83-#3, pp. 598-607.
-M. Dewatripont and G. Roland (1992). "The Virtues of Gradualism and Legitimacy in the Transition to a Market Economy". EJ; V.102-#?, pp. 291-300.
-M. Dewatripont and G. Roland (1992). "Economic Reform and Dynamic Political Constraints". REStud; V.59-#?, pp. 703-730.
-G. Roland and T. Verdier (1994). "Privatization in Eastern Europe: Irreversibility and Critical Mass Effects". JPubE; V.54-#2, pp. 161-183.
-J. Nelson (1984). "The Political Economy of Stabilization: Commitment, Capacity, and Public Response". World Development; V.12-#10, pp. 983-1006.
-S. Haggard and S. Webb (1993). "What Do We Know about the Political Economy of Economic Reform". WBRO; V.8-#2, pp. 143-168.
-S. Edwards (1994). "The Political Economy of Inflation and Stabilization in Developing Countries". EDCC; V.?-#?, pp. 235-266.