

Vengeance

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Vengeance is an emotion that can potentially help explain some economic behaviors. This paper investigates the extent of vengeful feelings and their determinants using data on more than 89,000 individuals from 53 countries. Country characteristics as well as personal attributes of the individuals influence vengeful feelings. The magnitude of vengeful feelings is greater for people in low-income countries, in countries with low levels of education, low levels of the rule-of-law, in collectivist countries and in countries that experienced an armed conflict in recent history. Females, older people, working people, people who live in high-crime areas of their country and people who are at the bottom 50% of their country's income distribution are more vengeful. Vengeful feelings are subdued as countries develop economically and become more stable politically and socially. The results reinforce the idea that some puzzles about individual choice can best be explained by considering the interplay of personal and cultural factors.

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Vengeance

“Thou shalt give life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot.”
Exodus 21:23-24

“An eye for an eye makes the whole world blind”
Attributed to Mahatma Gandhi.

I. Introduction

In an effort to better explain some seemingly-perplexing individual behavior, economists have developed theoretical models that incorporate deviations from self-interest. For example, Rabin (1993) formulated a framework which explicitly incorporates emotions. In this model people are willing to sacrifice their own material well-being to help those who are being kind and to punish those who are being unkind.¹ Fehr and Schmidt (1999) show that a model in which a fraction of people are motivated by fairness considerations, a variety of contradictory behavioral patterns can be explained. Fehr and Gächter (2000) argue that many individuals deviate from purely self-interested behavior in a reciprocal manner, i.e. they respond to friendly or hostile actions even if no material gains are to be expected from such responses. Evidence for positive reciprocity can be found in laboratory experiments of trust or gift exchange games (Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe 1995, Fehr, Kirshsteiger and Riedl 1993), and evidence for negative reciprocity or retaliatory action can be found in ultimatum games (Cameron 1999, Slonim and Roth 1998, Roth et al. 1991), where people tend to reject low offers and hurt both themselves and the person who made the offer.²

¹ Other examples include models that incorporate altruism (e.g. Becker 1974, Becker 1981, Becker and Barro 1986).

² In an ultimatum game one player is given a certain amount of money (or tokens than can be used for money or other items at the end of the experiment). The player then proposes a division of this money

The desire to punish others produces high levels of cooperation and enhances collective action (Fehr and Gächter 2002; Güreker, Irlenbush, and Rockenbach 2006), and there is evidence suggesting that people derive satisfaction from punishing norm violators (de Quervain et al. 2004.) Retaliation could also be a contract enforcement device in markets with incomplete contracts (Fehr, Gächter and Kirchsteiger 1997, Fehr and Falk 1999). Along the same lines, it has been argued that revenge serves a number of objectives, ranging from righting perceived injustice to restoring self-worth of the vengeful individual (Cota-McKinley et al. 2001). The idea that vengeful behavior can stop potential offenders from committing similar crimes or from even considering similar crimes (Cota-McKinley et al. 2001, Wilson 1983) also suggests a deterrence effect of vengeance.

It has been indicated that “Revenge is often tied to self-worth of the originally offended individual. Frequently, individuals with little power seek revenge against powerful adversaries even though the action has overwhelming costs” (Kim and Smith, 1993). This argument implies that investigation of the existence of vengeance, its extent and its determinants may also be important because it may shed light into extremely violent behavior such as suicide bombings and other terrorist attacks. Jaeger and Paserman (2008) aim to operationalize this idea and investigate whether violence against Israelis and Palestinians impacts the incidence and intensity of each party’s reaction.

Given that social norms play a significant part in human behavior, understanding the extent of retaliatory feelings and their interplay with the economic and cultural characteristics of the society is important. However, as Fehr and Gächter (2000) indicate, very little is known about the social, economic and personal factors that contribute to the desire to punish others who

between him/herself and the second player. If the second payer accepts the offer the game ends, and the players receive the proposed amount. If the second player rejects the offer no player receives anything.

have behaved in a manner that is considered unfair, harmful, or against the norms. Specifically, although vengeance is assumed to be an integral part of human behavior, no evidence on vengeance exists based on field data. One obvious reason for the dearth is the difficulty of measurement. A common procedure to measure an individual's extent of vengeful feelings is to employ the widely-used Vengeance Scale (Stuckless and Goranson 1992). This is a 7-point scale index based subjects' responses to such hypothetical statements as "I am not a vengeful person", "I try to even the score with anyone who hurts me," and "It is always better not to seek vengeance," Researchers have investigated the relationship between a vengeance index created this way and various behaviors, such as aggressive driving (Wiesenthal, Hennessy, and Gibson, 2000).

The dictionary definition of vengeance is "Punishment inflicted or retribution exacted for an injury or wrong." Consider a situation where having been subjected to a "wrong" means having been a victim of burglary in recent past and consider two individuals who are identical in all respects. If one of these individuals was then burglarized, vengeful feelings can be identified by the difference in the severity of punishment these individuals wish to inflict on a convicted burglar. This paper operationalizes this concept and provides evidence on the extent of vengeance using data on more than 89,000 individuals from 53 countries. It also investigates the extent to which personal attributes of individuals, and cultural and country characteristics explain the degree of their vengeful feelings.

People are likely to differ in their notions of fairness and in their beliefs about the level of appropriate punishment. Furthermore, victimization may prompt enhanced demand for protection, which may be mistaken for vengeance. To address these issues, empirical analyses control for a host of personal characteristics that may be correlated with potential victimization and the demand for punishment. These variables include, among others, age, gender, and

education of the person, the rank of family income in the income distribution of the country and the burglary rate in the area of the residence of the person. Furthermore, I present evidence indicating that having been victimized by burglary triggers vengeful feelings against a burglar, but having been victimized by other crimes such as robbery and theft does not trigger demand for harsher punishment for a burglar. This indicates that the results are not due to a general desire to punish or a pre-existing demand for protection. It is conceivable that vengeful feelings of people get stronger as they are exposed to more incidents of victimization. I find evidence that this is the case for people who live in countries with undesirable political and economic environment.

The paper is also related to an emerging literature in economics that analyzes the impact of culture on violent or illicit behavior. For example, Fisman and Miguel (2007) show that the parking violations of the foreign diplomats who live in New York City are related to the extent of corruption in their home country. Miguel, Saiegh and Satyanath (2008) analyze the actions of the soccer players in five European soccer leagues and find that the cautions and ejections handed out by the referees due to rough play are correlated with whether or not the player's home country was involved in a war or armed conflict. They conclude that having been exposed to war or armed conflict increases the propensity for violence.

There is also a broader literature in economics that investigates the impact of culture on economic behavior and outcomes. For example, Fernandez and Fogli (2006) investigate the link between culture and fertility. Alesina and Giuliano (2007) study the impact of culture, as measured by the strength of family ties, on labor force participation, living arrangements and geographical mobility of second generation immigrants in the U.S. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2008) investigate the determinants of bi-lateral trust between countries as a function of variables that measure culture. A summary on recent research on the impact of culture can be found in Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2006).

This paper documents that the degree to which people want retaliation depends on both personal attributes and a number of country characteristics. For example, vengeful feelings are stronger for people in low-income countries, in countries with low levels of education, low levels of rule-of-law, in countries that experienced a war in recent history and in countries which are fragmented ethno-linguistically. Females, older people, working people, people who live in high-crime areas of their country and people who are at the bottom 50% of their country's income distribution are more vengeful. There is also evidence indicating that vengeful feelings dissipate over time: having been victimized in recent past is associated with stronger vengeful feelings than having been victimized in more distant past.

There are also implications for the criminal justice system. The assumption that vengeance is an integral part of human psyche, and vengeful behavior is common and natural, along with the presumed deterrent effect of vengeful behavior give rise to the discussions of the role of vengeance in criminal justice system, and the extent to which vengeance should be an explicit part of the landscape of criminal law. For example, Whitman (2004) argues that individuals who have committed violent acts of vengeance are compelled to justify these acts in the language of self-defense or extreme emotional disturbance. He further states that "There is thus a kind of mismatch between our criminal law doctrine and the human motivations that give rise to violent crime." If vengeance is indeed hardwired into the human psychology, and if it is conceptually inseparable from justice itself as argued by Hegelian philosophy, then there may be reason to discuss the room for vengeance in an optimal punishment regime. (For a detailed discussion of this issue, see Whitman 2004).³

³ The United States penal system is based on retributive justice, where punishment is based on the assumption of "just deserts" (Wasserstrom 1978). An individual may be punished only if he/she has committed the crime voluntarily; and the blameworthiness determines the level of punishment. In the tradition of Bentham (1823) and Becker (1968), punishment has also a role of deterrence, but the extent

In a different framework, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2003) provide compelling evidence for the existence of vengeance in criminal punishment. They find that victim characteristics affect sentence lengths in vehicular homicide, which is a crime where the victim is random. This suggests that sentence lengths are determined, in part, by a taste for vengeance, which implies a need for a theory that incorporates the taste for vengeance.

Section II describes the data. Section III presents information on the vengeful feelings at the country level. Section IV describes the analyses conducted at the individual level and Section V presents the results of these analyses. Section VI investigates the determinants of vengeance. A discussion of the results and their implications are provided in Section VII, and Section VIII offers a conclusion.

II. Data and the Measurement of the Desire to inflict Punishment

The data are obtained from the International Crime Victim Survey compiled by the United Nations Inter-regional Crime and Justice Research Institute. Table 1 presents the list of countries included in the analysis. The countries were surveyed either in 1989, 2000, or between 1992 and 1996. Some countries were surveyed in more than one year. The key variable for this paper is based on the answer to the following two questions: *“People have different ideas about the sentences which should be given to offenders. Take for instance the case of a man of 20 years old who is found guilty of burglary for the second time. This time, he has stolen a colour TV. Which of the following sentences do you consider the most appropriate for such a*

of punishment should not be determined by emotion or vengeance. The desire for vengeance is not considered as legitimate in criminal law (Whitman, 2004); and it is argued that criminal law defenses reflect the need for a liberal polity to control vengeance (Nourse 2003). Any indication of vengeance-tainted punishment raises trepidations for legal scholars. For example, concerns have been raised that the 1991 Supreme Court decision in *Payne v. Tennessee* to allow victim impact statements during the penalty phase of a murder trial would introduce inappropriate emotion and vengeance to the sentencing hearing (Hoffman 2003, Bandes 1996, Long 1995).

case?” The alternatives given are: fine, prison, community service, suspended sentence, any other sentence (to specify), and don’t know. For those respondents who declared that a prison sentence is appropriate, the following question is asked: “*For how long do you think he should go to prison?*” Fifteen alternatives are given to this question, which are: one month or less, 2-6 months, 6 months-1 year, 1 year, 2 years, 3 years, 4 years, 5 years, 6-10 years, 11-15 years, 16-19 years, 20-24 years, more than 24 years, life sentence, and don’t know.

Table 1 displays the percentage of individuals in each country who declared the appropriateness (according to them) of various sentence lengths. The first column displays the proportion of individuals in each country who indicated that a prison sentence of two years or longer would be appropriate punishment for a burglar who is convicted for stealing a color TV as his second offense. The second column displays the proportion of respondents who would like to impose a sentence of 4 or more years; and the third column reports the proportion who suggests a prison sentence of at least 6 years. These percentages include every respondent regardless of whether they were a victim of a crime themselves. As expected, the proportion of individuals who prefer longer prison terms declines in each country. The last column exhibits the proportion of the respondents who would like to administer a life sentence for burglary. Although a very negligible fraction of the respondents suggested a life sentence for burglary in most countries, a sizable portion of individuals chose this option in some countries. For example, 14 percent of the respondents in Botswana, and 7 percent in both Costa Rica and Zimbabwe declared that a life sentence would be appropriate. The rate is about 4 percent in China.

A comparison of countries for a given desired sentence length reveals substantial differences. For example, in China, Romania and Botswana 39-to-40 percent of the people prefer a prison sentence of 4 or more years. The rate is 25 percent in South Africa, 18-to-20

percent in Egypt, Ukraine, Paraguay and Georgia, 16 percent in Canada and Indonesia, 12 percent in the U.S. and Philippines, about 4 percent in Norway and Slovenia, and 1 percent in Belgium and Spain.

III. Vengeful Feelings at the Country Level

The information displayed in Table 1 is not a reflection of vengeful feelings. It merely pertains to the *level of the desired stiffness* of punishment. There are at least three reasons why the preference for harsh punishment might differ across countries. First, the question pertains to stealing a color TV. This action carries different monetary values in different countries. A color TV constitutes a larger fraction of personal income in a developing country than a developed one. Thus, the desired penalty for the theft of a color TV is expected to differ between countries. Second, criminal penalties and the culture of illegality differ between countries. Imagine two otherwise similar countries. If the first country has developed a more strict penal code with harsher penalties than the second country, the citizens of the first country may be expected to propose more strict penalties for burglary in comparison to those of the second country.⁶ Third, the desired punishment level of each person may, in part, be determined by the level of prevailing criminal activity. Put differently, an individual's response to the desired punishment for burglary may contain his/her reactions to the extent of the crime rate in the region of country that he/she resides.

Because of these reasons, I will analyze the data by focusing on the variation of the responses to the revealed desired punishment *within a country*. As will be demonstrated in the next section, personal characteristics (such as age, education etc.) are similar between those who

⁶ On the other hand, it should be noted that if a country has a very harsh penalty for burglary (e.g. losing a limb), then, suggesting a 6 year prison term for burglary in that country may be considered a lenient treatment.

were victimized and who were not. Further, I will address the issue of potential differences between the individuals who were victimized and who were not victimized in the next section when I analyze the individual-level data. However, as a first approximation, the strength of vengeful feelings at the country level can be measured as the difference between the proportion of individuals who would like to assign a particular prison sentence for a burglar given that they themselves were victims of burglary, and the proportion of individuals who were not victimized but who would like to see the same sentence handed out to a burglar. For example, in Brazil 8 percent of the individuals, who were not victims of burglary, consider a prison term of at least 4 years as the appropriate punishment for a burglar who stole a color TV as a second offense. On the other hand, 14 percent of the people who were victimized by a burglar in Brazil believe that the same punishment is appropriate. The six percentage-point difference can be attributable to the effect of vengeful feelings due to having been victimized by a burglar.

If being burglarized does not trigger vengeful feelings towards a burglar, then the proportion of individuals who desire a certain level of punishment should be the same among groups of victimized and non-victimized people. Figure 1 displays, for each country, the proportion of individuals who desire at least a 2-years prison term for a burglar who stole a color TV as his second offense. The horizontal axis displays the rate among people who were not victimized, and the vertical axis measures the rate among those who were victimized. The solid line is the 45-degree line. As Figure 1 demonstrates most countries lie above the 45-degree line, indicating that the tendency to demand a stiffer penalty is higher among those who are victimized.⁷

⁷ For these figures I employ all people with non-missing responses to victimization and desired punishment questions even if some of their personal attributes are missing. Thus, the sample sizes are larger behind these figures, a total of more than 175,000 people in all countries. Albania, which is

Figures 2 and 3 display similar information. Figure 2 presents the proportion of people in each country who believe that a sentence of at least 4 years in prison is appropriate; and Figure 3 displays the rates pertaining to desired sentence of at least 6 years. Figures 4A and 4B present the rates of males and females who prefer a punishment of at least 4 years in prison. The gender-specific rates pertaining to the proportion of individuals who would like a sentence of at least 2 years or at least 6 years were similar to Figures 4A and 4B. As can be seen the disparity between the reaction of victims and non-victims is particularly significant in some countries. On the other hand a few countries, such as Botswana and China are located under the 45-degree line.

IV. Individual-level Analysis

I hypothesize that vengeful feelings can be measured by the discrepancy in desired punishment between victims and non-victims. On the other hand, the discrepancy, or part of the discrepancy, may pre-exist. Individuals who live in high crime areas (where the risk of victimization is higher) may have higher demands for punishment. That is, these individuals may prefer stiffer penalties for a deterrent effect to reduce their risk of victimization. Similarly, individuals who have lower risks of victimization may prefer lesser punishments. If the risk of victimization is highly correlated with actual victimization revealed in the data, then the observed differences displayed in Figures 1-4 may be due to pre-existing preferences about optimal punishment, and not necessarily because of the vengeful feelings that emerge after victimization.

The risk of victimization can be related to personal characteristics of the person, such as age, education and income level, labor market activity, and marital status. Although the

included in the graphs, could not be included in empirical analyses because it has only six individuals with non-missing values for all explanatory variables.

descriptive statistics presented in Table 3 below do not reveal differences in personal characteristics of individuals by victimization, it is important to control for potential confounding. Thus, I estimate individual-level regressions depicted by Equation (1) below.

$$(1) P_{ij} = \delta_0 + \delta_1 V_{ij} + X_{ij}' \delta_2 + K_j' \delta_3 + u_{ij},$$

where P_{ij} stands for desired punishment for burglary as revealed by individual i who lives in country j . V_{ij} is a dichotomous variable to indicate if the individual has been a victim of burglary in the recent past. The coefficient δ_1 is expected to be positive if, all else the same, being a victim of a burglary prompts a desire to inflict harsher punishment. X is a vector of personal characteristics, including age, gender, marital status, gun ownership, the level of education, labor market status of the individual and whether the individual's family income is located in the upper 50 percent of the income distribution in that country. These attributes may be correlated with the risk of victimization and the desire to impose stiffer punishment. Other variables that potentially impact the risk of victimization are the size of the city the person resides in, and the burglary rate in the region of the country where the individual lives.

The variables in vector K pertain to country characteristics. They allow for an investigation of the impact of country attributes on the desire to impose punishment. In addition to acting as control variables, these country characteristics will allow for an investigation as to whether the extent of vengeful feeling are influenced by such country attributes. Following La Porta et al. (1999) and Treisman (2000), I include variables that measure the structure of the existing legal system in the country. La Porta et al. (1999) argue that the common law system developed in England in the 17th century has been shaped by the parliament and aristocracy at the expense of the crown and it is intended to limit the power of the sovereign. As a consequence, British common law puts emphasis on individuals' private and property rights, and

it intends to limit, rather than strengthen, the power of the state (David and Brierley 1978, Finer 1997, La Porta et al., 1999). In comparison, French civil law, Scandinavian civil law and German civil law are designed as instruments of the state to expand its power; and socialist law is a manifestation of the state's intent to create institutions to maintain power and extract resources without much regard for protecting economic interests (La Porta et al. 1999). To control for the structure of the existing legal system in the country, I include variables to measure the legal origin of the country. They are: whether the country's legal system is based on British common law, French civil law, Scandinavian civil law, German civil law, or Socialist legal origin.

Religious make-up of the country may be a potentially important determinant of both individuals' demand for stiff penalties and the extent of the demand for retribution. Religious composition is controlled for by the proportion of Catholic, proportion of Muslim and proportion of Protestant in the country. If interrupted *democracy* in the country and involvement in a *war* in recent history are correlated with social disorder, they may impact people's exposure to violence and as a result, the extent of their willingness to punish. I employ the same measure of war/armed conflict as used by Miguel et al. (2008), obtained from the PRIO/Uppsala Armed Conflict data set.

Per-capita income in the country is another country attribute included in the analyses. A large government may create more occasions for individuals to interact with government workers, increasing the exposure to corruption, potentially influencing their desire to punish. On the other hand a large government may be correlated with a more developed welfare system that may mitigate strong feelings to punish. To control for this effect, I add a variable which is the *share of government* in per-capita gross domestic product. The average level of education in the country, which is an aggregate measure of the human capital, the *size of the population* of the

country, the *percentage of young people* in the population and the proportion of seats held by women in the parliament are additional variables that are added to control for country attributes.

Ethno-linguistic fragmentation of the country, the extent of individualistic culture prevailing in the country, and prevalence of the rule-of-law in the country are additional control variables to capture some cultural dimensions of the countries. The Rule-of-Law index is obtained from the World Bank.⁸ It measures “the extent of which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.” Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2007). The range of the index is from -2.5 indicating the weakest rule-of-law environment, to 2.5 representing the strongest. In our sample, the lowest score of rule-of-law is -1.71 and it belongs to Zimbabwe. Kyrgyzstan and Belarus have second and third lowest scores of -1.18 and -1.16. Norway and Denmark have the highest scores of the rule-of-law, with 2.02 and 2.03 respectively. Slovakia is at the sample median with 0.43.

Another measure of cultural differences is the index of individualism as employed Hermann, Thöni and Gächter (2008). The index is developed by Hofstede (2001) and Hofstede (2005).⁹ Lower values indicate the extent of collectivism of the society, which stands for the extent to which individuals are integrated into groups. Higher values of the index represent individualistic societies where the ties between individuals are loose, and where people are expected to look after themselves and their immediate family. In collectivist societies, people from birth onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups, often extended families (with uncles, aunts and grandparents) which continue protecting them in exchange for unquestioning

⁸ (http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi2007/mc_countries.asp.)

⁹ The data are downloaded from http://www.geert-hofstede.com/hofstede_dimensions.php.

loyalty.¹⁰ In our sample, the United States is the most individualistic country with a score of 91, followed by Australia with a score of 90 and the U.K. with 89. The most collectivists societies in the data are Colombia with a score of 13, Indonesia with a score of 14 and Costa Rica with a score of 15. Slovakia Czech Republic and Austria are around the median score of 57.

The ethno-linguistic fragmentation index measures the probability that two randomly selected people in a given country in 1985 will not belong to the same ethno-linguistics group. This index, which is obtained from (Roeder 2001), has been used in research in both economics and political science (Smith 2004, Easterly and Levine 1997). In the data, the most ethnolinguistically homogenous country is Portugal with the value of the index being 0.007, followed by Hungary with 0.01. The two most heterogeneous countries are Uganda and South Africa with score of 0.922 and 0.886, respectively. Belarus is at the mean with score of 0.374, and the U.S. has a score of 0.575.

Table 2 displays the definitions and the descriptive statistics of the variables employed in empirical analyses. The first column of numbers provide the descriptive statistics of the observations with non-missing personal and country characteristics. The second column displays the descriptive statistics of the sample which with non-missing personal characteristics. The third column provides the same information with the omission of the two variables that gauge the size of the city. Exclusion of these city size variables from the regressions did not alter either the magnitude or the statistical significance of the other coefficients, but allowed an increase in the sample size.

To provide a sense of the difference between people who were and who were not victimized, Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of the personal characteristics by victimization. The average personal characteristics, including gun ownership, income and

¹⁰ The description is obtained from (http://www.geert-hofstede.com/geert_hofstede_resources.shtml).

education, of those who were victimized this year or last year and who were not victimized during the same time period are similar. The same is true for victimization before last year, indicating that there are no obvious and systematic differences in observable characteristics between those who were victimized and those who were not. In fact, the burglary rate in the locality of those who were victimized are lower than the burglary rate in the locality of people who were not victimized.

V. Results

Table 4 displays the results of the ordered probit models, where the dependent variable consists of 6 categories, measuring the severity of desired punishment. These are: 1) if the person declared that the appropriate punishment is something other than a prison sentence (such as fine, community service, suspended sentence); 2) if the person declared that the appropriate punishment is a prison sentence of 1-to-6 months; 3) the appropriate punishment is declared as 6 months-to-a year prison term; 4) 2-to-3 years in prison; 5) 4-to-5 years in prison; 6) 6 years-to-life in prison. The proportion of responses in each category are: 62 %, 10%, 12%, 8%, 4% and 4%, respectively.

Three specifications are displayed in Table 4. All specifications include time dummies to control for the year in which the survey was registered in that country and the standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the country-level. The first column reports the results obtained from the entire sample with non-missing personal and country attributes. Because the variables which measure the size of the city the person lives in were never significant and because in a few countries this information was not collected, and because dropping these variables did not alter the remaining coefficients, I dropped these two variables and re-estimated the model. The results that are reported in column II are almost identical to the ones displayed in column I. Finally,

results of column III are based on the specification that includes country fixed effects, instead of the country characteristics. Again, the magnitudes and the statistical significance of the estimated coefficients do not change.

The existence of vengeful feelings is identified by comparing the reactions of individuals who have identical observable personal characteristics but who differ in their victimization experience. The first two coefficients reported at the top of Table 4 demonstrate evidence of *vengeful behavior*. Specifically, individuals who were victims of burglary this year or last year, prefer stiffer penalties for burglars in comparison to those who were not victimized. In addition, being a victim of burglary two years ago or earlier has an additional positive effect on the desire to impose stiffer penalties.

Other coefficients listed in Table 4 demonstrate the impact of a particular personal or country attribute on the level of desired punishment. For example, if the individual or anyone else in that household owns a gun, the intensity of the desire for stiffer punishment is stronger, suggesting that characteristics of the individuals that make them more likely to own a gun induce them to impose harsher penalties. An increase in the burglary rate in the region that the individual lives in has also a positive impact on the intensity of the desire to impose harsher punishment. Males prefer stronger punishment in comparison to females, and older individuals are more lenient in comparison to younger individuals. Singles and widows are also more lenient. On the other hand, working people, and retired or disabled individuals are harsher regarding the desired level of punishment. The legal origin of the country has an impact on the desired level of punishment as do other country attributes such as rule-of-law, individualism, women in the parliament and uninterrupted democracy. The proportion of women in the parliament is negatively associated with the intensity of the desire to impose harsh punishment.

Although the rule of law in the country and the extent of individualism in the country are highly positively correlated, these variables have different impacts on the desired stiffness of punishment. While the extent of individualism in the country has a negative impact on the desired level of punishment, a higher value for the rule-of-law is positively associated with stiffer desired punishment.

As described in the introduction, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2003) find that victim characteristics affect sentence lengths in vehicular homicide. To justify this result, an argument can be made that juries and judges implicitly calculate the social welfare loss associated with each victim's death, and they assign differential values for each victim type, which is then translated to the severity of the sentence. In our case, however, such a justification is not valid. This is because the individuals who are analyzed here were asked to provide information about a *hypothetical 20 year old male burglar*. This does not imply that the respondent in our data set would not be more or less vengeful against females, older criminals, or towards certain race or ethnicity classes, but the results in Table 4 demonstrate that there is an overall vengeful attitude, which stems from the person's own past victimization experience.

Note that the results of Table 4 indicate that vengeful feelings dissipate slowly over time. Individuals who were victims of burglary this year or last year would like to impose stiffer penalties on a burglar. If victimization took place before last year, this event still has an impact on the demand for retribution, but the magnitude of the impact is smaller. This suggests that people forgive and forget slowly. This finding is reinforced below when I estimate probit equations for the probability of asking for various sentence lengths.

Are Vengeful Feelings Event-Specific?

The results of Table 4 indicate that people who were victims of burglary demand stiffer penalties for a burglar in comparison to those individuals who were not victimized. An interesting question is whether or not other types of victimization trigger vengeful feelings towards burglars as well. In other words, do people who were victims of other crimes, such as theft or robbery, demand stiffer punishments for a burglar? To investigate this question, I re-estimated the models displayed in Table 4 by including an indicator variable to represent if the person was a victim of robbery this year or last year. I also ran the models with the following indicator variables: if the person was a victim of personal theft, victim of bicycle theft, or if he/she was physically assaulted.

Table 5 displays the results. In each of the four specifications reported, an additional victimization indicator is included (in addition to being a victim of burglary). For example, the model in column 1 includes an additional dichotomous indicator to measure if the individual was a victim of robbery this year or last year. Columns 2, 3 and 4 report the models which include indicator variables of whether the person suffered from personal theft this or last year, had a bicycle stolen this or last year, or was assaulted this or last year, respectively. As can be seen, having been a victim of robbery, theft, or bicycle theft in the past has no additional impact on vengeful feelings towards a burglar; but being a victim of an assault increases the extent of vengeful feelings (column 4). Dropping the burglary victimization variables but keeping the variable to indicate victimization for other crimes did not alter at all the remaining coefficients; and estimating the models with country fixed-effects provided the same results as in Table 5.

The results of Table 5 indicate that vengeful feelings are specific. They are targeted to the person who is believed to have generated the harm in the first place. People who were victimized by burglary have vengeful feelings about burglars; but having been victims of robbery, theft or bicycle theft do not evoke vengeful feelings about *burglars*. This suggests that

the identified vengeance effect is not likely to be driven by a general attitude about crime, or by a demand for protection that would be correlated with all types of victimization. The exception is physical assault. Having been physically assaulted increases people's desire to impose heavier punishment for burglary, indicating that physical victimization triggers stronger feelings than being victims of other crimes. This may suggest that having been targeted for violence may augment more general retaliatory feelings.

VI. What Determines Vengeance?

The identification of the extent of vengeful feelings is obtained from the responses of individuals who differ in their victimization experience. As shown in the previous section, controlling for personal characteristics and a host of country attributes (or country fixed effects), having been a victim of burglary increases one's desire to impose harsher punishment on a hypothetical burglar. In this section I investigate the extent to which these vengeful feelings are influenced by personal characteristics of the individuals or the attributes of the countries they live in. For example, I will ask question such as: are males more vengeful than females? Are more educated people in a country more vengeful than less educated people in the same country? Are people who live in high-crime areas in a country more vengeful than people in the same country who live in low-crime areas? Are people who live in poorer countries more vengeful than people who live in richer countries? What are the impacts on the strength of vengeful feelings of the rule-of-law, the level of individualism, having experienced a war in recent history, or having an uninterrupted democracy in the country?

To identify the impact of personal and country characteristics on vengeful feelings, I estimate a sequence of probit regressions, where the world population in the data set is divided into two groups for each regression. For example, I classify people by their gender. I run separate probit regressions for males and females to investigate if being a victim of burglary has an impact on the probability of a) imposing any prison sentence on a burglar, b) imposing a sentence of at least 2 years, c) imposing a sentence of at least 4 years.

The Impact of Personal Attributes

Table 6A reports the marginal effects obtained from running these probit regressions for males and females in the sample. Each regression contains the complete set of explanatory variables used in column II of Table 4. I also report the marginal effects obtained from the models that control for country fixed-effects instead of country characteristics. They are reported in [brackets]. The top panel of Table 6A shows that in the sample of 35,443 men from 53 countries, controlling for all personal and country characteristics, if a man was a victim of burglary this year or last year, his propensity to impose a prison sentence (as opposed to no sentence, a fine, or community service) is 2 percentage points higher in comparison to a man who was not victimized. Table 6A also reports that in the model with country fixed-effects, where the sample size is [41,832], victimization of men increases the probability of suggesting a prison sentence by 2.4 percentage points. The top panel of table 6A also reports that the mean of the dependent variable is 0.413 for men, indicating that 41.3% of the men in the world want to impose a prison sentence for burglary.

The right-hand panel of Table 6A displays the same information for females. Using 39,345 females from 53 countries, I find that having been burglarized increases females' propensity to impose a prison sentence for a hypothetical burglar by 3.7 percentage points.

Thus, according to top panel of Table 6A females are more vengeful than males, because having been burglarized this year or last year increases females' propensity to impose a prison sentence more than that of males (3.7 percentage point vs. 2.0 percentage point in models with country characteristics and 3.3 percentage points vs. 2.4 percentage points in models with country fixed effects). Furthermore, the baseline demand for punishment is lower for females: 36.8 percent of females versus 41.3 percent of males demand a prison term, implying that the effects are relatively stronger for females.

Another way to put these numbers into perspective is to consider the following simulation. At the bottom line of the top panel of Table 6A, the descriptive statistics reveal that 36.8 % of all females would like to impose a prison term punishment for burglary. If all females in the world were switched from being non-victimized to victimized, this would increase the demand for a prison term by females by 10% ($0.037/0.368$). If all males in the world were switched from being non-victimized to victimized, this would increase males' demand for a prison term by 4.8% ($0.020/0.413$).

The top panel of Table 6A indicates that having been victimized before last year has no statistically significant vengeful effects for either gender if the desired punishment pertains to any prison term. The middle panel of the table, however, shows that having been victimized this or last year and having been victimized before last year both have impacts on vengeful feelings if the punishment for burglary involves at least a two-year prison term. However, as discussed earlier, the marginal effects of having been victimized before last year are smaller, suggesting that victimization in more distant past triggers vengeful feelings that are weaker. In the middle panel the marginal effects are almost identical between males and females, and the baseline desired punishment rates also similar (0.180 and 0.156). The bottom panel of Table 6A presents the same information based on the desire to impose a prison term of at least 4 years.

Culture versus Individual Characteristics

The results displayed in Table 6A are summarized in the first two rows of Table 7. Specifically, Table 7 presents the calculations based on the coefficients reported in Table 6 to address the issue of relative vengefulness of various groups, such as males-females, people in high income countries vs. people in low income countries, people who live in areas of their countries with above-median burglary rate vs. people who live in below-median burglary rate areas. For example, the first two rows of Table 7 display the difference in vengeful feelings between males and females. Based on the marginal effects reported in Table 6A and the existing rates of desired punishment in these groups, also reported in Table 6A, if males were switched from being non-victims to being victims of burglary, this would increase their existing desire to impose a sentence of 4-plus years by 23 percent [and 19 percent in case of the model with country fixed effects]. If all females were victimized, this would increase females' desire to inflict a 4-plus years of punishment by 26 percent [or 23% in the model with fixed effects]. Note that in column III of Table 7 the rate of increase in the desire to punish is zero for men (row A1), because the estimated marginal effect is not significantly different from zero in this case (the bottom panel of table 6A for males). However, the impact is 16% in the model with country fixed-effects. Looking across the rows A1 and A2 of Table 7, we see that in all cases victimization increases the desire to inflict punishment more strongly for women than men; that is, women seem to be more vengeful than men.

Table 4 demonstrates that the coefficient of male is positive and significant in the models that explain the propensity to impose stiffer penalties, while the results displayed in Table 6A and summarized in Table 7 suggest that females are more vengeful than males. These results are not inconsistent, because the first groups of results indicate the desired *level of harshness* of the

penalty, while the second is about *vengeance*. Put differently, while men demand stiffer penalties, women react more strongly than men in response to being victimized.

Table 6B reports the results of the investigation of the impact of personal education on vengeful feelings. Each person in the data set is classified as having above-median education or below-median education in comparison to the median education level of *their own country*. As shown in the top panel of Table 6B, the mean of the dependent variable for highly-educated people is 0.362 for a jail or prison term. This means that 36.2 percent of people who are relatively more educated (in comparison to their country's median education) would like to impose a prison term on a burglar. Victimization among this group increases this propensity by 2.1 percentage points. Among people who are less educated (those who have less education than their country median) the proportion who wants to impose a prison sentence is 0.413, and victimization among less-educated people increases their propensity to impose a prison term by 3.4 percentage points. As before, these results are summarized in Table 7. Victimization has a similar impact on the propensity to impose any prison sentence between people who have above-median education and below-median education in their own country (6% increase vs. 8% increase, respectively). If all relatively more educated people were victimized, this would increase the proportion who wants to impose a prison sentence of 2 year or more by 30% in this group. On the other hand, if all relatively less-educated people were victimized, this would increase the rate of those who wants to impose a minimum 2 years of prison term by 11 percent among less-educated group, suggesting that more educated people are more vengeful. The third column of Table 7 shows that the reverse is true if we analyze the propensity to impose a sentence of at least 4 years. Thus, looking across rows B1 and B2 of Table 7, it is hard to make a statement about relative vengefulness of more educated people in comparison to less educated ones.

Rows C-F of Table 7, on the other hand, depict a clearer picture as to the impact of personal attributes on vengeful feelings. Specifically, burglarization of working people around the world prompts stronger reactions about their desired punishment to be imposed on a burglar in comparison to burglarization of nonworking people (rows E1 and E2). The same is true for people who live in above-median burglary areas of their countries in comparison to those who live in low burglary areas (rows F1 and F2), and people who are older than 40 years of age (C1 and C2). Similarly, people who are at the bottom 50% of their country's income distribution are more vengeful than those who are in the top 50% (rows D1 and D2). Summary tables pertaining to these results are presented in Tables 6C to 6F in the Appendix.

Rows G-M of table 7 display the impacts pertaining to the classification of people by their country characteristics. Some of these characteristics pertain to economic development such as per-capita income; some others can be claimed to be correlated with "cultural" aspects of these societies such as the extent of individualism or ethno-linguistic fragmentation in the country. The corresponding regression results are summarized in tables 6G-6M in the Appendix. Section G divides people into two groups: Those who live in countries where the average education in the country is *above the world median* in the sample of 53 countries, (which is 8 years); and those people who live in countries where the average country education is below the world mean. Rows G1 and G2 demonstrate that people who live in countries with low education are more vengeful than those who live in more educated countries. Other country differences also influence vengeful feelings. For example, people who live in countries that are more fragmented ethno-linguistically are more vengeful than people who live in more homogeneous countries. Similarly, people who live in more collective (less individualistic) societies, and those who live in countries that experienced a war or armed conflict in recent history, are more

vengeful. People who live in countries where per-capita income is less than \$8,000, which is the world median in the sample, are more vengeful than people who live in richer countries.

Although some of these country characteristics are reasonably highly correlated with per-capita income in the country, this is not the case for all country attributes. For example, there are six countries in the sample that experienced a war or armed conflict since 1975 although their average per-capita income is greater than \$8,000. These countries are United Kingdom, Spain, United States, Russia, Slovenia and Argentina. There are also 16 countries with less than \$8,000 per-capita income but have not involved in a war or armed conflict since 1975 (Poland, Latvia, Macedonia, Ukraine, Belarus, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Mongolia, Kyrgyzstan, Egypt, Botswana, Costa Rica, Brazil and Bolivia). Similarly, there is no strong correlation between ethno-linguistic fragmentation and per-capita income in the country.

Table 7 demonstrates that both personal characteristics and country characteristics are important in determining the extent of vengeful feelings. This suggests that country attributes alone are not reliable predictors in identifying vengeful behavior. For example, although low levels of per-capita income in a country, ethno-linguistics fragmentation or having experienced a war are positively related to vengeful feelings, personal characteristics of the individuals such as age, the crime rate in the locality of the individual, and the ranking of the individual's family income in his/her country's income distribution are also important.

To make the point visible, I classified the people in the world into two categories: those who live in poor countries (per-capita income <\$8,000) and with high ethno-linguistic fragmentation (above the world mean), but whose incomes rank in the top 50% of their own country's income distribution. The second category consists of people who live in richer countries, that also have low ethno-linguistic fragmentation. But people in this group have incomes that are in the bottom 50% of the income distribution of their country. Estimating

probit regressions as the ones reported in Tables 6 revealed that there is no meaningful difference in terms of the strength of vengeful feelings between these two groups of people. In all cases, having been victimized sparks vengeful feelings. However, the strength of these feelings is not different between these two groups. The results are summarized in rows N1 and N2 of Table 7. In the group of (relatively) rich people who live in low-per-capita GDP and highly fragmented societies, switching them group from being non-victims to victims of burglary increases their demand for any prison term for a burglar by 9 percent (shown in the first column). Row N2 displays that the same switch among relatively poor people who live in richer and more homogeneous countries increases the demand for a prison term by 6 percent. Looking across rows N1 and N2 reveals that there is no substantial difference in the strength of the reaction to victimization between these groups; i.e. their vengeful feelings are similar.

Rows O1 and O2 present the results of a similar analysis conducted for the following two groups: Poorer people (people who are in the bottom of the 50% of their countries income distribution), who are older (greater than 40 years of age), who live in high-burglary areas of their own countries, and who live in countries with no war or armed conflict experience since 1975. As rows C, D and F of Table 7 display, these personal attributes are positively correlated with vengeful feelings. On the other hand, having experienced no war in the country in recent history is associated with less vengeful feelings (row H). The second group of people possess the opposite attributes. They live in a country that experienced a war or armed conflict since 1975, but they are younger than 40, located in the upper 50% of their country's income distribution and live in low-burglary areas. The comparison between these two groups reveals that the strength of their vengeful feelings are comparable (rows O1 and O2).

The upshot of these results is the following. Although a number of personal and country attributes have significant impacts on vengeful feelings, a more complete picture of vengeful

behavior involves a combination of these attributes. As shown in Table 7, some of these factors can counter-balance each other (such as being a rich person in a poor country) and it may be misleading to attribute vengeful feelings to a particular characteristic.

Excess Vengeance

The results presented so far demonstrate that there is evidence for vengeful feelings. All else the same, people who were victimized by burglary demand stiffer penalties for a burglar in comparison to those who were not victimized; and the strength of these vengeful feelings depends on a number of personal and country characteristics. In this sub-section I ask the following question. *Among the group of people who were victimized, does the strength of vengeful feelings depend on repeated victimization?* To address this issue, I analyze the sample of people who were victimized this year or last year, or who were victimized before last year. An indicator variable is created that differentiates between two groups of people: 1) People who were victimized *both* during this year or last year *and* before last year. 2) People who were victimized in *either* during this year or last year *or* before last year, *but not both*.

In this sample which consists of victimized people, any residual unobservable that may be correlated with victimization should be similar between individuals. Using this sample I investigate if having been victimized more heavily (repeatedly) makes people more vengeful in comparison to those who have less severe victimization experience. Estimating probit regressions to analyze the impact of heavy victimization defined this way on the probability of demanding i) any prison sentence ii) a prison sentence of at least 2 years and iii) a sentence of at least 4 years revealed that the coefficient of heavy victimization was positive in all cases but significant only in the range of 0.15-0.4 level. However, estimation of the same models in sub-samples of the world population, displayed in Table 8, revealed very interesting patterns.

Table 8 shows that there is no difference in the severity of the vengeful feelings between those who were victimized less heavily and those who are victimized more heavily if these victims live in countries where the average country education is above the world median (row A1), if there was no war or military conflict in the country since 1975 (row B1), if the rule-of-law rating of the country is high (row C1), if the country's per-capita income is higher than \$8,000 (row D1), if the country is individualistic (row E1), if the country is homogeneous ethnolinguistically (row F1), or has enjoyed uninterrupted democracy (row G1).

On the other hand, people who are victimized more heavily are *more vengeful* in comparison to those who are victimized less heavily if the country they live in has poor education (row A2), has experienced a war (row B2), suffers from low rule-of-law (row C2), if the country is poor (row D2), if the country is collectivist (row E2), ethnolinguistically fragmented (row F2), or if the democratic structure has been interrupted (row G2).

In other words, additional victimization triggers additional vengeance only in countries that suffer from low income, low education, no adherence to the rule-of-law and similar attributes listed in Table 8. This finding is interesting because it suggests that a feeling such as vengeance, which usually is thought of as primal, is more subdued among the countries that are developed economically and more stable politically and socially.

VII. Discussion

These results reinforce the idea that some puzzles about individual choice can best be explained by considering the interplay of personal and cultural factors. For example, it is well-known that the proportion of rejected offers in ultimatum games differs substantially between experiments conducted in different countries (Oosterbeek, Sloof and Van de Kuilen 2004, Heinrich et al. 2001, Fehr and Gaechter 2000). Although the average offers made by the first

player in an ultimatum game is around 40% of the endowment in experiments conducted around the world, the rejection rates differ substantially between countries, ranging from no rejected offers to one-third of the offers being rejected (Oosterbeek, Sloof and Van de Kullen 2004). Similarly, there is significant variation in the rates antisocial punishment in experiments conducted in various countries (Hermann, Thoni and Gaechter, 2008). Although researchers recognize the complicated nature of behavioral responses in these environments, culture turns out to be a primary suspect as a determinant of behavior around the notions of fairness, individualism vs. collectivism, and retaliation. The results of this paper suggest that the variation in these behaviors can be best explained by taking into account both the personal and the cultural factors as well as the interplay between them.

On the other hand, country attributes are very important in explaining the extent of vengeful feelings. Furthermore, the finding that repeated victimization makes people more vengeful only if they live in countries with less desirable economic and political environments is consistent with the hypothesis that stronger vengeful feelings are needed in these countries for contract enforcement if vengeance is indeed a contract enforcement device. This finding also suggests a mechanism through which the observed “cycles violence” take place. People in societies with low-income, low education, poor rule-of-law, and military conflict are more prone to heightened vengeful feelings. Thus, violence between countries with these attributes may have a self-feeding mechanism that is fueled by retribution, if the impact of having been victimized by violence on vengeful feelings is as large as vengeance targeted towards a burglar, detected in this paper.

VIII. Conclusion

Although it has been argued that revenge is an integral part of human psyche, and vengeful behavior is common, there has been very limited research to quantify its extent. The investigation of the existence of vengeance, its extent and its determinants may be important not only for theoretical and practical aspects of criminal justice system, but also because it may shed interesting light into extremely violent behavior such as suicide bombings and other terrorist attacks. Furthermore, theoretical models in economics that incorporate other-regarding preferences, or emotions such as fairness, predict behaviors of retribution and punishment (Rabin 1993, Fehr and Gaechter 2000). Although these prediction have been confirmed in laboratory experiments, no evidence is available based on real data.

This paper employs data on more than 89,000 individuals from 53 countries to directly investigate the presence and the extent of vengeful feelings. Since the definition of vengeance is “infliction of punishment in return for a wrong committed,” the extent of vengeance is measured by the difference in the propensity to assign a particular punishment for the burglary of a color TV between two people: one, who has been burglarized himself/herself during this year or last year, and the other, who has not been burglarized. Empirical analyses control for potential differences in victimization propensities and other factors that may be correlated with both the demand for punishment and likelihood of victimization.

Descriptive statistics reveal that there are substantial differences between countries regarding the extent to which people are willing to impose harsh punishment. For example, while 1% of the population in Belgium believes that a prison term of four years to life is appropriate for a 20 year old man who is found guilty of stealing a color TV as a second offense, the rate is about 12 percent in the U.S., 19 percent in Paraguay, 21 percent in Mongolia, and 25 percent in South Africa. These average differences between countries are interesting, but they

can be reflections of a number of country characteristics, ranging from the effectiveness of the legal system to economic conditions and culture.

Individual-level analyses compare the reactions of observationally equivalent individuals, who differ in terms of their victimization experience. The results show that people's desire to impose stiffer punishment is positively related to their own victimization experience.

Controlling for a large set of personal characteristics ranging from education, the rank of the family income in the income distribution of the country to the crime rate of the region of the country, along with a host of country attributes, having been a victim of burglary increases one's willingness to impose harsh prison sentences on a hypothetical 20 year old burglar.

The strength of vengeful feelings are influenced by country characteristics, such as per-capita income, the extent of individualism and rule-of-law in the country, the extent of ethnolinguistics fragmentation in the country and the existence or a war in recent history as well as uninterrupted democracy. Vengeful feelings towards a burglar are not influenced by having been a victim of robbery, theft or bicycle theft, suggesting that the identified vengeance effect is not a reflection of a general demand for law and order or the demand for protection. The findings, which are summarized in Table 7, indicate that the magnitude of vengeful feelings is greater for people in low-income countries, in countries with low levels of education, low level of rule-of-law, and countries that experienced a war in recent history. Females, older people, working people, people who live in high-crime areas of their country and people who are at the bottom 50% of their country's income distribution are more vengeful. The intensity of vengeful feelings dies off gradually over time. Furthermore, the analysis of victims reveals that repeated victimization generates more vengeance, but this difference exists only in countries with poor economic and political circumstances.

These results have implications on at least two fronts. First, they suggest that a complete understanding of economic behavior should incorporate the context and the environment in which the decision is taking place, including measures of culture. But also, they highlight the dangers of attributing too much of the impact to culture as the economic conditions pertaining to the individual (independent of culture) are important determinants of behavior. For example, as summarized in Table 7, poor people who live in higher-income societies that are ethnolinguistically homogeneous are as vengeful as rich people who live in low-income societies that are ethno-linguistically fragmented.

Table 1
The Proportion of People in Each Country
Who Would Like to Impose the Following Punishment for Burglary

| Country Name | Two Years Or More | Four Years or More | Six Years or More | Life Sentence | Number of Observations |
|---|----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|------------------|---------------------------|
| WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES | | | | | |
| United Kingdom | 0.175 | 0.061 | 0.017 | 0.003 | 9,873 |
| Netherlands | 0.064 | 0.026 | 0.009 | 0.001 | 4,031 |
| Switzerland | 0.002 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 812 |
| Belgium | 0.028 | 0.011 | 0.002 | 0.001 | 1,778 |
| Finland | 0.012 | 0.004 | 0.001 | 0.000 | 3,344 |
| Norway | 0.096 | 0.035 | 0.009 | 0.000 | 115 |
| Sweden | 0.022 | 0.008 | 0.004 | 0.002 | 3,632 |
| Austria | 0.007 | 0.002 | 0.001 | 0.000 | 1,254 |
| Denmark | 0.014 | 0.004 | 0.002 | 0.000 | 2,637 |
| MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES | | | | | |
| France | 0.014 | 0.007 | 0.003 | 0.000 | 1,534 |
| Malta | 0.130 | 0.047 | 0.014 | 0.003 | 906 |
| Spain | 0.019 | 0.010 | 0.007 | 0.002 | 1,153 |
| Portugal | 0.107 | 0.040 | 0.017 | 0.000 | 948 |
| Italy | 0.049 | 0.024 | 0.010 | 0.000 | 716 |
| U.S., CANADA , AUSTRALIA and NEW ZEALAND | | | | | |
| United States | 0.253 | 0.117 | 0.044 | 0.006 | 1,379 |
| Canada | 0.218 | 0.159 | 0.136 | 0.027 | 4,611 |
| Australia | 0.095 | 0.035 | 0.011 | 0.002 | 2,964 |
| New Zealand | 0.045 | 0.017 | 0.004 | 0.002 | 1,504 |
| CENTRAL and EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES | | | | | |
| Estonia | 0.231 | 0.105 | 0.031 | 0.000 | 735 |
| Poland | 0.091 | 0.034 | 0.011 | 0.002 | 7,868 |
| Czech Republic | 0.163 | 0.062 | 0.016 | 0.000 | 2,355 |
| Slovakia | 0.265 | 0.101 | 0.031 | 0.001 | 1,179 |
| Russia | 0.237 | 0.123 | 0.049 | 0.009 | 1,282 |
| Georgia | 0.340 | 0.201 | 0.072 | 0.026 | 1,842 |
| Slovenia | 0.085 | 0.035 | 0.011 | 0.002 | 2,376 |
| Latvia | 0.299 | 0.141 | 0.056 | 0.004 | 1,273 |
| Romania | 0.581 | 0.409 | 0.221 | 0.010 | 958 |
| Hungary | 0.189 | 0.089 | 0.048 | 0.006 | 660 |
| Yugoslavia | 0.205 | 0.109 | 0.032 | 0.011 | 975 |
| Macedonia | 0.108 | 0.055 | 0.022 | 0.008 | 603 |
| Croatia | 0.030 | 0.009 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 865 |
| Ukraine | 0.335 | 0.202 | 0.112 | 0.006 | 837 |
| Belarus | 0.230 | 0.110 | 0.043 | 0.005 | 809 |
| Lithuania | 0.252 | 0.094 | 0.035 | 0.003 | 1,090 |

(Table 1 concluded)

| ASIAN COUNTRIES | | | | | |
|---------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Japan | 0.120 | 0.040 | 0.016 | 0.003 | 1,155 |
| Indonesia | 0.274 | 0.160 | 0.058 | 0.012 | 569 |
| Philippines | 0.300 | 0.121 | 0.061 | 0.014 | 1,960 |
| India | 0.302 | 0.170 | 0.099 | 0.009 | 1,398 |
| China | 0.734 | 0.391 | 0.205 | 0.039 | 1,373 |
| Mongolia | 0.441 | 0.211 | 0.068 | 0.003 | 762 |
| Kyrgyz Republic | 0.186 | 0.096 | 0.028 | 0.004 | 1,564 |
| AFRICAN COUNTRIES | | | | | |
| Uganda | 0.515 | 0.270 | 0.116 | 0.016 | 1,209 |
| Egypt | 0.380 | 0.183 | 0.070 | 0.005 | 573 |
| South Africa | 0.467 | 0.247 | 0.106 | 0.008 | 1,578 |
| Tunisia | 0.281 | 0.104 | 0.035 | 0.010 | 481 |
| Zimbabwe | 0.571 | 0.330 | 0.167 | 0.069 | 801 |
| Botswana | 0.557 | 0.397 | 0.296 | 0.142 | 388 |
| LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES | | | | | |
| Costa Rica | 0.346 | 0.258 | 0.191 | 0.072 | 1,116 |
| Brazil | 0.194 | 0.095 | 0.047 | 0.011 | 1,469 |
| Argentina | 0.161 | 0.049 | 0.021 | 0.005 | 1,700 |
| Bolivia | 0.272 | 0.143 | 0.056 | 0.018 | 767 |
| Paraguay | 0.313 | 0.188 | 0.098 | 0.027 | 480 |
| Colombia | 0.200 | 0.073 | 0.016 | 0.001 | 790 |

The values in columns represent the proportion of individuals in each country who consider the sentence length displayed in column headings (e.g. two years or longer) as the appropriate punishment for a burglar. The information pertains to individuals in each country who have non-missing values for all personal characteristics. The tabulations that used all individuals generated very similar outcomes.

Table 2
Descriptive Statistics

| Variable Name | Definition (source) | Mean (Std. Dev) N=70324 | Mean (Std. Dev) N=84338 | Mean (Std. Dev) N=89037 |
|--|---|--|--|--|
| Victim of Burglary- This or last year | Dummy Variable (=1) if the respondent was a victim of burglary this year or last year. | 0.067 (0.250) | 0.073 (0.259) | 0.072 (0.258) |
| Victim of Burglary- Before Last Year | Dummy Variable (=1) if the respondent was a victim of burglary before last year. | 0.086 (0.280) | 0.087 (0.281) | 0.087 (0.282) |
| Gun | Dummy Variable(=1) if the respondent or someone else in the household owns a gun (other than air rifle) for any purpose other than part of a collection (A) | 0.103 (0.304) | 0.101 (0.301) | 0.100 (0.301) |
| Male | Dummy Variable (=1) if the respondent is male, 0 otherwise (A) | 0.510 (0.500) | 0.477 (0.499) | 0.470 (0.499) |
| Upper Income | Dummy Variable (=1) if the family income is in the upper 50% of the country, 0 otherwise (A) | 0.537 (0.499) | 0.514 (0.500) | 0.512 (0.500) |
| Education | Years of education of the respondent (A) | 12.179 (3.524) | 12.238 (3.570) | 12.192 (3.572) |
| Burglary Rate | The burglary rate in the region of the country that the respondent lives in (A) | 0.036 (0.035) | 0.039 (0.036) | 0.038 (0.035) |
| Small City | Dummy Variable(=1) if the respondent is living in a town with a population of 50,000 less (A) | 0.442 (0.497) | 0.382 (0.486) | |
| Middle Size City | Dummy Variable(=1) if the respondent is living in a town with a population of 50,000 to 1 million (A) | 0.379 (0.485) | 0.430 (0.495) | |
| Age20to24 | Dummy Variable (=1) if the respondent is between ages 20 and 24, 0 otherwise (A) | 0.094 (0.292) | 0.079 (0.270) | 0.078 (0.269) |
| Age25to29 | Dummy Variable (=1) if the respondent is between ages 25 and 29, 0 otherwise (A) | 0.118 (0.323) | 0.110 (0.312) | 0.109 (0.312) |
| Age30to34 | Dummy Variable (=1) if the respondent is between ages 30 and 34, 0 otherwise (A) | 0.127 (0.333) | 0.122 (0.328) | 0.123 (0.328) |
| Age35to39 | Dummy Variable (=1) if the respondent is between ages 35 and 39, 0 otherwise (A) | 0.115 (0.319) | 0.125 (0.331) | 0.125 (0.331) |
| Age40to44 | Dummy Variable (=1) if the respondent is between ages 40 and 44, 0 otherwise (A) | 0.105 (0.307) | 0.111 (0.315) | 0.111 (0.314) |
| Age45to49 | Dummy Variable (=1) if the respondent is between ages 45 and 49, 0 otherwise (A) | 0.089 (0.285) | 0.094 (0.291) | 0.093 (0.291) |
| Age50to54 | Dummy Variable (=1) if the respondent is between ages 50 and 54, 0 otherwise (A) | 0.082 (0.274) | 0.079 (0.270) | 0.079 (0.270) |
| Age55to59 | Dummy Variable (=1) if the respondent is between ages 55 and 59, 0 otherwise (A) | 0.064 (0.244) | 0.066 (0.249) | 0.066 (0.249) |
| Age60to64 | Dummy Variable (=1) if the respondent is between ages 60 and 64, 0 otherwise (A) | 0.050 (0.219) | 0.056 (0.231) | 0.057 (0.232) |

(Table 2 continued)

| | | | | |
|--------------------------------|--|-------------------------|------------------|------------------|
| Age65to69 | Dummy Variable (=1) if the respondent is between ages 65 and 69, 0 otherwise (A) | 0.047 (0.212) | 0.050 (0.218) | 0.050 (0.219) |
| Age70+ | Dummy Variable (=1) if the respondent is older than 70, 0 otherwise (A) | 0.072 (0.259) | 0.078 (0.268) | 0.079 (0.270) |
| Single | Dummy Variable (=1) if the respondent is single, 0 otherwise (A) | 0.217 (0.412) | 0.213 (0.410) | 0.213 (0.410) |
| Widowed | Dummy Variable (=1) if the respondent is widowed, 0 otherwise (A) | 0.056 (0.229) | 0.069 (0.253) | 0.070 (0.256) |
| Living together | Dummy Variable (=1) if the respondent is living together as a couple (but not married, 0 otherwise (A) | 0.068 (0.252) | 0.060 (0.237) | 0.059 (0.237) |
| Divorced | Dummy Variable (=1) if the respondent is divorced, 0 otherwise (A) | 0.052 (0.223) | 0.062 (0.240) | 0.063 (0.243) |
| Working | Dummy Variable (=1) if the respondent is working, 0 otherwise (A) | 0.607 (0.488) | 0.595 (0.491) | 0.594 (0.491) |
| Looking for job | Dummy Variable (=1) if the respondent is looking for job, 0 otherwise (A) | 0.070 (0.255) | 0.069 (0.253) | 0.068 (0.251) |
| Home keeper | Dummy Variable (=1) if the respondent is house keeper, 0 otherwise (A) | 0.099 (0.299) | 0.098 (0.297) | 0.102 (0.302) |
| Retired/disabled | Dummy Variable (=1) if the respondent is retired or disabled, 0 otherwise (A) | 0.168 (0.374) | 0.186 (0.389) | 0.186 (0.389) |
| Individualism | Index of the degree to which individuals are integrated into groups (N) | 62.790 (21.351) | | |
| Rule of Law | Index of the extent to which agents have confidence and abide by the rules of society (M) | 0.982 (0.974) | | |
| Ethno-linguistic Fragmentation | The index of the extent of ethno-linguistic fragmentation in the country (P) | 0.358 (0.267) | | |
| British Legal Origin | Dummy Variable (=1) if the legal origin of the respondent is English, 0 otherwise (E) | 0.336 (0.472) | | |
| French Legal Origin | Dummy Variable (=1) if the legal origin of the respondent is French, 0 otherwise (E) | 0.250 (0.433) | | |
| German Legal Origin | Dummy Variable (=1) if the legal origin of the respondent is German, 0 otherwise (E) | 0.041 (0.198) | | |
| Percent Catholic | Percent of Catholics in the country (E) | 40.332 (34.718) | | |
| Percent Muslim | Percent of Muslims in the country (E) | 2.743 (11.128) | | |
| Democratic | Dummy Variable (=1) if the country was democratic in all 46 years between 1950 and 1995(D) | 0.563 (0.496) | | |
| Per-capita income | PPP adjusted Real per-capita income of the country in 2000 dollars (G) | 15685.030 (8444.320) | | |
| Government Share | Government share of per-capita GDP (G) | 20.755 (5.762) | | |
| Population | Population of the country in millions in the survey year (G) | 79.910 (201.873) | | |

(Table 2 concluded)

| | | |
|---------------------------|--|--------------------|
| Population less than 25 | Percentage of population less than 25 years of age (K) | 38.145 (9.601) |
| Average Country Education | Average education of adults in the country in the survey year (L) | 8.666 (2.192) |
| Women in Parliament | Percentage of women in parliament of the corresponding country (F) | 19.025 (10.699) |
| War | Dummy Variable (=1) if a war occurred during 1960s to 1980s, 0 otherwise (C) | 0.357 (0.479) |
| Western Europe | Dummy Variable (=1) if the country is in Western Europe, 0 otherwise | 0.370 (0.483) |
| Central Europe | Dummy Variable (=1) if the country is in Central Europe, 0 otherwise | 0.216 (0.411) |
| Mediterranean | Dummy Variable (=1) if the country is in Mediterranean region, 0 otherwise | 0.046 (0.209) |
| Asia | Dummy Variable (=1) if the country is in Asia, 0 otherwise | 0.089 (0.285) |
| Africa | Dummy Variable (=1) if the country is in Africa, 0 otherwise | 0.071 (0.256) |
| Latin America | Dummy Variable (=1) if the country is in Latin America, 0 otherwise | 0.072 (0.258) |

The descriptive statistics pertain to observations with non-missing values in all variables.

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N: Hofstede, Geert. "Cultural Dimensions," <http://www.geert-hofstede.com/hofstede_dimensions.php> (June 13, 2008).

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Table 3

Descriptive Statistics of Personal Characteristics by Victimization Status

| Variable Name | Victim of Burglary-This or last year | | | | Victim of Burglary- Before Last Year | | | |
|------------------|--------------------------------------|----------|-----------------|----------|--------------------------------------|----------|-----------------|----------|
| | Yes | | No | | Yes | | No | |
| | Mean | Std. Dev | Mean | Std. Dev | Mean | Std. Dev | Mean | Std. Dev |
| Gun | 0.105 | (0.307) | 0.114 | (0.318) | 0.104 | (0.306) | 0.119 | (0.324) |
| Male | 0.458 | (0.498) | 0.477 | (0.500) | 0.457 | (0.498) | 0.480 | (0.500) |
| Upper Income | 0.484 | (0.500) | 0.483 | (0.500) | 0.482 | (0.500) | 0.516 | (0.500) |
| Education | 12.168 | (3.501) | 12.599 | (3.676) | 12.150 | (3.501) | 12.678 | (3.625) |
| Burglary Rate | 0.034 | (0.030) | 0.063 | (0.053) | 0.034 | (0.031) | 0.049 | (0.046) |
| Age20to24 | 0.085 | (0.279) | 0.120 | (0.325) | 0.087 | (0.282) | 0.088 | (0.284) |
| Age25to29 | 0.101 | (0.301) | 0.128 | (0.334) | 0.103 | (0.304) | 0.102 | (0.303) |
| Age30to34 | 0.110 | (0.313) | 0.128 | (0.335) | 0.111 | (0.314) | 0.120 | (0.325) |
| Age35to39 | 0.112 | (0.315) | 0.119 | (0.323) | 0.111 | (0.315) | 0.122 | (0.328) |
| Age40to44 | 0.101 | (0.301) | 0.105 | (0.306) | 0.100 | (0.300) | 0.110 | (0.313) |
| Age45to49 | 0.085 | (0.278) | 0.085 | (0.279) | 0.084 | (0.278) | 0.088 | (0.284) |
| Age50to54 | 0.075 | (0.264) | 0.066 | (0.249) | 0.075 | (0.263) | 0.075 | (0.263) |
| Age55to59 | 0.065 | (0.247) | 0.057 | (0.231) | 0.065 | (0.246) | 0.062 | (0.242) |
| Age60to64 | 0.062 | (0.242) | 0.044 | (0.205) | 0.062 | (0.240) | 0.057 | (0.232) |
| Age65to69 | 0.058 | (0.233) | 0.038 | (0.191) | 0.057 | (0.232) | 0.048 | (0.213) |
| Age70+ | 0.095 | (0.293) | 0.053 | (0.224) | 0.094 | (0.292) | 0.070 | (0.255) |
| Single | 0.235 | (0.424) | 0.287 | (0.452) | 0.236 | (0.425) | 0.270 | (0.444) |
| Widowed | 0.079 | (0.270) | 0.056 | (0.230) | 0.078 | (0.269) | 0.067 | (0.250) |
| Living together | 0.053 | (0.223) | 0.055 | (0.227) | 0.053 | (0.224) | 0.051 | (0.220) |
| Divorced | 0.056 | (0.231) | 0.067 | (0.249) | 0.056 | (0.230) | 0.071 | (0.257) |
| Working | 0.582 | (0.493) | 0.603 | (0.489) | 0.580 | (0.494) | 0.616 | (0.486) |
| Looking for job | 0.060 | (0.237) | 0.074 | (0.262) | 0.061 | (0.240) | 0.059 | (0.235) |
| Home keeper | 0.099 | (0.299) | 0.105 | (0.307) | 0.100 | (0.300) | 0.092 | (0.289) |
| Retired/disabled | 0.177 | (0.382) | 0.121 | (0.326) | 0.176 | (0.381) | 0.144 | (0.351) |
| N | 9,817-11,547 | | 127,275-161,080 | | 11,475-14,420 | | 125,546-158,178 | |

Table 4
Ordered Probit Estimates

Dependent Variable: Severity of Desired Punishment for Burglary

| Variables | I | II | III |
|-------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| Victim of Burglary This/Last Year | 0.085*** (0.020) | 0.085*** (0.020) | 0.082*** (0.018) |
| Victim of Burglary Before Last Year | 0.041** (0.017) | 0.036** (0.017) | 0.033** (0.016) |
| Gun | 0.047* (0.027) | 0.036 (0.026) | 0.061*** (0.020) |
| Male | 0.122*** (0.023) | 0.127*** (0.022) | 0.113*** (0.020) |
| Upper Income | -0.020 (0.024) | -0.007 (0.026) | -0.004 (0.022) |
| Education | -0.021*** (0.005) | -0.020*** (0.005) | -0.022*** (0.004) |
| Burglary rate | 0.165 (1.091) | 1.196 (1.125) | 1.656** (0.817) |
| Small City | -0.057 (0.067) | | |
| Middle Size City | 0.040 (0.081) | | |
| Age20to24 | 0.023 (0.052) | 0.032 (0.051) | 0.032 (0.041) |
| Age25to29 | 0.018 (0.048) | 0.012 (0.046) | 0.023 (0.040) |
| Age30to34 | 0.044 (0.049) | 0.031 (0.048) | 0.051 (0.042) |
| Age35to39 | -0.008 (0.050) | -0.019 (0.051) | 0.005 (0.045) |
| Age40to44 | -0.038 (0.054) | -0.041 (0.054) | -0.010 (0.049) |
| Age45to49 | -0.090 (0.065) | -0.094 (0.063) | -0.061 (0.059) |
| Age50to54 | -0.115* (0.062) | -0.122** (0.063) | -0.085 (0.062) |
| Age55to59 | -0.119* (0.068) | -0.125* (0.068) | -0.096 (0.063) |
| Age60to64 | -0.089 (0.074) | -0.089 (0.071) | -0.062 (0.067) |
| Age65to69 | -0.090 (0.074) | -0.098 (0.072) | -0.059 (0.071) |
| Age70+ | -0.095 (0.076) | -0.098 (0.074) | -0.058 (0.073) |
| Single | -0.051** (0.025) | -0.051** (0.024) | -0.052*** (0.020) |
| Widow | -0.047* (0.025) | -0.032 (0.022) | -0.020 (0.021) |
| Living together | 0.024 (0.037) | 0.029 (0.035) | 0.040 (0.026) |

(Table 4 continued)

| | | | |
|---------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| Divorced | -0.008 (0.030) | -0.013 (0.030) | -0.029 (0.026) |
| Working | 0.096** (0.042) | 0.100** (0.041) | 0.026 (0.032) |
| Looking for job | 0.070 (0.044) | 0.072* (0.043) | -0.017 (0.038) |
| Home keeper | 0.114** (0.050) | 0.144*** (0.050) | 0.055 (0.040) |
| Retired/disabled | 0.163*** (0.050) | 0.163*** (0.049) | 0.099** (0.042) |
| Individualism | -0.021*** (0.005) | -0.018*** (0.006) | |
| Rule of Law | 0.369*** (0.137) | 0.381*** (0.143) | |
| Ethnolingu. Fragment | -0.109 (0.244) | -0.261 (0.288) | |
| British Legal Origin | 0.524 (0.368) | 0.402 (0.406) | |
| French Legal Origin | 0.475* (0.266) | 0.536* (0.315) | |
| German Legal Origin | -1.219*** (0.361) | -1.026** (0.431) | |
| Percent Catholic | -0.002 (0.003) | -0.003 (0.003) | |
| Percent Muslim | -0.011* (0.006) | -0.011* (0.006) | |
| Democratic | -0.443** (0.203) | -0.610*** (0.233) | |
| Per-capita income | 0.000 (0.000) | 0.000 (0.000) | |
| Government Share | 0.002 (0.012) | 0.014 (0.013) | |
| Population | 0.000 (0.000) | 0.001** (0.000) | |
| Population less than 25 | -0.006 (0.014) | 0.007 (0.015) | |
| Average Country Education | 0.033 (0.068) | 0.107 (0.078) | |
| Women in parliament | -0.017* (0.009) | -0.028*** (0.010) | |
| War | 0.305 (0.195) | 0.220 (0.222) | |
| Europe | -0.218 (0.353) | -0.171 (0.388) | 0.618*** (0.087) |
| Central Europe | 0.251 (0.649) | -0.337 (0.693) | 0.801*** (0.205) |
| Mediterranean | -1.562*** (0.480) | -1.334*** (0.529) | -0.049 (0.079) |
| Asia | 0.585 (0.563) | 0.232 (0.650) | 0.894*** (0.136) |

(Table 4 concluded)

| | | | |
|----------------|--------------------|-------------------|---------------------|
| Africa | 1.050** (0.472) | 0.611 (0.571) | 0.899*** (0.032) |
| Latin America | 0.166 (0.455) | -0.103 (0.533) | 0.507** (0.228) |
| N | 70,324 | 74,788 | 89,037 |
| Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Country FE | No | No | Yes |
| Log likelihood | -81,287 | -87063 | -104,265 |

Robust standard errors, clustered at the country-level are in parentheses. Statistical significance of the coefficients at the 10% , 5% and 1% level are indicated by *, **, and ***.

Table 5
Ordered Probit Estimates with additional Indicators of Victimization
Dependent variable: Severity of Punishment for Burglary

| Variable | Robbery | Personal Theft | Bicycle Theft | Assault |
|---|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| Victim of Burglary This/Last Year | 0.080*** (0.020) | 0.086*** (0.021) | 0.082*** (0.019) | 0.076*** (0.020) |
| Victim of Burglary Before Last Year | 0.032** (0.016) | 0.034** (0.016) | 0.032* (0.017) | 0.032** (0.017) |
| <i>Victim of the Crime listed in the column heading this or last year</i> | 0.003 (0.036) | -0.009 (0.020) | 0.026 (0.037) | 0.051*** (0.017) |
| Gun | 0.037 (0.026) | 0.038 (0.026) | 0.037 (0.026) | 0.033 (0.026) |
| Male | 0.125*** (0.022) | 0.125*** (0.022) | 0.125*** (0.022) | 0.126*** (0.022) |
| Upper Income | -0.007 (0.026) | -0.008 (0.026) | -0.006 (0.026) | -0.006 (0.026) |
| Education | -0.019*** (0.005) | -0.020*** (0.005) | -0.020*** (0.005) | -0.020*** (0.005) |
| Burglary rate | 1.100 (1.105) | 1.050 (1.102) | 1.128 (1.102) | 1.043 (1.113) |
| Individualism | -0.018*** (0.006) | -0.018*** (0.006) | -0.018*** (0.006) | -0.018*** (0.006) |
| Rule of Law | 0.375*** (0.140) | 0.374*** (0.140) | 0.375*** (0.139) | 0.374*** (0.141) |
| Ethnolingu. Fragment | -0.273 (0.287) | -0.264 (0.287) | -0.277 (0.287) | -0.269 (0.287) |
| Age20to24 | 0.031 (0.050) | 0.025 (0.052) | 0.031 (0.051) | 0.027 (0.051) |
| Age25to29 | 0.009 (0.045) | 0.007 (0.045) | 0.010 (0.045) | 0.006 (0.044) |
| Age30to34 | 0.030 (0.046) | 0.026 (0.047) | 0.029 (0.046) | 0.025 (0.046) |
| Age35to39 | -0.018 (0.050) | -0.022 (0.051) | -0.017 (0.050) | -0.020 (0.049) |
| Age40to44 | -0.039 (0.052) | -0.044 (0.053) | -0.039 (0.053) | -0.044 (0.052) |
| Age45to49 | -0.096 (0.061) | -0.098 (0.062) | -0.090 (0.062) | -0.099* (0.060) |
| Age50to54 | -0.121** (0.061) | -0.126** (0.062) | -0.118** (0.061) | -0.125** (0.061) |
| Age55to59 | -0.124* (0.067) | -0.125* (0.068) | -0.120* (0.067) | -0.125* (0.066) |
| Age60to64 | -0.089 (0.070) | -0.090 (0.071) | -0.086 (0.071) | -0.091 (0.070) |
| Age65to69 | -0.097 (0.071) | -0.102 (0.072) | -0.092 (0.071) | -0.096 (0.071) |
| Age70+ | -0.098 (0.073) | -0.102 (0.074) | -0.092 (0.074) | -0.096 (0.074) |

(Table 5 continued)

| | | | | |
|---------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| Single | -0.050** (0.024) | -0.050** (0.024) | -0.050** (0.024) | -0.053** (0.024) |
| Widow | -0.034 (0.022) | -0.036* (0.022) | -0.032 (0.022) | -0.036* (0.022) |
| Living together | 0.032 (0.035) | 0.031 (0.035) | 0.033 (0.034) | 0.033 (0.034) |
| Divorced | -0.015 (0.030) | -0.014 (0.030) | -0.016 (0.030) | -0.016 (0.030) |
| Working | 0.100*** (0.041) | 0.100*** (0.039) | 0.102*** (0.040) | 0.107*** (0.040) |
| Looking for job | 0.069 (0.043) | 0.068* (0.041) | 0.071* (0.043) | 0.075* (0.042) |
| Home keeper | 0.146*** (0.050) | 0.147*** (0.049) | 0.146*** (0.050) | 0.156*** (0.049) |
| Retired/disabled | 0.162*** (0.049) | 0.161*** (0.049) | 0.161*** (0.049) | 0.168*** (0.049) |
| British Legal Origin | 0.438 (0.400) | 0.431 (0.400) | 0.431 (0.399) | 0.433 (0.400) |
| French Legal Origin | 0.540* (0.314) | 0.539* (0.313) | 0.539* (0.314) | 0.539* (0.313) |
| German Legal Origin | -1.041 (0.428) | -1.044*** (0.428) | -1.033** (0.427) | -1.041*** (0.428) |
| Percent Catholic | -0.003 (0.003) | -0.003 (0.003) | -0.003 (0.003) | -0.003 (0.003) |
| Percent Muslim | -0.011* (0.006) | -0.011* (0.006) | -0.011* (0.006) | -0.011* (0.006) |
| Democratic | -0.602*** (0.232) | -0.594*** (0.233) | -0.596*** (0.232) | -0.602*** (0.233) |
| Per-capita income | 0.000 (0.000) | 0.000 (0.000) | 0.000 (0.000) | 0.000 (0.000) |
| Government Share | 0.014 (0.013) | 0.014 (0.013) | 0.014 (0.013) | 0.014 (0.013) |
| Population | 0.001** (0.000) | 0.001** (0.000) | 0.001** (0.000) | 0.001** (0.000) |
| Population less than 25 | 0.007 (0.015) | 0.007 (0.015) | 0.007 (0.015) | 0.007 (0.015) |
| Average Country Education | 0.110 (0.077) | 0.109 (0.077) | 0.110 (0.077) | 0.109 (0.077) |
| Women in parliament | -0.028*** (0.010) | -0.028*** (0.010) | -0.029*** (0.010) | -0.028*** (0.010) |
| War | 0.203 (0.217) | 0.206 (0.216) | 0.205 (0.216) | 0.204 (0.217) |
| Europe | -0.147 (0.380) | -0.151 (0.379) | -0.156 (0.379) | -0.153 (0.379) |
| Central Europe | -0.305 (0.685) | -0.304 (0.686) | -0.313 (0.685) | -0.311 (0.687) |

(Table 5 concluded)

| | | | | |
|----------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| Mediterranean | -1.309*** (0.521) | -1.313*** (0.520) | -1.317*** (0.519) | -1.320*** (0.521) |
| Asia | 0.271 (0.641) | 0.269 (0.638) | 0.278 (0.639) | 0.265 (0.641) |
| Africa | 0.637 (0.566) | 0.644 (0.567) | 0.645 (0.566) | 0.630 (0.567) |
| Latin America | -0.064 (0.524) | -0.065 (0.524) | -0.063 (0.524) | -0.072 (0.526) |
| N | 74,684 | 74,478 | 74,523 | 74,444 |
| Log-likelihood | -88,333 | -88,062 | -88,125 | -87,948 |

Robust standard errors, clustered at the country-level are in parentheses. Statistical significance of the coefficients at the 10% , 5% and 1% level are indicated by *, **, and ***.

Table 6A
The Preference for Punishment by Gender
Probit regressions

| Preference for any Jail or Prison Time | | | | |
|--|------------|---------|------------|---------|
| | Males | | Females | |
| Victim of Burglary- This or last year | 0.020** | (0.009) | 0.037*** | (0.011) |
| | [0.024***] | (0.009) | [0.033***] | (0.009) |
| Victim of Burglary- Before last year | 0.009 | (0.010) | 0.003 | (0.011) |
| | [0.008] | (0.010) | [0.006] | (0.010) |
| Gun | 0.027** | (0.012) | 0.007 | (0.018) |
| Upper Income | -0.006 | (0.012) | -0.022** | (0.011) |
| Education | -0.009*** | (0.002) | -0.011*** | (0.002) |
| Burglary rate | 0.534 | (0.409) | 0.340 | (0.421) |
| N | 35,443 | | 39,345 | |
| | [41,832] | | [47,205] | |
| Mean of the dependent variable | 0.413 | | 0.368 | |
| | [0.413] | | [0.371] | |
| Preference for at least 2 years in Prison | | | | |
| Victim of Burglary- This or last year | 0.024** | (0.011) | 0.024*** | (0.008) |
| | [0.019**] | (0.009) | [0.024***] | (0.006) |
| Victim of Burglary- Before last year | 0.017* | (0.009) | 0.017*** | (0.006) |
| | [0.016*] | (0.009) | [0.014**] | (0.006) |
| Gun | -0.002 | (0.008) | 0.000 | (0.007) |
| Upper Income | 0.007 | (0.007) | 0.003 | (0.007) |
| Education | -0.002** | (0.001) | -0.003*** | (0.001) |
| Burglary rate | 0.757** | (0.317) | 0.551* | (0.282) |
| N | 35443 | | 39345 | |
| | [41454] | | [47205] | |
| Mean of the dependent variable | 0.180 | | 0.156 | |
| | [0.189] | | [0.168] | |
| Preference for at least 4 years in Prison | | | | |
| Victim of Burglary- This or last year | 0.011 | (0.007) | 0.013*** | (0.004) |
| | [0.015***] | (0.006) | [0.013***] | (0.004) |
| Victim of Burglary- Before last year | 0.005 | (0.004) | 0.007*** | (0.003) |
| | [0.005] | (0.005) | [0.005] | (0.003) |
| Gun | 0.001 | (0.005) | -0.004 | (0.004) |
| Upper Income | 0.005 | (0.004) | 0.004 | (0.004) |
| Education | 0.000 | (0.001) | -0.002*** | (0.001) |
| Burglary rate | 0.383* | (0.206) | 0.195 | (0.211) |
| N | 35,443 | | 39,296 | |
| | [41,454] | | [46,719] | |
| Mean of the dependent variable | 0.087 | | 0.076 | |
| | [0.092] | | [0.083] | |

The reported values are the marginal effects. Regressions include all explanatory variables included in models of Table 4. The marginal effects reported in [brackets] are obtained from regressions that include country fixed-effects instead of country characteristics. The rest of the coefficients are not reported in the interest of space. Robust standard errors of the marginal effects, clustered at the country level, are in parentheses. Statistical significance of the underlying probit coefficients at the 10% , 5% and 1% level are indicated by *, **, and ***.

Table 6B
The Preference for Punishment by Personal Education
Probit Regressions

| | Preference for any Jail or Prison Time | | | |
|---------------------------------------|--|---------|---------------------------|---------|
| | Highly-Educated person | | Person with Low Education | |
| Victim of Burglary- This or last year | 0.021** | (0.011) | 0.034*** | (0.012) |
| | [0.023**] | (0.010) | [0.031***] | (0.010) |
| Victim of Burglary- Before last year | 0.005 | (0.011) | 0.008 | (0.014) |
| | [0.001] | (0.010) | [0.012] | (0.012) |
| Gun | 0.022 | (0.015) | 0.019 | (0.012) |
| Male | 0.063*** | (0.010) | 0.049*** | (0.010) |
| Upper Income | 0.001 | (0.013) | -0.021** | (0.010) |
| Education | -0.012*** | (0.003) | 0.002 | (0.004) |
| Burglary rate | 0.703* | (0.393) | -0.126 | (0.441) |
| N | 32,476 | | 42,312 | |
| | [38,564] | | [50,472] | |
| Mean of the dependent variable | 0.362 | | 0.413 | |
| | [0.364] | | [0.414] | |
| | Preference for at least 2 years in Prison | | | |
| Victim of Burglary- This or last year | 0.028*** | (0.009) | 0.019*** | (0.007) |
| | [0.023***] | (0.008) | [0.019***] | (0.006) |
| Victim of Burglary- Before last year | 0.018** | (0.009) | 0.015 | (0.010) |
| | [0.016*] | (0.009) | [0.012] | (0.008) |
| Gun | 0.008 | (0.007) | -0.006 | (0.008) |
| Male | 0.031*** | (0.004) | 0.020*** | (0.007) |
| Upper Income | 0.010 | (0.007) | 0.003 | (0.006) |
| Education | -0.005*** | (0.001) | 0.002 | (0.002) |
| Burglary rate | 0.791*** | (0.309) | 0.424 | (0.294) |
| N | 32,476 | | 42,312 | |
| | [38,564] | | [50,159] | |
| Mean of the dependent variable | 0.154 | | 0.179 | |
| | [0.164] | | [0.189] | |
| | Preference for at least 4 years in Prison | | | |
| Victim of Burglary- This or last year | 0.011** | (0.006) | 0.011*** | (0.003) |
| | [0.013***] | (0.006) | [0.014***] | (0.004) |
| Victim of Burglary- Before last year | 0.001 | (0.005) | 0.010** | (0.005) |
| | [-0.001] | (0.005) | [0.009**] | (0.004) |
| Gun | 0.004 | (0.004) | -0.005 | (0.004) |
| Male | 0.015*** | (0.003) | 0.003 | (0.004) |
| Upper Income | 0.001 | (0.003) | 0.008*** | (0.004) |
| Education | -0.001** | (0.001) | 0.000 | (0.001) |
| Burglary rate | 0.379** | (0.168) | 0.135 | (0.231) |
| N | 32,476 | | 42,312 | |
| | [38,564] | | [50,159] | |
| Mean of the dependent variable | 0.074 | | 0.087 | |
| | [0.083] | | [0.092] | |

The reported values are the marginal effects. Regressions include all explanatory variables included in models of Table 4. The marginal effects reported in [brackets] are obtained from regressions that include country fixed-effects instead of country characteristics. The rest of the coefficients are not reported in the interest of space. Robust standard errors of the marginal effects, clustered at the country level, are in parentheses. Statistical significance of the underlying probit coefficients at the 10%, 5% and 1% level are indicated by *, **, and ***.

Table 7
Differential Strength of Vengeful Feelings by Groups

| | | Percentage increase in the desire to impose <i>any prison sentence</i> due to victimization among people in the world with the characteristic listed in rows | Percentage increase in the desire to impose <i>a prison sentence of at least 2 years</i> due to victimization among the people in the world with characteristics listed in rows | Percentage increase in the desire to impose <i>a prison sentence of at least 4 years</i> due to victimization among people in the world with the characteristic listed in rows |
|---------------------------------|--|--|--|---|
| PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS | | | | |
| A1 | Males | 5% [6%] | 23% [19%] | 0% [16%] |
| A2 | Females | 10% [9%] | 26% [23%] | 26% [16%] |
| B1 | More Educated People (in own country) | 6% [6%] | 30% [24%] | 15% [16%] |
| B2 | Less Educated People (in own country) | 8% [8%] | 11% [10%] | 25% [25%] |
| C1 | Older People (Age≥40) | 7% [7%] | 26% [21%] | 18% [19%] |
| C2 | Younger People | 8% [7%] | 15% [13%] | 13% [13%] |
| D1 | People in the top 50% of the income distribution (in own country) | 10% [8%] | 22% [19%] | 9% [9%] |
| D2 | People in the bottom 50% of the income distribution | 5% [7%] | 26% [22%] | 30% [22%] |
| E1 | Working People | 8% [8%] | 29% [25%] | 23% [23%] |
| E2 | Non-Working People | 7% [6%] | 17% [14%] | 11% [8%] |
| F1 | People who live in High-burglary areas | 9% [9%] | 24% [20%] | 24% [16%] |
| F2 | People who live in Low -burglary areas | 0% [0%] | 16% [14%] | 0% [0%] |
| COUNTRY CHARACTERISTICS | | | | |
| G1 | People who live in countries where average country education is above the world median (8 years) | 6% [7%] | 8% [8%] | 8% [12%] |
| G2 | People who live in countries where average country education is below the world median (8 years) | 7% [8%] | 33% [32%] | 31% [33%] |
| H1 | People who live in countries where there was at least one war or military conflict since 1975 | 4% [4%] | 24% [22%] | 27% [30%] |
| H2 | People who live in countries with no war or military conflict since 1975 | 10% [10%] | 17% [15%] | 12% [16%] |

(Table 7 concluded)

| | | | | | | | |
|----|---|-----|-------|-----|-------|-----|-------|
| I1 | People who live in countries where the Rule-of-law rating is above the world median | 7% | [7%] | 10% | [12%] | 0% | [0%] |
| I2 | People who live in countries where the Rule-of-law rating is below the world median | 6% | [7%] | 27% | [21%] | 29% | [21%] |
| J1 | People who live in richer countries (mean GDP per-capita is greater than 8000\$) | 6% | [8%] | 0% | [9%] | 0% | [0%] |
| J2 | People who live in poorer countries (mean GDP per-capita is smaller than 8000\$). | 6% | [6%] | 30% | [22%] | 34% | [29%] |
| K1 | People who live in more Individualistic countries | 6% | [7%] | 12% | [0%] | 8% | [15%] |
| K2 | People who live in less Individualistic countries | 8% | [8%] | 29% | [28%] | 17% | [16%] |
| L1 | People who live in countries with higher ethno-linguistic fragmentation | 6% | [7%] | 25% | [24%] | 22% | [17%] |
| L2 | People who live in countries with lower ethno-linguistic fragmentation | 8% | [6%] | 15% | [10%] | 15% | [15%] |
| M1 | People who live in countries with uninterrupted Democracy | 12% | [12%] | 11% | [11%] | 0% | [0%] |
| M2 | People who live in countries with interrupted Democracy | 6% | [6%] | 31% | [22%] | 37% | [31%] |
| N1 | Low GDP, High ethno-linguistic fragmentation, Rich person | 9% | [11%] | 14% | [17%] | 21% | [22%] |
| N2 | High GDP, Low ethno-linguistic fragmentation, Poor person | 6% | [6%] | 23% | [19%] | 21% | [21%] |
| O1 | No war, High local burglary rate, Old and poor person | 4% | [11%] | 23% | [15%] | 33% | [0 %] |
| O2 | War, Low local burglary rate, Young and rich person | 7% | [7%] | 22% | [19%] | 14% | [11%] |

For each row, the cells depict the percentage *increase* in the proportion of people in that row who would like to assign the punishment listed in column headings if the people listed in the row were victimized. The values are calculated using the marginal effects reported in Tables 6A-6M and the relevant mean values of desired punishment. The values in [brackets] have the same meaning, except that they are based on the marginal effects that are obtained from the models with country fixed-effects in Tables 6A-6M.

Table 8
Differential Impact of More Frequent Victimization
Among Victims with Various Characteristics

| | | Percentage increase in the desire to impose <i>any prison sentence</i> due to more frequent victimization among victimized people in the world with the characteristic listed in rows | Percentage increase in the desire to impose <i>a prison sentence of at least 2 years</i> due to more frequent victimization among victimized people in the world with characteristics listed in rows | Percentage increase in the desire to impose <i>a prison sentence of at least 4 years</i> due to more frequent victimization among victimized people in the world with the characteristic listed in rows |
|----|--|--|---|---|
| A1 | People who live in countries where average country education is above the world median (8 years) | 0% [0%] | 0% [0%] | 0% [0%] |
| A2 | People who live in countries where average country education is below the world median (8 years) | 0% [0%] | 18% [0%] | 0% [0%] |
| B1 | People who live in countries with no war or military conflict since 1975 | 0% [0%] | 0% [0%] | 0% [0%] |
| B2 | People who live in countries where there was <i>at least one war or military conflict</i> since 1975 | 0% [0%] | 23% [18%] | 19% [18%] |
| C1 | People who live in countries where the Rule-of-law rating is above the world median | 0% [0%] | 0% [0%] | 0% [0%] |
| C2 | People who live in countries where the Rule-of-law rating is below the world median | 0% [0%] | 26% [0%] | 18% [0%] |
| D1 | People who live in richer countries (mean GDP per-capita is greater than 8000\$) | 0% [0%] | 0% [0%] | 0% [0%] |
| D2 | People who live in poorer countries (mean GDP per-capita is smaller than 8000\$). | 0% [0%] | 16% [0%] | 0% [0%] |
| E1 | People who live in more Individualistic countries | 0% [0%] | 0% [0%] | 0% [0%] |
| E2 | People who live in less Individualistic countries | 0% [0%] | 22% [21%] | 0% [0%] |
| F1 | People who live in countries with lower ethno-linguistic fragmentation | 0% [0%] | 0% [0%] | 0% [-23%] |
| F2 | People who live in countries with higher ethno-linguistic fragmentation | 0% [0%] | 0% [0%] | 19% [0%] |
| G1 | People who live in countries with uninterrupted Democracy | 0% [0%] | 0% [0%] | 0% [0%] |
| G2 | People who live in countries with interrupted Democracy | 28% [0%] | 21% [0%] | 0% [0%] |

See notes to Table 7.

Figure 1
Proportion of Respondents Considering 2 or More Years in Prison as Appropriate Punishment for Theft of a Color TV as a 2nd Burglary Offense




Figure 2
Proportion of Respondents Considering 4 or More Years in Prison as Appropriate Punishment for Theft of a Color TV as a 2nd Burglary Offense




Figure 3
Proportion of Respondents Considering 6 or More Years in Prison as Appropriate Punishment for Theft of a Color TV as a 2nd Burglary Offense




Figure 4A
Proportion of Females Respondents Considering 4 or More Years in Prison as Appropriate Punishment for Theft of a Color TV as a 2nd Burglary Offense





Figure 4B
Proportion of Males Respondents Considering 4 or More Years in Prison as Appropriate Punishment for Theft of a Color TV as a 2nd Burglary Offense



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Appendix-Table 6C
The Preference for Punishment by Personal Income
Probit Regressions

| | Preference for any Jail or Prison Time | | | |
|---------------------------------------|---|---------|--|---------|
| | If the family Income is in the top 50% of Income Distr. | | If the family Income is in the bottom 50% of Inc. Distr. | |
| Victim of Burglary- This or last year | 0.037*** | (0.010) | 0.022** | (0.010) |
| | [0.031***] | (0.009) | [0.028***] | (0.010) |
| Victim of Burglary- Before last year | 0.010 | (0.012) | 0.003 | (0.011) |
| | [0.010] | (0.011) | [0.006] | (0.011) |
| Gun | 0.032*** | (0.012) | 0.009 | (0.013) |
| Male | 0.065*** | (0.009) | 0.042*** | (0.011) |
| Upper Income | | | | |
| Education | -0.010*** | (0.002) | -0.010*** | (0.002) |
| Burglary rate | -0.009 | (0.520) | 0.570 | (0.389) |
| N | 38,527 | | 36,261 | |
| | [45,625] | | [43,412] | |
| Mean of the dependent variable | 0.370 | | 0.416 | |
| | [0.374] | | [0.413] | |
| | Preference for at least 2 years in Prison | | | |
| Victim of Burglary- This or last year | 0.018*** | (0.007) | 0.030*** | (0.010) |
| | [0.017***] | (0.006) | [0.027***] | (0.009) |
| Victim of Burglary- Before last year | 0.016** | (0.009) | 0.017** | (0.008) |
| | [0.014*] | (0.008) | [0.015*] | (0.008) |
| Gun | 0.007 | (0.007) | -0.007 | (0.011) |
| Male | 0.027*** | (0.006) | 0.023*** | (0.006) |
| Upper Income | | | | |
| Education | -0.003** | (0.001) | -0.003*** | (0.001) |
| Burglary rate | 0.113 | (0.274) | 0.933*** | (0.265) |
| N | 38,527 | | 36,261 | |
| | [45,625] | | [43,020] | |
| Mean of the dependent variable | 0.158 | | 0.180 | |
| | [0.168] | | [0.190] | |
| | Preference for at least 4 years in Prison | | | |
| Victim of Burglary- This or last year | 0.007* | (0.004) | 0.017*** | (0.006) |
| | [0.008**] | (0.004) | [0.020***] | (0.005) |
| Victim of Burglary- Before last year | 0.004 | (0.004) | 0.008** | (0.004) |
| | [0.004] | (0.004) | [0.005] | (0.004) |
| Gun | 0.002 | (0.004) | -0.003 | (0.006) |
| Male | 0.010*** | (0.004) | 0.008*** | (0.003) |
| Upper Income | | | | |
| Education | -0.001 | (0.001) | -0.001* | (0.001) |
| Burglary rate | 0.009 | (0.173) | 0.392* | (0.229) |
| N | 38,527 | | 36,242 | |
| | [45,205] | | [42,997] | |
| Mean of the dependent variable | 0.079 | | 0.085 | |
| | [0.085] | | [0.090] | |

The reported values are the marginal effects. Regressions include all explanatory variables included in models of Table 4. The marginal effects reported in [brackets] are obtained from regressions that include country fixed-effects instead of country characteristics. The rest of the coefficients are not reported in the interest of space. Robust standard errors of the marginal effects, clustered at the country level, are in parentheses. Statistical significance of the underlying probit coefficients at the 10%, 5% and 1% level are indicated by *, **, and ***.

Appendix-Table 6D
The Preference for Punishment by Age
Probit Regressions

| Preference for any Jail or Prison Time | | | | |
|--|------------|---------|------------|---------|
| | Age ≥40 | | Age <40 | |
| Victim of Burglary- This or last year | 0.024*** | (0.009) | 0.032*** | (0.008) |
| | [0.025***] | (0.009) | [0.030***] | (0.008) |
| Victim of Burglary- Before last year | 0.005 | (0.007) | 0.007 | (0.011) |
| | [0.007] | (0.007) | [0.008] | (0.010) |
| Gun | 0.020* | (0.012) | 0.023 | (0.014) |
| Male | 0.080*** | (0.010) | 0.028*** | (0.010) |
| Upper Income | -0.013 | (0.012) | -0.010 | (0.011) |
| Education | -0.010*** | (0.002) | -0.009*** | (0.002) |
| Burglary rate | 0.008 | (0.457) | 0.698 | (0.393) |
| N | 40,147 | | 34,641 | |
| | [47,714] | | [41,322] | |
| Mean of the dependent variable | 0.356 | | 0.428 | |
| | [0.363] | | [0.421] | |
| Preference for at least 2 years in Prison | | | | |
| Victim of Burglary- This or last year | 0.018*** | (0.007) | 0.029*** | (0.008) |
| | [0.017] | (0.006) | [0.026***] | (0.008) |
| Victim of Burglary- Before last year | 0.019*** | (0.007) | 0.014 | (0.010) |
| | [0.017] | (0.007) | [0.012] | (0.008) |
| Gun | -0.002 | (0.006) | 0.003 | (0.010) |
| Male | 0.031*** | (0.006) | 0.019*** | (0.006) |
| Upper Income | 0.000 | (0.007) | 0.013* | (0.007) |
| Education | -0.003*** | (0.001) | -0.002 | (0.002) |
| Burglary rate | 0.443 | (0.313) | 0.836*** | (0.309) |
| N | 40,147 | | 34,641 | |
| | [47,714] | | [41,322] | |
| Mean of the dependent variable | 0.144 | | 0.193 | |
| | [0.158] | | [0.198] | |
| Preference for at least 4 years in Prison | | | | |
| Victim of Burglary- This or last year | 0.012*** | (0.004) | 0.012*** | (0.005) |
| | [0.015***] | (0.004) | [0.013***] | (0.005) |
| Victim of Burglary- Before last year | 0.005 | (0.003) | 0.007 | (0.005) |
| | [0.004] | (0.004) | [0.005] | (0.004) |
| Gun | 0.001 | (0.004) | -0.002 | (0.005) |
| Male | 0.012*** | (0.003) | 0.006 | (0.004) |
| Upper Income | 0.002 | (0.004) | 0.008*** | (0.004) |
| Education | -0.001*** | (0.000) | 0.000 | (0.001) |
| Burglary rate | 0.280 | (0.167) | 0.285 | (0.271) |
| N | 40,147 | | 34,641 | |
| | [47,243] | | [40,981] | |
| Mean of the dependent variable | 0.070 | | 0.093 | |
| | [0.078] | | [0.096] | |

The reported values are the marginal effects. Regressions include all explanatory variables included in models of Table 4. The marginal effects reported in [brackets] are obtained from regressions that include country fixed-effects instead of country characteristics. The rest of the coefficients are not reported in the interest of space. Robust standard errors of the marginal effects, clustered at the country level, are in parentheses. Statistical significance of the underlying probit coefficients at the 10%, 5% and 1% level are indicated by *, **, and ***.

Appendix-Table 6E
The Preference for Punishment by Labor Market Status
Probit Regressions

| Preference for any Jail or Prison Time | | | | |
|--|----------------|---------|--------------------|---------|
| | Working | | Non-working | |
| Victim of Burglary- This or last year | 0.030*** | (0.010) | 0.026** | (0.011) |
| | [0.030***] | (0.009) | [0.024***] | (0.009) |
| Victim of Burglary- Before last year | 0.001 | (0.011) | 0.013 | (0.011) |
| | [0.003] | (0.010) | [0.013] | (0.011) |
| Gun | 0.022* | (0.013) | 0.019 | (0.015) |
| Male | 0.056*** | (0.008) | 0.053*** | (0.014) |
| Upper Income | -0.014 | (0.010) | -0.010 | (0.015) |
| Education | -0.011*** | (0.002) | -0.007*** | (0.002) |
| Burglary rate | 0.536 | (0.448) | 0.216 | (0.385) |
| N | 44,961 | | 29,827 | |
| | [52,843] | | [36,193] | |
| Mean of the dependent variable | 0.389 | | 0.394 | |
| | [0.390] | | [0.395] | |
| Preference for at least 2 years in Prison | | | | |
| Victim of Burglary- This or last year | 0.031*** | (0.009) | 0.014* | (0.009) |
| | [0.028***] | (0.008) | [0.012*] | (0.008) |
| Victim of Burglary- Before last year | 0.016** | (0.008) | 0.017** | (0.009) |
| | [0.014*] | (0.008) | [0.014*] | (0.008) |
| Gun | 0.005 | (0.007) | -0.011 | (0.009) |
| Male | 0.028*** | (0.005) | 0.018** | (0.008) |
| Upper Income | 0.002 | (0.006) | 0.006 | (0.009) |
| Education | -0.003** | (0.001) | -0.003*** | (0.001) |
| Burglary rate | 0.670** | (0.299) | 0.615* | (0.329) |
| N | 44,961 | | 29,827 | |
| | [52,843] | | [35,922] | |
| Mean of the dependent variable | 0.163 | | 0.176 | |
| | [0.172] | | [0.188] | |
| Preference for at least 4 years in Prison | | | | |
| Victim of Burglary- This or last year | 0.018*** | (0.006) | 0.003 | (0.005) |
| | [0.019***] | (0.005) | [0.004] | (0.005) |
| Victim of Burglary- Before last year | 0.004 | (0.004) | 0.009** | (0.005) |
| | [0.004] | (0.004) | [0.008**] | (0.004) |
| Gun | 0.002 | (0.003) | -0.006 | (0.005) |
| Male | 0.012*** | (0.003) | 0.003 | (0.005) |
| Upper Income | 0.003 | (0.003) | 0.006 | (0.005) |
| Education | 0.000 | (0.001) | -0.002*** | (0.001) |
| Burglary rate | 0.322 | (0.192) | 0.212 | (0.250) |
| N | 44,961 | | 29,827 | |
| | [52,302] | | [35,917] | |
| Mean of the dependent variable | 0.078 | | 0.087 | |
| | [0.084] | | [0.092] | |

The reported values are the marginal effects. Regressions include all explanatory variables included in models of Table 4. The marginal effects reported in [brackets] are obtained from regressions that include country fixed-effects instead of country characteristics. The rest of the coefficients are not reported in the interest of space. Robust standard errors of the marginal effects, clustered at the country level, are in parentheses. Statistical significance of the underlying probit coefficients at the 10%, 5% and 1% level are indicated by *, **, and ***.

Appendix-Table 6F
The Preference for Punishment by Local Crime
Probit Regressions

| | Preference for any Jail or Prison Time | | | |
|---------------------------------------|--|---------|--------------------------|---------|
| | High Burglary Rate | | Low Burglary Rate | |
| Victim of Burglary- This or last year | 0.037*** | (0.007) | 0.003 | (0.014) |
| | [0.035***] | (0.007) | [0.006] | (0.015) |
| Victim of Burglary- Before last year | 0.007 | (0.008) | 0.007 | (0.012) |
| | [0.009] | (0.009) | [0.008] | (0.012) |
| Gun | 0.011 | (0.011) | 0.036*** | (0.013) |
| Male | 0.058*** | (0.009) | 0.047*** | (0.012) |
| Upper Income | -0.019 | (0.013) | -0.002 | (0.008) |
| Education | -0.010*** | (0.002) | -0.010*** | (0.002) |
| Burglary rate | 0.666 | (0.464) | 0.957 | (1.005) |
| N | 47,678 | | 27,110 | |
| | [59,633] | | [28,964] | |
| Mean of the dependent variable | 0.409 | | 0.359 | |
| | [0.407] | | [0.369] | |
| | Preference for at least 2 years in Prison | | | |
| Victim of Burglary- This or last year | 0.030*** | (0.009) | 0.009 | (0.007) |
| | [0.026***] | (0.007) | [0.009] | (0.008) |
| Victim of Burglary- Before last year | 0.016*** | (0.006) | 0.020** | (0.010) |
| | [0.014**] | (0.007) | [0.019**] | (0.010) |
| Gun | -0.011 | (0.007) | 0.015** | (0.007) |
| Male | 0.026*** | (0.007) | 0.022*** | (0.005) |
| Upper Income | 0.006 | (0.008) | 0.002 | (0.005) |
| Education | -0.004*** | (0.001) | -0.002* | (0.001) |
| Burglary rate | 0.438 | (0.422) | 0.519 | (0.749) |
| N | 47,678 | | 27,110 | |
| | [59,633] | | [28,964] | |
| Mean of the dependent variable | 0.192 | | 0.126 | |
| | [0.200] | | [0.136] | |
| | Preference for at least 4 years in Prison | | | |
| Victim of Burglary- This or last year | 0.016*** | (0.006) | 0.002 | (0.006) |
| | [0.016***] | (0.005) | [0.005] | (0.007) |
| Victim of Burglary- Before last year | 0.007* | (0.004) | 0.006 | (0.005) |
| | [0.005] | (0.004) | [0.008] | (0.006) |
| Gun | -0.005 | (0.004) | 0.006 | (0.004) |
| Male | 0.009** | (0.004) | 0.007*** | (0.003) |
| Upper Income | 0.007* | (0.004) | 0.002 | (0.003) |
| Education | -0.002*** | (0.001) | 0.000 | (0.000) |
| Burglary rate | 0.179 | (0.293) | 0.179 | (0.595) |
| N | 47,678 | | 27,110 | |
| | [59,633] | | [28,152] | |
| Mean of the dependent variable | 0.095 | | 0.057 | |
| | [0.100] | | [0.063] | |

The reported values are the marginal effects. Regressions include all explanatory variables included in models of Table 4. The marginal effects reported in [brackets] are obtained from regressions that include country fixed-effects instead of country characteristics. The rest of the coefficients are not reported in the interest of space. Robust standard errors of the marginal effects, clustered at the country level, are in parentheses. Statistical significance of the underlying probit coefficients at the 10% , 5% and 1% level are indicated by *, **, and ***.

Appendix-Table 6G
The Preference for Punishment by Country Income
Probit Regressions

| | Preference for any Jail or Prison Time | | | |
|---------------------------------------|--|---------|------------------------|---------|
| | Per-capita GDP>\$8,000 | | Per-capita GDP≤\$8,000 | |
| Victim of Burglary- This or last year | 0.021*** | (0.008) | 0.034*** | (0.012) |
| | [0.025***] | (0.008) | [0.030***] | (0.010) |
| Victim of Burglary- Before last year | 0.004 | (0.008) | 0.008 | (0.018) |
| | [0.009] | (0.008) | [0.004] | (0.016) |
| Gun | 0.024** | (0.011) | 0.021 | (0.024) |
| Male | 0.065*** | (0.008) | 0.010 | (0.024) |
| Upper Income | -0.019** | (0.009) | 0.011 | (0.014) |
| Education | -0.010*** | (0.002) | -0.009*** | (0.003) |
| Burglary rate | -0.251 | (0.294) | 0.078 | (0.559) |
| N | 56,986 | | 17,802 | |
| | [60,337] | | [28,700] | |
| Mean of the dependent variable | 0.335 | | 0.568 | |
| | [0.337] | | [0.506] | |
| | Preference for at least 2 years in Prison | | | |
| Victim of Burglary- This or last year | 0.009 | (0.006) | 0.058*** | (0.014) |
| | [0.008] | (0.006) | [0.044***] | (0.011) |
| Victim of Burglary- Before last year | 0.008 | (0.007) | 0.044*** | (0.016) |
| | [0.010*] | (0.006) | [0.025**] | (0.012) |
| Gun | 0.003 | (0.004) | 0.008 | (0.030) |
| Male | 0.021*** | (0.004) | 0.032* | (0.018) |
| Upper Income | 0.001 | (0.006) | 0.015 | (0.013) |
| Education | -0.004*** | (0.001) | -0.004* | (0.002) |
| Burglary rate | 0.170 | (0.174) | 0.204 | (0.765) |
| N | 56,986 | | 17,802 | |
| | [60,337] | | [28,700] | |
| Mean of the dependent variable | 0.114 | | 0.341 | |
| | [0.114] | | [0.309] | |
| | Preference for at least 4 years in Prison | | | |
| Victim of Burglary- This or last year | 0.004 | (0.003) | 0.035*** | (0.014) |
| | [0.004] | (0.003) | [0.034***] | (0.009) |
| Victim of Burglary- Before last year | 0.001 | (0.003) | 0.026*** | (0.011) |
| | [0.003] | (0.003) | [0.013*] | (0.008) |
| Gun | 0.002 | (0.002) | -0.004 | (0.016) |
| Male | 0.008*** | (0.002) | 0.004 | (0.010) |
| Upper Income | 0.002 | (0.003) | 0.014 | (0.011) |
| Education | -0.001*** | (0.000) | -0.003*** | (0.001) |
| Burglary rate | 0.003 | (0.102) | 0.071 | (0.554) |
| N | 56,986 | | 17,802 | |
| | [59,525] | | [28,700] | |
| Mean of the dependent variable | 0.049 | | 0.183 | |
| | [0.050] | | [0.164] | |

The reported values are the marginal effects. Regressions include all explanatory variables included in models of Table 4. The marginal effects reported in [brackets] are obtained from regressions that include country fixed-effects instead of country characteristics. The rest of the coefficients are not reported in the interest of space. Robust standard errors of the marginal effects, clustered at the country level, are in parentheses. Statistical significance of the underlying probit coefficients at the 10% , 5% and 1% level are indicated by *, **, and ***.

Appendix-Table 6H
The Preference for Punishment by Country Individualism
Probit Regressions

| Preference for any Jail or Prison Time | | | | |
|--|------------------------|---------|----------------------|---------|
| | Highly- Indiv. Society | | Collectivist Society | |
| Victim of Burglary- This or last year | 0.024*** | (0.008) | 0.031*** | (0.011) |
| | [0.024***] | (0.008) | [0.031***] | (0.011) |
| Victim of Burglary- Before last year | 0.010 | (0.011) | -0.002 | (0.011) |
| | [0.008] | (0.009) | [0.004] | (0.010) |
| Gun | 0.019 | (0.014) | 0.042*** | (0.015) |
| Male | 0.069*** | (0.010) | 0.037*** | (0.012) |
| Upper Income | -0.024*** | (0.009) | -0.004 | (0.014) |
| Education | -0.013*** | (0.003) | -0.012*** | (0.003) |
| Burglary rate | 0.277 | (0.194) | 0.637 | (0.406) |
| N | 37,824 | | 36,964 | |
| | [52,073] | | [36,964] | |
| Mean of the dependent variable | 0.368 | | 0.414 | |
| | [0.376] | | [0.414] | |
| Preference for at least 2 years in Prison | | | | |
| Victim of Burglary- This or last year | 0.003 | (0.006) | 0.042*** | (0.008) |
| | [0.007] | (0.006) | [0.040] | (0.008) |
| Victim of Burglary- Before last year | 0.015** | (0.007) | 0.019** | (0.010) |
| | [0.011] | (0.008) | [0.018] | (0.009) |
| Gun | 0.000 | (0.006) | 0.016* | (0.009) |
| Male | 0.020*** | (0.006) | 0.029*** | (0.007) |
| Upper Income | -0.006 | (0.005) | 0.012 | (0.009) |
| Education | -0.004*** | (0.001) | -0.004*** | (0.001) |
| Burglary rate | 0.580*** | (0.145) | 0.460 | (0.403) |
| N | 37,824 | | 36,964 | |
| | [52,073] | | [36,964] | |
| Mean of the dependent variable | 0.128 | | 0.208 | |
| | [0.156] | | [0.208] | |
| Preference for at least 4 years in Prison | | | | |
| Victim of Burglary- This or last year | 0.004 | (0.003) | 0.017*** | (0.007) |
| | [0.011***] | (0.004) | [0.016***] | (0.006) |
| Victim of Burglary- Before last year | 0.005* | (0.003) | 0.008 | (0.005) |
| | [0.002] | (0.004) | [0.007] | (0.005) |
| Gun | 0.002 | (0.003) | 0.003 | (0.007) |
| Male | 0.009** | (0.004) | 0.007** | (0.003) |
| Upper Income | -0.002 | (0.003) | 0.010** | (0.004) |
| Education | -0.002*** | (0.000) | -0.002*** | (0.001) |
| Burglary rate | 0.258** | (0.110) | 0.126 | (0.250) |
| N | 37,012 | | 36,964 | |
| | [51,261] | | [36,964] | |
| Mean of the dependent variable | 0.061 | | 0.103 | |
| | [0.076] | | [0.103] | |

The reported values are the marginal effects. Regressions include all explanatory variables included in models of Table 4. The marginal effects reported in [brackets] are obtained from regressions that include country fixed-effects instead of country characteristics. The rest of the coefficients are not reported in the interest of space. Robust standard errors of the marginal effects, clustered at the country level, are in parentheses. Statistical significance of the underlying probit coefficients at the 10% , 5% and 1% level are indicated by *, **, and ***.

Appendix-Table 6I
The Preference for Punishment by the level of the Rule-of-Law
Probit Regressions

| | Preference for any Jail or Prison Time | | | |
|---------------------------------------|--|---------|------------------------|----------|
| | High Rule of Law | | Low Rule of Law | |
| Victim of Burglary- This or last year | 0.023*** | (0.008) | 0.029*** | (0.010) |
| | [0.022***] | (0.008) | [0.030***] | (0.009) |
| Victim of Burglary- Before last year | 0.009 | (0.009) | -0.002 | (0.013) |
| | [0.011] | (0.008) | [0.003] | (0.011) |
| Gun | 0.023** | (0.011) | 0.038** | (0.019) |
| Male | 0.066*** | (0.007) | 0.032** | (0.015) |
| Upper Income | -0.018** | (0.009) | -0.009 | (0.014) |
| Education | -0.012*** | (0.003) | -0.009*** | (0.0039) |
| Burglary rate | 0.105 | (0.245) | 1.184*** | (0.400) |
| N | 44,365 | | 30,423 | |
| | [45,340] | | [43,697] | |
| Mean of the dependent variable | 0.331 | | 0.477 | |
| | [0.333] | | [0.453] | |
| | Preference for at least 2 years in Prison | | | |
| Victim of Burglary- This or last year | 0.003 | (0.005) | 0.047*** | (0.010) |
| | [0.001] | (0.005) | [0.039***] | (0.008) |
| Victim of Burglary- Before last year | 0.011* | (0.006) | 0.023** | (0.011) |
| | [0.013**] | (0.006) | [0.015] | (0.009) |
| Gun | 0.004 | (0.005) | 0.008 | (0.016) |
| Male | 0.018*** | (0.003) | 0.032*** | (0.011) |
| Upper Income | -0.001 | (0.005) | 0.013 | (0.011) |
| Education | -0.004*** | (0.001) | -0.004*** | (0.001) |
| Burglary rate | 0.181 | (0.156) | 1.422*** | (0.506) |
| N | 44,365 | | 30,423 | |
| | [45,340] | | [43,697] | |
| Mean of the dependent variable | 0.103 | | 0.263 | |
| | [0.105] | | [0.253] | |
| | Preference for at least 4 years in Prison | | | |
| Victim of Burglary- This or last year | 0.001 | (0.002) | 0.025*** | (0.008) |
| | [0.001] | (0.003) | [0.026***] | (0.006) |
| Victim of Burglary- Before last year | 0.002 | (0.002) | 0.012** | (0.007) |
| | [0.004] | (0.003) | [0.007] | (0.006) |
| Gun | 0.003 | (0.002) | -0.005 | (0.009) |
| Male | 0.007*** | (0.002) | 0.007 | (0.006) |
| Upper Income | 0.000 | (0.002) | 0.016** | (0.007) |
| Education | -0.001*** | (0.000) | -0.003*** | (0.001) |
| Burglary rate | 0.042 | (0.083) | 0.506 | (0.419) |
| N | 44,365 | | 30,423 | |
| | [44,528] | | [43,697] | |
| Mean of the dependent variable | 0.046 | | 0.132 | |
| | [0.048] | | [0.127] | |

The reported values are the marginal effects. Regressions include all explanatory variables included in models of Table 4. The marginal effects reported in [brackets] are obtained from regressions that include country fixed-effects instead of country characteristics. The rest of the coefficients are not reported in the interest of space. Robust standard errors of the marginal effects, clustered at the country level, are in parentheses. Statistical significance of the underlying probit coefficients at the 10% , 5% and 1% level are indicated by *, **, and ***.

Appendix-Table 6J
The Preference for Punishment by the Existence of Armed Conflict in Country

| | Preference for any Jail or Prison Time | | | |
|--|---|---------|---------------------------------|---------|
| | Armed Conflict or War | | No War or Armed Conflict | |
| Victim of Burglary- This or last year | 0.021** | (0.009) | 0.029*** | (0.009) |
| | [0.021***] | (0.008) | [0.030***] | (0.009) |
| Victim of Burglary- Before last year | 0.009 | (0.014) | 0.003 | (0.007) |
| | [0.016] | (0.012) | [0.001] | (0.008) |
| Gun | 0.007 | (0.030) | 0.025*** | (0.008) |
| Male | 0.040* | (0.021) | 0.057*** | (0.010) |
| Upper Income | -0.028* | (0.015) | -0.005 | (0.009) |
| Education | -0.012** | (0.005) | -0.010*** | (0.002) |
| Burglary rate | 2.006*** | (0.770) | 0.127 | (0.178) |
| N | 26,504 | | 48,284 | |
| | [33,042] | | [55,995] | |
| Mean of the dependent variable | 0.570 | | 0.293 | |
| | [0.532] | | [0.310] | |
| Preference for at least 2 years in Prison | | | | |
| Victim of Burglary- This or last year | 0.031* | (0.017) | 0.018*** | (0.004) |
| | [0.024*] | (0.013) | [0.019***] | (0.005) |
| Victim of Burglary- Before last year | 0.037*** | (0.013) | 0.006 | (0.004) |
| | [0.036***] | (0.011) | [0.003] | (0.005) |
| Gun | -0.013 | (0.020) | 0.008* | (0.004) |
| Male | 0.041*** | (0.013) | 0.016*** | (0.004) |
| Upper Income | -0.001 | (0.011) | 0.003 | (0.005) |
| Education | -0.006** | (0.003) | -0.002*** | (0.001) |
| Burglary rate | 2.787*** | (0.593) | 0.040 | (0.188) |
| N | 26,504 | | 48,284 | |
| | [33,042] | | [55,995] | |
| Mean of the dependent variable | 0.285 | | 0.104 | |
| | [0.266] | | [0.126] | |
| Preference for at least 4 years in Prison | | | | |
| Victim of Burglary- This or last year | 0.020** | (0.010) | 0.006** | (0.003) |
| | [0.020***] | (0.008) | [0.010***] | (0.003) |
| Victim of Burglary- Before last year | 0.016*** | (0.006) | 0.001 | (0.002) |
| | [0.019***] | (0.006) | [-0.002] | (0.003) |
| Gun | -0.011 | (0.011) | 0.004* | (0.002) |
| Male | 0.013 | (0.010) | 0.006*** | (0.002) |
| Upper Income | 0.006 | (0.009) | 0.002 | (0.002) |
| Education | -0.003*** | (0.001) | 0.000 | (0.000) |
| Burglary rate | 1.591*** | (0.258) | -0.166 | (0.159) |
| N | 26,504 | | 48,284 | |
| | [33,042] | | [55,183] | |
| Mean of the dependent variable | 0.135 | | 0.052 | |
| | [0.129] | | [0.063] | |

The reported values are the marginal effects. Regressions include all explanatory variables included in models of Table 4. The marginal effects reported in [brackets] are obtained from regressions that include country fixed-effects instead of country characteristics. The rest of the coefficients are not reported in the interest of space. Robust standard errors of the marginal effects, clustered at the country level, are in parentheses. Statistical significance of the underlying probit coefficients at the 10% , 5% and 1% level are indicated by *, **, and ***.

Appendix-Table 6K
Preference for Punishment by Country Education

| | Preference for any Jail or Prison Time | | | |
|---------------------------------------|--|---------|---|---------|
| | Country Education above World Median | | Country Education below World Median | |
| Victim of Burglary- This or last year | 0.022*** | (0.007) | 0.038*** | (0.013) |
| | [0.023***] | (0.008) | [0.039***] | (0.011) |
| Victim of Burglary- Before last year | 0.006 | (0.008) | 0.009 | (0.017) |
| | [0.003] | (0.008) | [0.019] | (0.015) |
| Gun | 0.020** | (0.010) | 0.048*** | (0.018) |
| Male | 0.062*** | (0.008) | 0.017 | (0.023) |
| Upper Income | -0.011 | (0.010) | -0.011 | (0.017) |
| Education | -0.010*** | (0.002) | -0.011*** | (0.003) |
| Burglary rate | -0.015 | (0.263) | -0.609 | (0.728) |
| N | 56,690 | | 18,098 | |
| | [66,451] | | [22,586] | |
| Mean of the dependent variable | 0.341 | | 0.547 | |
| | [0.353] | | [0.508] | |
| | Preference for at least 2 years in Prison | | | |
| Victim of Burglary- This or last year | 0.010* | (0.006) | 0.055*** | (0.012) |
| | [0.011*] | (0.006) | [0.046***] | (0.010) |
| Victim of Burglary- Before last year | 0.009 | (0.007) | 0.041*** | (0.015) |
| | [0.006] | (0.007) | [0.036***] | (0.012) |
| Gun | 0.000 | (0.005) | 0.018 | (0.017) |
| Male | 0.020*** | (0.005) | 0.039*** | (0.013) |
| Upper Income | 0.003 | (0.006) | 0.009 | (0.013) |
| Education | -0.004*** | (0.001) | -0.004** | (0.002) |
| Burglary rate | 0.225 | (0.180) | -0.285 | (0.741) |
| N | 56,690 | | 18,098 | |
| | [66,451] | | [22,586] | |
| Mean of the dependent variable | 0.129 | | 0.290 | |
| | [0.150] | | [0.259] | |
| | Preference for at least 4 years in Prison | | | |
| Victim of Burglary- This or last year | 0.005** | (0.003) | 0.029*** | (0.012) |
| | [0.009***] | (0.003) | [0.027***] | (0.009) |
| Victim of Burglary- Before last year | 0.002 | (0.002) | 0.017* | (0.010) |
| | [0.001] | (0.003) | [0.017**] | (0.008) |
| Gun | 0.000 | (0.002) | 0.005 | (0.014) |
| Male | 0.007*** | (0.003) | 0.010 | (0.007) |
| Upper Income | 0.003 | (0.003) | 0.007 | (0.010) |
| Education | -0.002*** | (0.000) | -0.002** | (0.001) |
| Burglary rate | 0.058 | (0.095) | -0.168 | (0.416) |
| N | 56,690 | | 18,098 | |
| | [65,639] | | [22,586] | |
| Mean of the dependent variable | 0.060 | | 0.150 | |
| | [0.072] | | [0.132] | |

The reported values are the marginal effects. Regressions include all explanatory variables included in models of Table 4. The values reported in [brackets] are the obtained from the regressions that include country fixed-effects instead of country characteristics. The rest of the coefficients are not reported in the interest of space. Robust standard errors of the marginal effects, clustered at the country level, are in parentheses. Statistical significance of the underlying probit coefficients at the 10%, 5% and 1% level are indicated by *, **, and ***.

Appendix-Table 6L
Preference for Punishment by Democracy in Country
The Preference for Punishment

| | Preference for any Jail or Prison Time | | | |
|---------------------------------------|--|---------|-----------------------|---------|
| | Uninterrupted Democracy | | Interrupted Democracy | |
| Victim of Burglary- This or last year | 0.026*** | (0.007) | 0.028** | (0.012) |
| | [0.027***] | (0.007) | [0.027***] | (0.009) |
| Victim of Burglary- Before last year | 0.014* | (0.008) | -0.008 | (0.011) |
| | [0.014*] | (0.008) | [-0.001] | (0.012) |
| Gun | 0.020* | (0.011) | 0.040** | (0.019) |
| Male | 0.070*** | (0.007) | 0.029** | (0.014) |
| Upper Income | -0.023*** | (0.009) | 0.005 | (0.011) |
| Education | -0.012*** | (0.002) | -0.009*** | (0.003) |
| Burglary rate | -0.135 | (0.224) | 0.165 | (0.562) |
| N | 42,698 | | 32,090 | |
| | [42,698] | | [46,339] | |
| Mean of the dependent variable | 0.345 | | 0.452 | |
| | [0.345] | | [0.435] | |
| | Preference for at least 2 years in Prison | | | |
| Victim of Burglary- This or last year | 0.003 | (0.005) | 0.051*** | (0.010) |
| | [0.003] | (0.005) | [0.036***] | (0.008) |
| Victim of Burglary- Before last year | 0.012** | (0.006) | 0.023** | (0.010) |
| | [0.012**] | (0.007) | [0.015*] | (0.009) |
| Gun | 0.004 | (0.004) | 0.008 | (0.015) |
| Male | 0.020*** | (0.003) | 0.029*** | (0.010) |
| Upper Income | -0.004 | (0.005) | 0.014** | (0.007) |
| Education | -0.003*** | (0.001) | -0.005*** | (0.001) |
| Burglary rate | 0.007 | (0.248) | 0.387 | (0.604) |
| N | 42,698 | | 32,090 | |
| | [42,698] | | [46,339] | |
| Mean of the dependent variable | 0.114 | | 0.240 | |
| | [0.114] | | [0.236] | |
| | Preference for at least 4 years in Prison | | | |
| Victim of Burglary- This or last year | 0.001 | (0.002) | 0.027*** | (0.009) |
| | [0.001] | (0.001) | [0.025***] | (0.006) |
| Victim of Burglary- Before last year | 0.001 | (0.002) | 0.016*** | (0.006) |
| | [0.001] | (0.003) | [0.010**] | (0.005) |
| Gun | 0.002 | (0.002) | 0.000 | (0.009) |
| Male | 0.006*** | (0.003) | 0.008 | (0.005) |
| Upper Income | -0.002 | (0.002) | 0.013** | (0.005) |
| Education | -0.001** | (0.000) | -0.002*** | (0.001) |
| Burglary rate | -0.092 | (0.157) | 0.208 | (0.338) |
| N | 42,698 | | 32,090 | |
| | [41,886] | | [46,339] | |
| Mean of the dependent variable | 0.055 | | 0.116 | |
| | [0.056] | | [0.116] | |

The reported values are the marginal effects. Regressions include all explanatory variables included in models of Table 4. The marginal effects reported in [brackets] are obtained from regressions that include country fixed-effects instead of country characteristics. The rest of the coefficients are not reported in the interest of space. Robust standard errors of the marginal effects, clustered at the country level, are in parentheses. Statistical significance of the underlying probit coefficients at the 10% , 5% and 1% level are indicated by *, **, and ***.

Appendix-Table 6M
Preference for Punishment by Ethno-linguistics Fragmentation
Probit Regressions

| | Preference for any Jail or Prison Time | | | |
|---------------------------------------|--|---------|---------------------------|---------|
| | Heterogeneous Society | | Homogenous Society | |
| Victim of Burglary- This or last year | 0.029*** | (0.008) | 0.023* | (0.012) |
| | [0.032***] | (0.007) | [0.018*] | (0.011) |
| Victim of Burglary- Before last year | 0.005 | (0.011) | 0.010 | (0.009) |
| | [0.010] | (0.010) | [0.002] | (0.010) |
| Gun | 0.019 | (0.015) | 0.037*** | (0.011) |
| Male | 0.050*** | (0.014) | 0.056*** | (0.012) |
| Upper Income | -0.006 | (0.017) | -0.011 | (0.007) |
| Education | -0.012*** | (0.003) | -0.009*** | (0.002) |
| Burglary rate | 0.766*** | (0.310) | 0.096 | (0.406) |
| N | 36,902 | | 37,886 | |
| | [46,437] | | [42,600] | |
| Mean of the dependent variable | 0.482 | | 0.303 | |
| | [0.460] | | [0.318] | |
| | Preference for at least 2 years in Prison | | | |
| Victim of Burglary- This or last year | 0.027*** | (0.011) | 0.018*** | (0.006) |
| | [0.027***] | (0.009) | [0.013***] | (0.005) |
| Victim of Burglary- Before last year | 0.027*** | (0.009) | 0.005 | (0.006) |
| | [0.025***] | (0.008) | [0.001] | (0.007) |
| Gun | 0.001 | (0.009) | 0.011*** | (0.005) |
| Male | 0.032*** | (0.009) | 0.017*** | (0.004) |
| Upper Income | 0.015 | (0.012) | 0.000 | (0.005) |
| Education | -0.005** | (0.002) | -0.004*** | (0.001) |
| Burglary rate | 1.099*** | (0.434) | 0.396 | (0.290) |
| N | 36,902 | | 37,886 | |
| | [46,437] | | [42,600] | |
| Mean of the dependent variable | 0.214 | | 0.124 | |
| | [0.218] | | [0.133] | |
| | Preference for at least 4 years in Prison | | | |
| Victim of Burglary- This or last year | 0.015** | (0.007) | 0.008** | (0.004) |
| | [0.019***] | (0.006) | [0.009***] | (0.004) |
| Victim of Burglary- Before last year | 0.009** | (0.005) | 0.003 | (0.004) |
| | [0.007] | (0.005) | [0.003] | (0.004) |
| Gun | 0.000 | (0.006) | 0.005 | (0.004) |
| Male | 0.011* | (0.007) | 0.006*** | (0.002) |
| Upper Income | 0.014* | (0.008) | 0.000 | (0.003) |
| Education | -0.002*** | (0.001) | -0.001*** | (0.000) |
| Burglary rate | 0.421 | (0.380) | 0.132 | (0.120) |
| N | 36,090 | | 37,886 | |
| | [45,625] | | [42,600] | |
| Mean of the dependent variable | 0.110 | | 0.056 | |
| | [0.113] | | [0.060] | |

The reported values are the marginal effects. Regressions include all explanatory variables included in models of Table 4. The values reported in [brackets] are the obtained from the regressions that include country fixed-effects instead of country characteristics. The rest of the coefficients are not reported in the interest of space. Robust standard errors of the marginal effects, clustered at the country level, are in parentheses. Statistical significance of the underlying probit coefficients at the 10% , 5% and 1% level are indicated by *, **, and ***.