Abortion and the Argument from Convenience; Abortion, Forced Labor, and War; and Abortion and the Husband's Rights: A Reply to Teo. By Laura M. Purdy
In these three chapters, Laura Purdy takes on a philosophical perspective in examining arguments surrounding the issue of abortion. She attempts to put abortion in a different frame of reference, or to look at the big picture by comparing it with other aspects of society that are usually not held up against abortion.
Abortion and the Argument From Convenience:
Purdy begins by setting up her argument in terms of current thinking about abortion. She examines the notion of abortion as a matter of convenience, and what the compromise over abortion rights means for the equality of women. Purdy states that it is absurd to consider abortion as simply a matter of convenience. She goes on to use other "convenience-based" deaths that go unnoticed or unexamined by society to justify abortion on the grounds that it represents more than a matter of convenience. For example, she talks about the deaths caused by automobile accidents and tobacco use each year. Purdy argues that if these deaths were looked at under the rhetoric of anti-abortion groups, an argument of convenience could not hold up, yet society still tolerates these deaths because they are imbedded in benefits to certain groups. She goes on to further examine the arguments that would say comparing abortion to these deaths is incompatible, concluding that convenience based deaths really are comparable to fetal deaths. For instance, abortion is not chosen by the fetus, but no one chooses to die in a car accident. Fetal deaths can be thought of as "statistical" because no one knows which fetuses will die. No one would choose for car accidents or abortions to occur if there were other ways to achieve the desired results. Also, convenience based deaths are seen to in part be due to the choice of the person who dies, but in reality many people have limited, if any, choices. Purdy argues that philosophical debates abortion have taken too narrow a focus, concentrating on dead fetuses instead of the broader picture. This would entail considering the social context that makes abortion a need of women. Purdy concludes this chapter by examining the hypocrisy of anti-abortion supporters who claim to value the life of the fetus, but then refuse or fight against efforts that would improve the life of the child once it is born. Her argument is summed up well with, "...unwiliingness to share the burden of abortion restrictions implicitly says that reducing the slaughter of fetuses is not, after all, the primary value here. The overriding value is, on the contrary, shifting the cost of restrictive policies to others. Recognizing that fact changes the complexion of the abortion debate drastically" (p. 144).
Abortion, Forced Labor, and War:
In this chapter Purdy expands on concepts presented in the previous chapter, specifically that it is inappropriate to consider abortion a matter of convenience, comparable to riding the bus. She examines the arguments surrounding why certain types of abortion are seen as justifiable by most people, such as in cases of rape, or threat to the life of the mother. She concludes that this is because the benefits to those around the mother are what is implicitly being considered, rather than benefits to the woman herself. She presents the arguments of Petchesky, Luker and Davis to develop this point. Abortion is a need of women. It is tied to the meaning of motherhood and womanhood as nurturance. Essentialism in the abortion debate does not hold up for Purdy because that should mean feminine activities should be valued as highly as masculine activites. Purdy states that abortion, or more importantly unwanted childbearing, must be considered in the context of equality. She discusses men's expectations of certain freedoms, even those which are guaranteed by law, which are denied women through forced unwanted childbearing. She uses the legislation of the International Labor Organization Forced Labor Convention of 1930 to illustrate how unwanted child-bearing and rearing can be viewed to fall under the category of forced labor that would not be tolerated for men or women in other instances. Purdy goes on to take up a discussion of UN statements in regards to self-determination, particularly individual self-determination. Abortion is needed under current societal conditions if self-determination, with all of the options it could entail, is to be extended equally to women and men. Referring to abortion as simply a matter of convenience to preserve the same options that men take for granted represents a double standard. She ends with a comparison of war to abortion. Fetuses are only questionably considered persons, while in war many innocent people are killed to preserve the same values the option of abortion preserves for women.
Abortion and the Husband's Rights: A Reply to Teo:
In this chapter, Purdy examines and criticizes the arguments of Wesley Teo, who attempts to assert husband's rights in the decision to abort. Teo sees abortion undergone without the consent of the husband as sex discrimination against men. They should have the right to procreate, but because of the biological fact that they do not bear children, they are discriminated against in the decision to abort. His arguments fall apart, however, because the court case he cites protects the capacity to procreate, which still exists for the man even after abortion. Further, marriage does not imply an agreement to have children. Teo claims, according to Purdy, that men should in certain cases be able to take their wife to court to force her to carry the baby to term. If his initial argument is for a mutual decision about abortion, he is now contradicting himself because a court ordered pregnancy is by no means a mutual decision. Also, such a marriage is probably already close to falling apart. Further, women do carry the heavier burden, not only of child-bearing, but under current social conditions, of raising children, so arguments for sex discrimination do not hold up because there are important differences that must be considered. Teo's arguments would result in women being treated as a means to reproduce, rather than as a person.
One problem I found in this article was in the Forced Labor chapter. She refers to opponents of abortion as "they," and sets them up in opposition to women. (p. 147) She seems to overlook the fact that there are female opponents of abortion. This seems to obscure differences among women, such as along racial and class lines, that would lead to different perspectives on abortion. While it is true that for the most part men make decisions about abortion, it should not be ignored that these are often white, upper-class men (and a few women). I would argue that not only are the burdens of abortion being shifted to women, as Purdy argues, but particularlry to poor women (and their families and communities as a result).
notes by Amy Bergholtz