Ideology, metaphor and iconographic reference
Bruce Hawkins
This paper examines the interrelationships between the textual phenomenon of iconographic
reference, the cognitive resource of metaphor (or metaphorical reasoning), and the
socio-cognitive phenomenon of ideology. Two fundamental claims about iconographic
reference are elaborated. The first claim is that iconographic texts result from
metaphorical reasoning relative to highly valued human experiences, especially those
with significant conceptual links to life and death. The second claim is that iconographic
texts play a central role in the social and cognitive codification of ideological
systems. Elaborating these points leads clearly to the conclusion that iconographic
reasoning occupies a pivotal point in the relationship between language and ideology.
Iconographic reference is the linguistic resource of central importance in epideictic
rhetoric, i.e., the rhetoric of praise and blame. Many of the most notable instances
of iconographic reference occur in texts which seem to assign some sort of blame.
When Hitler characterized the Jews as "blood poisoning [which] can be removed
from our national body," he was making strategic rhetorical use of iconographic
reference to associate the Jews with the cause of problems plaguing Germany in the
years between the two world wars. When a resident of Union, South Carolina called
Susan V. Smith "slime, just slime" after learning that Smith had finally
confessed her responsibility for the drowning deaths of her two young sons in late
October 1994, she was appealing to iconographic reference to make the point that
Smith had violated a sacred trust. When Muhammad Ali repeatedly referred to Joe Frazier
as "the ggÅorilla" in the discourse leading up to the now legendary
"Thrilla in Manila" in the fall of 1975, he was using iconographic reference
to capture the public imagination in such a way that favored Ali and continues to
haunt Frazier to this very day. These examples of iconographic reasoning play on
such negative emotions as fear, hatred or revulsion. Other instances of iconographic
reference, however, play on our loftiest emotions. For example, when Jackie Kennedy
cultivated the image of Camelot in association with her husband's Presidency in the
early 1960s, she was consciously appealing to an image which had become especially
beloved and revered at that moment in history because of a wildly successful Broadway
play. It should be clear from these examples that iconographic reference plays a
major role in the construction of texts designed to move our emotions.
This paper will dedemonstrate the role of metaphorical reasoning in constructing
iconographic texts by examining a number of texts reported by Haig Bosmajian in The
Language of Oppression. It will be shown, for example, that Hitler's use of "blood
poisoning" derives its oppressive power through a metaphorical association drawn
between the Jews in Nazi Germany (target domain) and the threat that blood poisoing
poses to the health and ultimately the life of the human body (source domain.) Terms
such as "slime" and "gorilla" in the examples mentioned above
derive their oppressive power through metaphorical association involving a very different
source domain, which Lakoff and Turner (1990) have identified as the Great Chain
of Being.
Iconographic textual reference is among the discursive practices through which ideology
is imposed on the individual and collective conscience. Through iconographic reference,
an individual is defined relative to a particular conventional image from a culturally-based
system of images. This system constitutes a cognitive iconography. There is a close
relationship between ideology and iconography. Ideology is ubiquitous in our lives,
but its common-sensical nature makes it something that we are generally not equipped
to articulate effectively. That is, we live by it, but we generally don't think about
it and, therefore, few of us have any ability to describe it. However, we do periodically
find ourselves engaged in discourse in which our ideology is challenged. This is
where the relationship between ideology and iconography becomes apparent. Our ideology
enters our conscious awareness most directly in the form of our iconographies; our
icons are concrete symbols of our abstract ideological values. Since few of us are
equipped linguistically to debate ideologies, we fall back on our icons. In a discursive
battle of ideologies, we invoke our icons which stand metonymically for the ideology
we embrace and defend. The paper closes with a discussion of the place of ideology
in a cognitive grammar. This discussion begins by calling attention to a significant
ambiguity in the interpretation of "ideology" in the literature (primarily
within the Humanties) on this topic. Mitchell (1986:3-4) discusses this ambiguity
in the following terms:
"The orthodox view is that ideology is false consciousness, a system of symbolic
representations that reflects an historical situation of domination by a particular
class, and which serves to conceal the historical character and class bias of that
system under guises of naturalness and universality. The other meaning of "ideology"
tends to identify it simply with the structure of the values and interests that informs
any representation of reality; this meaning leaves untouched the question of whether
the representation is false or oppressive. In this formulation, there would be no
such thing as a position outside ideology; even the most "demystifyied"
critic of ideology would have to admit that he occupies some position of value and
interest, and that socialism (for instance) is as much an ideology as capitalism."
The latter is the sense of "ideology" that has been adopted in the work
by Hodge and Kress on language and ideology. In Language as Ideology, which has become
a classic text in that subfield, Hodge and Kress (1993:6) define ideology "as
a systematic body of ideas, organized from a particular point of view. Ideology is
thus a subsuming category which includes sciences and metaphysics, as well as political
ideologies of various kinds, without implying anything about their status and reliability
as guides to reality." A little later in the book (1993:15), they make essentially
the same point more succinctly: "ideology involves a systematically organized
presentation of reality."
In this paper, I argue that the two senses are quite easily reconciled. Furthermore,
both can be accounted for within a cognitive grammar. The broadest sense is that
adopted by Hodge and Kress. From this perspective, ideology is a system of ideas
conventionalized by a particular community. This is exactly what is captured in a
cognitive grammar - the set of conventionalized ideas which are symbolically linked
to phonological/graphological structures of a particular language. From this perspective,
all work in cognitive liunguistics provides useful insights on the socio-cognitive
phenomenon of ideology. The work on iconographic reference which leads to this paper
really pertains to the other sense of "ideology," which really refers to
the systems of ideals. To facilitate distinguishing between the two phenomena, I
will refer to an integrated system of ideas as an ideology and to a system of ideals
as an idealogy. Any idealogy is necessarily a subset of a particular ideology. The
present research program leads me to claim that the locus of idealogy in a cognitive
grammar is a experientially based system of iconographic frames of reference.