Post-War Immigration to the Deep South Triad:

What Can a Peripheral Region Tell Us about Immigrant Settlement and Employment?*

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ABSTRACT

Contemporary research on immigrant settlement and adaptation emphasizes the interactions of ethnic-immigrant resources and local economic contexts. Yet, understandably, most research in this field continues to focus on major urban centers, truncating our view of the range of these interactions and the extent to which theories and concepts emerging from immigrant "magnets" generalize to more peripheral regions of the country. To address this shortcoming, we use census data from the postwar period to examine immigrant settlement trends in The Deep South Triad of Alabama, Louisiana and Mississippi. Findings indicate that this peripheral region of an otherwise booming South is extremely diverse in terms of its foreign-born population and that the largest groups (British, Vietnamese, Indians and Hondurans) exhibit strong, yet distinct, patterns of concentration in the regional economy. These findings suggest that many of the same immigrant-adjustment processes documented in core immigrant cities generalize reasonably well to very different regional contexts with substantially lower rates of immigration and employment growth.

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In this study we examine patterns of immigrant settlement and employment in Alabama, Mississippi and Louisiana—three states that comprise what we call the "Deep South Triad" and that constitute the nation's oldest peripheral region in terms of demographic and industrial development. In examining this understudied region of postwar immigration, we seek to contribute broadly to the "interactionist" paradigm now current in studies of immigrant adjustment, particularly with respect to employment. This paradigm traces back to the general complaint, articulated by Waldinger, Ward and Aldrich (1985), that prevailing cultural explanations of ethnic-immigrant concentration in the labor market pay inadequate attention to the local economic contexts in which immigrants are inserting themselves. The solution to this analytical problem, Waldinger and colleagues argued, is to pursue an "interactive approach" that focuses on the "congruence between the demands of the economic environment and the informal resources of the ethnic population" (p. 589). According to Light and Gold (2000), this position has now become axiomatic in research on ethnic economies, directing attention to variation in regional context as well as to variation among specific immigrant groups.

To date, empirical and speculative work in this "interactionist" paradigm has focused on variation in opportunity structures among major urban centers, specifically New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Chicago, and Miami (e.g., Light and Rosenstein 1995; Logan, Alba and McNulty 1994; Razin and Light 1998; Waldinger 2001; Wilson 2000). While this line of multi-locality research has proven invaluable, it has also unintentionally truncated our view of the

range of local contexts in which immigrants are inserting themselves. Consequently, we know relatively little about immigrant settlement and work patterns in more peripheral regions of country. In this paper, we address this shortcoming by studying immigrant settlement and employment concentration in the nation's oldest peripheral region—a region culturally, economically, and demographically different from not only core urban centers of the U.S. but also, arguably, from the rest of the "new" South. We begin with a brief discussion of our study region and the factors that distinguish it from major immigrant receiving areas in the remainder of the country.

Background

The Deep South Triad as an Historical and Enduring Periphery

The Deep South Triad of Alabama, Mississippi and Louisiana constitutes the oldest, enduring geographic periphery in U.S. society, one which is demographically and economically very different from immigrant receiving centers in more "core" regions of the country. To appreciate the historical underpinnings of this peripheral status, it is useful to review the development of the U.S. urban system which has, and continues, to shape the distribution of the nation's immigrant population.

Conventional wisdom is that the U.S. urban system, although long including the southern port cities of Charleston and New Orleans, took root and spread from colonial port cities in the Northeast, specifically Boston, Providence, New York, Philadelphia and Baltimore. According to Eysberg (1989) this particular urban geography resulted more from historical accident than from fundamental differences between the North and South in raw materials and transportation

routes. Central to this "accident" was the British Crown's policy of encouraging migration of wealthy Anglicans—who, among other things, could afford slaves— to the southern colonies and religious refugees to northern colonies, which set in motion the development of two distinct socio-economic systems. As port cities in the Northeast grew and developed entrepreneurial and industrial middle-classes, they also began to attract middle-class immigrants, who tended to arrive in kinship groups that generated demand for urban services and manufactured goods, which in turn provided the basis for a new urban-based, capitalist economy.

By contrast, the disproportionate settlement of British, French and Spanish aristocrats in southern colonies during the same time period contributed to the development of a caste-like society with an economy based almost entirely on agriculture (particularly cotton, sugar and indigo), slave labor, and mercantilist exchange with Europe. As a result of these factors, urban centers in the South failed to develop strong business communities and tended to remain largely confined to harbor areas such as New Orleans and Charleston. According to Eysberg (1989), this initial "accident" of who settled where in the New World became reinforced by the development of the railroad network during the 1800s and early 1900s, which, while connecting southern agriculturalists with northern markets, remained directed and controlled by a growing capitalist elite in Northeast urban centers. These developments, among other things, reduced the importance of the Mississippi River for trade with growing industrial centers in the Midwest and increasingly rendered the South economically dependent on Northeast cities, particularly New York, for commerce.

This peripheral status of the southern U.S. continued in large part until the late 1960s, at which time "core" urban centers in the Northeast and Midwest began to deindustrialize, pushing

millions of people away from high heating bills and pink slips toward booming metro areas in California, Texas and Florida. These and more recent boom periods in Georgia and the Carolinas have since rendered southern cities like Charlotte, Atlanta, Miami, Dallas and Houston more prominent players in the U.S. urban system, while at the same time largely bypassing the Deep South Triad, where historic port cities like New Orleans, Biloxi and Mobile have experienced little demographic and economic growth by comparison (see Glasmeier and Leichencko 2000).

We contend that these historical conditions provide the basis for an interesting case-study of how immigrant workers settle and adjust in a relatively stagnant regional context—one that seems well-positioned geographically to capture increasing immigration from Latin America and the Caribbean but which, to date, has failed to do so.

How Might Peripheral Status Matter? Job Competition & Ethnic Networks

Extrapolating from recent research, there are two main ways that peripheral status is likely to affect immigrant distribution and adaptation in the Deep South Triad. The first and most direct way is through a lack of job opportunities. Peripheral regions, almost by definition, experience relatively little employment growth that would "pull" immigrants to the regional labor market. By contrast, recent research on immigrant magnets such as New York, Los Angeles and San Francisco emphasize the emergence of these places as "command-and-control" centers and as "technopoles" in the new world economy and the demand that these new strategic functions generate for increasing numbers of high- and low-skill workers (Castells and Hall 1994; Sassen 1991, 1994; Waldinger 2001). Despite its best efforts, the Deep South Triad simply has not cultivated such strategic functions and, as a result, continues to experience relatively little job

and wage growth overall. The implication of these conditions is not just fewer immigrants but, perhaps more importantly, a regional labor market in which immigrants are likely to find themselves in direct competition with native-born residents for a relatively finite set of jobs.

Within this context, a central question becomes whether immigrants who *do* migrate to the Deep South Triad insert themselves into the regional economy in the same ways as immigrants who migrate to major urban centers, which offer wider arrays of job opportunities and larger ethnic communities in which to adjust. This question points to the second way in which peripheral status might affect the distribution and adaptation of immigrants in the Deep South Triad: ethnic networks. It is now widely assumed among researchers that immigrant distribution and adaptation occurs through ethnic networks, which provide communal relations and social structures that facilitate successful resettlement and employment (e.g., Bailey and Waldinger 1991; Hagan 1998; Portes 1995). One of the chief functions of these ethnic networks is to link newly arriving members to jobs in the local economy—a function that commonly leads to ethnic segmentation of local economies, as members of different ethnic-immigrant groups establish strongholds over certain types of employment and then proceed to increase these strongholds over time through continued immigration and network referral.

Tilly (1998) terms these dynamics "opportunity hoarding" and notes that they are particularly evident in major urban centers, where immigrants concentrate not only geographically but also economically in particular sectors of the economy. Working within an "interactionist" framework, our question is whether similar patterns of employment concentration (indicative of ethnic networking) occur in the Deep South Triad, which possesses no booming economic sectors nor large ethnic-immigrant communities in which settle. On the one hand, we

might expect these peripheral characteristics to minimize the amount of immigrant concentration in the regional labor market, since these characteristics usually imply fewer, smaller, and weaker ethnic networks upon which to draw. On the other hand, we might expect the relative lack of such resources to render employment concentration even *more* important to immigrant settlement and adaptation in the Deep South Triad, as group members struggle to insert themselves into an otherwise stagnant and ethnically dissimilar economy. Below, we discuss the data we use to examine these competing possibilities.

DATA

The primary sources of data for this study are the 1-percent Public Use Micro Samples (PUMS) of the U.S. decennial censuses collected between 1950 and 1990, which have been organized and made publically available by the Integrated PUMS project at the University of Minnesota (see Ruggles and Sobek 1997). While ideally we would also include PUMS data from the 2000 census, these data are currently unavailable. In their place, whenever possible, we report estimates from the 2000 Census to provide a rough indication of contemporary trends. Because we are interested in the settlement and economic adjustment of first-generation immigrants, rather than their children or grandchildren, we limit our focus to foreign-born residents born to non-U.S. citizens. As with all census analyses, this focus likely undercounts illegal immigrants and seasonal workers and therefore offers a conservative portrait of recent trends, particularly as they relate to Mexican in-migration.

Our geographical focus is what we call the Deep South Triad, consisting of Alabama, Louisiana and Mississippi. These states comprise the poorest stretch of major coastline in the

country and represent a uniquely peripheral area within an otherwise booming "new" South. The latest example of the Triad's economic stasis comes from the U.S. Commerce Department's 2002 report on income growth. This report indicates that half of the eight *slowest*-growing metro areas in the country, in terms of annual income, are located in the Deep South Triad: New Orleans, Decatur, Lake Charles, and Anniston (in descending order). The remaining four "stagnant" metro areas are instructive by comparison: Decatur, IL, Toledo, OH, Flint, MI, and Youngstown-Warren, OH. Thus, it appears that despite its access to the Gulf of Mexico and proximity to Texas and Florida, the Deep South Triad exhibits all the economic vitality of a Rustbelt city—a Rustbelt in the swamp (see Hirsch 1983).

In the employment section of our analysis, we examine group variations in educational attainment, earnings, self-employment and industrial concentration. For our analysis of industrial concentration we subdivide the regional workforce into six major sectors using the Census Bureau's 1950 Industrial Classification System, thereby enhancing comparability over time. Our six sectors include the following: Extractive Industries (codes 105-236); Manufacturing and Construction (codes 246-499); Transportation, Communication and Utilities (codes 506-598); Trade and Personal Services (codes 606-699 and 826-859); Producer and Professional Services (including Health and Education) (codes 716-756, 806-817 and 868-899); and Public Administration (codes 906-936). The composition of these industrial categories is described in detail in the U.S. Census Bureau's *Alphabetic Index of Occupations and Industries: 1950.*

FINDINGS

In this section we address three broad questions with respect to postwar immigration to the Deep

South Triad. First, how many foreign-born persons have resided in the Triad region during this period and where have they tended to settle? Second, what have been the major global sending regions, particularly recently? Finally, to what extent are ethnic-immigrant groups pursuing self employment and concentrating in particular sectors of the regional economy?

Foreign-Born Residents in the Deep South Triad

To begin Table 1 reports population and foreign-born counts for each region in the U.S., along with metro and central-city distributions within these regions. Findings show that since 1960, the Triad region has added roughly 3 million people to its total population, whereas the rest of the South has added 42 million people—an overall growth rate of 33 percent compared with 90 percent. During the same period, the Triad region has been particularly unsuccessful in attracting immigrants, experiencing a net growth of under 200,000 foreign-born residents between 1960 and 2000 compared with a net growth of over 7.5 million in the rest of the South. As a result of these trends, the foreign-born population continues to account for a very small fraction of the Triad's total population: 2.1 percent according to the 2000 Census, compared with 9.5 percent in the rest of the South and 11.1 percent nationally.

[Table 1 about here]

In terms of its spatial distribution, the Triad's foreign-born population is relatively evenly dispersed. The share of the foreign-born population in Alabama is 2 percent; in Louisiana, it is 2.6 percent; and in Mississippi, it is 1.4 percent. These numbers are uniquely low even in

comparison with other southern states that have historically failed to attract large immigrant populations (e.g., Georgia, at 7.1 percent, and North Carolina, at 5.3 percent).[1] Recent research on major urban centers emphasizes that foreign-born populations tend to concentrate disproportionately in metro areas, particularly central cities. Table 1 shows that this tendency has been much weaker in the Deep South Triad than in the rest of the U.S., particularly as growing numbers of Asians and Latinos have entered the region. For example, in 1990, data show that 22 percent of the Triad's foreign-born population lived outside metro areas—nearly triple the rate in the rest of the South. This pattern suggests that urban and metro labor markets in the Triad region do not exert the same attraction to immigrants as they do in the rest of the South and nation as a whole.

Global Sources of Foreign-Born Population

In Table 2 we report global sources of foreign-born populations for each region in the U.S. These findings show that despite the Triad's historical and cultural links to Latin America and the Caribbean, it has consistently had much smaller shares of foreign-born residents from these global sources than other southern states. For example, by 2000, Latinos and Caribbeans accounted for less than 40 percent of the Triad's foreign-born population (97,000 residents) compared with 64 percent of the foreign-born population in the remainder of the South (5.4 million residents). The corollary pattern is that Asians and Pacific Islanders comprise a larger share of the Triad's foreign-born population (35.1 percent) than they do in any other region of the country, including the West (30.4).

[Table 2 about here]

To get a more detailed picture of which nationalities have contributed most to these trends, we examined country-specific counts for each decade. Because we are primarily interested in labor market dynamics, we limited this portion of our analysis to active labor force participants. Findings indicate that 36 nationalities accounted for at least 500 foreign-born workers in the Deep South Triad in 1990 and that these 36 nationalities constituted over 80 percent of all foreign-born workers in the region.[2] This rather surprising international diversity implies that the Deep South Triad has experienced relatively little immigration over recent decades not because few foreign-born groups live in the region, but rather because these groups have failed to increase their presence over recent decades.

Against this backdrop, Figure 1 graphs workforce trends for the five largest foreign-born groups in the Deep South Triad in 1990 (British, Vietnamese, Indian, Honduran and German)—the first four are also the *fastest-growing* groups during the postwar period. The groups with the longest sustained presence in the Triad region are European, specifically German and British, each experiencing a different trajectory during the postwar period. Since the 1980s, Germans have been declining in numbers, much the way Italians (the largest foreign-born group in 1950) did during the 1950s and 1960s. British immigrants, by contrast, have consistently increased their numbers over recent decades, such that by 1990, they accounted for over 6,000 workers in region's formal economy—the largest share of any foreign-born group in the region.

[Figure 1 about here]

The next largest sending countries are Vietnam and India, respectively, each of which began to arrive in the Deep South Triad after 1970. Since this time, the arrival of Vietnamese immigrants has occurred not so much as a result of chain migration and economic opportunity, but rather as a result of refugee flows following U.S. military involvement in their home country—flows encouraged by Catholic institutions, shared French influence, and environmental factors that worked to channel many Vietnamese immigrants into a tightly knit ethnic enclave in eastern New Orleans (see Zhou and Bankston 1998). The arrival of Indians, by contrast, began in the 1970s and accelerated during the 1980s, suggesting that ethnic networks are developing that provide a basis for continued in-migration.

Hondurans comprise the final "top five" foreign-born workforce in the Deep South Triad in terms of size and growth. This presence is best explained by opportunities generated by a century-long banana trade between Honduras and the Port of New Orleans—a relationship historically rooted in monopolistic practices of the United Fruit and Standard Fruit companies during mid-century (Bracken 1992). Since this time, Hondurans have continued to increase their presence in the regional labor market, growing steadily from 1,600 workers in 1960 to 4,455 in 1990. Further analysis (not shown) indicates that 90 percent of Hondurans in the Triad region remain concentrated in the New Orleans metro area—the highest spatial concentration, by far, of any major foreign-born group in the Deep South Triad.

Evidence of Employment Concentration?

In this section we examine employment trends among the four largest and fastest-growing

foreign-born workforces in the Triad region during the postwar period—British, Vietnamese, Indians and Hondurans. (We exclude Germans because we are interested in economic adjustment among growing, not declining, foreign-born populations.) Collectively, these four nationalities accounted for 25 percent of the Triad's total foreign-born workforce in 1990.

[Tables 3 & 4 about here]

Findings for British (mostly English) workers show regionally average levels of educational attainment and self employment but significantly *above*-average annual earnings: 20 percent higher than native-born whites in the region in 1990 and two-hundred percent higher than native-born blacks. This pattern suggests that British immigrants are coming to the Deep South Triad partly because they have been successful at "capturing" relatively good-paying jobs in the regional economy. Table 4 and Figure 2 indicate that during the 1980s this "job capture" involved an aggregate shift out of trade and personal services into manufacturing and construction—a sector experiencing overall numerical decline within the Triad region. Within this sector, British employment has tended to concentrate in printing equipment (26 percent), aircraft and parts (13 percent), blast furnaces (11 percent), and miscellaneous chemicals (10 percent).

Broadly speaking, this influx of British immigrants within a shrinking manufacturing sector is consistent with Sassen's (1991) and Waldinger's (1996) work on immigrant adjustment in New York City, which documented how Asian and Latino newcomers have concentrated in declining segments of the "old" industrial economy. What is distinctive about the British

experience in the Deep South Triad, however, is that it is not confined to marginal, low-wage jobs in a downgraded sector, nor is it concentrated in a particular urban center. Rather, British immigrants appear to be competing successfully against native-born workers throughout the Triad region, with no more than 18 percent of them living and working in any given metro area.

Further analysis (not shown) indicates that most British workers in the Triad region have lived in the U.S. for more than 20 years. This finding suggests that many British workers in the region likely arrived in the U.S. through other port cities and have since been slowly migrating to the Deep South Triad to take advantage good-paying manufacturing jobs scattered throughout the region. Thus, if ethnic-immigrant networks are in operation, they are embedded within years of U.S. residence and tend to lead to geographically dispersed middle-class jobs.

[Figure 2 about here]

In contrast to British workers in the Triad region, growing numbers of Indians and Vietnamese have been moving *out* of manufacturing and construction jobs into an expanding trade and service sector. Among Indians—the highest-paid group, native or foreign—this sectoral shift has proceeded along two paths. Along one path, growing numbers of Indian immigrants have entered self-employment, primarily as surgeons and physicians (54 percent) and as owners/managers of small hotels (39 percent). These patterns are consistent with Indian self-employment trends in the rest of the country (Helweg and Helweg 1990; Sanders and Nee 1996). Along another path, non-selfemployed Indians have exhibited much lower rates of economic concentration, with small clusterings in food stores, restaurants, and educational services.

Concentration of self-employed, but not employed, Indians in the hotel industry might reflect the practice of hotel/motel managers using family labor informally, that is, off-the-books, thereby deflating the total number of non-selfemployed Indians in the hotel industry (Helweg and Helweg 1990:151).

Further investigation reveals that, geographically, these two paths of Indian economic adjustment in the Deep South Triad have been just as likely to occur outside metro areas as within them. (As a point of reference, the largest metro concentration of Indians in the Triad region is located in New Orleans, which accounts for only 18 percent of the region's total Indian workforce.) This pattern implies that Indians have been successful in using their relatively high educational attainment to cultivate ethnic niches in "the periphery of the periphery." Judging from data in Table 3, this cultivation began with insertion into well-paid, professional jobs during the 1970s followed by dramatic increases in self-employment during the 1980s (from a rate of 5.6 percent in 1980 to 26.8 percent in 1990).

While the Vietnamese have also developed a relatively large entrepreneurial presence in the regional economy, they remain much more concentrated spatially than Indian immigrants, with over half (55 percent) residing in the New Orleans metro area. Supplemental analyses indicate that the largest sources of entrepreneurship for the Vietnamese involve fishing and running small retail establishments and gas stations. In this manner, the Vietnamese avoid direct competition with the native-born black workforce, which dominates New Orleans' low-wage hospitality industry, while still generating employment opportunities for family members and coethnics in the area.

Finally, Hondurans exhibit the strongest pattern of geographic concentration, with 90

percent of coethnic workers in the Triad region living and working in the New Orleans area. What is particularly striking about the Honduran population is that the majority of its members (61 percent) have resided in the U.S. for longer than 15 years and two-thirds are naturalized citizens—by far the highest percentage of any major immigrant group in the area. Further analysis (not shown) reveals that in addition to maintaining a longstanding presence in the Transportation/Communication/Utility sector, Hondurans remain, as they have since 1960, clustered in small retail shops and restaurants, often working as managers (24 percent), cashiers (13 percent) and general counter help (11 percent). This pattern, along with those for Indians and Vietnamese, suggests that trade and services remain a central avenue not only for immigrant insertion into the regional economy but also for niche maintenance. The trade-off, at least for Vietnamese and Honduras, is that these coethnic concentrations bring with them relatively low wages.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

What can the Deep South Triad tell us about immigrant settlement and employment? For starters, a small foreign-born population (244,000 according to the 2000 census) does not imply a small number of representative nationalities. In the Deep South Triad of Alabama, Louisiana and Mississippi, 36 nationalities claimed at least 500 workers in the formal economy in 1990, and no single group claimed over 6,200 workers. Moreover, the region's foreign-born population remains relatively evenly distributed geographically, not only across state lines but also across metro and nonmetro territory. As a result of this diversity and geographic dispersion, foreign-born residents constituted no more than five-percent of the population in any county or Parish in

the Triad region in 1990 (U.S. Census Bureau, 1990 Summary Tape File 3, Sample Date).

Under these conditions, it is unclear whether lessons learned about ethnic-immigrant networking and economic concentration in "core" urban centers of the U.S. apply to a peripheral region such as the Deep South Triad. Our findings, however, suggest that they do. Specifically, findings show that the four largest and fastest-growing foreign-born groups in the Triad region have collectively exhibited a substantial degree of self-employment, industrial concentration, and enclave development. For example, Hondurans and Vietnamese have developed two distinct but identifiable enclaves around the New Orleans metro area: the former is much older and industrially diverse; the latter is much newer and concentrated in trade and personal services and in self-employment. In terms of socio-economic status, these foreign-born groups are situated toward the lower reaches of the regional labor market and appear to be using their ethnic resources to compete successfully, but not richly, against working-class natives.

By contrast, the other two major immigrant groups during the postwar period (British and Indians) are relatively well-educated, well-paid, and geographically dispersed throughout the Deep South Triad. The British achieve this status less through entrepreneurship and more through long-time residence in the U.S. and concentration in the manufacturing sector—a sector in which they tend to work as managers and salespersons, rather than as operatives and laborers. Indians, by contrast, concentrate in the health and hotel sectors of the Triad economy, each providing ample opportunities for self-employment but failing to sustain geographically concentrated enclave economies, as in the cases of Vietnamese and Hondurans in New Orleans.

Overall, these findings suggest that just as in major immigrant-receiving centers at the top of the U.S. urban system, immigrants in the Deep South Triad tend to concentrate their

employment in particular industrial sectors in a manner consistent with ethnic network referral systems. Among recent arrivals (Vietnamese and Indians), this concentration began in the 1970s with low rates of entrepreneurship but has since increased to self-employment rates double and triple the regional average, respectively. Among longer established groups in the region (Hondurans and British), entrepreneurship has become *less* prevalent over time, although the benefits of industrial concentration still appear to remain. Thus, our overarching conclusion is that while the "interactionist paradigm" of ethnic-immigrant adjustment is correct to highlight variations in local/regional economic contexts, many of the same processes that appear to be operating in major immigrant centers such as New York and Los Angeles also appear to be operating in more peripheral regions of the U.S., albeit at lower levels of intensity.

As we look ahead to PUMS data from the 2000 Census and beyond, an important question is whether these established patterns and processes of immigrant settlement and adjustment in the Triad region will encourage, impede or have no effect on the tide of Mexican immigrants now moving into new states that have never before received significant numbers of Mexicans (see Donato, Bankston and Robinson 2001; Durand, Massey and Charvet 2000). One possibility is that the relatively stagnant economy of Deep South Triad will both thwart and "contain" this new Mexican migration, turning it into just another one of many small foreign-born groups in the region and, judging from recent past, a group concentrated economically in trade and personal services. Another possibility is that Mexican and other Latino immigrants in/to the region will begin concentrating in agricultural employment, in line with the "Latinization of rural America" observed in other parts of the country (Martin 2001; Taylor and Martin 1997). At present, however, 1990 census data show less than 10 percent of Mexican

workers in the region employed in agriculture. A third possibility is that relatively large numbers of Mexican immigrants will radically alter the foreign-born landscape in the Triad region, quickly surpassing all other immigrant groups in size and using their strong network referral systems to out-compete other groups in the regional economy. We look forward to future research on these issues.

ENDNOTES

1. In 1960, Louisiana accounted for nearly three-quarters of all foreign-born residents in the Triad region. Recently, there has been a shift, largely to Alabama and somewhat to Mississippi, with these two states now comprising the majority of all immigrants in the Triad region. Louisiana nevertheless continues to attract the better part (75 percent) of Latin American immigration and almost half of African immigration. By contrast, roughly half of European-born immigrants reside in Alabama.

2. The 36 nations with at least 500 workers in the formal economy in 1990 include the following, in descending order: United Kingdom (6,025), Vietnam, India, Honduras, Germany, China, Canada, Mexico, Cuba, Korea, France, Guatemala, Philippines, Nicaragua, Puerto Rico, Nigeria, Poland, Japan, El Salvador, Iran, Cambodia, Belize, Thailand, Ethiopia, Virgin Islands, Colombia, Jamaica, Netherlands, Egypt, Italy, Jordan, Greece, Haiti, Bangladesh, Laos, Russia, and Lebanon (528). These nations accounted for 66,577 labor force participants in the 1990 census—a 327-percent increase from 1970.

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Table 1: Total and Foreign-Born Populations by Region and Metro Status, 1950-2000

Region	1950	1960	1970[1]	1980	1990	2000[1]
Northeast						
Total Population (000)	39,444	44,835	48,690	47,485	50,155	53,594
% Foreign-born	14.7	11.4	10.1	10.9	12.1	13.5
% In a Metro Area	90.5	90.6		94.4	97.0	
% In a Central City[2]	57.5	59.0		55.7	53.8	
Midwest						
Total Population (000)	44,324	51,753	53,008	56,550	57,892	64,393
% Foreign-born	6.7	4.5	3.9	3.9	3.8	5.5
% In a Metro Area	74.9	87.9		89.1	89.6	
% In a Central City[2]	48.8	51.1		41.6	31.8	
West						
Total Population (000)	19,664	28,166	33,811	42,992	52,600	63,198
% Foreign-born	9.1	6.9	7.8	10.8	15.0	18.6
% In a Metro Area	71.2	87.9		92.9	94.8	
% In a Central City[2]	43.0	39.0		43.4	39.1	
Non-Deep South						
Total Population (000)	968	46,454	52,257	62,913	72,439	88,476
% Foreign-born	2.5	2.0	2.9	4.6	6.3	9.5
% In a Metro Area	59.8	78.1		89.1	91.4	
% In a Central City[2]	33.6	40.2		33.2	27.3	
Deep South Triad						
Total Population (000)	7897	8,782	6,468	10,508	10,670	11,761
% Foreign-born	1.1	.6	1.2	1.5	1.4	2.1
% In a Metro Area	50.8	86.1		74.8	78.0	
% In a Central City[2]	36.0	52.6		29.6	19.2	

Sources: 1950-1990 1-percent PUMS; Census 2000 estimates (http://censtats.census.gov/pub/Profiles.shtml).

[1] For 1970 and 2000, no information regarding metropolitan status is available.

[2] These are a deflated estimates of central-city residence because they do not include individuals who reside in Public Use Micro Areas that straddle both urban and suburban territory. Still, the trends are informative.

Table 2: Foreign-Born Population by Global Region of Birth, 1950-2000[1]

Region	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000
Northeast						
Foreign Born Population (000)	5,531	5,105	4,916	4,937	5,799	7,229
% Africa	.1	.2	.6	1.3	1.7	3.8
% Asia & Pacific Islands	2.1	2.8	5.3	10.8	19.2	25.5
% Europe & Canada	91.6	82.5	69.5	51.9	35.3	28.6
% Latin America & Carribean	6.2	14.4	24.6	36.0	43.8	42.1
Midwest						
Foreign Born Population (000)	2,678	2,317	2,071	2,051	2,130	3,510
% Africa	.1	.2	.9	1.7	1.9	3.8
% Asia & Pacific Islands	1.9	3.1	7.6	19.6	27.9	30.4
% Europe	95.9	91.3	79.1	57.5	42.8	29.9
% Latin America & Carribean	2.1	5.4	12.4	21.2	27.5	36.0
West						
Foreign Born Population (000)	1,624	1,946	2,636	4,412	7,596	11,760
% Africa	.2	.3	.8	1.0	1.1	1.4
% Asia & Pacific Islands	9.0	14.4	18.9	28.8	33.4	32.5
% Europe & Canada	76.1	65.7	52.5	28.9	16.4	12.0
% Latin America	14.7	19.6	27.9	41.5	49.2	54.1
Non-Deep South						
Foreign Born Population (000)	716	946	1,529	2,627	4,414	8,365
% Africa	.3	.2	.9	1.8	2.4	3.6
% Asia & Pacific Islands	3.9	6.3	9.9	16.1	18.7	18.8
% Europe & Canada	62.9	58.5	49.9	31.6	19.2	13.9
% Latin America & Carribean	32.9	34.9	39.4	50.5	59.7	63.7
Deep South Triad						
Foreign Born Population (000)	56	52	76	128	142	244
% Africa	.3	0	1.3	3.5	4.1	3.7
% Asia & Pacific Islands	10.1	10.3	11.1	35.5	36.1	35.1
% Europe & Canada	74.7	63.1	53.6	33.3	30.4	21.5
% Latin America & Carribean	15.0	26.7	34.0	27.7	29.4	39.7

Sources: 1950-1990 1-percent PUMS; Census 2000 estimates (http://censtats.census.gov/pub/Profiles.shtml).

[1] Foreign-born counts are smaller in Table 2 than Table 1 because here we exclude individuals born at sea and missing detailed nationality information.

Table 3: Employment Data for Select Foreign- and Native-born Groups in the Deep South Triad (ratio to regional average provided in parentheses)

Group	Year	# Employed	% Female	Mean Years of Schooling	Mean Earnings (1989 $)	% Self Employed
				Foreign-born		
British	1950	2,538	26.2 (1.1)	8 (2.6)	$17,745 (1.9)	18.6 (0.8)
	1960	1,800	61.1 (1.9)	12 (1.2)	$16,551 (1.3)	5.6 (0.4)
	1970	1,500	33.3 (0.9)	12 (1.1)	$26,001 (1.4)	6.7 (0.8)
	1980	4,594	47.9 (1.1)	12 (1.0)	$22,822 (1.1)	6.5 (0.8)
	1990	6,025	41.8 (0.9)	13 (1.0)	$25,249 (1.3)	7.6 (0.9)
Indians	1980	1,800	22.2 (0.9)	16 (1.3)	$38,180 (2.0)	5.6 (0.7)
	1990	4,951	35.9 (0.8)	16 (1.2)	$36,370 (2.0)	26.8 (3.1)
Vietnamese	1980	4,900	44.0 (1.1)	12 (1.0)	$13,782 (0.7)	4.0 (0.5)
	1990	5,167	42.4 (0.9)	12 (0.9)	$15,402 (0.8)	17.0 (2.0)
Hondurans	1960	1,600	37.5 (1.2)	11 (1.1)	$12,324 (0.9)	6.3 (0.5)
	1970	3,300	42.4 (1.2)	10 (0.9)	$14,845 (0.8)	9.1 (1.1)
	1980	3,498	44.7 (1.1)	12 (1.0)	$26,102 (1.3)	0.0 (0.0)
	1990	4,455	51.8 (1.1)	12 (0.9)	$16,974 (0.9)	8.5 (1.0)
				Native-born		
Whites	1950	1,760,041	22.7 (0.9)	3 (1.0)	11,184 (1.2)	24.5 (1.0)
	1960	2,061,200	29 (0.9)	11 (1.1)	$15,786 (1.2)	14.5 (1.1)
	1970	1,735,200	34 (0.9)	12 (1.1)	$20,822 (1.1)	9.5 (1.2)
	1980	3,224,394	39.1 (0.9)	12 (1.0)	$21,455 (1.1)	9.7 (1.2)
	1990	3,436,728	43.2 (1.0)	13 (1.0)	$20,944 (1.1)	10.3 (1.2)
Blacks	1950	960,304	31.8 (1.2)	1 (0.3)	$4,749 (0.5)	22.3 (0.9)
	1960	891,100	38.6 (1.2)	9 (0.9)	$6,455 (0.5)	9.7 (0.7)
	1970	585,300	43.5 (1.2)	10 (0.9)	$10,783 (0.6)	4.1 (0.5)
	1980	1,047,695	47.6 (1.2)	11 (0.9)	$13,497 (0.7)	3.4 (0.4)
	1990	1,202,929	51.9 (1.1)	12 (0.9)	$13,008 (0.7)	3.6 (0.4)

Sources: 1950-1990 1-percent PUMS.

Table 4: Industrial Distributions for Select Foreign- and Native-born Groups in the Deep South Triad (* Asterisks denote concentrations greater than 1.25 times the Triad average)

Group	Year	% of Group in Respective Industrial Sector					
		Agric. & Extrac-tive	Manuf. & Construct.	Transport., Communic. & Utilities	Trade & Personal Services	Producer & Professional Services	Public Admin.
				Foreign-born			
British	1950	7.5%	8.6	9.0	41.6*	14.0*	19.3*
	1960	0.0	38.9*	11.1*	33.3	16.7	0.0
	1970	0.0	40.0*	0.0	13.3	33.3*	13.3*
	1980	2.2	13.0	8.7	41.3*	30.5*	4.3
	1990	1.7	35.0*	6.3	25.7	28.6	2.6
Indians	1980	16.7*	11.1	11.1*	16.7	38.9*	5.6
	1990	0.0	6.3	3.9	32.1*	47.1*	5.5
Vietnamese	1980	6.0	38.0*	4.0	32.0*	18.0	2.0
	1990	6.7*	18.5	5.5	42.1*	23.1	2.6
Hondurans	1960	0.0	25.0	18.8*	25.0	12.5	6.3
	1970	6.1	18.2	18.2*	36.4*	15.2	3.0
	1980	2.6	21.0	15.8*	34.2*	18.4	7.9
	1990	2.0	20.7	11.1*	34.8*	26.6	3.3
				Native-born			
Whites	1950	24.6	25.7	7.3	23.1	13.0	6.4*
	1960	10.6	31.2	7.0	23.7	16.5	8.6*
	1970	6.2	28.5	7.3	25.8	23.0	8.8
	1980	6.2	28.9	6.7	23.9	26.3	8.1
	1990	4.7	25.3	6.2	24.9	31.3	6.8
Blacks	1950	38.5*	18.8	4.8	30.1	6.9	0.9
	1960	20.5*	21.4	4.5	37.2*	11.3	1.9
	1970	6.9	26.8	5.8	34.2	21.5	3.6
	1980	4.9	31.2	5.9	23.9	27.3	6.8
	1990	3.7	25.8	5.0	24.7	29.3	6.9

Sources: 1950-1990 1-percent PUMS.

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Figure 1: The Five Largest Foreign-Born Groups Employed in Deep South Triad in 1990



Sources: 1950-1990 1-percent PUMS.

Figure 2: Shifting Industrial Concentrations in the Deep South Triad by Group, 1980-90



Sources: 1950-1990 1-percent PUMS.