/** reg.elsalvador: 42.0 **/ From: cispesnatl@igc.org (CISPES) EL SALVADOR WATCH April 1997 Number 58 Produced By CISPES, the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador, P.O. Box 1801, New York, NY 10059 (212) 229-1290, cispesnatl@igc.apc.org * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * EDITOR'S NOTE: This month's El Salvador Watch is a special elections double issue, and this electronic version just doesn't do it justice! The 2-color (red & black) hard copy comes with a pull-out insert with election results: how many deputies and municipalities each party won, the list of FMLN deputies, the names of FMLN municipalities, and a map of El Salvador showing where these municipalities are located, and many photos! Text just doesn't do this month's issue justice! For the hard copy, please send a note with your name, mailing address, and a donation of your choice to the above p.o. box, attn: Tom Leonard. * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * VICTORY FOR THE FMLN! HECTOR SILVA WINS CAPITAL VIRTUAL TIE NATIONWIDE In a stunning setback for the ruling ARENA party and its neoliberal economic policies, the FMLN (Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front) swept to victory in March 16 elections in over fifty municipalities, including the capital city of San Salvador. The FMLN ran strongly in much of its historical rural zones, especially Chalatenango, and demonstrated phenomenal growth into the country's urban centers. It triumphed in the populous industrial towns and working class barrios that ring San Salvador: Soyapango (the country's second largest municipality), Mejicanos, Ciudad Delgado, Ayutuxtepeque, Ilopango and San Marcos, home of El Salvador's most notorious Free Trade Zone. The FMLN also prevailed in five other departmental capitals: Nueva San Salvador (Santa Tecla), Santa Ana, Sonsonate, Zacatecoluca, and Chalatenango City. (Results in Ahuachapan and San Miguel remain in dispute. The FMLN may legally challenge the Supreme Electoral Tribunal's figures, which show ARENA ahead by a handful of votes in each.) The FMLN won re-election in all eleven towns it has governed since 1994. In its 53 municipalities, it will govern nearly half the country's population - a feat the FMLN never achieved even at the height of its military prowess when it controlled vast swaths of territory in the Salvadoran countryside. The People's Mayor Election night witnessed a euphoria unknown in San Salvador since the heady days of the cease-fire five years ago. A jubilant Hector Silva, the new mayor of the 1.4 million residents of the capital, thanked the crowds, as a sea of red flags and T-shirts flooded the streets and plazas, accompanied by a din of fireworks, ecstatic shouting and caravans honking. The charismatic Silva ran as the coalition candidate of the FMLN, the Democratic Convergence (CD), and the Unity Movement (MU). Silva was born in Boston and trained in the United States as a medical doctor. He spent part of the 1980's in exile in Mexico, representing the Democratic Revolutionary Front, the political arm of the FMLN. He returned to El Salvador during the war, and won an Assembly seat in 1991. He was national campaign director for the left coalition in the 1994 race. Shake Up in the Assembly On a national level, the FMLN nearly doubled its representation in the Legislative Assembly and fell just one deputy short of matching ARENA's total. Each won about a third of the 84 seats in the next Assembly, which will be inaugurated on May 1, with seven other parties splitting the remaining third. In keeping with the pre-election political trends, ARENA, the Christian Democrats (PDC), and the Democratic Party (PD) were the big losers; the FMLN and the PCN the big winners. The new break-down is as follows: ARENA will have 28 deputies (down from 39); the FMLN 27 (up from 14); the PCN 11 (up from 4); the PDC 9 (down from 18). Minor parties represented are the PRSC (Social Christian Renovation Party) with 3 seats; the PLD (Liberal Democratic Party) 2; the CD 2 (up from 1); the PD 1 (down from 7); and the MU 1 (unchanged). Obstacles Overcome The FMLN met or exceeded its greatest hopes for the elections. It now has the opportunity to demonstrate its capacity to govern major cities. This is indispensable to its hopes of persuading the electorate to give the FMLN the opportunity to govern the whole country. Salvadorans will elect a new president in 1999. The FMLN successfully overcame formidable obstacles to achieve these remarkable gains: the power of ARENA's incumbency, its huge advantage in campaign funds, its virtually unrestricted access to the media, and its willingness to play dirty. The FMLN also had to overcome its own inexperience in the electoral arena, which hampered its effectiveness in the 1994 contest. Then, the FMLN was a novice, with just over a year under its belt as a legal political party. A number of international observers who also monitored that election noted a dramatic improvement this time in how well organized the FMLN was in its campaign, and how well trained its activists were at the polls. The depth of the FMLN's organizing was very apparent on election day. It mobilized some 30,000 activists - more than any other party - to help run the local voting tables, and to act as orientadores to assist voters through the maze to the proper table, or as vigilantes to monitor the voting process. The FMLN also had to contend with a decades-long legacy of violence and outright fraud that have led many to cynicism and a disbelief that change would ever be permitted through elections. Perhaps this history explains why so many party and solidarity activists were astonished at the FMLN's victories, despite the numerous polls predicting this outcome. It wasn't so much surprise that the FMLN won, but that the right wing was unable to steal it from them this time. The FMLN, though, had a hundred thousands eyes and ears to defend its victory. ARENA Wonders What Went Wrong For ARENA, the excuses began on election night. Party president Gloria Salguero Gross contended that ARENA's disappointing showing was simply a result of its supporters' overconfidence, explaining their failure to go to the polls. Many other party officials and factions recognized the writing on the wall and are demanding resignations from ARENA's Executive Committee, from Calderon's cabinet and other government officials. Those targeted for ouster thus far are the Ministers of Economy and Treasury, and the head of the Central Reserve Bank, as well as the Modernization Commissioner. Some within ARENA clearly realize the detrimental effect of its economic policies on its popularity. Most, though, are reluctant to acknowledge that, fundamentally, voters rejected its economic program. They admit only an internal organizational problem requiring some house-cleaning. By week's end, Salguero Gross herself became the first confirmed casualty of ARENA's poor showing, announcing she would not run again for president of the National Assembly. The Challenge of Governing: Local Popular Power Returns In the early 1980's, the FMLN organized Local Popular Powers to democratically govern its liberated zones in Chalatenango, San Vicente, and elsewhere in rural El Salvador. Local popular power has now come to the capital and fifty-two other municipalities. The newly elected FMLN mayors will, unfortunately, inherit all the social and economic ills produced by outgoing inept and/or corrupt ARENA administrations, and by the distorted priorities of the ruling party at a national level. As with the Local Popular Powers of the early 1980's, the FMLN will be bringing a new model of governing to the Salvadoran population. Through intensive consultation with broad sectors of the population, the FMLN developed municipal platforms that not only address the gravest concerns of the population, such as crime and gang activity, environmental devastation, and lack of potable water, but also look to collectively develop solutions. The FMLN municipal platform differs markedly from that of ARENA, especially in the capital. There, outgoing ARENA mayor Mario Valiente proposed several grandiose and controversial infrastructural projects, including a subway and a garbage incinerator. In addition, Valiente has virtually been at war with street vendors in a so-called "quality of life" campaign familiar in US cities that stigmatize marginal populations. Hector Silva's platform calls, instead, for a widespread recycling program to reduce San Salvador's mounting garbage crisis as well as providing jobs. And rather than scapegoating and blaming the poor for their economic situation, Silva and the FMLN are respectfully engaging people, be they street vendors or gang members or public workers or doctors, in developing concrete solutions. To battle crime, ARENA would mimic the US: build more jails in which to lock away more of the population. Mario Valiente went so far as to propose converting schools into prisons. In contrast, Ren‰ Canjura, FMLN mayor of Nejapa, turned its jail into a library. Creating a new model of government will be particularly difficult given the lack of resources necessary to generate real economic development at the local level. 262 municipalities combined are granted merely 0.7% of the national budget. The new FMLN mayors will work with its deputies in the Legislative Assembly to push for allocating 10% of the budget to the municipalities. * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * JUNTOS SOMOS EL CAMBIO WOMEN TAKE LEADERSHIP! Women comprise fully a third of the FMLN's new delegation to the Assembly. (In contrast, less than 10% of the other parties' deputies are women.) Returning are María Marta Valladares (Nidia Díaz), Lorena Pe±a (Rebeca Palacios), and Norma Guevara. Joining them will be María Ofelia Navarrete (María Serrano, featured in the award-winning documentary "Maria's Story"), Violeta Menjvar, Ileana Rogel, Rosario del Carmen Acosta, Lilian Coto de Cuellar, and Isabela Morales. The party was less successful at ensuring that women were put forward as candidates at a local level. Governing key municipalities in the San Salvador metropolitan area will be Dina Landaverde, the new mayor in Ciudad Delgado, Maria Flores del Cid in Mejicanos, and Hayd‰ Zometo in Nueva San Salvador (Santa Tecla), which is also the departmental capital of La Libertad. Women also constitute half the new municipal council of San Salvador. * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * THE FMLN'S LEGISLATIVE AGENDA: THE NEW BALANCE OF POWER The past year in El Salvador, a shifting political scene has unfolded, culminating in the March 16 elections. An analysis of the outcome brings this political realignment into sharp focus. At first glance, the correlation of forces in the new Assembly does not look especially favorable for the FMLN. Together with its allies on the center-left (the Democratic Convergence, the Unity Movement, and the Social Christian Renovation Party), it forms a minority bloc of 33 deputies. Right of center parties (ARENA, the National Conciliation Party, the Christian Democrats and Democratic Party, and the Liberal Democratic Party) hold a clear majority with 51 seats. However, the imposition of ARENA's neoliberal project has served to unify the left and split the right. This should allow the FMLN some success in steering parts of its platform through the new political landscape in the Assembly. In each case, passage of its initiatives will be possible when there is a coincidence of interest with the PCN or PDC, or defections from among their ranks. The Old Right Rises Again The elections confirmed the resurgence of the National Conciliation Party (PCN). Historically the party of the military, its generals doubled as presidents for several decades. Since ARENA's ascendance, the PCN had been fading from the political scene until six months ago, when its ranks were replenished by a number of defectors from the ruling party. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Although on the right of the political spectrum, the PCN is not fully committed to the governing party's neoliberal regimen. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - It is more protective of the nation's domestic industry and the agricultural production that the traditional oligarchy relies upon. The party appeals to those on the right who feel left behind by ARENA's subservience to the financiers of the new global economy. Because of this, there will be times when the PCN sides with the FMLN against ARENA. Eager to overcome its past reputation as a mere "appendage" of ARENA, the PCN has asserted that it will act as an independent force in the Assembly. Its eleven votes will be key in determining the fate of all legislation that finds ARENA and the FMLN on opposite sides. Also "independent" on the right is the the Liberal Democratic Party (PLD), headed by right-wing populist Kirio Waldo Salgado. A self-styled champion of honest government, Salgado has been a frequent critic of ARENA officials' corruption. He has said he is open to aligning with the FMLN in this battle. A "Grand Democratic Center" While the Christian Democrats (PDC) and the Democratic Party (PD) place themselves in the center, they have both done their share of cozying up to ARENA. In general, the Christian Democrats can be expected to fall in line with the ruling party, given ARENA's role in orchestrating the consolidation of the PDC's right-wing faction. Led by deputy-elect Ronal Uma±a, it now presumably owes ARENA such a debt. The PD, of course, was the only party to support ARENA in raising the IVA (Value Added Tax) two years ago. Since then, its political fortunes have plummeted. The party, headed by ex-FMLN comandantes Joaquin Villalobos and Ana Guadalupe Martinez, was widely perceived to have betrayed the ideals of the revolution for the sake of crass personal ambition. It was severely punished at the polls, winning barely 1% of the vote nationally, and just one municipality on its own. It survives only as a part of the so-called "Grand Democratic Center," which it concocted with the PDC. As en electoral alliance, it won four municipalities and three deputies, solely on the strength of the Christian Democratic vote. UNDOING ARENA'S NEOLIBERAL DAMAGE To take advantage of the right's lack of consensus around ARENA's neoliberal doctrines, the FMLN will need to grow adept at cobbling together ad hoc coalitions that vary from issue to issue. If it can, it ought to make some headway in implementing its own agenda of putting people's needs first. Reining in the Cost of Living First and foremost on the FMLN's platform is to put the cost of the basic food basket and public services within reach of the majority. A key aspect of this is guaranteeing El Salvador's own food production. The FMLN would do this by sustaining the livelihood of the small farming sector. One policy it has long sought is relief for campesinos and cooperatives saddled with an unpayable debt since the partially-implemented Agrarian Reform of the early 1980's. Here is a case where the PCN is in agreement. It also favors government support for the ailing agricultural sector, including the complete cancellation of the agrarian debt (estimated at nearly a quarter of a billion dollars). The PDC, with its traditional rural base, also supports forgiving the debt. This will be a very welcome step toward revitalizing the country's agrarian sector. The FMLN also stands a fighting chance of delivering on its campaign pledge to reduce the regressive IVA from 13% to 10%. ARENA and the Democratic Party alone no longer have enough votes to sustain the higher rate. Thus far though, the FMLN has only been able to extract promises from the other parties to study its proposed tax cut. Guaranteeing Public Services: The Future of ANTEL Another plank of the FMLN's platform is its opposition to the privatization of essential public services. The most prominent sale looming is that of ANTEL, the national telecommunications agency, scheduled for early April by Alfredo Mena Lagos, the Presidential Commissioner for "Modernization." Four transnational corporations, including GTE and Bell South, have lined up to submit bids. Mena Lagos's stewardship over this process has been cast in doubt, as he may fall victim to his party's post-election fallout. And if the sale can be delayed past May 1, the new Assembly may have some say over the matter. The PCN is of the opinion that, since telecommunications is strategic for the country, the state ought to guarantee control of its functioning. It should not therefore sell off 100% of ANTEL's shares, as is currently planned. It is similarly hesitant to wholly privatize other government agencies. ANTEL and CEL (the state electric company), in fact originated under PCN administrations decades ago, and the party retains a protective fondness for its creations. No Death Penalty One immediate consequence of this new balance of forces is that the death penalty will not go into effect. It passed last fall, but - as a constitutional amendment - requires two-thirds approval by the next Assembly. It is backed by ARENA, the PCN, and the PDC, but opposed by the FMLN, as well as all the smaller parties. They view the death penalty as a rash and unethical attempt to combat El Salvador's crime epidemic, which deserves more thoughtful solutions that address its root causes: poverty and joblessness. (The Assembly will also likely take up the call for electoral reform, another move deemed crucial by the FMLN. See "With Victory by Left...", below.) THE FMLN MAKES HISTORY: WHAT IT MEANS FOR ALL OF US By Cherrene Horazuk, CISPES Executive Director - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - The FMLN has given us the most significant victory for the left in this hemisphere in a decade. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - As the poll watchers began tabulating votes at 5:00pm on election day, a nervous tension settled on the voting center in Quetzaltepeque, a small city northwest of San Salvador. Everybody in the school was aware that massive fraud is a regular occurrence in Salvadoran elections, and that a progressive force has never been allowed to govern. In Quetzaltepeque, the last progressive mayor elected was assassinated shortly after taking office in 1980. The first voting box finished its count at 7:30: the FMLN 83, ARENA 32. One by one, the other tables finished their counts, with similar results. The FMLN won every table but one in the municipality. The FMLN members in the voting center were clearly jubilant, but maintained strict discipline - their job was not yet over. The ballot boxes still needed to be brought to the municipal center, a final tally needed to be tabulated for the city, and the results sent to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) head-quarters in San Salvador. At any stage, fraud could occur and the elections stolen. The paperwork finally complete, the doors to the center were opened, and FMLN members, accompanied by other poll watchers, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, the Civilian Police, and international observers, carried the ballot boxes on their shoulders the 15 blocks to the city hall. Citizens, some with tears in their eyes, some chanting "íEl Pueblo Unido, Jamas Sera Vencido!" poured out of their houses to watch the FMLN defending their votes and bringing a victory for the people to city hall. This victory, repeated in cities and towns across El Salvador, is significant not only for the people of El Salvador, but also for left and progressive forces throughout the Americas, and indeed the world. While many progressive, socialist, and communist movements have faded into oblivion, the FMLN is now about to govern 45% of the population, and stands a very good chance of winning the presidential elections in 1999. The FMLN is the only political party (with the exception of the ANC of South Africa) that has successfully transitioned from an armed revolutionary movement into an electoral party and won major victories without weakening its political ideals. The FMLN now stands as a role model for other political forces throughout the hemisphere. At a time when many political parties believe that you can't beat neoliberalism, the FMLN victory is a slap in the face of Washington's economic blueprint. The FMLN won because they put forward alternatives, because they are offering concrete solutions to people's everyday problems, and because they ORGANIZED. Unlike many other political parties, the FMLN does not view their primary objective as merely getting elected. Just as it was important during the war to link armed struggle with social struggle, they believe that it is critical to link their electoral struggle for state power with permanent grassroots struggle for day to day social change. For 17 years, CISPES and other solidarity organizations have been accompanying the Salvadoran people and the FMLN. We now have a rare opportunity to accompany a growing movement that has a significant amount of state power and has the capacity to change people's daily realities through the building of concrete alternatives. It will be a challenge, however. The Salvadoran right wing will not take defeat easily, nor will it willingly give up its economic stranglehold over the population. Nor will the U.S. government, intellectual authors of the Salvadoran neoliberal economy, willingly allow an anti-neoliberal party (which they spent $6 billion dollars trying to defeat) to rule the country. Mario Valiente, defeated ARENA mayor of San Salvador, stated, "The Salvadoran people [in electing the FMLN] have decided to try an adventure." I agree. It will be an adventure - an adventure in which the people will win. And we in solidarity are honored to be a part of it. * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * FMLN HONORS ACTIVISTS KILLED DURING CAMPAIGN Tragically, elections-related violence cost several young FMLN activists their lives, and others still suffer serious wounds. On the evening of the elections, the FMLN honored the dead, dedicating their victory to them. The FMLN Political Commission proclaimed to the Salvadoran people: "We reaffirm in a very special way our deepest condolences to the family of the...members who were killed during the electoral campaign." Three activists were killed before the elections: Moises Cano, 23, on February 20 in Nejapa; Rafael P‰rez Arias, on March 1 in Apopa; Jos‰ Gamaliel Franco Chavarra, 18, on March 7 in San Salvador. FMLN sympathizer, Haroldo Saravia Campos, 17, was killed two days after the elections on March 18, in El Paisnal. Many others were hospitalized, including two people who lie in comas as a result of gunshot wounds. Since the elections, the FMLN mayors of El Paisnal and Suchitoto have received death threats. In all cases, evidence of ARENA's responsibility for the crimes is clear. The violence served to intimidate voters and activists of the opposition political parties. However, it failed to prevent FMLN supporters from turning out to the polls en masse and propelling the FMLN into power. We recognize the contribution of these activists to the FMLN's victory, and that of all the 75,000 who lost their lives in the struggle: Moises Cano Rafael P‰rez Arias Jos‰ Gamaliel Franco Chavarra Haroldo Saravia Campos íPresente! * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL MISSION OF INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL OBSERVERS ON THE MARCH 1997 SALVADORAN ELECTIONS [excerpts] The International Mission of Independent Electoral Observer was comprised of approximately 100 observers from Canada, Holland, Spain, the United States, New Zealand, Germany and England. Field teams observed the elections in 16 municipalities on March 16, 1997... Summary of Findings and Conclusions 1. The 1997 electoral campaign and elections occurred under similar conditions to the ones in 1994 due to lack of political will to significantly reform the system. 2. The electoral code was violated, to the point of disregarding deadlines for the inscriptions of deputies and municipal candidates. 3. A "dirty" campaign was developed to discredit and damage the image of some political parties. 4. A disinformation campaign was launched with the objective of confusing the voting population as to how to vote. 5. As part of a systematic campaign, the killings of various FMLN activists were committed... [This] political violence which intimidated the voting population and inhibited them from exercising their right to vote. 6. A high level of disorder was observed during election day... [due to] functional and structural problems, and a high level of disorganization within the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE). The above mentioned anomalies and roadblocks to voter participation can only be changed with the following recommendations .... Recommendations: 1. A single, comprehensive National Registry of Citizens should be established to replace the current, error ridden electoral registry; 2. A single, National Identity Card should be issued for both identification and voting purposes; 3. A local precinct system of voting should be adopted, which would greatly facilitate improved voter turn out by allowing people to vote in their neighborhoods; 4. Implementation of proportional representation for the 262 municipal councils would encourage greater political pluralism and increased cooperation between local activists of different backgrounds... (The Mission's complete report is available through the CISPES National Office.) * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * OBSERVERS REFLECT ON A HISTORIC DAY ... "Leading up to election day, we traveled back and forth to our election-duty city and learned about the electoral process from many of the different political forces...I was amazed at the prestige and respect we were given as International Monitors. We had some serious clout. Our presence really made a difference. Besides the FMLN winning, my other favorite part was being international solidarity. Being with people from around the world that all supported the FMLN was really cool and very special. I sincerely tasted and understood the meaning of international solidarity." - Jaquie Spano, New York "Watching the JRV members at the voting tables in Soyapango counting FMLN ballot after FMLN ballot, some with tears in their eyes, is the most beautiful and joyous moment that I can remember. Knowing that more than 40% of Salvadorans, some of the most historically oppressed people on Earth, now have governmental representatives that really care about them gives me an immense amount of hope, and a renewed and recommitted understanding of what the solidarity work we do really means." - Eduardo Lerro, Minneapolis "At every table the pile of ballots for "El Frente" rose like fresh bread and the collective mood grew wilder and joyful. At the end of the night we sat with the FMLN activists who stood guard around the huge tower of boxes containing the ballots. They waited for the truck to come for the boxes and weren't letting those votes out of their sight! When the truck came, these people formed a human conveyor belt and passed each box overhead to the waiting truck, shouting 'íQue viva!' into the night. It was a sight to behold. History in the making!" - Dave Tatro, Seattle "There are a lot of factors that make up the analysis of the election of 1997, but I see one as most important and that was the thousands of people who worked on election day and in the campaign. Each of those red-shirted workers represents several hundred votes that each turned out. This is what made this effort so different from politics as usual, different from a machine. It is the youth, the women, and the campesinos in every municipality that delivered democracy in El Salvador." - Diane Greene, New York * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * WITH VICTORY BY LEFT, ELECTORAL REFORM SUDDENLY LOOKS GOOD TO THE RIGHT Since the war's end, El Salvador's electoral authorities have tried to keep too many people from voting. Knowing that the right wing's appeal was limited, ARENA used "bureaucratic incompetence, disorganization and apparent fraud" to keep its voters from being outnumbered, according to international observers in 1994. President Calderon Sol promised to rectify these irregularities before the 1997 elections, but none of the significant reforms identified three years ago were implemented by the right-wing dominated executive and legislative branches. This year, according to an exit poll, 7 to 13% of the people who tried to vote may have been turned away because of fraud or incompetence. Many more left in frustration when polls opened late or were poorly organized. The Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) itself estimated that of 3 million voters on the official list, half a million were dead or "phantom" voters and 300,000 more had left the country in the past few years. Another 325,000 did not get their voting cards in time for the elections. Electoral Antics Aside from this systemic disenfranchisement, the head electoral monitor from the Attorney-General's office denounced several instances of attempted fraud on election day. In Suchitoto, Cuscatlan, international observers were witness to "a deliberate and organized attempt to subvert the electoral process." Members of ARENA, the PD and the PDC who were monitoring the local voting tables walked out in the middle of the vote count, in some cases taking ballots and tallies with them. In Chinameca, San Miguel, ARENA's representative to the municipal electoral board altered the tallies after the vote count was completed, according to TSE magistrate Felix Ulloa. The FMLN is challenging ARENA's victory there on these grounds. An especially blatant attempt at fraud occurred in Sociedad, Morazan, where ARENA and the Unity Movement ran neck and neck. Numbers at one voting table - 98 votes for ARENA to 5 for the MU - raised suspicions, and when the ballot box was re-opened, officials counted 77 votes for the MU and 33 for ARENA! Clearly this is a system in need of reform. Now that the elections are over, chances are excellent for reforming El Salvador's electoral system. (Proposed reforms are virtually identical to the recommendations listed in the report of the International Mission. See above.) What's different now? The right lost an election - so now they're interested in changing the rules. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Last summer a US Embassy official told visiting solidarity activists that the Salvadoran government would implement electoral reform only if ARENA lost enough power. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - This year, ARENA's strategy of excluding voters backfired when the FMLN's highly motivated base turned out in numbers almost equal to ARENA's. Other rightist and centrist parties also have an interest in opening up the political system to more voters in hopes of taking the presidency away from ARENA in 1999. Reform isn't guaranteed, however. Pressure from outside is needed to make sure the reforms happen - and that they turn out right. Action Alert * Urge your Congressperson to sign the Moakley/McGovern Dear Colleague letter to new US Ambassador Anne Patterson. It calls for electoral reform, along with democratization and economic justice. Congressional switchboard: 202-224-3121. * There may also be a Senate version. Call CISPES for updated information. * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Sources this month include: the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, the FMLN, La Prensa Grafica, El Diario de Hoy, and the San Salvador-based International Solidarity Center (CIS). * * * * * * * * * * E N D * * * * * * * * ** End of text from cdp:reg.elsalvador ** *************************************************************************** This material came from PeaceNet, a non-profit progressive networking service. For more information, send a message to peacenet-info@igc.apc.org ***************************************************************************