POST-OFFICE DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, March 15, 1861.
Sir: In reply to your interrogatory, whether in my it is
wise to provision Fort Sumter under present circumstances, I submit
the following considerations in favor of provisioning that
fort.
The ambitious leaders of the late Democratic party have
availed themselves of the disappointment attendant upon defeat in the
late presidential election to found a military government in the
seceding States. To the connivance of the late administration it is
due alone that this rebellion has been enabled to attain its present
proportions. It has grown by this complicity into the form of an
organized government in seven States, and up to this moment nothing
has been done to check its progress or prevent its being regarded
either at home or abroad as a successful revolution. Every hour of
acquiescence in this condition of things, and especially every new
conquest made by the rebels, strengthens their hands at home and
their claims to recognition as an independent people abroad. It has
been from the beginning, and still is, treated practically as a
lawful proceeding, and the honest and Union loving people in those
States must by a continuance of this policy become reconciled to the
new government, and, though founded in wrong, come to regard it as a
rightful government.
I, in common with all my associates in your council, agree
that we must look to the people in these States for the overthrow of
this rebellion, and that it is proper to exercise the powers of the
Federal Government only so far as to maintain its authority to
collect the revenue and maintain possession of the public property in
the States, and that this should be done with as little bloodshed as
possible. How is this to be carried into effect? That it is by
measures that will inspire respect for the power of the government,
and the firmness of those who administer it, does not admit of
debate.
It is obvious that rebellion was checked in 1833 by the
promptitude of the President in taking measures which made it
manifest that it could not be attempted with impunity, and that it
has grown to its present formidable proportions only because similar
measures were not taken.
The action of the President in 1833 inspired respect, whilst
in 1860 the rebels were encouraged by the contempt they felt for the
incumbent of the presidency.
But it was not alone upon Mr. Buchanan's weakness the rebels
relied for success. They for the most part believe that the Northern
men are deficient in the courage necessary to maintain the
government. It is this prevalent error in the South which induces so
large a portion of the people there to suspect the good faith of the
people of the North, and enables the demagogues so successfully to
inculcate the notion that the object of the Northern people is to
abolish slavery, and make the negroes the equals of the whites.
Doubting the manhood of Northern men, they discredit their
disclaimers of this purpose to humiliate and injure them.
Nothing would so surely gain credit for such disclaimers as
the manifestation of resolution on the part of the President to
maintain the lawful authority of the nation. No men or people have so
many difficulties as those whose firmness is doubted.
The evacuation of Fort Sumter, when it is known that it can
be provisioned and manned, will convince the rebels that the
administration lacks firmness, and will, therefore, tend more than
any event that has happened to embolden them; and so far from tending
to prevent collision, will insure it unless all the other forts are
evacuated, and all attempts are given up to maintain the authority of
the United States.
Mr. Buchanan's policy has, I think, rendered collision
almost inevitable, and a continuance of that policy will not only
bring it about, but will go far to produce a permanent division of
the Union.
This is manifestly the public judgment, which is much more
to be relied on than that of any individual. I believe Fort Sumter
may be provisioned and relieved by Captain Fox with little risk; and
General Scott's opinion, that with its war complement there is no
force in South Carolina which can take it, renders it almost certain
that it will not then be attempted. This would completely demoralize
the rebellion. The impotent rage of the rebels, and the outburst of
patriotic feeling which would follow this achievement, would initiate
a reactionary movement throughout the South which would speedily
overwhelm; the traitors. No expense or care should, therefore, be
spared to achieve this success.
The appreciation of our stocks will pay for the most lavish
outlay to make it one.
Nor will the result be materially different to the nation if
the attempt fails, and its gallant leader and followers are lost. It
will in any event vindicate the hardy courage of the North, and the
determination of the people and their President to maintain the
authority of the government; and this is all that is wanting, in my
judgment, to restore it.
You should give no thought for the commander and his
comrades in this enterprise. They willingly take the hazard for the
sake of the country and the honor which, successful or not, they will
receive from you and the lovers of free government in all
lands.
I am sir, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
M. BLAIR.
