WAR DEPARTMENT, March 16, 1861.
Sir: In reply to the letter of inquiry, addressed to me by
the President, whether, "assuming it to be possible now to provision
Fort Sumter, under all the. circumstances is it wise to attempt it?
"I beg leave to say that it has received the careful consideration,
in the limited time I could bestow upon it, which its very grave
importance demands, and that my mind has been most reluctantly forced
to the conclusion that it would be unwise now to make such an
attempt.
In coming to. this conclusion, I am free to say I am greatly
influenced by the opinions of the army officers who have expressed
themselves on the subject, and who seem to concur that it is,
perhaps, now impossible to succor that fort substantially, if at all,
without capturing, by means of a large expedition of ships of war and
troops, all the opposing batteries of South Carolina. All the
officers within Fort Sumter, together with Generals Scott and Totten,
express this opinion, and it would seem to me that the President
would not be justified to disregard such high authority without
overruling considerations of public policy.
Major Anderson, in his report of the 28th ultimo, says: "I
confess that I would not be willing to risk my reputation on an
attempt to throw reinforcements into this harbor within the time for
our relief, rendered necessary by the limited supply of our
provisions, and with a view of holding possession of the same, with a
force of less than twenty thousand good and well-disciplined
men."
In this opinion Major Anderson is substantially sustained by
the reports of all the other officers within the fort, one of whom,
Captain Seymour, speaks thus emphatically on the subject: "It is not
more than possible to supply this fort by ruse with a few men or a
small amount of provisions, such is the unceasing vigilance employed
to prevent it. To do so openly by vessels alone, unless they are
shot-proof, is virtually impossible, so numerous and powerful are the
opposing batteries. No vessel can lay near the fort without being
exposed to continual fire, and the harbor could, and probably would,
whenever necessary, be effectually closed, as one channel has already
been. A projected attack in large force would draw to this harbor all
the available resources in men and material of the contiguous States.
Batteries of guns of heavy caliber would be multiplied rapidly and
indefinitely; at least twenty thousand men, good marksmen and trained
for months past with a view to this very contingency, would be
concentrated here before the attacking force could leave Northern
ports. The harbor would be closed; a landing must be effected at some
distance from our guns, which could give no aid. Charleston harbor
would be a Sebastopol in such a conflict, and unlimited means would
probably be required to insure success, before which time the
garrison at Fort Sumter would be starved out."
General Scott, in his reply to the question addressed to him
by the President on the 12th instant, what amount of means, and of
what description, in addition to those already at command, would be
required to supply and reinforce the fort, says, "I should need a
fleet of war vessels and transports, which, in the scattered
disposition of the navy (as understood), could not be collected in
less than four months; five thousand additional regular troops, and
twenty thousand volunteers -- that is, a force sufficient to take all
the batteries, both in the harbor (including Fort Moultrie) as well
as in the approach or outer bay. To raise, organize, and discipline
such an army (not to speak of necessary legislation by Congress, not
now in session) would require from six to eight months. As a
practical military question, the time for succoring Fort Sumter with
any means at hand had passed away nearly a month ago. Since then, a
surrender under assault or from starvation has been merely a question
of time."
It is true there are those whose opinions are entitled to
respectful consideration, who entertain the belief that Fort Sumter
could yet be succored to a limited extent without the employment of
the large army and naval forces believed to be necessary by the army
officers whose opinions I have already quoted. Captain Ward of the
navy, an officer of acknowledged merit, a month ago believed it to be
practicable to supply the fort with men and provisions to a limited
extent, without the employment of any very large military or naval
force. He then proposed to employ four or more small steamers
belonging to the Coast Survey to accomplish the purpose, and we have
the opinion of General Scott that he has no doubt that Captain Ward,
at that time, would have succeeded with his proposed expedition, but
was not allowed by the late President to attempt the execution of his
plan. Now it is pronounced, from the change of circumstances,
impracticable by Major Anderson and all the other officers of the
fort, as well as by Generals Scott and Totten; and in this opinion
Captain Ward, after full consultation with the latter named officers
and the superintendent of the Coast Survey, I understand now
reluctantly concurs.
Mr. Fox, another gentleman of experience as a seaman, who,
having formerly been engaged on the Coast Survey, is familiar with
the waters of Charleston Harbor, has proposed to make the attempt to
supply the fort by the aid of cutters of light draught and large
dimensions, and his proposal has, in a measure, been approved by
Commodore Stringham; but he does not suppose, or propose, or profess
to believe that provisions for more than one or two months could be
furnished at a time.
There is no doubt whatever in my mind that when Major
Anderson first took possession of Fort Sumter he could have been
easily supplied with men and provisions, and that when Captain Ward,
with the concurrence of General Scott, a month ago, proposed his
expedition, he would have succeeded had he been allowed to attempt
it, as I think he should have been. A different state of things,
however, now exists. Fort Moultrie is now re-armed and strengthened
in every way; many new hand batteries have been constructed, the
principal channel has been obstructed -- in short, the difficulty of
reinforcing the fort has been increased ten, if not twenty, fold.
Whatever might have been done as late as a month ago, it is too sadly
evident that it cannot now be done without the sacrifice of life and
treasure not at all commensurate with the object to be attained; and
as the abandonment of the fort in a few weeks, sooner or later,
appears to be an inevitable necessity, it seems to me that the sooner
it be done the better.
The proposition presented by Mr. Fox, so sincerely
entertained and ably advocated, would be entitled to my favorable
consideration if, with all the lights before me, and in the face of
so many distinguished military authorities on the other side, I did
not believe the attempt to carry it into effect would initiate a
bloody and protracted conflict. Should he succeed in relieving Fort
Sumter, which is doubted by many of our most experienced soldiers and
seamen, would that enable us to maintain our authority against the
troops and fortifications of South Carolina? Sumter could not now
contend against these formidable adversaries if filled with
provisions and men. That fortress was intended, as her position on
the map will show, rather to repel an invading foe. It is equally
clear, from repeated investigations and trials, that the range of her
guns is too limited to reach the city of Charleston, if that were
desirable. No practical benefit will result to the country or the
government by accepting the proposal alluded to; and I am, therefore,
of the opinion that the cause of humanity, and the highest
obligations to the public interest, would be best promoted by
adopting the counsels of those brave and experienced men whose
suggestions I have laid before you.
I have, sir, the honor to be, very respectfully, your
obedient servant,
SIMON CAMERON.
