DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, March 16, 1861.
Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
note of yesterday, requesting my opinion in writing upon the question
whether, " assuming it to be possible to now provision Fort Sumter,
under all the circumstances is it wise to attempt it?"
After a careful consideration of the opinions of Generals
Scott and Totten, and also those of Commodore Stringham and Mr. Fox,
as presented to the President and his cabinet on yesterday, I have
arrived at the conclusion that the probabilities are in favor of the
success of the proposed enterprise so far as to secure the landing of
the vessels at the fort, but there would be great danger of their
destruction and the loss of many lives before their cargoes could be
secured within the fort.
It would be impossible, in my judgment, to fit out and
conduct the expedition with such secrecy as to keep those who have
control of the harbor of Charleston in ignorance of their object, and
of the mode and time of their approach. I do not therefore attach any
importance to the proposition to approach the fort under the cover of
night, but I should expect the expedition to meet with all the
resistance which. the authorities of South Carolina may be able to
command.
The landing of supplies at Fort Sumter, if successfully
accomplished, would of itself be of no practical value, as it is
quite clear that Major Anderson, with his present inadequate force,
could not long maintain the fort against the means of attack now
concentrated there.
As the attempt to supply the fort with provisions without
the consent of the authorities of South Carolina would doubtless
induce an attack by them, the effect of such an attempt, whether
successful or not, would be the early loss of the fort and the
destruction or capture of Major Anderson's command. It would
therefore, in my judgment, be unwise to attempt to supply the fort
with provisions, unless they were sent with such a force as would
place beyond all doubt or contingency the success of the enterprise,
and also with such reinforcements of men as would insure a successful
defense of the fort against any attack which could be made upon
it.
The occupation of Fort Sumter is not essential to the
performance of any of the duties imposed upon the government. It
cannot be used as a means of enforcing the laws, or of compelling the
people of South Carolina to perform the duties they owe to the
federal Government. Viewing the question only as a military one, I
cannot doubt that it would be expedient to abandon a position which
can only be held at a great expense of life and money, and which,
when held, cannot be used as a means of aiding the government in the
performance of its duties.
But the most important question connected with this subject
is one of a political character. The State of South Carolina is in
open rebellion against the government. Her authorities have seized
the public property, have wholly disregarded the laws of the United
States, and have openly defied the government.
If the evacuation of Fort Sumter could be justly regarded as
a measure which would even by implication sanction the lawless acts
of the authorities of that State, or indicate an intention on the
part of the government to surrender its constitutional authority over
them, or if it could be regarded as an acknowledgment by the
government of its inability to enforce the laws, I should without
hesitation advise that it should be held without regard to the
sacrifices which its retention might impose. I do not believe,
however, that the abandonment of the fort would imply such an
acknowledgment on the part of the government. There are other means
by which the power and the honor of the government may be vindicated,
and which would, in my judgment, be much more effective to compel the
people of South Carolina to render obedience to the laws, and which
would at the same time avoid the sacrifice of life which must result
from a conflict under the walls of the fort.
The commencement of a civil war would be a calamity greatly
to be deplored, and should be avoided if the just authority of the
government may be maintained without it. If such a conflict should
become inevitable, it is much better that it should commence by the
resistance of the authorities or the people of South Carolina to the
legal action of the government in enforcing the laws of the United
States.
The public sentiment of the North would then be united in
the support of the government, and the whole power of the country
would be brought to its aid.
If a conflict should be provoked by the attempt to reinforce
Fort Sumter, a divided sentiment in the North would paralyze the arm
of the government, while treason in the Southern States would be
openly encouraged in the North. It is well known that this question
has already been much discussed throughout the country, and that even
among the friends of the administration, many of those who demand
that the laws shall be enforced urge the propriety of the withdrawal
of our troops from Fort Sumter, believing that the retention of that
fort is not essential to the honor of the government, or its power to
enforce the laws.
While the abandonment of the fort would doubtless to some
extent create surprise and complaint, I believe that public sentiment
would fully justify the action of the government when the reasons
which prompt it shall be explained and understood.
I therefore respectfully answer the inquiry of the President
by saying that, in my opinion, it would not be wise under all the
circumstances to attempt to provision Fort Sumter. I am, with
respect,
Your obedient servant,
CALEB B. SMITH
