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HIGHLIGHTS

Teaching
- Taught Valuation to graduate students
- Ratings from Fall 2015: 6.1/7, 6.4/7, 6.7/7, and 6.3/7

Research
- Paper titled "*Mutual Fund Risk-Shifting and Management Contracts*" was one of 8 papers to be selected for the Financial Research Association (FRA) conference.
- Paper titled *"Real Options, Financial Constraints and Drilling Rig Rental Rates"* was one of 6 papers selected for the early ideas session at the FRA conference.

ACADEMIC EMPLOYMENT

2014 – Present — Visiting Assistant Professor of Finance
A.B. Freeman School of Business, Tulane University

AREAS OF ACADEMIC INTEREST

Investments, Energy Finance

EDUCATION

Kelley School of Business, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN
PhD in Finance, August 2014

University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI
Masters of Science in Financial Engineering, August 2006

University of Madras, Chennai, India
Bachelor of Commerce, July 2002

WORKING PAPERS

"**Overconfidence in Money Management: Balancing the Benefits and Costs**" (Job Market paper)

"**Mutual Fund Risk-Shifting and Management Contracts**" (with Jung Hoon Lee and Charles Trzcinka)
Under Review at the Journal of Finance
Conference presentations: Financial Intermediation Research Society (2016), Financial Research Association (2015), Northern Finance Association (2015)

Seminar presentations: Indiana University, University of Illinois at Chicago, University of Missouri, University of Massachusetts Boston, University of Notre Dame

“Real Options, Financial Constraints and Drilling Rig Rental Rates” (with Zeigham Khokher, and Sheridan Titman)
Conference presentations: Financial Research Association Early Ideas Session (2015)

“Measuring the skill of the fund manager”
Seminar presentations: Indiana University brown bag seminar series, University of Connecticut, University of Wisconsin, Eau Claire, Radford University

“Cost of marketability and benefit of liquidity: evidence from peer-to-peer lending” (with Hong Kee Sul, and Brian Wolfe)

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Fall 2015	Valuation (FINE 7640) Tulane University Rating (6.1/7, 6.4/7, 6.7/7, and 6.3/7)
Spring 2015	Cases on Valuation and Financing (FINE 4600) Tulane University Rating (6/7)
	Financial Management (FINE 3010) Tulane University Rating (5.5/7)
	Advanced Financial Management (FINE 4100) Tulane University Rating (4/7)
Summer 2014	Derivative Security and Corporate Risk Management (F421) Indiana University Rating (6.19/7)
Summer 2013	Derivative Security and Corporate Risk Management (F421) Indiana University Rating (6.75/7) (Taught it in Summer 2012 also – (Ratings were 6.38/7)
Fall 2012	Security Trading and Market Making (F335) Indiana University Rating (6.13/7, 5.75/7)
Summer 2012	Equity and Fixed Income Investments (F420) Indiana University Rating (6.69/7) (Taught it in Summer 2011 also – (Ratings were 6.25/7)
	Intermediate Investments (F303) Indiana University Rating (6.00/7, 5.75/7)

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

2004 – 2005	**Graduate Employees’ Organization,** Ann Arbor, MI **-** Finance Manager Responsible for managing the payroll, finances, and their accounting database.
2000 – 2002	**Ernst and Young,** Chennai, India - Staff Accountant Engaged in various aspects of managerial, assurance, taxation, and due diligence issues resulting in increased financial value to clients.

WORKING PAPER ABSTRACTS

Overconfidence in Money Management: Balancing the benefits and costs

Individuals are overconfident, especially those in positions to influence outcomes. Overconfidence on the part of portfolio managers, can have severe consequences given the size of holdings of financial institutions. The impact of hiring an overconfident manager is studied here within the standard principal-agent framework. When compensation is endogenously determined, I find that investors can benefit from managerial overconfidence. Overconfidence induces a higher level of effort until the effects of restrictions on portfolio formation take over. Further, by increasing the incentive fee and sharing more risk the investor can curb excessive risk taking. However, excessive overconfidence is detrimental to the investor.

Mutual Fund Risk-Shifting and Management Contracts

We find evidence that risk-shifting by mutual fund managers is linked to their asymmetric performance-based compensation. We show that managers whose mid-year performance is close to their announced benchmark increase their portfolio risk in the second part of the year. As their performance deviates from the benchmark, their risk-shifting decreases except for the most extreme deviations. We find that the deviation from the benchmark dominates the incentives from the flow-performance relationship, supporting the conclusion that risk-shifting is based more on management contracts than on a tournament to capture flows.

Real Options, Financial Constraints and Drilling Rig Rental Rates

We investigate the investment decisions of oil and gas companies using a unique measure of investment costs. Our contract level data highlights significant variation in rig rental rates that standard models of resource extraction do not account for. We characterize a simple real options model that provides novel insights into this variation. Our empirical analysis confirms that controlling for relevant economic variables, including level of oil price, oil price volatility has a causal negative affect on investment costs. Our results also show that larger firms, facing fewer financial frictions, are more forward looking, while smaller firms, who have less access to capital markets, are more dependent on their past earnings.

Measuring the skill of the fund manager

I introduce a conditional measure of skill, the covariance between fund's trades and future "news" of the stocks traded. Using this measure, I show that the average fund manager in the cross-section of U.S. equity mutual funds has stock picking skill. This skill is mainly driven by manager's ability to predict firm's cash-flow news. Importantly, this skill has short term persistence, which is not explained by momentum effect, and is positively related to the traditional measures of performance. Consistent with theory, fund flows are increasing in managerial skill.

Cost of marketability and benefit of liquidity: evidence from peer-to-peer lending

We exploit the exogenous changes in the peer-to-peer lending market to quantify the discount applied to non-marketable securities. Specifically we show that the non-marketability discount documented in the extant literature is inherently tied to the liquidity of the secondary market. We show that illiquid marketable assets suffer the same discount as non-marketable assets and that the discount is lessened by improvements in secondary market liquidity. The analysis suggests policy implications for security platforms and secondary market creation in the wake of new regulations like Regulation Crowdfunding.

REFERENCES

Charles Trzcinka (Chair)
James and Virginia Cozard Professor of Finance
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