From Central America, A Nation Divided, 3rd ed., by Ralph Lee Woodward, Jr.
(Copyright Oxford University Press, 1998).
Chapter 9 Central America in the Ageof Social Revolution
[p. 224, from 2d ed.]
tested 1944 election, as Caldern's choice, Teodoro Picado Michalski, defeated Cortés Castro (now a Democrat) and the National Republicans won a majority in the Congress. Social reform continued under Picado, who enjoyed the cooperation of Vanguardia leader Manuel Mora Valverde.
In 1946 two new political factions emerged. Otilio Ulate Blanco, publisher of the Diario de Costa Rica, organized moderate conservatives into the vehemently anticommunist National Union Party. In the meantime, a former Conservative politician, José Figueres Ferrer, an aggressive and sometimes demagogic son of Catalan immigrants, organized the moderate leftist, but anticommunist, Social Democratic Party. Both of the new parties objected to the presence of communists in Picado's government. The Social Democrats, ideologically aligned with Social Democratic parties in Europe and South America and with the liberal wing of the Democratic Party in the United States, called for establishment of a "Second Republic" in Costa Rica to achieve wider popular participation and benefits. Both parties gained considerable support from opposition to Picado's revolutionary new income tax law, passed in late 1946.
The campaign for the presidency in 1948 loomed as a major turning point in Costa Rican history. In an effort to bring down the National Republicans, the Democrats and Social Democrats agreed to support Ulate against Caldern. Despite Caldern's strong hold on the government's election machinery, fear of dictatorship and his communist connections worked against him. Following a violent campaign, two members of the National Electoral Tribunal announced that Ulate had won, but a third called for further investigation. The Caldern-controlled Congress responded on March 1, 1948 by annulling the election. Government troops arrested Ulate and other political leaders.
Rebellion erupted in several quarters. Archbishop Víctor Manuel Sanabria y Martínez attempted mediation and achieved the immediate release of Ulate, but fighting continued. The principal opposition was a group called the National Liberation, led by José Figueres, who pronounced against the government on March 11 and harassed government forces in the Central Valley. Aided by arms from Arévalo's Guatemala and with assistance from the United States, Figueres launched two expeditions from San Isidro del General on April 11. One, which he himself led, took Cartago on the following day. The other, which he called the "Caribbean Legion," captured Puerto Limón. Figueres's forces then surrounded the capital. On April 13 most fighting stopped and negotiations began. The Costa Rican army was too small to give Caldern much support, but communist-led workers, especially from United Fruit Company operations, continued to fight for him until April 19. With assistance from Mexican and United States diplomats, the parties agreed upon Santos Len Herrera as Chief of State, and Picado and Caldern went to Nicaragua in exile. Figueres' troops marched into the capital on April 24. Soon to become a member of Herrera's cabinet, Figueres was the man behind the government from that point on. The brief 1948 War of National Liberation was the bloodiest episode in Costa Rican history.
On May 8, 1948, the Junta of the Second Republic, headed by Figueres, formally assumed power. It governed the state until November 1949. The Junta succeeded in restoring order and in repelling an invasion of Caldern forces supported by Anastasio Somoza. (A series of violent but indecisive clashes between forces backed by Somoza against those of Figueres continued intermittently into the 1960s. Figueres became openly committed to the ouster of rightist dictatorships, and Somoza did not hide his disdain for Figueres; each supported exile groups against the other.) Elections in December 1948 revealed that Figueres still enjoyed little popular support, as Ulate's National Union Party (PUN) won thirty-three seats in the Constituent Assembly. Allied parties won eight seats, while Figueres's Social Democrats took but four.
Despite his lack of a popular mandate, Figueres made notable structural changes during the period of Junta. Most significantly, he began the process of dissolving the Costa Rican army, although he kept a reserve force to provide for national defense. It proved adequate to resist the Nicaragua-based invasions. The new civil and rural police forces, however, soon outnumbered considerably the old Costa Rican army. He also outlawed the communist Popular Vanguard, nationalized the Costa Rican banks, placed a 10 per cent tax on private capital bank deposits exceeding 10,000 colones to pay for administrative changes, established agencies to promote agricultural production and to control inflation, promoted development of energy resources, and, finally, drafted a new constitution for consideration by the Constituent Assembly.
Understandably, the more conservative Constituent Assembly rejected Figueres' Constitution (March 1949). Rejecting the concept of a "Second Republic," they adopted a Constitution that differed little from the much-amended 1871 Constitution, preserving most of the social advances established under Caldern. The new Constitution, however, established a new Supreme Electoral Tribunal, under which Costa Rica would have the freest elections in the world, and they provided equal rights for women, confirmed Figueres' abolition of the army, and established an independent judiciary. Other notable additions prohibited reelection of the president for eight years and also proscribed political parties belonging to international movements, thereby outlawing the communist parties. Under its terms, Ulate took office on November 8, 1949.
Ulate slowed the pace of social reform, but he did not stop it. Because he wanted to stabilize the nation's finances and improve its foreign credit, he was more cautious than Figueres about expensive social measures and public works. "Economy" was his watchword, and economy was as much responsible for his completion of the move to abolish the army as were Figueres' more revolutionary motives. He reduced government expense to the bone wherever possible--including cutting his own salary by 23 per cent, to $250 per month--while raising taxes on exports. He improved the civil service system. His state-owned banking system gave Costa Rica the best credit system in Central America. Against the communists, Ulate was ruthless, suppressing all their efforts to organize working-class groups. Violence sometimes resulted as his police dealt harshly with leftist agitators. Meanwhile, a rising demand for Costa Rican agricultural exports improved the economy, although coffee and bananas still accounted for nearly 90 per cent of the country's exports in 1951.
In 1953, following a noisy campaign, Figueres, popularly known as "Don Pepe," won the presidency rather easily. His National Liberation Party (PLN) promised a broad program of social and economic reform, and he initiated legislation that resumed his program of 1948-49. The government quickly raised income taxes. It revised the contracts with the UFCO to provide greater income to the state, to raise employees' salaries, and to provide for state ownership and management of the fruit company's social service program, which included hospitals, clinics, and schools. To protect and promote local small industries, it raised tariffs. A general improvement in labor benefits accompanied this, and unemployment dropped owing to an expanded public works program.
Against Figueres's administration came charges of graft, corruption, creeping socialism, and demagoguery, charges which split the PLN and permitted a return of the National Union (PUN) in 1958 with the election of Mario Echandi Jiménez, a conservative. The rotation in office between progressives and conservatives continued: PLN candidate Francisco José Orlich won in 1962, and PUN's José Trejos Fernández won in 1966. In 1970 the electorate returned Figueres to the presidency, but his administration faced rising violence from impatient students and labor.
Since 1948 Costa Rica has been an example of moderate social and economic reform carried out under political democracy. National Liberation has been the dominant party in Congress, but has held the executive branch only slightly more than half the time. The result is a patchwork of legislation that has brought to Costa Rica a modern blend of socialist and capitalist institutions. Violence has erupted from time to time, and Figueres's second term (1970-74) was especially stormy. The opposition won every presidential election from 1948 until 1974, when Daniel Oduber won election and continued the PLN to power in 1978.
Oduber's administration confronted major problems resulting in large part from the worldwide energy crisis and by scandals involving the activities of the North American financial manipulator Robert Vesco. While the frequent changes in the executive office may suggest that no government was really able to satisfy the public very well, it also reflected a healthy political process that enjoyed popular confidence and worked well.
Yet the strength of the PLN could only be overcome with unified coalitions from a broad spectrum of opposition parties. From 1966 forward, at the center of these opposition parties was first Caldern Guardia and later his son, Rafael Angel Caldern Fournier ("Junior" Caldern). The United Party coalition of 1978 brought together under the candidacy of Rodrigo Carazo an unlikely alliance of disenchanted PLN members, Calderonistas, and oligarchical interests. Carazo narrowly defeated the PLN candidate, Luis Alberto Monge.
Costa Rican democracy remained strong. Economic difficulties plagued the Carazo administration, highlighted by a $2.6 billion foreign debt by 1981, the result of excessive borrowing abroad to meet the difference between higher prices for oil and other imports and lower prices for coffee and other exports. Moreover, the government continued to subsidize heavily public services and utilities and maintain a high level of welfare programs beyond income. Inflation in excess of 40 per cent per year resulted. In 1980 Carazo devaluated the coln and allowed it to float freely against the dollar. It fell from its 1979 value of 8.6 to the dollar to slightly more than 40 to the dollar by the end of his administration.
Luis Albert Monge, again the PLN candidate, was too firmly committed to social democracy to attack the philosophy of the welfare state in the 1982 campaign, but instead cited government mismanagement and corruption. He won handily, gaining 58.7 per cent of the popular vote to Caldern Fournier's 33.6 per cent. The PLN also won a majority in the legislature. Monge's election was as much an affirmation of Costa Rica's commitment to the democratic process even in the face of serious economic crisis as it was a vote of confidence in the PLN. Yet Monge benefitted from the bottoming out of the worldwide economic recession, and he was able to secure substantial aid and support from the U.S. and the international banking community. By 1984 the coln, which some had feared would reach 100 to the dollar, leveled off around 44 to the dollar and then edged above 50 to the dollar by the end of his administration in 1986. The debt problem remained serious, however, and despite some austerity programs recommended by the IMF and modest reductions in government spending, it had grown to $4.5 billion by 1986. Restructuring and loans from the U.S. eased immediate crises, however, and both the PLN and the Calderonistas opposed radical solutions from the right or the left.
The Sandinista Revolution next door in Nicaragua alarmed many Costa Ricans in the 1980s as Costa Rica became a base for anti-Sandinista contras. Ideological differences between the two mainstreams of Costa Rican political life were not great, so that the election of 1986 was another test of personality and circumstance. Although still vocal, Pepe Figueres had finally faded from the leadership of the PLN, as the party, still dominated by aging veterans of the 1948 crisis, searched for someone to meet the rising popularity of the young Caldern. The PLN found their answer in an attractive and youthful Oscar Arias Sánchez, the son of a coffee planter. Arias won a clear majority over Caldern's Social Christian Unity Party (PUSC), successor to the United Party coalition, and took office on May 8, 1986.
Arias gained international fame for his leadership in bringing a peace accord to the isthmus to end the war not only in Nicaragua, but also in El Salvador and Guatemala (see chapter 10). Economic difficulties, however, threatened Costa Rica's welfare-state programs and resulted in more neo-liberal economic policies designed to expand exports and transfer many state operations to the private sector. Arias soon found that he could do little in domestic politics, for uniquely in Latin America, the Costa Rican executive had become increasingly weakened in favor of a strong legislature. His popularity within Costa Rica thus declined at the very time when his foreign policy brought him the 1987 Nobel Peace Prize.
Costa Rica had the healthiest economy in Central America, but in the 1980s living standards declined for most Costa Ricans, as inflation outpaced wage increases. Real wages dropped by 42 percent between 1983 and 1988. The export-led economy continued to depend heavily on coffee and bananas, but considerable diversification--especially citrus fruits, macadamia nuts, and flowers--kept employment rates higher than in the rest of Central America and minimized the effects of lower prices for the primary commodities. Yet the rising trade deficit forced the Arias government to reduce public spending significantly by 1987 and to seek ways to restructure the debt. The PLN thus began to dismantle the welfare state. Neo-liberal reforms brought privatization of banks and other state agencies, which in turn dried up credit sources for small- and medium-scale farmers not linked to the "Agriculture of Change" program promoted by both parties to promote increased export agriculture. Arias' austerity policies to control government expenditures and combat inflation by January 1990 allowed the government to begin buying back the debt at substantial discounts, but the domestic economic policy became heavily dependent on foreign institutions, notably the IMF, the World Bank, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).
These policies, accompanied by declining real wages, caused labor problems. Strikes plagued the Arias administration. Longshoreman in Limn led an attempted general strike in August 1989, demanding higher wages, increased access to credit for farmers and agricultural workers, suspension of the national government's privatization plans, expanded trade union rights, and improved health care and educational services. Workers in hospitals, schools, and an oil refinery joined the strikers before the government managed a modest settlement. These and other strikes reflected widespread opposition to government economic policy from both urban and rural workers.
Notwithstanding substantial growth of export agriculture on larger estates, with the inevitable rise of a more powerful agrarian elite, the small, independent farmer remained important in Costa Rican life and politics. This class of yeoman farmers remains more important than elsewhere in Central America and plays a continuing role in both the myth and reality of Costa Rican democracy. Reflecting a strong sense of Hispanic individualism together with an egalitarian spirit, the rural tico has been a staunch defender of Costa Rican democracy and social justice. Unfortunately, the shortage of agrarian labor, which allowed rural workers to earn much higher wages than their Central American counterparts and contributed to the prosperity that has supported Costa Rican democracy, has been seriously eroded by the population explosion in Costa Rica in the late twentieth century. Yet more sympathetic relations between employers and workers in Costa Rica than in other Central American states is still an important characteristic in deterring the sort of repressive actions toward labor so common in other Central American states.
The unpopularity of Arias' economic policies brought victory for "Junior" Caldern in the 1990 presidential election, defeating a conservative member of the PLN's "old guard," Carlos Manuel Castillo. Caldern promised more popular policies such as food self-sufficiency and a return to his father's reformist legacy. High-tech image-making became an important part of this electoral campaign, as Caldern hired U. S. publicity agent Roger Ailes, a former adviser to George Bush. Castillo responded by hiring Joel McClairy, who had advised the U. S. Democratic Party. The new president had been born in Nicaragua while his father was in exile there and had not lived in Costa Rica until he was 15. His election represented the arrival of a new generation of Costa Rican leaders who had not participated in the 1948 revolution. This generation faced a crisis in the welfare state that had been erected in the mid-twentieth century. Limited economic growth combined with rapid population growth had put serious strains on Costa Rica's social security, medical care, and other progressive social programs by the 1990s. The migration of approximately 400,000 Nicaraguans into the country during the 1980s exacerbated the rapid growth of Costa Rica's population (nearly 2.5 percent per year over the past twenty years) despite considerable adoption of family planning by the Costa Rican middle class. Caldern dedicated himself to neo-liberal reforms which checked the growth of social programs and encouraged foreign investment and exports. These policies promoted new economic growth, which reached 7.3 percent in 1992, but slowed to 6 percent the following year, but real wages and benefits declined for most workers and the austerity measures, known as the Structural Adjustment Programs, led to an increase in poverty and more strikes and street protests. Exposed corruption in high places further discredited Caldern government.
The PLN candidate in the February 1994 election, José María Figueres Olsen--the son of Don
Pepe--promised to fight neo-liberalism and increase funding for health care. Following a
campaign that focussed on personalities and corruption more than issues, Figueres won election
and took office in May. Figueres was unable to cope successfully with the growing economic
problems as coffee prices fell and unemployment rose. His government faced more angry strikes
and protests from labor and disenchantment from much of the middle class. More than 20 percent
of the population lived below the absolute poverty indicators, unable to meet basic food and
shelter needs. Real income fell in 1995 by 3.5 percent and by 2.8 percent in 1996, while
unemployment rose to above 6 percent by 1997, the highest in a decade. In 1998 the PUSC
candidate, Miguel Angel Rodríguez, narrowly defeated the PLN's Jose Miguel Corrales., with a
plurality of 46.9 percent over Corrales 44.4 percent. Eleven other candidates divided the
remaining 8.7 percent, but 32 percent of registered voters abstained, the highest rate of voter
apathy in Costa Rica in 40 years, suggesting the alienation of many voters. Costa Rica's model
political democracy was facing serious economic and social challenges.
[230, from 2d ed.]
[p. 231, from 2d ed.]
[232, from 2d ed.]
[233, from 2d ed.]
[234, from 2d ed.]
rian reform followed the urban reforms, but Arévalo's government did not move very far in that area, aware of the power of the coffee and banana interests.
Arévalo's support of labor and peasant demands and his "softness" toward the communists brought him, nevertheless, into direct conflict with the principal defenders of the old order--the planters and foreign investors who were fearful of losing the advantages secured under Ubico. Those men believed that the "welfare state," labor unions, higher wages, social insurance, and increased taxes would wreck the economy--or more precisely, their own interests. Many military officers believed that only a military administration could govern the country effectively. Arévalo weathered twenty-two military revolts during his five years in office. The regime faced its most serious military threat in late 1949, following the killing by government agents in Amatitlán of Col. Francisco J. Arana, the principal rival to Jacobo Arbenz for the presidency. Arévalo feared that Arana was organizing a plot against him. It may never be known whether his police were merely attempting to arrest Arana and shot him when he attempted to escape, as was claimed, or whether it was a deliberate assassination, but the apparent conspiracy between President Arévalo and Arbenz in eliminating the more conservative Arana left the way open for Arbenz's election in 1950. The government issued arms to some workers, and they aided significantly in the suppression of the revolt that followed Arana's death.
At the other extreme, a small but militant group of students, editors, and other intellectuals wanted a more thoroughgoing social revolution. The communist feared that Arévalo's program, although it coincided with their own in some respects, could not be made to conform to their conceptual approach and that it might pose a threat to their own party's establishment as sole leader of the proletariat.
As the election of 1950 approached the communists campaigned more openly. Led by José
Fortuny, seventeen communists withdrew from Arévalo's Revolutionary Action Party (PAR) and
began to publish a pro-communist weekly, Octubre. Arévalo, to prevent loss of his moderate
support, responded with a tougher line toward the communists, but communist infiltration of
government information organs gave them a big advantage. Several worked in the government
news bureau. Another had been manager of the board of directors of the government's radio
station since 1946. The official government daily, Diario de Centroamérica, reflected leftist
views increasingly, and in 1949 Alfredo Guerra Borges, one of the country's leading journalists
and a member of the Communist Party's executive committee, became
[236, from 2d ed.]
[237, from 2d ed., with one small change noted]
[238, from 2d ed.]
[239, from 2d ed.]
[240, from 2d ed.]
[241, from 2d ed.]delete "neo-conservative", line 3, 2d paragraph
neuvers to deny his opponents access to power through democratic means. Then Fidel Castro established his regime in Cuba, and, in the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, Guatemala aided the United States, further polarizing political opinion in the state. In November 1960, Ydígoras succeeded in quelling a major revolt, led by Colonel Rafael Pereira, which began in the capital at Matamoros Barracks. Other rebels had invaded from the Caribbean inland as far as Zacapa before Ydígoras, personally leading his forces and supported by his air force's B-26 bombers, turned the tide. Although Pereira's threat failed, it was the beginning of a new phase of Guatemala's revolutionary history, as survivors of the rebellion, led by Lieutenant Marcos Aurelio Yon Sosa, formed the Thirteenth of November Revolutionary Movement (MR-13) and began a guerrilla war that continued throughout the subsequent decades. Another officer, Luis A. Turcios Lima, later formed a rival guerrilla group, the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) which collaborated with the outlawed, underground PGT.
These guerrillas kept Guatemala in a state of turmoil throughout the 1960s. Although they failed to take much territory, they created a sense of insecurity in the country and were aided by substantial support from middle-class youth in the university and even from within the army. A right-wing terror organization, the White Hand (Mano Blanca), arose in response, and assassination and terrorism spread. Later, another organization, known as the Eye for an Eye (Ojo por Ojo), replaced the Mano Blanca when that group's close relationship to the government and police became embarrassing. When Turcios died in an automobile wreck, César Montes emerged as a new and more dynamic leader of the FAR. Leftist exiles, including Arévalo, Fortuny, and Gutiérrez, reentered Guatemala. Ydígoras's failure to pursue a hard enough line against these "agitators" led to his ouster by the military in March 1963.
Ydígoras's successor, Colonel Enrique Peralta Azurdia, immediately declared a state of siege and
moved the country into a military dicta-
[243, from 2d ed.]change "Langerud" to "Laugerud"
[244, from 2d ed.]
VOTER ABSTENTION IN GUATEMALAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, 1944-96
% of Eligible
Votes for Vote for
Eligible Percent Winning Winning
Year Voters Votes Abstention Candidate Candidate
1944 310,000 296,000 4.5 255,700 82.5
1950 583,300 407,500 31.1 266,800 45.7
1958 736,400 492,300 33.1 191,000 25.9
1966 944,200 531,300 43.7 209,400 22.2
1970 1,190,500 640,700 53.6 251,100 21.1
1974 1,568,700 727,876 53.6 298,953 19.1
1978 1,785,876 651,817 63.5 269,979 15.1
1986 2,268,919 1,657,883 26.9 1,133,577 50.0
1991 3,171,900 1,375,397 45.8 901,081 28.4
1996 3,710,681 1,399,669 62.3 716,910 19.3
Sources: Julio Castellanos Cambranes, "Origins of the Crisis of the Established Order in
Guatemala," in S. C. Ropp and J. A. Morris (eds.), Central America Crisis and
Adaptation(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1984), p. 136; Inforpress
Centroamericana, Guatemala: Elecciones '95 (Guatemala, 1995); Adam Isacson, Central
America UPDATE, vol. 2, no. 1 (17 Jan. 1996).
of the Word. Evangelical Protestantism in Guatemala, with U.S. missionary support, has grown remarkably since about 1960, to the extent that about 30 percent Guatemala's population today claim Protestant affiliation. In contrast to the new Catholic evangelism in the country, which has been often associated with "liberation theology" and the political left, most of the Protestants are staunchly conservative and identify with pro-U.S. policies.
Ríos Montt's accession to power changed the pattern of military rule. Superficially, at least, he made a noticeable effort to curb the corruption and to encourage a higher degree of ethics in the conduct of government. More impressive was the decline of death-squad activities and the restoration of security and peace in the central highlands, although Ríos Montt's hard-line policies with criminals drew the censure of human rights advocates. Political assassinations virtually ceased, and the disastrous decline of tourism, to which the violence had contributed, was reversed. Yet the economic and military power of the powerful generals who had ruled the country since 1954 could not be turned back, nor was Ríos Montt in any sense sympathetic to leftist interests. He, and the officers he represented, were principally concerned with preserving the privileged position of the military, and perceived that military abuses and corruption threatened the institution. Massacres of Indian communities continued, as did the flow of refugees into Mexico. He implemented a system of civil patrols inaugurated by the Lucas García government, requiring Indians to serve, usually without firearms, as guardians against the guerrillas. Those who refused to serve met death. Ríos also suspended the constitution, restricted labor unions, and prohibited the functioning of political parties in his effort to maintain order. In the meantime, the leftists had united in January 1982 into the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union (URNG), an umbrella organization for the PGT, FAR, EGP, and ORPA (Organization of the People in Arms, commanded by Rodrigo Asturias, son of the noted Guatemalan novelist, Miguel Angel Asturias).
Ríos's challenge to the military elite, his constant evangelical and moralistic preaching, the excessively large role of North American Protestants in his advisory councils, imposition of a sales tax (IVA), and his meddling with powerful economic interests ensured that his regime was relatively short-lived. On August 8, 1983, a new coup replaced him with Defense Minister General Oscar Humberto Mejía Victores. Whatever his motives, Ríos Montt's brief tenure as President of Guatemala began a process toward more democratic, civilian rule, and eventually the end of Guatemala's long civil war. Assessing the serious economic difficulties facing the country caused by declining tourism and the general international economic downturn, as well as strong domestic and international censure of military atrocities in Guatemala, the military leaders decided to turn over limited power to civilians through elections in 1984 and 1985. Successful challenges to military dominance in Nicaragua and El Salvador undoubtedly influenced their decision. In the meantime, a return to the high degree of corruption mentioned earlier, efforts to check the guerrillas who were now largely confined to the Petén, and failure to do anything about the growing poverty and economic problems facing the majority of the population characterized Mejía's government. Cynicism and anti-communism were the most conspicuous qualities of the government, with commitment to the same neo-liberal policies on behalf of an entrenched oligarchy that had characterized Guatemalan governments since 1954.
Elections for a Constitutional Assembly to write a new Constitution on July 1, 1984, reflected widespread voter apathy in the political process, in which seventeen parties (nine of them new) vied for the 88 seats. Mejía warned that the Assembly was limited strictly to writing the new constitution and electoral and habeas corpus laws. Moderates led the polling with the Christian Democratic (DCG) and National Centrist Union (UCN) parties having a plurality, but with a coalition of diverse right-wing parties able to form a majority coalition, although in reality the divisions among themselves prevented them from dominating the Assembly. The new Constitution, ratified on May 31, 1985, laid a foundation for the freest election in Guatemala since 1945, won by the DCG's Marco Vinicio Cerezo in December 1985.
Taking office in January 1986, Cerezo quickly gave a new tone to Guatemala's government. Although he was unable to end quickly the civil war and its accompanying civil rights abuses, nor to suppress a rising narcotics trade, Cerezo promoted the Central American Peace Accord of 1987, which eventually brought a settlement to the civil war not only in Guatemala, but also in Nicaragua and El Salvador.
The restoration of civilian rule in Guatemala did not immediately end the powerful influence of the high-ranking Guatemalan army officers. It became clear early in Cerezo's administration that his authority was at their pleasure. Military violations of human rights continued to plague Guatemala, the continued resistance of leftist rebels providing a justification for repressive action from the military's point of view. The temporary cutting off of U.S. military assistance to Guatemala did not deter the military from protecting their own from prosecution for civil rights violations. The compassionate voice of a Quiché Indian woman, Rigoberta Menchú, however, brought the plight of the Guatemalan people to worldwide attention, increasing international pressure on the Guatemalan government to bring an end to the conflict and reach agreement with the rebels. For her efforts, Menchú received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1992, "in recognition of her work for social justice and ethno-cultural reconciliation based on respect for the rights of indigenous peoples." Traditional Guatemalan elites, including President Jorge Serrano, belittled the award.
The growing popularity of Ríos Montt resulted in remarkable realignments in the Guatemalan political spectrum during the campaign for Cerezo's successor. With the leftist parties still outlawed in 1990, a large number of parties from extreme right to center vied for the presidency. The new Constitution prohibited those who had participated in efforts to overthrow the government from candidacy, a provision challenged by Ríos Montt, but the courts eventually disqualified him, late in the campaign. Cerezo's Guatemalan Christian Democrats (DCG) had become strong in the 1980s, but Cerezo's failure to bring peace, economic uncertainty, and charges of widespread corruption, had heavily discredited that party. Moreover, the more open political climate had allowed peasant and labor organizations to become more vocal in their demands, but little tangible benefits came their way, causing widespread disenchantment with his government. Newspaper-owner Jorge Carpio Nicolle's National Centrist Union (UCN) was the leading challenger to the DCG, but Carpio failed to win the presidency in both 1985 and 1990, although his party remained important in the Congress in the early 1990s. As it turned out, Ríos Montt's disqualification late in the campaign paved the way for the meteoric rise of Jorge Serrano Elías' Solidarity Action Movement (MAS). Serrano was a right-wing engineer and businessman, but also an evangelical Protestant closely allied with Ríos Mont. He not only picked up much of the large vote that would have gone to Ríos Montt, but also captured the imagination of many urban Guatemalans disenchanted with both Carpio and the DCG's lackluster candidate, Alfonso Cabrera. In the November 11, 1990, election, in which the URNG urged voters to boycott the polls, Carpio led the polling with 27.5 percent, followed by Serrano's 24.2 percent, and Cabrera's 17.5 percent. Alvaro Arzú Irigoyen, former mayor of Guatemala and successful head of the National Tourism Board, at the head of the neo-liberal National Advancement Party (PAN), placed a close fourth with 17.3 percent. Eight other candidates trailed far behind. Significantly, voter abstention, which had dropped to 26 percent in the 1985 elections, soared to 51 percent, reflecting either voter disenchantment or commitment to Ríos Montt. The PAN, although failing to win the presidency, won the mayorship of Guatemala City as well as a large number of seats in the legislature.
Serrano gave evidence of effective political dealing, as he gained the endorsements of President Cerezo and of Arzú. In the run-off election on January 6, 1991, Serrano whipped Carpio with an impressive 68.7 percent of the vote, and carried 21 of Guatemala's 22 departments. On the next day he designated Arzú as his Foreign Minister, as well as other PAN members to high offices.
Although Serrano made some progress toward a peace settlement with the guerrillas and promised more rapid economic development, political violence continued to be the most salient characteristic of the country during his administration, and his lack of political experience became quickly evident. An earthquake struck the country in September 1991, leaving 30,000 homeless and killing 53, adding to the socioeconomic problems, especially of the poor. Soon after the assassination of UNC leader Jorge Carpio in May 1993, apparently frustrated by his inability to control the military or to check the rising opposition of labor and other opposition mass organizations, Serrano seized dictatorial control, in what some called a "self-coup," as he disbanded the Congress and all political parties. This move, apparently supported by the army, met massive protests from the populace. Then, when the traditionally docile legislature demanded his resignation, the army backed down, forcing Serrano's resignation on June 1, 1993. The Congress then elected Ramiro de Len Carpio, the Human Rights Ombudsman, as interim president. The army accepted this, but rejected the new president's choice for Defense Minister, emphasizing its right to choose that official. Although Len Carpio brought about some reforms aimed at a reduction in government corruption, his administration demonstrated once more that the military still held ultimate authority in Guatemala.
The Guatemalan political alignments continued to shift in the 'nineties, as the multitude of parties coalesced into working coalitions. The DCG and UNC had sunk to minor party status by 1995. In that year they joined with the Social Democratic Party (PSD), to form the Alianza Nacional, but won only four seats in the Congress. Alvaro Arzú's PAN, meanwhile, gained support from several center-right parties and won a congressional majority in 1995. More extreme right-wing interests followed the leadership of Ríos Montt in the Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG). After this group had triumphed in August 1994 legislative elections, Ríos Montt had became President of the Guatemalan Congress in January 1995 and immediately launched a new bid for the presidency, but once again the courts upheld the constitutional prohibition of his candidacy. Instead, Alfonso Portillo headed the FRG ticket. In the November 1995 election, Arzú and Portillo led the polling with 37 and 22 percent respectively, with the Alianza Nacional receiving 13 percent, and a new leftist coalition, the New Guatemala Democratic Front (FDNG) getting 8 percent. Again abstention ran high, with only 47 percent of registered voters participating. In the runoff on January 7, Arzú with 51.2 percent of the vote, managed a narrow victory over Portillo's 48.7 percent. Abstention was even greater than in the November election, with only about a third of registered voters participating. Arzú's victory reflected his strong strength in the capital, however, as Portillo carried most of the countryside and 18 of Guatemala's 22 departments.
Arzú took office as President in January 1996 and pursued a strongly neo-liberal agenda. Despite his weak mandate, Arzú made establishment of peace with the guerrillas a top priority of his administration. The URNG had essentially lost the military struggle and following agreements reached in Mexico, Madrid, and Oslo, a formal peace accord was celebrated in Guatemala City on December 29, 1996, allowing the guerrillas to return to peaceful political life in Guatemala. The formal end of the 36-year civil war that had killed more than 100,000 Guatemalans was a major event, although details of its implementation dragged on throughout 1997. An estimated 40,000 more had "disappeared" and up to a million had been forced from their homes or into exile. The former guerrillas and other outlawed leftist parties now joined the FDNG.
Arzú made significant progress in reducing human rights abuses and in dismissing military leaders
accused of human rights violations. This purge left behind military officers who supported, or at
least did not actively oppose, the UN-mediated peace talks with the guerrillas. A wave of
kidnapings and other criminal acts followed amid a generally rising crime rate in the country as the
neo-liberal economic policies followed in recent years improved many economic indicators, but
failed to reverse the trend toward declining standards of living for most Guatemalans.
Guatemala continued to claim Belize (formerly British Honduras), but found herself increasingly isolated as other Latin American states announced their support of independence for the tiny enclave of British colonialism on Guatemala's Caribbean shore. The economic decline of the late nineteenth century had continued, and the colony had become more of a liability than an asset to Great Britain. It produced a few bananas and some sugar for export, and there was some improvement in the mahogany market, but chicle and citrus fruit production became the principal economic activities, along with growing and smuggling marijuana and other illegal narcotics. Except for a small section where the foreign company and diplomatic representatives lived alongside a tiny local aristocracy, Belize City remained an unsavory, tropical village, with unpainted wooden houses, dirty streets, and open sewers.
In 1949 economic pressures forced the devaluation of the British Honduras dollar from US $1.00 to seventy cents. The economic difficulties that followed led to the first serious challenge to the status quo when, behind the leadership of George Price, a group desiring structural change formed the People's United Party (PUP). Labor struggles of the 1930s had begun the process of more active black participation in Belizean politics, but it was Price who mobilized diverse elements of the population into an effective political force. Price, who had been educated in the United States, had served as secretary for local multimillionaire Robert Sidney Turton. The party, representing leftist views, gained wide support from the working population. Because it was anti-British, PUP received support from the Arbenz government in neighboring Guatemala, which hoped to garner PUP support of Guatemalan sovereignty over the colony.
In 1954 the PUP swept legislative elections, winning eight of nine seats. Although the party split over the question of friendship with Guatemala, it soundly defeated the newly-formed Honduras Independence Party (HIP), which favored entry into the West Indian Federation. Price directed modest improvements in the economy and moved the colony closer to independence, winning reelection in 1961. Soon thereafter, Hurricane Hattie swept over Belize City, its tidal surge and winds causing massive destruction. This led to the decision to establish a new capital city inland, near Roaring Creek at a place to be named Belmopan. Considerable expenditure went into the new site. The new public buildings, inspired by Mayan architecture, somehow fell short of Mayan grandeur. The new capital grew only very slowly and Belize City continued for many years to be the site of much of the government's operations, even after Belize became self-governing in 1963 and gradually moved toward a fully independent status. By 1995 the capital city still had only about 5,000 residents. An expanding tourist trade, capitalizing on the excellent deep-sea fishing and scuba diving along Belize's coral reef, and new agricultural development by North American enterprises offered some economic growth and diversification to this tiny new nation.
Guatemala severed diplomatic relations with Panama over the latter's support for Belizean independence in 1977, but soon after several other Latin American states also declared their support for Belize and in November the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution favoring independence by a vote of 126-4 (with 13 abstentions). The U.S. had generally pursued a somewhat pro-Guatemalan neutrality in the dispute, but in November 1980 it supported the UN resolution (passed 139-0, with 7 abstentions) calling for Belizean independence. The resolution called on Britain to continue to defend Belize and later received endorsement from the Organization of American States (OAS), which until then had supported Guatemala's claim. Guatemala repeatedly threatened to attack Belize, but also entered long-term negotiations to resolve the dispute and in March 1981 begrudgingly agreed to accept Belizean independence, aware that British troops guaranteed its territorial integrity. Subsequent talks soon collapsed, however, and Guatemala once more broke relations with Britain and closed her Belizean consulates. On September 21, 1981, Belize officially became an independent constitutional monarchy within the British Commonwealth and soon thereafter joined the OAS.
During the Cerezo administration, Guatemala pursued extensive negotiations with Belize, and in 1991 the Guatemalan government of Jorge Serrano finally recognized officially Belizean independence. Subsequently, the Guatemalan Court of Constitutionality and the Guatemalan Congress confirmed that action. But after Serrano's fall, new Guatemalan challenges to this policy led the Congress to reverse itself and to brand Serrano a traitor for acting without prior approval from the legislature. Since then Guatemala has sought a solution that would cede a portion of southern Belize to Guatemala, and various border incidents have further inflamed relations between the two states. A Guatemalan commission visited Belize in 1997 in a new effort to resolve the matter but these talks also ended in failure. More recently, the British government has offered to pay Guatemala US$24 million in return for dropping its claim to Belize, but the dispute remained unresolved in early 1998.
Independence accelerated popular demands for more equitable land and income distribution. A modest land reform program begun in 1962 had resulted in more than a half-million acres being distributed to small farmers by 1982, but since that date large-scale agroexport agriculture has become the dominant agricultural activity, as Belize shifted from a forestry economy to one based on citrus and other agroexports. United States economic influence has largely supplanted the British throughout the twentieth century. By 1981 forestry products accounted for only 1.9 percent of exports, although it rose slightly after that. There has also been a much more notable increase in seafood exports. But, as with much of the rest of Central America in the 1990s, even as exports have risen rapidly imports have increased even more rapidly, and Belize's balance of trade deficit rose from $56 million in 1975 to $86 million in 1981 and $227 million in 1994.
Emphasis on economic development by the PUP tended to cause it to lose its focus on the
working classes. Its middle-class orientation was increasingly challenged by more radical groups
such as UBAD (United Black Association for Development), PAC (People's Action Committee)
and RAM (Revolitical Action Movement). UBAD began in 1969 as a black nationalist
organization but evolved into a major political party after independence. It pressured the PUP to
devote more attention to education at all levels and to improvement in wage levels. The leftist
groups eroded the constituency of the PUP, which in 1984 led to victory by the more
conservative United Democratic Party (UDP). Price returned to power in 1989, but when he
called for new elections in mid-1993, 15 months before they were scheduled, he lost his
premiership in a close election to the UDP's Manuel Esquivel. Esquivel led the country along the
neo-liberal policies being pursued by all the Central American states in the 'nineties, but by 1997
the new PUP leader Said Musa was regaining support for the PUP with his charges that these
policies had resulted in increased poverty, unemployment, high inflation, rising crime, and a
slow-down in economic growth.
Although El Salvador had no Revolution comparable to Guatemala's, many of the same forces were at work and there were some parallels of development. Hernández Martínez withstood a military revolt on April 4, 1944, but four days later there was a general strike, called by middle-class professionals as well as workers, and he then resigned. The success of student and labor elements in pulling down Hernández was important in encouraging similar groups in Guatemala against Ubico, but the power of students and labor in El Salvador was slight. Salvadorans were universally tired of the dictator, and he accepted their view and stepped down peacefully rather than subject the country to more violence. Andrés I. Menéndez, a moderate military officer who was also a member of one of the principal families of the country, formed a provisional government, but in October a conservative faction, led by Osmín Aguirre Salinas, chief of police under Hernández, reestablished the dictatorship.
Aguirre and his chosen successor, Salvador Castaeda Castro, were elected in controlled balloting in January 1945. They dealt harshly with leftist elements such as those who succeeded in organizing labor in Guatemala, thus the military and landholding oligarchy maintained its control of El Salvador. There were, however, both liberal and conservative factions within the military, and the pendulum swung from side to side, providing for some movement toward social and economic reform. The state for nearly thirty years enjoyed relative peace and order, with occasional military coups, some social progress, and freedom of expression. Clearly still within the liberal framework of government, El Salvador was, nonetheless, affected by some of the social reform movements around her. After the ouster of Castaeda in December 1948, Major Oscar Osorio presided over the country's first social security legislation, passed in 1949, and the adoption in 1950 of a Constitution that provided public health programs, women's suffrage, and extended social security coverage.
Osorio's moderate Revolutionary Party of Democratic Union (PRUD) dominated the state for the next decade, with both leftists and rightists charging that elections were fraudulent. In 1960, however, Osorio lost control of the party, and he then formed the Social Democratic Party (PDS) in opposition. After growing disorder from both left and right, it appeared that he would attempt to overthrow the moderate, pro-United States President José María Lemus, and a small group of leftist officers moved in quickly and took over the government. Their regime lasted only a few months, and in January 1961 right-wing military units installed a junta which broke relations with Fidel Castro's Cuba and instituted a more conservative, anti-communist program, one similar to that which dominated Guatemala in the 1960s. Although a great number of civilian political parties operated in the country, Col. Julio Rivera's conservative National Conciliation Party (PCN) and the army dominated the republic throughout the next decade. Despite its conservative base, the party sponsored moderate social reforms in an effort to stave off demands of workers, peasants, and students. El Salvador's government, faced with a shortage of land and an expanding population, recognized the need for some social welfare programs.
The formation of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) behind the leadership of the dynamic José Napolen Duarte, Mayor of San Salvador from 1964 to 1970, promised a more progressive, but strongly anti-communist, approach to El Salvador's social and economic problems. Duarte headed a coalition of opposition to the PCN in 1972 with the head of the social-democratic National Revolutionary Movement (MNR), Guillermo Ungo, as his vice-presidential running mate. Duarte campaigned tirelessly, despite violent harassment by the government. After a government "recount" overruled the National Electoral Commission which had declared Duarte and Ungo the winners, he publicly counseled against the popular uprising on his behalf that seemed imminent. Duarte nevertheless worked closely with labor leaders in an effort to consolidate organized labor behind him, but an attempted general strike failed when the government succeeded in maintaining the loyalty of transport workers. Amid rumors of a coup, the army tightened security over the country. Duarte denied complicity in the abortive coup that followed, but on March 25 police arrested him and beat him into unconsciousness. Diplomatic pressure gained his release from jail, and three days later he was quietly removed to Guatemala, where he received asylum.
Meanwhile, the new president, Colonel Arturo Armando Molina (PCN), took office. He surprised many Salvadorans by resuming some social and economic reforms in a conciliatory gesture to avoid further bloodshed. The harsher aspects of the dictatorship abated, and Molina even began to adapt certain aspects of Duarte's platform, particularly those relating to administrative reform within the government. Beneath this veneer of conciliation, however, was a clear pattern of activity to prevent popular parties from challenging the oligarchy again, and in 1976 the PCN swept congressional and municipal elections as most opposition parties refused to participate. In the meantime, guerrillas of the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) began to appear along the Honduran border region. In the presidential election of 1977 the PCN's General Carlos Humberto Romero was the winner in another fraudulent election surrounded by rising political violence and repression.
Factions of the oligarchy now turned to military terror squads, as in Guatemala, while the left and center-left abandoned the electoral process. A civil war was underway by 1977. The Catholic clergy and newly-formed Christian Base Communities began to speak out against the old order. Archbishop Monsignor Oscar Romero, who boycotted the inauguration of President Romero and denounced the violence on both sides, supported these protests and called for reform. Most of the opposition boycotted the 1978 legislative elections, won easily by the PCN. The growing repression and violence attracted international interest. The British cancelled arms sales and human rights organizations censured the Romero Government.
The revolutionary junta that seized power on October 15, 1979, with subsequent reshufflings that eventually included Duarte as Chief-of-State, represented more centrist, but relatively impotent elements of the middle class after the conflict had already become polarized. It was primarily a move by younger and more progressive military officers, led by Colonels Adolfo Majano and Jaime Abdul Gutiérrez, to save the military's institutional privileges, which had been under fire because of military repression and corruption. These more moderate officers sought reforms that would preserve the legitimacy of military rule and avoid the sort of popular uprising that had recently overthrown the National Guard in neighboring Nicaragua. Yet they failed to curb the human rights abuses of the security forces and death squads. Although the new junta ordered the dissolution of the notorious paramilitary death squad, ORDEN, that had terrorized the left since about 1964, other death squads soon commenced new killings and atrocities. The leading civilians on the junta, Guillermo Ungo and Román Mayorga, resigned in protest against continued military repression. This crisis ended in January 1980 when the PDC agreed to collaborate with the military to form a new junta, and Duarte became its chief later in that year. Ungo meanwhile accepted leadership of the Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR), an umbrella organization of the three major leftist political organizations and their military wings established in April 1980. The FDR paved the way for union, in October, of most of the guerrilla organizations into the united Farabundo Martí Front for National Liberation (FMLN), named for the leader of the January 1932 peasant uprising that had been so ruthlessly crushed by Hernández Martínez. Large numbers of the politically active, including many Christian Democrats, had joined the guerrillas or their political organizations as the only means of dealing with a government that refused to recognize legitimate elections. Denied gradual reform and change as the Christian Democrats had advocated, a bloodbath enveloped the country, and more than a hundred thousand died, mostly at the hands of the government or its terrorists, before peace returned a decade later. Political assassinations hit all classes, and few families in El Salvador avoided the violence. More than half a million Salvadorans fled the country.
Moderates could not control the right-wing military and, when the reformist Colonel Adolfo Majano was forced from command of the military at the end of 1980, coinciding with the election of Ronald Reagan in the United States, Duarte simply became a captive of the old order, still believing he could do more within the government than outside. But he was ineffectual in stemming the atrocities of the military or in bringing peace. When these included the murder of the Archbishop, a group of U.S. nuns, and more than a thousand peasants around the village of Mozote, international outrage focussed world attention on El Salvador's poor human rights record.
Duarte began an agrarian reform program designed to provide land for the peasants with just compensation to the large landholders, but it could not undo overnight the inequities of hundreds of years nor was it capable of bringing about the necessary expansion of the economy to solve the severe economic and social problems of the country. Reforms in the banking system and in the management of foreign commerce frightened private capital and failed to reverse the declining economic picture. His defeat in the 1982 elections ended that phase of the conflict with the election, under highly questionable circumstances, of a reactionary coalition (ARENA) dominated by Roberto D'Aubisson, widely believed to be associated with the death squads and accused by U.S. Ambassador Robert White of being responsible for the March 1980 assassination of Archbishop Romero. While the February 1982 election reflected widespread exhaustion with the civil war, it also reflected consolidation of neo-liberal forces to terminate the moderate coup of 1979. The new provisional president, Alvaro Magaña, although moderate in some respects, was dependent on this right-wing coalition, and was a compromise supported by the armed forces and the U.S. Embassy to stave off election of D'Aubisson, who for the moment served only as president of the Assembly. He presided, however, over the convention that enacted a new constitution in 1983, the 23rd in Salvadoran history. Although it changed relatively little from its 1962 predecessor, it provided a somewhat more modern framework for an attempt at democratic government in the country. The political intrigues extended into the military and the shakeups in command and rivalries among the leading officers disrupted much of the effort against the guerrillas, who made substantial gains during 1983-84, but could not score a decisive victory. The civil war cost Salvadoran economic development dearly. Capital flight was extensive, production declined, and real wages dropped more than 25 per cent between 1972 and 1984 in the face of spiraling inflation and a devaluation of the coln from 2.5 to 3.5 to the dollar. An estimated 79 per cent increase in the value of exports in 1983, however, reversed the downward trend since 1979 and saved the economy from collapse.
The civil war dragged on, increasingly injected into an East-West struggle. The Reagan administration accused Nicaragua and Cuba of assisting the Salvadoran guerrillas while the U.S. sent more and more military aid to the government, despite U.S. Congressional objections after the murder of four U.S. Catholic women and two U.S. labor advisers in El Salvador. Congress limited the number of U.S. military advisers in El Salvador to fifty-five and balked at some of Reagan's requests for more military aid. One apparent response to this was Salvadoran agreements with Israel for anti-guerrilla security assistance. Israel already provided military assistance to Guatemala and Honduras. On the other side, Salvadoran guerrillas reportedly received arms from the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and from Libya.
The human rights record of the Salvadoran government remained abominable, but the Reagan administration certified that improvements were being made and put great emphasis on anti-communism and the democratic process as reflected in the 1982 and 1984 elections. In the latter election, a showdown between Duarte and D'Aubisson, Duarte won by a margin of about 54 per cent to 46 per cent and took office in June, promising to curb the death squads, conduct a dialogue with the guerrillas, and continue the social and economic reforms he had begun in 1980-82.
The Marxist FMLN received rising support from both middle and lower class people, including many Catholic clergy and laypeople advocating a more activist Christian role in the country's politics. This activist role extended in the highest ranks of the Salvadoran clergy. At the same time, as in Guatemala, there was a remarkable growth of evangelical Protestant groups in both rural and urban areas. Protestants now comprise an estimated 20 percent of the population of El Salvador. Both foreign and native Catholic clergy politicized the rural and urban poor. The Archbishop of San Salvador often served as a mediator between the state and the guerrillas. The Protestant sects, on the other hand, have tended to be more conservative politically and less directly involved in politics.
With strong United States backing (the U.S. poured more than $4 billion in military aid to El Salvador's government during the 'eighties), Duarte tried to restrain the military, but he was unable to bring an end the destructive civil war, and he himself was dying of cancer. Compounding his problems, a massive earthquake destroyed much of San Salvador in 1986, killing 1500, leaving 10,000 homeless and causing $1.5 billion in damages. Charges of PDC corruption, popular exhaustion with the civil war, historically low prices for Salvadoran exports, and effective organization and campaigning by ARENA, gave that party control of the Assembly in 1988 and the following year its candidate, a popular sportsman and coffee planter, Alfredo Cristiani, won the presidency. With U.S. assistance, Cristiani launched neo-liberal reforms that favored private sector development at the expense of government programs for the less fortunate. His government also reached agreements with the FMLN to end the civil war at the end of 1991, providing for UN monitoring of a process of incorporating the rebels into Salvadoran political life and diminishing the traditionally strong role of the military. Demobilization of both the FMLN and the Salvadoran army and police forces proceeded behind schedule, but peace slowly returned to the country. A United Nations "Truth Commission" investigated the most flagrant cases of human rights abuses committed during the civil war, including the massacre of more than a thousand rural villagers in and around Mozote in 1981. Its 1993 report recommended removal from office for those guilty of human rights violations, as well as reform in the military and the judiciary. The Salvadoran government resisted, as the legislature gave amnesty from criminal prosecution to all those implicated in this report, but it did remove many officials from office. Officers implicated in the murder of six Jesuits at the Central American University in 1989 were freed, but were discharged from active duty along with hundreds of others. The Truth Commission had also recommended a total replacement of the Supreme Court and, in July 1994, the Assembly complied by electing an entirely new panel of Supreme Court justices.
The structure of political parties in El Salvador changed notably as a result of the civil war and the peace agreements, although the neo-liberal ideology has remained a powerful force through these changes. The old Liberal Party had been replaced after 1944 by newer, if strongly personalist parties (the PRUD and the PCN). More progressive parties (notably the PDC and the MNR) had challenged their dominance beginning in the 1960s. In the 'eighties, however, the neo-liberal ARENA emerged from the civil war as the dominant party, to be challenged in the 1990s by the legal successor to the FMLN guerrillas, replacing the Democratic Convergence (CD) as the principal leftist coalition in 1992. While many other splinter parties continue to participate in the electoral process, the middle sector parties (PDC and MNR) that had gained prominence earlier have been replaced by a more polarized political spectrum. The new civilian police (PNC) composed of both former members of the FMLN and the former national police became a reality by 1994 and had reached full force early in 1996. In compliance with UN recommendations, the government reduced the army from a high during the civil war of 63,000 to 28,000 by 1995, and it abolished the Treasury Police, National Police, and National Guard. It transferred the intelligence service to civilian control.
In the first national election since the civil war, in March 1994, ARENA's candidate, Armando Caldern Sol led a large field of candidates. In the runoff against the FMLN's Rubén Zamora in April 1994 he received an impressive 68 percent of the vote, benefitting from the restoration of peace and economic gains. The FMLN, nevertheless, established itself as the leader among the leftist opposition parties and won a quarter of the seats in the legislature.
Recovery from the devastating civil war was difficult for El Salvador, but with substantial U.S. assistance and an emphasis on the private sector, El Salvador demonstrated remarkable economic vitality by the mid-1990s. The government collaborated with international organizations to resettle many of those displaced by the war even as it proceeded with large scale demobilization of the military. There was a notable expansion of agroexports, and a sharp rise in light manufacturing. Privatization of banks and other government enterprises and expansion of infrastructure contributed to economic growth. Despite these advances, however, El Salvador continued to suffer serious balance-of-payment deficits and most of the serious socioeconomic problems that existed before the civil war remain today. By 1995 agriculture accounted for only 14 percent of El Salvador's $9.7 billion gross domestic product (GDP). The annual growth rate of the GDP during the early to mid years of the 'nineties averaged better than five percent, the highest in Central America, but standards of living for most Salvadorans remained low and real wages have been declining since 1989. Despite the land reform programs of 'eighties, about one percent of the landowners own more than 40 percent of the arable land.
Coffee remains El Salvador's principal export, but by 1995 accounted for only 36 percent of total
exports, while manufacturing was growing rapidly in importance and employed 20 percent of the
labor force. Since World War II, El Salvador has been the most industrialized nation in Central
America. Her factories supply principally domestic and Central American markets, although new
assembly plants (maquiladoras) have begun to export beyond the isthmus. Despite an advanced
system hydroelectric plants and one of the world's first geothermal electrical plants, El Salvador
still depends on imported petroleum for about half of its energy requirements, a major contributor
to its balance of payments deficit. Credit and economic assistance from the U.S. and other
western countries, and remittances from Salvadorans abroad to their families in El Salvador,
totalling about $800 million dollars annually by 1996, were an important factor in keeping the
Salvadoran economy afloat. Commerce in illicit drugs constituted another important source of
revenue for the country which cannot be accurately calculated. But its external debt had reached
$2.2 billion by the end of 1994. Inflation in El Salvador reached 20 percent per year by 1992, but
had moderated to about 10 percent per year by 1995.
[255, from 2d ed.]
[256, from 2d ed.]
[257, from 2d ed.]
[258, from 2d ed.]
American demonstrations erupted in Tegucigalpa. American support of "democratization" appeared to be simply a cover for "militarization." Suazo made clear that he commanded the armed forces as he named a nephew of former President Oswaldo Lpez, Walter Lpez Reyes, as the new military chief, but he also pledged continued cooperation with the U.S. Lpez, however, emphasized Honduras's geopolitical location and said Honduras should take advantage of it, threatening to expel the anti-Sandinista contras if more U.S. economic aid was not forthcoming. Outwardly, the remilitarization of Honduras had received a setback, but the military nevertheless continued to play a dominant role in the country throughout the 'eighties. Another Liberal, José Azcona Hoyo, succeeded Suazo to the presidency in 1986. Major U.S. military presence, including the construction of airports and other military installations, provided substantial economic benefits for certain regions and groups, creating another form of dependency which in the long run was both unnatural and unhealthy for the country. Tegucigalpa experienced enormous growth during the decade, following patterns seen earlier in other Central American capitals, with accompanying overcrowding housing, suburban development, air pollution, and rising crime rates. Honduras, following the trend in the other states turned toward neo-liberal solutions in 1990 with the election of National Party candidate, Rafael Leonardo Callejas, in late 1989. Callejas was a U.S.-trained agricultural economist, who been an economic planner in the Honduran government as well as a board member of several public and private corporations. His administration, however, was plagued by labor disputes, rising crime, protests and violence, and charges of corruption. A major struggle between independent banana growers and Chiquita (successor to United Fruit and United Brands) damaged banana production and exports seriously in 1990 before being settled. Per capita income in Honduras plummeted from US$534 to US$205 per year between 1990 and 1992. By 1993 Honduras was in serious financial difficulty. Thus the Liberals swept back in to power in 1994 behind Carlos Roberto Reina Idiaquez. President Reina could not contain all of the protests, especially from indigenous and other peasant groups, but he tried to be conciliatory. With some important economic growth in the country during his administration, the Liberals were again able to win the election of November 1997. The new president, Carlos Flores Facusse was an engineer with close ties to the United States. He represented the more conservative wing of the Liberal party and promised to continue the neo-liberal policies of his predecessor.
CENTRAL AMERICAN ARMS IMPORTS, 1984-1994(In millions of 1994 US$)Year Belize Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua Panama
1984 0 7 152 55 111 484 14
1985 0 27 160 40 40 374 13
1986 0 13 143 7 130 780 13
1987 0 6 101 13 113 662 25
1988 0 6 121 12 73 789 12
1989 0 0 116 12 58 395 12
1990 0 0 89 22 33 78 6
1991 0 0 86 0 32 86 6
1992 0 0 52 0 21 5 0
1993 0 0 41 5 20 5 0
1994 0 0 30 0 10 0 0
(0=none or negligible amounts)
source: World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1995 (Washington, 1995)
<http://www.acda.gov/wmeat95>.
In Nicaragua, under the Somozas, a close relationship had intensified between U. S. business and
the Nicaraguan government, similar
[260, from 2d ed.]
[261, from 2d ed.]
[262, from 2d ed.]
[263, from 2d ed.]
liberalism and defender of the old order. They quickly mobilized much of the population into mass organizations of peasants, women, youth, part of the clergy, and neighborhood Committees for Defense of the Revolution. They greatly increased arms imports from the Soviet Union and created a militia that by 1984 brought Nicaragua's total armed forces to approximately 100,000, frightening their neighbors and putting a major burden on the economy. The MPU and FPN, on the other hand, were allowed to fade away since the Sandinistas did not have direct control of those popular revolutionary groups that had outlived their usefulness once Somoza was overthrown. They could have become rival political parties to the FSLN.
The Sandinista reform program began by providing new housing and health facilities for the poor, and by sponsoring a literacy campaign that was a notable success, although the record of economic achievements was otherwise bleak. Expropriation of the vast Somoza family holdings provided the nucleus of a state-run economy, but the Sandinistas soon found that efficient management of these holdings was not automatic. Production declined notably even if better distribution of income was provided. Nicaraguan peasants received nearly 600,000 acres in an agrarian reform program between 1979 and mid-1983, as some 3000 cooperatives were established. Although an estimated 60 per cent of the economic activity of the country remained in private hands, there was a notable rise in government regulation. The Sandinista government inherited nearly $600 million of foreign debt, but managed to refinance it, with a severe austerity program and tight controls on currency. The bourgeoisie grumbled and some left Nicaragua, but the majority stayed, unwilling to abandon their country as their Cuban counterparts had done two decades before.
The Carter administration quickly recognized the new regime and approved significant amounts of economic assistance while expressing some concern over its leftward drift, but after Ronald Reagan took office, in January 1981, U.S. policy turned decidedly hostile. On April 1 he accused Nicaragua of serving as a conduit for 200 tons of military equipment to the Salvadoran rebels, and soon thereafter the U.S. resumed military sales to Guatemala, sent 55 military advisers to El Salvador, suspended AID programs to Nicaragua, and began CIA support of the anti-Sandinista National Democratic Front (FDN) operating near the Nicaraguan border in Honduras. A smaller opposition guerrilla group, Edén Pastora's Sandino Revolutionary Front (FRS), formed the nucleus of the Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE), which operated from Costa Rica and maintained an aloofness from both the U.S. and the somocista-tinged FDN. Pastora himself had been a Sandinista hero as "Comandante Zero," but had defected from the FSLN in protest against its pro-Soviet policies. These forces, in addition to collaborating Mosquito Indian groups, put a substantial military burden on the Sandinista regime from 1984 forward.
The Mosquitos and other indigenous peoples of the Caribbean coast became a serious embarrassment to the Sandinistas. Under the treaty with Great Britain by which Nicaragua had incorporated the Mosquito Kingdom, the Mosquitos were guaranteed autonomy. The Somoza dynasty had generally respected this provision. The Caribbean coast had always been well outside the mainstream of Nicaraguan life. Many of its inhabitants remained English-speaking, Protestant, their life style dependent on the wetlands of the tropical lowlands near the Caribbean. Primitive by some standards, they nevertheless had a strong sense of nationhood, which continued to thrive under the Somozas. The Sandinistas had ambitious plans to integrate the Caribbean peoples into the New Nicaragua, a concept that was incompatible with the independence that the Mosquitos had maintained against the rulers of Spanish-speaking Nicaragua since the sixteenth century. Moreover, the Mosquitos were located in the very area where the FDN was threatening Nicaragua and there was ample evidence that many Mosquitos and one of their principal leaders, Stedman Fagoth Muller, were conspiring with both the FDN and ARDE. The Sandinistas dealt with the situation by resettling thousands of Mosquitos away from the coast and border, forcing them to turn to agriculture in a hostile climate, after centuries of dependence on the sea.
Faced with U.S.-supported counterrevolutionary forces on both frontiers and with a vocal opposition within the country as well, in March 1982, the Sandinista government suspended the constitution and imposed stricter censorship, although it did not permanently shut down the opposition press, represented principally by La Prensa. A vigorous propaganda war between the U.S. and Nicaragua, with the guerrilla war in El Salvador hanging in the balance, undermined peace efforts by diplomats of Panama, Colombia, Venezuela, and Mexico, who began talks on Contadora Island, Panama, in January 1983. This "Contadora Group" sought to reduce foreign military presence in the Central American states. Their proposals received lip service approval from the United States and Nicaragua, but the rising tension and U.S.-supported disinformation, destabilization, and counterrevolutionary activities against the Sandinista regime, as well as the heavy presence of Cuban and eastern European advisers within Nicaragua, precluded an agreement under Contadora auspices.
Aside from ideological issues, the opposition accused the Sandinista leadership of profiteering, conspicuous consumption, corruption, and poor judgment. Moreover, they said the Sandinistas had polarized the Nicaraguan population instead of unifying it. Yet in response to U.S. policy, the Sandinistas, alarmed by the 1983 U.S. invasion of the eastern Caribbean island of Grenada, made notable concessions. Expelling 1000 Cuban military advisers, releasing hundreds of Mosquito Indian prisoners, and offering amnesty to the contras were among the more notable of their conciliatory moves in 1983. The U.S., however, continued to insist that Nicaragua was a threat to peace in Central America and began to apply economic sanctions. The U.S. also engineered the resurrection of the Central American Defense Command (CONDECA) by Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Panama, with Nicaragua excluded and Costa Rica declining participation. This accompanied the U.S. arms buildup in Honduras already noted. The Reagan government also established in 1983 a National Endowment for Democracy that aided political parties that opposed leftists in underdeveloped countries such as Nicaragua. Costa Rica emphasized its neutrality in the conflict, but found it difficult to resist the growing anti-Sandinista pressure from the U.S. because of its dependence on U.S. support in its precarious economic situation. Costa Rica found itself walking a tightrope between the Contadora and U.S. positions on Nicaragua. Early in 1984 Costa Rica officially requested and received U.S. military equipment following border incidents between the Sandinista Army and Costa Rican defense forces.
When the Contadora Group presented its 21-point peace plan, in December 1983, the Nicaraguans declared that they would negotiate only with the U.S. "We don't talk to puppets," declared Foreign Minister Miguel D'Escoto, "only to puppeteers." Meanwhile, the U.S. had fleets operating off both Central American coasts while it conducted large-scale military maneuvers in Honduras. Nicaraguan forces shot down a U.S. helicopter when it strayed across the border. Similar incidents occurred later in El Salvador when U.S. helicopters flew over guerrilla-held territory. In March 1984 there was an international outcry against the mining of Nicaraguan harbors by CIA-supported contras after seven foreign ships, including a Soviet freighter, were damaged. Nicaragua brought charges against the U.S. for this activity before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at The Hague, to which the Reagan administration arrogantly replied that it would ignore any judgment by that Court. Nevertheless, the mining ceased after the U.S. Senate passed a resolution (84-12) calling on the CIA to stop mine-laying operations. The ICJ did eventually, in May 1984, order the U.S. to stop mining Nicaragua's harbors.
In the midst of rising violence, a bitter election campaign between Sandinista candidate Daniel Ortega Saavedra and a coalition supporting Arturo Cruz, an international banker who had been active in overthrowing Somoza but had broken early with the Sandinistas after serving briefly as their ambassador in Washington. Cruz complained that the government would not let him campaign freely as Ortega swept the election easily. Ortega enjoyed widespread popularity because of the Sandinista advances in social programs, but once in office he was forced to divert more and more of the government's resources to the war against the U.S.-supported contras.
Not only was U.S. assistance to Nicaragua suspended, but the Reagan government also managed to block assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. The contras, raiding Nicaragua from protected camps in Honduras and Costa Rica forced the Sandinistas to suspend social programs and divert scarce funds to defense. Even after the U.S. Congress, by the Boland Amendment in October 1984 prohibited continued CIA aid to the contras, the Reagan administration sought clandestine ways to fund the contras. Use of funds earned from illicit sale of arms to Iran involved the CIA in a major embarrassment for the Reagan administration by 1986, but failed to stop the flow of war matériel to the contras. Meanwhile, the U.S. embargo on trade with Nicaragua beginning in 1985 compounded Nicaragua's already grim economic situation.
As in El Salvador and Guatemala, atrocities and a tremendous toll of human life characterized the civil war in Nicaragua. International efforts to bring peace established dialogues among the warring parties, but U.S. resistance to any plan that did not assure the ouster of the Sandinistas made a settlement difficult. Finally, however, a Central American peace plan promoted by Costa Rican President Oscar Arias Sánchez and Guatemalan President Vinicio Cerezo brought agreements in 1987 that promised to not only bring peace but to provide for democratic government in all of the Central American states.
Implementation of the agreements was a long and arduous process. Deadlines were seldom met and in Nicaragua the fighting continued to take a frightening toll of human life as well as continue the destruction of the Nicaraguan economy. Runaway inflation and currency devaluation, along with an enormous foreign debt left the country in shambles. Production had fallen way off and there were serious shortages of almost everything. The Sandinista social programs had nearly all been sacrificed to pay for the war, which by 1989 was absorbing more than 60 percent of the government's resources. Exhaustion with the war and with the sinking economy led all sides to collaborate in holding free elections in February of 1990.
Economic decline and the continuing civil war had cost the Sandinistas much of their earlier popularity by 1990. Nicaragua's GDP had fallen 11.7 percent since 1988 and unemployment had risen to 35 percent. Yet the Sandinistas retained confidence in their base of support and allowed a remarkably free election under the scrutiny of a huge number of international observers. The United States government pumped substantial sums of money and technical support into the election in support of anti-Sandinista candidates, resulting in the victory of the anti-Sandinista coalition (UNO). Their candidate, Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, the widow of Pedro Joaquín Chamorro, murdered by Somoza supporters in 1979, became the new president on April 25, 1990. The U.S. immediately lifted its trade embargo and restored economic assistance programs.
The UNO had won a majority in the National Assembly, but this coalition represented such a wide spectrum of fourteen political parties from extreme right to left that it never coalesced into an effective political force and divisions among these factions allowed the Sandinistas, still the largest single party within Nicaragua, to continue to play a major role in the legislature, even though it held only 39 of the 92 seats. In March 1990, the lame duck FSLN government had succeeded in gaining passage of laws legalizing the property expropriations since 1979 and protecting minimum wages and university autonomy. The divisions among the coalition prevented Mrs. Chamorro's government from challenging these acts and from governing effectively, making it difficult for her to lead Nicaragua out of the economic and political abyss into which it had sunk.
Yet the first female chief-of-state in Central American history since Doña Beatriz de la Cueva had briefly ruled Spain's Kingdom of Guatemala in 1541 struggled courageously to achieve a national reconciliation, and by the end of her 6-year term she had managed to maintain an uncertain peace with little harmony among the rival factions. American and other foreign economic assistance was a major element in allowing her to remain in office against repeated attacks from both left and right. She had reintegrated most of the contras into civilian life while at the same time resisting U.S. pressure to purge the Nicaraguan military of its Sandinista officers. This meant that she received less economic assistance from the U.S. than expected, as budget cutting efforts to reduce the deficit in the United States and dissatisfaction with the continued strength of the Sandinista had reduced U.S. aid. The U.S. also wanted more rapid privatization and neo-liberal development of Nicaragua to encourage foreign investment than the Chamorro government was able to accomplish with such Sandinista strength. Continued control of the military, under the command of Daniel Ortega's brother Humberto, was a major asset for the Sandinistas, even though in compliance with the peace accords the armed forces shrank to a mere 16,000 troops by 1992. A constitutional amendment in 1995 finally changed its name formally from the Popular Sandinista Army to the Army of Nicaragua.
If Nicaragua could not move so rapidly into the neo-liberal 'nineties as had the other Central American states, it was nevertheless following the same course. The FSLN and its allied labor and peasant organizations fought tenaciously to hang on to benefits gained under Sandinista rule. Rightists accused Mrs. Chamorro of appeasing the Sandinistas excessively. Some contras refused to disarm, and in November 1991 emerged as the recontras [rearmed contras] who resumed violent tactics in an effort to destroy the FSLN. The UNO coalition had ceased to be a force by the beginning of 1992. By January of 1993, twelve of its fourteen constituent parties were in opposition to the government. As so often in Central American history, natural disasters compounded political and economic problems, as, for example when a tidal wave on September 1, 1992, devastated the Pacific coast of Nicaragua, killing 160 and destroying thousands of homes. Given the widespread misery in the country, the considerable political intrigue and maneuvering even within her own government, and the armed resistance of the recontras, it was a significant achievement for Mrs. Chamorro to complete her term of office.
By 1994 a new rightist coalition had coalesced, headed by a "Group of Three" composed of Vice-President Virgilio Godoy, the popular Mayor of Managua Arnoldo Alemán Lacayo, and the President of the National Assembly Alfredo César. Although they failed to overturn Chamorro's government, they succeeded in thwarting her policies. While Mrs. Chamorro continued to enjoy wide support from some businesspeople and intellectuals, their moderate views were increasingly under attack from the right. The best organized of the right-wing parties emerged in 1996 under the leadership of Mayor Alemán. Winning the October 1996 presidential elections, Alemán took office on January 10, 1997.
The new President was a coffee grower, businessman, and the son of a government official under the Somozas. He had suffered property confiscation under the Sandinistas and in 1980 had been jailed for nine months on charges of counterrevolutionary activity. As head of the National Coffee Growers' Association, he built a constituency of support and he won election as mayor of Managua in 1990, with his Liberal Constitutionalist Party (PLC) as part of the UNO alliance. He used that position with great skill to build an effective political machine. Reminiscent of Anastasio Somoza in his effective use of political power, patronage, and graft, he had considerable popular and financial backing by 1996. His PLC became the nucleus of a coalition of Liberal parties, the Liberal Alliance (AL), in effect the successor to Somoza's National Liberal Party, as he made himself the clear leader among anti-Sandinista politicians. He also received substantial financial support from anti-Castro Cubans.
Alemán won 49 percent of the vote to FSLN candidate Daniel Ortega's 38 percent in the initial count, but allegations of massive fraud marred the election and forced the Supreme Electoral Council (CSE) to make a recount. The FSLN complained that U.S. government agents had been involved in the fraud and called for an annulment of the election. Further irregularities occurred during the recount, which gave Alemán 51.03 percent to Ortega's 37.75 percent. Although the AL failed to gain a majority in the Assembly, it led the FMLN there 42 to 37. Nine other parties held the remaining 14 seats, but most tended toward the right, making possible a working majority of 47 in support of President Alemán on specific issues. Despite their defeat, the FSLN greatly improved their position over the 1990 elections. In municipal elections the AL won 90 of the 144 mayorships, including Managua, but the FSLN took 52, up significantly from their 1990 total of only 13.
The return of the Liberals to the presidency paved the way for a full-scale return to neo-liberal
economic and social policy. It represented a sharp turn away from the more centrist policies of
the Conservative Party and of Mrs. Chamorro's government. Nicaraguan politics now became
polarized with both the Liberals and the Sandinistas representing more radical policies on the right
and the left. Alemán's policies stimulated the Nicaraguan economy, as foreign investments and
exports rose. But there was also a rising protest from labor and peasant organizations, as
Nicaragua continued a difficult return from socialism to capitalism. Early in his administration, in
April 1997, the National Farmers and Ranchers Union (UNAG) and other producers' groups
began a strike aimed at forcing his government to renegotiate their debts with the national banking
system. At issue also was the governments efforts to restore land expropriated in the 1980s to the
original owners and Alemán's plan to greatly cut the number of government employees. The
Sandinistas organized widespread anti-government protests and some violence followed. The
crisis prevented Alemán from attending a Central American summit meeting in Guatemala. A
meeting between Ortega and Alemán on April 17 resulted in an agreement by which the
government agreed to honor existing land titles and to limit layoffs of government employees to
3,000, as well as to negotiate the producers' bank debts and to establish commissions to resolve
other disputed issues. Ortega in turn called and end to the strike. It was clear that the Sandinistas
still wielded considerable power in the country and that Alemán would not have a completely free
hand in restructuring the country along capitalist lines. At the same time, the Sandinistas
confirmed their willingness to work within the system as a legal opposition party. Yet the free
elections which the Sandinistas had established in the 1980s, perhaps one of their principal
achievements, now appeared to have been abandoned in favor of the more traditional fraudulent
elections that had characterized the Liberal period since the 1870s.
Much of twentieth-century Central American history reflected the persistence of nineteenth-century liberalism--conservative by today's definitions--among Central American elites, along with the inevitable rise of more moderate, middle-class elements against it. While certain segments of the middle class embraced neo-liberalism, others, along with working-class representatives, rose to challenge it, with the inevitable clashes of working class versus capitalist interests becoming important in Central American politics. The principal failure of liberalism and capitalism in Central America was their failure to reward labor with adequate wages so that prosperity could become more general and expand in a healthy manner. Especially in agriculture, but also in the capital intensive new industries promoted by the Common Market, labor failed to receive a fair share of the gains, and this retarded development of a stronger, consumer-based economy. The continued repression of labor deprived most Central Americans of better standards of living and a more participatory role in their governments. The close relationship of the United States to the old elites was a major force in allowing the repressive policies to continue.
The strength of the old oligarchies and their resistance to social and political modernization failed, nevertheless, to block completely the trend toward social democracy. In all of the states, institutional change occurred through the establishment of social security, public medical services, university expansion and innovation, national development ministries or corporations, labor departments, and agrarian reform. While Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras resisted the structural reforms the left demanded, the pressure of the times brought some concessions and weakened the intransigent position of rightist oligarchies. Yet these oligarchies remained a powerful force. Significant U.S. assistance and fear of Marxist revolution helped to preserve military rule until the 1980s. But the old landholding oligarchies were forced to share political and economic power with the larger middle classes, which came into their own in the mid-twentieth century. By the 1980s these classes played major roles in the economy and politics of every Central American state; it was no longer possible to say that Central America has no significant middle class. The emphasis of the earlier liberal regimes on material development, production, and foreign investment gave way in the 1980s to concern for a broader distribution of wealth and popular participation in government, even though truly free elections are still rare outside of Costa Rica. The recognition of middle-class and working-class voices, both in political decision-making and in the determination of national policy, was part of a trend toward corporatism that changed the nature of twentieth-century Central America. This is why the middle class began to be effective in spite of the fact that elections were often rigged. As it developed institutional strength--in labor unions, universities, political parties, the army, civic organizations, etc.--it has been able to exert pressures on national decision-making. Its strength in these institutions forced concessions from traditionalists on a number of fronts.
At the same time, the military itself became a powerful institution, as high ranking officers gained
economic power, challenging the traditional elites, while retaining the tradition of the fuero
militar, or corporate privileges for the military. The result, especially in Guatemala, El Salvador,
and Honduras, was the rise of various "mafia"-type, extended families often rivaling each other for
control of regions, economic concessions, or privilege. These family-oriented power blocs cannot
be ignored in analyzing modern Central America. They were important in defeating the
progressive revolutions of the 1980s and remain important in the neo-liberal governments that
have come to dominate all of the Central American states. At the same time, new families, both
native and foreign have gained strength from new economic activities, both agricultural and
industrial, making the dominant class in each state both larger and much more complex.
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