at intervals of three to four years, and in some cases six to seven. Forging more sustained links between the American Southwest and the rest of New Spain would require continued efforts over the next three hundred years. The slow progress of colonization and commerce was to have a deep and lasting influence on both Native and Spanish communities throughout this period.

Conflict, Violence, and Warfare in La Florida

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Native people and Spanish expeditions experienced several kinds of conflict in La Florida during the sixteenth century, some of which had roots in the prehistoric past, and some of which were new. Warfare in the Mississippian Southeast emphasized status relations within and between chiefdoms and the acquisition of war trophies rather than territorial conquest, and aboriginal warfare was often shaped by the interests and agendas of individual chiefs and individual towns. Members of Spanish expeditions launched attacks, or threatened violence in some instances, in attempts to acquire food and other resources, to capture slaves, to establish and to maintain Spanish hegemony in La Florida, and to create tributary relationships favorable to Spanish colonial interests. Here, we identify major types of conflict in the sixteenth-century Southeast, and the sources of those conflicts. Then, we consider the aftereffects of conflicts on Native and Colonial societies in the sixteenth-century Southeast, which compounded the problems and challenges posed by climatic developments (see Anderson et al. 1993; Blanton, this volume, 2000; Stahle et al. 1998) and, perhaps, some local cases of disease (see Hutchinson 1990, 2006, this volume; Kelton 2007). The combination of these developments created a “perfect storm” that dramatically altered the geopolitical landscape of the Native American Southeast, and the course of European colonial history in the Americas.

The colonial activities of primary interest here are Spanish entradas led by Juan Ponce de León (1513 and 1521), Lucas Vázquez de Ayllón (1521 and 1526), Pánfilo de Narváez (1527–1536), Hernando de Soto (1539–1543), Tristán de Luna y Arrellano (1559–1561), and Juan Pardo (1566–1568), as well as mid-sixteenth-century attempts by the French to colonize the Southeast.1 The routes and outcomes of these expeditions have been considered elsewhere, and we rely upon those treatments in developing
Conflict of violence to the structure of Mississippian chiefdoms and the cosmology of Native peoples in the Southeast (Dye 2004, 2007; Steponaitis and Knight 2004). The principles of “red” and “white” dualism—that is, dualism between war and peace, and the activities related to them seen in eighteenth-century tribal societies of the Southeast—are thought to have been derived from antecedents in late prehistoric and sixteenth-century chiefdoms (Dye 2009:160). Archaeologists have identified defensive log stockades at many Native American settlements and mound centers in the Southeast (Dye 2009:145–148; Smith 1987; Steinm 1993). The chronicles of Spanish entradas in La Florida record the presence of stout fortifications at numerous towns in eastern Tennessee, in the Central Mississippi valley, and elsewhere (Hudson 1987, 2005). In addition to war clubs, bows and arrows were very effective weapons in the hands of Native American warriors (Dye 2009:156; Hudson 1976:243), and many members of the Soro expedition discarded chain mail armor when an Apalachee archer demonstrated its ineffectiveness at protecting people from well-shot stone-tipped arrows (Ewen 1990:8–89). Spanish soldiers in La Florida carried weapons such as swords, daggers, crossbows, and matchlock guns (or arquebuses). Soro had warhorses and war dogs. Pardo lacked horses, but his sergeant, Hernando Moyano, had a war dog, and a chief of the Chiscas threatened to eat it and to kill Spanish expeditionaries in retaliation for Moyano’s raids on Chisca villages in 1567.

Direct archaeological evidence of conflicts between Native American warriors and Spanish soldiers in La Florida is hard to come by. In contrast to growing knowledge about the sites of battles between the Vázquez de Coronado expedition and warriors from pueblos in the Southwest (Mathers, this volume), archaeological signatures of historically documented conflicts between Spanish soldiers and Native American warriors in La Florida are difficult to pinpoint. The general locations of many conflicts are known with varying degrees of accuracy and precision, but even the site of the epic battle of Mabila has not been identified archaeologically (Knight 2009). On the other hand, the Spanish colonial capital of La Florida, Santa Elena, was burned down in 1576, and archaeologists have found remnants of burned houses and the burned fort at Santa Elena, as well as remnants of the rebuilt fort dating from 1576 to 1587 (South 1988). Attacks by Native American
warriors on Santa Elena followed successful assaults in 1568 on six forts established by the Juan Pardo expeditions, as well as attacks at the southern end of La Florida on Spanish outposts established by colonial governor Pedro Menéndez de Avilés (Hann 2003; Lyon 1976, 1990; Milanch 1996). Our investigations at the Berry site in western North Carolina have identified it as the location of the Native American town of Joara and the Spanish settlement of Fort San Juan, and we think that the five structures we have identified at the site were burned down during or after the attack on the fort (Beck et al. 2006; Hudson 2005; Moore 2002). Other sites offer evidence for conflict between Native groups and Spanish entradas, even if this evidence cannot be directly related to specific historically documented incidents.

The Tarham Mound is one of several burial mounds associated with the Safety Harbor culture in the vicinity of Tampa Bay, close to routes of the Narváez and Soto expeditions (Hutchinson 2006), and in the vicinity of settlements of the group known as the Tocobagas (Hann 2003). Archaeologists have found evidence for dozens of interments in the Tarham Mound, as is typical for burial mounds in that region, and the association of Spanish goods with some of those burials is clear evidence that they postdate early Spanish contact (Mitchem 1990:56). The number of people buried in the Tarham Mound who were killed by disease or by combat with Spaniards is not known with certainty, but at least two individuals at Tarham sustained pre mortem wounds from edged metal weapons, probably Spanish swords (Hutchinson 2006:146–152).

The King site is the location of an aboriginal town in the province of Ulibahali, in northern Georgia, founded shortly after either the Soto or Luna y Arellano expeditions traversed the province of Coosa (Hally 2008). Spanish goods have been found in six burials at King, including an iron sword, three iron celt or chisels, two iron knife blades, one iron wedge, and one iron rod (Hally 2008:222–223). The adult males buried with them may have received them as gifts from members of the Soto or Luna y Arellano expeditions. Known examples of Native chiefs receiving gifts from Spanish entradas include instances when Soto gave the chief of Casqui an iron knife (Hally 2008:46), when Narváez gave brass bells and glass beads to a Native chief in Florida (Hutchinson 2006:11–14), and when Pardo gave the chief of Joara several iron knives (Moore 2002:237). On the other hand, people at King may have acquired Spanish goods through aboriginal trade networks (Waselkov 1989). It is also possible that they acquired these iron tools in battle (Hally 2008:460–462). When Soto visited towns in Ulibahali, there were several instances in which the Spanish soldiers took up arms in the presence of armed warriors from Coosa, but no skirmishes or battles in this particular area were recorded (Hudson 1997:224–229).

**Types of Conflict**

Chronicles of Spanish entradas and settlements in La Florida record at least eight types of conflict during the sixteenth century. These types of conflict include warfare between different Native groups, major battles between Native groups and Spanish expeditionaries, Native raids on Spanish expeditions, raids on Spanish encampments, Native raids on Spanish settlements, combined raids by Native warriors and Spanish soldiers on other Native groups, attacks on Catholic friars living in or near Native settlements, and battles between colonial rivals such as those between the French and Spanish.

One form of conflict includes the hostile receptions and stiff resistance that several Spanish entradas received upon entering a town or a province. Both the Narváez and Soto expeditions were attacked upon approaching the Apalachec province in Florida, and Pardo learned of plans by warriors from Coosa to attack his expedition before they could reach the province of Coosa itself. Even the Ponce de León expedition—the first recorded Spanish reconnaissance of Florida—encountered combative Native warriors, indicating there had already been contact between Native groups and Spanish colonists, such as Spanish slavers from the Caribbean (Hann 2003:113, 133). Preemptive responses by the Apalachec and Coosa to the Soto and Pardo expeditions make some sense, as there had been a history of interaction between those groups and preceding entradas. On the other hand, both Ponce de León and Narváez were the first recorded entradas in southern and northern Florida, respectively. It seems likely that in both of these areas there had been some earlier, unrecorded contacts between Native communities and Spanish or other European groups, perhaps in the form of slaving and slave raids. Ayllón captured slaves in 1521 and 1526 (Hoffman 1994a,
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These events at the southern edge of La Florida involved both small groups and large numbers of people. Likewise, while aboriginal warfare sometimes involved small parties of warriors, large numbers of individuals and materiel were mobilized in some cases. As the Soto expedition traveled through Florida, some Spanish soldiers were killed by Native snipers. Small groups of warriors harassed the Soto expedition at its first and second winter encampments, with sporadic nighttime raids, during which they fired at soldiers, sometimes set fire to structures, and then quickly retreated. By contrast, large numbers of warriors gathered to attack Soto at Mabila (1540), at Chicaça (1541), and at an Alibamó fort in the hinterlands of Chicaça (1541). Hundreds of warriors from Quigualtam pursued the Soto expedition, led by Luis de Moscoso, down the Mississippi River in 1543 in dozens of war canoes. The leaders of some chiefdoms clearly were able to mobilize large numbers of people, but combat also gave warriors chances to earn war honors. It is possible that some instances of attacks on Spanish expeditions gave Mississippian warriors and chiefs opportunities to claim that they bested the Spaniards in battle, or even conquered them.

Major battles between Spanish expeditions and Native American warriors were rare. Exceptions include the epic battle at Mabila in 1540, which greatly affected both Soto’s army and the Native chiefdoms that participated in the battle, as well as the attack on Soto’s winter encampment in Chicaça, just before the expedition was planning to depart in 1541. Other exceptions include the 1567 attack by hundreds of Timucuan warriors on vessels transporting some of Menéndez’s soldiers to Santa Elena, the 1568 uprising during which Pardo’s six forts were attacked and abandoned, and the 1576 uprising during which Santa Elena was attacked and burned by Native American warriors.

Although the outcomes of conflicts between Spanish entradas and Native American warriors had broader geopolitical implications, Native warfare in the Southeast traditionally emphasized status and status relations. Warriors from several chiefdoms pursued common strategic interests in attacking Soto’s army at Mabila in 1540, but this alliance grew in part out of Tascalusa’s attempts to consolidate his own power relative to neighboring chiefdoms such as Talisi and Coosa (Ethridge 2020:26–28; Hudson 1997:230–231). When the Soto expedition was building boats to cross the Mississippi River in 1541, after traversing the
province of Quizquiz, they were visited every day for a month by warriors in two hundred to three hundred canoes from a chiefdom (Aquijo) on the west side of the river (Ehridge 2010:117–118; Hudson 1997:284–285). Warriors shouted at and shot arrows at the soldiers, soldiers fired back from foxholes near the river bluffs, and the fleets of canoes would then leave. These daily attacks, which harassed the soldiers but did not stop them from crossing the river, would have given Native warriors many opportunities to demonstrate participation in warfare. Given the significance of warfare, and the accomplishments of warriors to power and status in the Mississippian world, these daily attacks created theaters for warrior performance. The pursuit of Moscoso’s canoes by hundreds of warriors from Quigualtam in 1543, during which the warriors sang war songs (Hudson 1997:390–394), likewise may have been a stage for warrior performance, even as warriors also drove the remnants of Soto’s expedition out of their territory, and out of the Southeast.

Participation in warfare may have been the main point, in and of itself, from the Native perspective. Individual warriors could claim status from sniper attacks and from participating in sporadic harassment of Soto’s (and, later, Moscoso’s) expedition. Surely the Chicaza knew Soto was planning to decamp as winter gave way to spring in 1541, and warriors attacked the Soto expedition just before they departed, perhaps in an effort to claim that they had driven the Spanish out of Chicaza, after months of alternating diplomacy and conflict (Ehridge 2010:42–56; Hudson 1997:262–270). Soon after the Soto expedition departed Chicaza, they came to a small village called Alibamo, and in searching for food nearby, they encountered a fort with a series of concentric log stockades and hundreds of warriors (Ehridge 2010:56–59; Hudson 1997:271–274). Rather than bypassing this fort, Soto attacked, and the Spanish sustained heavy losses. Once the Spanish drove the Alibamo warriors out of the fort and across the nearby creek, they found that their horses could not cross the creek. There were neither houses nor stores of food inside the fort, which, presumably, was built to lure the Soto expedition into an area in which they were vulnerable. There is no doubt that battles at Chicaza and Alibamo hobbled the Soto expedition, but in these instances, as at Mabila and along the Mississippi River, there were also many chances for individual warriors to earn war honors, for themselves and their towns. Timucuan warriors harassed Menéndez’s forts near the mouth of the St. John’s River in 1567, dramatically affecting the fortunes of these forts (Hann 1996:60) and, again, giving warriors chances to achieve war honors. Timucuan warfare was, more typically, smaller in scale (Hann 1996:103–105), but large numbers of warriors were mobilized for some events, and warriors had chances to display evidence of success in combat during community events in council houses.

In contrast to status-related dimensions of Native American warfare in La Florida, motivations for Spanish participation in warfare were more materialistic. Ponce de León and Ayllón captured slaves and took hostages, and Soto threatened or committed violence to procure food, wealth, porters, and Native women. French colonists who participated in raids with Timucuan warriors on Potano villages in Florida in 1564 and 1565 specifically wanted to kill as many Potano warriors as they could, whereas Native chiefs and warriors were focused primarily on winning a battle against a rival and preparing their home villages for retaliatory raids (Milanich 1996:86). Not long afterward, having sacked the French settlements of Fort Caroline and Charlesfort, Menéndez established St. Augustine and Santa Elena in 1565 and 1566 as part of an effort to stake Spanish claims to La Florida in the aftermath of French exploration and settlement. His first settlement at St. Augustine was attacked by Timucuans, leading him to move St. Augustine to its current location soon afterward. During the 1560s and 1570s, Menéndez’s men periodically launched punitive raids against Native settlements in retaliation for periodic raids on Menéndez’s settlements and soldiers. Much later, in 1587, Sir Francis Drake attacked and burned St. Augustine, contributing to the abandonment of Santa Elena, the first capital of La Florida.

In contrast to violence and threats by many Spanish expeditions in La Florida, Pardo emphasized diplomacy as colonial strategy and practice. His sergeant, Hernando Moyano, however, raided Chicsa villages in 1567 for reasons that are not clearly delineated in documentary sources but which may have been linked to relations between Joara and the Chicsas, as well as the presence of copper and mica in the areas where Chicsa settlements were located (Hudson 2005:26–29).
the desired ends were land, people, metal, food, labor, or combinations thereof, Spanish colonists approached conflict and warfare differently than did Native peoples of the Southeast.

This is not to say there were no material motivations to aboriginal warfare in the Southeast. Members of the Soto expedition participated with Chicaza warriors in attacks on the Chakchiumas in 1541, the results of which were that the major town of the Chakchiumas was burned down and the Chakchiumas resumed paying tribute to the Chicazas (Ethridge 2010:39–41; Hudson 1997:266). Members of the Luna y Arellano expedition aided Coosa in raids on the Nacoches in 1560, for the same reason (Ethridge 2010:62–64; Hudson 2003:102). When Menéndez met with the Calusa chief, Carlos, in 1567, Carlos requested Spanish help in attacking his rival to the north, the chief of the Tocobagas (Hann 2003:103). Menéndez declined, to Carlos’s dismay. Similarly, in 1528, Narváez disappointed a Timucuan chief by not helping him in raids on the Apalachee (Milanich 1996:79). Even in these cases, and although tribute was involved, status relations within and between Native societies were at stake.

Sources of Conflict

The sources of some conflicts in La Florida can be traced back to the late pre-Contact (Mississippian) Period, and other forms of conflict developed in the course of cultural encounters between Native and colonial societies. Warfare was widespread in southeastern North America during the period just before and after early Spanish contact (Cobb and Drake 2008; Cobb and Giles 2009; Dye 1994, 1995, 2002; Lambert 2002; Milner 1999). Warfare shaped the history of major Mississippian mound centers such as Moundville, Cahokia, Etowah, and Spiro, and warrior imagery is present in iconography and material culture at these and other Mississippian centers (Dye 2004; King 2003; Knight 1986; Livingood 2008; Stroponaitis and Knight 2004). In most if not all cases of Mississippian warfare, participants were involved in achieving status and in negotiating power relations between and within societies, rather than eliminating or displacing particular polities. Chiefdoms coalesced and collapsed throughout the Mississippian Southeast, but chiefdoms of varying scales and degrees of centralization dotted the cultural landscape of La Florida for hundreds of years before the Spanish entradas

(Anderson 1994; Beck 2003, 2006; Blitz 1999; Hally 1996, 2006). Cycles of cooperation and conflict, alliance and enmity, and warfare and peace contributed significantly to the history of Mississippian societies. These cycles shaped the Native societies of the Southeast that encountered Spanish expeditions. The history and ideology of Mississippian warfare guided strategic decisions about attacking Spanish colonists and colonial outposts, and about cooperating with or accommodating Spanish colonists and interests. On one hand, Spanish entradas in the Southeast changed everything, for everybody involved, including those only indirectly engaged. On the other hand, historical conditions and cultural practices in the Southeast affected the ways in which Native groups responded to Spanish contact and the situations created by these colonial encounters.

Threats or demands made by Spanish entradas in La Florida were probably the primary impetus for attacks by Native American warriors in some cases. Ponce de León took hostages from villages in southern Florida in 1513, perhaps contributing to the hostility he encountered when he approached Calusa villages (Hann 2003). Aylón captured slaves in coastal Georgia or South Carolina in 1521, undoubtedly ensuring enmity toward his attempted colony five years later (Hoffman 1994a). Narváez captured several Native people during his march from Tampa Bay to the Apalachee province in northern Florida in 1528, which probably led to attacks by Native warriors on the Narváez expedition (Hoffman 1994b; Martinan et al. 1990). Native interactions with the Narváez expedition likely also contributed to the stiff resistance to the Soto expedition upon reaching Apalachee in 1539 (Mitchem 1990). Soto often made demands on Native towns for food, porters, women, and for material wealth such as his expedition found at Cofitachequi (DeFrater 1994). Soto took hostages both for their local intelligence and guidance, and for forcing Native groups to heed demands and threats placed upon them. He took Tascalusa hostage, for example, in advance of the battle that awaited him at Mabila, in 1540 (Hudson 1997:229–232). Not long after Soto demanded porters from Chicaza, in 1541, warriors from Chicaza attacked his winter encampment (Hudson 1997:267–270).

As already noted, it is possible that slave raids by Spanish soldiers, by Native American warriors, or both, affected the geopolitical landscape of La Florida during the 1500s. In the 1600s, slaving activity
had dramatic impacts on Native societies throughout eastern North America (Gallay 2002; Martin 1994). Given that Ayllón captured slaves, that Ponce de León took hostages, and that Spanish slavers were active in the Caribbean during the 1500s, it is not difficult to imagine that the slave trade and forms of warfare that developed along with it may have begun as early as the sixteenth century, although the supporting documentary evidence is not as clear-cut as it is for the slave trade in the 1600s (Ethridge 2006, 2009a, 2009b).

Threats and demands by Spanish entrada, the dynamics of chiefly warfare and rivalries among Mississippian towns and chiefdoms, and periodic shortages of food or other resources were all sources of conflicts in the Southeast during the sixteenth century. Menéndez traveled from Santa Elena to Guale and Orista villages in 1570, in an effort to ease growing tensions that had apparently arisen because of food scarcity and competition for resources in drought conditions. Droughts affected English settlement at Jamestown (Blanton 2000), the Spanish mission at Ajacán (Mallios 2006), and Santa Elena (Anderson et al. 1995; South 1988). When members of the Luna y Arellano expedition reached Coosa in 1560, it was neither as prosperous nor as powerful as it was when the Soto expedition visited in 1540, perhaps in part because of droughts that affected the productivity of farming and the ability of towns and chiefs to store and to mobilize surplus resources. Such developments may help account not only for the decline of Coosa between the Soto and Luna y Arellano expeditions but also, in part, for the apparent plans by Coosa to attack Pardo in eastern Tennessee, in 1567, before Pardo could reach Coosa itself.

Although Pardo placed greater emphasis on diplomacy and gift giving than did preceding Spanish entradas, the Pardo expeditions did lead to conflict. Pardo spoke with the leaders of Native communities and polities and gave them gifts such as iron axes, knives, chisels, wedges, glass beads, cloth, mirrors, and gilded ball buttons (Hudson 2005:134–143). Pardo did develop favorable diplomatic relations with many Native groups through gifting. However, there were places where he did not distribute any gifts, and he may have committed one or more diplomatic errors in what he gave (or did not give) to some chiefs as compared to what he gave to neighbors or to rivals. Supplies of gifts also did not last very long, and if Native people expected that they were forming relations of reciprocity and gift exchange with the Pardo expeditions, which seems likely, they would have been disappointed when provisions ran low and new supplies were not forthcoming, especially during the long periods when Pardo himself was in Santa Elena rather than at his outposts along the northern edge of Florida.

On the other hand, Pardo provisioned those forts with what supplies he could (Hudson 2005:141–153). All six forts were built at Native American towns. His primary outpost, Fort San Juan, was built beside the town of Joara, in the western North Carolina Piedmont (Beck et al. 2006). It is not clear whether Native people frequented those forts or the houses built for Spanish soldiers, but they may have, and whether or not they did, they must have known that supplies were stored at Pardo’s forts. Spanish material culture from Santa Elena includes weaponry, hardware, metal tools, pottery, scrap copper, glass beads, and other artifacts (South et al. 1988); very similar artifacts have been found at the Berry site, the location of Pardo’s Fort San Juan (Beck et al. 2006). Such items probably were highly valued by the people of Joara and other towns in La Florida (Smith 1987; Waselkov 1989). Native people, especially warriors whose status depended upon war honors and tangible markers of their accomplishments, may have perceived the supplies known to be (or thought to be) stored at Pardo’s forts as prestige goods, or war trophies, or even gifts that Native people thought they deserved in exchange for supporting Spanish garrisons and building houses for them. There are no historically known cases in which goods were stolen from Pardo’s forts, but there are many instances in which Native people asked for gifts from Pardo himself.

During his talks with Native leaders, Pardo requested that Native groups build houses and set aside food (primarily maize) for his soldiers (Hudson 2005:144–146). It was common practice for Spanish expeditions to ask for or demand food from Native towns. Leaders of Spanish expeditions quickly learned to travel trails connecting large and powerful Native towns, where they could find large stores of food and powerful chiefs who could give them what they wanted or needed. Many entradas placed demands on towns they visited only briefly. By contrast, members of the Pardo expeditions lived for prolonged periods at Joara and other Native towns, and demands they made were placed on a single community, rather than on a series of towns for shorter intervals.
At first, favorable relations developed between Pardo and Native towns at the northern edge of La Florida. Talks took place and gifts were given, houses and forts were built, and Pardo became part of networks of chiefly tribute and diplomacy that were already in place. Fort San Juan was first built in January 1567, and by May 1568 news reached Santa Elena that Pardo’s forts had been sacked and abandoned. Little is recorded in documentary sources about what transpired during attacks on Pardo’s forts (which may have been burned down after soldiers were lured out of them), nor about whether attacks on different forts were part of a coordinated effort or even a revitalization movement, like the 1680 Pueblo Revolt in New Mexico (Liebmann 2008b; Liebmann et al. 2005; Preucel 2002). Perhaps inspired by these and other attacks in 1568, Native American warriors sacked and burned Santa Elena in 1576.

The “perfect storm” that ruined Pardo’s forts and Menéndez’s plans for settling La Florida and developing an overland route to the Spanish silver mines at Zacatecas was shaped by cultural, historical, and climatic trends. By 1568, there had been more than fifty years of Spanish exploration in La Florida and a long history of conflict and instability created by Spanish entradas. By 1568, there would have been few people still alive who had experienced what life was like before Spanish contact. Native people had learned that Spanish entradas could alter the fortunes of specific Mississippian chiefdoms and towns, for better or worse. Despite Pardo’s emphasis on diplomacy, Moyano’s raids on Chicsa villages and his entry into the province of Chiaha contributed to regional instability and the vulnerability of Pardo’s forts. Despite Pardo’s emphasis on gift giving and alliance making, he could not sustain the stream of gifts to Native chiefs. Pardo specifically forbade any of his soldiers from bringing Native women into Fort Santiago, at the town of Guatari, when the fort was built in early 1568 (Hudson 2005:150–152), and there is some indication in documentary sources that soldiers at Fort San Juan committed improprieties with Native women from Joara during Pardo’s long absence in 1567 (Hudson 2005:175–177). Pardo and his garrisons were dependent on local Native groups for at least some food (Hudson 2005:176), and, meanwhile, droughts and other unfavorable climatic conditions may have posed considerable challenges to chiefs in collecting and mobilizing surplus resources to support Spanish forts at the northern edge of La Florida (Anderson et al. 1995; Blanton, this volume; Worth, this volume). It is likely that the chief or chiefs of Joara (as well as those of other towns) saw some benefit in forming alliances with Pardo—the power of Joara seems to have grown as the chiefdom of Cofitachequi waned during the years after the Soto expedition, and an alliance with Pardo probably bolstered Joara’s hegemony (Beck 2009). Just as an alliance with Pardo was probably in Joara’s interests in late 1566, the conquest of Fort San Juan (and the sacking of Pardo’s other forts) probably served the interests of Joara and those of other towns whose warriors participated (Beck et al. 2011). Pardo’s forts, the houses and storehouses built for him, the goods stored at them, and Pardo’s men themselves may all have been perceived by Native warriors as war trophies.

Aftermath of Entradas

After the Pardo expeditions, the focus of Spanish colonialism in La Florida shifted to missionization and trade (Hann 1994; Hann and McEwan 1998; McEwan 1993; Worth 1994, 1998a,b). The colony was unable to sustain settlements along the frontiers of La Florida, and efforts were concentrated instead on settlements in Florida and neighboring areas of coastal Georgia (Milanich 1996; Thomas 1988). The inability, in the long run, for the La Florida colony to maintain a permanent presence north of modern Florida and Georgia created an opening for later French and English exploration and settlement of the Southeast. Had the Spanish found gold or silver (gold was discovered in Georgia and in North Carolina in the 1600s), had they built the road to Zacatecas, had Santa Elena and Fort San Juan endured, the English settlements at Roanoke and Jamestown may have had a very different history. What happened to towns and chiefdoms in La Florida in the wake of Spanish entradas? What impacts did conflicts with Spanish expeditions have on Native societies?

Some groups, such as Cofitachequi and Coosa, experienced diminishing power and prosperity in the aftermath of the Soto expedition (DePratter 1994; Hally 1994; Smith 1987, 2000), but others, like Joara, may have risen in status and prestige, at least temporarily (Beck 2009). Joara was still a major town, if not a powerful polity, in the early 1600s (Moore 2002:29–31), and some form of chiefly hierarchy endured at Cofitachequi through the 1600s (Beck 2009:136). Casqui benefited
from an alliance with Soto in its rivalry with Pacaha, but there is some indication that Pacaha retaliated and raided Casqui after the Soto expedition left the Central Mississippi valley (Jeffrey Mitchem, personal communication 2009). Although many Native people were killed in conflicts with Spanish colonists during the sixteenth century, damage to the social fabric of Native communities was probably greater, and participation of Native warriors in conflicts with Spanish entradas probably had effects on status relations within Native societies that went unnoticed and unrecorded by Spanish chroniclers. Spanish contact changed the conditions from those in which Mississippian culture had developed, and conflicts within and between Native groups in La Florida compounded the effects of direct conflict and combat between Native American groups and Spanish expeditions.

Chiefdoms of La Florida were dynamic social and political formations. For several hundred years before Spanish contact, chiefdoms had formed, had reached their respective peaks, and had declined, in cyclical patterns. Centers of chiefly power shifted across the landscape, and relative statuses of Mississippian mound centers waxed and waned. Despite instability in individual chiefdoms, and despite variation in their structure of leadership and spatial extent, the general form of Mississippian chiefdoms endured. Spanish entradas and the conflicts sparked by them contributed to changes in the fortunes and status of individual chiefdoms (including the decline of Coosa and the rise of Joara), but they also led to the collapse of chiefdoms as a viable and a sustainable form of social and political organization. Mississippian chiefdoms experienced warfare, changes in trade networks, changes in environmental conditions, and changes in the capacity of chiefs and towns to mobilize surpluses, but chiefdoms had endured (Hally 2006). Spanish contact, on the other hand, created cycles of conflict and other conditions from which those chiefdoms could not recover in traditional forms, leading to the coalescence of the confederacies and tribal societies present during the eras of French and English exploration and settlement in the 1600s and 1700s (Ehrtridge 2006, 2009a, 2009b).

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NATIVE AND SPANISH NEW WORLDS
SIXTEENTH-CENTURY ENTRADAS IN THE AMERICAN SOUTHWEST AND SOUTHEAST

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