I. THE POLITICAL-ECONOMY OF PROTECTION

A. Domestic Political Economy


a. Overviews


b. Legislative Structure, Process, and General Political Economy

(1) The Classic Tariff System


(2) The Smoot-Hawley Tariff

(a) Political Economy


(b) How High Was the Smoot-Hawley Tariff?


(c) Macroeconomic Consequences of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff


(3) The RTAA and the Transition to the Modern System


(4) The Modern Trade Policy System


  **c. Administrative Structure and Process**


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   a. Comparative Studies


b. Britain


c. Canada


d. Germany


e. France

3. Comparative Institutional Analysis

a. Japan


b. **Australia**


c. European Countries and the EC


**d. East Asian NICs**


(1) Mostly Taiwan


(2) Mostly Korea


e. Latin America


4. Empirical Studies on the Political Economy of Protection

a. Correlates of Interindustry Variation in Protection


b. Regulation Theory: Partial Equilibrium Models of Endogenous Protection

(1) Theoretical Framework

(a) General Papers on Regulation Theory


(b) Regulation Theoretic Approaches to Trade Policy


(2) Empirical Findings


c. Explaining Legislative Votes on Protection

(1) General Trade Legislation


(2) NAFTA

d. Explaining Administered Protection Outcomes

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(5) Comparative Analysis


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d. Macroeconomic Conditions and Protection

(1) Tariff Protection


(2) Administered Protection


5. Endogenous Tariff Theory

a. Surveys/Overviews


b. Deriving Agent Preferences


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c. The Organization of Interests


**d. Equilibrium Policy Choice: Levels**

(1) Lobbying


(2) Voting


(3) Partisan Competition with Probabilistic Voting


(4) Influence-driven Contributions


c. Equilibrium Policy Choice: Instruments


f. Equilibrium Policy Choice: The Role of Foreign Interests


  g. *Equilibrium Policy Choice: The Role of State-Society Relations*


6. *International Structures and the Domestic Politics of Trade*


**B. International Political Economy**

1. **The Optimum Tariff with Retaliation and Trade War**

  a. *The Basic Analysis*


b. Quotas


2. Political-Economy of Trade Conflict


a. Textiles and Apparel


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b. Steel


(1) Basic Economics of Steel Production and Trade


(2) Consequences of Steel Protection


(3) Domestic Political-Economy of Steel: US


(4) EC Steel Policy and US-EC Steel Conflict


(5) Japanese Steel Policy and the US-Japan Steel Conflict


### c. Automobiles

(1) General Analysis of Auto Industry


(2) Microeconomic Analysis of the Auto Industry


(3) International Competition and the US Auto Industry


(4) Effects of Trade Policy on the US Auto Industry

(a) Welfare Costs


(b) Costs of Protection with Monopolistic Competition and Quality Upgrading


(c) Oligopolistic Competition


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c. Semiconductors and Computers


3. The Macro Political-Economy of Economic Power and Policy Compliance

a. General


  b. Against the (now “former”) Soviet Union


  c. Against South Africa


  (1) International Aspects


(2) Domestic Aspects


4. Political Power and Trade Structure


5. Imperialism, Neoliberalism and Political-Economic Domination


6. Trade, War and Peace

   a. Economic Interdependence and Political Conflict


b. Regime Type, Economic Interdependence and Political Conflict


II. THE POLITICAL-ECONOMY OF LIBERALIZATION

A. Interdependence: Theory, Measurement and Political Economy

1. The Measurement of Interdependence


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2. Theoretical Analysis of Political Implications of Economic Interdependence


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a. Unilateral Reform of Tariffs


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b. Unilateral Reform of Trade and Domestic Taxes


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C. Multilateral Liberalization

1. Liberalization with Price-Taking Firms


2. Liberalization with Imperfect Competition


3. Strategic Analysis of Liberalization

a. Bargaining and Trade Bargaining


b. On Issue Linkage in General and in Trade Policy

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c. Basic Analysis

(1) Static Models


(2) Repeated Game Models


d. PD Games, Repeated Play and Absolute v. Relative Gains in Bargaining


c. Empirical Evaluation of Strategic Models
Asymmetric Information and Strategic Equilibrium

1. Self-Enforcing Agreements with Stochastic Shocks

   a. Economic (i.e. Terms of Trade or Trade Volume) Shocks


   b. Political Shocks


(2) Equilibria with Asymmetric Information, or Uncertainty, about Type


4. Institutional Foundations of the Trading Order

a. General

(1) Overviews: Historical, Legal, and Institutional


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(2) Analytical Overviews


b. MFN/Non-Discrimination

(1) Descriptive and Policy Analyses


(2) Analytical Issues


c. Reciprocity

(1) Descriptive and Policy Issues


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(2) Analytical Issues


**d. Special and Differential Treatment for LDCs**

1. Theoretical Foundations of Arguments for S&D


2. Economic Analysis of GSP


(3) Political-Economy of GSP/NIEO


c. Dispute Resolution

(1) Institutional and Legal Analysis


(2) Formal theory


(3) Statistical and Econometric Analyses


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6. The Domestic Economic Effects of Liberalization


7. The Domestic Politics of Trade Liberalization

a. Mainly Historical/Institutional Analysis


b. Mainly Formal Theoretical Analysis

(1) Endogenous Policy Approach
(a) Theory


(b) Applications


(2) Unmodeled Economies and “Two-Level Games”
(a) Some Theory


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(b) Some Applications


8. “Ideas” and Ideology in Trade Policy

a. Domestic Doxastic/Epistemic Communities


b. Transnational Doxastic/Epistemic Communities


### c. Doxastic Communities in General


D. Regional Integration and Preferential Trading Systems

1. Overview/Surveys on Regional Integration


2. Regionalization of International Trade

a. The Effect of Preferential Trade Agreements on Intra-Union Trade


b. The Effect of Preferential Trade Agreements on World Trade Patterns


3. Integration with Price-Taking Firms

   a. The Vinerian Approach

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d. The Kemp-Wan Theorem


4. Customs Unions with Imperfect Competition

a. Customs Unions with Labor Unions


b. Customs Unions with Economies of Scale


c. Customs Unions with Monopolistic Competition


d. **Customs Unions with Oligopolistic Firms**

(1) Partial Equilibrium Studies


5. Multilateral Tax Harmonization and Economic Integration

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   a. Social Policy and the “Race to the Bottom”


  b. Regional Labor Markets and Integration


  c. Integration and the Endogenous Emergence of Cores and Peripheries


d. Regionalization or Convergence in the EU


7. Political-Economy of Integration

a. Integration Experience

   (1) General Discussions


   (2) The EC Case


(3) The NAFTA Case


b. **Formal Theories of the Internal Political Economy of Integration**


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